

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. For other comments on Lipset, see Wilson 1998, Kingdon 1999, and Lockhart 2003.
2. The Rio Grande is a river separating Mexico and the United States.
3. In his book, *Only in America* (1998), Graham Wilson makes a brief account of American institutions in comparative perspective (especially in contrast to Britain). But his main focus is on US public policy.

CHAPTER 2

1. Roman citizens were divided into classes whose members possessed different rights. Full citizenship—entailing civil, commercial, and voting rights—was restricted to a very small circle of people, most of them residing in Rome. The geographical expansion of citizenship came about by steps. To begin with, the free inhabitants of Italy were accorded full citizenship. Then, in the early third century (long after the fall of the Republic), Emperor Caracalla gave that right to inhabitants of the provinces (Finer 1997: 388–95, 563–65; Christ 1984: 121–32).
2. The Constitution (Article II) refers to the president as “he,” and all presidents so far have been men.
3. The term of office in the Senate is six years. One-third of the chamber is elected every second year. In the House the term of office is two years, and the whole chamber is elected at the same time.

CHAPTER 3

1. *McCulloch v. Maryland* 1819.
2. US Constitution, Sixteenth Amendment. See also Brownlee 2004.
3. This increase was mainly an effect of inflation in combination with progressive taxation, as the tax brackets were not indexed (Tax Foundation: *U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History 1913–2011*).
4. State and local authorities generally offer quite different “service portfolios.” Local governments play the leading role in education—an area in which state governments mostly have supplementary functions, geared particularly toward higher education. The states’ prime area of activity is health care. Yet responsibility in that area is shared. In financial terms, the federal government plays an important role particularly in the medical field. This blending of duties, in a complementary way, is a general characteristic of federal-state/local relations in the country. The United States, accordingly, displays a high degree of cooperative

- federalism. In the area of pensions, the federal government is the principal provider, but states make a significant contribution as well. Where welfare is concerned, the roles are about the same. The opposite holds true in the fields of transportation and protection: Here it is state and local governments that make the largest contribution (Chantrill 2014: ch. 3; Berman 2003: ch. 2).
5. As a share of public expenditures, military spending accounts for 12 percent in the case of the United States. The OECD average is 4 percent. For Israel, it is 16 percent. All figures are from OECD: *Government at a Glance* 2011.
 6. In the early 1990s, when George H. W. Bush was president, the balance was -3 percent; under Barack Obama, it has been -17 percent for the most part (Gallup, September 19, 2013).
 7. This thesis links up with the so-called veto-point argument developed by other authors (Stepan and Linz 2011).
 8. The opposite of a federal state is a unitary state, which lacks the decision-making duality just described. Countries such as Britain and Sweden are examples (both having a unicameral legislature and no constitutional court).
 9. The European Union might be said, at its current stage of development, to be located somewhere between these two systems. Like the United States under the Articles of Confederation, the EU today is not a full-fledged state. What is missing in both cases is the right to levy taxes and exert supremacy in the military realm. These are things that a state, according to the standard definition, must have if it is to qualify as a state (Fukuyama 2011: 80f).
 10. In an intergovernmental organization, the decision-making formula is often unanimity, implying that each member state has a right of veto. By contrast, a different decision-making rule is generally used in communities of a state (or semistate) character: namely, some kind of majoritarian method.
 11. The bottom line, one could say, is the distinction between two ways of understanding the delegation of power to a central authority. According to one view, it is the subunits that have made the delegation; it is therefore they who are the true sovereigns and the ones to be represented—as units. In principle, moreover, they are entitled to retain the powers that have been relinquished; and they also have the right, ultimately, to secede. According to another view, it is the citizens who are the subjects of the delegation; it is these who are the sovereigns to be represented—as individuals. Only the citizenry as a whole can, through some form of majority vote, change the terms of the power delegation and the terms of membership in the community. The first view corresponds with a (firmly held) confederalist notion, the other with a unitary notion. Federalism represents a blend between the two principles (a strong federalist stance, however, leans toward the second view). John Marshall made an interesting analysis of this point in *McCulloch v. Maryland* 1819. In a constitutional sense, the American Civil War was fought over these contrasting views of power delegation.
 12. See, e.g., Josselin and Marceau (2006).
 13. For other aspects of decentralization, which coincide more or less with the ones observed here, see, e.g., Lowi 2006: 95f; Sharma 2006; Horváth 2000; and Oates 1999.
 14. For an overview of the general buildup of these states (all classified as “mature” federations), see Watts 2008: ch. 2.
 15. Senators are appointed by the Governor General, who represents the British Queen. In reality, however, it is the prime minister who makes the selection—through “advice.”

16. See Auel 2014 and report on German finances issued by Deutsche Bank Research, May 27, 2011.
17. See footnote 13.
18. Describing their importance, Tocqueville furnished the following ranking: “The township is the first in order, then the county, and lastly the state” (2000: ch. 5). Thereafter, it is stated implicitly, comes the Union.
19. It should be observed that, for a short period after the terror attack of 2001, the level of support was equally high for the federal government. In both 1997 and 2013, on the other hand, the difference was about 30 percentage points.

CHAPTER 4

1. Of the 12 presidents who served up to 1850, 5 did not issue a single veto. And among those who did, the average number of vetoes during their time in office was 5—meaning that these “interfering” presidents made use of their veto less than once a year (Peterson 2007: 96f; Harness 1992).
2. As a token of their modest approach, these two presidents issued, in all, two vetoes during their 16 years in office: Washington: 2, Jefferson: 0 (Harness 1992).
3. In a mocking comment by Thomas Reed, Speaker of the House in the late 1800s, the Senate was characterized as “a nice quiet sort of place where good representatives [i.e., members of the House] go when they die” (MacNeil and Baker 2013: 152).
4. The first Congress, that of 1789, was composed of 26 senators and 59 representatives. In the Congress summoned in 1825, the corresponding figures were 48 and 213. And the expansion continued. By the turn of the century, the Senate had 90 members and the House 357.
5. In 1896, there were some eighty thousand patronage positions in the postal service alone—most of the individuals in question serving as postmasters.
6. In the congressional session 1964–1965, he had a success rate in Congress of over 90 percent (CQ Vote Studies 2011).
7. In early 1952, Truman had an approval rating of 22 percent—which is still the lowest in Gallup history (Gallup Historical Statistics 2013: 9).
8. This political turnaround in the South was accompanied by a comprehensive demographic and economic change in that part of the country. A new type of professionally oriented entrepreneurship (not least in the high-tech sector) has at the same time developed in the South. A traditionally poor and stagnant part of the country has thus become dynamic and prosperous. This transformation has been reinforced by a large migration from the North—both by well-educated working people and by well-to-do retirees who have moved there because of the weather.
9. It should be noted that the degree of polarization among the mass public has been contested. According to one camp among researchers, an evident widening of the opinion gap has taken place in the last decades. Another camp sees this portrayal as an overstatement. As is obvious, my understanding of the situation accords with the first view. For an account of the two camps, see Abramowitz 2010; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011; and Fleisher and Bond 2013.
10. As for his success rate in Congress, Bush in these years had a score above 90 percent—which put him almost on par with Johnson in the mid-1960s (CQ Vote Studies 2010).

11. At its worst, his rating was down to 25 percent (Gallup Historical Statistics 2013). Cf. footnote 7 above.
12. According to White House calculations reported by the *New York Times*, party-line voting in the Senate had increased from 80 to 90 percent over this period (September 18, 2013).
13. A possible alternative explanation would be that public opinion had grown more supportive over that time span in question. However, available survey results do not seem to substantiate that view. As for support for government intervention in society (in various areas), the overall trend since the 1990s has been downward (Pew, July 23, 2013). At the same time, the gap between the two parties' sympathizers regarding the role of government has widened considerably over this period—with Democrats becoming much more favorable to a significant role for government than Republicans (Gallup, September 23, 2013). In all likelihood, this increased polarization in the citizenry contributed to the higher degree of unity among Democratic congressmen manifested in the 2010 health-care vote. It also explains the continued strong resistance to the reform among Republican law-makers. See also Anthony Wilson: "Why 'HillaryCare' Failed and 'Obama-Care' Succeeded," americanheathline.com.
14. In the words of Standard and Poor: "The downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned . . . we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement" (press release, August 5, 2011).
15. In one month, from September to October 2013, the party's approval rating dropped by 10 percentage points, to 28 percent; whereas the Democrats faced only a modest fall, to 43 percent (Gallup, October 9, 2013).
16. See Gallup, November 12 and 14, 2013: about congressional approval (which was only 9 percent) and "the most important problem facing the country" (where dissatisfaction with government comes up on top).
17. In addition, presidents tend to make the point in these signing statements that they will not obey a law that undercuts the constitutionally granted authority of the president to supervise the executive branch (GAO: Presidential Signing Statements 2008).
18. The following account of Latin American and US presidents is based on Mezey 2013: ch. 3; Morgenstern et al. 2013; Cheibub et al. 2011; Bonvecchi and Scartascini 2011; Saiegh 2010; and Shugart and Carey, 1992.
19. Other presidential prerogatives found in several Latin American states—but not in the United States—include the following: (1) the power to appoint cabinet members freely; (2) the ability to attach an urgency petition to a bill in order to speed up the legislative process; and (3) the power to call a referendum (Mezey 2013; Ackerman et al. 2011).
20. As for other unilateral powers (of lesser significance) held by the US president, see Morgenstern et al. 2013.
21. Lula, the Brazilian president, is an illuminating example. After the congressional elections of 2002 and 2006, his Workers' Party controlled just 15–18 percent of the seats. Yet he was able to form workable majorities in the legislature even so. He was aided in his efforts by the fact that a significant proportion of members

- of Congress (typically one-third) changed party after being elected (Mezey 2013; see also Zucco 2013).
22. The downturn was particularly striking in Obama's case: from 94 to 17 percent.
 23. Among presidents it is interesting to compare Johnson and Carter (under unified government), and Reagan and Obama (under divided). As for congressional leaders, the difference in orientation between speakers O'Neill and Gingrich would seem to illustrate the point.
 24. A terminological clarification regarding executive organs: I consistently use the term "cabinet" in the case of *pure* presidential systems (like that in the United States). With regard to parliamentary systems—including semipresidential ones—I use "cabinet" and "government" synonymously.
 25. Information on majority and minority governments here refers to conditions in 35 OECD and EU countries in the 1990s and the first years after 2000 (Kaiser 2009).
 26. These include amendment powers, reversionary budgets, executive flexibility during implementation, the timing of the budget, legislative committees, and budgetary information (Wehner 2006: 769–72).
 27. Lacking such a focus—on influence in the budgetary field—Fish and Kroenig (2011) make a fairly different ranking of the standing of national legislatures. In my mind, the Fish and Kroenig study (where all kinds of decision-making involvement are lumped together) does not provide a proper grading of legislative clout.
 28. In fact, the last amendment of weight to a budget proposal was made during World War I (Posner and Park 2007: 11).
 29. Among democratic countries on average the process takes about three months (Blöndal et al. 2003).
 30. In Australia, however, conditions are somewhat different. The House of Representatives (the lower chamber) operates on the whole like its British counterpart. But the Senate—which can have a different political composition—has taken on a special function: that of government watchdog (Messick 2002).
 31. This tendency has also been manifested in the establishment of auditing agencies under parliamentary control. Even Britain, too, has set up such an agency. This trend could be a first step on the road to stronger engagement in the area of bureaucratic oversight.
 32. For a similar assessment, see Morgenstern et al. 2013: 60.
 33. Argentina—with its periods of divided government and its modest party fragmentation—gets a high score, too. It is interesting to note, as regards the question of party fragmentation, that Argentina uses a threshold for representation (3 percent), and that Mexico has a combined proportional and majoritarian electoral system. The effect in both instances is to reduce the degree of proportionality.
 34. A possible (modest) criterion for lasting importance would be a vote share above 10 percent in at least two consecutive presidential or congressional elections (cf. Madrid 2005: 692). As is obvious, none of the third candidates has achieved results of that magnitude.
 35. This account is based on electoral results reported by Latin American Electoral Data. See also Kitschelt et al. 2010 and Alcántara 2012.
 36. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, there have been significant turnabouts between elections in several countries. But this regional difference might be

- attributable in a high degree to a distinction between old and new democracies (parties in the latter, it may be, have not had enough time yet to become rooted and institutionalized).
37. The following accounts are based on reports by the countries' electoral commission. See also Ware 2009.
 38. The New Democrats are a left-leaning party founded in the 1960s. The Bloc Québécois is a francophone party. In its heyday (1990–2008), it got 10–15 percent of the vote.
 39. Normally third parties get less than 1 percent, but in one instance (1997) such a party got 5 percent. It should be added that Bermuda and Barbados come close to the Jamaican example of long-standing two-party dominance. Here, however, third parties have occasionally managed to “break through” and to acquire a parliamentary role of importance.
 40. The closest historical equivalent is the Farmer–Labor Party, with a regional footing in Minnesota, which won five seats in the House in 1932.
 41. What seems understandable, however, is the relationship between high linguistic fragmentation and the existence of a linguistic party in Canada. The existence of regional parties in India can as well be attributed to linguistic fragmentation. It may be added that economic factors, too, could be considered. With regard to GNP per capita, of course, India is a special case among the states under consideration. But it is not evident how the development of the Indian party system in recent decades (when GNP has risen considerably) can be explained from that perspective. As for Gini scores, these are generally low in India. For a study of deviations from Duverger's Law, which includes Canada and India, see Singer 2012.
 42. Among 21 countries the United States was thirteenth. Americas Barometer Insights 2010.
 43. In May 2013, its approval rate was 16 percent. It achieved its best results in the period from 1997 to 2005, when the level was around 40 percent, and occasionally much higher (Gallup, June 12, 2013).
 44. In April 2013, this group came to 40 percent (Gallup, June 12, 2013). See also Pew Research, May 21, 2009.
 45. Another notable difference between Canada and the United States is that, in the former country, it is common for people who strongly identify with a given party, but who decide for some reason not to vote for it, to switch to another party. In the United States such people normally abstain from voting.
 46. More precisely, it has to do with the introduction of the Australian (secret) ballot, which assigns the production and distribution of voting papers to state officials and not to parties. This practice has been held to disadvantage outsider parties (Caiazzo and Marsh 2011).
 47. Due to the existence of primary elections, it has been argued, “dissidents and insurgents do not need to go through the difficult and often frustrating exercise of forming an alternative party.” Instead they can “use the burrowing from within strategy” (Bibby and Maisel 2003: 60f).

CHAPTER 5

1. The following overview of court rulings is based on Whittington 2007, O'Brien 2008, and Schier and Eberly 2013.
2. *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* 1954.
3. *Shelby County v. Holder* 2013.

4. *Gibbons v. Ogden* 1824.
5. I am referring in particular to *United States v. Lopez* 1995 (which involved the carrying of a gun into a school) and *United States v. Morrison* 2000 (which had to do with violence against women). The question was whether the crimes in question were a federal or a state concern.
6. One illuminating case concerned a state's right to legalize the production and use of cannabis, which the Court denied—citing primarily the federal authority to regulate interstate commerce (*Gonzales v. Raich* 2005).
7. See above, p. 44.
8. *United States v. Curtis-Wright* 1936; *United States v. Belmont* 1937.
9. As one illuminating example, the Court did not take up for review an issue concerning the president's authority to nullify an international treaty unilaterally (*Goldwater v. Carter* 1979). As another example, it did not take a stand in a controversy over the president's right to initiate a military attack (*Cambell v. Clinton* 2000).
10. The following account is based on Federal Justice Center: Biographic Directory of Judges and Wikipedia: List of Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.
11. Here, I am using the same criteria—at federal level: cabinet member/member of Congress; at state level: governor/member of legislature.
12. It should be added regarding the long time period we have just examined (1789–1950) that the correspondence between the party affiliation of associate justices and that of the presidents who appointed them has been very high (almost 100 percent).
13. Data from Federal Judicial Center: Impeachments of Federal Judges.
14. No. 78.
15. The disparity arose because presidential elections in the United States are not strictly proportional. A similar outcome occurred in the 1880s (then favoring the Democratic Party).
16. As we will see in the coming comparative section, legislative insubordination in this field in Latin America has primarily taken place under conditions of divided government—that is, when the president does not have majority backing in the legislature. In an effort to demonstrate that such was the situation in the United States as well, Chávez et al. (2011) make the point that the Roosevelt in 1937 did *not* rule under conditions of unified government. Because in reality, it is argued, a conservative coalition—composed of members from both parties—dominated decision making in Congress. That coalition would certainly play an important role on many issues in years to come. But when the court case was in question, it had not yet been formed. The important point is rather that the US Congress, due to its stronger standing, has taken issue with the president over court independence under conditions of *unified* government. This deviates from the Latin American pattern.
17. This description clearly applies in the case of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, which have all been institutionally redesigned by their longtime (politically dominant) leaders. It applies only to a lesser degree in the case of Nicaragua.
18. It should be noted, however, that the Court *does* have the authority to strike down legislation at the cantonal level on constitutional grounds. Thus, a partial form of judicial review could be said to be applied (cf. Sweet 2003). Yet in the present analysis only the capacity to interfere on *both* the national and the subnational level is counted as judicial review authority.

19. An ancillary motive may have played a role as well: The existence of such institutions for the protection of rights could be used as a good argument in coming negotiations for EU membership (which for many of these states was a highly desired objective).
20. See The Rule of Law Index 2012–2013.
21. As for the necessity of avoiding confrontation with the political leadership on central issues, it is interesting to note that, when French Constitutional Council struck down a tax law in 2012, it only demanded a minor change in the proposal—which the government immediately accepted (BBC News, December 29, 2012).
22. Another reflection of this tendency is the increasing autonomy of central banks (Arnone et al. 2008).

CHAPTER 6

1. This is also an interesting fact in view of the heated debate on the identification requirements in connection with voting that were introduced in several states prior to this election. In the view of many critics, such measures would reduce the rate of voting among blacks (CNN, July 9, 2012). That obviously did not happen.
2. Cf. Patterson 2002 and Teixeira 1992.
3. All of the countries in the study have a population above one million, and an unbroken democratic record back to 1980; none has compulsory voting. Only elections where executive power is at stake are considered. Switzerland is thus excluded, since it has a permanent coalition government. Also France is excluded due to its special semi-parliamentary mode of government formation. Data: IDEA.
4. For an account year by year, see *Bureau of Labor Statistics*: Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional population, 1943 to date. It should be noted that an unemployment rate above average not always causes electoral defeat. Presidents Reagan and Obama were reelected despite unemployment figures above 7 percent. Yet in combination with other difficulties (mentioned below) the employment issue can tip the balance in a negative direction.
5. Ford's own motivation, expressed in his autobiography (1979), was that he wanted to put an end to the national trauma in question and at the same time save the Nixon family from further humiliation.
6. It might be argued that Hoover, too, faced a contender of outstanding capacity: Franklin Roosevelt, who turned out to be one of the most innovative and energetic presidents in US history. His organizational capacity certainly played a role during the campaign. In policy terms, however, he kept a very low profile. His main approach was to blame the president for the misery afflicting the country. It was only after the election, when he had moved into the White House, that he presented his famous New Deal agenda. Challenging the person of the president was indeed an easy strategy. Hoover had become extremely unpopular among large segments of the population. When he was out at rallies, he often encountered unmistakable hostility. People threw fruit and eggs at him, and at times he could not even get out of his car (Carcasson 1998).
7. It should be noted that the two originally Republican candidates together got 50 percent of the vote, as against 43 for Wilson.

8. This examination is based on Corrales (2012) and election results reported by *Latin American Electoral Data*.
9. Three incumbent victories out of five elections. If we look instead at elections from 1986 to 2012, the score is 75 percent (three wins out of four).
10. The following account of congressional elections is based on Carson et al. 2007, Stockmer and Praisio 2012, Opensecrets.Org: Reelection Rates Over the Years (1964–2012), and election statistics collected by the Clerk of the House of Representatives.
11. In Senate races, incumbents seeking reelection have generally faced a higher risk of losing. The general probability of this happening has been about 20 percent since the 1960s. The fluctuations over time have also been more pronounced in elections to the upper chamber. During some years in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the loss rate was as high as 40 percent. In subsequent decades, however, it sometimes fell as low as around 5 percent.
12. Besides the difference between the candidates in each election, another measure focuses on the difference over time for an incumbent. The two measures give broadly the same result.
13. For this party the effect is at the 7-percent level; for the other parties it is at the 2-percent level.
14. Above p. 103f.
15. The only outcome of a surprising character, given our assumptions, is the rate for Canada: 28 percent. This would seem to indicate that the relationship with the number of parties is not linear.
16. Data from Opensecrets.org.
17. Data on donor demographics is provided by Opensecrets.org and Campaign finance.org.
18. Data from Federal Election Commission.
19. Making a similar comparison with Britain has not been possible, because only relatively large private donations need be reported to the Electoral Commission in that country. It is evident, however, that private donations play a much bigger role than public grants. In that respect, Britain is more like the United States than Canada.
20. As a rule these decisions have been made through a 5–4 vote, and the conservative/liberal division has been plain (the liberal block has voted against).
21. The steep increase in the first decade of the new century remains even after inflation is controlled for (AWL, November 6, 2012).
22. The answer to this question is often taken for granted among observers. For an example, see *The Guardian*, April 6, 2014.
23. However, the way that campaign resources are allocated geographically (to critical states) can have a vital impact on the outcome (Nagler and Leighley 1992).
24. It has been noted in several studies that incumbents with a large “war chest” stand a better chance of deterring potential opponents of good quality from entering the race. This scare-off capacity is of importance for relatively weak incumbents in particular. Such incumbents, thus, tend to have the largest war chest (Goodliffe 2005; see also Box-Steffensmeier 1996).
25. As demonstrated by Marian Currinder, the ability of raising funds—for oneself and for one’s party colleagues—is a highly valued quality among congressmen. Yet the author’s basic assumption about the electoral effects, namely that “money has become central for securing majority control” (2009: 7), never becomes substantiated.

CHAPTER 7

1. *Direct Legislation Through the Initiative and Referendum*. True Nationalist Publishing Company (1893).
2. A special form of initiative is the *recall*, which (through the same procedure) can be used to unseat elected officials. This institution is in place in 18 states.
3. If one includes all kinds of referenda (including those initiated by the state government), there were on average 22 referenda every second year during the 1990–2010 period in California. As for effects on democratic life, Boehmke and Bowen (2010) show that referenda tend to stimulate interest-group membership.
4. Kefauver was known to the public mainly from televised broadcasts of the Senate committee he was chairing (which dealt with organized crime). He had no leading position in the Democratic Party.
5. In so-called open elections—when no incumbent president seeks reelection, as in 2000 and 2008—both parties have primaries in all states. When a presidential challenger is selected (as in 2004 and 2012) the party in question also has primaries in all states. However, in the case of sitting presidents seeking reelection, the number of primaries tends to be reduced. In 2004, Bush took part in such an election in 35 states. The corresponding figure for Obama in 2012 was 42.
6. A voter can, however, take part only in one party's primary (not in both).
7. In a few states the two models are combined, so that some of that state's delegates are elected in accordance with the one model and some in accordance with the other.
8. See above p. 71f.
9. This is generally the rule. Yet as the 1984 Democratic Convention opened, neither of the two major candidates (Walter Mondale and Garry Hart) had gained a majority of elected delegates. In this case the bloc of so-called superdelegates (notables appointed by the Party apparatus) tipped the balance (Aldrich 2009).
10. The proportional code is used consistently in the Democratic Party nowadays, and sometimes in the Republican Party, too. A rationale for using this method has been to prolong the competitive phase and thus to get a more robust test of the candidates' winning ability.
11. Adding these cases to the group of incumbent failures reported above (p. 160), the winning score since 1900 falls to 65 percent.
12. General information about referenda around the world is provided by Democracy International, ECAS, and IRI Europe.
13. One such controversial matter has concerned the prohibition of minarets.
14. This overview of Latin American primaries is based on Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2006; Kemahiloglu et al. 2009; Buquet and Piñeiro 2011; *Economist*, August 17, 2013; Americas Society/Council of the Americas, January 24, 2014; and MercoPress, May 7, 2014.
15. The information on British primaries is based on Quinn 2012; Williams and Paun 2011; and Labour Party Rule Book 2013.
16. It should be added the Conservatives have tried open elections (and voting by mail) in a few cases.
17. This section on the French Socialist Party and the Italian Democratic Party is based on Paun 2011; Pasquino 2011; and Seddone and Venturino 2013.
18. Outside the regions mentioned above, the primary model is applied in Israel and in a few African and Asian countries. Ghana and South Korea are examples.

CHAPTER 8

1. Seen from the point of view of governmental decision-making capacity, the involvement of the courts can be said to have mixed effects. On the one hand, it has a complicating and hampering impact—as laws and executive measures become subject to judicial scrutiny. On the other hand, it has evidently been the case that the judiciary has stepped in and taken over the regulative function when the other government organs have lacked ability, or the will, to take action.
2. In my judgment, Germany and Canada are the cases that come closest. Both are federal states (but of divergent composition; see pp. 39–42 above), and both have developed a far-reaching system of judicial review (particularly Germany). Being parliamentary democracies, the executive side normally has the upper hand in the policy-making process. However, in Germany there is an element that at times serves to enhance the independence of the legislature. I have in mind the upper chamber (Der Bundesrat), which represents the regional governments. When the opposition party has a majority in this chamber—which occasionally happens—the cabinet can get involved in a bargaining game resembling the American one.
3. Uruguay seems to be the only parallel case.
4. It should be observed that the United States was not a full-fledged democracy at this time. Women did not have the vote, and the black population suffered discrimination in the South. The calculation presupposes that the general political dynamic noted here, with its roots in economic advancement, can also be identified in a polity where under half the adult citizenry is enfranchised—but where at any rate the vast majority of the male population has the vote. Historical GNP data are taken from Maddison 2001.
5. The trend began in the 1800s and accelerated in the following century. Between 1900 and 1980 more than one hundred successful coups were staged in this region, the frequency being particularly high between the 1940s and the 1970s (Dix 1994).
6. In connection with the features just mentioned, it may be of interest to make a parallel with the ancient Roman Republic, renowned for its long survival: It lasted almost five hundred years. It was based on a military organization of the citizen-soldier model. Furthermore, its institutional setup was characterized by an intricate system of power division, with firm restrictions on the prerogatives accruing to occupants of the various political offices (Finer 1997: I).
7. Today's Iraq is a striking example.
8. In the White terror after the Finnish Civil War of 1917, for example, some ten thousand people on the losing (Red) side were executed. And in the aftermath of the Russian Civil War, which was fought between 1917 and 1922, more than two hundred fifty thousand people (perhaps up to one million) on the White side were summarily executed. For an overview of civil wars in Europe in the early twentieth century, see Payne 2011.
9. He refused, for instance, to attend a meeting of Congress to which he had been invited, on the grounds that the independence of the legislative branch might be thereby infringed (Wayne 2009: 62).
10. This was the Twenty-Second Amendment.

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