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Introduction


4 Ibid.


11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 608.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, p. 209.
18 Ibid., p. 211.
23 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, p. 215.
24 In his sweeping history of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis gives Iran barely one paragraph, reducing US–Iranian relations in this period to a direct path from coup to revolution; John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War (London: Allen Lane, 2005), pp. 166–167.
Notes

167


Chapter 1


5 Ibid., pp. 190–197.
7 Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*.
15 Ibid., p. 3.
17 Ibid., p. 32–42.
Notes 169


26 Ibid., p. 154.


31 Ibid., p. 433.


33 Ibid., p. 284.


37 Ibid., p. xix.


Heiss, *Empire and Nationhood*, p. 45. On the legacy of Mossadeq’s time in office on US foreign policy, see Goode, *The United States and Iran*. Reza Ghasimi has argued that the *coup d’état* that toppled Mossadeq in 1953, which was a response to his nationalization of the oil industry, ended the prospects of genuine democracy in Iran; Reza Ghasimi, “Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Mossadeq’s Involvement with the World Bank,” *Middle East Journal*, 65.3 (Summer, 2011), pp. 442–456.

Heiss, *Empire and Nationhood*, p. 15.

Ibid., pp. 15–44.

Ibid., p. 46.

Ibid., pp. 77–78.

Ibid., pp. 167–168.

Ibid., pp. 130–134.

In contrast, Francis J. Gavin argues that the Truman administration had already begun to adopt a more assertive policy towards Iran and that Eisenhower’s comparative aggression merely represented a continuation of this pattern; Francis J. Gavin, “Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950–1953,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1.1 (1999), pp. 56–89.


Ibid., p. 3.


Kinzer, *All the Shah’s Men*, pp. 209–210; Lytle, *Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance*, p. 213. Dulles offered Kermit Roosevelt the opportunity to head the CIA’s covert operation to overthrow the democratic government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. Ironically, Roosevelt declined on the grounds that the situation in Guatemala was not suited to a coup d’etat. For a discussion of the legacy of the 1953 coup and its impact on the workings of the CIA, see Douglas Little, “Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East,” *Diplomatic History*, 28.5 (Nov., 2004), pp. 663–701.


Chapter 2

5 Goode, *The United States and Iran*, p. 169.
6 Bill, *Eagle and the Lion*, p. 137.
7 “Memorandum of Conversation with Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari,” 3 Jul. 1968. *Digital National Security Archive* (Hereafter referred to as DNSA), IR00688. Matin-Daftari, the grandson of former prime minister Mohammed Mossadeq, had regular contact with US embassy officials. In this particular meeting, he also notes that “many members of the court rejoiced on hearing the news that Robert Kennedy had been shot,” suggesting that the Shah and his entourage favoured Nixon but also had little goodwill towards the Kennedy family. Abbas Milani notes that “more than once in his Daily journals,

8 This is the title of Bill’s chapter on Kennedy’s relationship with Iran; Bill, *Eagle and the Lion*, pp. 131–153.

9 Ibid., p. 149. David Collier makes an even stronger case for this idea; David R. Collier, “To Prevent a Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Promotion of Development,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 34.3 (2013), pp. 456–475.


14 Ibid., p. 360.


17 These historians have also missed the other consensus within the Kennedy administration regarding the use of a “massage policy” to maintain a close relationship with the Shah, which, as we shall see in Chapter 3, further undermined the influence of modernization theory on Kennedy’s policy and played a central role in US–Iranian relations right through until the Iranian Revolution.


19 That is, until the emergence of Fred Greenstein’s “hidden-hand” thesis, which argues that Eisenhower actually played a more active role in his administration’s foreign policy than had previously been assumed; Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (John Hopkins University Press, 1984).


25 Ibid., p. 200.
26 Ibid., p. 216. For an overview of flexible response as a strategy see Ibid., pp. 197–271.
27 Ibid., p. 199.
31 Ibid., pp. 180–185.
38 Popp, “An Application of Modernization Theory during the Cold War?” p. 98.
40 Ibid., p. 102 (italics in original).
41 Ibid., p. 99 (italics in original).
54 “Call by General Teimur Bakhtiar on The Secretary,” 21 Feb. 1961. Ibid., p. 34.
58 Ibid., p. 63.
59 Ibid., p. 65.
64 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 10 May 1961. Ibid., p. 110.
65 Ibid., pp. 105–106.
66 Ibid., p. 107.
70 Ansari, *Modern Iran Since 1921*, p. 156.
71 Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 139.
72 Goode, *The United States and Iran*, p. 175.
74 Goode, *The United States and Iran*, p. 172.
75 “Special National Intelligence Estimate 34. 2–61: Short-Term Outlook for Iran,” 23 May 1961. DNSA, IR00409.
77 Mohammad Gholi Majd has argued that because much of the middle classes’ wealth was tied into land investments (although they were not landowners themselves), the confiscation and reform of land also contributed to the demonstrations: “the protests reflected the anger and alienation of the urban


80 Ibid., pp. 213–214.

81 “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk,” 7 Aug. 1961. Ibid., pp. 215–216.

82 “Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” 11 Aug. 1961. Ibid., pp. 227–228.

83 “Memorandum from Robert W. Komor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” 11 Aug. 1961. Ibid., p. 228.

84 Ibid., p. 229.


86 Ibid., p. 240.


88 Ibid., p. 248.

89 Ibid., p. 253.

90 Ibid., pp. 247, 252.

91 “Memorandum from the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Hansen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot),” 18 Oct. 1961. Ibid., p. 307.


95 Ibid., p. 318.

96 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 5 Nov. 1961. Ibid., p. 326.

“Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen),” 19 Jan. 1961. Ibid., p. 429.

Ibid., p. 430.

“Memorandum from the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to the National Security Council,” undated but written in response to NSC Action 2447, which was taken on 18 Jan. 1962. Ibid., p. 512.

“Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy,” 28 Mar. 1962. Ibid., pp. 548–549.

“Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” 8 Mar. 1962. Ibid., p. 516, 518.


“Memorandum from the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Hansen) to President Kennedy,” 7 Apr. 1962. Ibid., p. 581.


“Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” 1 Jun. 1962. Ibid., p. 700.


“Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” 15 Jun. 1962. Ibid., p. 725.

“Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” 15 Jun. 1962. Ibid., p. 726.

Ibid., 727.


Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1921, p. 157.

Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p. 146.

Keddie, Roots of Revolution, pp. 144–145.


“Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy,” 18 Jul. 1962. Ibid., p. 11 (italics in original).
Notes 179

123 “Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” 19 Jul. 1962. Ibid., p. 16.
127 Footnote 3, Ibid., p. 105.

Chapter 3

2 For a useful discussion of the Kennedy administration’s use of psychological analysis to assess Iran and “update” earlier Orientalist views of Tehran, see Warne, “Psychoanalyzing Iran,” pp. 1–27.
3 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p. 137.
5 Little, American Orientalism, p. 219.
28 “Komer (Beirut) to Rusk, No. 924,” 10 Apr. 1963. Iran General 4/1/63–4/19/63. JFKL, NSF, Countries – Iran, Box 116A.
34 Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” 21 Jan. 1963. Ibid., p. 313.
38 Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy, pp. 311–328.


Ibid., pp. 105–125.


“In the same meeting the Shah and Holmes discussed, without reaching a conclusion, why the Soviets had finally acquiesced and accepted this version of the missile declaration rather than the bilateral version they hoped for.


“Holmes to Secretary of State, No. 558,” 6 Dec. 1962. Folder 12/62. JFKL, NSF, Countries – Iran, Box 116A.

“Holmes to Secretary of State, No. 1038,” 28 May 1963. Folder 5/63. JFKL, NSF, Countries – Iran, Box 116A.

“Secretary of State to Tehran Embassy, No. 859,” 29 May 1963. Folder 5/63. JFKL, NSF, Countries – Iran, Box 116A.


In 1962, the UN Security Council consisted of 11 members, five of whom (the United States, Britain, France, China, and Russia) were permanent members.


69 Ibid., p. 460.

70 Ibid., p. 464.

71 “Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy,” 20 Apr. 1963. Ibid., p. 478.


74 “Memo for the President,” 1 Nov. 1963. Iran General 11/1/63–11/21/63. JFKL, NSF, Countries – Iran, Box 116A.

75 “Memo for McGeorge Bundy,” 1 Nov. 1963. Iran General 11/1/63–11/21/63. JFKL, NSF, Countries – Iran, Box 116A.

76 “JFK Letter to the Shah of Iran,” 7 Nov. 1963. Iran General 11/1/63–11/21/63. JFKL, NSF, Countries – Iran, Box 116A.


### Chapter 4


2 Desmond Harney interview with Habib Ladjevardi, 15 Oct. 1985, *Harvard Iranian Oral History Project*, Tape No. 1, p. 35 (hereafter referred to as *HIOHP*). Harney is actually referring to the role of British ambassadors in Iran, debunking the belief of British omnipotence in Iran. I believe, however, that his phrase is equally apt in describing Lyndon Johnson’s relationship with the Shah at this time.

3 Mitchell Lerner, “‘A Big Tree of Peace and Justice’: The Vice Presidential Travels of Lyndon Johnson,” *Diplomatic History*, 34.2 (Apr. 2010), p. 357.


11 Ibid., p. 154.
18 Ibid., p. 55.
19 “Current Intelligence Memorandum, 30 May 1964.” Ibid., p. 62 (emphasis added).
20 Ibid., p. 62.
21 Ibid., p. 63, 62.
25 Lebanese students comprised the next largest contingent at 8,000 students. Iranian students approximately equalled in number those from Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya, and Kuwait combined. Ibid., p. 79.
28 Askari and Cummings, “A Problem of ‘Brain Drain,’” p. 73.


32 Behrooz, Rebels with a Cause, p. 47; Matin-asgari, Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah, pp. 54–55.


36 Ibid., p. 62.


39 Shannon, “Contacts with the Opposition,” p. 4.


45 “Visit of the Shah of Iran to the United States, Jun. 1964,” 9 Jun. 1964. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1158043–000, 64-HQ-32944, Section 1, pp. 4–6. (All FBI files have been obtained by the author through a Freedom of Information Act request.)


48 Ibid., p. 4.

49 Ibid., p. 3.

50 “Open Letter to the President of the American University, Washington, DC,” undated. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1158043–000, 64-HQ-32944, Section 1, p. 2.

51 “International Federation for Narcotic Education to Mr Clark Kerr, President,” 19 May 1964. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1158043–000, 64-HQ-32944, Section 1, p. 1.

52 “Executive Committee of the ISAUS (H. Lebastchi, M. Tehranian, A. Barzegar, H. Mousavi and B. Daryani) to The Freedom-Loving People of the United States; The United States National Student Association; The African Students Association in the United States; The Organization of Arab Students in the United States; The National Association of University Professors; The International League for the Rights of Man; The A.F.L.-C.I.O.; Civil Liberties Union; The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; The Congress of Racial Equality,” 25 May 1964. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1158043–000, 64-HQ-32944, Section 1, p. 35.


65 Ibid.
67 Ibid., p. 71.
68 “Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson,” 5 Jun. 1964. Ibid., p. 73.
69 “Julius Holmes to Department of State,” 2 Jun. 1964. Iran – Shah’s Visit, 6/5/64. LBJL, NSF, Country File, Box 137.
70 “Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson,” 3 Jun. 1964. FRUS 1964–1968 XXII, p. 67 (italics in original).
71 Ibid., p. 68.
74 “Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” 27 Jun. 1964. Ibid., p. 92.
76 FRUS 1964–1968 XXII, p. 93.
79 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p. 158.
81 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 27 Oct. 1964. FRUS 1964–1968 XXII, p. 108. Footnote 3 cites an airgram from Tehran, 15 Dec. 1964, as having “reported that the ‘coincidence’ of having the parliamentary vote on the status of forces bill followed within 2 weeks by the unanimous vote to accept a $200 million credit from US commercial banks for the purchase of US military equipment had contributed to the widespread belief that in some way the passage of the status bill was the price exacted by the United States for the granting of the credits in question.”
93 Ibid., p. 108.
95 Ibid., p. 66.
96 Ibid., p. 73.
97 Land reform was a key issue for the Shiite clergy as most of their income was derived from land ownership.
100 Ibid., p. 188.
Notes

107 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 25 Apr. 1964.” Ibid., p. 33.
111 Ibid., p. 183.
112 Ibid., p. 186.
119 Ibid., p. 122.
120 Ibid., p. 123.
121 Ibid., p. 123–124.
124 Khaibar Gudarzian accused members of the Iranian royal family, including the Shah’s sister, Princess Ashraf, and court of corruption and misappropriation of aid funds. The Johnson administration’s inability to resolve the issue angered the Shah greatly, creating serious tension between the two. US officials viewed the situation as so dire that at one point Secretary of State Dean Rusk told the Shah that the “only other matter which had recently been taking up more of his time than this affair was Vietnam.” The Shah, however, could not believe that Johnson was unable to simply dismiss the case, seeing as it involved an important ally. “Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State,” 8 Apr. 1965. *FRUS 1964–1968 XXII*, p. 135.

Chapter 5

1 Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 169.
2 Goode, *The United States and Iran*, p. 182.
3 Johns, “‘Tired of Being Treated Like a Schoolboy,’” p. 94.


12 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery.


18 Ibid., p. 169.

19 Ibid., p. 168.


21 Ibid., p. 173.


23 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 13 Sep. 1965. Ibid., pp. 175; 176.

24 Ibid., pp. 176; 177–178.


26 Meyer, Quiet Diplomacy, p. 140.


32 “Meyer to Secretary of State, Priority 345,” 12 Sep. 1965. Iran – 1965–Mar. 1966 (2 of 3). LBJL, NSF, Files of Robert W. Komer, Box 28. Meyer suggests that Hoveyda’s position was actually far more moderate than the Shah’s, and in fact might have been “groping for arguments, new ones, to use with [the] Shah.”

33 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 116.


35 “Meyer to Department of State, 611,” 19 Oct. 1965. Iran – 1965–Mar. 1966 (2 of 3). LBJL, NSF, Files of Robert W. Komer, Box 28. For a discussion of why many Third World governments zealously sought to acquire steel mills, which were often seen to represent both modernization and national independence, see Engerman, “The Romance of Economic Development,” pp. 23–54.

36 On Hoveyda’s tenure as prime minister, see Milani, The Persian Sphinx, pp. 209–281.


39 “Meyer to Department of State, 730,” 16 Nov. 1965. DEF 19–8 US–Iran. NARA, RG59, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–1966, Political and Defence, Box 1733.


41 “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” 12 Jun. 1965. Ibid., p. 156.


43 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 12 Nov. 1965. Ibid., p. 186.

44 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 18 Nov. 1965. Ibid., p. 188.

45 “Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” 22 Nov. 1965. Ibid., pp. 188–189.


49 Ibid., p. 199.
53 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 117.
58 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 14 Mar. 1966. Ibid., p. 221.
59 Ibid., p. 220.
64 Ibid., p. 226. Emphasis added.
67 Ibid., p. 228.
68 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 4 May 1966. Ibid., p. 237.
70 Ibid., p. 239.
Notes 193


80 “Memorandum from W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow),” 21 May 1966. FRUS 1964–1968 XXII, p. 250.

81 “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,” 21 May 1966. Ibid., p. 251.

82 Ibid, p. 252.

83 “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,” 23 May 1966. Ibid., p. 256.

84 Ibid., p. 257.


89 The Shah’s comments were made during an interview with “the pro-Soviet Bombay weekly Blitz.” “Chester Bowles to Department of State,” 9 Jun. 1966. POL 15–1, 1/1/66 Iran. NARA, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–1966, Political and Defence, Box 2333.


91 “Letter from Vice Presidential Aide George Carroll to Vice President Humphrey,” 27 Jul. 1966. Ibid., p. 299.

92 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 3 Jul. 1966. Ibid., p. 266.


“Memorandum from W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow),” 22 Jul. 1966. *FRUS 64–68*, p. 289.


**Chapter 6**

Notes 195


10 Ibid., p. 248.


14 Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 281.

15 Ibid., p. 321.


17 Bass is actually referring to Lyndon Johnson’s troubles in the Middle East: “For Washington, befriending both Nasserite Egypt and the conservative monarchs was proving a bit like trying to stay on cordial terms with the Capulets and the Montagues”; Bass, Support Any Friend, p. 249.


21 Ibid., p. 386.


26 Ibid., p. 398.

27 “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” 23 Aug. 1967. Ibid., p. 418.


29 “Action Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow),” 11 Dec. 1967. Ibid., p. 452.
32 “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” 16 Mar. 1968. Ibid., p. 482.
33 Ibid., p. 484.
34 “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” 30 Mar. 1968. Ibid., p. 493.
41 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez, p. 209.


48 Ibid., 7.


50 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez, p. 212.


57 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez, pp. 220–223.


60 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 12 Apr. 1967. Ibid., p. 355.


62 “Tass Statement,” 4 Mar. 1968. Pravda, p. 4 (All Pravda articles have been accessed using institutional access using the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press: Digital Archive 1949 to present, which has translated copies of original Russian articles translated into English).


67 For a detailed examination of these disputes with Saudi Arabia and the role of the Shah, see Roham Alvandi, “Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain
75 “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” 19 May 1967. Ibid., p. 372.
80 Ibid., p. 346. Emphasis added.
90 “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,” 19 Dec. 1967. Ibid., p. 454.
91 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 22 Nov. 1967. Ibid., pp. 447.
93 “Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle),” 22 Mar. 1968. Ibid., pp. 486–487.
94 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 23 Mar. 1968. Ibid., p. 488.
95 “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,” 29 Apr. 1968. Ibid., pp. 507–509.

Chapter 7

3 Ibid.; Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 365.
5 “Department of State to Embassy,” 3 Apr. 1969. DNSA, IR00711.
11 Ibid., p. 859.
13 Ibid., p. 273.
15 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 241.


Ibid.
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Ibid. (Emphasis added.)


Ibid.


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“A Self-Defeating Campaign of Hate, by Our Political Correspondent,” 8 Jan. 1972. *Kayhan International*, pp. 6–7. This was the latest episode of tension in the long and antagonistic history of Iran–Iraq relations; Hussein Sirriyeh,


86 On Soviet–Iranian relations, see Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, pp. 176–196.


92 Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, p. 167.

93 “Memorandum of Meeting between Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco and Ambassador Afshar,” 22 May 1972. POL 17–1, 1/28/70, Iran-US. NARA, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–1973, Political and Defense, Box 2381, p. 2.


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8 Ibid., p. 96.
9 Ibid., p. 97.
12 Ibid., p. 110.
13 Ibid., pp. 123–125.
14 Ramazani, *Iran’s Foreign Policy*, p. 286.
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Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, 60, 61
Afshar, Amir-Aslan, 150
Agency for International Development (AID), 11, 30, 43, 63, 80, 82, 108, 109, 110, 115–16, 145
end of AID in Iran, 114, 128–9, 131, 134–5, 162
Alam, Asadollah, 53, 59, 140, 147, 148, 151, 154
appointment as Prime Minister, 49, 52, 55
Alliance for Progress, 15
Amini, Ali, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44–5, 54, 76
appointment as Prime Minister, 26, 37–8
and development, 40, 53, 56
and military, 45
resignation, 45–9, 52–3, 55
Anderson, Hurst R., 78
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), 16, 19, 20, 22, 123
Ansary, Hushang, 100, 120, 121
Arab oil embargo (1967), 119, 121–2
Aram, Abbas, 59, 61, 77, 96
Arms sales, 8, 10–11, 70–1, 73, 80, 81, 83, 85, 91–3, 95, 102–3, 105, 107–13, 116, 129, 132–5, 139, 141–6, 151, 154, 156–8, 161–3
Arsanjani, Hassan, 54
Azerbaijan crisis (1946), 19, 26, 159

Baghdad Pact (1955), 23
Bahrain, 148
Bakhtiar, Teymour, 36, 147
Balance of payments, 83
Battle, Lucius, 119
Bell, David, 63
Borujerdi, Hossein 87
Bowling, John W., 29, 36, 37, 56
Bracken, Katherine, 90

Britain, 18, 20
and Iranian oil, 23
withdrawal from Middle East, 10, 103, 114–16, 122–8, 133–5, 139, 140, 148–9, 152, 162
Brown, George, 124, 125
Brubeck, William, 57
Bundy, McGeorge, 5, 29, 34, 35, 40, 46, 47, 48, 67, 103
Bureau of Budget, 82, 110
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 89

Carter, Jimmy, 155–6, 158
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 20, 39, 52, 74, 95–9, 107, 108, 118
and SAVAK, 23
1953 coup, 6, 20, 21–2, 24, 58, 87, 101, 112, 159
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 23, 60, 93, 124
Confederation of Iranian Students, 76
Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU), 91
Congress, 93, 100, 109, 115, 129, 132, 158
Crawford, Franklin, 111
Critchfield, James H., 109

Defence, Department of, 82, 86, 96, 105, 108, 145–6
Derakhshesh, Mohammad, 37
Development, Iranian, 4, 9, 11, 18, 29, 39, 46, 52–3, 67, 81, 101, 159, 160, 162
economic development, 1–2, 44, 46, 80, 81–3, 91, 110, 116, 129–31, 141–2, 146–7, 153, 162
Development, Iranian (Continued)
  political development, 82–3, 91, 129–31
  military modernization, 44, 55, 82, 91, 116, 119, 129, 132, 134–5, 142, 152, 162
  reforms, 51, 74
  Second Seven Year Plan, 23
  Third Development Plan, 39, 43, 44
  Dulles, Allen, 20, 21
  Dulles, John Foster, 20, 21
  Economic assistance, 24, 115–16, 132, 159
  Egypt, 115–18, 126, 147
  Eisenhower, Dwight, 9, 15, 20–2, 30, 159
    and development, 17
    and military assistance, 24
    and economic assistance, 24
    rollback and New Look strategy, 21
  Eisenhower Doctrine, 23
  Embassy staff, 31, 35, 37, 48, 52, 85, 96, 129, 146
  Eshkol, Levi, 119
  Farhang, Mansur, 76
  Farland, Joseph, 154
  Farrell, Raymond F., 77
  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 77, 79–80, 83
  Flanigan, Peter, 140
  Ford Foundation, 18, 159
  Ford, Gerald, 157
  Gaud, William, 43
  Green Movement, 164
  Hamilton, Fowler, 43
  Hansen, Kenneth, 1, 29, 39, 41, 43, 46
  Hare, Raymond, 109
  Harney, Desmond, 70
  Harriman, Averell, 36, 44, 118–19, 133
  Harrison, Sir Geoffrey, 41
  Healey, Denis, 124
  Helms, Richard, 158
  Henderson, Loy, 21
  Herz, Martin, 85, 86
  Holmes, Julius C., 6, 9, 27, 29, 30, 33, 35, 37, 40–3, 45–9, 52–3, 59–63, 67–8, 71, 144–5, 158, 160
  Hoopes, Townsend, 109
  Hoveyda, Amir Abbas, 97, 100–102
  Hughes, Thomas, 90
  Human rights, 155, 158
  Imami, Jafar-Sharif, 37
  Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 77–8, 83
  India, 60, 97, 100
  Indo-Pakistan War (1965), 10, 92, 93, 100–103, 112, 114, 162
  Iran Task Force, 1, 5, 37–40, 42, 54, 64, 109
  Iranian opposition, 10, 69, 70, 73–80, 83, 86, 88–9, 91–2, 129, 156, 161, 163
  religious opposition, 57, 87–90, 92, 131, 161
  Iranian Revolution, 6, 12, 36, 50, 51, 87, 89, 156, 163
  Iranian students, 1, 10, 69, 70, 73–8, 80, 82–3, 161
  and international collaboration, 75–7, 79
  Iranian Students Association (ISA), 1, 69, 76–80, 91, 161
  Iraq, 23, 126, 137, 148–51
  Irwin, John, 140
  Islamic Republic, 164
  Israel, 115–19, 124, 143
  vice presidential trips abroad, 71
  Johnson’s personality, 71
  and “massage policy”, 72
  relationship with the Shah, 72, 95, 106, 115, 126, 128
  and arms sales, 110
  and British withdrawal from Middle East, 125
  and development, 128
Kahn, Ayub, 60, 96
Kashani, Ayatollah Mostafa, 21, 87
Kaysen, Carl, 34
Kennedy, John F., 1, 2, 9, 11–12, 24, 26, 29, 30, 38, 40, 43–4, 46, 51, 55–7, 59, 61, 63–6, 68, 71, 155–9, 161
election campaign, 30
and modernization, 14
and developing world, 15, 30
relationship with the Shah, 28, 36, 46, 50, 61, 68
and National Security Council, 31, 34
and flexible response, 31
and containment, 47
assassination, 71, 73
Kerr, Clark, 78
Khomeini, Ruohollah, 70, 83, 87–90, 156, 161
and June 1963 riots, 86
Khrushchev, Nikita, 26
Kissinger, Henry, 137, 138, 140–1, 143–6, 151, 157, 163
Komer, Robert W., 5, 9, 27, 29–30, 33–5, 38–49, 53, 55, 57, 60–1, 63, 67–8, 71, 73, 79, 81, 83, 100, 103, 145, 160
Kurdish people, 163
Land reform, 39, 40, 46, 56, 73
Lilienthal, David, 16, 17, 18

MacArthur, Douglas, 139, 143–6, 150, 158
Mace, Charles H., 77, 78, 79
Majlis (Iranian parliament), 83, 130
and Status of Forces Agreement, 86
Mansur, Ali, 86, 88
assassination, 90
“massage policy”, 5, 9, 33, 48–51, 55–8, 60–3, 65–8, 72, 79, 81, 95, 100, 106, 156, 160
McCone, John, 63
McNamara, Robert S., 43, 63, 82–3, 96, 98, 105, 109–10, 113
Military assistance, 24, 46, 47, 55, 60, 80, 142, 159
Military Assistance Program (MAP), 43, 55, 69
Military sales, see Arms sales
Military threats to Iran, 81, 105–7, 145
Military, Iranian, 38, 43–4, 66, 70, 102, 106, 129, 133, 141–2
Miller, William, 89, 92, 156
views on Ayatollah Khomeini and religious opposition, 90–1
Millis, Max, 13
Mills, Arthur C., 16
Missionaries in Iran, American, 16, 18, 158
Mossadeq, Mohammad, 1, 20–3, 54, 76, 87, 159
and “negative equilibrium”, 23
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 35, 97, 105, 107, 112, 117–19, 126, 147
National Front, 20–1, 36, 39, 42, 45–6, 54–6, 58, 76, 88, 92, 129, 161
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), 22
National Security Action Memorandum 228 (NSAM-228), 63–6
Nixon, Richard M., 5–6, 8, 11, 71, 105, 135, 138, 140–1, 143–5, 152–8, 162–3
visit to Iran May 1972, 6, 7, 11, 111, 137, 141–6, 151–3, 155–6, 162–3
relationship with the Shah, 28, 136–7, 141, 146, 151, 162
Nixon Doctrine, 105, 137–9, 141, 146, 152, 162
and arms sales, 111
and detente with Soviet Union, 141
Novin Party, 86
nationalization crisis, 20
international consortium, 22, 119–22, 132, 140
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 140, 158

State Department, 29, 31, 35–7, 40, 42, 46, 53, 61, 73–4, 77–9, 82, 85–6, 91, 96, 98, 102, 106, 108–9, 111, 120, 127, 130, 141–2, 144–6
Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) (1964), 10, 70, 83, 85–6, 88–9, 91, 161
background of SOFAs, 84–5
Suez Crisis (1956), 117
Talbot, Philips, 41, 66, 79
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 17
Thorneycroft, Peter, 123
Tiger, Gordon, 86
Truman, Harry S., 19–20
Tudeh Party, 21, 55
Turkey, 23, 83

Union of Iranian Students of El Paso, 77

United Arab Republic, 62
United Nations, 9, 60, 62–3

Vietnam, American war in, 4, 10, 14, 31, 40, 62, 71, 78, 92–3, 95, 97, 99, 100, 102–6, 112–14, 124, 129, 154

Wailes, Edward, 35, 37
White Revolution, 9, 26, 51, 56–7, 73, 87, 129–31
1963 referendum on White Revolution, 51
Williamson, Ellis, 147
Wilson, Harold, 122–3, 125
Wriggens, Harold, 109, 110, 111
Wright, Denis, 147

Zahedi, Ardeshir, 121
Zahedi, Fazlollah, 21