

Notes

Foreword

1. John Jay Chapman, *Practical Agitation*, New York: Charles Scribner & Sons 1900, pp. 63–64.
2. See Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion*, Charleston: BiblioLife 2008.
3. When, in the Summer of 2013, Western European states grounded Evo Morales' presidential plane on which he was returning from Moscow to Bolivia, suspecting that Edward Snowden was hidden in it on his way to the Bolivian exile, the most humiliating aspect was the Europeans' attempt to retain their dignity: instead of openly admitting that they were acting under US pressure, or pretending that they were simply following the law, they justified the grounding on pure technicalities, claiming that the flight was not properly registered in their air traffic control. The effect was miserable—the Europeans not only appeared as US servants, they even wanted to cover up their servitude with ridiculous technicalities.

Introduction: L'Orient n'existe pas

1. The direct result of the 2002 Patriot Act was the 779 detainees in Guantanamo, most of them Muslim and many of them non-combatants, without any access to counsel or *habeas corpus*, against all international conventions (Chossudovsky 2004). Some of these people allegedly committed suicide. Despite President Obama's promises during both his campaigns, the Guantanamo Camp is still open and functioning.
2. It is not a mere coincidence that Herbert's *Dune* (1965) became, almost 50 years later, a perfect, prophetic and almost allegorical metaphor for the Orient subverting the existence of the 'Empire', another Lacanian letter eventually arriving at its destination.
3. The same process in the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, although similar in certain respects, is outside the scope of this study.
4. *Theoria* (θεωρία) in Classical Greek derives from *theorein* (θεωρεῖν): looking at, gazing or contemplation, that is, a way of looking at or observing and contemplating phenomena. Considered as such, Einstein's dictum that 'only the theory decides what can be observed' becomes self-evident, almost tautological, since what can be seen is definitely determined by how we look. What is seen, on the other hand, regardless of the way we look, bypassing our theoretical stance, belongs in the 'Real', in what is yet unnamed/ever unnameable and becomes the material for a later 'paradigmatic shift'.
5. By that, I mean 'a non-American rest-of-the-world, [...] a virginity parenthetically married to Europe' (Derrida 2007, p. 319).
6. Zeki Velidi Togan (1890–1970), a famous Turkologist, pan-Turkist and nationalist ideologue and scholar, was born in today's Bashkortostan. He became

aligned with Kolchak's rebel forces against the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution, then switched sides and attended the Baku Congress (Congress of the Peoples of the East) on the side of the Bolsheviks. He later became one of the leaders of the Turkistan National Liberation Movement and was forced to immigrate to Turkey in 1925. He was not on good terms with the Kemalist regime due to his extreme nationalist/pan-Turkist views, and he moved again, this time to Vienna, where he gained a PhD and, incidentally, met Sigmund Freud.

7. The subject matter of the complaint was Togan's *takunyas*, a kind of Turkish sabots that can make an infernal noise for the people living downstairs.
8. The samurai refused to use firearms as late as the Tokugawan Shogunate, that is, until the mid-19th century. A Turkish folk song from the 16th century that laments, '*Delikli demir çıktı, mertlik bozuldu*' ('They invent the iron with a hole and bravery is no more'), never lost its popularity during the 19th and 20th centuries and became in the 21st century: 'They invent the internet and bravery is no more.'
9. There were, as usual, significant exceptions to this, most of them in the realm of literature and literary criticism, most eminent among them being Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar and Cemil Meriç, who, despite their apparent conservatism and traditionalism (especially of the latter writer), were usually successful in manoeuvring within the 'Maze of Mirrors' and at the same time retaining their semantic integrity.

1 Is East East and West West?

1. Arthur de Gobineau proposed this three-way inequality of races in his *Essai sur l'inégalité des races* in 1853–1855. Henry Hotze popularised Gobineau's *Essai* in the US, as a defender of the Confederacy's regime of slavery (1856).
2. Any *failed* Oedipal bargain within a family ends up in a family tragedy, as is apparent from the archetypal story, Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*. The failure to reach a working settlement with the father function, either within the family or, more generally, in any social/cultural formation based on male/father domination tends to lead to subversion, revolt or terminal envy, resulting in a tragic reversal of fortune (*peripeteia*). A failed Oedipal bargain is universal (it can happen anywhere within the historical limits of so-called 'civilisation'), but not necessarily inevitable: the Phallic/Symbolic Order almost always provides for ways to reach some kind of a settlement with the Name-of-the-Father (or the Body-of-the-Father); these 'settlements' actually constitute the ideological structure (a framework of consent) that hold together the Symbolic Order, without having to resort to permanent raw, coercive force. In this sense, these reconciliations are akin to what Althusser calls the 'Ideological Apparatuses of the State' (Althusser 1971).
3. The division of labour in which all these contradictions are implicit, and which in its turn is based on the natural division of labour in the family and the separation of society into individual families opposed to one another, simultaneously implies the distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution, both quantitative and qualitative, of labour and its products, hence property, the nucleus, the first form of which lies in the family, where wife

- and children are the slaves of the husband. This latent slavery in the family, though still very crude, is the first form of property, but even at this stage it corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economists who call it the power of disposing of the labour-power of others (Marx & Engels 1976, p. 46).
4. The prefix ortho- means 'straight' in Greek, and its diametrical opposite is hetero- which means 'other'. Applied to sexual orientations/preferences rather than doctrines, we can see that the 'straight' (orthodox) position can only see any orientation/preference other than itself as 'queer'. The identification of this orthodoxy/straight-ness with heterosexuality, however, is just an irony of translation: defining persons who exclusively desire the 'opposite' sex as heterosexual is a recent quirk of translation; heterosexual should have meant anybody who desired an 'other', whose opposite would be 'idiossexual', somebody who exclusively desired himself/herself; namely, a narcissist.
 5. The 'Not-Only-But-Also' approach or methodology as an alternative to 'either/or', has been mostly overlooked by Marxist thinkers and critics, except for Darko Suvin, who insistently sets it forth as an indispensable methodological tool for a Marxian/Brechtian aesthetics. See, for example, his 'Not Only but Also: Reflections on Cognition and Ideology in Science Fiction and SF Criticism' (with Marc Angenot), in *Science Fiction Studies* #18, Volume 6, Part 2, July 1979; and his paper submitted to University of Chicago 'After Postmodernism' Conference (14–16 November 1997), entitled 'On Cognitive Emotions and Topological Imagination' (http://www.focusing.org/apm_papers/suvin.html), as well as throughout Patrick Parrinder's compilation dedicated to him, *Learning from Other Worlds: Estrangement, Cognition and the Politics of Science Fiction*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000.
 6. 'The utility of a thing makes it a use value. But this utility is not a thing of air. Being limited by the physical properties of the commodity, it has no existence apart from that commodity. A commodity, such as iron, corn, or a diamond, is therefore, so far as it is a material thing, a use value, something useful. (...) Let us now consider the residue of each of these products; it consists of the same unsubstantial reality in each, a mere conglomeration of homogeneous human labour, of labour power expended without regard to the mode of its expenditure. All that these things now tell us is that human labour power has been expended in their production, that human labour is embodied in them. When looked at as crystals of this social substance, common to them all, they are—Values.'
(Marx 1976, pp. 2–3)
 7. By the same token, nuclear physics until Heisenberg and Bohr was befuddled by the particle/wave dichotomy, since it was unable to think outside of the either/or epistemology. It was only with the advent of quantum mechanics, and especially with Heisenberg's 'Uncertainty Principle' that contemporary physics came to terms with the concept of 'not only (particle), but also (wave)'. The introduction of the not-only-but-also approach in quantum physics also did away with the deterministic structure of the law of causality, which was a direct corollary of the either/or epistemology and the bedrock of what Foucault calls 'the Western ratio': 'But what is wrong in the sharp

formulation of the law of causality, "When we know the present precisely, we can predict the future," is not the conclusion but the assumption. Even in principle we cannot know the present in all detail' (Werner Heisenberg, 'The Uncertainty Paper', in *Quantum Theory and Measurement*, eds. John Archibald Wheeler & Wojciech Hubert Zurek; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).

8. There are many instances where two or more of these positions cross-connect in order to redouble subalternity: a post-9/11 Oriental (or merely an Oriental-looking person) becomes also a Criminal; Women were almost always blamed with hysteria whenever they refused to denounce their sexuality and submit to male authority, thus making them also Insane; homosexuality was considered to be a type of mental illness until recently (and still is in some parts of the world), connecting it both with the Infirm and the Insane; and, of course, it was (and again, in some parts of the world, still is) a crime, connecting it to the Criminal. Hence, we have following concepts: the 'Terrorist', the 'Hysteric', the 'Pervert', the 'Sadist' (not as a sexual orientation or preference but as an illness/crime) and finally, the biggest American discovery of the post-queer era, the 'SSAD' (Same Sex Attraction Disorder).
9. About Badiou's critique of Lacan, see also Grigg, pp. 53–65. This rendering will also gain exceptional significance when we consider the position of women in the Republican phase of Turkey (in Chapter 7), when women from the conservative/middle-class/lower-middle-class strata of Turkish society assert their *subjecthood* by visually (but also, as we will see, superficially) confirming their *subjection* to the old patriarchal order; that is, by militantly covering their heads in public despite the authoritarian prohibitions devised by the 'modernist Father' of the Republic.
10. See Derrida's comments on Austin in 'Signature Event Context', in Derrida 1988.
11. Even these performatives will not be functional if I am denied that authority, as in the case of a slave: slaves cannot make promises since they are not the masters of their destinies, have no possessions to use in betting and no legal standing to bequeath anything to their progeny or kin.
12. By the same token, if *Genesis* 1.3 had read: 'And God said, Let there be light and . . . nothing happened', the Old Testament would have ended there and then. Likewise, the 1960s slogan 'What if they gave a war and nobody showed up?' is both a challenge and a way to estrange and unveil the performative character of the act, 'declaring a war'.
13. The fact that 'authority' is not an essential, a-historical position, but a performative itself, emergent in historical periods of transformation, also allows for subjects within civil society (new social movements, NGOs, protests, strikes, etc.) assume positions of authority (or mock-authority) during such periods and challenge and problematise already existing positions of (state) authority.

2 The Function of the Father in the East and the West

1. According to James Wescoat (Wescoat 2000), the critics of Wittfogel's concept of 'hydraulic societies' roughly fall in two categories: in the first group

there are usually Marxist or Marxian-oriented critics who are distressed by the rather far-reaching conclusions Wittfogel draws from his theory (i.e. his characterisation of the Soviet Union and China as Oriental despotic states), such as the Indian Marxist historian Irfan Habib (Habib 1961); in the second group there are mostly geographers/historians who question the validity of some of his facts (e.g. Adams 1966, Butzer 1976, Hunt & Eva Hunt 1976). Although I would agree (with reservations) with the first line of criticism that Wittfogel was too ambitious in extending his theory in order to 'explain away' Russian and Chinese revolutions, the second line usually misses the main point Wittfogel tries to make and gets lost in details (Harris 1977), although it is true that he was sometimes too hasty in generalising his observations on ancient Chinese history (a subject he was a leading expert on) to include other ancient civilisations (which he didn't know as well). The kernel of his theory, however, the correlation between the despotic nature of the state and the hydraulic nature of material production, still upholds against these critiques, at least as far as my present purpose in this study is concerned.

2. It is interesting to note that the distinction made between a 'society with slaves' and a 'slave society' (Dal Lago & Katsari 2008) is almost never challenged, although most historical scholarship (especially until Finley) simply ignores the difference and assumes that, for instance, the Israelites in Egypt were 'slaves'. Finley, on the other hand, maintains that, 'Were the Israelites in Egypt slaves because they were called upon, as were most native Egyptians, to perform compulsory labor for the Pharaoh? The answer seems clearly to be "Neither"; or better still, "Yes and no"' (Finley 1964, p. 237). To support this point, the evidence unearthed in Gaza in the last decade by Mark Lehner and Zahi Hawass (the infamous Egyptian ex-Minister of Antiquities) strongly suggests that the builders of the pyramids were not slaves but indentured workers.
 3. '[A] historical materialist views [cultural treasures] with cautious detachment. For without exception the cultural treasures he surveys have an origin which he cannot contemplate without horror. They owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great minds and talents who have created them, but also to the anonymous toil of their contemporaries. There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of barbarism; barbarism taints also the manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to another. A historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from it as far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain.'
- (Walter Benjamin, Thesis VII, *Theses on the Philosophy of History*)
4. Orlando Patterson argues that, 'In almost all non-Western slaveholding societies there was no such status in law as a "free" person. Indeed, there was no word for freedom in most non-Western languages before contact with Western peoples' (Patterson 1982, p. 27). According to Bernard Lewis, however, this is not exactly the case: a version of the concept of 'freedom' indeed existed in Arabic (and derived from that, in Ottoman Turkish), but it was a legal concept rather than social or political:

In traditional Islamic usage freedom was a legal not a political concept. The Arabic terms *hurr* 'free,' and *hurriya*, 'freedom,' with their derivatives and equivalents in the other languages of Islam, denoted the status of the free man in law as opposed to the slave [... T]he term *hurr* was normally used only in a juridical sense, with little social and no political content.

(Lewis 1993, p. 323)

5. That is, once in Europe from the 6th throughout 15th centuries, and the second time in the Americas throughout the 19th century, ending with a 'historic' event, i.e. the conclusion of the Civil War in the US in 1865.
6. This false promise can be clearly observed in the case of Turkey, which, after two centuries of 'Westernisation' and voluntary Occidental-mimicking, and a century of 'democracy' and integration into the capitalist world system, is still held at the threshold of the EU, the supposed end result and stronghold of Western civilisation.
7. Sadullah Paşa (1838–1891) is one of the typical Ottoman intellectual/statesmen of the 19th century: he entered state service as a translator (which is quite significant as we shall see later) when he was 18, served a short term as the Minister of Trade and Agriculture (1876), and then became Ambassador to Berlin and Vienna. He committed suicide at the age of 53 when he was still an Ambassador in Vienna.
8. Ziya Gökalp is another Turkish politician/intellectual of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, belonging to the *İttihat ve Terakki* [Unification and Progress] Party. Unlike Enver, however, Gökalp did not have a military background, and while Enver was discredited and forced to flee Turkey after the inglorious fiasco of the World War and eventually killed in the Soviet Union during an unsuccessful pan-Turkic uprising, Gökalp became one of the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic and the *ideologue par excellence* of Turkish nationalism, although he was of Kurdish origin.
9. It is interesting to note that 'the Jew' in this instance is *demoted* to his Oriental self. Western civilisation, ever unsure of what to do with the Jewish people in its midst, is engaged in a pendulum motion, here promoting Jewish culture to one of the main constituents of Westernity (as in the phrase 'Judeo-Christian'), there demoting it to its Mesopotamian, pre-diaspora ancestry, which is definitely Oriental. One of the most interesting and revealing occurrences of this profound ambiguity can be observed in the recent 'aside' dialogue between Sarkozy and Obama, unfortunately for them with the microphones on. Both presidents, who are the champions of the Israeli state as the Western and Westernising power in the Middle East, betray their profound dislike (almost disgust, very much like that towards an Arab Sheik, despised but *must* be tolerated) for its president when 'nobody is listening'. It is important to note, however, that this dislike is cultural rather than simply racial, given that the presidents in question, representing French and US cultures, are both of mixed races, the former of Hungarian-Jewish and the latter of Anglo-Irish-Kenyan descent.
10. To go back to our initial analogy, the same mechanism is present in the (now universal—both Occidental *and* Oriental) gynophobia and homophobia of the straight/male unconscious. Women, gays, lesbians—do they 'know something we don't'? Are they sharing some unknown form of enjoyment

we are excluded from? These gnawing suspicions lead to a sometimes partial, sometimes total suppression of female, gay and lesbian sexualities: suppression always indicates a sense of lack in the suppressor.

11. Critics of Western conceptions of sexuality sometimes travel too far to the other end and share in the fantasy that Oriental sexuality is essentially different from and preferable to the Western one: Foucault's distinction between *ars erotica* and *scientia sexualis*, for example, although sound enough on the analytical level, sometimes portrays an overly utopian view of Oriental sexuality, thus falling in the same trap of fantasy he was militating against. See, for instance, Leon Antonio Rocha, 'Scientia Sexualis Versus Ars Erotica: Foucault, van Gulik, Needham', *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*, Vol. 42, 2011, pp. 328–343.
12. In Arabic, *Gilman* is the plural for *gulam*, meaning 'young boy'. *Gulamperest* is the Ottoman composite word (Arabic with Persian suffix) for a paedophile/pederast. In the *Koran*, *gilman* are the young boys who are supposed to serve faithful (male) Muslims in Paradise.
13. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, p. 4.
14. It is interesting to note that the story of the 'passage' to the democratic regime in Athens as told by Aeschylus in *Oresteia*, coincides with the story of the construction of the male-dominant order. Athena establishes the Aeropagos to save Orestes, who killed his mother, from the fury of the Erinyes, avengers for matricide. Erinyes submit to the authority this newly constructed court, and in the final vote, Athena tips the balance in favour of Orestes, proclaiming that in killing his mother Klytaemnestra, Orestes has rightfully avenged his father, Agamemnon, whom Klytaemnestra had killed:

Athena. Born, and beholden to no mother, I
With undivided heart prefer the man
In all save wedlock. I am for the sire
Wholly, and will not overprize her death,
Who slew the lord and guardian of her home.

(*The Oresteia of Aeschylus*. Tr. George. C. W. Warr,
London: George Allen, 1900; pp. 736–740)

In a single stroke, mariticide (killing the husband) becomes *the* capital crime, while matricide, considered the most heinous crime until then, is pushed into the secondary place. As a result, *Erinyes*, ancient goddesses of female vengeance, are retired into obscurity. A very detailed argument on this coincidence of 'democracy' and male domination can be found in George D. Thomson's *Aeschylus and Athens*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1946.

15. As it happened in the cases of Caesar's assassination by his peers and his 'son' ('καί σὺ τέκνον?'—'You too, my son?'), or in Alexander's very controversial (e.g. strongly opposed by Plutarch) alleged assassination in Babylon. If, however, there is a grain of truth in the rumours of assassination in Alexander's case, the person behind this alleged assassination is named *Antipater*, or 'Ἀντίπατρος in Greek, which curiously means 'anti-father'. A coincidence, no doubt, but a very interesting one, being another instance of the Lacanian 'letter' eventually, but without fail, arriving at its destination.
16. See *The Book of Dede Korkut*, ed. Geoffrey Lewis, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974. *The Book of Dede Korkut* is constructed in the form of a frame tale,

- containing 12 legends of the Oghuz Turks or the Turkomans (of which '*Dirse Han Oğlu Boğaç Han*' is the first), dating from the 8th to the 14th centuries AD, and taking its present form in the 15th.
17. We should be reminded of the myth of Remus and Romulus at this point, which is definitely Western, and although by no means cosmogonic or theogonic, it is without a doubt a founding myth. However, it differs from the Oriental myths in that *the father* in the story of Remus and Romulus is lacking. The twins do not have a father (it is possible that Ares or Hercules sired them, but they are not involved in the story) for whose position (or love or appreciation) they are competing. Another argument for the non-applicability of the Roman founding myth is that, it is most probably borrowed from the Old Testament anyway: the story of the twins being put in a basket and left to float along the Tiber is almost a word-for-word rehash of the story of Moses from the *Exodus*.
 18. 'And Cain knew his wife; and she conceived, and bare Enoch: and he builded a city, and called the name of the city, after the name of his son, Enoch. And unto Enoch was born Irad: and Irad begat Mehujael: and Mehujael begat Methusael: and Methusael begat Lamech. And Lamech took unto him two wives: the name of the one [was] Adah, and the name of the other Zillah. And Adah bare Jabal: he was the father of such as dwell in tents, and [of such as have] cattle. And his brother's name [was] Jubal: he was the father of all such as handle the harp and organ. And Zillah, she also bare Tubalcain, an instructor of every artificer in brass and iron: and the sister of Tubalcain [was] Naamah.'

(*Genesis* 4:17–22)

 19. Although the New Testament was also written in the Middle East, and therefore in one sense it can be considered as an 'Oriental text', the Middle East of the New Testament was also Alexandrian-Greek/Roman; that is, constantly under 'Western influence' for almost three-and-a-half centuries until the advent of Christianity.
 20. See, for instance, John M. Ross, 'Oedipus Revisited: Laius and the "Laius complex"', *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, Vol. 37, 1982, pp. 169–200; or Claude Le Guen, 'The Formation of the Transference: Or the Laius Complex in the Armchair', *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 55(4), 1974, pp. 505–512.
 21. Even the basic ideological structure of most of today's 'civilisation' (both Western and Islamic), namely the monotheistic, Abrahamic religions, starts with an attempted filicide, that of Isaac.
 22. An alternative translation of this passage by John Freely reads: 'Whichever of my sons inherits the sultan's throne, it behooves him to kill his brothers in the interest of the world order. Most of the jurists have approved this procedure. Let action be taken accordingly' (Freely, *Inside the Seraglio*, p. 12).
 23. There are exceptions even to this: in every coup, rebellion or deposition of a Sultan, the Janissaries play a key role, mostly as 'muscle', but sometimes as the political and ideological spearhead. In 1703, for instance, decades before the American and French revolutions, an Algerian Janissary named Çalık Ahmet declares that there is no need for the Sultanate, the country should be ruled by the *cumhur* (loosely meaning the public, the root of the much later term *Cumhuriyet*, meaning republic) and government should be

- run by communal counsel. A century later, during the deposition of Selim III in 1807, some Janissaries shouted: 'Isn't the Sultan a human being like us? One of us might serve in his stead as well!' (see Tezcan 2010, pp. 198–213, *passim*).
24. The feudal *Ius primæ noctis* (the *Droit du seigneur* or the 'Law of the First Night') in Europe is indeed a poor excuse for the Oriental Harem in retaining some element of the primal father's unbounded polygyny, and it was never an actual law in itself: it was a remnant of the omnipotent father imago, and was usually maintained as a threat, as some kind of a bogeyman to keep the serfs under control rather than being actually implemented.
 25. *Kul* is a term used in Islam to denote the position of human beings vis-à-vis God and also vis-à-vis the Sultan. This was not particular to Islam, however; the Chinese Emperor (*Huangdi*) was considered to be the 'Son of Heaven' (*Tianzi*) and thus was the ruler of 'all under heaven' (*Tianxia*). The rulers of Western empires from Alexander of Macedonia to the Habsburgs, on the other hand, however extensive their domain or however strong their hold on political power may have been, never had such an absolute claim.
 26. It is Karl Wittfogel who first suggested that the Stalinist regime in the USSR was a direct continuation of 'Oriental despotism' in Russia. See his *Oriental Despotism*, and especially, 'The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolution', *World Politics*, Vol. 12(4) July, 1960, pp. 487–508.
 27. Lacan seems not to have done his homework in this matter, though, because the sentence, 'If God doesn't exist, then everything is permitted' does not exist in either the French or the English translations of *Brothers Karamazov*. The Russian original is *said* to have the sentence '*Esli boga net—znachit vsio pozvoleno*', but the online Russian edition does not have it. The closest the French edition (the one most likely used by Lacan, if he is not simply quoting Sartre) comes to this sentence is when Alyosha recounts his dialogue with Rakitin (and not, as Lacan thought, in a dialogue between Ivan and his father) in Book XI, Chapter 4: '*Mais alors, que deviendra l'homme, sans Dieu et sans immortalité? Tout est permis, par conséquent, tout est licite?—Ne le savais-tu pas? Tout est permis à un homme d'esprit, il se tire toujours d'affaire*' (*Les Frères Karamazov*, tr. Henri Mongault, 1880, *Éditions de groupe* [online edition], p. 775).

3 The First Triangulation: Desire, Mimicry, Revolt

1. I am referring to Marco Polo's *Il Milione*, first published in French in the early 14th century and translated into English and other European languages several times since (see, for example, *The Travels of Marco Polo, the Venetian*, New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1953). A recent book by historian Frances Wood (Wood 1996) claims (with some pretty convincing arguments) that Marco Polo never travelled farther from Persia and based his narrative on the accounts of several other travellers. Ironically enough, Wood's claim in one sense literalises a metaphor: haven't Oriental and postcolonial studies always claimed that 'the Orient' was a discursive construct? Well, here it is: it *is* a construct after all, written by a man who has never been east of Persia, who is oblivious of the Great Wall or the chopsticks Chinese people use while

eating, never mentioning these in his account, and who is entirely non-existent in the Chinese chronicles of the time, all the while he pretends to have befriended the Emperor as some kind of an unofficial 'cultural attaché' from Europe.

2. A good example of this sub-genre would be George Orwell's *Burmese Days* (1934, Orwell 1974), who, as Eric Arthur Blair, was a colonial police officer in Burma in 1922–1927 and recorded his experiences there (in his usual semi-fictional/semi-documentary style) in this book.
3. The 'Oriental-ness' or 'European-ness' of Imperial Russia is the subject of a much heated debate. Discursively speaking, a culture that spent two centuries discussing 'Westernisation' and 'Europeanisation' cannot be 'Western' or 'European' *per se*, since you cannot go where you already are. We can, of course, argue that it was *not only* Oriental *but also* Western, considering the facts that there was a religious common ground (Christianity) with the West, there were many more or less Western elements within the Empire (the Baltic states and, to a certain extent, Byelorussia), and it was the first to 'Westernise' after all. For a detailed discussion, see, for instance, David-Fox, *et al.* 2006, especially the epigraph in the 'Introduction' from Dostoyevsky's 'Diary of a Writer': 'In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, but in Asia we are masters. In Europe we were Tatars, but in Asia we, too, are Europeans' (p. 3).
4. The second failure before the walls of Vienna, in 1683, was decisive and final. The Austrians and their allies advanced rapidly into Ottoman territory in Hungary, Greece, and the Black Sea coast, and the Austrian victories at the second battle of Mohacs in 1687 and at Zenta in 1697 sealed the defeat of the Turks. The peace treaty of Carlowitz, signed on 26 January 1699, marks the end of an epoch and the beginning of another. This was the first time that the Ottoman Empire signed a peace as the defeated power in a clearly decided war, and was compelled to cede extensive territories, long under Ottoman rule and regarded as part of the House of Islam, to the infidel enemy. It was a fateful opening to the eighteenth century.

(Lewis 1968, p. 36)

5. [T]he *Unhappy Consciousness* is the consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely contradictory being. [207.] This *unhappy, inwardly disrupted* consciousness, since its essentially contradictory nature is for it a *single* consciousness, must for ever have present in the one consciousness the other also; and thus it is driven out of each in turn in the very moment when it imagines it has successfully attained to a peaceful unity with the other.

(Hegel 1977, p. 126)

6. *Ulema* is the plural of Arabic *Alim*, which in turn comes from '*Ilm*' (so does the name of the sub-class, *Ilmiyye*), meaning *science*, but it refers to law and religion rather than 'positive sciences'. *Ilmiyye* was one of the four main branches of the Ottoman administrative class; the other three were *Seyfiyye* (the sword-bearers, the military), *Kalemiyye* (the pen-bearers, the bureaucracy) and *Mülkiyye* (public administration, the civil service), although these

last two did not coexist temporally, but rather the latter eventually replaced the former.

7. Amid all the discourse of 'the promotion of European literature and science among Indians', the fact that the reverse was also the case, albeit to a more limited extent, is usually not seen worth a mention. In 1794, for instance, an article by surgeons Cruso and Findlay (who were in India during the war of 1789–1792) was published in the October issue of *Gentlemen's Magazine*, describing the rhinoplasty techniques of Indian surgeons. This article and subsequent medical discussions around it led to the rediscovery of rhinoplasty in Europe, something not practised since the Roman times, and later inspired Karl Ferdinand von Gräfe's *Rhinoplastik*, and, in fiction, Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (the concept of surgically rebuilding the human body), both in 1818.
8. Throughout most of the rest of this study, I will be using the masculine pronoun for 'the Mimic Man', 'the colonial subject', 'the colonial mimic' and 'the Oriental Transvestite'. This is not because I prefer the masculine pronoun for the universal, non-gendered subject, but because these subjects are almost exclusively male, since most Oriental and/or colonial women did not willingly engage in mimicry, or demonstrate an apparent 'desire to imitate', at least until early to mid-20th century; I will, however, use 'they' or in a few cases, 's/he', whenever there are exceptions.
9. There was indeed something we can name 'Occidental Transvestitism' in Europe in the 19th century, but this was mostly due to the efforts of the occasional visitors and diplomats to the Orient to blend in, to don Oriental clothing as camouflage, for reasons of safety, and in a few cases, to express solidarity. A few of them even brought back this practice to Europe as an exotic habit and had their portraits made in Oriental attire, Lord Byron's Albanian costume being one of the most famous (Schiffer 1999, Sweetman 1991).
10. It is only through the encounter with the capitalist West that the option to revolt becomes an actual possibility, since that encounter obliterates, once and for all, the myth of the indestructibility (omnipotence/omnipresence) of the Oriental Father. Once revolt starts (e.g. in the Balkans against the Ottoman state), the Oriental Oedipal bargain loses its rational foundation (and hence its actuality), and after that it becomes something of habit and, eventually, a mere excuse to carry on with the performance of the opportunistic son.
11. As we will later see, the fundamental difference between the Oriental and Occidental Oedipal bargains also changes the position of the female subject substantially. In the Occidental Oedipal bargain, the Father is internalised and, therefore, the mission of controlling desire falls to men: they should be on constant watch lest 'improper desire' threatens the patriarchal structure. In the Oriental Oedipal bargain, however, the primordial Father's desire (or his *jouissance*) is considered uncontrollable: so it is the mission of *women* to keep this desire under check. They should, therefore, cover their bodies permanently, denying the fact that they are the object of His (and through him, of the entirety of the male community's) desire, and in doing so, constantly admit that there is *something* there to be hidden, turning the Oriental patriarchal order into one of perpetual tantalisation.

12. This different bargain can be best observed in the semi-official system of bribes in the Orient. Although bribing is a universal, present wherever there is a bureaucracy, in the Orient it had become more of a semi-acknowledged official tradition, practised everywhere although it is not inscribed in the legal system. The famous line by one of the most eminent satiric poets of the 16th-century Ottoman Empire, Fuzuli, is witness to this fact: 'I greeted them but they ignored, since my salute was not a bribe.' Four-and-a-half centuries later, when the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic, Turgut Özal, was faced with charges of excessive bribing in the customs office, he famously remarked, 'My bureaucrat knows what is best for him.'
13. Empress Dowager Cixi is usually referred to as a 'scheming and devious woman', a 'Dragon Empress' in various histories, although in her reign of 47 years she managed to hold the Qing Dynasty (and the Empire) together, regardless of her methods. She was not, however, the only Empress in Chinese history: almost 12 centuries before her, Wu Zetian ruled China, first as Empress Dowager and then as self-proclaimed Empress between 690–705, even founding her own (Zhou) dynasty. The attitude of Chinese historians towards her, however, is usually very remote and extremely disapproving, since in the Confucian code a woman is 'not fit to rule'.
14. On an etymological note: *emasculation* comes from the Latin verb *emasculare*, that is, *ex-* (out) *masculus* (male), meaning castration, 'making less than man', and in that sense is directly related to *humiliation*. *Effemination*, on the other hand, has almost the same root, *ex-* (out) *femina* (female), and should have meant 'making less than woman', but no, it means 'making more female', the prefix *ex-* taking on opposite meanings in these two closely related words. In European languages there is no word for de-feminisation, while both emasculation and effemination mean de-masculinisation, which indicates the constant fear of castration in the male, and the patriarchal presupposition that the female is *already castrated*. In Turkish, Russian, Hindi and Chinese, which are structurally no less patriarchal, one cannot even say 'effemination' without resorting to English or French. We can deduce from this etymological impasse that the effemination (or *feminisation*) of the Father-image cannot mean, in Hindi and Chinese as well as in Turkish and Russian, anything other than emasculation, and therefore humiliation.
15. Although the title of the novel is usually translated as *The Carriage Affair* by many Turkish literary critics, a more faithful translation would be *Love of Carriage*, or, with an ounce of interpretation, *Lovesick for a Carriage*. I do not intend to dispute the canonised translation, but for my purposes here, the latter seems more appropriate.
16. There may be many reasons for this: Catherine was herself a playwright of sorts, and had written an opera about Vadim of Novgorod herself, which may indicate pure artistic envy (Wachtel 1994, p. 32). More importantly, however, the hero of both their operas, Vadim, was a rebel who had revolted against the enlightened despot Riurik, and when in the end he is defeated by him, commits suicide declaring: 'What are you against him who dares to die?' (Morrissey 2006, p. 56). Not surprisingly, Catherine's opera was written from the point of view of Riurik, and Kniazhnin's from that of Vadim. Vadim's final declaration in Kniazhnin's opera definitely upsets the Hegelian contract

of master/bondsman, not because Vadim rebels, but because he 'dares to die', not only defying Riurik's rule, but also *his right to rule*, by assuming the master's distinguishing trait, which, according to Hegel, is courage and the ability to risk death. Kniazhnin's epic opera, then, may be seen as one of the earliest indications of the Russian *intelligent*, bestowed (or cursed) with a Hegelian 'unhappy consciousness' from the very start.

17. The *Tanzimat* (the Reorganisation; 1839–1876) is a period in Ottoman history starting with the Rescript of Gülhane and ending with the Declaration of Constitutional Monarchy. It is an era of accelerated cultural and economic Westernisation, and is also underlined by increasing Western political intervention in the Empire's affairs (indicative of a different sort of 'emasculatation') as a series of concessions:

[The Rescript of Gülhane] was penned by Reşid Paşa, but it was pressed for and approved by the British, foreshadowing the typical local-Western configuration of the *Tanzimat* brand of Westernization [...] The Imperial Rescript of Reform (*Islahat Fermanı*) which was issued in 1856 to reaffirm the Rescript of Gülhane was outright co-authored by three European ambassadors together with Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa, both protégés of Reşid and the leaders of the second stage of the *Tanzimat*.

(Parla 1985, p. 3)

18. Rumour has it that on one occasion, when introduced to someone as simply 'Ekrem Bey', the other person discreetly asked 'Which Ekrem?' (no last names being used at that time), and Recaizade, overhearing the question, proudly declared 'Le Ekrem!' Narcissistic arrogance and French-dropping in one exclamation—sure-fire indicators of Occidentomimic dandyism.
19. According to Figes, many Russian aristocrats and *intelligents* of the early 19th century hardly spoke any Russian, and if they did, quite poorly, since they would have learned it from house servants and *muzhiks* (Figes 2002, p. 55).
20. Pushkin's couplet is valid almost word-for-word for Turkish, with a very ironic twist: a *pantaloon* is '*pantolon*' in Turkish, and a *frock*, '*frak*' (used exclusively for a tailcoat). *Gilet*, however, used in the 19th-century Ottoman Turkish as '*jile*', has its etymological roots in Arabic '*jalikah*', and before that, Turkish '*yelek*'. Even when the 'original' is Turkish, 19th-century Ottoman culture still transliterated it from the French, thus creating a double alienation.

4 The Second Triangulation: Desire, *Özenti*, Envy

1. *Özenti* in Turkish is a curious word, not readily translatable into European languages. One meaning of the root, *özen*, is 'meticulous attention'. The infinitive, '*özenmek*' is both 'to pay meticulous attention' and 'to emulate'. *Özenti*, however, since its 'invention' (because it was one of the 'invented' words during the 'language revolution' of the 1930s), has taken on a peculiar meaning during the course of the republican era, including both 'affectation' and 'emulation', with a connotation of 'coveting' as well. Accordingly, *özenti* with reference to a state of mind means 'affectative emulation' or 'emulative affectation', and an *özenti* with reference to a person means a travesty of the West, imitating but without any proper verisimilitude, *alike but not quite*.

2. That was a novel and somewhat revolutionary move by the Ottoman state, albeit dictated by necessity: since entire non-Ottoman Europe was considered *Dar-al Harb* ('Realm of War') by *Sharia* law (as opposed to *Dar-al Islam*—'Realm of Islam/Peace'), it was not acceptable for Muslim subjects of the Sultan to live in European countries, under heathen governments (see, for example, Badr 1982). Ottoman administration, however, opportunistic as ever in the interpretation of *Sharia* law, made a 'switch' in the early 19th century, making it possible for Muslim youths to travel to Europe and receive a secular education.
3. Even as late as 21st century, some (not to say most) Turkish intellectuals still argue for state subsidies in cultural production, in theatre, cinema, music and publishing, *not*, as in some European countries, as an appeal to the capitalist 'welfare state', but rather as a nostalgic act, asking for the patronage of the Asiatic Father/state.
4. At this point, we should remember Sadullah Paşa, already mentioned in Chapter 1, who also served as Minister of Trade. Apparently, the Ministry of Trade was an important post for francophone, European-educated officials who also had ambitions in the literary trade.
5. To give the most prominent examples, İbrahim Şinasi (1826–1871), who wrote the first Turkish verse plays, was also a translator and an appointed official in the *Encümen-i Daniş* (Academy of Sciences) and the *Meclis-i Maarif* (Council of Education). Likewise, Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem (1847–1914), whose novel *Araba Sevdası* (*The Carriage Affair*, on which I have commented at length in the previous chapter) is usually considered to be the first 'realist' Turkish novel, was a translator as well (in the Foreign Office as well as literary); he was also member of the *Şura-yı Devlet* (State Court) and even Minister of Education for a short spell.
6. Some sources claim that Namık Kemal himself translated *Du contrat social* from Rousseau and *De l'esprit des lois* (*The Spirit of the Laws*) from Montesquieu, but there is no indication that these translations were ever published (Öztürk 2000, pp. 71–72).
7. The Ottoman system of *devşirme* (co-optation, or 'child levy') was itself partially adopted from the conquered Byzantine tradition, and involved the co-optation of non-Turkish, non-Muslim youth as teenagers and educating them for the military and the bureaucracy. They would thus have no permanent and hereditary claim on their positions, and since they would be converted to Islam and state-educated from an early age, their obedience would be practically guaranteed. Feroz Ahmad observes that:

Technically, the recruits became 'slaves' or, more accurately, 'clients' (*kul*) of the sultan though not in the sense of chattel slaves and owed absolute loyalty to him. Having severed all family bonds and connections with their past, they were able to create new ties and an *esprit de corps* with other recruits. But their positions of power and their wealth could not be inherited by their children who were born Muslims. Therefore it was not possible for them to create a class with its own vested interests.

(Ahmad 2003, p. 19)

This system only functioned until the end of the so-called 'classical age' of the Empire (approximately between 1300 and 1600), and after the mid-17th century it degenerated into a system of bribes and favouritism. A more or less

accurate description of the system can be found in Findley 1980, pp. 14–18, although he is not free from the misconception of treating *kuls* as slaves in the Greco-Roman sense; a misconception I have already commented on in Chapter 1. Also, see Kunt 1974, *passim*.

8. The Janissary order was one of the oldest institutions of the Ottoman Empire; it was an order of professional soldiers located at the political centre of the Empire, and it was instrumental in many shifts in power, using its monopoly of brute force in the capital in resolving domestic political conflicts almost as often as in fighting wars.
9. See Küçük 1984, v. I, p. 26. Yalçın Küçük's four-volume history of the Turkish intelligentsia is an extensive study, albeit exceedingly chaotic. The author, who is an ardent, not to say voracious, researcher, is also extremely paranoid and often falls prey to his own conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, his book contains a lot of useful data, not readily accessible elsewhere.
10. A century later, for instance, in 1915, when the Ottoman army denied penetration to the British fleet in Dardanelles, it was considered to be the greatest victory of the century and 'Dardanelles, *no pasaran!*' ('Çanakkale geçilmez!') became a catchphrase in Turkish. Not surprisingly, one of the commanding officers leading the successful defensive battle was Mustafa Kemal, who would later become the founding father of the Republic and adopt the last name 'Atatürk', meaning the ancestor/father of Turks. The official history of the Dardanelles defensive would later be 'revised' to make Mustafa Kemal the *only* hero responsible for the victory, in order to turn this story into a founding myth.
11. One of the most famous poets of the late Ottoman/early republican era, the poet who wrote the lyrics of the national anthem, Mehmed Akif Ersoy, also wrote in his *Ode to the Martyrs of Dardanelles*, 'Asım's generation, said I, a generation true/Didn't let its chastity/honour/virtue [*namus*] to be trampled on, neither shall let it ever come to pass.'
12. Not surprisingly, it was Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) who answered this call in 1921 during a session of the National Assembly. When a deputy quoted Namık Kemal's couplet, Mustafa Kemal answered: 'Let the enemy to the bosom of the homeland press his dagger/There will be someone to save your ill-fated mother.'
13. İnalçık and Quataert call this 'the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire'; which choice of words definitely (although probably independently of the authors' intention) indicates castration (İnalçık and Quataert 1994, p. xxxviii).
14. Being paranoid, however, doesn't mean you are not being followed. Many (sometimes most) of these suspicions definitely had some basis in truth: the Sultan and many politicians *were* mis- (and dis-) informed most of the time, and there were, indeed, many bought and voluntary 'traitors' to go around. But the reverse is also true: the fact that you are being followed doesn't mean you are not paranoid.
15. From the child's point of view, the sexual relationship between the mother and the father is *always* incestuous; since they are both related to her/him by blood, they should be related to each other the same way. The child resolves this mystery through the Oedipal bargain, by accepting the alienated/mystified structure of the family, which both sanctions and

- prohibits sexuality, and both necessitates and disallows kinship within the family. The *failure* of the Oedipal bargain, however, leaves the child with a double mystification, which tends to result in psychosis.
16. This turn towards conspiratorial politics ended up in the establishment of *İttihat ve Terakki* (Committee of Union and Progress) in 1889, and it represents, for the first time in Ottoman history, a bid for an Occidental Oedipal bargain; that is, a conspiracy of brothers against the father, although they did not openly declare (or even themselves *know*) their intention to abolish the Sultanate until much later. Consequently, when Mustafa Kemal, a former minor member of the committee, abolished the Sultanate in 1923, it came as a surprise even for some of the ex-members.
 17. See, for instance, Şerif Mardin's account of the attitude of Young Ottomans towards the Sultan: 'It is thus quite surprising to find out that the attacks of the Young Ottomans were rarely directed at the sultan's person, and never against the institution of the monarchy' (Mardin 2000, p. 108).
 18. It is possible to see that the Sultan in this metaphor takes on a feminine attribute, which is understandable: the 'rape and murder' in the beginning of the century had not only emasculated, but also *effeminated* (hence feminised) the Sultan, depriving him of his masculine potency, and 'reducing' him to the position of a woman who has to be protected/saved by her 'sons', against her own volition if necessary.
 19. As a matter of fact, an allegoric Turkish adaptation of *Hamlet* was staged in 1970 by a well-known left-wing Turkish director, Beklan Algan (*Hamlet '70*), in which the ghost was Mustafa Kemal, Hamlet was the 'revolutionary Turkish youth', Gertrude was the 'Motherland', Laertes was the fascists and Claudius was the present government. For an extended discussion about Hamlet's psychotic split and its relevance as a metaphor for the state of mind of the Ottoman (and later Turkish) intellectual as can be observed in this allegory, see Somay 2008, pp. 92–97.
 20. This feminine 'father' is not much unlike Géza Róheim's concept of the 'vaginal father' as a replacement for the 'phallic mother' (Róheim cited in Campbell 1960, p. 103).
 21. So much so that, in Turkish slang *bikr* is sometimes used as a synonym for the hymen.
 22. In the German original, Marx uses the word '*phantasie*' for *fancy*, further connecting him (retroactively, of course) to the Lacanian concept of 'desire'. If we read this together with Barbon's definition of desire as 'the appetite of the mind', we can see the Lacanian narrative of '*traversé du phantasme*' as the wellspring of desire at work.
 23. The 'Ode to 19th Century' by Sadullah Paşa which I quoted in the previous chapter is a good example of this sentiment on the eastern side of the border, whereas on the opposite side, almost the entire Orientalist discourse is built on this premise.
 24. *Vuslat* in Arabic means a union with the beloved, but its root is *arrival*, reaching your destination.
 25. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the fez will already have been past history, illegalised by the early republican Kemalist government, but the necktie (both the cravat and the bowtie) will have become the centre of a controversy, in both Turkey and, not surprisingly, Iran. After the

Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iranian upper classes and government officials completely refused to wear these two garments, whereas their Turkish counterparts insistently did so, until the present 'soft-Islamic' government. In the last decade, Turkish government officials and politicians have invented an opportunistic middle way worthy of their imperial ancestors, wearing the cravat in official occasions, while pointedly refusing to do so in less-official public appearances. A detailed discussion of cultural/sartorial politics of both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic can be found in Chapter 4.

26. Hodja Nasreddin is a semi-legendary Turkish folkloric figure who (is believed to have) lived in the 13th century. There are hundreds of Hodja Nasreddin jokes, some supposedly authentic and some apparently invented after his time. He is a cross between a jokester/clown and a sage, almost all of the time satirising authority, and as such is as close the Turkish/Ottoman culture can get to the carnivalesque as historically possible.
27. In a sense, the concealed Ottoman intellectual both reverses and adds a new dimension to Žižek's paraphrase of Lacan's description of love: 'Everyone knows Lacan's definition of love ("Love is giving something one doesn't have ..."); what one often forgets is to add the other half which completes the sentence: "...to someone who doesn't want it"' (Žižek 2006, p. 355). Although he still desires it, the concealed Ottoman intellectual 'gracefully' declines what Europe seems to offer but refuses to give, and doesn't have anyway.
28. The quotation is from so far the best translation into English by Anthony Burgess (Rostand 1991), and even this translation cannot come close to the lyricism, stylistic precision and emotional depth of the Turkish one by Sabri Esat Siyavuşgil in 1942. The translation was one of the reasons the play became an immediate hit; not only the sentiment, but also the language made the play sound almost authentic. It is rumoured that *Cyrano* was scheduled for translation and performance in the Court of Sultan Abdülhamid II in the early 1900s, but was censored due to the possibility that the Sultan, who had a rather prominent nose, could have been offended. There is no doubt, however, that it would have enjoyed the same success it had in the 1940s, if it had been produced at that time, since the history of Ottoman intellectual's romantic conceit goes as far back as the late *Tanzimat* era.
29. 'In place of the patriotism of Western Europe, a different sentiment arose—nationalism, romantic and subjective in its criteria of identity, all too often illiberal and chauvinistic in its expression' (Lewis 1968, p. 344).
30. 'Concluding that their liberal experiment had been a failure, the [Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)] leaders turned to Pan-Turkism, a xenophobic and chauvinistic brand of nationalism that sought to create a new empire based on Islam and Turkish ethnicity' (Melson, 'Paradigms of Genocide', cited in Zarakol 2011, p. 124). Consequently, when more than a million-and-a-half Armenians were 'deported' in 1915, most of them being killed en route to their destination (which was only able to sustain 60,000 anyway), the CUP felt itself justified in ethnically 'homogenising' the population. This event became the starting point of a century-long mourning for the Armenian people, as well as the subject of the unending debate around 'Armenian genocide', or to use the more fitting Armenian phrase, the *Medz Yeghern* ('Great Calamity'). The Republic was no less determined in ethnical

homogenisation: in 1923, after the Turco-Greek War was over, tens of thousands of Greeks were 'exchanged' with the ethnic Turkish population living in Greece, with much less bloody but, perhaps, equally devastating cultural and psychological consequences.

31. This concern was later repeated in the republican era (early 1930s), to uphold national unity against Islamic revivalist and Kurdish nationalist sentiments, in the racist 'Sun Language Theory' and 'Turkish Historical Thesis', although these extremist theories that attempted to prove all languages and major civilisations were derived from the Turkic ones were later (at least officially) dropped:

An obscure Viennese scholar, Hermann Kvergič, had a theory that all languages derived, through Turkish, from an ancient Central Asian tongue. Despite scholarly skepticism, Atatürk liked this 'Sun Language Theory' and promoted it officially. The Turkish Historical Society propounded a matching 'Turkish Historical Thesis,' also approved by Mustafa Kemal, which held that the Turks had originated in Central Asia and expanded from there to found the great civilizations. This meant that ancient Near Eastern peoples, the Sumerians and Hittites, had been proto-Turks. As archaeological discoveries expanded knowledge of the millennia before the Turks' eleventh-century migration into Anatolia, and as linguists and historians studied the Turks' Central Asian origins, the theorizing about language and history reprocessed everything into a 'national' form suitable for a teleological canon leading up to the Turkish republic, whose founding Mustafa Kemal had expounded in his 1927 speech.

(Findley 2010, pp. 255–256)

32. This is almost exactly the same argument Žižek uses in *The Art of the Ridiculous Sublime*: the construction (even *invention*) of father images may as well be a defence mechanism against the horrifying realisation that enjoyment as such may not exist at all:

Such monstrous apparitions are 'returns in the Real' of the failed symbolic authority: the reverse of the decline of paternal authority, of the father as the embodiment of the symbolic Law, is the emergence of the rape-enjoying father of the False Memory Syndrome. This figure of the obscene rapist father, far from being the Real beneath the respectful appearance, is rather itself a fantasy formation, a protective shield—against what? Is the rapist father from the False Memory Syndrome not, in spite of his horrifying features, the ultimate guarantee that there is somewhere full, unconstrained enjoyment? And, consequently, what if the true horror is the lack of enjoyment itself?

(Žižek 2000, p. 31)

5 Europeanness as Masquerade

1. It is easy to state in a formula the distinction between an identification with the father and the choice of the father as an object. In the first case one's father is what one would like to *be* and in the second he is what one

would like to *have*. The distinction, that is, depends upon whether the tie attaches to the subject or to the object of the ego.

(Freud 1949, p. 62)

As we shall see later in this chapter, this distinction by Freud anticipates the distinction made by Lacan (1989, pp. 215–222, *passim*) and Butler between “‘being” the Phallus and “having” the Phallus’ (Butler 1999, p. 56).

2. As I have argued before, this sense of ‘entitlement’ was connected to the ideal-ego (Lacanian *je-idéal*) as well as the ego ideal, so it was not sufficient for the intellectuals to merely *mimic* the European imago: self-conviction was also a precondition; they had to see themselves as Europeans (through their reflection in ‘European eyes’), or else they would not ‘pass’.
3. It is obvious that a seemingly cosmetic Westernization adopted by the Ottoman elites was only skin-deep. Nevertheless, it generated criticism in the society that was crystallized in the Tanzimat literary tradition. Cosmetic Westernization was criticized as imitation of Western ways. It was also maintained that modernization was possible without resorting to Western codes of conduct that were usually portrayed as ridiculous for being artificial and phony.

(Kadioğlu 1996, p. 181)

4. Until the early 19th century, there was almost no privileged ethnicity in the Ottoman Empire, least of all the Turks. The ruling elite and sometimes the Sultans themselves referred to the Turks as ‘*Etrak-ı bi İdrak*’ (‘Turks without sense’); the administrative class mostly consisted of *devşirme* (co-opted and converted Christian children), and Turks were rarely allowed in this ‘inner circle’:

[In] the Imperial society of the Ottomans the ethnic term Turk was little used, and then chiefly in a rather derogatory sense, to designate the Turcoman nomads or, later, the ignorant and uncouth Turkish-speaking peasants of the Anatolian villages. To apply it to an Ottoman gentleman of Constantinople would have been an insult.

(Lewis 1968, pp. 1–2)

5. In the Ottoman Empire, these different religious identities were referred to as *millet*, a term used in contemporary Turkish for *nation*. In the 19th century, however, *millet* had nothing to do with ethnic origin or language; Catholic and Gregorian Armenians, for instance, constituted two different *millets* (Belge 2005, pp. 254–255).
6. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, there came into existence what we may call a European world-economy. It was not an empire yet it was as spacious as a grand empire and shared some features with it. But it was different, and new. It was a kind of social system the world has not really known before and which is the distinctive feature of the modern world-system.

(Wallerstein 1974, p. 15)

7. I have already argued in Chapter 1 that the Magna Carta was one of the first politico-social inscriptions of the Occidental Oedipal bargain, of the brothers sharing the father/sovereign’s power.

8. The *tımar* system and 'lifetime tax farms' are elements of land management particular to the mode of production of the Ottoman Empire: a *tımar* is a piece of land bestowed to a particular state official by the Sultan, without possibility of legacy and subject to disentitlement at the Sultan's whim. Likewise, a 'lifetime tax farm' (*iltizam*) is the bestowal of the right to collect taxes from a piece of land to somebody for that person's lifetime, again without possibility of legacy, in return for advance payment. These two mechanisms functioned well enough during the so-called 'classical era' of the Empire (ca 1300–1600), but gradually degenerated into a system of bribes and favouritism. Mahmud's reforms dismantled the system which was already on the way to disintegration.
9. <http://uyg.tsk.tr/aturk/aturk.asp> (last accessed 27 February 2013).
10. Another possibility is that Kavalalı means the headgear, the *üşküf* traditionally worn by Janissary officers, which seems likely since it actually lends additional height, if not majesty. No resource, however, mentions that the *üşküf* is also referred to as *maske* (mask) in Turkish.
11. 'Attempting to escape the designation "exotic", Ottoman statesmen sought to capitalize on aspects of their society and civilization which were attuned to the mainstream of world trends. By emphasizing symbols which had come to denote modernity, the Ottoman state was staking its claim to the right to exist' (Deringil 1999, p. 151).
12. Belonging to the 'Inner Circle' in Mustafa Kemal's sense meant being a regular at his dinner table in the Presidential Palace in Ankara, and participating in his drinking chats. Many historians believe that most decisions about affairs of state were made at this table rather than at the National Assembly or the Cabinet. The Palace was located in the Çankaya district and was popularly referred to as such, hence the name of Atay's book of memoirs, *Çankaya*.
13. 'Frenk' in Ottoman (and later early republican) parlance came to mean 'Westerner' in general, although the word itself only meant 'French'. Accordingly, if an Ottoman gentleman is perceived to be 'Frenk', it means that he is an Occidentophile/Occidentomimic. '*Tatlı su Frenkleri*' (literally, 'fresh-water Frenchies') are Occidentophile/Occidentomimic *dandies*. The universal character of the word 'Frenk' denoting all Westerners and Western mimics/transvestites subsisted as late as the 1960s. With the eventual establishment of the worldwide Pax Americana, however, the predominance of French language and culture in Turkey gave way to English as the preferred foreign language and US culture as the ultimate model to be looked up to and, whenever possible, imitated.
14. See Chapter 3.1 above.
15. *Yatagan* is a recurved short sword without a hand-guard, extensively used in the Ottoman Empire 16th through 19th centuries. The *yatagan* used by Janissaries was sometimes called a *varsak*.
16. '[S]exual difference has been translated into the sexual division of race, so the white male's object of desire has been relocated across the racial divide' (Young 1995, p. 104).
17. In early 1938, the year he died, Mustafa Kemal attended a ball in Yalova. He started the ball with a waltz (to the chagrin of his doctor), and after a while he ordered the orchestra to play a *zeybek*, an authentic and typically male dance from the Aegean region, to which he

also danced. It is another incident underlining the kind of elaborately mixed messages he devised: in a single shot (maybe his last) he: (i) re-masculinised dancing, invoking a traditionally male dance along with the waltz; and (ii) de-authenticised the *zeybek*, dancing it in a tuxedo (which, we should add, he had already ordered to be rearranged as a mixed-gender dance).

18. 'It was one of those headgears of composite order, in which we can find traces of the bearskin, shako, billycock hat, sealskin cap, and cotton night-cap; one of those poor things, in fine, whose dumb ugliness has depths of expression, like an imbecile's face. Oval, stiffened with whalebone, it began with three round knobs; then came in succession lozenges of velvet and rabbit-skin separated by a red band; after that a sort of bag that ended in a cardboard polygon covered with complicated braiding, from which hung, at the end of a long thin cord, small twisted gold threads in the manner of a tassel. The cap was new; its peak shone.' (Flaubert 2001, pp. 3–4)
19. The original expression is '*Şapka İnkılabı*'. The term '*inkılap*' can be translated as both 'revolution' and 'reform'; during the 'Language Revolution' (1932–1938), however, when an attempt was made to discard words of Arabic and Persian origin *en masse* and replace them by new, supposedly 'original Turkish' words, '*inkılap*' was replaced by a 'New Turkish' word, '*devrim*' ('revolution'). Since in the new linguistic regime there was no new Turkish word for 'reform' (it remained as an 'imported word', pronounced as in French), '*Şapka İnkılabı*' became '*Şapka Devrimi*' and is usually translated into English as 'Hat Revolution', however odd it may sound.
20. The *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party) was founded by Mustafa Kemal's consent (and even insistence) by five prominent members of the leading cadres of the National Liberation Struggle (Kâzım Karabekir, Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele and Adnan Adıvar) in November 1924 with a fairly liberalist programme. It was closed down a year later and all the leading members were accused of defending the Sultanate, the Caliphate, of treason, rebellion and defending the US mandate (Ahmad 2003, pp. 57–58; Tunçay 1981, pp. 99–109).
21. Halide Edip Adıvar argues that, 'Broadly one can say that the hat law could not have passed in 1925 without a regime of terror' (Adıvar 2003, p. 129). Mustafa Kemal himself also acknowledges this fact, albeit tangentially, in his mythopoeic address, the *Nutuk*:

Gentlemen, it was a necessity to throw away the fez which was considered to be the trademark of ignorance, negligence, bigotry and enmity of progress and civilisation, and replace it with the hat, the headgear of the entire civilised world, and thus demonstrate that there was no difference in mentality at all between the Turkish nation and civilised societies. We did this when the Law for the Maintenance of Order was in effect. We would have done it all the same if it weren't. If one says this law acted as an expediting factor, however, it will also be true.

(Atatürk 1927, p. 870)

The version of the *Nutuk* (*The Address or The Speech*) I use is the bilingual (that is, Ottoman Turkish and 'New' Turkish) online edition. The Ottoman

- Turkish version which serves as the basis for my translations is a direct transcription from the original in Arabic script, and I only use the 'New Turkish' translation for verification on moot expressions.
22. See Tunçay 1981, p. 158, ff. 44.
 23. Halide Edip Adivar (1884–1964), a novelist and a writer, was one of the most prominent activists of women's rights both during the last years of the Empire and in the Turkish Republic. She was sentenced to death by the Occupation forces in Istanbul in 1919, and fled to Anatolia to participate in the 'War of Independence' as a writer, propagandist, nurse and soldier (she was even nicknamed 'Corporal Halide'). Before the First National Assembly of 1920 convened, Halide Edip led a group of intellectuals in Istanbul who called for a US mandate rather than immediate independence, which would be strongly opposed by Mustafa Kemal and his immediate circle during the first years of the national struggle. Although this particular argument seemed to be settled (or at least put to sleep) during the 'War of Independence', she and her husband Adnan Adivar had a series of serious disagreements with Mustafa Kemal after the proclamation of the Republic, and were retroactively branded 'traitors' with reference to their 'Americanism' in 1919, which resulted in their voluntary exile. She lived in the UK and France for 14 years and came back to Turkey in 1939, only after the death of Mustafa Kemal.
 24. Kemalist mythology prefers to name the Turco-Greek War of 1919–1922 either 'War of Independence' or 'National Liberation Struggle'. The actual fact was, during this period all the significant clashes were between the Greek army which occupied the Aegean region of Anatolia and the *Kuva-yi Milliye* militia (National Forces), which was transformed in 1920 into a standing army. After the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was founded on 23 April 1920, the victors of the First Great War avoided skirmishes with the Turkish army and practically abandoned the occupying Greek army to meet its (unavoidable) fate. After the establishment of the Republic, however, the Kemalist historiographers preferred to present the Turco-Greek War as some kind of an epic 'anti-imperialist war', using it as a pretext for the later 'state of exception' they established.
 25. 'Hat Factory—The Ministry of Trade is continuing stockpiling material for the production of fedora hats and caps. The fez patterns in Hereke and Feshane factories will be used with minor modifications [...] The raw material for these are wool and rabbit fur, and since these are found in abundance in our country, the fedoras and caps will be extraordinarily inexpensive.'
(*Cumhuriyet [The Republic] Newspaper*, 7 September 1925; cited in Tunçay 1981, p. 150, ff. 35)
 26. There are many sales clerks in the US or Europe who have risen to become shop owners. But try to imagine a country that is transformed from a Caliphate to a secular republic, in which what the people can and cannot wear are dictated by the state. It is no mean feat to seize the day in that particular historical period in order to meet the needs (call it coerced needs, if you will) of the day to produce, say, hats, and to proceed from that to prêt-à-porter, and to do that in a country with no past experience, preparation or infrastructure, with very little time for research and

learning, in order to catch up with the Western countries with centuries of accumulation and experience.

(Hakko 2004, p. 58)

27. The comedy quickly turns into tragedy, though, when we consider the fact that the photograph was taken in Dersim (already renamed 'Tunceli') a Zaza/Kurdish region, which would rise in rebellion against the Kemalist regime in 1937. The revolt would be put down in 1937–1938 with 13,160 civilian casualties and 11,818 deported (see 'BITSUMUN 2013, United Nations Human Rights Council Background Guide' at http://bitsmun.in/2013/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/UNHRC_bg1.pdf, last accessed 2 April 2013), considerably more than the total number of losses in the entire 'War of Independence', which was estimated at around 9,000.

6 The Primordial Father Reborn

1. The supposed assassination attempt on Mustafa Kemal's life on 17 June 1926 in Izmir (which never actually took place but was thwarted beforehand) was a perfect excuse for a 'cleansing' operation. As a result, 49 people were tried in the notorious 'Independence Tribunals', most of them members of the National Assembly and former members of the CUP—*İttihat ve Terakki*, and 15 of them were sentenced to death, the rest having been effectively banned from politics altogether, at least for the duration of Mustafa Kemal's lifetime (Tunçay 1981, pp. 162–167). It is important to note, however, that this behaviour is also in line with the Jacobin 'code' of purging almost all brothers-in-arms, on the pretext that that 'betrayed the revolution', a significant indication of the mixed character of the 'Turkish Revolution', combining both Western/Enlightenment and Oriental despotic traits. The same combination can also be observed throughout the Bolshevik Revolution and the ensuing Stalinist regime in Russia (see Deutscher 1959).
2. Mustafa Kemal's transformation from successful military leader to the 'Father of the Nation' is usually accepted uncritically (and sometimes enthusiastically) by some (actually the most prominent) of his Western biographers. The most significant biography of Mustafa Kemal was written by Lord Kinross in 1960 (*Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation*), and in a 1965 title change it became *Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey*. A similar biography in 1999 by Andrew Mango, an Istanbul-born British author (*Atatürk*) was equally celebratory, although it included some remarks on issues which were hitherto considered controversial. Both biographies had a strong streak of Orientalism running through their central narratives; for all their praise of Mustafa Kemal, one can read between the lines that he was not an acceptable political leader *in the Western sense*, and was only *bon pour l'Orient*. The same thing is true for historian Bernard Lewis, whose works I have used in this study extensively. Despite his critical attitude to the nation-building process in Turkey, he tends to Orientalise the Ottoman Empire and Turkey (and sometimes the entire Islamic world), and at times pretends to speak *for* them, trying to make them more palatable for Western audiences.
3. In Turkey, it is still the habit of the well-intentioned/macho fathers to encourage (even force) their infant sons to 'show their pee-pee to the

uncles', meaning the male relatives. What Mustafa Kemal was suggesting was apparently the same thing on a global/historic scale, the 'pee-pee' in this case being the yet-un(der)developed masculinity (civilised-ness) of the sons/nation. Being 'civilised' (or modernised/Europeansised) thus becomes a synonym for masculinity.

4. Yannis Stavrakakis maintains that Lacan's concept of *jouissance*, and/or Freud's earlier concept of *libidinal investment* may prove central in understanding national identifications and nationalist discourses:

[M]y main hypothesis will be that the longevity of national identifications, beyond any variation in the particular diachronic content of nationalist discourses, can only be indicative of the depth that certain attachments have historically acquired. The complex dialectics of *jouissance*, Lacan's way of recasting the Freudian problematic of libidinal investment, seem to offer a rather promising line of explaining the nature of these attachments.

(Stavrakakis 2007, p. 190)

In the period of transition to capitalism and of nation-building, there is also a vast effort of libidinal reinvestment, of restructuring the expectations (and promises) of *jouissance*, when the fantasies that make up various communal identities give way to a more homogeneous identity of citizenry, which will assume many different and euphemistic names ('voters', 'consumers', 'taxpayers', etc.) as we advance farther into 'civil society'.

5. There are more than 50 leaders or nation-builders, most of them in the ex-Third World, who were bestowed with the title 'Father'. Simon Bolivar has the record among them being the 'father' of four separate 'nations'. The term is used as an analogue for the Roman *Pater Patriae*, 'father of the fatherland', however tautological it may sound, and has been translated in various ways, 26 of these translations being 'Father of the Nation'. Mustafa Kemal is the 'Father of Turks' and George Washington is the 'Father of his Country'. The most pretentious of all is the title bestowed upon Joseph Stalin on his 70th birthday in 1949, 'The Father of Nations'.
6. It is no big surprise, therefore, that the transition to a multiparty regime in Turkey took place in 1946, only one year after the end of the Second World War. With a 'New World Order' in the making, the danger of losing 'national sovereignty' was not a persistent threat anymore; as a result, the Kemalist regime had the option of loosening the reins on internal political diversity. Until then the name 'Republic' was enough to be accepted in the fold; now the 'pee-pee' to be demonstrated to the 'uncles' became formal democracy, and the 'nation' promptly obliged.
7. He is so paternalist and monocratic an educator that he does not secure his assurance and authority from another collectivity; he does not, however, explicitly pretend to secure these from only himself through brute force without any need for legitimacy. Very significantly, he legitimises his personal mission in the quality/privilege of being the one (the only one) to intuit/sense 'the huge potential for development in the nation's conscience.' In other words, he demonstrates a typical and exemplary psychosis of the charismatic leader.

(Parla 2008/1, p. 35)

8. A similar observation can be seen in Erich Auerbach's assessment of the 'Turks' and Mustafa Kemal, surprisingly as Orientalist: 'But in general, the country has become decisively and completely ruled by Atatürk and his Anatolian Turks—a naive, distrustful, honest, somewhat blunt and boorish but also emotional race of men. Because they are accustomed to slavery and hard, slow work, they are tougher and more unpolished, and also more rigid and more surly, than southern Europeans, but at the same time they are quite likable and have much vital energy. The 'grand chef' is a sympathetic autocrat, smart, grand, and imaginative, completely different from his European counterparts because he has actually himself turned this country into a state and because he is absolutely without eloquence' (Auerbach 2007, p. 751).
9. For the concept of a sovereign who stands outside the law, see Giorgio Agamben's *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (1998).
10. This, incidentally, is almost the exact date Mustafa Kemal officially became 'Atatürk':

Ata is the prefix to 'Atatürk,' the surname Mustafa Kemal adopted when the law requiring that all Turks adopt surnames was passed in 1934. *Ata* translates literally as 'ancestor' or 'great father'; hence, the name 'Atatürk' memorializes Mustafa Kemal as the great *pater* of the contemporary Turks.

(Parla & Davison 2004, p. 37)

11. *Mehmetcik* is the Turkish equivalent of British *Tommy*.
12. Both the popular rumours at his time and the contemporary grapevine intimate that Mustafa Kemal was an alcoholic, a Freemason, a Sabbatean, a paedophile, gay and an insatiable womaniser. Most of these accusations were first voiced by Rıza Nur, whom I have referred to in the previous chapter, and his testimony is erratic and undependable at best, since it is usually driven by spite. There is, however, at least a grain of truth in each of them, most of which were exaggerated out of proportion, especially posthumously. Mustafa Kemal definitely drank a lot; he once *did* give an interview to a Jewish journalist, which vaguely suggested he was in some way connected to the Sabbatean community in Salonika; he adopted nine children, seven of them girls; and he definitely had extramarital affairs, not only with Gabor, but also, for instance, with Fikriye Hanım, among others, who committed suicide after he married someone else (Bozdağ 2005). There is also the 'curious incident' of Latife Hanım, whom he married in 1923 and divorced in 1925. After their divorce Latife Hanım went into seclusion and never reappeared until her death in 1975. As Sherlock Holmes said about the dog, whose 'curious behaviour' was not having barked at all, the 'curious incident' of Latife Hanım lies in the fact that her memoirs still remain unpublished, 88 years after the divorce, 75 years after Mustafa Kemal's and 38 years after Latife Hanım's deaths, under changing pretexts (Çalışlar 2011).
13. In his personal life, he did differ from many other developing countries' leaders in not trying to found a dynasty. Only briefly married, he had no biological children but adopted a number of orphans or took them under his protection, giving them different surnames and preparing them for different careers, so taking an original approach to being the father of his country.

(Findley 2010, p. 279)

14. As a matter of fact, the biography of İnönü, written by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, an ex-communist-turned-left-wing-Kemalist, was named *İkinci Adam* (*The Second Man*). Aydemir's first venture into writing biographies was *Tek Adam* (*The Only Man*), and it was, not surprisingly, about Mustafa Kemal.
15. *Gestus*, in Brechtian aesthetics, 'means both gist and gesture; an attitude or a single aspect of an attitude, expressible in words or actions' (Willett 1964, p. 42).
16. Lacan 1998, p. 42.
17. Süleyman Demirel eventually became President of the Republic in 1993. In the last days of his presidency, he was 'assaulted' by a fan, which act was mistaken by his security detail as an attempt on his life. The poor 'assailant', however, was only trying to steal his hat as a memento. Demirel jealously held on to his hat, but promised to send a similar one to the man, thus ending the 'Hat Saga' on a note of comic relief.
18. *Netekim* is an old Turkish expression meaning 'as a matter of fact', and the leader of the 1980 coup General (later President) Kenan Evren was usually ridiculed for his continuous usage of this expression, more often than not unnecessarily. It became some kind of a nickname for him in later 1980s. 'Rap-Rap' indicates the mock-rap character of the song, but in Turkish it is also onomatopoeic for marching military boots.
19. This is a Lacanian reading of Giorgio Agamben's concept 'state of exception' (Agamben 2005). That the first 15 years of the Turkish Republic constituted a 'state of exception' can be verified from two facts, the first being as a transitional form the founders of the Republic considered themselves in a constant state of emergency, and second, they also considered themselves to be a 'revolutionary government'. The Kemalist elite endeavoured to prolong the 'revolutionary situation' almost indefinitely in order to maintain the 'state of exception', so much so that one of the six constitutional tenets of the ruling Republican People's Party was 'Revolutionism'.
20. Universal suffrage for women in Turkey was achieved on 5 December 1934, although they could only vote for a single party (since there was no other) until 1946. In France, women achieved the right to vote ten years later, on 21 April 1944. In Italy it was in 1946, in Belgium in 1948, while Switzerland waited until 1971. It is ironic that the Turkish Republic, preceding Switzerland in the matter of women's suffrage by 37 years, also boasted to have adopted the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 as the most 'developed' legislation in women's rights.
21. Although the Ottoman women's movement had a fifty-year history by then, the early republic gets credit for inscribing women's emancipation into the law. In a way that reappears in their policy toward peasants and all their 'others,' however, Turkey's elite male politicians assumed that they knew what women needed without having to ask.

(Findley 2010, p. 278)
22. Her utterances were gibberish in Turkish as well: '*Kadın şapka giye ki asıla?*' These words were indicative of the impossibility to make sense of a situation in which her old way of life as a 'special person' tolerated and included by the community was over, and since she could not be a proper citizen, she had to

be eliminated. She was a ‘citizen who was not a citizen’ and a ‘woman who was not a woman’; something not only she, but also the local authorities could not possibly make sense of. To be sure, the Republic would develop ‘modern methods’ to deal with such cases later through the 20th century, but then, this was a ‘transitional era’.

7 The Invention of (Re)Covering

1. Again, the exact word used was ‘İnkılap’, which is translatable as both ‘revolution’ and ‘reform’. Mustafa Kemal himself tries to define this concept not as a mere reform, but as ‘something more extensive than revolution’: ‘This “inkılap” denotes, in addition to the prima facie connotation of “revolution”, a more extensive transformation’ (Mustafa Kemal cited in Parla T. 2008/3, p. 281).
2. The Kemalist state was famous for pre-emptively assimilating (or pretending to assimilate) *any* subversive movement: in 1934, an RPP deputy Nevzat Tandoğban declared, ‘If Communism is necessary for this country and Communism is something useful, it is *us* who will bring it here.’
3. See Chapter 4, ff. 23 above.
4. The best examples of these ‘modernised women’ were, not surprisingly, Mustafa Kemal’s own ‘adopted daughters’. One of them, Afet İnan, later became a ‘social scientist’ of sorts, and was a vocal element in the Kemalist propaganda around Women’s rights:

A civics manual, *Medeni Bilgiler*, was published, ostensibly by Atatürk’s adopted daughter Afet İnan; in fact, he dictated it to her. Embodying state feminism, she also produced a later book on *The Emancipation of the Turkish Woman*.

(Findley 2010, p. 279)

Another adopted daughter, Sabiha Gökçen, was indeed a different kind of ‘exemplary modern Turkish woman’. She was trained as an aircraft pilot (‘first female pilot in Turkish history’), and became a part of the task force carpet-bombing the Dersim resurrection into submission, killing 13,000 civilians during the operation.

5. ‘[Westernised Oriental woman’s] sexuality was erased by a successful portrayal of her as a mother, symbolizing the motherland, so that her new place in the outside world would not constitute a significant challenge for the care and protection of the nation’s true self, its genuine and essential identity’

(Yeğenoğlu 1998, p. 125).
6. Later in the 1960s and onwards, European women themselves became ‘available’ as a result of the rapidly developing tourism sector. Newspapers at the time used this ‘availability’ to channel middle-class males’ desires towards ‘the real thing’. A lot of headlines from the so-called ‘Boulevard Press’ of the time (the Turkish equivalent of tabloids) were designed to underline the sexual availability of European women: the headline ‘German Tourist Women Fancy Turkish Men!’ became proverbial for this innuendo for decades, apart

- from inciting many a rape, since it affirmed the 'willingness' of all foreign women visiting Turkey.
7. *Milliyet*, 25 November 1956, p. 4. http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/aFbujt_x2F_LPJN9_x2F_bqKIIjW8w_x3D_x3D_ (last accessed 30 July 2013).
 8. '[I]t is the absence of the penis that turns her into the phallus, the object of desire' (Lacan 1989, p. 246).
 9. Being 'most hated' only makes the same point in reverse, since it goes to demonstrate that the 'libidinal investment' was still very considerable.
 10. This translation is one of the six offered by Quran.com (last accessed 1 August 2013). In order to demonstrate the complications in translation, one can compare the same passage with the one I have already quoted as the epigraph to this chapter (Muhsin Khan, 24/31). While in the translation I used (the Sahih International version) there is no qualification about the meaning of 'that which [necessarily] appears' or 'that which is apparent', the Muhsin Khan translation interprets these phrases to mean 'like palms of hands or one eye or both eyes for necessity to see the way, or outer dress like veil, gloves, head-cover, apron, etc.', allowing only one eye (or both eyes) to be visible. I cannot pretend to take sides (even less to have an opinion) about these arguments, so I will let the most popular translation stand. I use the *Feyzül Furkan Kuran-ı Kerim Meali* by Hasan Tahsin Feyizli (Feyizli 2007), a fairly popular Turkish interpretation, as my reference text.
 11. The veil functioned, to borrow a phrase from Lacan, as a *point de capiton* (quilting point), a point of condensation of the modernist discourse. The unveiling of women became a convenient instrument for signifying many issues at once, i.e. the construction of modern Turkish identity as opposed to backward Ottoman identity, the civilization and modernization of Turkey and the limitation of Islam to matters of belief and worship.
(Yeğenoğlu 1998, p. 132)
 12. *Çarşaf* is the Turkish name for *burka*, and is homonymous with 'bedcloth'. It covers the entire body, including the head and hair and only leaves the hands and face visible. In many cases the face is also covered by a full or partial veil.
 13. The middle class in question consisted first of local artisans, who replaced the former artisans of the Ottoman Empire, mostly consisting of Armenian and Greek subjects, who were no more due to the Armenian deportation and massacre of 1915, and the Greek population exchange of 1923. Second, there were local and suburban shopkeepers and petty merchants; and third, there were (again mostly local) petty entrepreneurs. Since the economic structure of the early Republic depended on state ownership of heavy industry, construction and transportation, a new class of capitalists was made possible only by state subventions and, not surprisingly, these subventions were mostly reserved for the already-modernised Kemalist elite who dared venture into capitalist entrepreneurship (Keyder 1997).
 14. The coups in question were: (i) 27 May 1960; (ii) 12 March 1971 (not exactly a coup but an ultimatum which resulted in the resignation of the cabinet and

the assignment of a 'cabinet of technocrats'); (iii) 12 September 1980; and (iv) 28 February 1997 (again not exactly a coup but a so-called 'postmodern coup', which resulted in the ousting [and later the liquidation] of the Islamist Fazilet [Virtue] Party).

15. First of all, look at the facts of the case. Western nations as soon as they emerge into history show the beginnings of those capacities for self-government... having merits of their own... You may look through the whole history of the Orientals in what is called, broadly speaking, the East, and you never find traces of self government. All their great centuries—and they have been very great—have been passed under despotisms, under absolute government.
(Balfour cited in Said 2003, pp. 32–33)
16. 'Absent a revolutionary break in the class basis of the state, the fundamental division between the state class and the masses was perpetuated. A factor strengthening the status of the republican state was the material resources it had acquired during the civil wars leading to its establishment' (Keyder 1997, p. 40). At this point we should probably be reminded of the famous/notorious declaration by the Governor of Istanbul, Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, in the early 1950s, that 'People crowd the beaches, the citizens cannot take a swim!' It was one of the most famous expressions among the people for decades to mock and criticise the elitist outlook of the RPP, and it *definitely* betrayed that party's underlying assumption that the Republic was, in fact, made up of two 'classes', *the people* and *the citizens*.
17. After all, it was always possible to resort to *Takiyye*, an Islamic tradition of 'pretending to be otherwise when under heathen rule'.
18. 'The prohibition of the Ottomans lasts but three days', was a popular proverb from the Ottoman days, and in that respect the Republic had changed little.
19. This endeavour curiously paralleled the Kemalist endeavour to create a 'fantasy past', as it was observed by Erich Auerbach who lived in Istanbul (1936–1947), where, by the way, he wrote his groundbreaking *Mimesis*:

[Atatürk] has had to accomplish everything he has done in a struggle against the European democracies on the one hand, and on the other against the old Muslim, pan-Islamist sultan economy, and the result is a fanatical, anti-traditional nationalism: a renunciation of all existing Islamic cultural tradition, a fastening onto a *fantasy 'ur-Turkey'*, technical modernization in the European sense in order to strike the hated and envied Europe with its own weapons. [...] The result: Nationalism in the superlative with the simultaneous destruction of the historic national character.

(Auerbach 2007, p. 751, my italics)

20. *Selamet* (Salvation) which started publication in May 1946 [...] dealt extensively with religious education, although it did not concern itself with everyday politics. Contemporary problems about women and covering were not present in its pages, but there were narratives about personages such as Khatija [the Prophet's wife], Fatimah [the Prophet's

daughter] and Umm Ayman [the Prophet's slave/nanny] from Islamic history.

(Aktaş 2006/1, p. 253)

21. Here, when I use the term 'the veil', I mean the whole array of female covering related to the religious edict about female chastity/virtue, rather than the specific piece of cloth that covers the face (see Yeğenoğlu 1998).
22. In sum, the veiling of women is not a smooth, gradual continuous process growing out of tradition. On the contrary, it is the outcome of a new interpretation of Islamic religion by the recently urbanized and educated social groups who have broken away from traditional popular interpretations and practices and politicized religion as an assertion of their collective identity against modernity.
(Göle 1996, p. 5)
23. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's name was usually abbreviated as *Ata* (both 'Sire' and Father/Ancessor) somewhat unceremoniously, especially after his death. It provided the Kemalists with a much-needed familiarity with the 'dead father' in the absence of the real one.
24. We need to clarify our terminology at this point: I refer to all forms of (religiously motivated) female covering as 'the veil'. In Ottoman culture, the 'turban' used to be the name used for the wrap around the male *kavuk* prior to the 'Hat Revolution'. The term disappeared along with the *sarık*, the *kavuk* and the *fez*. When a new (but supposedly authentic) form of covering the female head returned, it was at first simply called the '*başörtüsü*' as before; literally, the headscarf. Then there was a distinction made between a simple headscarf that loosely covered the hair (the kind which is becoming more and more popular in Iran nowadays), and the tightly wrapped scarf which covered all hair and the neck. For a while, this latter covering was pejoratively referred to by the secularist and Kemalist critics as the '*sıkmabaş*' ('the squeezehead'). Finally, in the 1980s and 1990s, this style was (wrongly) christened as *the turban*; the name stuck and became the fundamental item in the argument about the 'right to cover' in the public space (Aktaş 2006/2).
25. UNESCO: *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2006*; Ch. 8: 'The Making of Literate Societies'; http://www.unesco.org/education/GMR2006/full/chapt8_eng.pdf (last accessed 11 August 2013).
26. UNICEF: *A Gender Review in Education, Turkey 2003*; <http://www.unicef.org/turkey/gr/ge21a.html> (last accessed 11 August 2013).
27. The recent history of the Islamist and Kurdish parties followed a definite pattern: as long as they remained a marginal minority, they were tolerated. Whenever they started to increase their votes and threatened to become a significant factor in parliamentary politics, they were closed down by the Constitutional Court (or by a military coup, whichever came first), in which case they were re-established under a different name. Such 'spare' parties were even established beforehand and 'lay in wait' for the inevitable Constitutional Court order. For most of the socialist and communist parties, the customary practice was *not* to wait until they threaten to become a significant factor in parliamentary politics. This pattern has only very recently been

- broken, when the JDP (currently in power) narrowly escaped dissolution by a single vote in 2008.
28. Incidentally, the leaders of the 1980 coup had imitated their early republican ancestors and tried to pre-empt the feminist movement by legalising abortion after the coup, in 1983.
 29. Not unlike African-American feminists of the 1970s who stood against the demonisation of black men in the issue of rape (see, for instance 'A Black Feminist Statement' by Combahee River Collective, 1977), many feminist women of Kurdish origin in the 1980s and 1990s confronted their modernist/Turkish friends within feminist organisations about the demonisation of Kurdish mores and traditions, and some of these confrontations ended up in secessions. In both cases, their critics had valid points: it was a fact that, demographically, more African-American men were involved in rape cases, and Kurdish tradition *did* call for 'honour killings' even when a woman was a victim of rape. In both cases, however, they missed the fact of composite identities, and how subalternity was constructed and reconstructed within these identities. It was only in the 2000s that many feminists realised that it was possible to militate against 'honour killings' without demonising Kurdish culture as a whole and, conversely, upholding their culture without consenting to patriarchal violence.
 30. 'Women participating in radical Islamic movements not only gain some control over their lives, as they break from traditional roles and develop personal strategies for education and career, but also politicize the entire Islamic way of life' (Göle 1997, p. 87).

Conclusion: Prolegomena for Another Modernity/Authenticity

1. According to the Turkish Physicians' Association (TPA), one policeman and five protesters were killed during the events: the policeman accidentally fell from a road bridge, one protester was shot to death, one was beaten to death, two were hit by gas canisters on the head and one was ran over by a car. As of 12 June 2013, 7,478 people were wounded, 91 of them had severe head traumas and 10 permanently blinded (<http://www.ttb.org.tr/index.php/Haberler/veriler-3842.html>, last accessed 10 August 2013). We should add that the ongoing sporadic demonstrations have increased this number significantly, although there is no official report as to the exact numbers.
2. Abdullah Öcalan ('Apo') is the PKK leader who was arrested in 1999 and sentenced to life imprisonment on a small and secluded island (İmralı) in the Marmara Sea. He is still extremely influential in Kurdish politics, on the legal political Party (PDP) and among the PKK guerrillas, and he is a party (through the National Intelligence Agency and some PDP deputies) to the peace negotiations between the JDP government and the PKK.
3. Even this incident did not fail to have consequences in the opposite direction than the one the JDP government intended: after it was more or less firmly established that the lady's account was mostly invented, many

- feminists who were a part of the Gezi Movement refused to demonise her, holding firm to the belief that 'it is the woman's account that matters', and blamed the PM for instrumentalising her.
4. This was probably the best indication of the neo-liberal ('shop') soft-Islamic ('pray') character of the JDP rule: PM Erdoğan's utopia for Istanbul (and we should remember that he was the Mayor of Istanbul for four years) was a huge shopping mall and a huge mosque in Taksim Square and Gezi Park.
 5. *Iftar* is the evening meal to break the daily Ramadan fast. It is a 'divine' meal in which all Muslims were supposed to share their daily bread. Under the JDP, the *iftar* has become a showpiece: a series of bawdy, expensive middle-class and upper-middle-class gatherings, with the showcase 'free *iftar* tents' for the poor, i.e. a much cheaper imitation of the same event.
 6. The Gülen Movement (or Sect) is a semi-religious community of businessmen and state officials led by Fethullah Gülen, a self-styled Imam currently resident in the US. The inquiry was apparently a reaction to PM Erdoğan's threats to shut down the Prep Courses for the University Entrance Exam, a nationwide network of private schools (most of them owned and run by the Gülen Movement), providing his community with both young sympathisers/activists and a considerable source of income.
 7. Since the beginning of the investigations into governmental corruption in which four ministers (since resigned) and Erdoğan's own son were implicated, he constantly blamed the investigations themselves on the existence of a 'parallel state', a state within the state, a conspiracy led by the Gülen Movement, his own partners in power since 2001. His accusations took on a fiercely nationalistic tone after a secret wiretap of a conversation between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Head of the National Intelligence Agency and the Deputy Chief of Staff about Turkish involvement in Syria was leaked to the social media. Erdoğan blamed the leak on the Gülen Movement and charged it (without taking any legal action) of high treason and of a conspiracy including (but not limited to) the US and Israel. This has become the main justification for a 'state of exception' (he called it a 'Second War of Liberation'), leading to a total ban on Twitter and YouTube. The Supreme Court has since lifted the ban on Twitter (resulting in Erdoğan's accusation of the Supreme Court of being 'non-national'), but not yet the one on YouTube.
 8. Although thousands of policemen (many of them officers) and public prosecutors and judges were demoted and/or reassigned as of December 2013, very few of them have actually been charged with any crime. Most of Erdoğan's campaign against the 'state within the state', therefore, seems to be built mainly on hearsay and to assume facts not in evidence.
 9. Erdoğan's JDP gained more than 43% of the votes in the March 2014 Municipal Elections, a 6% decrease from the almost 50% vote in the 2011 General Elections, but still a considerable victory. It gained this vote only nine months after the Gezi Event and three months after the governmental corruption inquiries were unveiled. Literally *billions* of US dollars were involved

in these cases, and many were well documented, including a wiretap of the PM himself ordering his son on the phone on the first day of the operation 'to get rid of the money at home', which was approximately tens of millions of euros *in cash*. Although he later claimed that the recording was 'edited and dubbed', no professional examination has yielded any proof of its being so. All these resulted in only a 6% decrease. Clearly, his voters were giving the PM the message to 'Enjoy!'

10. İstiklal Street is one of the entertainment centres of Istanbul; it is the street where most of the city bars, pubs, night clubs and discos are located, and probably where most of the city's daily alcoholic beverages are consumed.

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Index

- Abdülhamid II, 114, 210
Abdülmecid I, 99
Adivar, Halide Edip, 134, 136–7, 161, 214–15
Afet İnan, 164–5, 220
Agamben, Giorgio, 218–19
Ahıska, Meltem, 110, 135, 146, 163–4, 168
Aktaş, Cihan, 157, 166, 169, 173, 176, 179, 222–3
Anderson, Benedict, 71–2
Anderson, Perry, 41, 80
Arat, Yeşim, 160, 175
Aristotle, 41–2
Asiatic, 2–3, 6, 8–9, 15, 53, 60, 67, 72, 126, 145, 207
Atatürkkii (also see Mustafa Kemal), xii, 105, 127, 130, 139, 142, 145–6, 155, 191, 208, 211, 213–14, 216, 218, 220, 222–3
Atay, Fahih Rifki, 127–9, 139, 213
Aufhebung, 26, 32, 179, 183, 193
Austin, J. L., 34–5, 197
authentic, authenticity, 9–10, 15, 39, 112, 114, 120, 127, 163, 169, 171–2, 180, 182, 189, 193, 210, 213–14, 223
Badiou, Alain, 32, 197
Bayar, Celal, 150
Belge, Murat, 85, 101, 113, 117, 147, 212
Bhabha, Homi, 14, 27, 70, 73–5
Bloch, Ernst, 16, 26–7, 33, 37
Brecht, Bertolt, 26, 37–8, 196, 219
Butler, Judith, xi, 17, 21–2, 27, 33–4, 36–40, 73, 123, 125, 130, 145, 212
capitalism, capitalist, x, xii, 3, 5–6, 9–11, 13, 16, 36, 41, 43, 65, 87–8, 91, 102, 105–7, 117, 139, 141, 149, 181–3, 185, 188, 190–3, 199, 204, 207, 217, 221
çarşaf, 167, 171, 221
castration, 50, 52, 54–6, 107, 153, 155–6, 172, 205, 208
Chatterjee, Partha, 14, 142, 178, 182
China, 1, 63–4, 73, 78, 80, 142, 198, 205
circumcision, 54–5
citizen, citizenry, xiv, 118, 121–2, 126, 129, 135, 141–2, 156, 158, 163, 168, 175, 180, 191, 217, 219, 222
Civil Code, 155, 161, 219
civilisation, 1, 3, 8–9, 15, 22, 29, 36, 40–3, 46–7, 49, 51–3, 61, 67–8, 70, 91, 104, 111, 113, 117, 127, 144–5, 149, 163–4, 168, 180, 195, 198–9, 201, 211
colonialism, 2, 22, 78–9, 176
Copjec, Joan, 117–18
'culture of translation', 89, 95
CUP (also see *İttihat ve Terakki*), 150, 210
Cyrano de Bergerac, 111–12, 114, 210
Dardanelles, 97–8, 208
Delacroix, Eugène, 158–60
Demirel, Süleyman, 151–2, 219
Deringil, Selim, 118, 125–6, 213
Derrida, Jacques, 34, 194, 197
desire, 8, 14, 23, 31, 48–9, 53, 57–9, 61, 63, 74–6, 80–1, 83–4, 87–90, 95–6, 102–4, 106–8, 110, 114–16, 125, 130–1, 139, 147, 163–6, 170–1, 177, 185, 196, 202, 204, 206, 209–10, 213, 220–1
'development', 2–3, 9, 45, 88, 140, 150, 168
dimorphism, 3, 14, 30, 32, 108, 177–8
dichotomy, 17, 26–7, 29–30, 39, 93, 196
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, 60, 69, 76, 203
DP (Democratic Party—*Demokrat Parti*), 150, 167

- East/West, 13, 17, 23, 39, 41–2, 44, 53, 105, 162, 171
- Egypt, 2, 18, 25, 41, 45, 54, 59, 63, 66, 73, 79–80, 198
- 'either/or', 24, 26–7, 31, 33, 39, 196
- effemination, 122, 205
- emasculation, 79–80, 103, 122, 154, 159, 205–6
- Enver Paşa, 46–7, 49, 107, 199
- Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, xii–xiii, 2, 186–7, 189–90, 192, 224
- essential, essentialist, 7, 9, 17, 21–3, 25, 28, 33, 40, 45, 53, 107, 197, 200, 203, 220
- Europeanisation, 2–3, 9, 36, 67–8, 82, 87–8, 203
- Fanon, Franz, 14
- Father, vii–viii, 2, 21–2, 32, 40, 49–61, 67, 75–8, 80, 82, 87–8, 95, 99, 100–5, 107, 113–14, 131, 139–58, 162, 167, 172, 177, 179, 187, 189–93, 195, 197, 199–200, 202, 204–5, 207–9, 211–12, 216–18, 223
- Oriental Father, 87, 144, 148, 192, 204
- 'Father function', 22, 44, 50, 78, 88, 101–3, 107, 154, 180, 190
- 'Father of the Nation', 142, 147–8, 162, 167, 216–17
- feminine, femininity, xi, xiv, 18, 99, 104, 130, 156–61, 170, 172, 209
- feminism, 7, 160, 169–70, 175–6, 220
- Kemalist feminism, 170
- fez*, 108, 115, 119–21, 126, 133, 137, 140, 154–5, 209, 214–15, 223
- Figes, Orlando, 81–2, 85–6, 206
- filicide, 49, 54, 56, 201
- Findley, Carter Vaughn, 90, 97–8, 140, 160–1, 207, 211, 218–20
- Flaubert, Gustave, 18, 47, 76, 131, 214
- Foucault Michel, 12–13, 23–4, 27–9, 49, 196, 200
- fratricide, 53–4
- Freud, Sigmund, 4–5, 7–8, 20, 39, 49–50, 52–4, 58, 60–1, 76, 87, 147, 153–4, 171, 195, 212, 217
- Frosh, Stephen, 30
- Gandhi, Mohandas (*Mahatma*), 74, 142
- Girard, René, 76, 125
- Gabor, Zsa Zsa, 147, 218
- Garber, Marjorie B., 18
- Gezi*, xii–xiii, 2, 184–9, 193, 224–5
- globalisation, 15
- Gobineau, Joseph Arthur, Comte de, 19, 47, 195
- Gouges, Olympe de, 158–9
- Göçek, Fatma Müge, 46, 113
- Göle, Nilüfer, 110, 163, 170–1, 174, 178–9, 187–8, 223–4
- Granda, Cemal, 145–6
- Greece, Greek (Ancient), 4, 9, 41–2, 65, 86, 178, 185, 194, 201
- Greece, Greek (Modern), 89, 100, 203, 211, 215, 221
- Grosrichard, Alain, 57–8
- Gülhane (Rescript of), 99, 206
- Gürbilek, Nurdan, 15, 44, 62, 66, 83–4, 89
- Hakko, Vitali, 136, 215
- Hamlet*, 101–3, 191, 209
- harem*, 48, 58, 144, 202
- hat, xi, 115, 119–21, 128–9, 131–4, 136–8, 140, 151–7, 160, 174, 179, 214–15, 219, 223
- 'Hat Drive', 132–4, 140
- 'Hat Law', xi, 136, 138, 156, 174, 214
- 'Hat Revolution', 131, 133–4, 136, 138, 154–6
- headscarf, 173, 179, 223
- Hegel, G. W. F., 14, 25–6, 42, 68, 80, 151, 203, 205–6
- Heisenberg, Werner, 13, 196–7
- hijab*, 1, 160–1, 167
- Hugo, Victor, 92, 112
- Hunt, Lynn, 20, 80
- Hwang, Henry, 18
- İbrahim Şinasi, 92, 104, 207
- imperialism, 2, 143
- İnalçık, Halil, 116, 208
- India, 1, 41, 52, 58, 63–4, 70–4, 77–80, 85, 95, 142, 198, 203–4
- İnönü, İsmet, 140, 149–50, 219

- intellectuals, intelligentsia, 2, 11–12, 44, 46, 63, 64, 66–9, 79–80, 88–90, 92–96, 100, 108, 111, 114, 116, 118, 129–30, 148, 168, 176–7, 179–83, 189, 192, 207, 212, 215
- İskilipli Atıf Hoca, 138
- İslam, xii–xiii, 1–2, 9, 12, 47, 54–5, 58, 66–7, 77, 86, 88, 93–4, 96, 105, 110, 112–13, 119, 126, 129, 133, 148, 154, 159–61, 166–71, 173–4, 176–9, 184–7, 189, 198, 201–3, 207, 209–11, 216, 221–4
- İttihat ve Terakki* (also see CUP), 114, 141, 199, 209, 216
- İzer, Zeki Faik, 159–61
- Jacobin, 150, 216
- JDP (Justice and Development Party—*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*), xiii, 167, 171, 185–6, 189–90, 192, 223–5
- JP (Justice Party—*Adalet Partisi*), 151, 167
- jouissance*, 44, 48–9, 51, 57–9, 61–2, 105, 110–11, 147–9, 192, 204, 217
- Jusdanis, Gregory, 91
- Kadıoğlu, Ayşe, 163, 176, 212
- Kagarlitsky, Boris, 67, 69, 85
- Kandiyoti, Deniz, 121, 127, 155, 158, 170
- Kant, Immanuel, 11, 107
- Karaca, Cem, 152
- Katouzian, Homa, 55
- Kemalism, Kemalist, 60, 127, 129, 133–6, 138, 142–4, 146–7, 149–50, 155–6, 160–1, 163, 166–77, 187, 195, 209, 215–17, 219–22
- Keriman Halis, 164–5
- Keyder, Çağlar, 168, 180, 221–2
- Kniazhnin, İakov Borisovich, 81–4, 205
- Knox, Geoffrey, 144–5, 147–8
- Koçak, Orhan, 46–7, 88, 107, 109
- kul*, 60–1, 92, 107, 117–19, 121, 126, 191, 202, 207
- Küçükömer, İdris, 150, 167
- Lacan, Jacques, 4, 10, 17, 21–2, 27, 30–3, 50, 60–1, 70, 75–6, 80–2, 87, 102, 123, 152, 154–6, 165, 171, 194, 197, 200, 202, 209–10, 212, 217, 219, 221
- ‘Laios Complex’, 54
- ‘Law for the Maintenance of Order’ (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*), 133, 136, 214
- leisure class, 41–4, 51, 65–7
- Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 142, 149
- Lewis, Bernard, 46, 85, 94, 133–4, 140, 154–5, 163, 198–200, 203, 210, 212, 216
- Maalouf, Amin, 14
- Macaulay, Thomas Babington, 70–2, 74
- Mahmud II, 68, 87, 95, 97–8, 118–20, 122, 126, 213
- Mao Zedong, 142
- Marco Polo, 105, 202
- Mardin, Şerif, 16, 94, 103, 112, 209
- Marx, Karl, xiv, 26–7, 42, 60, 66, 71–3, 83, 87, 105–7, 127, 144, 151, 156, 196, 209
- Marxism, Marxist, 6, 7, 9, 26, 96, 196–8, 202
- masculine, masculinity, xi, 17–18, 38, 73, 79, 104, 111, 123, 125, 127, 129–31, 141, 144, 154–5, 157–9, 163–4, 177–9, 192, 204, 209, 216–17
- masquerade, 95, 115, 123, 125–7, 130–1, 145, 164–5, 170–1
- Master/Bondsman, 14–15, 25, 129, 192, 205
- Middle East, 2, 53–4, 58, 64, 67, 73, 199, 201
- Mehmed II (Conqueror), 56
- Menderes, Adnan, 150–1
- Milyukov, Pavel, 69–70, 85
- mimic, mimicry, 63, 69, 73–4, 81, 87, 108, 138, 202, 204
- modernisation, x, xv, 2–3, 9, 15–16, 20, 36, 81, 88, 91, 95, 98–9, 108, 119, 134, 144, 154–5, 162, 164, 167–9, 176, 178–80, 182, 190–3

- Muslim, xiii, 1, 71, 85, 90, 99, 105,
113, 116–17, 135, 143, 154,
165–6, 168, 171, 173, 185, 187–8,
193–4, 200, 207, 222, 225
- Mustafa Kemal (also see Atatürk), xii,
60, 105, 115, 119, 123–4, 126–32,
134, 138–51, 153, 155–6, 159,
161–3, 165, 167, 185, 190–2,
208–9, 211, 213–20, 223
- Namık Kemal, 92–4, 96, 100, 110–12,
163, 207–8
- namus* (chastity/honour/virtue),
98, 208
- nationalism, 16, 80, 96, 113, 127–8,
142, 182, 199, 210, 222
Turkish, 113, 127, 182, 199
- ‘National Liberation Struggle’, 134,
138, 142, 214–15
- ‘not only, but also’, vii, 22, 26–7
- Nutuk* (the Speech), 140, 142–3, 214
- objet petit a*, 75, 83, 87, 104, 106, 177
- ‘Obscene Father’, 148, 152–3, 192
- Occident, Occidental, 1–3, 6–10,
12–17, 22–3, 27–30, 33, 39–40,
42–6, 49, 78, 83–4, 93, 101,
103–4, 108, 128, 138, 164, 178,
192–3, 199, 204, 206, 212–13
- Occidentalism, 16, 110
- ‘Occidentomimic Dandy’, 83–4, 206
- Oedipus, Oedipal, 4, 8, 20, 52–3, 64,
75–7, 80, 95, 101, 103, 118, 195,
204, 208–9, 212
- ‘Oedipal bargain’, 20, 64, 76–7, 80, 95,
101, 103, 118, 195, 204, 208–9,
212
- Orient, Oriental, vii, x, 1–16, 17–18,
20–4, 27–30, 33, 36, 39, 40, 42–9,
52–9, 61–7, 69, 73–81, 83, 86–8,
93, 95, 101, 103, 107, 110, 114,
117–18, 120, 125–31, 139, 141,
144–5, 148, 153, 168–9, 176–8,
180, 183, 187, 190, 192–3, 194,
197, 198–204, 209, 216, 220, 222
- ‘Oriental despot’, 46, 57–9, 65–7,
75–6, 80, 88, 125, 168, 190, 198,
202, 216
- Orientalism, Orientalist, 2, 13–14,
16–18, 27–9, 43–4, 47, 49, 59,
145, 148, 159, 168, 209, 216, 217
- ‘Oriental transvestite’, 17, 39, 69,
73–4, 83, 87, 204
- Ottoman Empire, 3, 6, 44, 46, 55, 64,
66–9, 81–3, 85–92, 95–6, 99,
101–8, 112–19, 121–3, 125–6, 131,
133, 139, 180–1, 187, 191, 203,
205, 208, 210, 212–13, 216, 223
- Pamuk, Orhan, 14
- pan-Islamism, 88, 222
- pan-Turkism, 88, 194–5, 199, 210
- Parla, Jale, 82–3, 99–100, 103–5, 107
- Parla, Taha, 135, 148, 206,
217–18, 220
- pas tout*, 32, 156, 172, 179
- patriarchal, patriarchy, 8, 45, 50, 58,
60, 79, 102–4, 106, 153, 156, 160,
168–70, 172, 176–9, 190, 197,
204–5, 224
- patricide, 49, 52–3, 58
- PDP (Peace and Democracy
Party—*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*),
185, 224
- performance, vii, 3, 17, 22, 27, 33, 36,
37–8, 40, 67, 204, 210
- phallus, viii, 8, 30–3, 51, 54, 107, 114,
123, 129–31, 153–4, 164–5, 212
- postcolonial, postcolonialist, 5–6,
14–16, 27, 45, 66, 74, 202
- primordial Father, 2, 22, 32, 49–51,
53, 58, 139, 144, 146–7, 149, 153,
155–6, 158, 190–3, 204
- problematisation, vii, 13, 15, 27–8
- psychoanalysis, 3–8, 101, 201
- Qaddafi, Muammar, 2
- Quataert, Donald, 106, 116,
119–22, 208
- ‘quilting point’ (*point de capiton*), 112,
141, 221
- Quran*, the, 158, 165–6, 169, 178, 221
- reaya*, 116–17, 121, 191
- Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem, 81–4,
92–3, 107–9, 206–7

- ‘Republican sisterhood’, 162–3, 167–8, 170–1, 175
- Rıza Nur, 138, 218
- ‘ridiculous uncanny’, 148, 151–3
- Riviere, Joan, 123, 125
- RPP (Republican People’s Party—*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), 167, 174, 220, 222
- Rushdie, Salman, 14, 72–3
- Russia, 1, 3, 64, 66–70, 81–3, 85–8, 91, 100, 113, 198, 202–3, 205–6, 216
- Sabiha Gökçen, 164–5, 220
- Sadullah Paşa, 45, 199, 207, 209
- Said, Edward, 13–14, 17–18, 27–8, 59, 79, 222
- Şalcı Bacı*, xi, 157
- Schick, Irvin C., 22–3, 48–9
- Scott, Joan Wallach, 178–9
- Selim III, 68, 87, 95, 97–8, 103, 119, 201
- Sened-i İttifak*, 118
- Sharia*, 58, 85, 112, 144, 167, 179, 206–7
- Shayegan, Daryush, 66, 90–1, 95–6
- slave(s), slavery, 6, 7, 25, 41–4, 51, 56, 65, 67, 74, 195, 197–9, 207, 218
- social engineering, 134–5, 144, 191
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, 14, 27, 93
- splitting, vii, 30, 32–3, 37, 80, 102, 177
- ‘sovereign of exception’, 145, 191
- ‘state of exception’, 155–6, 190, 215, 219, 225
- Stalin, Iosif Vissarianovich, 60, 142, 202, 216–17
- Stavrakakis, Yannis, 154, 217
- subaltern, subalternity, 18, 25, 27, 150, 182–3, 191–2, 197, 224
- subjectivisation, 14, 27, 29, 31–3, 36
- Suvin, Darko, 11, 26, 196
- Tekeli, Şirin, 160
- Tanzimat*, 82–3, 89, 95, 99, 105, 108, 122, 206, 210, 212
- transvestite, vii, 11, 17, 38–9, 69, 73–4, 80–1, 83, 87, 204, 213
- Tunçay, Mete, 136, 138, 214–16
- turban* (original use as male headgear), 119–21, 140
- turban* (pejorative use as female headscarf), 172–3, 179, 223
- Turco-Greek War, 211, 215
- Turkey, x-xii, xiv, xv, 2–3, 44, 46–53, 60, 63, 89, 91, 95–6, 115, 126, 134–6, 141–3, 150, 152–5, 161, 164, 173, 175–92, 195, 197, 199, 209, 213, 215–17, 220–3
- utopia, xiii, 9–12, 26, 78, 208, 224
- Veblen, Thorstein, 41
- veil, veiling, 1, 48, 57, 155, 158, 160, 169–79, 181–6, 188, 197, 221, 223, 225
- ‘War of Independence’, 134, 161, 169, 215–16
- Wallerstein, Immanuel, 190–2, 212
- Weber, Max, 65
- Westernisation, 2–3, 9, 15–16, 20, 36, 67–8, 82–3, 88, 95, 98–9, 103–4, 110, 135, 144, 154, 156, 168, 180, 199, 203, 206
- Western *ratio*, 2, 14, 23–4, 29, 36, 107, 110, 182–3, 196
- Western thought, 1, 2, 9, 105
- Wittfogel, Karl, 41, 67, 197–8, 202
- Yeğenoğlu, Meyda, 161, 167, 172, 220–1, 223
- Young Ottomans, 112, 209
- Young, Robert J. C., 14, 19–20, 213
- Young Turks (*Les jeunes turcs*), 112–14
- Yumul, Arus, 127, 130–1
- Žižek, Slavoj, 48, 101, 105, 114, 148, 152, 190, 192, 210–11