

APPENDIX 1 IMPLEMENTATION AGAINST ODDS: THE INDONESIAN STORY

According to a seasoned Swedish donor representative, ‘even a well recorded failure of this pioneering assessment project would be good enough as there would be much to learn’.¹

We certainly did better than a ‘recorded failure’, though the aims and strategies of the research proved overambitious. Some sails should have been taken in and more hands called on deck. The problems were less serious in the initial stages than when it came to making comprehensive analyses, and to the drafting of policy recommendations together with relevant pro-democrats.

The following is an attempt to tell the story in brief, based on Törnquist 1979–idem. and with a special focus on the 6 tasks on scholarly partnership and the 12 stages of co-operation between researchers and practitioners that were identified in the general part of this chapter.

The Conditions

By 2002, in Indonesia there was a shortage of almost everything: time, funds, committed academics, educated researchers, reliable previous research and data banks. One source of inspiration was the comparative studies of social and political movements (including Törnquist 2002) and assessments of theoretically defined democratic institutions such as those by David Beetham (2002). Another more practical and political example of what might be possible was the concerned scholarship and participatory practices in Kerala in the 1980s and 1990s that were mentioned in chapter 1.

Indonesia, however, was quite different from Kerala’s long history of progressive popular action for citizenship rights, political independence and land reform against caste oppression, colonialism and landlordism. Even the mass-based educational movement that was crucial in Indonesia during the struggle for independence had been suppressed or domesticated by socio-religious organisations. But various associations of journalists, human rights and peace and reconciliation activists had been crucial in the democracy movement; and they were prepared to engage alongside a number of widely trusted leaders and a few academics.

As mentioned in the second part of chapter 1, a number of leaders of the major pro-democracy organisations together with this author were entrusted

by a conference of activists and scholars discussing a previous study of the pro-democracy movement in early 2002 to initiate broader democracy analyses. To facilitate this, the leaders and a few concerned Indonesian scholars established an organisation called DEMOS (The Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies). DEMOS in turn formed a research team.

The team that consisted of investigative journalists and young researchers who had reviewed the democracy movement. The 'juniors' were backed up by the organisers of DEMOS and an academic supervisor. The former included the most widely respected human rights activist, a former general secretary of the national human rights commission, a major reconciliation theorist and campaigner and a leading investigative journalist and media educator (later on national human rights commissioner) – most of whom, sadly, are no longer with us: the late Munir Said Thalib (assassinated by the Indonesian security agencies), the late Asmara Nababan, the late Th. Sumartana and Stanley Adi Prasetyo. Unfortunately, however, they were not accompanied by representatives from Indonesia's scattered and often poorly developed mass organisations of white- and blue-collar workers and farmers. Further, this author was involved not as a consultant but as academic director in his capacity as professor at the University of Oslo, the principles of which I was thus obliged to honour and DEMOS promised to respect. This base was significant for the author's integrity as well as for the quality and credibility of the project.

Financial Resources and Institutional Co-operation

The decision with regard to funding was *not* to ask for co-operation within the framework or pet strategies of any donors or democracy-building organisations, but only on the basis of our own theoretical framework and strategic plan. As a result, we worked out a project proposal in much the same way as when an academic applies for funding from a research council. The major difference was that many tasks would be carried out in co-operation with democracy activists and organisations. The proposal (which was well anchored in Indonesia though initiated by this author) was sent from the University of Oslo as the lead partner in co-operation with DEMOS, the Indonesian research organisation. Fortunately both the Norwegian and Swedish authorities for international development co-operation (NORAD and Sida) responded positively. Some direct support was also granted to DEMOS for specific parts of the project by the Ford Foundation, the Tifa Soros Foundation and the local office of the European Union. International IDEA, however, abandoned a promising partnership, possibly because it wanted to give priority to its own assessments scheme. Other international organisations with their own formats also seemed to look upon us more as competitors than as possible partners, but cordial relations were sustained with the UNDP.

Our strict principles meant, however, that the main donors had only limited interest in making use of the results that they had contributed to. Most importantly, they did not follow up the results by even considering providing support to the more than one thousand committed pro-democrats who engaged with the project and had so many ideas on how to move ahead through a diversity of

locally rooted pro-democracy initiatives and with so many individual and organisational contacts around the country.

This was a huge loss of a unique opportunity that remains hard to digest. But the blame can not be placed only at the door of our donors. It was also due to DEMOS' insufficient facilitation of a membership organisation composed of the people who engaged in the assessment work. With a reasonably efficient and trustworthy membership-based organisation of all the people involved, it would have been easier to convince our Scandinavian donors to come forward. On the contrary, DEMOS' leaders advocated localised 'non-imposed' initiatives. They also warned against broad membership as it might open up the potential for external manipulation and hijacking.²

An additional institutional dilemma generated severe problems over the years. Norwegian and Swedish funding through the University of Oslo meant support for partnership and academic principles. After the initial three years and the first qualitative survey, however, the Swedish donors wanted to withdraw because of its limited interest in Indonesia; and while Norway was willing to act as the lead donor and thus shoulder the administration of the Swedish funds too, Norway in turn shifted the responsibility for the project from its development aid authority to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy in Jakarta as part of a major overhaul of its international co-operation. Thus it was also decided that support should be given directly to DEMOS 'as any Indonesian NGO', rather than via the University of Oslo, which would instead be engaged by DEMOS for whatever co-operation and advice that it deemed necessary. While this may have been well intended to foster more contextual Norwegian judgement and Indonesian 'ownership', it ignored that DEMOS was a research organisation established as a substitute for a sufficiently good academic base in the public university system (from which many of those involved had been thrown out under Suharto) and that the University of Oslo was not an NGO or a semi-private research institute or consultancy firm.

The new Norwegian policy thus undermined the chances of sustaining the academic-based partnership and credible democracy assessments that were originally agreed on. This was because the policy strengthened the position of those within DEMOS who were sceptical of the principles of independent, unbiased and high-quality research through co-operation with scholars and academic institutions. These critics claimed to be more nationally independent and wanted to give priority to the dynamics of NGO activism based on less qualified research – with external academics in the consultancy business giving advice and providing respectability, though not sharing the responsibility and thus, in reality, not being able to guarantee that the research was up to the mark.

It was possible to manage these problems for a few years thanks to the personal respect and understanding between the executive and academic directors (Nababan and this author) on sustaining the original model in spite of the changes imposed by Norway. But then tensions increased within the framework of a follow-up project in Aceh. This project had been initiated just after the tsunami by this author in consultation with democracy activists inside and outside Aceh. Thereafter the project was developed in co-operation between DEMOS

and Indonesian and Aceh pro-democrats with the aim of fostering civil-society-based democratisation in the province. This, we postulated on the basis of our emerging research results, would be possible within the new political space that was about to be created thanks to Indonesian decentralisation and some actors' interest in fostering peace by allowing local political parties. The initially positive but then deteriorating developments in Aceh have already been discussed in the Indonesian part of chapter 5, but the point here is that as these negative tendencies evolved in Aceh, and as there was a particular need to stand up for the genuine democrats in the province, the Norwegian authorities did not support the fulfilment of the original aim of the project in spite of obvious and serious mismanagement, perhaps for 'diplomatic reasons'. We shall return to the effects on the research later.

A few months later, when Nababan retired and the new executive director (with major responsibility for the Aceh project too) entirely excluded the academic principles in a proposed new general contract of co-operation between DEMOS and the University of Oslo, it was thus impossible for this author, and certainly also for the University of Oslo, to sustain the co-operation.

Later the Norwegian authorities have fostered 'institution-to-institution co-operation agreements', to reduce the number of small projects calling for time-consuming administration as well as the importance of individuals. Institutional co-operation in terms of being guided by rules and regulations is obviously fundamental. But it is vital to recall that while companies, policy or assignment-driven research institutes are directed from top-down, a rector, dean or head of department in proper academic institutions cannot instruct a professor what research the latter should engage in, and instead help to defend these principles and facilitate the research – which has been made clear by the University of Oslo too, as an institution. We will return to the alternative forms of co-operation that have evolved through partnership between Gadjah Mada University and the University of Oslo.

Working with Activists to Identify Sources

Engaging key people and organisations able to carry out the research and access the best sources was even more challenging. The comprehensive and inclusive analytical framework was crucial but a precondition was that we could develop a method for accessing the facts. Research on power and democracy had been obstructed under Suharto, and now it remained poor and faced new challenges.

There was one major reason for the new problems. Under Suharto, Indonesia became so centralised that it was thought possible to monitor and analyse major developments by going to the offices of leading individuals in Jakarta and a few other major cities (just as in the former Soviet Union). After Suharto, much of this disintegrated and a localised political system evolved based on a combination of patron-clientelism, bureaucratic and military organisation and increasingly privatised robber capitalism (e.g. Aspinall and Fealy 2003, Nordholt 2004, Samuel and Nordholt 2004, Nordholt and Hoogenboom 2006, Nordholt and van Klinken 2007, van Klinken 2007 and 2009, Hadiz 2009). Moreover,

popular protest and emerging organisations were also dispersed and fragmented (Budiman and Törnquist 2001, Törnquist 2002, Prasetyo et al. 2003).

Thus there was very little reliable data and most assessments of democracy were based on the opinions of metropolitan air conditioned experts, journalists, NGO leaders and liberal politicians. The frequently proposed shortcut to gaining better knowledge was the use of quantitative opinion surveys. But aside from the problems of reaching out and asking good questions, the most important information needed at this point was *not* people's views of democracy (even if that was interesting too) but how actually existing democracy was developing and what mechanisms, actors and relations of power were proving decisive.

In short, there was a need to substitute for the missing detailed research in a number of crucial fields. In the long run, close research should be added, of course, but for the foreseeable future: what informants would be the best substitute? Who would know best?

Our answer lay with the well-educated and experienced pro-democracy activists on the ground with a long track record and reputation for being able to reflect critically. If a sufficient number of such expert-informants could be identified around the country, we would thus gain access to the best possible sources. These people would be capable, moreover, of understanding and answering our insufficiently contextualised questions. Finally, the informants would also be interested in making use of the results of the assessment.

The only two problems were, first, how to identify and engage all the informants? Second, why should they trust the integrity of the team enough to commit to answering hundreds of sensitive questions on how they judged the problems and options of democratisation in a country with a rather dubious reputation in terms of civil and political freedoms?

Given, first, that during the Suharto regime we had been thrown out of the public universities, second, that academic integrity remained an endangered quality and third, that the room for manoeuvre within public universities was still quite narrow, the answer lay with the establishment of DEMOS as a joint venture between committed academicians and well-reputed democracy activists representing leading human rights and media organisations in co-operation with the University of Oslo (via this author's professorship).

Successes

Thus it was possible to develop a national network of experienced and reliable key informants-cum-local representatives spanning all the 33 provinces who were prepared to have their track record scrutinised publicly. These key informants in turn began to mobilise some 900 reliable informants along 13 or so major frontlines of democracy work who would be able to answer our many questions. These frontlines had been identified in the earlier qualitative survey and case studies on the post-Suharto democracy movement. Together with the research team, the key informants also recruited and trained reliable field assistants.

As previously mentioned, two country-wide qualitative expert surveys were carried out and analysed, one in 2003 and 2004, another in 2007 and 2008;

and both surveys were to be followed up with local qualitative surveys and thematic studies. The frontlines along which the informants were selected in each province in the first and second surveys were almost the same. These not only reflected the priorities of the main democracy groups but also the everyday struggles of major importance in the processes of democratisation that had been vital, though not as visible. In Indonesia, (1) the struggle of the peasants, agricultural labourers and fisher folk for their social and economic interests and basic rights; (2) the struggle of labour for better working conditions and standards of living; (3) the struggle for the social and economic interests and basic rights of the urban poor; (4) The promotion of human rights; (5) the struggle against corruption in favour of 'good governance'; (6) democratisation of political parties and the party system; (7) the promotion of pluralism, religious and ethnic reconciliation and conflict resolution; (8) the improvement of democratisation of education; (9) the promotion of professionalism as part of 'good governance' in public and private sectors; (10) the promotion of freedom, independence and quality of media; (11) the promotion of gender equality and feminist perspectives; (12) the improvement of supplementary representation at the local level and (13) the promotion of sustainable development.

The first of the qualitative surveys conducted was carried out in two rounds in order to use the first to test the framework and the methodology, develop experience and produce quick preliminary results that could be useful for pro-democrats in the run up to the 2004 general elections. This learning by doing was wise and thereafter the quality of the work improved substantially. Taken together the huge operations in 2003–2004 and 2007–2008 of enrolling informants and collecting information in co-operation with the democracy movement around the country was remarkably successful. Almost all the informants in both qualitative country-wide surveys went out of their way to answer the questions. This often called for several sessions and six to eight hours work. It is a significant indication of the democratic commitment of the participants as well as their trust in the idea of independent research, the organisation and the team.

Sceptics did not support our idea of co-operating with key informants–cum–local representatives from the democracy movement in carrying out the research and select senior democracy activists as informants (i.e. those to be interviewed in the actual qualitative surveys). In reality, however, these partners and informants proved to be extraordinarily committed to the idea and principles of the research; and the reliability in terms of the consistency of the answers given to several related questions was quite high too. Equally important: the sceptics' perception that the pro-democrats were likely to make overly critical assessments proved entirely mistaken. In fact, the senior activists' answers were generally balanced and nuanced.

Stumbling Blocks

There were certainly also problems with the data collection. One was the criterion that required the identification of the most seasoned and critically reflective informants within each of the frontlines of democracy work. Another was that

the local key informants' selection of the informants unintentionally side-lined women and activists outside the NGO sector. Women as well as ordinary workers, small farmers and the urban poor have been remarkably active in the democracy struggle, though rarely in leading positions. This is now being considered in forthcoming qualitative surveys.

Second, the frontlines of democracy work are not written in stone and hence change over the years. Problems of human rights and corruption, for instance, remain crucial, but it is important to consider that much of the struggle for democracy may have shifted to the everyday conflicts and initiatives taking place in residential areas and workplaces.

Third, insufficient use was made of the remarkable national scope of the qualitative survey that succeeded in collecting information at the local level throughout the country, and not just in the main cities and towns. The informants were asked to assess the standard of a range of indicators at the local level. And if they were most active with regard to all-Indonesia politics, they were asked to do the same along a specific political field such as agricultural or industrial policies and conflicts. Yet we failed to aggregate the data within these contexts and fields, focusing instead on the general Indonesia-wide level and on the basis of broadly defined regions that did not always correspond to the contexts and political fields where the informants had made their specific assessments.

It is indeed methodologically dubious to aggregate local assessments in this way and to make statements about 'all-Indonesia', but it was about the best we could do at the time. For the future, the general recommendation made in chapter 2 is, however, that the local level contexts should be related to the nodes of local political dynamics and that the central contexts should be in the form of the crucial political fields that condition local democracy such as centrally directed labour or agricultural policies. In Indonesia, the focal points of local politics are the 500 or so districts to which most of the decentralised formal powers have been devolved, and where critical elections of local officials and legislatures take place. (The semi-autonomous province of Aceh is the only exception in terms of having more powers than its districts.) Obviously, the inclusion of a sufficient number of informants from various sectors in almost 500 districts is unrealistic, but critical cases may be selected.

Making the Model Work: Advances and Setbacks with the First Survey

As has been mentioned, the operational model developed and improved upon along the way was that concerned academics would begin by designing an inclusive draft framework for data collection and analysis. This framework had to be specific enough to enable a team of committed investigative journalists with some basic academic training to guide and co-ordinate experienced and critically thinking activists around the country in collecting reliable local information as quickly as possible. Once the data had been collected the assumption was that the team would be able to tabulate and classify the information from the interviews and then input the systematised information into computerised

databases. Finally, the academic director and local advisors would guide and supervise the analysis process.

The analysis process, in turn, was planned in four stages. First, a quick general analysis that could be of immediate use for the pro-democrats who had engaged in the qualitative survey work. This quick analysis was to be published as executive reports and disseminated more widely via the media. Second, extended and specified analysis in co-operation with local key informants in order to correct mistakes in the first analysis and to generate refined results that would make sense to activists on the ground. Third, comprehensive analysis, in extended co-operation with local advisers and published in book form. Fourth, supplementary local qualitative surveys as well as case studies identified in the surveys and carried out by the team in co-operation with practitioners in order to facilitate more specific recommendations.

The experiences from implementing this plan were mixed, so let us look further into the details in search for lessons to be learnt.

Too abstract Framework, Yet Possible to Gain Data, Analyse and Disseminate

The initial stumbling block was expected: how to reduce all the questions we wanted to ask to a manageable number, and how to train the team and local key informants on the logic and possible theoretical interpretations, so that they in turn could train local participants and contribute contextual examples relating to each of the 33 provinces and 13 frontlines of democratisation? Needless to say, we should have developed more contextualised questions. But ideally, then, the team would have ended up with some 33 times 13 contextual versions of the about 300 questions (which we will return to in the following chapters on the analytical framework). This would have taken us to a total of around 129,000 specific questions.

As this was clearly excessive, attempts were made to develop instead general Indonesian examples of the questions that the key informants and field assistants could use as points of departure for developing additional local examples. It is true that this process was not sufficiently well managed, but the informants remained engaged and the team was able to keep the process going. This will be easier with the new recommendation (in chapter 2) that the focus should be on a limited number of critical local contexts as well as centrally based country-wide political sectors or policy areas.

Remarkably, moreover, as we know, very few informants dropped out, in spite of all the time that the extensive questionnaire required; and the level of consistency between the answers to different but related questions was found to be quite high. Further, the central team did an excellent job by consolidating almost all the overwhelming mass of data gathered from around the country with minimal delay.

It was consequently possible to produce the initial executive reports on the results in relation to different arguments about democratisation in Indonesia just before our self-imposed deadlines (DEMOS 2004, 2005, 2008). It is true that the

academic director had to engage extensively in the interpretation of the data and the final analysis, but it nevertheless remained a collective task. And the capacity of the researchers to do much of the work on their own increased substantially as we moved from the first to the second qualitative survey.

The main findings and analysis of the first two reports were also republished in a series of popularised articles in the leading weekly news magazine *Tempo* (DEMOS 2004–2005). The same applied, albeit on a lesser scale, after the second qualitative survey (DEMOS 2008a). This called for extensive editorial assistance, but it succeeded. Interestingly, however, this publishing required separate financing, in spite of the fact that the previous case studies and the democracy qualitative survey had grown in part out of close co-operation with the pro-democratic media community. A major reason was the new commercial competition between the media and that public dissemination of advanced qualitative democracy surveys was not deemed profitable. (This is in contrast to what still seems to be the case for advanced magazines in India such as *Frontline*.) There were also reports published by journalists in other media and in editorials and opinion pages (e.g. Törnquist 2004–2008).

Generally speaking, however, the public discourse was less widespread than expected given the initial engagement of journalists and cultural workers with the project.

Finally, the executive reports were also used as a basis for a number of seminars with several of the informants and local activists in regional centres, although the outcomes were quite uneven. One obstacle and lesson was that our data was not aggregated to fit the politically relevant contexts well enough. A second problem was that DEMOS did not really engage in facilitating the work and organising informants and assistants who, in turn, we hoped would take the data and results as a point of departure for discussions on priorities and co-operation between pro-democracy activists and politicians.

Delayed Analyses: Insufficient Local Supervision, Editing and Support

The most serious dilemma was much less expected: how to finalise the analysis of the data and write up both brief summary and full reports.

The analysis had to be carried out and published as quickly as possible. To make sense, moreover, the reports had to identify the implications of the qualitative survey on the major contending arguments about democratisation: were these arguments refuted or vindicated and were there alternative, more fruitful perspectives?

First, it was essential to provide quick and clear-cut results to the committed journalists and local informants and activists who were expected to engage in public discussion and provide supplementary input. Ideally, these discussions would in turn have been followed by more thorough political deliberation by civil society and political groups convened by the key informants in each province (and clusters of key informants) to initiate joint agendas. It is true that the first general analysis (published in the executive reports with the academic

director) could serve as a synopsis and general guide for briefings. Yet writing for the media and activists is a separate task and art, and that was not well mastered by the team, so not very much was produced. Thus the full potential of the results could not be utilised in local democracy promotion.

Meanwhile another section of the central-level research team was to have written up the more comprehensive reports. However, while the team understood well the data it had collected, tabulated and systematised, it was not so well read in the various existing theories and arguments that they would need to confront the data with, and to thus judge the pros and cons of these often contending theses. Thus the initial drafts of the comprehensive reports were delayed and of poor quality. With regard to the first comprehensive report, the team, the academic director and a committed external editor, who was finally brought on board, had to engage in permanent rescue missions that were expensive and highly frustrating for all parties involved. As a result, the time-consuming rewriting of the full report until it was up to international academic standards (Priyono et al. 2007) meant that most of the scheduled local qualitative surveys³ and the thematic follow-up studies⁴ were neglected and had to be shelved almost completely.

Instead of commenting and correcting and commenting again on the manuscripts for the major report from the national qualitative survey, the academic director could, of course, have written the report on his own (and gained the credit for it). But that would have meant abandoning the whole idea of participatory research and capacity building.

In hindsight the problem boils down to three factors, the first of which was the lack of committed Indonesian supervisors with relevant academic training. This was due in part to this author and DEMOS' mistake of not having put enough effort from the outset into identifying and engaging available scholars and senior students. (There was certainly also a problem of combining the work in Indonesian and English, but that was well known from the outset and could have been managed.⁵) Basically, however, very few competent scholars and senior students were available. This was both because of the poor standard of democracy studies at Indonesian universities and research institutes and because scholars still tend to be on low incomes and thus seek higher remuneration from consultancy-type work on expert markets and/or career possibilities than we could offer. Besides, there was also little time in which to engage additional supervisors with good ideas in the middle of permanent crises and rescue missions.

The second major factor behind the problems was too little engagement and investment in good editors and translators. In spite of the severe difficulties in producing good briefings and reports, this neglect was never really acknowledged until the conclusion of the report from the second qualitative survey, produced in co-operation with scholars at the University of Gadjah Mada.⁶

The third major cause of the problems was the insufficient involvement of the activists and journalists that had initiated the project in the first place. This was partly due to the fact that several had lost some momentum in their own work. As a result, their activities were confined to citizen associations, and they continued to operate in relative isolation from popular movements. Similarly, aspects

of the journalistic commitment to public democratic discourse (in addition to basic freedoms and professional work ethics) were lost with the increasing commercialisation of the media and the purchase of and investment in major media outlets by corporations with vested political interests.

Crucial but Aborted Advances with the Second Survey

By contrast, it must be noted that there were huge improvements in the management and reporting of the second qualitative survey carried out in 2007 and 2008. Unfortunately, however, the advances were undermined by NGOish consolidation and fear for academic co-operation.

NGOish Consolidation

After the conclusion and reporting from the first qualitative survey, the major general strategy for addressing the problems was consolidation in terms of enhancing the abilities of the research team. Unfortunately, this also implied that the research organisation become introspective in trying to manage problems that were more rooted in the insufficient involvement of external translators, editors and supervisors than in the individual qualities of the members of the team itself, with one or two exceptions.

In so doing DEMOS ironically transformed itself into the type of archetypical NGO that had been identified as a major hurdle in pro-democracy work in both the previous case studies on 'floating democrats' and the new qualitative survey results themselves: an atomised association that nourished its own networks and advocacy projects rather than paving the way for broader and more unified agendas and campaigns.

The NGOish consolidation also affected the opportunities for using the delayed research reports as a basis for recommendations in co-operation with informants and the activists and organisations that they were assumed to be able to engage locally. Briefings to the informants and the facilitation of communication between them remained neglected.

As already mentioned, one argument in the team was that activism should evolve locally and without direction; another was that a broad membership of DEMOS would open up the potential for political manipulation and hijacking. References to the development of popular educational movements in other contexts, from Kerala to Scandinavia, were not attended to; and neither did compromise proposals on the launching of separate or parallel organisations.

As a partial central-level alternative, the DEMOS officer in charge brought together and facilitated a group of informants and activists from various parts of the country with an interest in following up the assessment results. While these were all fine and admirable activists, serious questions were asked about how they had been selected and their representativeness.

Nevertheless, it represented a step forward, and the academic director designed initial memoranda (in late 2005 and early 2007) on possible recommendations. There were two main arguments. One concerned the need for civil society-based

pro-democrats to engage in organised politics, not just in civil society. The other addressed the way in which this might be best achieved through so-called intermediary socio-political blocks in between party politics and civil society and social movement activism. They would have to be initiated by leading pro-democrats and their organisations on various levels. The substance was elaborated upon in chapter 6.

The ideas were discussed by the research team and the group of particularly interested activists DEMOS had assembled. Separately, several activists who had not been invited by DEMOS also discussed the matter, including with this author. During 2008, the conclusions from these discussions were supplemented by the results from the second qualitative survey, ongoing case studies (Nur 2009, Törnquist et al. 2009a) and the conclusion of the studies in Aceh (Törnquist et al. 2011). Thus the full report from the second qualitative survey (Samadhi and Warouw 2009) has a specific chapter on the idea of a socio-political block strategy (Mundayat and Piryono 2009).

However, the delay in the assessment work, the problems of inclusion and representation of various interested actors as well as the termination of the cooperation between DEMOS and the University of Oslo (which also mirrored conflicts inside DEMOS) constrained further initiatives. Later DEMOS went on to produce a separate training manual, but without much substance and without the involvement of the researchers, leading activists and the academic director (DEMOS 2009).

Promising but Threatening Academic Partnership

The second strategy for addressing the problems of conducting good analyses and publishing briefings and reports as well as facilitating an inclusive educational movement was to work more closely with supportive scholars and students within academia. This is how crucial advances were made in the implementation and analysis of the second qualitative survey (2007–2008) as well as the concluding report. By then a core team of committed researchers had received sufficient training and experience. They knew how to master the process and to make sufficient use of instructions and advice from local academics that had been brought on board to support the team and the academic director. And they appreciated and benefitted from good editing. (DEMOS 2008a and Samadhi and Warouw 2009) This testified to the fact that the basic roadmap was feasible – with sufficient training and academic advice. Yet, the advances were stalled.

There were several reasons for the cooperation with the academia. One was the much needed professional development of the key researchers. They had to be able to better understand and apply the theories and arguments of democracy to the data collated. They needed more knowledge of the methodologies available to carry out qualitative assessment surveys and research case studies. They had to be able to write up good reports.

Another reason was the need to engage local supervisors in order to speed up the pace of the work, improve quality and integrate new results from the rapidly expanding university studies of democracy. Local supervisors would also reduce

the workload and dominance of the main academic director in order to facilitate instead more equal academic partnership between him and local researchers.

Yet a reason was that these needs – as well as the importance of reaching out and initiating at least widespread education and related activism – should be combined with efforts to rebuild democracy studies and research at university level. In 1994, we were thrown out of the Satya Wacana Christian University in Salatiga, Central Java, where a promising Masters programme and related research had been initiated by Indonesian scholars (including Arief Budiman, Ariel Heryanto and George Aditjondro) with international support from the University of Sydney and individual scholars such as this author. Parallel to the work with DEMOS, minor portions of the Norwegian support that was in the hands of the academic director had thus been used to facilitate committed colleagues at one of Indonesia's foremost higher education institutes, the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM) in Yogyakarta which, then, also backed up DEMOS.

These attempts were intensified and combined in late 2006 with the founding of a Norwegian-supported Masters and PhD programme in democracy studies at UGM and the launch of an associated journal and publishing house (the PCD Press; www.pcd.ugm.ac.id). This was followed by the collaboration on the analysis and writing up of the results from the second qualitative survey, in association with additional supervisors at UGM (Samadhi and Warouw 2009). The plan from late 2008 onwards was to further develop this cooperation between civil society and university-based researchers.

However, a major unavoidable effect of the university strategy was that academic advisors become more influential than had previously been the case. This was obviously threatening to some sections in DEMOS. By early 2009, as mentioned above, the then new leaders of DEMOS no longer wanted to sustain a partnership based on academic principles. These leaders opted to use academics as supporting consultants instead. Thus the cooperation with first the University of Oslo and then UGM had to be terminated.

The Way Ahead

In this process DEMOS' main researchers opted for sustaining the original model by moving ahead with their own studies and developing new research together with the supportive scholars inside UGM.

At the time of writing, the qualitative survey work and the originally planned case studies have thus been resumed within the Masters and PhD programmes mentioned above and an associated comprehensive research programme at UGM on 'Power, Welfare and Democracy'. This programme retains extensive joint work with practitioners on the ground and develops cooperation with other universities around the country as well as international academic partners, including the University of Oslo. This is an environment in which basic regular qualitative surveys can be supplemented with a cluster of thematic studies into key problems and areas; studies that can be more varied, less extensive and more flexibly defined within a broad and continuously improved framework. Fortunately, the efforts have gained Norwegian support.

With the transition from an NGO to a major public university, however, a number of new organisational problems emerge. Those agents of change at UGM who try to combine their own need for supportive colleagues and institutions with efforts to develop sufficiently strong leadership to overcome irrelevant status barriers, career-based project competition and compartmentalisation within universities need to be supported. It must also be possible to appreciate and integrate researchers with their crucial experiences outside the academic hierarchy, not least because they have had to work in the NGO sector for many years. Meanwhile, tolerance to the engagement of colleagues who seek outside activities and extra income have to be reduced. Finally, the donors on their part prioritise quite naturally top-level administrative institutional agreements between themselves and university leaders, therefore having to be reminded of the need to also respect academic institutions in terms of rules and regulations for the autonomy and freedom of the active scholars to decide about priorities, design and implementation, given that the very idea of independent academies and academicians is that they are not ordinary state institutions and employees, or for that matter consultants or activists. This continue to be crucial in the efforts at democratisation in Indonesia; in the distressful era of New Public Management, it also needs to be kept in mind in countries like Norway.

APPENDIX 2 THE QUESTIONNAIRES
FOR THE 2013 THIRD INDONESIAN
DEMOCRACY ASSESSMENT

(A): LOCAL QUESTIONNAIRE

**Baseline survey on
Development of Democracy**

QUESTIONNAIRE

3rd round assessment on problems and
options of democratisation in Indonesia -
2013

Version:

LOCALCONTEXT
 CENTRAL-SECTORAL CONTEXT



**UNIVERSITAS
GADJAH MADA**



**UNIVERSITY
OF OSLO**

| A | B | C |
|---|---|---|
| | | |

NO QUESTIONNAIRE

A. CODES OF REGION

| | | | | | |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| TOWN | 13 | Manado | 24 | Sidoarjo | |
| 01 | Banda Aceh | 14 | Ternate | 25 | Kutai Kartanegara |
| 02 | Medan | 15 | Denpasar | 26 | Poso |
| 03 | Batam | 16 | Kupang | 27 | Belu |
| 04 | Bekasi | 17 | Ambon | 28 | Jayapura |
| 05 | Bandung | | | 29 | Manokwari |
| 06 | Pekalongan | DISTRICT | | | |
| 07 | Surakarta | 18 | Aceh Selatan | | |
| 08 | Surabaya | 19 | Kerinci | SPECIAL REGION | |
| 09 | Pontianak | 20 | Bengkulu | 30 | DI Yogyakarta |
| 10 | Banjarmasin | 21 | Lampung Selatan | 31 | DKI Jakarta |
| 11 | Balikpapan | 22 | Tangerang | | |
| 12 | Makassar | 23 | Batang | | |

B. CODES OF FRONTLINE OF DEMOCRATIC WORK ALONG WHICH THE INFORMANT IS ACTIVE

| | | | |
|----|--|----|---|
| 01 | Issues of Education, including both services and content | 08 | Issues of Clan, Ethnic, and Religious Relations |
| 02 | Issues of Health Services | 09 | Issues of Media, Culture and Social Media |
| 03 | Issues of Ecology, Environment and Natural Resources (incl. mining, forestry, fishery, etc.) | 10 | Issues of Security Sector and Welfare Reform |
| 04 | Issues of Labour Movement and related policies | 11 | Issues of Anti-corruption, Transparent and Accountable Government |
| 05 | Issues of Informal Sectors (incl. urban poor issues) | 12 | Issues of Human Rights and Law (incl. minority rights) |
| 06 | Issues of Agrarian Movements, Land Reform and Land Grabbing | 13 | Issues of Party and Electoral rules and regulations |
| 07 | Issues of Women, Gender Equality and Children | 14 | Issues of Industry and Business |

C. NUMBER OF INFORMANT IN TOWN/DISTRICT (01–30)

INTERVIEW PROCESS

| NO | DATE | PART (NUMBER) | TIME | |
|----|------|---------------|-------|-----|
| | | | START | END |
| 1 | | | | |
| 2 | | | | |
| 3 | | | | |
| 4 | | | | |
| 5 | | | | |

VALIDATION

Interviewed by:

(name)

Local assistant

(sign)

Checked and validated by:

(name)

Key informant

(sign)

STATEMENT OF AIMS, PRINCIPLES AND COMMITMENT

This survey is based on the combined efforts of concerned scholars, students and experienced and reflective practitioners of democracy. The study would not be possible without the dedicated involvement of the informants in particular. We know that it will

take a lot of your important time to answer all the questions, but we hope that you like to contribute thus to the production of an independent baseline of knowledge for further efforts at democratisation, and we like to express our sincere thanks for your commitment and patience. We shall certainly keep you updated on the results and we are looking forward to further cooperation on various follow up activities.

Please note that the research team based at the UGM, supervised by us, Professors (Dr.) Purwo Santoso (UGM) and Olle Törnquist (UiO), is committed to keep all information about the informants in strict confidence, only use it to secure the validity and reliability of the survey, as well as to keep the information separated from the answers to all the substantive questions and only use the thus anonymised information for the purpose of non-commercial and independent academic research in accordance with strict academic principles. All members of the team, including local key-informants and research assistants, have signed a statement of commitment to this effect.

The survey is supported by the Universitas Gadjah Mada and the University of Oslo and by additional financial support from the Royal Embassy of Norway to Indonesia. The financial support is given to the universities without any other formal or informal conditions than to conduct the best possible independent academic study for the benefit of democracy and thus based welfare and development, and, of course, to account for all funds used and make the results available for the public.

The survey is to follow up and broaden two previous surveys which were carried out in partnership between the civil society organisation, Demos, and the University of Oslo, in cooperation with the Indonesian Democracy Movement, between 2004 and 2008 about the problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia. The comprehensive previous results were reported on in Priyono et al. (2007) and Samadhi et al. (2009).¹ The transfer of the responsibility to UGM

¹ Priyono, A.E, Samadhi, W.P. and Törnquist, O. with Birks, T. (2007). Making Democracy Meaningful. Problems and Options in Indonesia. Jakarta and Singapore: Demos and ISEAS; Samadhi, W. P. and Warouw, N. (Eds.) (2009). Building Democracy on the Sand. Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia. Jakarta and Yogyakarta; Demos and PCD Press. (1st edition: December 2008; 2nd edition 2009).

is to (a) sustain the academic basis and quality of the surveys while continuing the cooperation with democratic practitioners and (b) to foster the utilisation of the results in the wide academic and public education and information as well as in academic follow-up studies. A reference group of leading democracy activists and intellectuals serves to support this cooperation and contribution to the public discourse. The founding members of the group include Danang Widoyoko, Daniel Dhakidae, Eva Kusuma Sundari, Ikrar Nusa Bakti, Handoko Wibowo, Luky Djani, Mian Manurung, Mohtar Mas'oeed, Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Wardah Hafidz, and Wiladi Budiharga. The ultimate aim of the survey is to generate the best possible knowledge as a basis for attempts at democratic transformative politics through the combination of democratisation and reforms towards welfare based and sustainable social and economic development.

The survey is not built on the number of answers and of statistical analysis but on the quality of the assessments by the informants of the problems and options of democratisation and the interpretation of this information with the help of a number of relevant theories. For further information about the rationale and academic foundations of the survey, see Törnquist (2013).²

The survey is carried out both in a number of local contexts around the country and with regard to crucial national level institutions of public governance. The focus is on six pillars of democracy: (1) the constitution of the *demos* (people) and public affairs; (2) the institutions (rules and regulations) of democracy; (3) the actors; (4) how the actors relate to these institutions; (5) the political capacity of the actors and (6) how their strategies affect democratisation.

Once again, on behalf of the full team, thank you very much for engaging in this effort.

Yogyakarta and Oslo, March 2013
Purwo Santoso and Olle Törnquist

² Törnquist, O. (2013). *Assessing the Dynamics of Democratisation: Transformative Politics. New Institutions and the Case of Indonesia*. New York: Palgrave.



BASELINE SURVEY ON DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY

PWD Project
UGM–UiO research cooperation
2013

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ABOUT THE INFORMANT

NAME

SEX

FEMALE

MALE

AGE

ADDRESS

CITY

PROVINCE

PROFESSION

ORGANISATION

LOCATION OF
ACTIVITY

CONTACT

PHONE/MOBILE

EMAIL

In this part we focus on the constitution of the demos (people) and public affairs. Both topics are related to definition of democracy, e.g. ‘popular control over public affairs on the basis of political equality’ (Beetham 1999). More specifically, we want to explore what constitutes public issues, who shall control them, and how.

PART
1

THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE DEMOS AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

- Q1.1.** In your assessment, which of the issue areas that are listed in the Table A below do **people in your town/district** think are public issues, irrespective of whether the current local government addresses them or not?
- Q1.2.** In your assessment, which of these issue areas that are listed in the Table A below do **people in your town/district** deem to be the most important in your town/district? (*Pick one from the list*)

| TABLE A | | | | |
|---------|---|------------------------------|-----|--|
| NO | PUBLIC ISSUE ACCORDING TO PEOPLE | Q1.1. | | Q1.2. |
| | | ACCEPTED AS PUBLIC ISSUES | | THE MOST IMPORTANT PUBLIC ISSUE |
| | | YES | NO | |
| A | Education | [] | [] | [] |
| B | Health services | [] | [] | [] |
| C | Physical security | [] | [] | [] |
| D | Fishery | [] | [] | [] |
| E | Agriculture | [] | [] | [] |
| F | The informal sector, such as street vendors, | [] | [] | [] |
| G | Industry | [] | [] | [] |
| I | Welfare and social security | [] | [] | [] |

| TABLE A | | | | |
|---------|---|---------------------------|-----|---------------------------------|
| NO | PUBLIC ISSUE ACCORDING TO PEOPLE | Q1.1. | | Q1.2. |
| | | ACCEPTED AS PUBLIC ISSUES | | THE MOST IMPORTANT PUBLIC ISSUE |
| | | YES | NO | |
| J | Public transportations | [] | [] | [] |
| K | Traffic | [] | [] | [] |
| L | Public housing | [] | [] | [] |
| M | Discrimination against minority groups (gender, ethnic, religion) | [] | [] | [] |
| N | Regulations of the rights of children | [] | [] | [] |
| O | Religion-based regulations | [] | [] | [] |
| P | Others | [] | [] | [] |

Q1.3. In your assessment, what of the major issue areas listed in the Table B below do **people in your town/district** think are left outside local government attention in your district/town and left to the market, self-help among communities and private solutions?

Q1.4. In your assessment, what of the major issue areas listed in the Table B below that **people** say have been left out of public governance do they think should instead be subject to public governance?

| TABLE B | | | | | |
|---------|-------------------|--------|-----------|--------------------|--|
| NO | ISSUES | Q1.3. | | | Q1.4. |
| | | MARKET | SELF-HELP | FAMILY, INDIVIDUAL | SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO PUBLIC GOVERNANCE |
| A | Education | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| B | Health | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| C | Physical security | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| D | Fishery | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| E | Agriculture | [] | [] | [] | [] |

| TABLE B | | | | | |
|---------|---|--------|-----------|-----------------------|---|
| NO | ISSUES | Q1.3. | | | Q1.4. |
| | | MARKET | SELF-HELP | FAMILY, INDIVIDUAL | SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO PUBLIC GOVERNANCE |
| F | The informal sector, such as street vendors | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| G | Industry | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| H | Wages & labour regulations | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| I | Welfare and social security | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| J | Public transportations | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| K | Traffic | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| L | Public housing | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| M | Discrimination against minority groups (gender, ethnic, religion) | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| N | Regulations of the rights of children | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| O | Religion-based regulations | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| P | Others | [] | [] | [] | [] |

Q1.5. We return now to the issues that people deem to be most important (Q 1.2). In your assessment, do **people in your town/district** know who and what institutions are supposed to control and manage the problem that they deem to be most important?

- a. [] Yes, they know very well
- b. [] Yes, but they know only partially
- c. [] No, they don't really know much about this

Q1.6. In your assessment, who and what institution (as listed in Table C) do **people in your town/district** think should handle the problem you just said that they deem to be most important (Q1.2)?

Q1.7. And how should this be done?

| TABLE C | |
|--|--|
| Q1.6. | Q1.7. |
| WHO SHOULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM | HOW THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED |
| a. <input type="checkbox"/> The individual | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Proceed directly to Q1.9. |
| b. <input type="checkbox"/> The family | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Proceed directly to Q1.9. |
| c. <input type="checkbox"/> On the market | a. <input type="checkbox"/> By paying for help/services b. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to the market: |
| d. <input type="checkbox"/> Citizens' and people's own organisations | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done through community organisations (for example, self-management groups and cooperatives but also religious and cultural (adat) groups) b. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by joint interest/issue organisations c. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to groups in civil society |
| e. <input type="checkbox"/> State and/or local government | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by town/district government (including local politicians) b. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by provincial/ national government (including politicians) c. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to state/local government: |
| f. <input type="checkbox"/> State and stakeholders' organisations | a. <input type="checkbox"/> By the town/district government and local stakeholder organisations that have been selected at the discretion of the politicians and bureaucrats. b. <input type="checkbox"/> By the provincial/ national government according to the same method of selection as in (a). c. <input type="checkbox"/> By town/district government and local stakeholder organisations in accordance with politically decided but impartial rules and regulations and with the right of the organisations to appoint their representatives. d. <input type="checkbox"/> By the provincial/ national government according to the same method of selection as in (c). e. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to state and stakeholders' organisations: |

Q1.8. In **your own** assessment, who in this town/district discuss actively the issue that you just said people deem to be most important (Q1.2)?

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.....
.....
.....

Q1.9. What additional issues do **you yourself** think are also necessary for people at the local level to engage in, in order to control their 'local' problems?

.....
.....
.....
.....

Q1.10. In **your assesment**, what (if any) are the problems of identifying the 'demos' (those who shall decide about public affairs) among all the people who think that certain problems are of public concern (as specified in question Q 1.2) and are involved in discussing public issues (as specified in Q1.8)?

.....
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.....
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.....
.....
.....

This part focuses on the institutional means that are supposed to promote the aim of democracy (i.e. popular control of public affairs based on political equality). These means or dimensions of democracy are listed below. For these means to be good enough there must be a number of promotional rules and regulations. A substantial democracy that is comprehensive by not being too narrowly defined requires thus also that the quality of these rules and regulations is reasonably high.



PART
2

THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRATIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

Q2.1. What is **your** general assessment about the situation in your town/district with regard to the following means of democracy? Is it good or fair or bad? Please give priority to the institutions that you are most well informed about and then continue to the rest on the list! (*If you absolutely do not know, you can of course abstain from answering*)

Q2.2. In **your** assessment, has the quality of the means of democracy (rules and regulations) improved or worsened or remained the same since the first Pemilukada (direct elections of local executives) during 2008/2009 in your town/district?

In answering those questions (Q2.1 and Q2.2), please consider and combine these three aspects:

- 1) How effective are the existing rules and regulations in fostering the 13 means of democracy mentioned in Table D below?*
- 2) How comprehensive are the existing rules and regulations in terms of covering all or only a few aspects of these means of democracy, for instance only a few of the many human rights?*
- 3) How comprehensive are these rules and regulations applied to the entire town/district?*

| TABLE D | | | |
|----------------|---|---|--|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.1 | Q2.2 |
| | | GENERAL ASSESSMENT | IMPROVED, WORSENEED, NOT CHANGE |
| 1 | <p>EQUAL AND INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP</p> <p>This is with regard to consensus on equality without discrimination. For example: No discrimination of indogenous people, or Chinese and ex-tapol (tahanan politik/political prisoner) as well as of minority/imigrant/internally displaced persons and refugees, The legal framework includes (1) <u>Law and implementing regulations</u>, such as Antidiscrimination Law (UU No 40/2008), and (2) <u>Implementing agencies</u>, such as National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider <u>other practices</u></p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |
| 2 | <p>RULE OF LAW (INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UN CONVENTIONS)</p> <p>This is with regard to the subordination of the government and public officials to the laws, and the implementation of the ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For example: Does the government implement all ratified universal declarations, as well as international covenants and conventions through (1) the <u>Law and implementing regulations</u>, such as Constitutional Law, Law No.7/1984, the law No. 39/1999, the Law No. 11/2005, the Law No. 12/2005 and other related laws, and (2) <u>implementing agencies</u> such as National and Regional Ombudsman and the National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider <u>other practices</u>.</p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |
| 3 | <p>EQUAL JUSTICE</p> <p>This is with regard to secure equal access for all people to justice, including poor people. Please consider the <u>Law and implementing regulations</u> such as the Constitutional Law and the Antidiscrimination Law as well as <u>implementing agencies</u>, such as courts, legal aid agencies, and also consider <u>other practices</u>.</p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |

| TABLE D | | | |
|---------|--|---|--|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.1 | Q2.2 |
| | | GENERAL ASSESSMENT | IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE |
| 4 | <p>THE UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS (INCLUDING BASIC NEEDS)</p> <p>This is with regard to the respect for and promotion of civil and political rights as well as the protection and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. Please consider the <u>laws and implementing regulations, implementing</u> state agencies (courts, police) and societal agencies such as legal aid organisations and also consider <u>other practices.</u></p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |
| 5 | <p>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REPRESENTATION THROUGH PARTIES AND ELECTIONS</p> <p>This is with regard to the extent to which elections and parties offer people the chance to choose the persons and parties they want to represent them, articulate their interest and control the government and its policies. One may also consider the chances to form parties and participate in elections, the chances for independent candidates to participate and the quality of democratic decisions inside parties.</p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |
| 6 | <p>RIGHTS-BASED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE</p> <p>This is with regard to public participation in the process of policy making and implementation. To what extent is it possible in principle (according to law) and in practice for citizens to take part in and be consulted in various public matters such as, for example, the planning of residential and industrial areas, the deciding of budget priorities, the running of schools and hospitals, the regulation of market places and public transportation, the regulation of local economic activities and the upholding of law and order?</p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |

| TABLE D | | | |
|----------------|---|---|--|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.1 | Q2.2 |
| | | GENERAL ASSESSMENT | IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE |
| 7 | <p>INSTITUTIONALISED CHANNELS FOR INTEREST- AND ISSUE BASED REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE</p> <p>To what extent are there institutionalised channels of influence for the organisations of immediately concerned stakeholders with regard to various public matters such as, for example, for traders to have a say on local market places, for trade unions to have a say on labour regulations, for employers and labourers to have a say on support for local production and for parents to influence the schools? Please consider both the legal framework and actual practices.</p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |
| 8 | <p>LOCAL DEMOCRACY MADE REAL IN COMBINATION WITH INFLUENCE ON OTHER LEVELS WHEN NECESSARY</p> <p>This is with regard to what extent the local democracy and regional autonomy work. Has it become more possible for ordinary people to control and influence local politics or is it controlled by powerful actors and by various actors from outside the town/district? Has decentralisation made a difference? Please consider the <u>laws and implementing regulations</u> as well as other practices.</p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |
| 9 | <p>DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION (INCLUDING PRIVATE MILITIAS, ETC)</p> <p>This is with regard to the capacity of democratic political institutions to control various instruments of coercion. To what extent are police and military as well as private security organisations and various gangs subordinated to democratic control and regulations? Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.</p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |

| TABLE D | | | |
|---------|--|---|--|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.1 | Q2.2 |
| | | GENERAL ASSESSMENT | IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE |
| 10 | <p>TRANSPARENT, IMPARTIAL AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE</p> <p>This is about the institutionalisation and implementation of transparent, impartial and accountable governance. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.</p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |
| 11 | <p>GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE AND CAPACITY TO MAKE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENT THEM</p> <p>This is with regard to whether governments are subject to backseat driving by powerful actors and conditions beyond the control of government and, most importantly, the extent to which the government and its bureaucrats are capable of really implementing its laws and decisions. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.</p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |
| 12 | <p>FREEDOM OF AND EQUAL CHANCES TO ACCESS TO PUBLIC DISCOURSE, CULTURE AND ACADEMIA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS</p> <p>Please consider both laws and implementation regarding, for example, National Education System Law, regulations on art festival, public polling, and other practices, such as writing opinion article in mass media.</p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |
| 13 | <p>CITIZENS' DEMOCRATIC SELF-ORGANISING</p> <p>Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices regarding both rights to organise and the independence of organisations to elect accountable leaders.</p> | <p>a. [] Good</p> <p>b. [] Fair</p> <p>c. [] Bad</p> | <p>a. [] Improved</p> <p>b. [] Worsened</p> <p>c. [] Not change</p> |

Q2.3. In **your** assessment, what informal rules and regulations support the formal means of democracy (listed in Table E)?

Q2.4. In **your** assessment, what informal rules and regulations limit or contradict the formal means of democracy (listed in Table E)?

| TABLE E | | | |
|----------------|--|--|--|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.3 | Q2.4 |
| | | INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT SUPPORT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT LIMIT OR CONTRADICT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY |
| 1 | Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs | | |
| 2 | Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions) | | |
| 3 | Equal justice | | |
| 4 | The universal human rights (incl. basic needs) | | |
| 5 | Democratic political representation through parties and elections | | |
| 6 | Rights based citizen participation in public governance | | |

| TABLE E | | | |
|----------------|--|---|---|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.3 | Q2.4 |
| | | INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT SUPPORT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT LIMIT OR CONTRADICT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY |
| 7 | Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue-based representation in public governance | | |
| 8 | Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary | | |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc) | | |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | | |
| 11 | Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them | | |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights | | |
| 13 | Citizens' democratic self-organising | | |

Democracy is not just about the intrinsic institutional means of democracy. It is also essential that people have the will and capacity to promote and use these instruments. From this part and onwards, we will focus on the actors and their issues. First, we identify who are the main actors in public affairs.



MAIN ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Q3.1. Who are the main influential actors – individual or collective – in the discussion about public issues in your town/district? *(Please mention 2-4 actors in each arena mentioned in Table F)*

| TABLE F | |
|---|--|
| Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS | |
| NAME AND PROFESSION | WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE? |
| A. STATE AND GOVERNMENT | |
| (1) | |
| (2) | |

| TABLE F | |
|---|--|
| Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS | |
| NAME AND PROFESSION | WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE? |
| (3) | |
| (4) | |
| B. POLITICAL SOCIETY (including parties and political movements, pressure groups and interest groups) | |
| (1) | |
| (2) | |
| (3) | |
| (4) | |

| TABLE F | |
|--|--|
| Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS | |
| NAME AND PROFESSION | WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE? |
| C. BUSINESS LIFE | |
| (1) | |
| (2) | |
| (3) | |
| (4) | |
| D. CIVIL SOCIETY (for instance NGOs, trade unions, peasant organisations, neighborhood groups, civic communities) | |
| (1) | |
| (2) | |

| TABLE F | |
|---|--|
| Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS | |
| NAME AND PROFESSION | WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE? |
| (3) | |
| (4) | |

Q3.2. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most dominant actors (irrespective of whether they foster democracy or not) when it comes to public affairs in your town/district? *(Please mention two actors)*

| Q3.2. DOMINANT ACTORS | |
|---------------------------------|----------------|
| DOMINANT ACTOR 1 (DOM-1) | |
| DOMINANT ACTOR 2 (DOM-2) | |

Q3.3. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most important sub-ordinated (alternative actors) in favour of change and more popular control of public affairs in your town/district? *(Please mention two actors)*

| Q3.3. ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|
| ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 1 (ALT-1) | |
| ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 2 (ALT-2) | |

In this part, we want to explore how the main actors that you have identified relate to the means of democracy. It is basic to a democracy that the major actors are willing to apply the rules of the game. More specifically, we want to explore how they use the various rules and regulations that are supposed to promote means of democracy. Do the actors promote or abuse or avoid them?



MAIN ACTORS' RELATION TO THE MEANS OF DEMOCRACY

Q4.1. In **your** assesment, how (if at all) do **the dominant actors** (Q3.2) **promote** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|---|---|
| | | DOM-1 | DOM-2 |
| 1 | Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 2 | Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|---|---|
| | | DOM-1 | DOM-2 |
| 3 | Equal justice | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 4 | The universal human rights (incl. basic needs) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 5 | Democratic political representation through parties and elections | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 6 | Rights based citizen participation in public governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 7 | Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|---|---|
| | | DOM-1 | DOM-2 |
| 8 | Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 11 | Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| | | DOM-1 | DOM-2 |
| 13 | Citizens' democratic self-organising | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |

Q4.2. In **your** assesment, how (if at all) do **the alternative actors** (Q3.3) **promote** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|---|---|
| | | ALT-1 | ALT-2 |
| 1 | Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 2 | Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 3 | Equal justice | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain |

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|--|--|
| | | ALT-1 | ALT-2 |
| | | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 4 | The universal human rights (incl. basic needs) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 5 | Democratic political representation through parties and elections | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 6 | Rights based citizen participation in public governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 7 | Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 8 | Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain |

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|---|---|
| | | ALT-1 | ALT-2 |
| | | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 11 | Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 13 | Citizens' democratic self-organising | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |

Q4.3. In your assesment, how (if at all) do **the dominant actors** (Q3.2) **abuse or avoid** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.3. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|---|---|
| | | DOM-1 | DOM-2 |
| 1 | Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 2 | Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 3 | Equal justice | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 4 | The universal human rights (incl. basic needs) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 5 | Democratic political representation through parties and elections | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.3. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|---|---|
| | | DOM-1 | DOM-2 |
| | | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 6 | Rights based citizen participation in public governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 7 | Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 8 | Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.3. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|---|---|
| | | DOM-1 | DOM-2 |
| 11 | Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 13 | Citizens' democratic self-organising | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |

Q4.4. In your assesment, how (if at all) do the **alternative actors** (Q3.3) **abuse or avoid** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.4. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|--|--|
| | | ALT-1 | ALT-2 |
| 1 | Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain |

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.4. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|---|---|---|
| | | ALT-1 | ALT-2 |
| | | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 2 | Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 3 | Equal justice | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 4 | The universal human rights (incl. basic needs) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 5 | Democratic political representation through parties and elections | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 6 | Rights based citizen participation in public governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.4. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|---|---|
| | | ALT-1 | ALT-2 |
| 7 | Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 8 | Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc) | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |
| 11 | Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |

| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | Q4.4. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY? | |
|----|--|--|--|
| | | ALT-1 | ALT-2 |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Please explain b. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely promote this R/R |

In politics as in sports: even if all players follow the rules of the game, it also matters if some are strong while others are weak.

This part focuses on the political capacity of the actors. There are five aspects of capacity to be explored: a) whether people are politically included or excluded from vital parts of public life, b) whether actors possess authority and legitimacy, c) whether they can put their issues on the public agenda, d) whether they can mobilise and organise followers, and e) whether they can participate and build representation. We want to ask you to assess the capacity of the four dominant and alternative actors that were identified in the previous part (Part 3 Q3.2 and Q3.3).

PART
5

ACTORS' CAPACITY

A. POLITICAL INCLUSION (VERSUS EXCLUSION) – *Democratisation presupposes that people are not excluded from politics and the crucial parts of society that effect politics. They must at least be powerful enough to fight exclusion and claim presence.*

What is the capacity of the main actors to exclude others or overcome political exclusion and marginalisation?

Q5.1. In your assesment, what methods are used to involve people in the political process in your town/district? (*You may select more than one option*)

- a. Politics (examples: registered as voters, eligible to run for public positions)
- b. Economy (examples: property rights, access to business permit)
- c. Social and culture (examples: eligible for community gathering, freedom of expressing cultural identity)

| MAIN ACTOR | Q5.3. | Q5.4 | |
|------------|--|----------------------|----------|
| | WHOM ARE BEING INCLUDED | SECTORS OF INCLUSION | EXAMPLES |
| ALT-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 1 | | |
| | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 | | |
| | c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 | | |
| | d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain) | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| ALT-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 1 | | |
| | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 | | |
| | c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 | | |
| | d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain) | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Q5.5. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 exclude other main actors or other people?

| Q5.5. ARE THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS EXCLUDE OTHER MAIN ACTORS OR PEOPLE | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|---|
| DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
| DOM-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8) | ALT-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8) |
| DOM-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8) | ALT-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8) |

Q5.6. Whom are being excluded by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

| MAIN ACTOR | Q5.6. | Q5.7. | |
|------------|--|--|--|
| | WHOM ARE BEING EXCLUDED | SECTORS OF EXCLUSION | EXAMPLES |
| ALT-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain) | | |

Q5.8. What do the dominant and alternative actors do to overcome exclusion?

| Q5.8. WHAT DO THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS DO TO OVERCOME EXCLUSION? | | | |
|---|--|--------------------|--|
| DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
| DOM-1 | | ALT-1 | |
| DOM-2 | | ALT-2 | |

Q5.9. In your assesment, who else (in addition to the major dominant and alternative actors) are involved in excluding/marginalising people in your town/district? *(You may indicate more than one option)*

Q5.10. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the they (Q5.9) exclude people? *(Please provide examples!)*

| Q5.9. | | Q5.10. |
|--|---|---|
| OTHER ACTORS INVOLVED IN EXCLUDING/ MARGINALISING PEOPLE | | SECTORS OF EXCLUSION |
| a. <input type="checkbox"/> POLITICAL ACTORS | | |
| b. <input type="checkbox"/> BUSINESS ACTORS | | |
| c. <input type="checkbox"/> SOCIAL-CULTURAL ACTORS | | |

Q5.11. What kind of favours, rights and policies, do you think that those who are excluded or marginalised in your town/district need to claim and develop in order to be included in public and political life?

a. Special favours and preferential treatments

Explain:

.....
.....

b. Equal rights for all

B. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY – *Knowledge of the predominant ways in which various resources (capital) are transformed into legitimate authority is crucial when we wish to explain the problems and options of democracy. Economic resources are about money and other assets; social resources are about good contacts and networks; cultural resources are about knowledge; coercive resources are about armed, physical or other forms of force.*

What is the capacity of the actors to transform their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources (capital) into legitimate and political authority as a leader or leading organisation, to thus become politically powerful?

Q5.12. What are the prime bases for the capacity of the dominant and alternative actors that you have identified in Part 3? (*Pick the most two important prime bases for each actor, then rank them*)

| MAIN ACTOR | Q5.12. ACTOR'S PRIME BASES | | | |
|------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|--|
| | ECONOMIC RESOURCES (ECONOMIC CAPITAL) | GOOD CONTACTS (SOCIAL CAPITAL) | KNOWLEDGE/ INFORMATION (CULTURAL CAPITAL) | MEANS OF COMPULSION (COERCIVE CAPITAL) |
| DOM-1 | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| DOM-2 | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| ALT-1 | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| ALT-2 | [] | [] | [] | [] |

Q5.13. Is it easy or difficult to become a *legitimate and authoritative* political leader?

| MAIN ACTOR | Q5.13. | |
|------------|---|----------------------------------|
| | EASY OR DIFFICULT TO BECOME A LEGITIMATE AND AUTHORITATIVE POLITICAL LEADER | WHY? |
| DOM-1 | a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult | |
| DOM-2 | a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult | |
| ALT-1 | a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult | |
| ALT-2 | a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult | |

Q5.14. How successful are the dominant actors and sub-ordinated/alternative actors in using their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, i.e. to gain political power?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.14. |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| | INDICATORS OF SUCCESS |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.15. In their attempts to use their resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, when do the actors fail?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.15. |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| | CAUSES OF FAILURE |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.15. |
|-------------|-------------------------|
| | CAUSES OF FAILURE |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

C. POLITICISATION AND AGENDA SETTING – *In Part 3 you have already identified the priorities of the dominant and the sub-ordinated actors of change give priority to. Now we want to know how the actors try to put ‘their issues’ on the top of the political agenda.*

What is the capacity of the actors to turn problems that they deem to be of common concern into public matters, i.e. to put them on the ‘political agenda’?

Q5.16. What are the issues that the dominant and alternative actors give priority to?

| Q5.16. ISSUES THAT DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS’ GIVE PRIORITY TO | |
|--|----------------|
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.17. What are these dominant actors' and alternative actors' methods to put those issues on the political agenda? (*Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them*)

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.17. |
|--------------|---|
| | METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA |
| DOM-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others: |
| DOM-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others: |
| ALT-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others: |
| ALT-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others: |

Q5.18. When promoting their issues, do the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors typically frame them as single issues/specific interests or as issues and interests that are part of strategic reforms? *(Pick only one option per actor)*

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.18. |
|--------------|--|
| | METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA |
| DOM-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans |
| DOM-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans |
| ALT-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans |
| ALT-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans |

Q5.19. How successful do you think that the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors are in turning their issues into public matters, i.e. to put them on the political agenda?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.19. |
|--------------|----------------------------------|
| | INDICATORS OF SUCCESS |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.20. In their attempts to turn issues into public matters, in what situation do the actors fail?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.20. |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| | CAUSES OF FAILURE |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

D. MOBILISATION AND ORGANISATION – *Democracy presupposes that all actors are able to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies. This in turn calls for a capacity to include people into politics, primarily by way of mobilisation and organisation – i.e. to politicise the people.*

What is the capacity of the actors to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies?

Q5.21. How do the actors try to increase their capacity to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies? (*Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them*)

| TABLE L | |
|--------------------|--|
| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.21. |
| | METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT |
| DOM-1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups |
| DOM-2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups |
| ALT-1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi |

| TABLE L | |
|-------------|--|
| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.21. |
| | METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT |
| | h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups |
| ALT-2 | a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups |

Q5.22. How do the actors use their specific capacity and methods to mobilise people that you have indicated in Q5.23 (e.g. to use populism or networks)?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.22. |
|-------------|---|
| | HOW THE ACTOR DEVELOP AND USE THEIR METHODS OF MOBILISING SUPPORT |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.22. |
|-------------|---|
| | HOW THE ACTOR DEVELOP AND USE THEIR METHODS OF MOBILISING SUPPORT |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.23. How successful do you think that the actors are in mobilising and organising support for demands and policies?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.23. |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| | INDICATORS OF SUCCESS |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.24. In their attempts to mobilise and organise support for demands and policies, in what situation do the actors fail?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.24. |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| | CAUSES OF FAILURE |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

E. PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION – People must be able to use existing means of participation and representation, reform them or develop new ones in order to approach and influence governance institutions. These may be institutions for public governance of various kinds but also associational or private governance. The main focus needs be, then, on different types of representation in relation to these institutions and how these are legitimised and mediated through traditional leaders, parties, interest organisations, corporatist arrangements and/or institutions for direct participation.

What is the pattern and capacity of the actors to use and improve existing means of participation and representation?

Where do the **dominant actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.25. To what institution of governance?

Q5.26. Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

| DOMINANT ACTORS | Q5.25. | Q5.26. |
|-----------------|--|---|
| | WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT | MEDIATORS |
| DOM-1 | a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive | a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation |
| DOM-2 | a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive | a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, Including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation |

Where do the **sub-ordinated/alternative actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.27. To what institution of governance?

Q5.28. Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

| ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | Q5.27. | Q5.28. |
|--------------------|--|---|
| | WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT | MEDIATORS |
| ALT-1 | a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive | a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation |
| ALT-2 | a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive | a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation |

Q5.29. Why do the different dominant and alternative actors go to the specific institutions and mediators in the ways that you have indicated in your answer to the previous question ?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.29. |
|-------------|----------------|
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.29. |
|-------------|-------------------------|
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.30. How successful do you think that these are in seeking participation and developing representation in the way that you have indicated in your previous answer?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.30. |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| | INDICATORS OF SUCCESS |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.31. When do the actors fail in their attempts to solve/address problems and promote their vision and interests through channels and mediators as you mentioned before?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.31. |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| | CAUSES OF FAILURE |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Now we turn to how ordinary people seek representation. Please indicate the most two important channels and the three important mediators.

Where in your judgement do **ordinary people** go to solve/address their problem and promote their vision and interests?

Q5.32. To what institutions of governance?

Q5.33. Via what mediator?

| Q5.32. | Q5.33. |
|--|--|
| CHANNELS | MEDIATORS |
| a. <input type="checkbox"/> Institutions for private governance b. <input type="checkbox"/> Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. <input type="checkbox"/> Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. <input type="checkbox"/> Civil and military administration e. <input type="checkbox"/> The judiciary and police f. <input type="checkbox"/> The political executive | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Civil society organisations b. <input type="checkbox"/> Media c. <input type="checkbox"/> Issue and interest organisations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. <input type="checkbox"/> Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. <input type="checkbox"/> Informal leaders g. <input type="checkbox"/> Ways of bypassing democratic representation |

Q5.34. In your judgment, *why* do **ordinary people** go to the specific institutions and mediators etc? (*Open question*)

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

| MAIN ACTORS | Q6.1. |
|-------------|--|
| | ACTOR'S STRATEGY TO REACH AIMS |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

6.2. What are major challenges related to democratisation that the actors face when implementing their strategies?

6.3. What effects do actors' strategies have on the problems and options of democratisation that you have pointed to in the previous questions?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q6.2. | Q6.3. |
|-------------|--|--|
| | MAJOR CHALLENGES RELATED TO DEMOCRATISATION | EFFECT OF THE ACTOR'S STRATEGY ON DEMOCRATISATION |
| DOM-1 | | |
| DOM-2 | | |

| MAIN ACTORS | Q6.2. | Q6.3. |
|-------------|---|---|
| | MAJOR CHALLENGES RELATED TO DEMOCRATISATION | EFFECT OF THE ACTOR'S STRATEGY ON DEMOCRATISATION |
| ALT-1 | <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> | <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> |
| ALT-2 | <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> | <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> |

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

APPENDIX 2 THE QUESTIONNAIRES
FOR THE 2013 THIRD INDONESIAN
DEMOCRACY ASSESSMENT

(B): NATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE

**Baseline survey on
Development of Democracy**

QUESTIONNAIRE

3rd round assessment on problems and
options of democratisation in Indonesia -
2013

Version:

[] *LOCALCONTEXT*

[] *CENTRAL-SECTORAL CONTEXT*



**UNIVERSITAS
GADJAH MADA**



**UNIVERSITY
OF OSLO**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | A | B |
| 9 | 9 | | |

NO QUESTIONNAIRE

A. CODES OF FRONTLINE OF DEMOCRATIC WORK ALONG WHICH THE INFORMANT IS ACTIVE

| | | | |
|----|--|----|---|
| 01 | Issues of Education, including both services and content | 08 | Issues of Clan, Ethnic, and Religious Relations |
| 02 | Issues of Health Services | 09 | Issues of Media, Culture and Social Media |
| 03 | Issues of Ecology, Environment and Natural Resources (incl. mining, forestry, fishery, etc.) | 10 | Issues of Security Sector and Welfare Reform |
| 04 | Issues of Labour Movement and related policies | 11 | Issues of Anti-corruption, Transparent and Accountable Government |
| 05 | Issues of Informal Sectors (incl. urban poor issues) | 12 | Issues of Human Rights and Law (incl. minority rights) |
| 06 | Issues of Agrarian Movements, Land Reform and Land Grabbing | 13 | Issues of Party and Electoral rules and regulations |
| 07 | Issues of Women, Gender Equality and Children | 14 | Issues of Industry and Business |

B. NUMBER OF INFORMANT (01-50)

This survey is based on the combined efforts of concerned scholars, students and experienced and reflective practitioners of democracy. The study would not be possible without the dedicated involvement of the informants in particular. We know that it will

STATEMENT OF AIMS, PRINCIPLES AND COMMITMENT

take a lot of your important time to answer all the questions, but we hope that you like to contribute thus to the production of an independent baseline of knowledge for further efforts at democratisation, and we like to express our sincere thanks for your commitment and patience. We shall certainly keep you updated on the results and we are looking forward to further cooperation on various follow up activities.

Please note that the research team based at the UGM, supervised by us, Professors (Dr.) Purwo Santoso (UGM) and Olle Törnquist (UiO), is committed to keep all information about the informants in strict confidence, only use it to secure the validity and reliability of the survey, as well as to keep the information separated from the answers to all the substantive questions and only use the thus anonymised information for the purpose of non-commercial and independent academic research in accordance with strict academic principles. All members of the team, including local key-informants and research assistants, have signed a statement of commitment to this effect.

The survey is supported by the Universitas Gadjah Mada and the University of Oslo and by additional financial support from the Royal Embassy of Norway to Indonesia. The financial support is given to the universities without any other formal or informal conditions than to conduct the best possible independent academic study for the benefit of democracy and thus based welfare and development, and, of course, to account for all funds used and make the results available for the public.

The survey is to follow up and broaden two previous surveys which were carried out in partnership between the civil society organisation Demos and the University of Oslo, in cooperation with the Indonesian Democracy Movement, between 2004 and 2008 about the problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia. The comprehensive previous results were reported on in Priyono et al. (2007) and Samadhi et al. (2009).¹ The transfer

¹ Priyono, A.E, Samadhi, W.P. and Törnquist, O. with Birks, T. (2007). Making Democracy Meaningful. Problems and Options in Indonesia. Jakarta and Singapore: Demos and ISEAS; Samadhi, W. P. and Warouw, N. (Eds.) (2009). Building Democracy on the Sand. Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia. Jakarta and Yogyakarta; Demos and PCD Press. (1st edition: December 2008; 2nd edition 2009).

of the responsibility to UGM is to (a) sustain the academic basis and quality of the surveys while continuing the cooperation with democratic practitioners and (b) to foster the utilisation of the results in the wide academic and public education and information as well as in academic follow-up studies. A reference group of leading democracy activists and intellectuals serves to support this cooperation and contribution to the public discourse. The founding members of the group include Danang Widoyoko, Daniel Dhakidae, Eva Kusuma Sundari, Ikrar Nusa Bakti, Handoko Wibowo, Luky Djani, Mian Manurung, Mohtar Mas'oeed, Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Wardah Hafidz, and Wiladi Budiharga. The ultimate aim of the survey is to generate the best possible knowledge as a basis for attempts at democratic transformative politics through the combination of democratisation and reforms towards welfare based and sustainable social and economic development.

The survey is not built on the number of answers and of statistical analysis but on the quality of the assessments by the informants of the problems and options of democratisation and the interpretation of this information with the help of a number of relevant theories. For further information about the rationale and academic foundations of the survey, see Törnquist (2013).²

The survey is carried out both in a number of local contexts around the country and with regard to crucial national level institutions of public governance. The focus is on six pillars of democracy: (1) the constitution of the *demos* (people) and public affairs; (2) the institutions (rules and regulations) of democracy; (3) the actors; (4) how the actors relate to these institutions; (5) the political capacity of the actors and (6) how their strategies affect democratisation.

Once again, on behalf of the full team, thank you very much for engaging in this effort.

Yogyakarta and Oslo, March 2013
Purwo Santoso and Olle Törnquist

² Törnquist, O. (2013). *Assessing the Dynamics of Democratisation: Transformative Politics. New Institutions and the Case of Indonesia*. New York: Palgrave.



BASELINE SURVEY ON DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY

PWD Project
UGM-UiO research cooperation
2013

Purwo Santoso, Olle Törnquist *Project Directors*

Eric Hiariej *Deputy*

Amalinda Savirani *Survey Coordinator*

Hasrul Hanif, Willy Purna Samadhi, and local teams in
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ABOUT THE INFORMANT

NAME

SEX

FEMALE

MALE

AGE

ADDRESS

CITY

PROVINCE

PROFESSION

ORGANISATION

LOCATION OF
ACTIVITY

CONTACT

PHONE/MOBILE

EMAIL

| Q1.1. MAJOR PUBLIC ISSUE | Q1.2. ILLUSTRATION/EXAMPLE |
|--|--|
| 3. | 3. |
| 4. | 4. |
| 5. | 5. |
| 6. | 6. |

B. People’s Assessment of Public Issues

Q1.3. In your assessment, do **people in general** think that the issues that you listed in the above (Q1.1) should be matters of major public concern in your political field/sector?

Q1.4. Please give concrete examples for each type of issue.

| Q1.3. MAJOR PUBLIC CONCERN ACCORDING TO PEOPLE IN GENERAL | Q1.4. CONCRETE EXAMPLE |
|--|--|
| 1. | 1. |
| 2. | 2. |
| 3. | 3. |
| 4. | 4. |
| 5. | 5. |
| 6. | 6. |

Q1.5. According to **people in general**, which issue is the most important within your political field/sector?

.....

Q1.6. With regard to the issue that people in general think is most important in your political field/sector (Q 1.5), in your assessment, **do people** know who and what institution that are supposed to control and manage that issue?

- a. Yes, they know very well
- b. Yes, but they know only partially
- c. No, they don't really know much about this

Q1.7. Again with regard to the issue that people in general think is most important in your political field/sector (Q 1.5), in your assessment, who and what institution **do people** think should handle that issue?? Do people think the problem should be handled primarily on the market, by organisations in society, by the state/government, or state and stakeholders' organisations together?

Q1.8. And how should this be done?

| Q1.8. WHO SHOULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM | Q1.9. HOW THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED |
|---|--|
| A. <input type="checkbox"/> On the market | a. <input type="checkbox"/> By paying for help/services b. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to the market: |
| B. <input type="checkbox"/> By citizens' and people's own organisations | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done through community organisations (for example, self-management groups and cooperatives but also religious and cultural (adat) groups) b. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by joint interest/issue organisations c. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to groups in civil society: |
| C. <input type="checkbox"/> By state and/or local government | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by government (including politicians) b. <input type="checkbox"/> Getting it done by provincial/ national government (including politicians) c. <input type="checkbox"/> In other ways related to state/government |

| Q1.8. WHO SHOULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM | Q1.9. HOW THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED |
|--|--|
| D. [] By state and stakeholder's organisations | a. [] By the government and stakeholder organisations that have been selected at the discussion of the politicians and bureaucrats. b. [] By the provincial/local government according to the same method of selection as in (a). c. [] By government and stakeholder organisations in accordance with politically decided but impartial rules and regulations and with the right of the organisations to appoint its representatives. d. [] By the provincial/ local government according to the same method of selection as in (c). e. [] In other ways related to state and stakeholders' organisations: |

C. Constitution of the demos (the people who shall have control of public issues)

Q1.9. In your assessment, who within your political field/sector discuss actively the issue that you just said people have deemed to be most important (Q1.5)?

.....

Q1.10. What additional issues and tasks within your political field/sector do you yourself think are also necessary for people to engage in order to control their problems?

.....

Q1.11. In your assessment, are there any problems within your political field/sector with regard to who have the right to decide and control public affairs (and to thus be part of the political demos)?

.....

This part focuses on the institutional means that are supposed to promote the aim of democracy (i.e. popular control of public affairs based on political equality). These means or dimensions of democracy are listed below. For these means to be good enough there must be a number of promotional rules and regulations. A substantial democracy that is comprehensive by not being too narrowly defined requires thus also that the quality of these rules and regulations is reasonably high.

PART
2

THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRATIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

- Q2.1.** What rules and regulations related to these 13 means (listed in Table A) of democracy are applicable or not applicable in your political field/sector?
- Q2.2.** What is your general assessment about the situation in your political field/sector regarding the following means of democracy? Is it good or fair or bad?
- Q2.3.** In your assessment, has the thus combined performance of the rules and regulations improved or worsened or remained the same since 2007 in your political field/sector?
To answer the questions, ask the informant to consider and combine these three aspects:
- 1) How effective are the existing rules and regulations in fostering the 13 means of democracy listed in Table A below?*
 - 2) How comprehensive are the existing rules and regulations in terms of covering all or only a few aspects of these means of democracy, for instance only a few of the many human rights?*
 - 3) How comprehensively are these rules and regulations applied in the country as a whole?*

| TABLE A | | | | |
|---------|--|---|--|---|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.1 | Q2.2 | Q2.3 |
| | | HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR | GENERAL ASSESSMENT | IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE |
| 1 | <p>EQUAL AND INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP</p> <p>This is with regard to consensus on equality without discrimination. For example: No discrimination of indogenous people, or Chinese and ex-tapol (tahanan politik/political prisoner) as well as of minority/imigrant/ internally displaced persons and refugees, The legar framework includes (1) <u>Law and implementing regulations</u>, such as Antidiscrimination Law (UU No 40/2008), and (2) <u>Implementing agencies</u>, such as National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider <u>other practices</u></p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p> |
| 2 | <p>RULE OF LAW (INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UN CONVENTIONS)</p> <p>This is with regard to the subordination of the government and public officials to the laws, and the implementation of the ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For example: Does the government implement all ratified universal declarations, as well as</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p> |

| TABLE A | | | | |
|---------|---|--|---|--|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.1 | Q2.2 | Q2.3 |
| | | HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR | GENERAL ASSESSMENT | IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE |
| | international covenants and conventions through (1) the <u>Law and implementing regulations</u> , such as Constitutional Law, Law No.7/1984, the law No.39/1999, the Law No. 11/2005, the Law No. 12/2005 and other related laws, and (2) <u>implementing agencies</u> such as National and Regional Ombudsman and the National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider <u>other practices</u> . | | | |
| 3 | EQUAL JUSTICE This is with regard to secure equal access for all people to justice, including poor people. Please consider the <u>Law and implementing regulations</u> such as the Constitutional Law and the Antidiscrimination Law as well as <u>implementing agencies</u> , such as courts, legal aid agencies, and also consider <u>other practices</u> . | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change |
| 4 | THE UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS (INCLUDING BASIC NEEDS) This is with regard to the respect for and promotion of civil and political rights as well as the protection and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. Please consider the <u>laws and implementing regulations</u> , <u>implementing</u> state agencies (courts, police) and societal | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change |

| TABLE A | | | | |
|---------|---|---|--|---|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.1 | Q2.2 | Q2.3 |
| | | HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR | GENERAL ASSESSMENT | IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE |
| | agencies such as legal aid organisations and also consider <u>other practices</u> . | | | |
| 5 | <p>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REPRESENTATION THROUGH PARTIES AND ELECTIONS</p> <p>This is with regard to the extent to which elections and parties offer people the chance to choose the persons and parties they want to represent them, articulate their interest and control the government and its policies. One may also consider the chances to form parties and participate in elections, the chances for independent candidates to participate and the quality of democratic decisions inside parties.</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p> |
| 6 | <p>RIGHTS-BASED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE</p> <p>This is with regard to public participation in the process of policy making and implementation. To what extent is it possible in principle (according to law) and in practice for citizens to take part in and be consulted in various public matters such as, for example, the planning of residential and industrial areas, the deciding of budget priorities, the running of schools and hospitals,</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p> |

| TABLE A | | | | |
|---------|--|---|--|---|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.1 | Q2.2 | Q2.3 |
| | | HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR | GENERAL ASSESSMENT | IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE |
| | the regulation of market places and public transportation, the regulation of local economic activities and the upholding of law and order? | | | |
| 7 | <p>INSTITUTIONALISED CHANNELS FOR INTEREST- AND ISSUE BASED REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE</p> <p>To what extent are there institutionalised channels of influence for the organisations of immediately concerned stakeholders with regard to various public matters such as, for example, for traders to have a say on local marketplaces, for trade unions to have a say on labour regulations, for employers and labourers to have a say on support for local production and for parents to influence the schools? Please consider both the legal framework and actual practices.</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p> |
| 8 | <p>LOCAL DEMOCRACY MADE REAL IN COMBINATION WITH INFLUENCE ON OTHER LEVELS WHEN NECESSARY</p> <p>This is with regard to what extent the local democracy and regional autonomy work. Has it become more possible for ordinary</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p> |

| TABLE A | | | | |
|---------|--|---|--|---|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.1 | Q2.2 | Q2.3 |
| | | HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR | GENERAL ASSESSMENT | IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE |
| | people to control and influence local politics or is it controlled by powerful actors and by various actors from outside the town/ district? Has decentralisation made a difference? Please coinsider the laws and implementing regulations as well as other practices. | | | |
| 9 | <p>DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION (INCLUDING PRIVATE MILITIAS, ETC)</p> <p>This is with regard to the capacity of democratic political institutions to control various instruments of coercion.To what extent are police and military as well as private security organisations and various gangs subordinated to democratic control and regulations? Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p> |
| 10 | <p>TRANSPARENT, IMPARTIAL AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE</p> <p>This is about the institutionalisation and implementation of transparent, impartial and</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p> |

| TABLE A | | | | |
|---------|--|---|--|---|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.1 | Q2.2 | Q2.3 |
| | | HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR | GENERAL ASSESSMENT | IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE |
| | accountable governance. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices. | | | |
| 11 | <p>GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE AND CAPACITY TO MAKE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENT THEM</p> <p>This is with regard to whether governments are subject to backseat driving by powerful actors and conditions beyond the control of government and, most importantly, the extent to which the government and its bureaucrats are capable of really implementing its laws and decisions. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p> |
| 12 | <p>FREEDOM OF AND EQUAL CHANCES TO ACCESS TO PUBLIC DISCOURSE, CULTURE AND ACADEMIA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS</p> <p>Please consider both laws and implementation regarding, for example, National Education System Law, regulations on art festival, public polling, and</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad</p> | <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change</p> |

| TABLE A | | | | |
|---------|--|--|---|--|
| NO | 13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Q2.1 | Q2.2 | Q2.3 |
| | | HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR | GENERAL ASSESSMENT | IMPROVED, WORSENERD, NOT CHANGE |
| | other practices, such as writing opinion article in mass media. | | | |
| 13 | CITIZENS' DEMOCRATIC SELF-ORGANISING Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices regarding both rights to organise and the independence of organisations to elect accountable leaders. | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable b. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Good b. <input type="checkbox"/> Fair c. <input type="checkbox"/> Bad | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Improved b. <input type="checkbox"/> Worsened c. <input type="checkbox"/> Not change |

Q2.4. In your assessment, what informal rules and regulations support the formal means of democracy (listed in Table B) apply to your political field/sector according to your answer to Q2.1?

| TABLE B | | | |
|---------|--|---|---|
| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/ SECTOR (Q2.1) [√] | Q2.4. |
| | | | INFORMAL PRACTICES ALLOW FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS |
| 1 | Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs | [] | |
| 2 | Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions) | [] | |

| TABLE B | | | |
|----------------|--|--|--|
| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/ SECTOR (Q2.1) [√] | Q2.4. |
| | | | INFORMAL PRACTICES ALLOW FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS |
| 3 | Equal justice | [] | |
| 4 | The universal human rights (incl. basic needs) | [] | |
| 5 | Democratic political representation through parties and elections | [] | |
| 6 | Rights based citizen participation in public governance | [] | |
| 7 | Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance | [] | |
| 8 | Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary | [] | |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc) | [] | |

| TABLE B | | | |
|----------------|--|--|--|
| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/ SECTOR (Q2.1) [√] | Q2.4. |
| | | | INFORMAL PRACTICES ALLOW FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | [] | |
| 11 | Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them | [] | |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights | [] | |
| 13 | Citizens' democratic self-organising | [] | |

Q2.5. In your assessment, what informal rules and regulations limit or contradict the formal means of democracy (listed in Table C) that apply to your political field/sector according to your answer to Q2.1?

| TABLE C | | | |
|----------------|--|---|--|
| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/SECTOR (Q2.1) [√] | Q2.5. |
| | | | INFORMAL PRACTICES LIMIT FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS |
| 1 | Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs | [] | |

| TABLE C | | | |
|---------|--|--|---|
| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/SECTOR (Q2.1) [√] | Q2.5. |
| | | | INFORMAL PRACTICES LIMIT FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS |
| 2 | Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions) | [] | |
| 3 | Equal justice | [] | |
| 4 | The universal human rights (incl. basic needs) | [] | |
| 5 | Democratic political representation through parties and elections | [] | |
| 6 | Rights based citizen participation in public governance | [] | |
| 7 | Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance | [] | |
| 8 | Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary | [] | |

| TABLE C | | | |
|---------|--|--|---|
| NO | MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/SECTOR (Q2.1) [√] | Q2.5. |
| | | | INFORMAL PRACTICES LIMIT FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc) | [] | |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | [] | |
| 11 | Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them | [] | |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights | [] | |
| 13 | Citizens' democratic self-organising | [] | |

Democracy is not just about the intrinsic institutional means of democracy. It is also essential that people have the will and capacity to promote and use these instruments. From this part and onwards, we will focus on the actors and their issues. First, we identify who are the main actors in public affairs.

PART
3

**MAIN ACTORS IN
PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

Q3.1. Who are the main influential actors – individual or collective – in controlling and disputing public issues in your political field/sector? *(Please mention 2-4 actors in each arena mentioned in Table D)*

| TABLE D | |
|--|---|
| Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS | |
| NAME AND PROFESSION | WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE? |
| A. STATE AND GOVERNMENT | |
| (1) | |
| (2) | |

| TABLE D | |
|--|---|
| Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS | |
| NAME AND PROFESSION | WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE? |
| (3) | |
| (4) | |
| B. POLITICAL SOCIETY (including parties and political movements, pressure groups and interest groups) | |
| (1) | |
| (2) | |
| (3) | |
| (4) | |

| TABLE D | |
|--|---|
| Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS | |
| NAME AND PROFESSION | WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE? |
| C. BUSINESS LIFE | |
| (1) | |
| (2) | |
| (3) | |
| (4) | |
| D. CIVIL SOCIETY (for instance NGOs, trade unions, peasant organisations, neighborhood groups, civic communities) | |
| (1) | |
| (2) | |

| TABLE D | |
|---|--|
| Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS | |
| NAME AND PROFESSION | WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE? |
| (3) | |
| (4) | |

Q3.2. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most dominant actors (irrespective of whether they foster democracy or not) when it comes to public affairs in your political field/sector? *(Please mention two actors)*

| Q3.2. DOMINANT ACTORS | |
|---------------------------------|----------------|
| DOMINANT ACTOR 1 (DOM-1) | |
| DOMINANT ACTOR 2 (DOM-2) | |

Q3.3. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most important subordinated (alternative actors) in favour of change and more popular control of public affairs in your political field/sector? *(Please mention two actors)*

| Q3.3. ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|
| ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 1 (ALT-1) | |
| ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 2 (ALT-2) | |

In politics as in sports: even if all players follow the rules of the game, it also matters if some are strong while others are weak.

This part focuses on the political capacity of the actors. There are five aspects of capacity to be explored: a) whether people are politically included or excluded from vital parts of public life, b) whether actors possess authority and legitimacy, c) whether they can put their issues on the public agenda, d) whether they can mobilise and organise followers, and e) whether they can participate and build representation. We want to ask you to assess the capacity of the four dominant and alternative actors that were identified in the previous part (Part 3 Q3.2 and Q3.3).

PART
5

ACTORS' CAPACITY

A. POLITICAL INCLUSION (VERSUS EXCLUSION) – *Democratisation presupposes that people are not excluded from politics and the crucial parts of society that effect politics. They must at least be powerful enough to fight exclusion and claim presence.*

What is the capacity of the main actors to exclude others or overcome political exclusion and marginalisation?

-
- Q5.1.** In your assesment, what methods are used to involve people in the political process in your political field/sector? (*You may select more than one option*)
- a. Politics (examples: registered as voters, eligible to run for public positions)
 - b. Economy (examples: property rights, access to business permit)
 - c. Social and culture (examples: eligible for community gathering, freedom of expressing cultural identity)

Q5.2. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 include other main actors or other people?

| Q5.2. ARE THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS INCLUDE OTHER MAIN ACTORS OR PEOPLE | | | |
|--|---|---------------------------|---|
| DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
| DOM-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.7) | ALT-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.7) |
| DOM-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.7) | ALT-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.7) |

Q5.3. Whom are being included by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

Q5.4. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors include other main actors or other people? *(Please provide examples!)*

| MAIN ACTOR | Q5.3. | Q5.4 | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|
| | WHOM ARE BEING INCLUDED | SECTORS OF INCLUSION | EXAMPLES |
| DOM-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain) | | |
| DOM-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain) | | |

| MAIN ACTOR | Q5.3. | Q5.4 | |
|------------|--|----------------------|----------|
| | WHOM ARE BEING INCLUDED | SECTORS OF INCLUSION | EXAMPLES |
| ALT-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 | | |
| | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 | | |
| | c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 | | |
| | d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain) | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| ALT-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 | | |
| | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 | | |
| | c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 | | |
| | d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain) | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Q5.5. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 exclude other main actors or other people?

| Q5.5. ARE THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS EXCLUDE OTHER MAIN ACTORS OR PEOPLE | | | |
|---|--|--------------------|--|
| DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
| DOM-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | ALT-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes |
| | b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8) | | b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8) |
| DOM-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | ALT-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes |
| | b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8) | | b. <input type="checkbox"/> No (proceed to Q5.8) |

Q5.6. Whom are being excluded by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

Q5.7. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors exclude other main actors or other people? *(Please provide examples!)*

| MAIN ACTOR | Q5.6. | Q5.7, | |
|------------|--|----------------------|----------|
| | WHOM ARE BEING EXCLUDED | SECTORS OF EXCLUSION | EXAMPLES |
| DOM-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 | | |
| | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 | | |
| | c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 | | |
| | d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain) | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| DOM-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 | | |
| | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 | | |
| | c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 | | |
| | d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain) | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| ALT-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 | | |
| | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 | | |
| | c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 | | |
| | d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain) | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| ALT-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant actor 2 | | |
| | b. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 1 | | |
| | c. <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative actor 2 | | |
| | d. <input type="checkbox"/> Other people (please explain) | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Q5.8. What do the dominant and alternative actors do to overcome exclusion?

| Q5.8. WHAT DO THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS DO TO OVERCOME EXCLUSION? | | | |
|---|--|--------------------|--|
| DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
| DOM-1 | | ALT-1 | |
| DOM-2 | | ALT-2 | |

Q5.9. In your assesment, who else (in addition to the major dominant and alternative actors) are involved in excluding/marginalising people in your political field/sector? *(You may indicate more than one option)*

Q5.10. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do they (Q5.9) exclude people? *(Please provide examples!)*

| Q5.9. | | Q5.10. |
|---|---|---|
| OTHER ACTORS INVOLVED IN EXCLUDING/MARGINALISING PEOPLE | | SECTORS OF EXCLUSION |
| a. [] POLITICAL ACTORS | | |

| Q5.9. | | Q5.10. |
|---|---|---|
| OTHER ACTORS INVOLVED IN EXCLUDING/ MARGINALISING PEOPLE | | SECTORS OF EXCLUSION |
| b. <input type="checkbox"/> BUSINESS ACTORS | <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> | <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> |
| c. <input type="checkbox"/> SOCIAL-CULTURAL ACTORS | <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> | <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> |

Q5.11. What kind of favours, rights and policies, do you think that those who are excluded or marginalised in your political field/sector need to claim and develop in order to be included in public and political life?

- a. Special favours and preferential treatments

Explain:

.....

.....

- b. Equal rights for all

B. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY – *Knowledge of the predominant ways in which various resources (capital) are transformed into legitimate authority is crucial when we wish to explain the problems and options of democracy. Economic resources are about money and other assets; social resources are about good contacts and networks; cultural resources are about knowledge; coercive resources are about armed, physical or other forms of force.*

What is the capacity of the actors to transform their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources (capital) into legitimate and political authority as a leader or leading organisation, to thus become politically powerful?

Q5.12. What are the prime bases for the capacity of the dominant and alternative actors that you have identified in Part 3? (*Pick the most two important prime bases for each actor, then rank them*)

| MAIN ACTOR | Q5.12. ACTOR'S PRIME BASES | | | |
|------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|--|
| | ECONOMIC RESOURCES (ECONOMIC CAPITAL) | GOOD CONTACTS (SOCIAL CAPITAL) | KNOWLEDGE/ INFORMATION (CULTURAL CAPITAL) | MEANS OF COMPULSION (COERCIVE CAPITAL) |
| DOM-1 | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| DOM-2 | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| ALT-1 | [] | [] | [] | [] |
| ALT-2 | [] | [] | [] | [] |

Q5.13. Is it easy or difficult to become a *legitimate and authoritative* political leader?

| MAIN ACTOR | Q5.13. | |
|------------|---|-------------------------|
| | EASY OR DIFFICULT TO BECOME A LEGITIMATE AND AUTHORITATIVE POLITICAL LEADER | WHY? |
| DOM-1 | a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult | |
| DOM-2 | a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult | |
| ALT-1 | a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult | |
| ALT-2 | a. [] Easy b. [] Difficult | |

Q5.14. How successful are the dominant actors and sub-ordinated/alternative actors in using their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, i.e. to gain political power?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.14. |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| | INDICATORS OF SUCCESS |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.15. In their attempts to use their resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, when do the actors fail?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.15. |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| | CAUSES OF FAILURE |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.15. |
|-------------|-------------------------|
| | CAUSES OF FAILURE |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

C. POLITICISATION AND AGENDA SETTING – *In Part 3 you have already identified the priorities of the dominant and the sub-ordinated actors of change. Now we want to know how the actors try to put ‘their issues’ on the top of the political agenda.*

What is the capacity of the actors to turn problems that they deem to be of common concern into public matters, i.e. to put them on the ‘political agenda’?

Q5.16. What are the issues that the dominant and alternative actors give priority to?

| Q5.16. ISSUES THAT DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS’ GIVE PRIORITY TO | |
|--|-------|
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.17. What are these dominant actors' and alternative actors' methods to put those issues on the political agenda? (*Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them*)

| Q5.17. | |
|--------------------|---|
| MAIN ACTORS | METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA |
| DOM-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others: |
| DOM-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others: |
| ALT-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others: |
| ALT-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda b. <input type="checkbox"/> Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation c. <input type="checkbox"/> Build TV/radio stations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Writing articles in media e. <input type="checkbox"/> Offering support f. <input type="checkbox"/> Petition g. <input type="checkbox"/> Demonstration, Mass action h. <input type="checkbox"/> Others: |

Q5.18. When promoting their issues, do the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors typically frame them as single issues/specific interests or as issues and interests that are part of strategic reforms? *(Pick only one option per actor)*

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.18. |
|-------------|--|
| | METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA |
| DOM-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans |
| DOM-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans |
| ALT-1 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans |
| ALT-2 | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Single issues/Specific interests b. <input type="checkbox"/> Parts of strategic reforms and plans |

Q5.19. How successful do you think that the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors are in turning their issues into public matters, i.e. to put them on the political agenda?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.19. |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| | INDICATORS OF SUCCESS |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.20. In their attempts to turn issues into public matters, in what situation do the actors fail?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.20. |
|-------------|-------------------|
| | CAUSES OF FAILURE |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

D. MOBILISATION AND ORGANISATION – *Democracy presupposes that all actors are able to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies. This in turn calls for a capacity to include people into politics, primarily by way of mobilisation and organisation – i.e. to politicise the people.*

What is the capacity of the actors to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies?

Q5.21. How do the actors try to increase their capacity to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies? (Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them)

| TABLE L | |
|--------------------|--|
| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.21. |
| | METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT |
| DOM-1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups |
| DOM-2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups |
| ALT-1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi |

| TABLE L | |
|-------------|--|
| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.21. |
| | METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT |
| | h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups |
| ALT-2 | a. [] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi b. [] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir c. [] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto d. [] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by KontraS e. [] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana f. [] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut g. [] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare 'Ciganjur pact' days before reformasi h. [] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign i. [] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups |

Q5.22. How do the actors use their specific capacity and methods to mobilise people that you have indicated in Q5.21 (e.g. to use populism or networks)?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.22. |
|-------------|---|
| | HOW THE ACTOR DEVELOP AND USE THEIR METHODS OF MOBILISING SUPPORT |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.22. |
|-------------|---|
| | HOW THE ACTOR DEVELOP AND USE THEIR METHODS OF MOBILISING SUPPORT |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.23. How successful do you think that the actors are in mobilising and organising support for demands and policies?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.23. |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| | INDICATORS OF SUCCESS |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.24. In their attempts to mobilise and organise support for demands and policies, in what situation do the actors fail?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.24. |
|-------------|-------------------|
| | CAUSES OF FAILURE |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

E. PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION – *People must be able to use existing means of participation and representation, reform them or develop new ones in order to approach and influence governance institutions. These may be institutions for public governance of various kinds but also associational or private governance. The main focus needs be, then, on different types of representation in relation to these institutions and how these are legitimised and mediated through traditional leaders, parties, interest organisations, corporatist arrangements and/or institutions for direct participation.*

What is the pattern and capacity of the actors to use and improve existing means of participation and representation?

Where do the **dominant actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.25. To what institution of governance?

Q5.26. Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

| DOMINANT ACTORS | Q5.25. | Q5.26. |
|-----------------|--|---|
| | WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT | MEDIATORS |
| DOM-1 | a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive | a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation |
| DOM-2 | a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive | a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation |

Where do the **sub-ordinated/alternative actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.27. To what institution of governance?**Q5.28.** Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

| ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | Q5.27. | Q5.28. |
|--------------------|--|---|
| | WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT | MEDIATORS |
| ALT-1 | a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive | a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation |
| ALT-2 | a. [] Institutions for private governance b. [] Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. [] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. [] Civil and military administration e. [] The judiciary and police f. [] The political executive | a. [] Civil society organisations b. [] Media c. [] Issue and interest organisations d. [] Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. [] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. [] Informal leaders g. [] Ways of bypassing democratic representation |

Q5.29. Why do the different dominant and alternative actors go to to the specific institutions and mediators in the ways that you have indicated in your answer to the previous question?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.29. |
|-------------|-------------------------|
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.29. |
|-------------|-------------------------|
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.30. How successful do you think that these are in seeking participation and developing representation in the way that you have indicated in your previous answer?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.30. |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| | INDICATORS OF SUCCESS |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q5.31. When do the actors fail in their attempts to solve/address problems and promote their vision and interests through channels and mediators as you mentioned before?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q5.31. |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| | CAUSES OF FAILURE |
| DOM-1 | |
| DOM-2 | |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Now we turn to how ordinary people seek representation. Please indicate the most two important channels and the three important mediators.



Where in your judgement do **ordinary people** go to solve/address their problem and promote their vision and interests?

Q5.32. To what institutions of governance?

Q5.33. Via what mediator?

| Q5.32. | Q5.33. |
|--|--|
| CHANNELS | MEDIATORS |
| a. <input type="checkbox"/> Institutions for private governance b. <input type="checkbox"/> Institutions for community and civil self-governance c. <input type="checkbox"/> Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance d. <input type="checkbox"/> Civil and military administration e. <input type="checkbox"/> The judiciary and police f. <input type="checkbox"/> The political executive | a. <input type="checkbox"/> Civil society organisations b. <input type="checkbox"/> Media c. <input type="checkbox"/> Issue and interest organisations d. <input type="checkbox"/> Individual direct participation as stakeholder e. <input type="checkbox"/> Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels f. <input type="checkbox"/> Informal leaders g. <input type="checkbox"/> Ways of bypassing democratic representation |

Q5.34. In your judgment, why do **ordinary people** go to the specific institutions and mediators etc? (*Open question*)

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.....

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Finally, it is crucial to understand the dynamic dimensions of democratisation. This can best be done by identifying actors' strategies to reach their aims and to thereafter study how their strategies influence the major challenges of democratisation.

PART
6

STRATEGIES
(DYNAMICS) OF
DEMOCRATISATION

Q6.1. What are dominant and alternative actors' main strategies to reach their own aims?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q6.1. |
|-------------|--|
| | ACTOR'S STRATEGY TO REACH AIMS |
| DOM-1 | <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> |
| DOM-2 | <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> |

| MAIN ACTORS | Q6.1. |
|-------------|---|
| | ACTOR'S STRATEGY TO REACH AIMS |
| ALT-1 | |
| ALT-2 | |

Q6.2. What are major challenges related to democratisation that the actors face when implementing their strategies?

Q6.3. What effects do actors' strategies have on the problems and options of democratisation that you have pointed to in the previous questions?

| MAIN ACTORS | Q6.2. | Q6.3. |
|-------------|---|---|
| | MAJOR CHALLENGES RELATED TO DEMOCRATISATION | EFFECT OF THE ACTOR'S STRATEGY ON DEMOCRATISATION |
| DOM-1 | | |
| DOM-2 | | |

NOTES

Preface

1. Originally a Swedish acronym, over the years ‘AKUT’ come to refer to concerned scholarly work on acute issues.

Introduction

1. Including Mulyana W. Kusumah, who focused on electoral watch and the electoral commission, and Todung Mulya Lubis, who initiated an NGO for electoral reforms.
2. The main financial sponsor of the projects was the then Department for Research Co-operation with Developing Countries (SAREC) within the Swedish Development Aid Authority (SIDA) in cooperation with first the University of Oslo, then the University of Oslo, on the Scandinavian side, and first the Indonesian Legal Aid Association (YLBHI) and then the Institute for the Studies of the Free Flow of Information (ISAI) on the Indonesian side.
3. Supplementary support for the conference and the second book was provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as parts of its fostering of a Human Rights Dialogue with Indonesia.

4 Actors and Power

1. The following sections on representation draw particularly closely on Törnquist (2009), which in turn benefitted from the collective work of Törnquist et al. (2009) and Harriss et al. (2004) as well as inspiration from the public discourse on the Norwegian research programme on power and democracy (cf. Østerud 2003, 2005) and the working papers by Stokke (2002), Houtzager et al. (2005), and Castiglione and Warren (2005) in addition to identifying if and how the framework and concepts would make sense in reality together with the activist-research NGO and DEMOS.

5 Actors and Democratisation

1. The following summary draws on the introductory chapter to Stokke and Törnquist (2013).
2. The following few sections draw closely on these two previous analyses.

6 From Results to Recommendations

1. The following sections are largely based on this authors' contribution to a position paper towards establishing dialogue between Indian and Scandinavian scholars on 'Agendas for transformative politics: Indian and Scandinavian perspectives on democracy, economic development and well-being', (Chandhoke et al. 2012) and his contribution to an introductory chapter in Stokke and Törnquist (2013). For further references in English, see at first hand Berman (2006), Andersson (2006), Esping-Andersen (1985, 1990), Kangas and Palme (2005), Moene and Wallerstein (2006), Przeworski (1985), Rothstein (2004), Swenson (2002) and Trägårdh (2007).
2. A recent local example is that of the district of South Aceh. As already indicated in the section on the lost opportunities in Aceh in chapter 5, contextual research in theoretical perspective shows that the inclusive democratic model that facilitated peace and reconstruction in the autonomous province has been weakened by the dominance of powerful elites, insufficiently accountable and development-oriented government and the lack of interest-based organisations beyond clientelism, middle-class NGOs and lobby groups (Törnquist et al. 2011, Törnquist 2013). In South Aceh, these tendencies are very explicit. A local research team has mapped the problems of public action and tried to understand why it is so difficult for the crucial actors and ordinary people to come together and discuss and decide on welfare and development priorities in spite of being able to benefit from the new civil and political rights and elections. A major conclusion points to the basic problem is the weak position and capacity of development-oriented administrators, producers and labourers (Avonius et al. 2013). Numerous schemes for consultation as well as associations and community and customary groups are present, but they materialise mainly when top-down instructions are given and funding is provided. Most importantly, they tend to be driven by the already powerful vested interests and they usually fail to represent potential actors of change. On the basis of how similar problems were addressed historically in Scandinavia, one may therefore study the potential of a supplementary development forum with a clear focus on fostering a welfare-based growth coalition associated with the productive sectors with the best development potential such as fishing, and based on key representative actors from government as well as the businesspeople, small-scale producers and labour involved. Most importantly, it should also provide preferential treatment in support of better democratic interest-based representation of such key actors to thus enhance their capacity and power to foster political transformation.

Appendix 1 Implementation against Odds: the Indonesian Story

1. Statement by Helena Bjuremalm at conference on Democracy as Actual Practice: What Does Democracy Really Bring, Uppsala University Collegium for Development Studies and Sida, March 12–13, 2003.
2. The author was certainly of a different opinion but had no powers beyond the design and quality of the research.
3. A special test case on how to use local assessments in democratisation was initiated in post-tsunami Aceh in early 2005. The purpose was to foster civil society participation in local democratisation. Data presented in the initial part of the first national qualitative democracy survey (published in January 2005) indicated

that there would be some space in Aceh for local democratisation. Having been delayed for a year, primarily because it was deemed politically sensitive by potential Swedish and Norwegian donors, Norway did, fortunately, provide funding and the project could get started.

The 'entry point' would be to use participatory research among civil society groups in order to map and analyse the problems and options of democracy in peace building and reconstruction. The main aim was to foster civil society participation in the new democratic politics following the tsunami in late December 2004 and the Helsinki peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in mid-2005. This in turn was to counterbalance the dominance of traditional parties and a political organisation based on the old command structure of the previously armed and quite authoritarian-led GAM.

However, the participatory research with civil society activists was mismanaged. Data was incomplete and poorly analysed, discussed and reported. Thus the results were insufficient as a basis for joint political engagement and capacity building. As a consequence, the intervention could not help to contain the political marginalisation of civil society initiatives in Acehnese politics in the 2009 elections. In spite of the problems, and possibly with diplomatic sensitivities in mind, the Norwegian donors chose not to restate the original aims and methods of the project. This may be understandable, but speaks very clearly about the negative effects of subordinating research-based democracy promotion in favour of the priorities of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the integrity of the academic partners and their collaborators on both sides.

Ultimately the research element of the project had to be rescued by this author in cooperation with consistent and committed local partners within the framework of a broader, separate project (financed by the Norwegian Research Council) on the role of democracy within the context of post-tsunami efforts at peace in Sri Lanka and Aceh (Törnquist et al. 2011). But by this point the political momentum had passed, and the potential for civil society activists to build new democratic politics with the reformist former GAM commanders had largely vanished. Thus the loss of another major opportunity that remains hard to digest.

4. There were, however, a few potentially fine case studies on how civil society actors tried to engage in politics. Partially, these results could be drawn upon in books and articles.
5. The main academic director was available electronically every day for questions and discussion, but he was engaged only on a limited part-time basis and only physically present with the team during three and later five intensive work periods per year – and then discussion took place in English. These drawbacks in terms of presence and language in particular were well known from the outset, but no one could find a better alternative, such as mobilising a resident academic director. Thus the plan was to use regular translations and good local supervisors and editors. The academic director saw this as a priority, but in reality much too little attention and resources were made available by the team and operations managers.
6. Teresa Birks, who had made the previous book on the pro-democracy actor readable (Prasetyo et al. 2003), was engaged as editor with DEMOS but was never really integrated into the team and when she left she was not replaced by a similarly qualified individual. She anyway helped the academic director in rescuing the first basic report when it had to be rewritten.

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INDEX

Notes: Locators in **boldface** denotes main text, locators in *italics* denotes figures and tables, locators followed by 'n' denotes notes.

- academia, 14, 42, *66, 75*, 115, 116, 117, 118, 136
- accountability
 - CSOs and, 62, 82, 83
 - collective action for, 111
 - democracy and, 3–4, 12, 13, 19, 31, 38, 82
 - governance and, 32, *42*, 276n2
 - horizontal, 41, 111
 - representation and, 40, 61, 62, 63, *64*, 68, 79, 83, 120
 - vertical, 42
- Aceh, 95, 128, 276n2, 276–7n3
 - alliances, 45, **84–6**
 - democracy actors and, 81, **84–5**, 127–8
 - elections in, 45, **84–6**
 - GAM–Free Aceh Movement, 45, 84, 85
 - independent candidates in, **84–6**, 87
 - local political parties in, 45, **84–5**, 109, 128
 - peace, 45, 46, 80, 84, 85, 95, 128, 276n2 ch.6, 277n3 appendix
 - surveys of, 80, 127, 136, 276–7n3
- Aceh National Party (PNA), 85
- Aceh Party (PA)
 - political alliances, 45, **84–6**
- actors, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 25, 26, 27, 41, 43, 46, 49, 50, 53, 59, 60, 78, 83, 90, 94, 97, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 111, 116, 117, 276n2 ch.6, 277n4
 - appendix
 - abusers of democracy, 53, 90, *94*
 - assessment of, 13, 20, **49–55**, **55–70**, **71–9**, **84–6**
 - capacity of, 20, 31, 45, 49, 51, **55–70**, 65, 67, 74, 90, 113, 114, 115, 122, 276n3 ch.6
 - of change, 14–15, 16, 17, 52, 53, 57, 67, 68, 69, 70, 87, 90, 95, 107, 108, 115
 - democracy, relations to, 20, 31, **49–55**, 90
 - democratisation and, 9, 18, 19, **71–87**, 115, 117
 - dominant, 9, 14, 50, 52, 53, 57, 65, 67, 68, 70, 108, 115, 116
 - fragmentation and, 78, 120
 - identification of, **49–55**
 - institutions and, 31, **49–55**, 113, 145
 - mobilisation and, 26, 46, 50, 59, 60
 - power and, 20, 31, **55–70**
 - powerful, 8, 9, 23, 45, 49, 68, 82, 90, 96, 109, 116
 - pro–democracy, 6, 15, 25, 26, 27, 69, 70, 72; *see also* pro–democrats
 - reformist actors, 51, 72, 84, 85, 115
- adat, *see under* customary law
- Africa, 23, 108
- agriculture, 80, 96, 99
- AKUT, *see under* Sweden
- alliances, 5, 6, 12, 54, 59, 68, 69, 77, 82, 83, 87, 89, 93, 101, 107, 110, 112
 - international, 99, 104, 105, 106
- anti–corruption, 44, 54, 71, 77, 82, **86**, 87, 100, 111, 103, 104, 108, 109, 112, 130
- area studies, 21
- armed struggle, 45
- army, *see under* military
- Asian values, 43

- assessments in Indonesia
 alternative framework, **114–15**
 context for, **20–9**
 countrywide expert survey, 129, 130
 first survey, 43, 127, 130, 131
 implementation, **115–22**
 of institutions, **43–7**
 of political capacity, **68–70**
 of post-Suharto democracy
 movement, 27
 results and recommendations, **106–12**
 second survey, 43, 44, 54, 86, 130
 of strategies, **79–87**
 third survey, 112
- assessments, main challenges
 assessing the substance of substantial
 democratisation, 15
 considering the wider context, 15–16
 grounded facts and engagement, 17
 inclusive framework, 16
- assessments, main problems
 change taken for granted, 14–15
 elitism, 12
 institutional bias, 12–13
 liberal bias, 13
 uncritical and poor sources, 14
- assessments of democracy, **1–20**
 actors and, 13, 20, **49–55, 55–70, 71–9, 84–6**
 alternatives, the case for, **11–17**
 audits, *see under main entry*
 case studies, *see under main entry*
 contextual studies, xii, 5, 11, 12, 17,
 24, 32, 37, 39, 49, 51, 52, 52, 58, 60,
 73, 90, 92, 94, 119, 121–2, 129, 132,
 276n2 ch.6
 data, *see main entry*
 deficiencies of, 11–12
demos and, 2, 12, 13, 15, 18, **32–6, 36**
 frameworks for, 11, **12–15, 15–17, 24–5, 114–15**
 frontlines of democracy, *see under main entry*
 implementation of, 113, 114, **115–22, 122**
 inclusive, 15, 16, 20, 24, 31, 114
 informants, **18, 27, 34, 35, 36, 43, 44, 50, 51, 53, 55, 57, 58, 65–9, 116, 117, 120–22, 129–32, 133, 135**
 institutions and, **31–43, 49–55**
 key questions, **65–6**
 origins of, **4–5**
 of political capacity, 20, 49, **55–70, 65, 67, 90, 114, 115**
 public affairs, 1, 2, 4, 7, 12, 13, 14, 18, 31, **32–6, 36**
 qualitative (rather than quantitative), **17–19**
 questionnaires, 18, 116, 132
 results and recommendations, **89–106, 106–12**
- associational life, 63, 64
 audits, 12, 41, 82
 Australia, 25
 authoritarianism, xi, 6, 7, 10, 22, 28, 40, 43, 50, 62, 76, 80, 91, 92, 96, 111
 authoritarian regimes, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 21, 73, 80, 104, 117, 119
 authorisation, 3, 31, 32, 40, 61, 63
- balkanisation, 44
 Beijing, 10
 bossism, 25, 108
 bourgeoisie, 6, 23, 100, 101
 Brazil, 94, 96, 98, 106
 participatory planning, 95;
 see also main entry
 representation, 41, 77, 106
 welfare schemes, 108
- bureaucracies, 51, 115
 bureaucrats, 7, 14, 19, 22, 46, 50, 51, 111
 Burma, xii
- capacity, *see under* political capacity and
 under social capacity
- capital
 accumulation of, 57, 67, 80, 98, 108
 labour and, 96, 98, 99
 capitalism, 5–6, 11, 26–7, 53, 96, 98, 99, 100, 106, 128
 capitalists, 6, 23, 53
 case studies, 18, 26, **27, 54, 70, 129, 132, 133, 135, 137, 277n4**
 castes, 2, 36, 37, 57, 74, 125
 Cebu City, Philippines, xiv
 chain of popular sovereignty, **61–2, 63**
 change, 9, 72, 76, 77, 79, 80–1, 96, 106, 114
 actors of, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 77, 83, 87, 90, 95, 107, 108, 110, 115, 119, 138, 276n2 ch.6

- China, 10, 50, 86, 98, 99
- citizens, 2, 7, 26, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 55,
60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 66, 74, 75, 76,
78, 82, 94, 95, 100, 103, 109
definition of, 33
vs. demos, 33, 34, 57, 58, 59
inclusive, 39, 42, 57
organisations, 9, 18, 19, 26, 35, 43, 56,
59, 76, 95, 96, 134
participation, 1, 32, 37, 42
- citizenship, 1, 2, 20, 32, 34, 39, 42, 55, 56,
57, 60, 62, 69, 73, 79, 81, 82, 111, 125
- CIVICUS, 11
- civil society, 8, 9, 12, 15, 25, 28, 32, 38,
43, 46, 51, 60, 63, 67, 76, 84, 104,
108, 109, 111, 136
actors and, 3, 52, 53, 57, 59, 63, 68, 80,
83, 136, 277n4 appendix
in Indonesia, 43, 44, 46, 81, 128, 133
organisations (CSOs), 8, 10, 11, 18, 25,
26, 37, 51, 57, 60, 80, 276n3
appendix, 277n3 appendix
representation and, 56, 63, 64
self-management, 33, 58, 60, 103
vs. state, 42, 96, 114
- clans, 2, 33, 60
- clash of civilisations, 10
- class, **5–7, 61**, 75, 78, 87, 90, 97, 108, 109
in assessments, 14, 65
- clientelism, 59, 69, 76, 84, 108, 128,
276n2 ch.6
see also mobilisation
- coercion, democratic control of
instruments of, 32, 41, 42, 69
- cold war, 10, 91, 104
- communism, 80
- Communist Party of India (Marxist)
(CPI-M), 106
- Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), 21,
22, 44, 80
- Communists, 6, 10, 20, 21, 22, 44
- communitarians, 62, 78, 99, 107
- communities, 13, 26, 33, 34, 44, 58, 73,
81, 87, 107
constituting, 34
democratisation and, 62, 81, 82
mobilisation of, 69
participation and, 76–7
public affairs, control of, 74, 79, 82
representation and, 64, 76–7
- community based organisations (CBOs),
66, 66, 75
- conservatives, 8, 96, 97, 100, 101
- constituencies, 59, 82
- Constitutional Court, Indonesia, 85
- constitutions, 2, 8
- consultations, 37, 276n2 ch.6
- consumer participation, 62
- consumption, 98, 99, 104, 105
- contacts, 46, 53, 56, 62, 81
good, 11, 50, 57, 60, 64, 65, 67, 68, 76,
82, 83
- control, 1, 6, 8, 9, 22, 43, 44, 68, 95
democratic, 41, 42, 47, 78
demos and, 2, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 55,
56, 63, 66, 70, 74, 75, 82
of instruments of coercion, 32, 41, 42, 69
popular, 1, 10
of public affairs, 1, 2, 4, 9, 14, 18, 22,
31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43,
45, 54, 55, 56, 63, 66, 68, 70, 74, 75,
82, 104
privileged, 54, 108
- corruption, **3**, 9, 10, 12, 19, 20, 23, 44,
45, 52, 53, 54, 69, 71, 73, 77, 79, 80,
82, 84, 86, 87, 99, 131
- cultural capital, 57, 58, 67, 69
- customary law, 81
- data, 6, 16, 17, 19, 27, 54, 115, 116, 122, 125
aggregation of, 16, 131, 133
collection of, 13, 16, 17, 27, 117, 118,
119, 130, 131, 132, 134, 136
interpretation of, 16, 89, 119, 121, 133
- decentralisation, 17, 25, 32, 41, 45, 54, 73,
95, 106, 128
- democracy and democratisation
Aceh, xii, **84–6**
authority and legitimacy, **57–8**
actors' strategies and, 71–2;
see also actors
capacity and, 14, 19, 31, 38, 55, **65–8**,
69, 77–8, 87, 114
chain of popular sovereignty, **61–2**
comparative insights, **91–104**
crafting, 5, 8, 9, 10, **23–4**, 73, 114, 123
definitions of, **1–4**, 9–11
direct, 36, **62–3**
dynamics of, 9–11, **89–91**
extension of, **2–3**

- democracy and
 democratisation—*Continued*
 frontlines of, 18, 121, **129–32**
 Global South and, xi, 6–9
 inclusive, 3, 105, 109
 Indonesia and, **20–9**, **43–7**, **53**, **54**,
68–70, **79–87**, **106–12**
 intrinsic institutional means of,
39–42, 42
 institutions, *see under main entry*
 mobilisation and, **59–60**;
see also main entry
 participation and, **60–3**, 64;
see also main entry
 pillars of, **145**
 political inclusion, **56–7**
 politicisation and agenda setting, **58–9**
 pre-conditions for, 5, 22, 27, 39, 73, 86,
 100, **106–7**
 problems of, **72–9**
 procedural, 2, 3, 4, 15, 38, 45, 54, 71
 public affairs, *see under main entry*
 representation and, 60–3, 64;
see also main entry
 sequencing of, 10
 substantial, 3, 4, 15, 17, 25, 31, 43, 72,
 74, 77, 95, 102, 114, 123
 substantive, 2, 3, 4, 15, 34, 38, 46, 61,
 64, 71, 72, 74, 77, 95, 114, 123
 theories of, 4–11, 61–3
 third wave of, 7–8
 democratic deficits, 15, 53, 90
 Democratic Party, Indonesia, 45, 84
 democratic politics, 31, 38, 44, 49, 59, 63,
 66, 74, 75, 77, 98, 101, 104, 107, 123
 democratic representation, 40, 41, 46,
60–3, 64, 67–8, 73, 74
 chain of popular sovereignty, **61–2**, 63
 direct, 39, 61, **62–3**
see also representation
 democratic self-organising, 42, 43
 democratisation, *see under democracy*
demos
 assessments and, 2, 12, 13, 15, 18,
32–6, 36
vs. citizens, 33, 34, 57, 58, 59
 concept of, **33–6**
 constituting public affairs and, **32–6**,
 36, 40, 58, 70, 75, 114, 152
 control and, 2, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40,
 55, 56, 63, 66, 70, 74, 75, 82
 privatisation and, 32–33
 representation and, 56, 67
 DEMOS, Indonesian Center for
 Democracy and Human
 Rights, xvi, 126, 127, 128, 129,
 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137,
 275n1 ch.4, 277n6
 denizens, 60, 66, 74, 75
 Denmark, 101
 dependency theory, 4, 6, 91
 depoliticisation, 13, 58, 61, **73**, 74, 94
 determinist theories, 8
Detik, journal, Indonesia, 26
 development, 6, 21, 27, 46, 69, 76, 81, 82,
 86, 91, 92, 109, 276n2 ch.6
 aid, 84, 92, 123
 alternative, 80, 84
 capitalist, 5, 98, 99, 100, 106
 democracy and, 6, 27, 123
 economic, 5, 10, 11, 13, 23, 97, 104,
 105, 107, 108, 111, 276n1 ch.6
 Scandinavian, 99, 100, 103, 104
 social, 97, 105, 145, 207
 sustainable, 58, 110, 130
 uneven, 57, 99, 105, 109
 welfare-based, 109
 dictatorships, 4, **22**, 25, 28
 direct democracy, 39, **62–3**
 direct participation, 33, 39, 60, 62, 63,
 64, 105
 discrimination, 32
 dissidents, 7, 8, 11, 21, 23, 25, 26, 67,
 71, 87
 donors, 10, 11, 25, 45, 70, 76, 82, 91, 92,
 111, 116, 117, 120, 125, 126, 127,
 138, 277n3 appendix
 East Timor, 44, 81
 Eastern Europe, 23
 economic crises, 7, 11, 23, 97, 101, 107
 economic growth, 3, 22, 28, 87, 96, 98,
 104, 105
 inclusive, 95, 97, 110
Editor, journal, Indonesia, 26
 education, 1, 2, 21, 40, 97, 99, 102, 107,
 111, 119, 130
 democracy surveys and, 119
 knowledge capture, 117, 120, 122, 137
 educational movements, 17, 27, 111, 125,
 136
see also KSSP

- elections, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, **9–10**, 12, 17, 18,
20, 21, 25, 32, 37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45,
52, 54, 54, 68, 69, 71, 73, 75, 81
- Aceh, xvii, **84–5**
- executive, 46, 84, 85, 109, 153
- independent candidates, 65, 83, 84–6,
87, 109
- individual candidates, 25, 46, *66*, 75,
76, 85
- Indonesia, 20–2, 25, **81–2**, 108
- local political parties, 45, 83–5, 109, 128
- parliamentary, 46, 84, 85, 79, 99
- vote buying, 24
- electoral systems, 12, 25, 32, 90
- elites, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 21, 25, 34, 45, 49, 53,
54, 56, 69, 86, 87, 110, 114
- crafting, 24, 71
- mobilisation by, 54, 59, 76
- pacts, xi, 11, 10, 12, 20, 73, 92, 123
- party politics, 20, 54, 81
- politics, 15, 44, 77, 109
- powerful, 22, 28, 53, 54, 60, 68, 73, 84,
276n2 ch.6
- reformist elite, 15
- elitism, **12**, 50, 94
- end of history, xi, 10
- engagement
- of actors, 15, 17, 69, 80, 81, 87, 111
 - political, 56, 62, 73, 111, 277n3
 - appendix
- England, 98
- environment, 40, 80, 99, 104, 105, 106,
109
- environmental movements, 46, 65, 76, 82
- equal access, 79, 97
- equality, 1, 96, 97
- gender, 98, 111, 130
 - political, 1, 4, 18, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38,
39, 40, 60, 63, 68, 70, 103
- ethno-nationalism, 44, 99, 101
- Europe, 5, 6, 8, 10, 20, 23, 91, 92, 96,
100, 101
- European Union, 126
- executive government, 16, 23, 31, 32, 46,
51, 57, *64*, 65, *66*, 69, 75, 76, 77, 83,
84, 85, 96, 90, 97, 109, 120
- faith and democracy, 2, 33, 33–4, 40
- Fascist welfare model, 99
- finance and democracy, 62, 98, 109
- floating mass, Indonesia, 70
- Ford Foundation, xvi, 21, 126
- fragmentation, 37, 45, 78, 79, 95, 100,
103, 104, 106, 109
- key problems of, **78–9**, 80
- Free Aceh Movement, *see under* GAM
- Freedom House
- frontlines of democracy, 18, 121, **129–32**
- democratisation of political parties and
the party system, 129
 - improvement of democratisation of
education, 129
 - improvement of supplementary
representation at the local level, 129
 - promotion of freedom, independence
and quality of media, 129
 - promotion of gender equality and
feminist perspectives, 129
 - promotion of human rights, 129
 - promotion of pluralism, religious and
ethnic reconciliation and conflict
resolution, 129
 - promotion of professionalism as part of
'good governance' in public and
private sectors, 129
 - promotion of sustainable development,
129
 - struggle against corruption in favour of
'good governance', 129
 - struggle of labour for better working
conditions and standards of living,
129
 - struggle of peasants, agricultural
labourers and fisher folk for social
and economic interests, 129
 - struggle for the social and economic
interests and basic rights of the
urban poor, 129
- Gadjah Mada University, (UGM)
- Indonesia, xvi, xvii, 29, 128, 134, 137
- GAM–Free Aceh Movement, 45, 84, 85
- gangster groups, 41
- gender, 3, 36, 39, 46, 51, 98, 111, 130
- Global North, 32, 92, 98, 99, 104, 117
- Global South, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 33, 36,
38, 54, 60, 73, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98,
99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 109,
117, 119
- globalisation, 33, 40, 44, 61, 52, 98, 104,
106, 109
- Golkar, 26

- good contacts, *see under* contacts
- governance and government, 2, 6, 9, 15, 32, 33, 36, 37, 44, 46, 53, 54, 58, 63, 81, 83, 95, 105, 106, 107, 111, 115, 120
- assessment of, 9–12, 14
- capacity of, **38**, 43, 69
- democratic, 13, 15, 32, 41, 97, 123
- good governance, 9, 10, 13, 14, 19, 52, 73, 130
- intrinsic institutions and, 39–42, 42
- multi-level/-layered, 2, 13, 33, 37, 78
- participatory, 46, 62, 82
- polycentric, 2, 57, 98
- powerful actors and
- public affairs and, 64, 65, 66, **74–8**, 75
- rule of law and, 39, 40
- Scandinavian model, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103
- substantive democracy and, 3, 4
- government, *see under* governance
- Guided Democracy, Indonesia, 21, 22
- habitus*, 59
- Hanoi, 10
- health, 3, 38, 41
- Helsinki peace agreement, Aceh, Indonesia, 45, **85**, 277n3 appendix *see also* peace
- human rights, 2, 7, 9, 12, 14, 23, 25, 27, 28, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 55, 65, 69, 73, 80, 91, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 275n3 ch.1
- identity politics, 33, 39, 44, 56, 99, 108
- ideology, 10, 63, 83, 102
- IMF, 96
- immigrants, *see under* migration
- impartiality, **38**, 41, 42, 63, 64, 68, 71, 74, 77, 79
- imperialism, 6, 20
- independent candidates, *see under* elections
- India, xiv, xvii, 4, 6, 17, 27, 36, 37, 54, 92, 96, 98, 101, 106, 108, 133, 276n1, ch.6
- Indonesia, xii, xiii, xv, xvi, xvii
- Aceh, *see under main entry*
- actors and democratisation, **79–87**
- actors and institutions, **53–4**
- actors and power, **68–70**
- assessment, alternative, **114–15**
- assessment, implementation, 113, **115–22**, **125–38**
- crafting democracy, xi, **23–4**
- new democracy, **22–3**
- old left democracy, **21–2**
- pro-democracy actors, **25–9**
- recommendations, **106–12**
- reformasi*, post-Suharto reform, **43–7**
- rise and crisis of democracy, **20–1**
- transformative politics, **106–11**
- Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), xvii, 21–2, 80
- Indonesian Democracy Watch, Imparsial, xv
- Indonesian Democrat Party, 45, 84
- Indonesian Human Rights Commission, Komnas HAM, xv
- Indonesian Nationalist Party, 21
- Indonesian Socialist Party, 20
- Indonesian strategic policy areas, **110–12**
- anti-corruption, 111
- improved democratised education and public discourse, 111
- preferential treatment of subordinate women, 111
- socio-political blocks, 111–12
- sustainable development, 110–11
- welfare policies for economic growth, 110
- Indonesia surveys, *see under* assessments in Indonesia
- industrialisation, 98, 99, 100, 109
- inequalities, 44, 96, 105, 109
- Institute for Popular Democracy, Diliman, Philippines, xiv
- Institute of Interfaith Dialogue, Indonesia, xv
- institutional theory, 12
- institutions of democracy, **36–9**
- actors' relations to, 31, **49–55**, 52, 113, 145
- beyond liberal-democratic institutions, **38–9**
- capacity of governments, **38**
- constitution of public affairs and the *demos*, **32–6**, 36
- crafting institutions, 8, 10, 52, 53, 71, 73, 94
- inclusive assessment of, 31, 39, 42, 46, 57, 114, 128, 131

- intrinsic means of democracy, 4, 32, 39–42, 42; *see also* intrinsic institutional mean of democracy
- quality and comprehensiveness, 36–7
- scope of, 32, 36, 109
- standard of, 10, 43, 49, 57, 60, 68
- International IDEA, xvii, 11, 13, 14, 126
- intrinsic institutional means of democracy, 39–42, 42
- citizens' democratic self-organising, 42, 43
- democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private forces), 41, 42
- democratic political representation through parties and elections, 40, 42
- equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well-defined public affairs, 39, 42
- equal justice, 40, 42
- freedom of and equal chances to access public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights, 42, 42–3
- full universal human rights (including basic needs), 40, 42
- government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them, 42, 42
- institutionalised channels for interest and issue-based representation, 40–1, 42
- local democracy made real in combination with relevant influence at other levels, 41, 42
- rights-based citizen participation in public governance, 40, 42
- rule of law (including international law and UN conventions), 39–40, 42
- transparent, impartial and accountable governance, 41–2, 42
- ISAI, Institute for the Free Flow of Information, xiii, xiv, 275n2 ch.1
- Islam, 10, 93
- Jakarta, 23, 83, 84, 85, 86, 108, 127, 128
- Java, 26, 83, 108, 137
- Jogjakarta, *see under* Yogyakarta
- Kedung Ombo, dam, Indonesia, 26
- Kenya, xvii
- Kerala, India, xiii, xiv, xv, 41, 77, 96, 100, 106, 107, 135
- educational movements, 17, 27
- participatory planning, 17, 27, 41, 95, 106
- Keynesian model, 11, 97, 98, 99
- Komnas HAM, *see under* Indonesian Human Rights Commission
- KSSP, People's Educational Movement, Kerala, 17, 27
- labour, 2, 6, 34, 41, 57, 82, 96, 99, 101, 102, 103, 107, 108, 110, 112, 131
- laws, 82, 99
- labouring classes, 2, 26, 46, 57, 97, 110, 130, 156, 276n1 ch.6
- land, 26, 38, 108, 111
- reform, 6, 10, 21, 22, 23, 37, 125
- landless peasants, 59, 79
- Latin America, xi, 4, 5, 6, 23, 91, 104, 108
- leaders, 8, 19, 28, 46, 50, 54, 78, 82, 84, 87, 107, 108, 125, 129
- charismatic, 60, 67
- communist, 6, 20, 22, 23
- democracy-oriented, 63, 125
- ethnic, 51, 53, 57, 75
- informal, 64
- military, 21, 22, 57
- Muslim, 21, 26
- nationalist, 6, 81
- political, 17, 25, 81, 83, 108, 112
- religious, 57, 75
- traditional, 26, 27, 53, 60
- see also* elites
- Lebanon, 34
- leftists, 40, 80, 97, 100, 103, 106, 109
- legislative assemblies, *see under* parliament
- legitimacy, 6, 21, 22, 56, 57–8, 60, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 74, 81, 115
- liberal democratic model, xi, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 38, 39, 41, 73, 84, 92, 103, 123
- liberalisation, 8, 9, 10
- liberals, 10, 21, 25, 40, 96, 108
- liberties, 5, 9, 12, 52, 71
- linkages, 41, 66, 74, 96, 111, 114
- flawed, 74–8, 82
- lobbying and democratisation, 9, 41, 46, 61, 65, 69, 81, 82, 83, 84, 103, 114

- Madura, Indonesia, 26
 mapping, 12, 17, 27, 123
 Marxist perspectives, 4, 5, 6, 13, 91
 maximalist democracy, 2
 May 1998, Indonesia, 23
 Medan, Indonesia, 26
 middle classes, 5, 6, 7, 10, 23, 25, 37, 54,
 59, 80, 86, 98, 103, 105, 276n2 ch.6
 participation and, 100
 representation and, 46, 73, 76
 migration, 33, 67, 98
 migrant labourers, 2, 57, 108
 immigrants, 43, 102, 105
 military, 1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 21, 22, 32, 41, 44,
 45, 50, 51, 55, 57, 61, 64, 65, 66, 69,
 75, 80, 86, 128
 militias, 41, 44, 50, 75
 minimalist democracy, 2, 3
 minorities, 1, 20, 44, 45, 57, 67, 86
 mobilisation, 9, 20, 54, 56, **59–60**, 69, 76,
 77, 93, 108, 119
see also clientelism
 modernisation, xi, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 23,
91–92, 99, 105, 110
 monopolisation, 23, 45, 46, 81, 86, 110
 multilevel governance, 13, 33, 36, 37,
 77, 78
 Muslims, 13, 21, 26, 43, 81, 102
Musrebang, participatory governance,
 Indonesia, 46, 82
- National Commission for Human Rights,
 Indonesia, xv
 nationalism, 22, 80, 99
 nationalists, 6, 21, 22, 26, 44, 80, 81, 83,
 99, 101, 104
 nationhood, 32
 natural resources, 45, 82, 98, 99, 108, 111
 Nazi welfare projects, 99, 107
 neighbourhood groups, 33, 61, 82
 neoliberalism, 2, 61, 96, 100, 103, 106
 nepotism, 23, 79
 networks, 20, 27, 33, 54, 57, 60, 76, 78,
 80, 95, 120, 135
 New Order, Indonesia, 21, 26, 44, 54, 86
 Nigeria, xvii, 98, 108
 Nipah dam, Madura, Indonesia, 26
 non-governmental organisations, NGOs
 assessments and, 11, 14, 91, 112, 122,
 127, 129, 131
 democratisation and, 7, 52, 69, 81, 82,
135–6
 representation and, 46, 68, 117
 NORAD, *see under* Norway
 Norway
 democratisation in, 96, 97, 100, 101,
 102, 104, 105, 138
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, xv, xvi, 127
 NORAD, xvi, 26
 Research Council of, 277n3 appendix
 Royal Embassy of, Indonesia, 127
 University of Oslo, xii, xvi, 126, 127,
 128, 129, 136, 137, 275n2 ch.1
- oligarchs, 24, 32, 54
 opinion polls, 12, 14
 outsourcing, 33, 87
- pacts, 14, 92
 crafting, 8, 92
 elitist, xi, 10, 11, 12, 24, 71, 73, 92, 123
 moderate rulers and dissidents, 8, 11,
 24, 71
 social, 96, **97–100**, 107, 108
- PAN, Indonesia, xv
 Pandanon Island, Philippines, xiv
 Papua, 26, 43, 81
 paramilitaries, *see under* militias
 parliament, 21, 32, 46, 57, 64, 65, 66, 69,
 75, 76, 87, 131
 parliamentary system, 10, 20, 37
 participation, 3, 7, 25, 44, 45, 46, 84, 100,
 103, 106, 107, 119, 276n3 & 277n3
 appendix
 accountability and, 42
 aims of democracy and, 1, 31
 citizens and, 37, 42
 direct, 33, 39, 105
 institutions and, 1, 32, 39, 40, 44, 77
 representation and, 33, 56, **60–8**, 69
 participatory planning, 17, 27, 41, 93, 106
 patronage, 20, 24, 47, 58, 60, 64, 67, 69
 PCD journal, UGM, xvii
 PDI-P, Indonesia, 26, 83
 peace, 8, 9, 13, 37, 97, 125
 in Aceh, 45, 46, 80, 84, 85, 95, 128,
 276n2 ch.6, 277n3 appendix
 people power, 57, 76, 86, 87
 People's Planning Campaign, Kerala, 17,
 95, 106

- personality oriented politics
 Philippines, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, 25, 95
 pilot studies, 19, 58, 72
 PKI, *see under* Indonesian Communist Party
 police, 32, 41, 44, 53, 64, 65, 66, 75
 political capacity, 2, 13, 40, 45, 58, 72, 77, 83, 87, 106, 110
 actors and, 20, 31, 45, 49, 51, **55–70**, 74, 90, 113, 114, 115, 122, 276n2 ch.6
 democratic, 14, 19, 31, 38, 55, 69, 77–8, 87, 114
 governments, **38–42**, 43, 69
 institutions, 13, 31, **38**, 42, 42, 43, 45, 49, 51, 90
 people's, 2, 4, 7, 55, 58, 77, 78, 83, 114
 state and, 31, 38, 42, 100, 101, 105
 political parties, 8, 9, 21, 25, 32, 37, 40, 42, 45–6, 49, 53, 54, 57, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 75, 76, 82, 83, 86, 91, 99, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 111, 116, 130, 136
 Aceh, 45, **84–6**, 109, 128
 elite driven, 54, 81, 84
 Indonesia
 local political parties, Aceh, 45, 83, 84, 109, 128
 party building, 44
 party-cum-candidate driven projects, **83–4**
 party politics, 20, 28, 95
 party systems, 10, 12, 52
 polycentrism, 2, 33, 34, 57, 70, 81, 87, 98, 100, 103
 popular movements, 7, 12, 17, 19, 20, 22, 27, 33, 56, 61, 76, 80, 83, 84, 102, 107, 110, 111, 125, 134, 136
 popular sovereignty, 8, 10, 13, 21, 61, 62, 63
 see also chain of popular sovereignty
 populism, 59, 60, 63, 67, 68, 76
 Porto Alegre, Brazil, 95
 Portugal, 4
 post-clientelism, 108
 power
 abuse of, 12, 21
 actors and, 20, 31, **55–70**
 people's power, 57, 76, 86, 87, 97
 relations of, 2, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 34, 43, 46, 49, 50, 73, 95, 104, 114, 129
 sharing, 9, 23, 24, 84, 85
 sources of, 9, 58, 67, 68
 pressure from below, 77
 pressure politics, 76, 82, 102
 private companies and governance, 42, 66
 privatisation
 chain of popular sovereignty and, 61
 demos and, 32–3
 de-politicisation and, 58, 73, 94
 economistic modernisation and, 7
 Indonesia and, 23, 70, 87
 public affairs and, 13, 32–3, 34, 70, 73, 77
 structural adjustment and, 9
 privilege, 2, 23, 54, 45, 60, 62, 72, 76, 79, 99, 108, 110–11
 procedural democracy, 2, 3, 4, 15, 38, 45, 54, 71
 pro-democrats, 19, 24, 25, 28, 46, 53, 69, 79, 86, 91, 114, 116, 122, 125, 126, 128, 130, 132, 136
 pro-democracy movements, 22, 23, 33, 26, 27, 28, 46, 57, 64, 82, 83, 87, 94, 96, 100, 101, 102, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 125, 135
 propelling forces, 72, 78
 protest, 6, 12, 21, 26, 76, 87, 108, 129
 public affairs, 8, 12, 62, 73
 constituting, 13, 32, 34, 35, 36, 43, 58, 59, 60, 74, 75, 78, 95, 114
 control of, 1–2, 4, 9, 14, 18, 22, 31, 32, **32–6**, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45, 54, 55, 56, 60, 63, 66, 68, 70, 74, 82
 definition of, 13, 33, 34, 36, 37, 63, 67, 75, 79, 120
 demos and, **32–6**, 40, 58, 70, 75, 114
 governance of, 50, 58, 64, 66, 74, 75, 77, 78
 public assets, 7, 9
 public concerns, 63
 public discourse, 16, 41, 42, 42, 43, 58, 69, 82, 89, 111, 119, 122, 133, 275n1 ch.4
 public management, 33, 98, 103, 138
 public officials, 32
 public resources, 54, 61, 69, 94
 public sphere, 2, 20, 34, 58, 87, 95, 104

- questionnaires, 18, 116, 132
- questionnaire for third democracy
 assessment, Indonesia, local,
 139–99; national, 201–74
- codes of region, local, 142;
 national, **204**
- codes of frontline of democracy work,
 local, 142; national, 204
- statement of aims and principles, local,
 144–5; national, 206–7
- part 1. constitution of the *demos*
 and public affairs, local, 148–52;
 national, 210–14
- part 2. quality of democratic rules and
 regulations, local, 153–9; national,
 215–26
- part 3. main actors in public affairs,
 local, 160–3; national, 227–30
- part 4. main actors' relation to the
 means of democracy, local, 164–75;
 national, 231–49
- part 5. actors' capacity, local, 176–96;
 national, 250–70
- part 6. strategies of democratisation,
 local, 197–9; national, 271–3
- racism, 20
- radical liberals, 25
- rational actors, 7, 9, 12
- reform, 5, 6, 8, 19, 20, 23, 24, 38, 50, 54,
 84, 111, 277n3 appendix
- actors and, 67, 72, 79
- electoral, 87, 275n1 ch.1
- land, *see under* land reform
- participation and, 60, 67
- representation and, 60, 67, 77
- religion, 20, 21, 35, 36, 37, 44, 45, 46, 50,
 57, 58, 68, 74, 75, 87, 100, 130
- religious associations, 2, 21, 47, 51, 53, 57,
 62, 75, 81, 82, 125
see also Muslims, Islam
- representation, 3, 8, 10, 12, 31, 33, 37, 40,
 41, 42, 46, 54, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66,
 67, 68–9, 74, 76–8, 79, 86, 87, 95,
 101–6, 107, 109, 110, 111, 130, 136
- actors and, 8, 53, 56, 67
- assessment of, 68, 74
- concept of, **60–1**
- democracy and, 3–4, 31, 41, 46, 61, 62,
63–5, 64, 66, 73, 74, 115
- demos* and, 56, 67
- descriptive, 61, 64, 74
- institutions and, 32, 64, 123
- interest-based, 2, 3, 10, 19, 38, 40, 42,
 42, 63, 66, 114
- issue-based, 37, 39, 40, 42, 42, 66
- monopolised, **45–6**
- participation and, **60–8**
- popular, 10, 46, 56, 60, 64, **73–4**, 74,
 115
- substantive, 46, 61, 64, 74, 77
- symbolic, 61, 64, 74
- resistance, 20, 37, 77, 84
- responsiveness
 democracy and, 3, 31, 32, 61
 representation and, 62, 64, 68
- rights
 frontlines of democracy and, **129–32**
 human, *see main entry*
 intrinsic institutional means of
 democracy and, **39–42**, 42
- riots, 22, 23, 45, 50, 57, 61, 87
- roadmaps to democracy, 1, 136
- rule of law, xi, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 18, 19,
 20, 21, 27, 32, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 46,
 69, 71, 73, 77, 86, 90, 105, 109, 123
- rules and regulations, 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12,
 13, 31, 32, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 49,
 71, 72, 77, 103, 116, 128, 138
- Salatiga, Indonesia, 26, 137
- SAREC, *see under* Sweden
- Satya Wacana University, Indonesia, xii,
 26, 137
- scaling-up actors' strategies, 78, 79, 95
- Scandinavia, 92–3, 94, 96, 106–7, 135
- Scandinavian model, 41, 63, 96, **96–106**,
 276n1 ch.6
 comparison with Indonesia, 106–7, 135,
 276n1 ch.6
- Second World War, 4
- security, 41, 74, 120, 121, 126
- self-help, 9, 69, 102, 103
- self-management, 33, 43, 61, 62, 64
- self-representation, 33, 37, 64, 105
- sequencing theory, 10
- service provision, 74
- SIDA, *see under* Sweden
- Singapore, 3, 6, 10, 86
- single issues, 28, 59, 67, 81, 81

- small farmers, 51, 96, 99, 101, 102, 107, 131
- social capacity, 40
- social capital, 56, 57, 62
- social democratic model, 2, 11, 24, 40, 42, 85, 96, 97, 101–3, 104, 105, 107
- social movements, 11, 15, 16, 28, 49, 51, 56, 57, 59, 60, 69, 82, 83, 92, 95, 101, 109, 111, 114, 136
- social relations, 34, 62
- social security, 96, 97, 98, 99, 108
- socialism, 27, 97
- socialist, 2, 21, 80, 102, 105
- socio-political blocks, **109–11**, 136
- solidarity and democracy, 3–4, 31, 32, 102, 105
- Solo, 83, 108, *142*
- South Africa, 36, 95, 96, 108
- Spain, 4, 24
- state, 1, 3, 5, 6, 21
 - actors' relations to, **50–1**
 - building, 6, 32, 36
 - capacity, **38**, 42, 101, 103, 105
 - control of, 8, 9
 - institutions, *see under main entry*
 - welfare, 65, **97–8**, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105
- strongmen, local, 6, 19, 20, 22
- structural adjustment, 7, 9, 10, 99, 123
- structural change, 5, 6, 9, 11, 24, 96
- structuralists, xi, 4, 5, 9, 11, 92
- subsidiarity, 73
- substantial democracy, 3, 4, 15, 17, 25, 31, 43, 72, 74, 77, 95, 102, 114, 123
- substantive democracy, 2, 3, 4, 15, 34, 38, 46, 61, *64*, 71, 72, 74, 77, 95, 114, 123
- Surakata, *see under Solo*
- surveys, 17, 118, 121
 - institutes, 14, 119
 - qualitative, 17–18, 27, 28, 29, 34, 51, 51, 53, 54, 57, 70, 79, 86, 110, 112, 119, 129, 130
 - quantitative, 14, 17–18, 34, 121, 129
 - supplementary, 34, 35
 - see also assessments*
- Sweden
 - AKUT, xii, 275n1 preface
 - democratisation and, 96, 97, **100–105**
 - SAREC, xiii, xv, 275n2 ch.1
 - SIDA, xvi, 126, 275n2 ch.1, 276n1 appendix
 - Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy, xvii
- symbolic capital, 57, 58, 61, *67*
- symbolic representation, 61, *64*, *74*
- Taiwan, 6, 96
- tax revenues and welfare, 97, 105, 108
- technocrats, 22, 54, 59, 80, 90, 94
- technocratisation, 58
- Tempo*, journal, Indonesia, 26
- Thailand, xv, 86
- Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines, xiv
- think thanks, 40, 50, 117
- Third Wave of democracy, 7–8
- 30th September Movement, 22
- Tifa Soros Foundation, 126
- transformative politics, xi, 11, 20, 78, *79*, 85, 87, 93, 107, 108, 109
 - alliances for, 104–6
 - comparative problems of, **94–6**
 - enabling, dynamics of popular organisation, state and welfare, 102–3
 - enabling, unification of interest-based representation, 103–4
 - Indonesia in comparison, 106–10
 - Scandinavian experience, **96–102**
 - strategic policy areas, Indonesia, 110–11
- transitions, 4–5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 25, 81, 91, 92
- transparency, 3, 31, 32, 41, 61, 63, *64*, 68, 116
- Transparency International, 11
- trustworthiness, 32, *122*
- tsunami, Aceh, 45, 84, 127, 276n3, *277n3*
- UNDP, 11, 13, 38, 126
- unemployment schemes, 38, 59, 96, 97, 99, 107, 108, 110
- United Nations conventions, 40, 42
- United States, 25
- University of Oslo, 126, 127, 128, 129, 136, 137, 144, 206, 275n2 ch.1
- University of the Philippines, xiv
- University of Sydney, 137
- upper classes, 78
- Uppsala University, xii, 276n1 appendix

- variables
 - assessment analysis of, 55, 63, 72, 89, 118
 - in theories, 10, 16, 55
- Vietnam, 10, 99
- vote-buying, 24

- welfare, 19, 59, 63, 69, 82, 83, 87, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108
 - democracy and, 37, 78, 82, 96, 106
 - fascist projects and, 99, 102
 - growth and, 78, 86, 87, 96, 97–8, 99, 100, 104, 105
 - reform and, 9, 38, 77, 95
 - representation and, 86, 87, 95, 101
 - in Scandinavia, 96, 97–8, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103
 - state, 65, **97–8**, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105
- West New Guinea, 21, 22
- Workers Party (PT), Brazil, 95
- working classes, 5, 23, 45, 96, 98, 99, 100, 105, 106
 - democracy and, 6, 49, 50, 51
 - representation and, 45, 86
- World Alliance for Citizen Cooperation, 11
- World Bank, 38, 46, 56, 62, 76, 96

- YLBHI, Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, xiii, xiv, 25, 275n2
- Yogyakarta, 26, 237