

## EPILOGUE

The present study was designed and conducted shortly after the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao team succeeded the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin regimes with a singular emphasis on economic growth, in 2003. Although there was no fundamental change in their vision of reform, compared with their predecessors, the Hu–Wen administration became more aware of the widespread discontent resulting from the state’s excessive emphasis on economic development to the neglect of people’s livelihoods and social well-being, which had intensified social tensions and conflicts. In the third plenary of the 16th CPC Congress in October 2003, Hu for the first time raised the notion of “the human oriented” (*yi ren wei ben*), “coordinated and sustainable development” (*xie tiao de ke chi xu fa zhang*), and of “harmonious society” (*he xie she hui*), attempting to shift the attention of the CPC from “things” (*wu*) to “human beings” (*ren*) in China’s development strategies. The Hu–Wen administration also took a series of measures to improve the lives of ordinary people, such as policies that would encourage enterprises to hire, free employment services, subsidies for job training, oversight of rural migrant workers’ pay, the 2008 new Labor Law designed to protect workers’ rights, exemption from agricultural tax, and an emergency fund for poor rural and urban families whose family members suffered from major diseases. Meanwhile, the party-state had launched anti-corruption campaigns, emphasizing the CPC’s service to the public and people (*li dang wei gong, zhi zheng wei min*). Yet, the

social problems described above, although reduced, persisted against the background of the continuing privatization of enterprises and marketization of medical, housing, educational, and childcare services. Under the Hu–Wen leadership, official corruption was also not curtailed, owing to the ineffectiveness of senior leaders and their lack of determination to address the problem.

Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang came to power in 2012 with another smooth transition in top leadership. The Xi–Li administration is closely aligned with the political ideology of the CPC, with its dominant leadership and market-reform, open-door economic policies. They have not only vowed to continue with multiple ownerships but also to upgrade the role of markets in the regulation of daily economic activity from a “basic role” (*ji chu xing zuo yong*) to a “decisive role” (*jue ding xing zuo yong*), announced by Xi Jinping in his speech to the Third Plenary of the 18th CPC Congress. Interestingly, the purpose is not to have markets dominate all economic activities but to prevent the state from direct involvement in resource allocation so as to reduce the possibility of abuse of power as well as to ensure fair competition among economic enterprises in market conditions, which Li Keqiang (2015) terms “the government’s revolution on itself” (*zheng fu zi wo ge ming*). The state should act as a “visible hand” to regulate and manage the “invisible hand” of markets at the macro level. Unlike Western market societies where the government is often perceived as being in opposition to market forces, the current Chinese administration sees the two as complementing each other in sustainable and healthy development. The logic behind this presumed state–market compatibility is not the interest of capital but the livelihood of the masses, according to the party-state. Extending on Hu’s notion of “the human oriented,” Xi called for “the people oriented” (*yi min wei ben*) in governance. In a speech as early as November 2012, Xi stated: “Our people love life; they are longing for better education, more stable jobs, more satisfied income, more reliable social security, better quality health care services, more comfortable living conditions, and a better environment. Moreover, they want their children to grow up well, work well, and live well. People’s expectations of a good life is our goal” (Xi 2014, p. 108). Xi has made similar speeches on many occasions (2015). The most recent version of the CPC Constitution (2012, p. 19), reminiscent of its earlier versions, reiterates that the party must “serve the people wholeheartedly. The CPC has no special interests of its own apart from the interests of the working class and of the broadest masses of the people.” According to the Xi–Li administration, so-called

sustainable economic development will make sense only when all people's lives are improved.

To make their promise into a reality, the Xi–Li team's leadership style seems somewhat different from those of their reform predecessors. First, they are more determined to take the unique Chinese pathway founded on long-standing Chinese culture and experience, including those of the CPC in the past. Instead of being critical of China's earlier belief systems and practices, the leadership of this generation considers Chinese traditional culture the “root” and the “soul” of the Chinese; therefore, they point to the “confidence in the Chinese road, theory, and system” of China's self-proclaimed “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Xi 2015, p. 22). In his 2013 visit to Confucius' home town, Xi advocated promoting Chinese culture as a vital condition for China's “great revitalization” (*wei da fu xing*). Xi said (2014, p. 100): “We can only have a future if we know where we came from; we can only be more innovative if we are good at [cultural] inheritance.”

Second, for that reason, the Xi–Li administration relies much more on the traditional wisdom and practice of the CPC than on Western models in developing its governance strategies. One of the visions that they wish to revive is that of “state–family integration.” They believe in mutual dependence between Chinese families and the state for a prosperous and stable family life and for a strong nation, and they similarly believe in the primacy of national strength in determining family well-being (Xi 2014). In addition, although the Xi–Li administration emphasizes more than ever the rule of law, they also stress the importance of the morality-bound rule of benevolence (*de zhi*) that requires the ruler to be mindful of the people's interests. In his 2015 Report on the Work of the Government, Li laid out in detail a plan for improving people's lives in the areas of employment, education, housing, and health care. In other aspects of governance, the Xi–Li team reminds the Chinese of the CPC's historical mission as the vanguard of the working class, its glorious tradition of promoting thrifty work and lifestyle, the Chinese democracy of the masses that allows common people's voices to be heard and implemented through a democratic centralized system of “from the masses, to the mass line,” criticism and self-criticism extending to CPC cadres, as well as the example set by the CPC leadership in promoting state agendas and in self-discipline (Xi 2015). To the Xi–Li administration, much of Chinese traditional culture provides the government and people not only with wisdom and guidance, but, more important, a main moral source of socialist core values

and a cultural foundation for the Chinese in the current world of cultural turmoil. As Xi points out: “We would have spiritual lifeblood cut if we abandoned our tradition—our fundamentals” (Xi 2015, p. 164). For that reason, in addition to the emphasis on the rule of law, Xi (2015) urges all CPC officials to take the lead in removing formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, and extravagance, starting with themselves.

Third, the Xi–Li administration sees the post-market reform as a continuity rather than a negation of the Maoist socialist enterprise of the state-socialist period.<sup>1</sup> To them, denying the first 30 years of China’s socialist experiment is not only factually wrong but also politically dangerous. Learning from historical lessons both domestically and internationally, they understand that to remove a kingdom or a country, it is necessary for someone to erase its history first. To this administration, negating the first 30 years of the Maoist state-socialist program is tantamount to fundamentally challenging the legitimacy of the CPC rule, which they are part of, and is not acceptable.

Finally, the current administration begins to emphasize “fairness” (*gong ping*) and “justice” (*zheng yi*), the concepts abandoned in earlier years of the reform. They seem determined: the economic gains of the reform must “benefit everyone,” implying that the rapidly growing social inequality of the past 30 years in China is unjust, and economic growth must be sustainable and healthy (Xi 2015, p. 96).

Compared to the Hu–Wen administration, the Xi–Li team seems equally good at passing laws, regulations, and policies but much more effective at implementing them. Two recent examples concern the well-being of disadvantaged social groups. On 8 July 2015, the State Council announced that financial support to poverty-stricken college students would be strengthened by reducing their loan interest, increasing the pay-back period of their loans, and providing funding for poor student-loan takers who became either physically or mentally disabled upon graduation.<sup>2</sup> At its cabinet meeting on 22 July 2015 the State Council decided to widen the coverage of medical insurance to the entire country by the end of the year. The decision was made to help the tens of thousands of people in both rural and urban areas who are in serious financial need due to chronic disease or serious illness (Zhang 2015).

In the area of cracking down on official corruption, I learned it in 2014, after the “Eight-Point Rules”—an anti-bureaucracy, anti-corruption, and anti-extravagance measure published by the 18th Central Politburo—that by December 2012, many up-market restaurants were forced to close due

to the rapidly declining numbers of customers, which had not been seen before since the reform. As I attended academic conferences and visited my relatives and friends during the summers of 2013 to 2015, many of the expenses of government officials or scholars were no longer covered by public funds or individuals' grants; other items had to go through tight accounting scrutiny before being approved. Conference dinners were allowed only when provided by catering services within the walls of the hosting institution rather than a restaurant. Effectiveness in policy implementation is also evidenced by the persistence of policy enforcement. In one of his speeches to the Central Disciplinary Committee—the CPC's top anti-graft body—Xi stressed (2015, p. 386): “The keys to anti-corruption and promoting honest governance are ‘frequent’ (*chang*) and ‘long-term’” (*chang*). Between December 2012 and January 2015, the central government published 35 regulations and measures concerning honest governance of the party-state, which mainly focus on five aspects: management and supervision of government officials; the example to be set by government officials; the promotion of thrift in daily operations; rules on business expenses; and the prohibition of gift giving using public funds (People's Press 2015). One policy I have been following is that of central inspection tours beginning in 2013. This is an oversight measure that the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission has designed to crush official corrupt behavior and practice in government agencies and state-owned, now called centrally owned, enterprises. The way that government agencies and centrally owned enterprises are selected has evolved from random to targeted selection driven by problems either detected by central government or notified via tip-off hotlines. The length of an inspection has also been doubled to two months since 2013; a unit can be inspected more than once in a short period of time, depending on the seriousness of the problems; and follow-up inspections can be done without notifying the targeted institution in advance. Seven rounds of major central inspections of over 30 state agencies and centrally owned firms had been conducted as of the end of June 2015 while I was finishing the writing of this book; more than 200 high-ranking administrators were found guilty of corruption and disciplined. Wang Qishan, the head of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission, emphasized at a meeting in February 2015 “have the inspection sword hang high over [officials'] heads and the deterrence be forever present.” According to a more recent report by the CPC's top anti-graft body, 19,000 officials were reprimanded for violating frugality rules in the first six months of 2015, which brought the total

number of those punished since late 2012 to more than 120,000. But the 2015 figure was a significant drop from the year before, when more than 71,000 officials were punished, signaling that the “Eight-Point Rules” introduced in 2013 were taking effect (*China Daily* 2015). At central level, the fall of the three highest-ranking officials—Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo, Xu Caihou, the vice chairman of the Central Military Committee and a member of the Central Politburo, and Ling Jihua, the vice chairman of the 12th Political Negotiation Committee—seemed a good illustration of the commitment made by the current administration to crack down on official corruption.

The ideological orientation and political efforts that the Xi–Li team have been making seem to demonstrate their commitment to China’s continuing socialist experiment. Compared to the former Soviet Union and other former socialist nations, China always articulates the market economy as a way of reaching its socialist goals of economic advancement and high living standards for all members of society (Lin 2006). If so, this may lend support to Lin Chun’s argument (2006, p. 283): socialism in China, “after being made and unmade, could still be remade.” This seems to make sense as China’s market reform has paid a high social and environmental price for the fast economic growth it has achieved, which forces the country to keep searching for alternative pathways. Moreover, the ongoing internal and external challenges that endanger the stability of the nation and the CPC regime also compel the party-state to remain on a socialist course. External challenges include a hostile international environment that the party-state sees as a threat to China’s sovereignty. Internally, the downward trend of economic growth coupled with widespread discontent about huge inequality and ethnic conflicts has raised the CPC’s concerns about the legitimacy of its rule. Based on the CPC’s 90-plus years of history and experience, the current administration is well aware that the CPC would not have taken hold of China’s political landscape without the long-standing support of the masses. Metaphorically, CPC–people relations have been long articulated as those of flesh and blood in the CPC discourse. As Xi (2015, p. 387) similarly points out: “If we did not make correction of our unhealthy leadership style, it would be just like a wall erupting between our party and our people. Our party would then lose the foundation, the blood, and the strength.” Therefore, “people’s support of the CPC is concerned with the life and death of the party” (Xi 2015, p. 368). This prompts the CPC to want to represent the broadest masses again.

On the other hand, this administration's dance between capitalist and socialist roads also reveals contradictions in their rhetoric and policies, given the incompatibility of socialist principles and market logic found in the present and previous studies. More specifically, first, China's continued privatization has put 48% of urban workers in the hands of the private sector which is also a main source of informal employment (Park and Cai 2011). This contradicts directly the state's people-oriented ideology. In practice, this also implies likely continued labor commodification and the lack of a safety net for millions of workers in the private sector. Second, it is well known that market competition will eventually lead to monopoly which may undermine markets' ability to set open, fair, and correct prices for commodities or services that the party-state desires. Moreover, markets coupled with privatization may inevitably lead to concentration of capital and thus further widen gaps between the haves and have-nots. This may destroy the party-state's original intention of getting rich together. Third, there is a contradiction between the state's need for the frugal use of natural resources for sustainable economic development and the same state's desire to encourage consumption in order to stimulate economic growth under market conditions. Without resolving this contradiction, consumers' market-stimulated needs for more consumption (e.g. constant upgrading of durable goods or the purchase of branded consumer products) may be confounded with people's needs for a better life (e.g. affordable health care, housing, education, and childcare), resulting in more extravagance, depletion of natural resources, and/or environmental contamination. Fourth, in the 14th meeting of the Central Leadership Team of Comprehensive and Deepening Reform on 1 July 2015, Xi Jinping required all centrally owned cultural enterprises to give priority to social benefits and social values in production and, in the meantime, combine economic with social benefits. But the parameters of social values are often incompatible with economic ones, for example the cultural value of a product for society as a whole as opposed to its exchange value for an enterprise. Similar contradictions may be seen in the areas of education, health care, housing, and childcare in which free or low-cost services may enhance family well-being and bring broader social benefits; such practice will surely reduce the economic gains of the above-mentioned industries if they are run by the private sector. Finally, although the state is taking various measures to crack down on official corruption, it has yet to eliminate market conditions that tend to aggravate corrupt behaviors such as rent seeking, private embezzlement of public funds, nepotism, and favoritism.

Bearing in mind the ambiguity of the term “socialist market economy,” my question is this: is it wishful thinking to successfully remake socialism in China by expanding the private sector, allowing the accumulation of capital, and maintaining market mechanisms? Compared with many market societies, the only logic of a negative answer to my question that I can think of is, paradoxically, the centralized leadership in China. The CPC as the dominant ruling party, authoritarian as it may be, has the advantage of rising above the fray of various interest groups and has incentives to balance them out and even channel those differing interests towards the common good. In this case, the CPC’s legitimacy is judged by the extent of its popular support rather than the support of interest groups through multi-party competitions. Popular support in the Chinese context does not refer to a simple numerical majority but to working-class people, who always constitute the overwhelming majority of the population, as opposed to capital which tends to be controlled by a handful of people. The CPC’s legitimacy would be called into question once it stopped representing the working class. As the dominant party, the CPC could push through policies that would benefit working-class people without having to go through endless political wrangling with other parties, as several cases in the present study have shown. To take another stark example, in the face of a sharp fall in the Chinese stock market since mid-June 2015, the central government swiftly coordinated a number of activities to stabilize the stock market and save nearly 100 million small stock holders at least temporarily during the short period between 7 July and 21 July 2015. First, the Ministry of Finance took the lead, pledging to hold onto its blue-chip shares; they also urged centrally owned enterprises not to sell shares in which they had a controlling interest and even encouraged them to purchase more shares. It further supported the development of state-owned financial firms so that they could provide services to the real economy. Meanwhile, the People’s Bank—the Central Bank of China—injected 35 billion yuan into the money market through open operations to reverse the nose-diving pattern of the stock market. The Ministry of Public Security also made a concerted effort to crack down on illegal behaviors, such as insider trading and malicious selling. All three branches of government called on financial institutions and major stock holders to be “responsible stock holders,” “shoulder social responsibility,” and “protect medium and small share holders’ legal rights and benefits.” Following the actions of the state, the Security Association of China and the Insurance Association of China, two government-affiliated institutions, established specific policies

prohibiting large stock holders from selling stocks and raising the costs of selling them until the stock market stabilized. Other government-affiliated financial institutions all followed suit. For instance, the state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, the state assets regulator, urged 112 centrally owned enterprises to buy more shares in their own firms, and it prohibited major shareholders and senior executives of listed companies from selling stocks in their own firms for at least six months. As a result, the stock market began to recover at the end of the week of July 10.

Another advantage of the CPC is its enormous mobilizing capacity given its omnipresent political structure and grassroots political networks, as well as state-controlled economic, cultural, and other political resources accumulated from its revolutionary and socialist past. It has the ability, when properly done, to substantially increase the efficiency of governance of a large country like China through good planning and unified ideology. As I was writing this section, I learned from China Central Television (CCTV) news that the CPC Central Committee had called a national conference of the party-affiliated mass organizations, such as the Labor Union of China, the Communist Youth League of China, All-China Women's Federation, and others, in early July 2015. This was the first time in the CPC's history that it had organized a mass conference. Xi wasted no time tapping into these resources, asking these organizations to help unite the 1.36 billion Chinese around the party for what he saw as a great common cause of the party and of the people.

Finally, the CPC has a long history of criminalizing undisciplined or corrupt members, especially those in leadership positions, to protect the party's unity, strength, and legitimacy. The most prominent cases range from the classic death penalties for Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan, two high-ranking state officials found guilty of embezzlement in the early 1950s, to the life sentence pronounced on Zhou Yongkang, mentioned earlier. The Xi-Li administration has vowed repeatedly since coming to power to "strictly manage and discipline the party." If the CPC can successfully continue this tradition, it might help increase the odds on its surviving the test of the ongoing market transition.

Given the 90-plus years of the CPC's persistent pursuit of socialist ideals and 60-plus years of China's socialist experiment, there is still a possibility that socialism in China will develop further with Chinese characteristics. According to a recent statistical report by Wang Baoan, the head of the Statistical Bureau of China, there was coordinated income and

economic growth in the first half of 2015. During this period, there was an economic growth rate of 7%; income grew at the slightly higher rate of 9%. Net income growth was 7.8% after taking into account inflation. Employment was 7.18 million, completing 71.8% of the national plan during first half of 2015. By comparison, unemployment was under control at 5.1%. Wang attributed these achievements to macro-level adjustment and the greater power released to markets.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the continued and widespread processes of privatization and capital accumulation, and the financialization of capital at both global and domestic levels may make the Chinese socialist road a very bumpy one. Whether the party-state can survive globalization and where it will lead China if it does remains to be seen.

## APPENDIX: SOURCES OF DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS

The present study takes a qualitative approach for an in-depth understanding of women's changing experience with work and family in urban areas under China's socialist transitions since its 1949 communist revolution. My primary source of data is narratives from married individuals of the revolutionary, Mao-era, and post-Mao cohorts.

In the summers of 2000 and 2003, I interviewed 80 married individuals, who were all above the age of 69 in 2000 and lived in the city of Beijing. To enable various voices to be heard, I used three strategies to ensure diversity in sampling. I began by working with four residential committees in three different urban districts in Beijing, who recommended and introduced prospective informants. In the meantime, I obtained interviews through relatives, friends, and acquaintances. The final strategy was to approach prospective informants myself in neighborhoods and parks in Beijing. I finally obtained similar numbers of individuals from the different strategies that I employed (27 from the first two and 33 from the last one). The sample also covers a wide spectrum of demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic attributes, summarized in Table A.1.

The sample includes 31 women, 11 men, and 19 couples, totaling 80 married individuals, or 61 marriages. Forty-two of the marriages were represented by one informant and 19 by two informants. The informants originally came from 14 provinces in both rural and urban areas upon marriage; the youngest informant was 70 years old and the oldest was

**Table A.1** Social and demographic characteristics of female informants of revolutionary cohort (N=80)

	Total (80 persons/59 marriages)		Females (50 persons)		Males (30 persons)	
	Value (%)	Mean	SD*	Value (%)	Mean	SD
I. Marriages						
Marital status						
(persons)						
Married	47(59)					
Widowed	25(31)					
Divorced	1(1)					
Remarried	4(5)					
Recovered marriage	2(3)					
Length of marriage		53	8.9			
Number of children		3.8	1.7			
Child care						
Wife	35(60)					
Parents/daycare/ other	22(37)					
Wife and her mother	2(3)					
II. Individuals						
Age				76	5.1	4.2
Ethnicity						
Han				42(84)		27(90)
Hui				6(12)		2(7)
Manchurian				2(4)		1(3)
Self-identified class prior to 1949						

Very poor or poor	24(48)	15(50)
Between poor and rich	17(34)	7(23)
Rich or very rich	9(18)	8(27)
Education		
(Semi-) illiterate	31(62)	10(34)
Elementary	4(8)	4(13)
High school	10(20)	10(33)
College	5(10)	6(20)
Employment		
Government officials	7(14)	7(23)
Professionals	5(10)	6(20)
White-collar workers	4(6)	3(10)
State/collective-enterprise workers	8(16)	14(47)
Neighborhood-enterprise workers	6(12)	0
Temporary workers	11(22)	0
Never employed	9(18)	0
Party affiliation		
CCP	8(16)	9(30)
GMD	0	1(3)
None	42(84)	20(67)
Place of birth		
Rural	22(44)	14(47)
Urban	28(56)	16(53)

<sup>a</sup>Standard deviation

91; educational attainment ranged from illiteracy to college degrees; and economically, the sample included very poor families such as those of landless or jobless laborers all the way up to those of plant owners and rich professionals.

All interviews obtained through the assistance of the residential committees and my personal connections were conducted in informants' homes; the rest were completed either in a public place or in informants' homes. When a couple was selected, separate interviews were arranged for each spouse. Follow-up interviews were scheduled when additional information was sought or clarification was needed. The average length of each interview was around two hours, and the average number of interviews for each person was about 2.5. Tape recording, with permission, was the primary data-recording device. Note taking supplemented tape recording whenever necessary. The interview data were transcribed in Chinese by hired professionals; I only translated into English the sections of the data cited or quoted in this book.

For the Mao and post-Mao cohorts, the target population was married women born after 1949. Four large cities—Beijing, Lanzhou, Shanghai, and Jilin—from different geographical regions were selected as research sites. These cities varied in levels of reform, hence comprising the diverse population needed for this study (Weiss 1994).

From the summer of 2005 to 2007, my research associate and I recruited 115 married women who either currently held a job or had retreated to the home from the workplace but were under the official retirement age of 50 (for female manual workers) or 60 (for female administrators or professionals). To capture women's diverse work experiences and underlying historical and institutional forces, we selected female informants along a wide range of domestic-role orientation, employment status, economic sectors and occupations, political and socioeconomic status, as well as marital and familial circumstances.

Given the qualitative nature of this project, we employed the “maximizing range” sampling technique (Weiss 1994) which enabled us to identify women with various characteristics matching the aforementioned criteria. We mainly relied on local branches of the Women's Federation, personal and professional networks, and our informants from previous studies to form the sample. As Table A.2 shows, of all female informants, 75 came of age in the Mao era (born during the 1950s) and 40 in the reform period (born after the 1950s); both samples include women of diverse backgrounds.

**Table A.2** Socio-demographic information on female informants of the Mao and post-Mao cohorts ( $N = 115$ )

Characteristics	<i>Mean (SD)</i>		<i>Median</i>		<i>f (percent)</i>	
	Mao $N_1 = 75$	Post-Mao $N_2 = 40$	Mao	Post-Mao	Mao	Post-Mao
Age of informants	47 (5)	32 (3)				
Length of marriage	20 (6)	6 (4)				
Number of children	1.1 (.6)	1 (.7)				
Age of children	17 (8)	5 (4)				
Work status					$N_1 = 75$	$N_2 = 40$
Employed (full time)					58 (77)	33 (82)
Underemployed					4 (5)	0
Non-employed					6 (8)	5 (13)
Early retired					4 (5)	0
Unemployed					3 (4)	2 (5)
Work sector					$N_1 = 66$	$N_2 = 33$
State owned					49 (74)	23 (7)
Collectively owned					2 (3)	2 (1)
Privately owned					12 (18)	2 (1)
Foreign owned					2 (3)	4 (12)
Other					1 (2)	2 (1)
Occupation					$N_1 = 66$	$N_2 = 33$
State senior managerial					4 (6)	2 (6)
Corporate senior managerial					5 (8)	5 (15)
Entrepreneurs					1 (2)	1 (3)
Professionals					22 (33)	10 (30)
White-collar workers					11 (17)	8 (24)
Manufacturing workers					8 (12)	6 (18)
Small business owners					3 (5)	1 (3)
Service workers					12 (18)	0
Monthly income (yuan)	6722 (25,712)	2303 (2182)	2020	2000		
Annual family income (yuan)	111,599 (160,963)	134,325 (231,514)	60,000	68,400		
Education of informants					$N_1 = 75$	$N_2 = 40$
Less than junior high					6 (8)	3 (8)
Junior high					14 (19)	2 (5)
Senior high/vocational					17 (23)	9 (23)
Three-year college					10 (13)	7 (17)
Bachelor's degree					20 (27)	12 (30)
Postgraduate					8 (11)	7 (17)
Ethnicity					$N_1 = 75$	$N_2 = 40$

*(continued)*

**Table A.2** (continued)

	<i>Mean (SD)</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>f (percent)</i>	
Han			70 (93)	33 (82)
Hui (Muslim)			5 (7)	5 (13)
Other			0	2 (5)
Region			$N_1=75$	$N_2=40$
Beijing			34 (45)	16 (40)
Lanzhou			16 (25)	14 (35)
Shanghai			19 (22)	10 (25)
Jilin			6 (8)	0
Role orientation			$N_1=75$	$N_2=40$
Home oriented			8 (11)	5 (13)
Combining work with family			44 (59)	27 (67)
Work/career oriented			23 (30)	8 (20)

The interviews took place primarily in informants' homes or workplaces. Wherever appropriate, we also interviewed these women's spouses, co-workers, and supervisors to gain a better understanding of their home and work environments. To the extent that researchers' presence may have mixed and sometimes negative impacts on informants' well-being or bias the data due to the unequal power relations between researchers and subjects, we made a concerted effort to build a rapport with our informants, interview through conversation, and ensure an equal partnership with them (Wolf 1996).

Using a combined process analysis and comparative strategies (Mahoney 2000), I first identified mechanisms of workplace engendering processes (e.g. competition) that had influenced women's construction of family roles in each case. My central concern about causal relations between the two variables was the time sequence (Pierson 2000). For example, to women of the Mao generation, was gendered ideology always present but merely suppressed by the hegemonic gender-equality discourse prior to the reform, or did it emerge after the passing of state socialism? Similarly, did younger women's domestic-role orientation stem from their revolt against the image of "state persons" of their mothers' generation or was it a result of changing meanings of work in the market transition?

Besides the above within-case analysis, I took a cross-case approach to compare women's experiences across work environments and generations (Burton 2004), as mentioned earlier. The cross-case and cross-cohort analyses helped me extend the generalizability of findings within each case.

Table A.3 provides a breakdown of the female informants of various work–family role configurations: stay-at-home moms (17 cases), family-oriented working women (66 cases), and work-/career-oriented women (32 cases). It shows that stay-at-home moms were considerably younger, had lower levels of education, and had younger children present at home, compared to the other two groups of women. This table pertains to data analysis in Chapter 6, in which I examine ways in which urban women of the Mao and post-Mao cohorts construct their work–family roles in the broader context of work–family conflict amid China’s market transition.

**Table A.3** Characteristics of female informants of Mao and post-Mao cohorts by role configuration ( $N=115$ )

	<i>Stay-at-home moms (n = 17)</i>	<i>Family-oriented working women (n = 66)</i>	<i>Work-/career- oriented (n = 32)</i>
Age of informants (frequency (%))			
20–29	–	6 (9.1)	2 (6.3)
30–39	9 (52.9)	26 (39.4)	12 (37.5)
40–49	7(41.1)	19 (28.8)	7 (21.9)
Over 50	1 (0.7)	15 (22.7)	11 (34.4)
Length of marriage (mean (min; max))	17.4 (3; 32)	14.5 (1; 28)	15.8 (1; 31)
Number of children (mean (min; max))	2.4 (1; 4)	0.9 (0; 2)	0.91 (0; 2)
Age of children (mean (min; max))	6.3 (0; 31)	13.4 (0; 26)	14.8 (0; 30)
Work sector (frequency (%))			
State owned	–	47 (71.2)	24 (75)
Collectively owned	–	1 (1.5)	2 (6.2)
Privately owned	–	10 (15.2)	4 (12.5)
Foreign owned	–	2 (3)	2 (6.3)
Other	–	6 (8.1)	–
Occupation (frequency (%))			
State senior managerial	–	2 (3)	4 (12.5)
Corporate senior managerial	–	2 (3)	7 (21.9)
Entrepreneurs	–	–	2 (6.3)
Professionals	–	19 (28.8)	13 (40.6)
White-collar workers	–	15 (22.7)	3 (9.4)
Manufacturing workers	–	11 (16.7)	2 (6.3)
Small business owners	–	2 (3)	1 (3.1)

(continued)

**Table A.3** (continued)

	<i>Stay-at-home moms (n = 17)</i>	<i>Family-oriented working women (n = 66)</i>	<i>Work-/career- oriented (n = 32)</i>
Service workers	–	7 (10.6)	–
Migrant workers	–	1 (1.5)	–
Underemployed workers	–	6 (9.1)	–
Annual income (yuan) (median (min; max))	0 (0; 120,000)	24,000 (4800; 204,000)	59,400 (30,2000; 1 million)
Family income (yuan) (median (min; max))	36,000 (6000; 620,000)	64,600 (10,000; 1,048,000)	211,062 (26,000; 1,036,000)
Education of informants (frequency (%))			
Less than junior high	7 (41.2)	3 (4.5)	–
Junior high	3 (17.6)	12 (18.2)	2 (6.3)
Senior high/vocational	4 (23.5)	16 (24.2)	4 (12.5)
Three-year college	1 (5.9)	10 (15.2)	6 (18.8)
Bachelor's degree	2 (11.8)	18 (27.3)	12 (37.5)
Postgraduate	–	7 (10.6)	8 (25)
Region (frequency (%))			
Beijing	7 (41.2)	37 (56.1)	7 (21.9)
Lanzhou (Gansu Province)	9 (52.9)	14 (21.2)	8 (25)
Shanghai	1 (5.9)	13 (19.7)	13 (40.6)
Jilin (Jilin Province)	–	2 (3)	4 (12.5)

## NOTES

1. Xi's speech at a seminar on Implementing CPC 18th National Congress' Spirit to Newly Recruited Committee Members: "Our party has led the people in socialist construction which can be divided into pre- and post-reform periods. The two periods are related but at the same time different in major ways. But in both periods the socialist exploration and practice by the people were conducted under the leadership of our party. To be sure, 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' was a creation of the reform era, but it was based on the Chinese socialist system established more than 20 years ago. Therefore, we must make a correct evaluation of pre-reform history; we should not negate it with the reform history, or vice versa. Our pre-reform experience and practice bred the conditions for those of the reform era, whereas our practice and exploration in the reform era were of instance, reform, and development of our prior experience" (Source: Mei Hong "How to correctly assess two 30-years before and during the reform." The News Network of the CPC. 19 February 2013. <http://www.cpc.people.com.cn>).
2. The source of the information came from the CCTV evening news, 7 July 2015.
3. The information was obtained from the evening news, 17 July 2015.

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