

Notes

Chapter 1 The Treaty of Lisbon in Context

- 1 All of the EU's constitutive and amending treaties have been signed by ministers, normally foreign ministers. The only previous treaty to have been signed by heads of state or government was the Constitutional Treaty in 2004.
- 2 Of the documents: six concern procedural matters; ten are letters, opinions or resolutions from different institutions or committees; and 33 are drafts or final versions of various elements of treaty text, declarations or the final act of the IGC. The database is accessible via www.consilium.europa.eu/documents/treaty-of-lisbon.

Chapter 2 The Constitutional Treaty: Rejection and Reflection

- 1 See the *Declaration on the Future of the Union* annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty of Nice (*Official Journal*, 2001: 85).
- 2 Of note too is that the national governments and parliaments represented were not only those of the member states but also those of current candidate countries, so including all the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 as well as Turkey.
- 3 The assumed constitutional requirement to hold a referendum in Ireland is questioned. See Barrett (2009).
- 4 Indeed the Presidency Conclusions (Council of the European Union, 2005a) made no mention of either the referendum outcomes or the launch of the reflection period.
- 5 Inigo Mendez de Vigo had been one of the MEP conventionnels and member of the Convention Praesidium. Alexander Stubb had been a member of the Finnish negotiating team in the subsequent IGC.
- 6 Similarly the European Subsidiarity Conference 'Europe begins at home' hosted by the Austrian Council Presidency on 18–19 April 2006 offered little inspiration beyond a reaffirmation of support for subsidiarity. However, as Fischer (2008) notes, discussions were held on what elements of the Constitutional Treaty should ideally be retained in order to promote subsidiarity and enhance the role of national parliaments in EU decision-making. It was also proposed that member states examine ways of allowing national parliaments to appeal via their governments to the ECJ in cases of infringement of the subsidiarity principle.
- 7 The 'Penelope' text was a draft constitution prepared secretly for Prodi by a small group of officials and advisers under the leadership of François Lamoureux. On circulation it was rejected by a majority of Prodi's fellow Commissioners. See Mattera (2003).

- 8 Such a group – co-chaired by Amato and including two current and three former Commissioners among its 16 members – did emerge as the *Action Committee for European Democracy* in September 2006. Nine months later it produced a draft treaty and associated protocols to replace the Constitutional Treaty (see 2.6 in Chapter 2 and notes 23 and 24 below).
- 9 Vanhanen had been a representative of the Finnish Parliament at the European Convention.
- 10 The resolution also noted a number of conclusions drawn from a two-day joint parliamentary meeting of MEPs and national parliamentarians on the subject of the ‘Future of Europe’ on 8–9 May 2006. MEPs contended that it was ‘generally recognised’ that the Constitutional Treaty would provide the EU with an appropriate framework for addressing the major political challenges facing Europe (European Parliament, 2006b).
- 11 For an overview of the German position on the Constitutional treaty, see Möller (2008).
- 12 The choice of term was clearly intentional since it implied something other than the existing *Vervassungsvertrag* (Constitutional Treaty) to which Merkel made frequent reference but nevertheless a document of a constitutional nature.
- 13 At Schüssel’s insistence, and with a possibly critical nod to the UK government, the Presidency Conclusions reminded everybody that ‘[e]ach Presidency in office since the start of the reflection period has a particular responsibility to ensure the continuity of this process’ (Council of the European Union, 2006c: 48).
- 14 The latter timetable did receive implicit public backing from, for example, Schüssel.
- 15 The Estonian *Riigikogu* approved the Constitutional Treaty on 9 May 2006. Earlier, in February 2006, the last of the seven parliamentary endorsements of the Constitutional Treaty required in Belgium was secured. This paved the way for the instruments of ratification to be deposited on 13 June 2006.
- 16 To be added to the list at this stage were Bulgaria and Romania who would join the EU on 1 January 2007 and who had endorsed the Constitutional Treaty during their respective ratifications of their accession treaty. Bulgaria completed ratification on 11 May 2005, Romania on 17 May 2005.
- 17 The third most popular candidate, François Bayrou of the Mouvement Democratique, envisaged a new IGC producing ‘un texte lisible par tout le monde court, compréhensible et offrant les garanties démocratiques nécessaires’ (Bayrou, 2007). The text would be submitted to a referendum at the same time as the EP elections in June 2009.
- 18 German officials were also in contact with aides from the Royal and Bayrou camps (Interview: 20 May 2009).
- 19 Indeed sections were word-for-word the same.
- 20 The assumption regarding Blair was strengthened in early September 2006 when he announced that he would be leaving office within the next 12 months. Blair was expected to remain in post until at least 2 May 2007 and thus complete ten years as Prime Minister. The date of his departure – 27 June 2007 – was announced on 10 May 2007.
- 21 An initial emphasis was placed on promoting subsidiarity, a move which gained support from the UK Council Presidency which co-hosted a conference on ‘Sharing Power in Europe’ in mid-November 2005.

- 22 For a revised version of Leinen's proposal for a 70-article 'fundamental treaty' complete with a 'Treaty on the EU's Policies' and three protocols, see *Agence Europe* (2007a).
- 23 The idea of an Action Committee was not new. As noted above (see 2.3 in Chapter 2) it had previously been put to Barroso to propose. Merkel was reportedly 'sceptical' about the potential value of the Action Committee's work. She described as 'political' not technical the problem of how to deal with the rejected Constitutional Treaty (*European Voice*, 2006c). The membership included: three former Prime Ministers – Jean-Luc Dehaene (also co-Vice President, with Amato, of the European Convention), Paavo Lipponen and Wim Kok; two Commissioners – Danuta Hubner and Margot Wallström; three former Commissioners – Michel Barnier, Chris Patten, and António Vitorino. Sponsorship was provided by the Robert Bosch Foundation.
- 24 The Action Committee did not actually report until 6 June 2007 when it published a draft treaty and supplementary protocols (Action Committee for European Democracy, 2007). Although the draft attracted some media coverage, it ultimately had very little impact on the nature and content of the Treaty of Lisbon. The same was true of the proposals contained in a joint report from the Instituto de Estudios Europeos, the Fundación Rafael del Pino and the European University Institute published in Brussels on 30 May 2007 (see Instituto de Estudios Europeos *et al*, 2007) and the barely noticed proposal of the Italian Foreign Minister, Massimo D'Alema, for a new 'Pact for Europe' preserving the essentials of the Constitutional Treaty (D'Alema, 2007).
- 25 See also Iglesias and Torreblanca (2007a) as well as later the ideas for a 'reduced treaty' (Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, 2007) and the broader policy options advanced by Iglesias and Torreblanca (2007b) both published in June 2007.
- 26 See also his similar comments two months later in *Die Zeit* (2006).
- 27 This was not the first time Keller-Noëllet and Milton had reflected on the Constitutional Treaty. They were the lead authors of an insider account of its origins and negotiation (see Milton and Keller-Noëllet, 2005).
- 28 Moreover, Germany was not facing any elections (Moxon-Browne, 2008).
- 29 The report, which is the property of the Finnish government, remains classified as 'secret' (communication with Finnish Prime Minister's Office, Helsinki, 18 May 2010).
- 30 The delay to ratification in Germany being completed was due to legal proceedings before the country's Constitutional Court.

Chapter 3 The German Council Presidency I: Focal Points and Reverse Engineering

- 1 Discussions on how the 'trio' Presidency should proceed with the Constitutional Treaty started in 2005 with each government expressing a desire from the outset to see progress with the Constitutional Treaty's reforms being adopted, possibly via a new 'reform' treaty. The question that concerned officials was which route to pursue: 'rupture', i.e. abandoning the Constitutional Treaty and starting afresh; or 'reform' proceeding with

- adjustments to the wording or substance of the Constitutional Treaty (Interview: 7 May 2010).
- 2 That such an 'historical failure' had to be avoided was her clear message to the EP the following month too. See Merkel (2007a).
 - 3 The wording is taken from the only published copy of any of Merkel's letters, the letter sent to the EP President, Josep Borrell Fontelles, on 2 January 2007.
 - 4 The initial German preference was to refer to the appointees as 'sherpas', a term rejected and studiously avoided by the focal points themselves.
 - 5 Throughout the German Council Presidency it was Corsepius that led on the treaty reform dossier. This initially caused surprise among some of the more established member states' focal points. Silberberg had extensive experience of treaty negotiations having participated in the IGC negotiations on Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and the Constitutional Treaty. For many he was the 'éminence grise' of German European policy (*Financial Times Deutschland*, 2003). Moreover, having previously been head of the European Policy Department in the Bundeskanzleramt for seven years (1998–2005) he had for a short period been Corsepius' boss. Also, Corsepius' background was in economics, not treaty reform.
 - 6 Merkel declared this as the German Council Presidency's maxim during the press conference following her meeting with the Danish Prime Minister, Rasmussen, on 19 December 2006. She added, 'I hope that we will be able to offer a way forward at the end of our presidency' (Bundesregierung, 2006b – own translation).
 - 7 The close links were evident at the launch of Piris' book *The Constitution for Europe – A Legal Analysis*. Launching the book – and quoting favourably from it – was the German Minister of State for Europe in the *Kanzleramt*, Günter Gloser (*EUpolitix*, 2006b). Merkel later provided the foreword to Piris' book on the Treaty of Lisbon (Piris, 2010).
 - 8 This was Richard Cachia Caruana, the Maltese Permanent Representative to the EU. There were four other Brussels-based focal points: two from the Commission and two from the EP. Several had experience of working in Brussels and a number were subsequently appointed Permanent Representatives.
 - 9 A list of focal points was never formally published but appeared in the public domain thanks to the efforts of the Young European Federalists who expressed their contempt for the secrecy of the 'sherpa' process claiming that it was 'a threat to the democratic process of the EU'.
 - 10 Only one bilateral meeting on the Berlin Declaration was held with most focal points.
 - 11 One focal point interviewed maintained that the German Council Presidency indicated at the first bilateral consultation that one option was to pursue a mandate route (Interview: 28 May 2010).
 - 12 The German representative attended in only an observer capacity.
 - 13 For a discussion of the Madrid gathering and thinking in Spain on the future of the Constitutional Treaty at this time, see Roy (2008, 2012).
 - 14 See Rasmussen (2007), as cited in Laursen (2008b: 272).
 - 15 Indeed, Lamassoure (2007) implies that he and Sarkozy were instrumental in encouraging the Friends of the Constitutional Treaty to unite and 'parler

- haut et fort'. He also maintains they convinced the Finns to ratify the Constitutional Treaty during the second half of 2006.
- 16 See also Maurer (2007b) who saw such a charter or declaration being accompanied by an EU strategy on globalization that would set out basic social and economic standards that the EU would uphold in its external relations.
 - 17 Refinements identified included: introducing a right of initiative for national parliaments; removing the reference to 'highly competitive' from the EU's economic aims; retaining unanimity for economic policy matters; maintaining the existing system of qualified majority voting; and not reducing the size of the Commission. For a revised assessment of this option, see König *et al* (2008).
 - 18 Reforms to be abandoned would include the reduction in the size of the Commission, the citizen's initiative and the extension of majority voting to JHA matters.
 - 19 Merkel's address to the EP did not impress Spanish analysts. Roy (2008: 133) maintains that they viewed the ambitions of the German Council Presidency as 'weak'.
 - 20 MEPs appear to have overlooked the fact that the EP President, Josep Borrell Fontelles, following an invitation from Merkel, had already appointed two EP focal points: Klaus Welle, his *chef de cabinet*; and José Luis Pacheco, a member of the Secretariat of the Constitutional Affairs Committee.
 - 21 Earlier in January, officials from the *Bundeskanzleramt* and *Auswärtiges Amt* had sought to downplay reports in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that an IGC was now part of the German government's plans for its Council Presidency. See Bundesregierung (2007a).
 - 22 This was the view presented by Peter Altmaier, State Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior, in his presentation to an audience at the European University Institute in Florence on 9 February 2007. He also confirmed that the German Council Presidency, supported by the other member states, was proposing to maintain the 'l'essentiel du projet de Constitution' (cited in Ponzano *et al*, 2007: 14) by using it as the basis for discussions on what to amend. Altmaier, an alternate national parliamentarian member of the European Convention, added that personally he was in favour of adopting a protocol amending the Constitutional Treaty. This protocol could then be ratified by member states that had already ratified the Constitutional Treaty. Non-ratifiers would ratify the Constitutional Treaty as amended by the protocol.
 - 23 For an insight into the drafting issues being considered by Blanchet and Piris, see Blanchet (2011: 1228–34).
 - 24 Interviews generally point to the original initiative being Piris', but Lamassoure (2007) maintains that the Council Legal Service was responding to requests from Merkel's office which in turn was liaising regularly with Lamassoure and Sarkozy.
 - 25 The drafts – appreciably sensitive documents – were presented in hard copy only and not circulated electronically. Moreover, the paper copies of the draft were numbered and a register kept of recipients.
 - 26 Other sources (e.g. *The Guardian*, 2007a) suggested signature in February 2008. Such a timescale corresponds with that contained in a leaked US

- Embassy cable from mid-March 2007 which reported German intentions of 'reaching consensus on a text by the end of the Portuguese presidency and signing a "Treaty of Ljubljana" during the Slovenian presidency followed by ratification under the French presidency'. See *US Embassy Berlin* (2007).
- 27 For more detail on the drafting and content of the Berlin Declaration, see Schwarzer (2008); Goosman (2007); Ludlow (2007a); *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2007a).
 - 28 The 'we' is decidedly ambiguous and can be read, in the light of the text's preceding lines, as referring to either the member states or the citizens of Europe. Alternatively the 'we' could be read as referring to the Declaration's three signatories: Hans-Gert Pötering, the EP President of the European Parliament; Merkel as head of government of the member states holding the rotation Council Presidency; and Barroso as President of the European Commission. Originally it was intended that Merkel's fellow heads of government and state would sign the Declaration, but several refused to do so.
 - 29 Roy (2008: 138; also 2012: 150) maintains, somewhat disingenuously it might be said, that the text, presumably through the reference to renewal 'in keeping with the times', 'still read as having the intention of creating a document that committed to the spirit and purpose of the Constitutional Treaty'.

Chapter 4 The German Council Presidency II: From Berlin Declaration to Road Map

- 1 For an overview of issues deemed to be of 'concern' for member states, but not necessarily part of the respective government's position, see de Búrca (2008) who summarizes the positions of 18 member states on the basis of reports compiled by national rapporteurs for the 23rd Congress of the Fédération Internationale de Droit Européen (FIDE). The reports, structured around a questionnaire are available via <http://fide-europe.eu/index.php> and reproduced in Koeck and Karollus (2008). Among the member states not covered by the reports are France and the Netherlands.
- 2 These meetings were initially scheduled for the period between 21 May and 1 June. Even though MEPs in particular voiced their criticism of the closed and 'secretive' process of using bilateral discussion with focal points, the German Council Presidency confirmed that it would continue using this method. According to a spokesperson: 'the very large majority of member states, as well as representatives of the European Commission and Parliament have explicitly welcomed this way of working' (*Agence Europe*, 2007g).
- 3 The evidence provided by UK Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, to MPs on the focal point process is rather misleading. She maintained as late as 19 June 2007 that there had been a 'couple or so conversations bilaterally between the German [focal points] and those of the United Kingdom' (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2008: Q113).
- 4 According to Maurer (2008b), Merkel and her team were intent on keeping the information available on the consultations with focal points to a minimum. German embassies in the member states, tasked with reporting

on national positions, were explicitly instructed to avoid any communication on the consultations. Furthermore, interventions by German government representatives in parliamentary hearings, speeches and the press were edited to limit the amount of information entering the public domain.

- 5 The agreement continued: 'The opinion of the Council of State will be sought on these and other aspects of these treaty changes. At European level the Netherlands will work for effective cooperation and a clear division of responsibilities between member states and the European Union based on the principle of subsidiarity. In this context we will aim to conclude agreements on the compatibility of the internal market concept with the organisation of the public sector (including pensions, social security, taxation, education and health care), and on greater European cooperation on measures to make European economies more competitive, transboundary environmental problems, energy policy, asylum and migration policy, external policy and the fight against terrorism and cross-border organised crime. National parliaments should be given a stronger position in relation to the subsidiarity test (a "red card" procedure for example)'.
- 6 For a detailed discussion of the Dutch position, see Claes *et al* (2008).
- 7 For a subsequent enunciation of the Dutch position, see the speech of the Dutch Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, before the European Parliament on 23 May 2007 (European Parliament, 2007c).
- 8 See, for example, the debate in the comment and letters pages of *NRC Handelsblad*.
- 9 Nor was he, as Lequesne (2007) maintained, advocating a process that would mean no new treaty until 2011.
- 10 See, for example, Sarkozy's speech in Strasbourg on 21 February 2007 where he argued in favour of 'un traité simplifié qui reprendra les dispositions du projet de traité constitutionnel nécessaires pour que l'Europe puisse se remettre en marche qui n'ont pas suscité de désaccord majeur durant la campagne référendaire ... Ce traité simplifié, de nature institutionnelle, sera soumis pour ratification au Parlement. Il permettra de faire en sorte que nous puissions de nouveau parler ensemble, décider ensemble, construire ensemble' (Sarkozy, 2007a).
- 11 A further option being canvassed at the time was for a '*traité institutionnel*'. Its champion was Pierre Lequiller who in February 2007 published a draft treaty text (Lequiller, 2007). Although Lequiller, chair of the Délégation de l'Assemblée nationale pour l'Union européenne, was, like Lamassoure, a member of Sarkozy's UMP and former member of the European Convention, his *traité institutionnel* idea was not pursued publically by Sarkozy even though subsequently the concept was associated with the new President. Among other ideas circulating in France at this time was Philippe Herzog's proposal for a new 'Single Act'. See *Agence Europe*, 2007i; Herzog, 2007).
- 12 Even here, however, there was some doubt as to Royal's preferences. According to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2007c), she had indicated to German government officials that she was opposed to a referendum.
- 13 On the Irish position, see Girvin (2010). It is striking how rarely specific Irish preferences feature in accounts of the discussions and negotiations that led to the Treaty of Lisbon. Even in the Irish government's own White

Paper on the Treaty, there is only one reference to an Irish proposal: the inclusion of a reference to combating climate change as part of the EU's environmental policy. The government's clear preference was 'the retention of as much as possible of the substance of [the Constitutional Treaty]. In particular, it did not want the institutional aspects of the Constitutional Treaty to be reopened as this was regarded as very balanced and also a particularly sensitive part of the 2004 agreement. During the Reform Treaty negotiations, Ireland combined with other like-minded Member States sought to preserve the main substance of the Constitutional Treaty while agreeing to certain modifications. These included omitting certain elements of the Constitutional Treaty and recasting it as a series of amendments to the existing EU Treaties' (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). See also the comments of the Irish Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, to the European Parliament in November 2006 where he argued in favour of retaining the text of the Constitutional Treaty (*Irish Times*, 2006).

- 14 See also the comments of the former Czech President, Vaclav Havel, who in April 2007 spoke of his support for 'eine föderalistische, kurze, bündige, verständliche, in schöner Sprache geschriebene Verfassung ... die die Kinder in der Schule auswendig lernen und die sie dann erinnern wie die Kinder in Amerika' (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2007).
- 15 The other elected politician was Zoltán Gál, a member of the Hungarian Parliament and State Secretary in the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office.
- 16 Zahradil nevertheless signed that draft Constitutional Treaty, albeit adding in brackets after his name 'minority report'. See Norman (2005: 277).
- 17 Zahradil's appointment was controversial domestically for a variety of reasons: he refused to be bound by a mandate of the government since he was the appointee of the Prime Minister, Mirek Topolánek; the Prime Minister had failed to consult on his appointment as he was seen as being close, at least in his views on the Constitutional Treaty, to Klaus. The second Czech focal point, Jiri Sedivy, deputy Minister with responsibility for EU matters and former Defence Minister, played a far less public role in representing the Czech position. At the time he was being positioned to take over as Deputy Secretary General of NATO.
- 18 Zahradil's preferences were dismissed by the Czech Republic's Deputy Prime Minister, Martin Bursik, who maintained that Zahradil did not represent the official position of the Czech Republic. Bursik, chairperson of the Green party, a junior partner in the three-party governing coalition, dismissed the idea of negotiating a new treaty and expressed his support for proceeding on the basis of the Constitutional Treaty (*Czech News Agency*, 2007b). The Greens were later critical of Zahradil allegedly misrepresenting the government's position.
- 19 See also, Cichocki (2007b).
- 20 See the comments of the Polish President, Lech Kaczyński, to the National Forum in Dublin, as reported in *Agence Europe* (2007l).
- 21 Saryusz-Wolski was Poland's first Minister for European Affairs (1991–1996) and held the post again in 2000–2001. He became an MEP in 2004 and Vice-President of the EPP in 2006.
- 22 In fact the opposition of the Polish social democratic government of Leszek Miller to double majority voting had been responsible, along with the

- opposition of the Spanish government, for blocking progress in the 2003–2004 IGC.
- 23 On the Polish opposition to double majority voting see Gaisbauer (2010).
 - 24 Saryusz-Wolski along with Cichocki and Ośniecka-Tamecka, the second Polish focal point, were viewed domestically as the 'Natolin wing' in debates on EU matters owing to their associations with the Natolin European Centre. Saryusz-Wolski had since 1993 been Chairman of the Council of the Natolin European Centre; Cichocki was its Research Director; and Ośniecka-Tamecka was Director in 1997–2000. Much of the research critical of the double majority voting system, defending the Nice arrangements, or supporting an alternative, was undertaken or coordinated by the Natolin European Centre (e.g. Trzaskowski, 2006).
 - 25 See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2000). For a detailed explanation and justification of the Jagiellonian Compromise, see Słomczyński and Życzkowski (2010). As Lewis (2010) notes, and as demonstrated by Barcz (2008), support for the square root formula and for the priority the government was giving to it was far from universal in Poland.
 - 26 The requirement is now present in Article 9 TEU. Despite their willingness to refer to the Constitutional Treaty's provisions, the Polish focal points questioned the use of the Constitutional Treaty – 'which has never been ratified' – as a 'binding point of departure' arguing that 'a classical understanding of the method of EU treaty revision ... implies that only existing treaties ... can constitute a basis for treaty revision negotiations' (Cichocki and Ośniecka-Tamecka, 2010: 287).
 - 27 The following list of issues draws on Barcz (2008) and interview data (Interview: 25 May 2010).
 - 28 The fact that the preamble to the Constitutional Treaty was not going to be retained significantly weakened any justification for the demand to be pursued. Wilga (2008: 238) maintains, however, that the issue 'which had somehow disappeared in the last weeks [sic] – suddenly came up again in the first hours of the summit in Brussels'. Her account of the June European Council fails to provide any details, however. Merkel had long supported the inclusion of a reference to Christianity in the preamble to the TEU. Although in March 2007 she reiterated such a preference, there was no actual push to see it included in any new treaty (*Agence Europe*, 2007n).
 - 29 Merkel's charm offensive towards the Kaczyńskis included taking her husband on the visit and later personally accompanying the Polish President to the Brandenburg gate during the celebrations in Berlin on 25 March 2007 to mark the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome.
 - 30 Previously, at the March European Council, Lech Kaczyński had expressed his opposition, arguing that the Nice arrangements were 'very advantageous to Poland' and that 'it is natural that each country should defend the system that is best for it' (*Agence Europe*, 2007p).
 - 31 In the same statement, Kaczyński also expressed Poland's opposition to the EU Foreign Minister, although in the same breath the Polish President also advocated the EU being equipped with the 'tools to enable it to act much more strongly' on the international stage. He went on: 'I am speaking about physical strength, about a European army' (*Agence Europe*, 2007q).

- 32 See, for example, Hoon's written statement to the House of Commons on 5 December 2006 which infers that the German Council Presidency would be addressing the question of what to do with the Constitutional Treaty but reveals nothing of the UK government's position or preferences beyond a commitment to the loosely defined principles of: pursuing British interests, modernization and effectiveness, consensus, subsidiarity, the use of the existing treaties, and openness – in the sense of the EU being open to the outside world (Hoon, 2006).
- 33 For a more detailed consideration of the UK position, see Nugent and Phinnemore (2010) on which this section draws.
- 34 Concern with the UK government's desire to reverse some of the reforms agreed in the Constitutional Treaty arguably strengthened the German Council Presidency's resolve to secure a detailed mandate that left little room for negotiations *per se* in the ensuing IGC (Interview: 20 May 2009).
- 35 The German Council Presidency was apparently particularly 'bugged' by the demand for extra safeguards on the ECJ's jurisdiction over the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Interview: 4 May 2010).
- 36 News of the letter only emerged several weeks later immediately before the June European Council. See Laursen (2012b).
- 37 Confirmation that with these issues addressed ratification could proceed without a referendum was not provided until December 2007 (see 8.1 in Chapter 8).
- 38 The meeting was also attended, at Merkel's request, by the former German President and chair of the Convention that drew up the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Werner Herzog. The aim was to try and soften Klaus' opposition to the Constitutional Treaty. Klaus and Herzog knew one another well from when Herzog was German President (1994–1999) and Klaus was the Czech prime minister (1992–1997). Both participated in the preparation of the 1997 *Czech-German Declaration on Mutual Relations and their Future Development*. The day before the meeting, Merkel's aides had met informally with the Czech focal points (*Czech News Agency*, 2007c).
- 39 Initial reports (*European Voice*, 2007b; *Der Spiegel*, 2007a) implied that Merkel had sent formal, confidential letters to fellow EU leaders. The existence of a letter *per se* was correctly denied by a German government spokesman, reporters having confused the introduction to the questionnaire for a letter. The questionnaire is undated, but according to Ziller (2008a) it was circulated on this date.
- 40 This discussion of the questionnaire draws on the synoptic analysis provided by Maurer (2007b, 2007c). For a contemporaneous overview of options available to the German Council Presidency in addressing the issues covered in the questionnaire, see Kurpas and Micossi (2007).
- 41 Beckett's position is quite remarkable given what was clearly happening. She maintained in evidence to the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee on 7 June 2007 that 'I really cannot tell you what the original purpose of [the questionnaire] was but whatever it was I am not sure it has served it'. Earlier in her evidence she maintained, seemingly disingenuously, that '[a]t no point have those felicitously called our focal points been invited to address these questions or to answer them. [The questionnaire] has just lain on the table'. Later she stated: 'it is not that I do not know what is going

- on. It is that because nothing is going on'. (House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 2007a: Q1 and Q17). Later in the month, on 19 June 2007, Beckett maintained, in response to the German Council Presidency's report that it had conducted 'extensive consultations' with focal points, that '[the Germans] are free to call them consultations, and they are consultations in the sense that they have had people in and said, "What's your general approach?" I guess that most people have done what we have done, which is indicate our general approach and our concern that this should be an amending treaty' (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2008: Q121; also Q164). See also Blair (2012: 110) who refers to other of Beckett's comments as being 'clearly untrue' given developments.
- 42 The estimate comes from Blanchet, Piris' assistant in the Council Legal Service. See Blanchet (2011).
- 43 For a presentation of and translated excerpts from the paper, see Komárek and Kühn (2008).
- 44 However, the announcement did force Blair to indicate earlier than planned the UK government's intended 'red lines'. These, according to Seldon (2008: 570), were hastily agreed and made known publicly on the morning of 21 April 2007 as Blair sought to limit press speculation, fuelled by a leak from the *Kanzleramt*, of a possible return of the Constitutional Treaty under a different name.
- 45 Also attending were European Commission President, Barroso, and the EP President, Pöttering. The meeting had originally been planned by Barroso as an informal summit involving key non-ratifiers of the Constitutional Treaty, so France, the Netherlands, Poland and the Czech Republic. Once news of the summit was leaked, Barroso's initial plan was abandoned and the format switched to the face-saving trio Presidency plus institutions.
- 46 Clearly the German Council Presidency's thinking regarding the form and substance of the new treaty was well beyond the 'subconscious image' being reported in the *Financial Times* (2007c) two days previously.
- 47 The briefing took place over a lunch hosted by the German Council Presidency on 23 May 2007.
- 48 As noted, a number of informal meetings (e.g. with Klaus and Blair) had already taken place. Merkel had also hosted a visit from the Slovak Prime Minister, Robert Fico, on 26 April.
- 49 All the same, French support, according to Maurer (2008c), did not come without a cost. Elsewhere, the German Council Presidency was obliged to compromise on positions in the Doha round of trade talks and commit to fewer concessions on trade in services and agricultural goods.
- 50 Prodi's comments came in the wake of his call the previous month for an 'avant garde' Europe to extricate the EU from its constitutional crisis if unanimous agreement among the 27 member states could not be reached at the forthcoming European Council (*Die Zeit*, 2007). The comments were designed in part as a warning to the UK that if it did not agree to a new treaty, then it risked marginalization (Interview: 4 May 2010).
- 51 Among the additional occasions where opportunities existed to discuss issues was the G8 summit at Heiligendam on 6 June 2007. Sarkozy certainly used the occasion to canvass – and allegedly secure – Blair's support for the idea of a *traité simplifié* (Reuters, 2007a).

- 52 According to a leaked US Embassy cable, the talks between Prodi and Kaczyński twins were 'brutally frank' with an Italian diplomat reporting that 'Prodi called his meeting with PM Kaczyński the chilliest he has ever had with an EU leader, with the exception of a recent meeting with Czech President Klaus' (US Embassy Warsaw, 2007).
- 53 According to *The Economist* (2007a), Sarkozy's secret for eliciting a more accommodating stance from Kaczyński was to '[lay] on the flattery with a trowel' and to argue that 'Poland had to compromise because it was one of Europe's "big countries" and so could not afford the angry gestures or threats allowed to tiddlers'.
- 54 Maurer (2007c) maintains that the report was presented to focal points on 6 June 2007. No confirmation exists.
- 55 There were also concerns that the United Kingdom wanted to re-open discussion on the proposed upgrading of the High Representative for the CFSP. The UK Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, questioned both the role and status of the post, and in later discussions before the European Council, UK officials proposed to reduce the post-holder's powers and responsibilities (e.g. not chairing meetings of the External Affairs Council) and limit the staff of the planned External Action Service to just seconded member state officials. See *Financial Times* (2007e); Ludlow (2007b).
- 56 For Wessels and Faber (2007), the pragmatic, functional, step-by-step approach adopted represented a 'renaissance' of the Monnet method.

Chapter 5 The German Council Presidency III: From Road Map to Mandate

- 1 The meeting had been signalled in the German Council Presidency report on *Pursuing the Treaty Reform Process* (Council of the European Union, 2007a), albeit without an express purpose being revealed.
- 2 See, for example, the comments of the UK Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee earlier in the day on 19 June: 'we believe that a draft mandate *may* well be put before [focal points] to communicate to their Governments' (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2008: Q113, emphasis added).
- 3 For a discussion of the draft mandate, see Herma (2008).
- 4 The UK focal point did, however, seize the opportunity at the meeting to restate UK reservations regarding the proposed legally binding status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, QMV extensions in the area of justice and home affairs, and aspects of the CFSP, notably any reference to a European 'Foreign Minister' and the possible extension of ECJ jurisdiction (*Agence Europe*, 2007z).
- 5 This was not the first version of the draft mandate. Its numbering (SN 3116/2/07 REV 2) indicates that the original version had undergone two revisions. It is, however, the earliest version to become available publically.
- 6 See the admission of the UK Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2008: Q317). Concern over the brevity of the 'negotiations' led one MP to accuse the UK government of

- 'meekly' accepting the German timetable for an IGC and 'a frightening abdication of national responsibilities' (*ibid*: Q318).
- 7 Wolinetz (2008: 195) is more positive: 'the Dutch got most of what they wanted'; even on enlargement the TEU was amended to require the EU when deciding on the admission of new member states to take into account 'the conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council'.
 - 8 As Laursen (2012b) demonstrates, the Danish government had nine issues relating to transfers of sovereignty that needed to be addressed. Most of these were clearly addressed in the draft mandate and had all been addressed by the time the Treaty of Lisbon was agreed. A number of devices were used: the types of EU measures that could be adopted were limited in areas of extended competence to incentive measures, excluding the harmonization of national laws; provisions were placed in parts of the EU treaty base covered by a Danish opt-out arrangement; the provision was incorporated in a Danish opt-out; the measure was subjected to a subsequent national decision.
 - 9 The Czech Deputy Prime Minister, Alexandr Vondra, announced during the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers in Luxembourg on 18 June that the Czech government had 'no wish to see Poland isolated ... There must be a compromise which doesn't require anybody to die' (*Agence Europe*, 2007v).
 - 10 The Czechs also had ideas: retaining a population threshold of 62% and raising the threshold for a blocking minority to five member states (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2007e).
 - 11 Blair's autobiography, despite its 700+ pages (Blair, 2010), is conspicuously silent on what happened at his last appearance at a European Council.
 - 12 For a detailed description of events at the June European Council, see Ludlow (2007b). See also Kammholz and Müller (2007) and, with a focus on the Polish position, Wilga (2008).
 - 13 On the UK's exploitation of the CFSP issue for domestic purposes, see Reynolds (2007).
 - 14 There has been much comment on the supposed Sarkozy 'coup' at the European Council meeting over securing the removal of the wording and its consequences. It is worth noting that the offending phrase – 'an internal market where competition is free and undistorted' – only appeared as an objective of the EU in the Constitutional Treaty (Article I-3(2)). It was not listed as an objective of the EU in the TEU. At the time, the Commission and others argued that it was highly unlikely that the non-transfer of the phrase would affect the legal basis for free competition in the EU given the numerous other references to it in the EU treaty base (*Euractiv*, 2007b).
 - 15 See, respectively, *European Voice* (2007d) and Council of the European Union (2007d: Annex 1, Point 3).
 - 16 This did not prevent Sarkozy claiming that he had secured a 'major orientation of the EU's objectives' such that 'competition will no longer be an objective in itself but a way of serving the EU and organizing the internal market. For the first time, the European Union has to ensure protection of citizens' (*Agence Europe*, 2007cc: 4). Within a fortnight, however, Sarkozy acknowledged that the change was symbolic and political rather than legal, nevertheless insisting that it provided an opportunity to debate the

- perceived neo-liberal bias of the EU (see Sarkozy (2007b), as referred to in Dimitrakopoulos *et al* 2009).
- 17 See the account offered by Seldon (2008).
 - 18 As part of the package it was also agreed that the new treaty would include a 'solidarity clause' and increased cooperation on European issues between Germany, France and Poland. See *Agence Europe* (2007bb); *EU Observer* (2007k, 2007l).
 - 19 News of the abandonment of the square-root option and of what had been tentatively agreed led Saryusz-Wolski to declare that Poland was taking decisions 'hastily, under pressure' and was falling into a 'trap' instead of having the voting system become the subject of negotiation in the IGC (*Agence Europe*, 2007dd). On Saryusz-Wolski's reaction, see Wilga (2008).
 - 20 The mandate notes that 'two delegations reserved their right to join in this Protocol'. It was subsequently revealed that the two member states in question were Ireland and Poland. The general declaration originally contained a third paragraph confirming at Poland's instance that 'the Charter does not affect in any way the right of member states to legislate in the sphere of public morality, family law as well as the protection of human dignity and respect for human physical and moral integrity'. Following opposition from several other member states, the paragraph was removed with Poland agreeing to issue the paragraph as a unilateral declaration. See Ludlow (2007b).
 - 21 Whether the Polish government would have exercised its veto has always been a matter of speculation. The fact that the President, Lech Kaczyński, and not the Prime Minister, Jarosław Kaczyński, represented Poland at the European Council was not without significance. The latter had indicated that he would only attend if a veto was necessary (Fischer, 2008). Moreover, Jarosław Kaczyński was widely regarded as 'a much less moderate negotiator and thus less ready to compromise' (Wilga, 2008: 238). He was more likely to have held out (Interview: 25 May 2010).
 - 22 It is unclear whether the issue of additional MEPs was initiated by Poland or its partners. Compare the accounts of events provided by Fischer (2008) and Wilga (2008).
 - 23 Ludlow (2007b: 26) maintains that had Polish leaders not 'lapsed into violent Germanophobia', then the German Council Presidency 'would have been willing to consider solutions which would by one means or another have modified the double majority systems at Germany's expense'.
 - 24 Also attending his last – and 65th – European Council was the German Permanent Representative, Schönfelder.
 - 25 Verhofstadt's scorn is unlikely to have been induced solely by the concessions that Balkenende had secured. As Ludlow (2007b) notes, Balkenende had actively supported the Flemish Christian Democrats in the recent Belgian elections and thereby contributed to Verhofstadt's defeat.
 - 26 Following Piris (2010), *Ioannina-bis* is used to distinguish the mechanism from the existing *Ioannina* compromise.
 - 27 See 7.1. Kaczyński insisted that he had received an 'oral commitment' that the 'reasonable time' during which efforts would continue to be made to find a compromise solution under the revised *Ioannina* compromise would be two years, not the three or four months assumed by other member states (*Agence Europe*, 2007y).

- 28 On the German Council Presidency more generally, for Ludlow, a veteran commentator on European Councils and Council Presidencies, the agreement on the IGC mandate was the ‘principal achievement’ of ‘one of the most impressive six-month presidencies in the EU’s 50-year history’, a Presidency ‘about which it is difficult not to speak in superlatives’ (Ludlow, 2007b: 34). Elsewhere, he rates the German Council Presidency – alongside the Danish Presidency in 2002 that concluded the accession negotiations that led to the EU’s 2004 enlargement – as ‘the outstanding Presidency of the decade’, not least because Merkel did not abuse the Council Presidency ‘to flout her power or importance’ (Ludlow, 2009: 8).
- 29 On Sarkozy’s activities in 2007 see Drake and Lequesne (2010) who provide a generally sympathetic treatment of the new President’s role in securing agreement on the Treaty of Lisbon.
- 30 See, for example, *Der Tagesspiegel* (2007).
- 31 Ośniecka-Tamecka certainly appears to have regarded the outcome as a failure. She tendered her resignation as a focal point immediately after the European Council and in August 2007 left the Polish civil service.
- 32 Verhofstadt also mentioned the declaration on the primacy of EU law over national law. The declaration had, however, been envisaged in the draft of the IGC mandate circulated on 19 June. See Council of the European Union (2007d, point 3).
- 33 According to one interviewee (4 May 2010), had the UK government proved unwilling to reach a deal on an IGC mandate, Prodi was intent on pushing his idea of an *avant-garde* – see his comments in May 2007 in *Die Zeit* (2007) – by tabling a protocol, supposedly supported by Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Greece, on allowing the members of the eurozone to proceed with closer integration without requiring the approval of eurozone outsiders.
- 34 Ultimately the smaller member states’ preference for one Commissioner per member state was satisfied following the agreement to abandon the proposed reduction in the size of the Commission as part of the package of measures agreed in response to the initial popular rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland. See 8.5 in Chapter 8.

Chapter 6 The IGC Mandate and the Draft Reform Treaty

- 1 See the comment of Gisela Stuart, a member of the European Convention and its Presidium in 2002–2003, in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2008: Q218). Stuart presumably meant to say ‘Platform 9¾’ the secret platform at London’s King’s Cross railway terminus from which the Hogwarts Express leaves in the Harry Potter series of fantasy books.
- 2 For a review of the mandate, see Müller-Graff (2007); Mayer (2007); Ludlow (2007b); Piris (2010); Craig (2008a); Berman (2012); Seeger and Emmanouilidis (2007).
- 3 See Sarkozy’s comment at his press conference at the end of the June European Council that ‘the simplified treaty, which no-one believed in is a reality’ (*Agence Europe*, 2007cc: 3). Sarkozy persisted in claiming credit for the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. For him it was simply a matter of fact: ‘c’est sur le base de la proposition française d’un traité simplifié que l’accord [de Lisbonne] a été possible’ (Sarkozy, 2008a: 6).

- 4 The complexity of the treaty led to allegations that member state governments were deliberately trying to make it unintelligible so as to avoid any suggestion that it was a 'constitutional' document and thereby justify calls for ratification. The allegations appear groundless given that the text follows the structure and form of past amending treaties. The allegations were given some credence by comments from Giuliano Amato, Vice-President of the European Convention, that 'if it is unreadable, then it is not constitutional. That was the sort of perception' (*EU Observer*, 2007n).
- 5 The mandate's instructions regarding the application of the Ioannina-*bis* mechanism had to be revised twice before agreement was reached on what had been agreed, in spirit at least, at the European Council. See Council of the European Union (2007i, 2007j). Even then, the Polish government remained dissatisfied (see 7.1 in Chapter 7).
- 6 The change from 'one-third' to 'nine' member states had been included as a last minute concession to an incensed Verhofstadt (see 5.5 in Chapter 5). In an EU of 27 member states the change makes no difference.
- 7 This revised mandate also clarified that the protocol which two delegations reserved the right to join was the UK protocol relating to the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The changes were set out in a set of corrections to the Presidency Conclusions from the European Council. See Council of the European Union (2007k).
- 8 The final version of the mandate did not include any substantive changes but contained some textual tidying up and clarification of some cross-references (see Council of the European Union, 2007l).
- 9 This would not represent a total abandonment of the original Communities. The European Atomic Energy Community would continue to exist. Technical amendments to its constitutive treaty would be included in a dedicated protocol.
- 10 The IGC deviated somewhat from the instruction in that the wording of Article 48(6) TEU on the first simplified revision procedure notes only that a European Council decision revising the TFEU 'shall not increase the competences conferred on the Union'.
- 11 The document is dated 23 July, but was circulated electronically on 21 July (Herma, 2008).
- 12 Had Merkel revealed the text, MEPs may well have been asking Steinmeier to explain his comment during his appearance before the EP's Constitutional Affairs Committee in January 2007 that 'I cannot imagine there being a new Constitution before the IGC' (*Agence Europe*, 2007c).
- 13 Indeed, the strict prescriptiveness of the mandate led several MPs on the Italian Parliament's Committees for European Affairs to question whether an inquiry into the proposed treaty called at the end of July 2007 was actually worth holding (Bindi and Gianniti, 2012).

Chapter 7 The 2007 Intergovernmental Conference

- 1 The same day, Solana's office circulated to all member state governments an extract of the revised Presidency Conclusions from the European Council (Council of the European Union, 2007n).

- 2 Additional views were provided by the Committee of the Regions which had adopted an opinion on 6–7 June in anticipation of the European Council agreeing to call an IGC (Committee of the Regions, 2007). Following publication of the mandate, the President of the Committee of the Regions wrote to the Portuguese Council Presidency requesting that Article I-32 of the Constitutional Treaty be incorporated in the new treaty thereby recognizing the status of the EU's advisory bodies (*Conférence des représentants des gouvernements des états membres*, 2007d). The provision was duly inserted into Article 13(4) TEU. Much later, the Economic and Social Committee, in a letter from its President, also proposed a number of 'concrete proposals' but these were not sent to the Portuguese Council Presidency until 3 October 2012 (*Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States*, 2007e). They were not circulated until more than a week later, and so after COREPER had considered the draft treaty produced by legal experts (see 7.4 in Chapter 7). More timely proposals – this time for revised wording to selected treaty provisions – were contained in a letter from the European Data Protection Supervisor sent to the Portuguese Council Presidency on 23 July 2007 (*Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States*, 2007f). The letter was circulated among IGC participants in early September.
- 3 The note indicated that the draft treaty text 'distributed in one (legally revised) language' (i.e. French) would be circulated at the inaugural meeting of the IGC on 23 July. The translations (non-legally revised) would be distributed as soon as possible thereafter. As already noted (see 6.4 in Chapter 6), a French-language version of the draft treaty text was circulated electronically two days earlier than planned on 21 July. The English-language version followed on 23 July.
- 4 In fact the statement is the only recorded formal submission to the IGC from a member state government. On the submissions to the IGC, see note 11 below.
- 5 Such a comment undoubtedly soothed any concerns other member states had about recent political developments in Poland. A week before the launch of the IGC the Self-Defence Party, a junior member of the Polish coalition government, had announced plans to block the commitments Poland had made regarding the new 'reform treaty' and secure its rejection and if unsuccessful ensure that the treaty be put to a referendum in Poland. See *Agence Europe* (2007ee).
- 6 See *EU Observer* (2007o); *Financial Times* (2007j); Wilga (2008). Prior to her statement, Fotyga's inability following the European Council to confirm what had been agreed led to a vote of no confidence in her as foreign minister being tabled in the Polish parliament (Barcz, 2008).
- 7 In her statement Fotyga also reminded her audience that Poland would during the IGC be taking a decision on whether to join the United Kingdom in its Protocol on the Charter for Fundamental Rights.
- 8 The Council Presidency was also tasked with ensuring that candidate states were kept 'fully and regularly briefed throughout the [IGC]' (Council of the European Union, 2007q; point 6).
- 9 Duff in particular was vociferous in his support of the Constitutional Treaty and efforts to salvage it following the French and Dutch 'no' votes in 2004

- (Duff, 2005, 2006, 2007). He was equally vocal subsequently in defending the 'logic' of the Treaty of Lisbon (Duff, 2009).
- 10 The UK government was formally of the view that the negotiations had been completed. See the comment of the UK Minister for Europe, Jim Murphy, to MPs on 12 September 2007 that 'A formal negotiation process is not going on; the UK negotiated its deal in June' (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2008: Q212).
 - 11 The information note also indicated that all IGC documents would be made public and accessible on the Council website and that interpretation arrangements for the meetings of the IGC at the level of Heads of State or Government or at ministerial level would be those used at European Council meetings. In practice, relatively few documents appeared on the website. In addition to the original drafts and agreed texts of the treaty, its preamble, protocols and declarations, there are letters from the ECB, the Court of Auditors, the Committee of the Regions, the Economic and Social Committee and the European Data Protection Supervisor; an opinion from the Committee of the Regions; the indicative timetable for the legal experts; the IGC's final act; and Fotyga's speech (see <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/treaty-of-lisbon/igc-2007.aspx>). Other documents were circulated among IGC participants, but these, according to Fischer (2008), were classified as either 'session documents' or 'working documents' and so did not make their way onto the Council website.
 - 12 In most cases the personal representatives were senior government officials and often one of the focal points from the period of the German Council Presidency.
 - 13 Although the 2003–2004 IGC had before it the draft Constitutional Treaty produced by the European Convention, the text was only regarded as 'a good basis for starting in the Intergovernmental Conference' (Council of the European Union, 2005c: point 5). Moreover, the 2003–2004 IGC was operating under a far less prescriptive mandate.
 - 14 Not all member states were necessarily enthused by the prospect of Piris playing such a prominent role. The UK government apparently insisted that he not be allowed to chair proceedings alone (Interview: 27 November 2009).
 - 15 On Piris' career and contribution to IGCs and the work of the European Council, see the tribute provided in Goebel (2011).
 - 16 Written correspondence with author, 28 May 2009.
 - 17 For Piris' account of the work of the legal experts – on which this section draws – see Piris (2010). A further, more candid, account is provided by Herma (2008), a member of the Polish delegation to the group of legal experts.
 - 18 This did not stop one of the more experienced participants asking whether the 2004 innovation removing the reference to 'ever closer union' from the preamble to the TEC could be included in the new treaty. Piris 'furiously' rejected the idea (Interview: 11 June 2009). The Commissioner for Communication, Margot Wallström, also sought unsuccessfully to have inserted in the treaty an additional clause (on the right of EU citizens to information from EU institutions and an obligation on these institutions to inform citizens). See *European Voice* (2007e).

- 19 No provision was made for interpretation at the meetings of the legal experts.
- 20 This raises the question of whether member states really had enough time to subject the draft Reform Treaty to a comprehensive review. Pressure of time and limited human resources, particularly acute given this was the summer vacation period, meant that some delegations were not necessarily as well prepared as they might have been had there been longer to review the mandate and the draft Reform Treaty.
- 21 See also Fischer (2008) who notes 14 substantive issues being resolved by the legal experts. In addition to the issues noted here, these included: how the Charter of Fundamental Rights would be referenced; a TEU reference to the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee; provisions governing the entry into force of the TEU and TFEU; data protection and transparency in the TFEU; a list of citizenship rights; the establishment of a new system of legal acts and the flexibility clause; a protocol on transitional arrangements; data protection exemptions relating to the UK opt-out/opt-in arrangements provisions.
- 22 These titles had been included in Parts I and IV of the Constitutional Treaty and transferred to the TEU (except for the CFSP provisions) in the draft Reform Treaty. However, there were no corresponding titles for the articles in the TEC/TFEU. Although titles/headings would have arguably made the treaties more comprehensible, agreeing them would be a lengthy and potentially controversial process. According to Petite, Director-General of the Legal Service of the European Commission, 'everybody felt the easiest solution was to delete rather than to invent: thus the deletion of the titles in the [TEU]' (House of Lords, 2007: Q36).
- 23 Generally legal experts from the new member states raised few issues. For one participant, it was apparent that several of these states were still on a 'post-accession high' (Interview: 6 May 2010). For another, they were still on a 'learning curve' regarding IGCs (Interview: 20 May 2010).
- 24 No doubt the ECB's determination to retain its distinct status was reinforced by French efforts to open up a discussion on the role of the ECB, efforts the Portuguese Council Presidency resisted. See Fischer (2008).
- 25 The ECB did, however, secure a change in the wording of Article 314(1) TFEU exempting it from the requirements to supply the Commission by 1 July annually with an estimate of expenditure for the following year. The Court of Auditors viewed the proposed text far more favourably. Having been listed in the TEC as an institution since the TEU's entry into force in 1993, it had been excluded from the Constitutional Treaty's definition of the EU's 'institutional framework'. This led its President to write to the Portuguese Council Presidency in June 2007 requesting that the omission be rectified. A number of other drafting proposals were made. Needless to say the Court welcomed its inclusion in the list of EU institutions contained in the IGC's draft text of what is now Article 13 TEU. See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007j, 2007k).
- 26 Fotyga's assurances did little to assuage the concerns of some diplomats and EU officials that the Kaczyński twins might be tempted to use the European Council for electoral purposes. See *Agence Europe* (2007jj).

- 27 In early September 2007 a cross-party 'I want a referendum' campaign was launched and the opposition Conservative Party renewed its commitment to hold a referendum on any further transfer of competence to the EU. The developments followed opinion poll data in August 2007 showing 82% of UK voters wanted a referendum (*Daily Telegraph*, 2007a) and suggestions that the UK Prime Minister faced a backbench revolt by Labour MPs if he resisted calls for one (*Daily Telegraph*, 2007b). Brown, during a bilateral meeting with Merkel the same month reaffirmed his preference for the new treaty to be ratified by parliamentary means.
- 28 On the Polish demand, which received no support from the other member states, see Barcz (2008).
- 29 See House of Lords (2007: Q2). The figure was provided by Kim Darroch, the recently appointed (July 2007) UK Permanent Representative to the EU. During the German Council Presidency, Darroch had been one of the two UK focal points.
- 30 For the detail, see Herma (2008).
- 31 For a more detailed list of adaptations and improvements, see Piris (2010: 42–4).
- 32 See *Declaration (62) by the Republic of Poland concerning the Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in relation to Poland and the United Kingdom*. The Declaration first appeared in the draft of declarations published on 5 October 2007. See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007l).
- 33 See the comment of Petite in evidence to the House of Lords (2007: Q48).
- 34 This led to a series of very brief and, for some participants, meaningless meetings of the legal experts.
- 35 Underlining the centrality of Piris to the work of the IGC, the meetings, with only a very few exceptions, took place not in the Presidency suite in the Justus Lipsius building but in Piris' office.
- 36 For a UK government assessment of its position at this point in the IGC, see the evidence provided to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union on 19 September 2007 (House of Lords, 2007).
- 37 The reference to 'that extension' suggested that Ireland could only opt in to the extension of the Protocol relating to the Schengen acquis.
- 38 On the reaction to Blair's statement and the ensuing debate over whether an opt-out had been secured, see Barnard (2008) who concludes (p. 281) that the protocol is 'an exercise in smoke and mirrors ... introduced largely for presentational reasons to help convince the British public that the Lisbon Treaty was different to the Constitutional Treaty'.
- 39 The discussion of the new UK opt-in/opt-out arrangements draws heavily on Fletcher (2009).
- 40 The UK government nevertheless announced that it fully supported 'robust action with regard to adoption financial sanctions designed to prevent and combat terrorism and related activities'. It was therefore intending to opt-in to such measures. A new *Declaration (65) by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Article 61 H of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* duly appeared in the revised treaty draft circulated in early October.
- 41 The provisions are contained in Protocol (36) on Transitional Provisions.

- 42 Expert commentary has not been enthusiastic either. Ladenburger (2008: 37), for example, maintains that the arrangements 'are to be deplored, for their complexity, for their potential torpedoing of the ambitious legislative initiatives, and lastly for the symbolic message of the precedent: [f]or the first time an EU Treaty allows a member state to withdraw from existing *acquis*'.
- 43 The UK government also reported to the press that, in order to ensure all its 'red lines' were fully respected, it was in mid-September in 'emergency talks' to 'hammer out stronger guarantees' restricting the role of the ECJ in interpreting certain international agreements of the EU (*The Times*, 2007b).
- 44 On the expert legal opinion, see Dougan (2008), Fletcher (2009). Dougan (2008: 670) is particularly scathing, describing the Protocol as 'a veritable dog's dinner' (p. 691) and viewing its primary purpose as 'to serve as an effective political response to a serious failure of public discourse. Indeed, the Protocol emerges as a fantasy solution to a fantasy problem: the Charter is not actually a serious threat to UK labour law; for its part, the Protocol is not really an opt-out from anything. The Protocol is 'a fantasy solution to a fantasy problem'. Equally scathing is Ziller (2008a: 123–6) who ridicules the text for making little sense and compares it mockingly with the conditions imposed on Jonathan Swift's Gulliver by the Court of Lilliputians.
- 45 See the comments of Paul Berman, the UK legal expert at the IGC, in evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union on 19 December 2007 (House of Lords, 2008: Q282).
- 46 The sense of exasperation and frustration was in part fuelled by the combative approach adopted, presumably at the behest of the new Prime Minister, Brown, by his 'personal representative' to the IGC, Jon Cunliffe. Cunliffe, formerly Second Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, had recently been appointed Head of International Economic Affairs and Europe at the Cabinet Office.
- 47 The option to join the *Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the United Kingdom* had been included in the IGC mandate and re-affirmed in the draft treaty of 5 October. In announcing that it would be joining the UK in the revised opt-in/opt-out arrangements regarding Schengen and the AFSJ, the Irish government noted that it would review its position after three years. The review commitment was immediately included in a unilateral Irish declaration published on 12 October and later attached to the Final Act of the IGC. The Declaration also affirmed the government's intention to participate 'to the maximum possible extent it deems possible' in adopting AFSJ measures. See *Declaration [56] by Ireland on Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice* and Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007o). For a defence of the Irish decision, see the views of the Irish Foreign Minister, Dermot Ahern in *Irish Times* (2007b). See also *Irish Times* (2007c).
- 48 Fischer (2008: 73–5) provides a longer list which includes: a French attempt to weaken the commitment to the liberalization of services in Article 60 TFEU; how to determine the rotation of Commissioners in a smaller

Commission; an Austrian request for the harmonization across language versions of the wording of Article 49 TEU to reflect the EU's absorption capacity; the possibility of Poland seeking a UK-style five-year opt-out from ECJ jurisdiction over pillar III measures; a Belgian attempt to simplify the means by which the powers of the European Public Prosecutor could be extended; the ECB's demand not to be included in the TEU's list of EU institutions; an EP demand for measures relating to data protection under the CFSP be subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ; UK reservations on the status of the CFSP; a Polish opt-out from the Charter; the UK's insistence on the less prescriptive 'may' translation to 'shall' in draft Article 8C TEU regarding the involvement of national parliaments in 'the good functioning of the Union'; a bid by the social partners in Austria and Germany to give greater prominence to the TFEU provision on the role of social partners; a German desire to see greater prominence given to EU symbols albeit not necessarily in the treaty base; UK opposition to the inclusion in the TEU of the content of EU citizenship.

- 49 According to Bindi and Gianniti (2012), the Italian government appeared to have failed at the June European Council – either by accident or design – to pick up on the likelihood of a decrease in the number of Italian MEPs in any new composition of the EP. According to one witness, neither the Italian Prime Minister, Prodi, nor his Foreign Minister, D'Alema, was present in the room when the discussion took place.
- 50 There were indications that the Czech Republic was also seeking formal clarification on the delimitation of EU competences and formal confirmation that legislation might be repealed at the request of a member state and that treaty revision could be used to reduce the competences conferred on the EU. The Czech position was often stated late and generally lacked clarity. In part this was due, according to one leading IGC participant, to a lack of coordination domestically (Interview: 27 November 2009).
- 51 However, progress was not being made as swiftly as MEPs wished. Brok, Crespo and Duff therefore travelled to Lisbon to secure an EP role in the appointment of the first High Representative and parliamentary and ECJ supervision of the protection of personnel data under the CFSP. Eventually, the MEPs' demands on the former were addressed for the most part in an additional *Declaration (12) on Article 18 of the Treaty on European Union*. On data protection, the member states refused to concede ground. Also, MEPs were still voicing various other concerns about the treaty text. Attracting particular concern were the Ioannina-bis mechanism – which they feared would complicate and slow down decision-making – and the derogations being granted to the United Kingdom and Poland relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. See *Agence Europe* (2007kk, 2007pp).
- 52 Although the agreement – confirmed at the informal Lisbon European Council – was widely cited, it was recorded in neither the Presidency Press Release nor any announced changes to the text of the Reform Treaty or associated documents. Coincidentally the agreement followed the Bulgarian government's decision at the GAERC on 15 October not to block the signing that day of the EU's Stabilization and Association Agreement with Montenegro over Cyrillic spelling of 'euro' (*Reuters*, 2007b, 2007c).

- 53 Not all EU leaders attended for the duration. Almost on arrival in Lisbon the Latvian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were obliged to return to Riga owing to the latest developments in a political crisis engulfing the government. Latvia was represented by Normunds Popenis, the country's recently appointed Permanent Representative to the EU. Popenis had been one of Latvia's two focal points during the discussions on the IGC mandate. Also, leaving early was Jean-Claude Juncker, the Luxembourg Prime Minister, who, as chair of the eurozone group, had to leave early for the G7 finance ministers' meeting in Washington.
- 54 For a detailed sequencing and presentation of developments at the informal European Council, see Ludlow (2007c) on which this section draws. See also: European Policy Centre (2007); *European Voice* (2007i); Agence Europe (2007ss); *Deutsche Welle* (2007); *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2007f).
- 55 *Declaration (38) on Article 252 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union regarding the number of Advocates-General in the Court of Justice.* Formally, according to Article 252 TFEU any increase must be at the request of the Court of Justice. Such a request was not made until 25 January 2013, when the President of the Court of Justice requested the appointment of three extra Advocates-General.
- 56 See *Protocol (9) on the Decision of the Council relating to the Implementation of Article 9c(4) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 205(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union between 1 November 2014 and 31 March 2017 on the one Hand, and as from 1 April 2017 on the Other.* One explanation for Kaczyński's acceptance was that there was now no chance of news of the deal appearing in Polish newspapers until 20 October, and so after the end of official campaigning for the general election being held on 21 October. The deal could not therefore become an election issue. Ludlow (2007c) dismisses the explanation on the grounds that Antici records of the bilateral meeting show no actual agreement being reached at this relatively early stage in the evening's negotiations. Carbone (2009) argues mistakenly that Poland was compensated with a reinforced energy solidarity clause and a permanent advocate-general at the Court of Justice. However, the wording of the relevant solidarity clause remained unchanged following the informal European Council and, as indicated (see note 55 above), an increase in the number of advocates-general was not requested until early 2013.
- 57 Concerns were also being expressed in Poland over the distribution of seats in the EP, such that there was pressure on the government to raise the issue of increasing Poland's allocation by one seat. The government's preference was to defer any discussion until the December European Council, but it was never – at least formally – raised (see Barcz, 2008).
- 58 See *Declaration (4) on the Composition of the European Parliament* and *Declaration (5) on the political agreement by the European Council concerning the draft Decision on the composition of the European Parliament.*
- 59 See *Declaration (28) in relation to the delimitation of competences.*
- 60 See *Declaration (12) on Article 18 of the Treaty on European Union.*
- 61 Since the Lisbon gathering was an informal European Council no formal Presidency Conclusions were produced. The only semi-formal record of events is the press release (Portuguese Council Presidency, 2007) that was

- posted on the Portuguese Council Presidency website (www.eu2007.pt). This website has since been deactivated.
- 62 Some of the texts reflecting these agreements (the 'Polish' protocol, six declarations and provisions governing the size of the EP) were made available in all the official languages (except Irish) on the IGC website on the 19 October, the day they were adopted. By contrast at this stage it was still only possible to access online the drafts of the Reform Treaty and the associated Protocols and Declarations in English and French. Corrections to the draft Reform Treaty necessary to effect the agreements mentioned were published on 22 October. At the same time a revised version of *Declaration (No. 28) in relation to the delimitation of competences* set out in a dedicated *Protocol (no. 8) on the exercise of share competence* was issued.
- 63 One possible late adjustment that was flagged but ultimately not pursued was the removal of Poland's 'opt-out' from the Charter. The incoming Tusk government which won the election on 21 October 2007 had declared its intention to abrogate the 'opt-out'. For domestic political reasons, however, it subsequently agreed to retain the 'opt-out' so as to facilitate ratification. See *Agence Europe* (2007tt, 2007uu); Lewis (2010).
- 64 The European Council of 14 December could in theory have been moved, but the Belgian government objected. Officials, evidently conscious of the political fallout at a time of increased concern over the environmental impact of air travel, wished to avoid EU leaders becoming part of a travelling circus flying from Lisbon to Brussels simply to maintain protocol (*EU Observer*, 2007t; *The Times*, 2007c).
- 65 The list of signatories is notable for the inclusion of the Heads of State and Government who attended meetings of the European Council. Traditionally, signing duties have been left to foreign and other ministers. The precedent for Heads of State and Government to sign was set with the signing of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2004.
- 66 Brown signed the Treaty of Lisbon in a separate ceremony – with the moment photographed for posterity – in the *Museu Nacional dos Coches* (National Coach Museum) (*The Guardian*, 2007d; *Daily Telegraph*, 2007c). More successful in avoiding having his name on the Treaty was the Polish President, Lech Kaczyński, who attended the signing ceremony but was not among the Polish signatories (*Agence Europe*, 2007vv).
- 67 Further consolidated versions were published in the *Official Journal* in March 2010, four months after the Treaty of Lisbon's eventual entry into force on 1 December 2009. See *Official Journal* (2010a).
- 68 In her account of the Portuguese Council Presidency, Ferreira-Pereira fails even to acknowledge Piri's role in the IGC (or even the role of the Council Legal Service in providing the draft treaty that provided the focus of the IGC's work). Instead, she argues, somewhat naïvely, that '[t]he Portuguese government ... drove forward the political and technical exercise of giving substance to the mandate agreed under the German Presidency' (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008: 63).
- 69 The discretion may have been the result of pressure from Merkel. One interviewee (27 November 2009) was of the view that Pöttering was under pressure from the German Chancellor not to rock the boat. A further

interviewee (11 June 2009) maintained that the MEPs were told not to leak any materials or they would be 'out of the game'.

- 70 See Ludlow (2009: 9) whose praise for Merkel when chairing the 'German Council Presidency has already been noted in Chapter 5.

Chapter 8 Ratification and Implementation

- 1 Article 6 provided that if not all instruments of ratification had been deposited by 1 January 2009, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon would be on the first day of the month following the deposit of the final instrument.
- 2 The optimism was not shared by the Czech government which had already expressed concern during the IGC at what it regarded as an overly ambitious and potentially unrealistic goal of completing ratification in 12 months. Fearful of having to dedicate time during its Council Presidency in the first half of 2009 to addressing delays in ratification, the Czech government argued for at least a more realistic timescale or ideally no timescale at all. See *Agence Europe* (2007ww).
- 3 It had long been assumed that the Irish government would, as with the TEU and the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, submit the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon to a popular vote, even though there was open debate on whether a referendum was actually necessary. See Abaquesne De Parfouru (2008); Hogan (2009); Barrett (2009).
- 4 On the thresholds, see Hagemann (2007). For more detailed coverage of the ratification in selected member states, see Carbone (2010a).
- 5 On the Council of State's opinion, see Ziller (2008b) who notes that the Council of State had in fact only been asked to opine on whether a referendum on the proposed treaty would be admissible under the Dutch constitution, not whether a referendum would be necessary.
- 6 The Dutch government, owing to policy differences within the coalition and as a means of strengthening its hand in securing concessions in the consultations with the German Council Presidency, had not initially ruled out a referendum. Indeed public opinion supported the idea. It instead decided in early 2007 to refer any new treaty to the Council of State for its opinion. However, rather than await the formal conclusion of the IGC, the Balkenende government on 18 July 2007 forwarded the Council of State the IGC mandate for its opinion.
- 7 Given past amending treaties had generally been ratified via referendum, a variety of commentators alleged the report had been fixed to facilitate the passage of the Treaty of Lisbon. As a pre-emptive sweetener to advocates of a referendum, Rasmussen in November 2007 announced his intention to hold a referendum on maintaining Denmark's various existing opt-in/opt-out arrangements. The planned referendum never took place.
- 8 On the Hungarian debate, as well as the debates in the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom, see Maatsch (2010).
- 9 In order that they may enter into force, treaties amending the EU's constitutive treaties must first 'be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in

accordance with their respective constitutional requirements'. Once domestic ratification has been completed, the so-called 'instruments of ratification' – a formal document notifying ratification – are 'deposited with the Government of the Italian Republic'. Only when all instruments of ratification have been deposited does a treaty enter into force.

- 10 On Polish ratification, see Zwolski (2009).
- 11 The tradition began in the 1950s with the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community – the Treaty of Rome – and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.
- 12 On the campaign and results, see Abaquesne de Parfouru (2008); Holmes (2008); O'Brennan (2009); Quinlan (2009); Qvortrup (2009); Brown (2010); Crum (2012).
- 13 On the ratification process in Poland, see Kaczyński *et al* (2008); Wilga and Karolewski (2012).
- 14 As much had been made clear at the European Council in June 2008 where, in the face of demands from other member state governments that ratification continue, the Czech government insisted that due notice be taken of the fact that the Czech Republic could not complete ratification until the Constitutional Court had delivered a 'positive opinion on the accordance of the Lisbon Treaty with the Czech constitutional order' (Council of the European Union, 2008b: note 1). Its position was recorded, unconventionally, in a footnote to the Presidency Conclusions. See *Agence Europe* (2008b).
- 15 On the ruling, see Bríza (2009).
- 16 A detailed analysis of the ruling argued, however, that the Czech Constitutional Court's 'visible effort to find the Treaty [of Lisbon] compatible with the Constitution almost at all costs' meant that 'there is neither the will nor the force within the Court to render the Treaty ineffective' (Bríza, 2009: 164). On the Czech Court's role in reviewing the constitutionality of the Treaty of Lisbon, see also Šlosarčík (2010).
- 17 For a detailed discussion of the domestic politics surrounding ratification in the Czech Republic, see Keil and Maršić (2009); Maršić (2009); Rovna and Kasáková (2012).
- 18 Subsequent academic analysis of the Millward Brown IMS poll findings, commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs, confirmed the importance of these issues, especially the loss of a permanent Irish Commissioner and 'specific misperceptions in the areas of abortion, corporate taxation and conscription' (Sinnott *et al*, 2009: point 15). It also highlighted the contribution that low levels of knowledge about Europe and the Treaty of Lisbon had in people's decisions to abstain or vote 'no'.
- 19 For a more detailed discussion of this period, see Dinan (2009); Walsh (2012).
- 20 During the preparation of the mandate for the IGC in 2007 the German Council Presidency had made it clear that the move to a small Commission was part of a wider package deal on institutional reform. Revisiting the deal would have opened up a Pandora's box. So, in the interest of securing agreement on salvaging as much as possible of the Constitutional Treaty, interested member states desisted from raising the issue (Interviews: 1 July 2009; 2 July 2009).

- 21 As Kuijper (2009) points out, the Irish electorate would therefore be voting a second time on the basis of a European Council commitment – not a guarantee – to retain one Commissioner per member state. The necessary decision to revert to one Commissioner from each member state was adopted in September 2012 (see 8.8 in Chapter 8).
- 22 See the *Decision of the Heads of State and Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty of European Union (Official Journal, 1992)* which had been adopted at the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992 in order to pave the way for a second referendum on the TEU in Denmark.
- 23 The Presidency Conclusions make no reference to a protocol. However, during his press conference, Sarkozy, having chaired the European Council, reported that unanimous agreement had been reached on addressing Irish concerns via a protocol to Croatia's accession treaty. Sarkozy also referred to the protocol route in his report of the EP. See Sarkozy (2008b).
- 24 The idea of opting out of aspects of defence policy appears to have been dropped, in part at least, following analysis of the Danish experience of its defence opt-out. The 2007 Oireachtas report on *Ireland's Future in the European Union: Challenges, Issues and Options* noted that Denmark's defence and euro opt-outs had had 'a detrimental effect on Denmark's national interest' and that opt-outs could 'potentially mean Ireland losing its right to shape and influence key policy areas' (House of the Oireachtas, 2008: point 17). See also Buskjær Christensen and Manners (2008).
- 25 Early polls prompted speculation that the referendum might be held earlier, in June 2009. A major risk on bringing forward the timing of the referendum was, however, that the text of the 'guarantees' might not be ready in time.
- 26 On these concerns, see *Irish Times* (2009b); *European Voice* (2009b); *EU Observer* (2009b).
- 27 The UK government's concerns had been a sticking point in the discussions over the content of the declaration. See *Irish Times* (2009b); *European Voice* (2009b); *EU Observer* (2009b).
- 28 The Dutch, by contrast, appear to have been more concerned about the implications for further enlargement that linking the adoption of a protocol to an accession treaty would have. The Slovene government held a similar position. The linkage might give Croatia's membership prospects a boost at a time when Ljubljana was blocking accession negotiations over a border dispute with Zagreb (*Irish Times*, 2009e).
- 29 The full text of the Presidency conclusions went further: 'the Protocol will in no way alter the relationship between the EU and its Member States. The sole purpose of the Protocol will be to give full Treaty status to the clarifications set out in the Decision to meet the concerns of the Irish people. Its status will be no different from similar clarifications in Protocols obtained by other Member States. The Protocol will clarify but not change either the content or the application of the Treaty of Lisbon' (Council of the European Union, 2009b: 5 (v)).
- 30 For a discussion of the guarantees, see IIEA (2009), Barrett (2012).
- 31 For a discussion of the ruling, see Becker and Maurer (2009); Kiiver (2009); Thym (2009); Doukas (2009).

- 32 The drafting of the package was not without problems. MPs from the Christian Social Union, the Bavarian sister party of Merkel's CDU, sought unsuccessfully to include provisions allowing parliament to bind the government in EU decision-making (*Die Zeit*, 2009). The agreed package included provisions requiring parliamentary approval for moves from unanimity to a qualified majority for decision-making and the opening of accession and treaty change negotiations; increased information for and reporting to parliament; and improved federal government engagement with Länder governments (*EU Observer*, 2009c).
- 33 On the 2009 referendum, see also: Fitzgibbon (2010); Schünemann (2010); Sinnott and Elkink (2010); Tonra (2009).
- 34 Adding to the sense of pantomime surrounding when exactly Kaczyński would sign, the first pen he tried to use to sign the ratification act failed to work.
- 35 Media reports subsequently confirmed that the leader of the UK Conservatives, David Cameron, had written to Klaus in July 2009 drawing attention to the fact that if his party won the UK general election a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon would be held (see *EU Observer*, 2009d). The idea of Klaus delaying Czech ratification in the hope of a Conservative general election victory had been mooted the previous month (*Financial Times*, 2009a), by which time the Conservatives had already drawn up a draft referendum bill.
- 36 It was not just EU leaders who were frustrated by the process. Opposition social democrats in the Czech Republic considered seeking a suspension of Klaus' powers on the grounds that his persistent refusal to sign the ratification act was unconstitutional. See *EU Observer* (2009e).
- 37 For a discussion of the complaint, see Šlosarčík (2009).
- 38 See also Klaus' message to the British electorate that it should have been 'doing something really much earlier and not just ... saying something and waiting for my decision' (*BBC News*, 2009b).
- 39 There were also suggestions circulating that Klaus might delay any decision on whether to sign the ratification act until after the Czech elections in June 2010, the Constitutional Court having previously ruled the original September 2009 date invalid. See Emmanouilidis and Missiroli (2009).
- 40 See also *Financial Times* (2009b); *European Voice* (2009d).
- 41 It also caused some confusion since it was widely assumed that the Czech President has no constitutional power to negotiate international treaties. The Czech government duly considered seeking clarification from the Czech Constitutional Court. An amendment to the constitution, as well as the impeachment of Klaus, was also considered. See *The Times* (2009b).
- 42 The government's assertion that it had not known about Klaus' concerns at the time the Treaty of Lisbon negotiations was swiftly challenged by Klaus' aides (*České Noviny*, 2009). Certainly, as noted (see 4.3 in Chapter 4), the Czech focal point, Zahradil, expressed opposition to the Charter of Fundamental Rights being made legally binding. However, his concerns focused on its implications for national social security, healthcare and pension arrangements (see *EU Observer*, 2007e). Moreover, the Czech government does not appear to have pursued its concerns. When the agreement was reached in the IGC mandate on adopting a protocol limiting the

applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to national laws and practices, the Czech Republic was not among the two delegations that 'reserved their right to join in this Protocol'. These were Poland and Ireland. See 5.5 in Chapter 5, note 20.

- 43 On the Slovak and Hungarian positions, see *EU Observer* (2009i, 2009j, 2009k); *Financial Times* (2009c); *Czech News Agency* (2009).
- 44 The Hungarian government was responding to pressure from politically significant groups that had lost property when expelled from Czechoslovakia following the Beneš decrees. Budapest was therefore intent on ensuring that the rights of the expellees were neither weakened nor compromised through any reference in EU law to the decrees. The Austrian government was similarly minded, having been 'incensed' by Klaus' demand (*Financial Times*, 2009c; see also *Die Presse*, 2009). In Germany also the government came under pressure to oppose any move that might strengthen the legal standing of the Beneš decrees. However, according to Ludlow (2009), newly re-elected as Chancellor, Merkel was able to resist any pressure and became more of an ally of the Czech government in seeking a solution than an obstacle, although reports indicate that Germany did side with Austria at the European Council (see *European Voice*, 2009e).
- 45 A third post that was filled was that of Secretary-General of the Council, a position currently held by Solana but which would not be assumed by the new High Representative once the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. It was widely expected that Merkel's European policy adviser, Corsepius, who had been so influential in securing agreement on the mandate for the 2007 IGC, would be appointed. However, following ostensibly procedural objections from the UK government, it was agreed that the current Deputy Secretary-General of the Council, de Boissieu, would be appointed with Sarkozy indicating that Corsepius might take over following de Boissieu's anticipated retirement in June 2010. Clearly intent on securing the Secretary-General post for Corsepius, Merkel ensured that the question of who would succeed de Boissieu was addressed immediately. On 16 December 2009 the Council adopted a Decision appointing Corsepius Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union for the period from 26 June 2011 until 30 June 2015 (*Official Journal*, 2009).
- 46 Two days previously, on 25 November 2009, the parliament of the Åland Islands approved Finland's ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. Rejection would not have jeopardized the entry into force of the Treaty but would have placed the Åland Islands in an unprecedented situation: legally part of an EU member state (Finland), but a part of the member state to which application of the Treaty of Lisbon had been rejected. The anticipated consequence was the negotiation of a new status for the Åland Islands. See the sporadic discussion of the protracted ratification process on the Åland islands on <http://grahnlaw.blogspot.com/>.
- 47 The previous record for the shortest IGC was held by those convened on 3 February 1992 to amend the TECSC and TEAEC to reflect changes to the TEC resulting from the TEU. Their work was completed on 7 February when the TEU was signed. The IGC held on 23 June 2010 lasted no more than 15 minutes (*European Voice*, 2010). As one participant observed: 'blink and you would have missed it' (Interview: 29 June 2010).

- 48 Much commentary at the time the protocols were agreed assumed that they would be attached to the TEU and TFEU via the Croatia's Treaty of Accession. However, accession treaties may only contain 'the adjustments to the Treaties ... which ... admission entails' (Article 49 TEU).
- 49 The letter containing the request had attached to it a draft protocol reflecting the wording agreed by the European Council in June 2009 (see 8.5 in Chapter 8). The letter is reproduced in Council of the European Union (2012a).
- 50 The proposal for a protocol was carried by 586 votes in favour, with 26 against and 34 abstentions. MEPS voted 590 in favour with 20 against and 41 abstentions on the decision not to hold a convention. See *Irish Times* (2012).
- 51 The letter containing the request had attached to it a draft protocol reflecting the wording agreed by the European Council in October 2009 (see 8.5 in Chapter 8). The letter is reproduced in Council of the European Union (2012b).
- 52 Legal experts at one stage appeared divided on whether the European Council decision route could be taken. Some opined that the principle of a *reduced* sized Commission is enshrined in the TEU and that a European Council decision could only be used to alter the reduced size of the Commission further as the EU enlarges. On the legal debate, see Piris (2010: 227–8, footnote 24).

Chapter 9 The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of EU Treaty Reform

- 1 Greater optimism was shown by Emmanouilidis (2007a, 2007b), but he did not predict a detailed mandate. Others, who sought to predict an outcome based on preference data related to the Convention (König *et al*, 2007, 2008) fell wide of the mark, no doubt because debates had moved on.
- 2 Ziller (2008a) presents the treaty in colourful language, describing it somewhat romantically as a 'traité chrysalide' which allows the EU to move from the 'caterpillar' composed of the TEU and TEC to the 'butterfly' composed of the new TEU, the TFEU and the Charter of fundamental rights: 'Il s'agit d'un traité chrysalide, qui permet de passer de la chenille composée du traité UE et du traité CE au future papillon composée du TUE, du TFUE et de la Charte' (Ziller, 2008a: 109).
- 3 Ziller (2012) emphasizes the 'epistemic community of legal experts' whose role was 'fundamental in the negotiations which led to the Lisbon Treaty'. Not only did they demonstrate that it was legally feasible to take over the substance of what had been agreed in the 2003–2004 IGC in another treaty, but they were also effective 'in counteracting the cumulated effect of initiatives taken by governments and other stakeholders which were mainly driven by a short term fear of the electorate or by genuine euro-sceptic convictions'.
- 4 As already noted (see 6.1 in Chapter 6), Sarkozy was eager to establish himself as the inspiration for the Treaty of Lisbon. Following French parliamentary approval of the Treaty of Lisbon, he claimed: 'Ce traité simplifié,

c'est la France qui a pris l'initiative de le proposer pour sortir l'Europe de la crise institutionnelle dans laquelle elle se trouvait plongée.... Grâce à l'initiative française, grâce à l'Allemagne qui présidait alors l'Union et à la Chancelière Angela Merkel à laquelle je veux rendre hommage, l'Europe dispose maintenant du cadre qui lui est nécessaire pour se remettre en marche' (Sarkozy, 2008c). Various analyses of Sarkozy's European policy have seemingly taken Sarkozy at his word. Dimitrakopoulos *et al* (2009: 453–4), for example, argue that the European Council in June 2007 'paved the way for the adoption of a *simplified treaty* that focused on institutional reform in line with Sarkozy's campaign pledge' (emphasis added). For a more perceptive and critical French observer, it was more the case that Sarkozy had 'kidnapped the treaty' (Autret, 2008).

- 5 On the former, see Corbett (1993); on the latter, see the comments of Pierre Pescatore, one of the drafters of the Treaty of Rome, in Melchionni and Ducci (2007: 84) and Pescatore (1981: 165).
- 6 A further procedural change concerns the decision to launch formal consideration of amendments to the treaties. Traditionally the formal decision to call an IGC has been the responsibility of the Council. Post-Lisbon, the decision to convene the Convention is taken by the European Council.
- 7 The Treaty of Lisbon also increased the number of provision-specific simplified revision procedures to be found in the TEU and TFEU from five to 12 (see Piris, 2010: 361–2). These procedures provide for treaty revision without recourse to an IGC. The seven procedures introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon concern: Article 82(2)(d) TFEU, enabling the Council to identify other aspects of criminal procedure for which minimum EU rules may be established; Article 83(1) TFEU, enabling the Council to extend the list of crimes which may be subject to minimum EU rules; Article 86(4) TFEU, enabling the European Council to extend the powers of the European Public Prosecutors Office; Article 355(6) TFEU, enabling the amendment of the status, with regard to the Union, of a certain Danish, French and Netherlands country or territory; Article 98 TFEU, enabling the repeal of the provision (i.e. Article 98 TFEU) allowing specific transport measures to be taken with respect to areas of Germany affected by the its division; Article 107(2)(c) TFEU, enabling repeal of the provision (i.e. Article 107(2)(c) TFEU) allowing aid to be granted to the economy of certain areas of Germany affected by the division; Article 300(5) TFEU, enabling the review the nature of the composition of the Committee of the Regions and of the Economic and Social Committee.
- 8 On the Decision, see Barrett (2011) and de Witte (2011).
- 9 Van Rompuy, did, however, suggest that an alternative route existed for introducing provisions relating to excessive deficits. Article 126 (14) TFEU provides for the replacement of the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure by a unanimous Council vote (see *EU Observer*, 2011a, 2011b).
- 10 The Czech Republic joined the UK in not signing.

References

- Abaquesne de Parfouru, A. (2008) “‘See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil’: The Irish Referendum and Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty”, *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law*, 15 (4), 493–515
- Action Committee for European Democracy (2007) *A New Treaty and Supplementary Protocols*, 4 June (www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/RobertSchumanCentre/Research/ArchivesInstitutionsGovernanceDemocracy/ACED/BrusselsConf2007.aspx)
- Agence Europe* (2006) ‘Angela Merkel calls on Heads of State and Government to appoint sherpas’, 15 December, p. 6
- Agence Europe* (2007a) ‘Jo Leinen proposes “fundamental treaty” (with 70 articles), a “treaty on the EU’s policies” and three protocols’, 11 May, p. 3
- Agence Europe* (2007b) ‘Meeting of 18 countries which have ratified constitutional treaty (plus Portugal and Ireland) – Angela Merkel wants current text to be used as basis – Ségolène Royal backs new French referendum’, 18 January, p. 8
- Agence Europe* (2007c) ‘German Presidency to propose keeping the substance of the current text, says Steinmeier – criticism of use of “sherpas” – calls for a “treaty plus”’, 24 January, p. 5
- Agence Europe* (2007d) “‘Berlin Declaration” sticks to June 2009 Deadline for entry into force of new treaty but Warsaw and Prague express doubts – Angela Merkel affirms, “we want discussions in June”, which could lead to IGC in second half of 2007’, 27 March, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2007e) ‘Positive developments towards agreement on new European treaty, but difficulties and reservations remain’, 18 April, pp. 3–4
- Agence Europe* (2007f) ‘Jean-Claude Juncker speaks out – at times forcefully – on the new European treaty envisaged and the situation and prospects of the euro’, 20 April, p. 3
- Agence Europe* (2007g) ‘Berlin Declaration is ready to be signed on Sunday after Prague lifts reservations on Friday – aim of three institutions is to renew collective commitment to Union by 2009’, 24 March, pp. 3–4
- Agence Europe* (2007h) ‘United Kingdom and Netherlands on same wavelength in thinking “Union does not need a Constitution” – Blair says simple amended treaty would not require a referendum’, 18 April, p. 5
- Agence Europe* (2007i) ‘The constitutional debate is resumed in France – significant contributions’, 27 January, pp. 3–4
- Agence Europe* (2007j) ‘Czech Republic does not want “European Foreign Minister” – refuses any “quasi-constitutional symbolism”’, 5 April, p. 3
- Agence Europe* (2007k) ‘Angela Merkel begins consultations win preparation for June European Council – Meeting with Vaclav Klaus on Tuesday’, 17 April, pp. 4–5
- Agence Europe* (2007l) ‘Warsaw in no hurry to resolve institutional problem – President Kaczyński in favour of re-worked treaty’, 23 February, p. 3

- Agence Europe* (2007m) 'Warsaw comes out against double majority voting – Poland to submit views to Angela Merkel on 16 March', 6 March, p. 6
- Agence Europe* (2007n) 'Angela Merkel in favour of reference to Christianity', 2 March, p. 3
- Agence Europe* (2007o) 'Warsaw to sign Berlin Declaration – Commissioner Wallström supports energy solidarity clause in future treaty', 20 March, p. 5
- Agence Europe* (2007p) 'Poland does not support "double majority" and considers EU can work with Nice Treaty – Jacques Chirac expresses regret', 10 March, p. 11
- Agence Europe* (2007q) 'Poland sets out its position on future treaty', 11 May, p. 3
- Agence Europe* (2007r) 'Tony Blair wants June European Council to agree on key elements of future treaty – no referendum in United Kingdom', 21 April, p. 3
- Agence Europe* (2007s) 'Sarkozy and Barroso say compromise is in reach on idea of a simplified treaty – Paris' tone toughens on Doha round – French initiative for "economic government"', 25 May, pp. 4–5
- Agence Europe* (2007t) 'Prodi and Adamkus don't want treaty on the cheap – Barroso calls on London and Warsaw to compromise', 13 June, p. 5
- Agence Europe* (2007u) 'National and European Parliamentarians make joint appeal for substance of Constitutional Treaty to be maintained strengthening subsidiarity and watchdog role for national parliaments', 13 June, pp. 6–7
- Agence Europe* (2007v) 'Poland, largely isolated, continues to oppose double majority – Merkel insists on "exhaustive" mandate for IGC', 19 June, p. 5
- Agence Europe* (2007w) 'German Presidency proposes "Treaty on Functioning of EU" and "Treaty on European Union"', 16 June, p. 6
- Agence Europe* (2007x) 'Warsaw more flexible but still demanding Council voting mechanism is on IGC agenda', 20 June, p. 5
- Agence Europe* (2007y) 'IGC launched on rather optimistic note – Poland's demands for "clarifications" will be tackled at technical level and then possibly become political issue', 24 July, pp. 4–5
- Agence Europe* (2007z) '25 against two on double majority, says Presidency, but failure cannot be ruled out', 21 June, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2007aa) 'Support from EPP, PES and ALDE group leaders for presidency text – Polish and British demands in line of sight', 22 June, pp. 3–4
- Agence Europe* (2007bb) 'Difficult negotiations and uncertainties about negotiating brief for IGC – postponement of double majority to 2014?', 23 June, pp. 4–5
- Agence Europe* (2007cc) 'Agreement on IGC mandate for finalising and adopting new Union treaty', 24 June, pp. 3–6
- Agence Europe* (2007dd) 'Jacek Saryusz-Wolski hopes to refer debate on voting system back to IGC', 23 June, p. 6
- Agence Europe* (2007ee) 'Formation of new Euro-sceptical grouping, opposed to EU treaty within Polish government', 18 July, p. 5
- Agence Europe* (2007ff) 'After two days of trouble-free work in draft treaty, legal experts suspend work until 29 August', 27 July, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2007gg) 'Future Treaty, Kosovo, relations with Russia and Middle East on this weekend's informal meeting agenda', 5 September, p. 5
- Agence Europe* (2007hh) 'Seat distribution at European Parliament risks further complicating IGC conclusion', 7 September, p. 3

- Agence Europe* (2007ii) 'José Manuel Barroso and Anibal Cavaco Silva want a "Treaty of Lisbon"', 7 September, p. 3
- Agence Europe* (2007jj) "'Determined" to conclude IGC in October but certain demands and polish elections leave room for doubt', 11 September, p. 5
- Agence Europe* (2007kk) 'Mr Duff, Mr Brok and Mr Barón Crespo concerned at proposals on data protection included in revised draft treaty', 27 September, p. 6
- Agence Europe* (2007ll) 'Legal experts to complete their work – it is now up to Ministers and Heads of State', 19 September, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2007mm) 'Pleased with having defined issues pending, Presidency thinking about concluding IGC this week in Lisbon', 16 October, pp. 4–5
- Agence Europe* (2007nn) 'Czech Republic wants to limit right of Commission's initiative', 17 October, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2007oo) 'Warsaw wants to include Ioannina compromise in treaty protocol', 10 October, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2007pp) 'European Parliament still has concerns and several demands', 18 October, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2007qq) 'Presidency and Commission optimistic about treaty approval – several problems to settle', 18 October, p. 3
- Agence Europe* (2007rr) 'Difficult discussions on treaty opened – Warsaw threatens to block – Austrian problem resolved', 19 October, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2007ss) "'Lisbon Treaty" approved to everybody's satisfaction – having overcome its institutional crisis, EU can now "concentrate on its real priorities", say Presidency and Commission', 20 October, pp. 4–6
- Agence Europe* (2007tt) 'New government will opt out of derogations from charter of fundamental rights negotiated by Kaczyński', 23 October, p. 5
- Agence Europe* (2007uu) 'Donald Tusk and José Manuel Barroso welcome new "climate of confidence and cooperation" between Warsaw and Brussels', 5 December, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2007vv) 'Lisbon Treaty is signed in atmosphere of relief and determination – call for swift ratification', 14 December, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2007ww) 'Dutch referendum very unlikely – Warsaw does for opt-out on charter – Prague concerned about ratification', 15 September, p. 5
- Agence Europe* (2008a) 'Situation becomes complicated in Poland, in Czech Republic and in Germany', 2 July, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2008b) 'EU unanimously calls for continued ratification process – solution to Irish "no" to be discussed at October summit, possible on basis of proposal from Dublin', 21 June, p. 4
- Agence Europe* (2008c) 'Coreper starts preparing vital decisions for effective application of new treaty in 2009', 23 January, p. 3
- Agence France Presse* (2006) 'New EU presidency promises constitution "road map"', 18 January
- Agence France Presse* (2007) 'Czech pundit says "opportunism" prevents Greens from promoting EU priorities', 18 May
- Amato, G., Bribosia, H. and de Witte, B. (eds) (2007) *Genèse et destinée de la Constitution européenne/Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution* (Bruxelles: Bruylant)
- Austrian Council Presidency (2006a) *The Sound of Europe – 26–28 January 2006*, Salzburg (www.eu2006.at/en/The_Council_Presidency/Conference_The_Sound_of_Europe/index.html)

- Austrian Council Presidency (2006b) *Plassnik: First Building Blocks for New Consensus on Future of EU*, Press Release, 28 May (www.eu2006.at/en/News/Press_Releases/May/2805plassnik.html)
- Auswärtiges Amt (2012) *Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain*, Berlin, 17 September (www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/626322/publicationFile/171844/120918-Abschlussbericht-Zukunftsgruppe.pdf)
- Autret, F. (2008) *Sarkozy à Bruxelles* (Paris: Seuil)
- Barcz, J. (2008) 'Poland', in Koeck, H.F. and Karollus, M.M. (eds) *Preparing the European Union for the Future? Necessary Revisions of Primary Law After the Non-Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), pp. 281–312
- Barnard, C. (2008) 'The "Opt-Out" of the UK and Poland from the Charter of Fundamental Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?', in Griller, S. and Ziller, J. *The Treaty of Lisbon: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty?* (Wien: Springer), pp. 277–83
- Barrett, G. (2009) 'Building a Swiss Chalet in an Irish Legal Landscape? Referendums on European Union Treaties in Ireland and the Impact of Supreme Court Jurisprudence', *European Constitutional Law Review*, 5 (1), 32–71
- Barrett, G. (2011) *First Amendment? The Treaty Change to Facilitate the European Stability Mechanism* (Dublin: Institute of International and European Affairs)
- Barrett, G. (2012) 'A Rough Passage: Lessons from the Experience of the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Making of the EU's Lisbon Treaty: The Role of Member States* (Bern: Peter Lang), pp. 273–95
- Barroso, J.M. (2006) *Speech to the European Parliament prior to the European Council of 15 and 16 June 2006*, Speech/06/373, Strasbourg, 14 June
- Bayrou, F. (2007) *Un texte simple et lisible comme nouvelle Constitution européenne*, Strasbourg, 12 February (www.bayrou.fr/opencms/opencms/discours/bayrou-strasbourg-120207.html)
- BBC News (2006) 'Finns predict new EU constitution', 29 June (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5128786.stm>)
- BBC News (2008) 'UK to press ahead with EU Treaty', 13 June (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7453084.stm)
- BBC News (2009a) 'Klaus scorns senators over Lisbon', 7 May (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8037441.stm>)
- BBC News (2009b) 'Will Czechs disappoint Tories?', 3 October (www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/2009/10/will_czechs_disappoint_tories.html)
- BBC News (2009c) 'Czech president's new treaty snag', 8 October (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8297757.stm>)
- BBC News (2009d) 'EU reform treaty passes last test', 3 November (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8340664.stm>)
- Beach, D. (2004) 'The Unseen Hand in Treaty Reform Negotiations: The Role and Influence of the Council Secretariat', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11 (3), 408–39
- Beach, D. (2005) *The Dynamics of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave)
- Beach, D. (2007a) 'The European Parliament in the 2000 IGC and the Constitutional Treaty Negotiations: From Loser to Winner', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14 (8), 1271–92

- Beach, D. (2007b) 'Oiling the Wheels of Compromise: The Council Secretariat in the 1996–97 and 2003–04 IGCs', in Beach, D. and Mazzucelli, C. (eds) *Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 76–93
- Becker, P. and Maurer, A. (2009) 'Deutsche Integrationsbremsen: Folgen und Gerfahren des Karlsruher Urteils für Deutschland und die EU', *SWP Aktuell*, 41, Berlin, July (www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2009A41_bkr_mrr_ks.pdf)
- Berman, P. (2012) 'From Laeken to Lisbon: The Origins and Negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty', in Biondi, A. *et al* (eds) *EU Law after Lisbon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 3–40
- Biering, P. (2008) 'Denmark', in Koeck, H.F. and Karollus, M.M. (eds) *Preparing the European Union for the Future? Necessary Revisions of Primary Law After the Non-Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), pp. 69–79
- Bindi, F. and Gianniti, L. (2012) 'Italy and the Making of the Lisbon Treaty', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Making of the EU's Lisbon Treaty: The Role of Member States* (Bern: Peter Lang), pp. 123–41
- Blair, A. (2012) 'Britain and the Negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Making of the EU's Lisbon Treaty: The Role of Member States* (Bern: Peter Lang), pp. 97–121
- Blair, T. (2010) *The Journey* (London: Hutchinson)
- Blanchet, T. (2011) 'The Treaty of Lisbon: A Story in History or the Making of a Treaty', *Fordham International Law Journal*, 34 (5), 1217–50
- Bonde, J-P. (2008) *From EU Constitution to Lisbon Treaty* (Brussels: Foundation for EU Democracy)
- Bříza, P. (2009) 'The Czech Republic: The Constitution Court on the Lisbon Treaty Decision of 26 November 2008', *European Constitutional Law Review*, 5 (1), 143–64
- Brown, T. (2010) 'Saying No'. *An Analysis of the Irish Opposition to the Lisbon Treaty* (Dublin: Institute of International and European Affairs) (www.iiea.com/documents/saying-no)
- Brown, T. (ed.) (2008) *Lisbon: What the Reform Treaty Means* (Dublin: Institute of International and European Affairs)
- Brunkhorst, H. (2006) 'The Legitimation Crisis of the European Union', *Constellations*, 13 (2), 165–80
- Bulmer, S. (2010) 'Germany: From Launching the Constitutional Debate to Salvaging the Treaty', in Carbone, M. (ed.) *National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 51–70
- Bundesregierung (2006a) *Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und Ministerpräsident: Balkenende Deutsch-niederländisches Verhältnis und europapolitische Themen – The Hague*, 28 October (<http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Pressekonferenzen/2006/10/2006-10-28-pressekonferenz-merkel-balkenende.html?nn=486326>)
- Bundesregierung (2006b) *Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und Ministerpräsident Rasmussen am 19. Dezember 2006 in Dänemark* (<http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Pressekonferenzen/2006/12/2006-12-19-bkin-mp-rasmussen.html?nn=486326>)

- Bundesregierung (2007a) *Regierungspressekonferenz vom 3. Januar* (<http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Pressekonferenzen/2007/01/2007-01-03-regpk.html?nn=486326>)
- Bundesregierung (2007b) *Pressebegegnung von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und dem Ministerpräsidenten des Königreichs der Niederlande, Jan Peter Balkenende, am 2. März 2007 in Berlin* (<http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Pressekonferenzen/2007/03/2007-03-02-pk-merkel-balkenende.html?nn=486326>)
- Bursens, P. and Crum, B. (2010) 'The Benelux Countries: How Politicization Upset a Pro-Integration Coalition', in Carbone, M. (ed.) *National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 144–63
- Buskjær Christensen, M. and Manners, I. (2008) 'The Irish Opt Outs from the Lisbon Treaty? Lessons of the Danish Experience', *DIIS Brief*, Copenhagen, December (www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2008/B08_The_Irish_Opt_Outs_from_the_Lisbon_Treaty.pdf)
- Carbone, M. (2009) 'From Paris to Dublin: Domestic Politics and the Treaty of Lisbon', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 5 (1), 43–60
- Carbone, M. (ed.) (2010a) *National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar)
- CDU/CSU/SPD (2005) *Gemeinsam für Deutschland – Mit Mut und Menschlichkeit: Koalitionsvertrag von CDU, CSU und SPD*, Berlin, 11 November (www.cdusu.de/upload/koavertrag0509.pdf)
- České Noviny (2009) 'Czech govt knew about Klaus's objections to treaty – secretary', 11 October (via www.ceskenoviny.cz)
- Chalmers, D. (2007) 'The Death of European Constitutionalism and the Renaissance of European Liberal Democracy', *European Law Review*, 32 (4), 441–2
- Chirac, J. (2006) *New Year Greetings to the Diplomatic Corps*, Speech, 10 January (www.ambafrance-uk.org/New-Year-greetings-to-the.html)
- Christiansen, T. (2002) 'The Roles of Supranational Actors in EU Treaty Reform', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9 (1), 33–53
- Christiansen, T., Falkner, G. and Jørgensen, K.E. (2002) 'Theorizing EU Treaty Reform: Beyond Diplomacy and Bargaining', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9 (1), 12–32
- Christiansen, T. and Reh, C. (2009) *Constitutionalizing the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan)
- Church, C.H. and Phinnemore, D. (2006) *Understanding the European Constitution: An Introduction to the EU Constitutional Treaty* (London: Routledge)
- Church, C.H. and Phinnemore, D. (2008) *Shackled by the Mandate: Negotiating and Ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon* (unpublished manuscript)
- Cichocki, M.A. (2007a) 'The German EU Presidency – The Polish Point of View', *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, 8 (21), 55–60 (www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue21.pdf)
- Cichocki, M.A. (ed.) (2007b) 'Reform of the European Union – The Polish Perspective', *Forum Natolińskie*, 1 (9) (www.natolin.edu.pl/pdf/FN/FN_1_2007_EUConst_PL_view.pdf)
- Cichocki, M.A. and Ośniecka-Tamecka, E. (2010) 'Conclusions: The System of Equal Influence of the Citizens in the EU – The Polish Proposal Submitted

- During the 2007 Reform Treaty Negotiations', in Cichocki, M.A. and Życzkowski, K. (eds) *Institutional Design and Voting Power in the European Union* (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 283–92
- Claes, M.L.H.K., de Visser, M.C.B.F., Leenknecht, G. and Senden, L.A.J. (2008) 'The Netherlands', in Koeck, H.F. and Karollus, M.M. (eds) (2008) *Preparing the European Union for the Future? Necessary Revisions of Primary Law After the Non-Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), pp. 243–80
- Cohn-Bendit, D. and Verhofstadt, G. (2012) *For Europe* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag)
- Committee of the Regions (2007) *Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on Relaunching the Process of Reforming the European Union in Anticipation of the European Council of 21 and 22 June 2007*, CONST-IV-011, Brussels, 6–7 June
- Common Market Law Review* (2008) 'Editorial Comments: "Protocology"', 46 (6), 1785–93
- Conférence des représentants des gouvernements des états membres (2007a) *CIG 2007: Projet de traité modifiant le traité sur l'Union européenne et le traité instituant la Communauté européenne*, CIG 1/07, 23 July
- Conférence des représentants des gouvernements des états membres (2007b) *CIG 2007: Projet de traité modifiant le traité sur l'Union européenne et le traité instituant la Communauté européenne – Protocoles*, CIG 2/07, 23 July
- Conférence des représentants des gouvernements des états membres (2007c) *CIG 2007: Projet de déclarations*, CIG 3/07, 23 July
- Conférence des représentants des gouvernements des états membres (2007d) *CIG 2007: Lettre du Comité des Régions, en date du 28 août 2007*, CIG 1207, 3 September
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2000) *IGC 2000: Weighting of votes in the Council*, CONFER 4797/00, Brussels, 9 November
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007a) *IGC 2007: Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community*, CIG 1/07, Brussels, 23 July
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007b) *IGC 2007: Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community – Protocols*, CIG 2/07, Brussels, 23 July
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007c) *IGC 2007: Draft Declarations*, CIG 3/07, Brussels, 23 July
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007d) *IGC 2007: Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community – Draft Preamble*, CIG 4/07, Brussels, 24 July
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007e) *IGC 2007: Letter from the European Economic and Social Committee, dated 3 October 2007*, CIG 13/07, Brussels, 11 October
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007f) *IGC 2007: Letter from the European Data Protection Supervisor, dated 23 July 2007*, CIG 9/07, Brussels, 3 September

- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007g) *IGC 2007: Statement by Ms. Anna E. Fotyga, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of the opening of the Intergovernmental Conference*, CIG 5/07, Brussels, 25 July
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007h) *IGC 2007: Indicative and forward timetable of the Working Group of Legal Experts*, CIG 6/07, Brussels, 24 July
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007i) *IGC 2007: Letter from the European Central Bank, dated 2 August 2007*, CIG 10/07, Brussels, 3 September
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007j) *IGC 2007: Letter from the European Court of Auditors, dated 16 July 2007*, CIG 8/07, Brussels, 3 September
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007k) *IGC 2007: Letter from the European Court of Auditors, dated 10 August 2007*, CIG 11/07, Brussels, 3 September
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007l) *IGC 2007: Draft Declarations*, CIG 3/1/07 REV 1, Brussels, 5 October
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007m) *IGC 2007: Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community*, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, Brussels, 5 October
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007n) *IGC 2007: Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community – Protocols*, CIG 2/1/07 REV 1, Brussels, 5 October
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007o) *IGC 2007: Draft Declarations*, CIG 3/1/07 REV 1, COR 1, Brussels, 12 October
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007p) *IGC 2007 Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community*, CIG 1/1/07, REV 1, COR 1, Brussels, 22 October
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007q) *IGC 2007: Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community – Protocol s*, CIG 2/1/07, REV1|COR2, Brussels, 22 October
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007r) *IGC 2007: Draft Declarations*, CIG 3/1/07, REV 1|COR2, Brussels, 22 October
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007s) *Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community*, CIG 14/07, Brussels, 3 December
- Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2012) *Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon*, CIG 1/12, Brussels, 14 May
- Corbett, R. (1993) *The Treaty of Maastricht: From Conception to Ratification: A Comprehensive Reference Guide* (Harlow: Longman)

- Corthaut, T. (2008) 'Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose? A Comparison with the Constitutional Treaty', *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law*, 15 (1), 21–34
- Council of the European Union (1999) *Helsinki European Council: Presidency Conclusions*, 00300/1/99, Brussels, 11 December
- Council of the European Union (2005a) *Brussels European Council – 16 and 17 June 2005: Presidency Conclusions*, 10255/1/05 REV1 CONCL2, Brussels, 15 July
- Council of the European Union (2005b) *Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union on the Ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (European Council, 16 and 17 June 2005)*, SN 117/05, Brussels, 18 June
- Council of the European Union (2005c) *Interim Report on the national debates during the reflection period on the future of Europe*, 15576/05, POLGEN 46, INF 200, Brussels, 12 December
- Council of the European Union (2005d) *Brussels European Council – 15/16 December 2005: Presidency Conclusions*, 15914/05 CONCL3, Brussels, 17 December
- Council of the European Union (2005e) *Operational Programme of the Council for 2006 submitted by the incoming Austrian and Finnish Presidencies*, 16065/05, POLGEN 51, Brussels, 22 December
- Council of the European Union (2006a) *Evaluation report on Member States' activities during the reflection period – questionnaire*, 6199/06 LIMITE, INF 33, Brussels, 9 February
- Council of the European Union (2006b) *Report on Member States' information and communication activities during the reflection period*, 9701/1/06 REV 1, INF 105, POLGEN 67, Brussels, 24 May
- Council of the European Union (2006c) *Brussels European Council – 15/16 June 2006: Presidency Conclusions*, 10633/1/06 REV 1 CONCL 1, Brussels, 17 July
- Council of the European Union (2006d) *18-month Programme of the German, Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies*, 17079/06 (POLGEN 125), 21 December
- Council of the European Union (2007a) *Report from the Presidency to the European Council: Pursuing the Treaty Reform Process*, 10659/07, POLGEN 67, Brussels, 14 June
- Council of the European Union (2007b) *Brussels European Council – 14/15 December 2006: Presidency Conclusions*, 16879/1/06 REV 1, Brussels, 12 February
- Council of the European Union (2007c) *Pursuing the treaty reform process*, 10837/07, POLGEN 69, Brussels, 14 June
- Council of the European Union (2007d) *2808th Council Meeting: General Affairs and External Relations – General Affairs, Luxembourg, 17–18 June 2007*, 10654/07 (Presse 137), Brussels, 18 June
- Council of the European Union (2007e) *Draft IGC Mandate*, SN 3116/2/07 REV 2, Brussels, 19 June
- Council of the European Union (2007f) *IGC Mandate*, 11218/07 (POLGEN 74), Brussels, 26 June
- Council of the European Union (2007g) *Presidency Conclusions – Brussels, 21/22 June 2007*, 11177/07 REV 1 (CONCL 2), Brussels 20 July

- Council of the European Union (2007h) *Draft IGC Mandate*, 11177/07, Brussels, 22 June
- Council of the European Union (2007i) *Brussels European Council – 21/22 June 2007 – Presidency Conclusions – Corrigendum to Cover Note*, 11177/07 COR 1 CONCL 2, Brussels, 25 June
- Council of the European Union (2007j) *Brussels European Council – 21/22 June 2007 – Presidency Conclusions – Corrigendum to Cover Note*, 11177/07 COR 1 REV 1 CONCL 2, Brussels, 26 June
- Council of the European Union (2007k) *Brussels European Council – 21/22 June 2007 – Presidency Conclusions*, 11177/07 COR 1 REV 1 (CONCL 2), Brussels, 26 June
- Council of the European Union (2007l) *IGC Mandate*, 11177/07 REV 1 (CONCL 2), Brussels, 20 July
- Council of the European Union (2007m) *Amendment of the Treaties on which the Union is founded*, 11222/07 (POLGEN 75), Brussels, 26 June
- Council of the European Union (2007n) *Treaty reform process*, 11216/07 POLGEN 73, Brussels, 26 June
- Council of the European Union (2007o) *Council's opinion in favour of convening an Intergovernmental Conference under Article 48 of the TEU*, 11597/07 (POLGEN 81), Brussels, 11 July
- Council of the European Union (2007p) *2815th Council Meeting: Agriculture and Fisheries – Brussels, 16 July 2007*, 11680/07 (Presse 167), Brussels, 16 July
- Council of the European Union (2007q) *Convening of an Intergovernmental Conference*, 12004/07 (POLGEN 92), Brussels, 18 July
- Council of the European Union (2007r) *2816th Council Meeting: General Affairs and External Relations – General Affairs, Brussels 23 July 2007*, 11911/07 (Presse 170), Brussels, 23 July
- Council of the European Union (2008a) *Brussels European Council – 14 December 2007 – Presidency Conclusions*, 16616/1/07 1 REV 1 (CONCL 3), Brussels, 14 February
- Council of the European Union (2008b) *Brussels European Council – 19/20 June 2008 – Presidency Conclusions*, 11018/1/08 1 REV 1 CONCL 2, Brussels, 17 July
- Council of the European Union (2008c) *Brussels European Council – 15 and 16 October 2008 – Presidency Conclusions*, 14368/08 CONCL 4, Brussels, 16 October
- Council of the European Union (2009a) *Brussels European Council – 11 and 12 December 2008 – Presidency Conclusions*, 17271/1/08 REV 1 CONCL 5, Brussels, 13 February
- Council of the European Union (2009b) *Brussels European Council – 18/19 June 2009 – Presidency Conclusions*, 11225/2/09, REV 2, CONCL 2, Brussels, 10 July
- Council of the European Union (2009c) *Brussels European Council – 29/30 October 2009 – Presidency Conclusions*, 15265/09, CONCL 3, Brussels, 20 October
- Council of the European Union (2009d) *Informal Meeting of EU Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 19 November 2009 – Press Release*, Brussels, 19 November
- Council of the European Union (2009e) *Revision of the Treaties – Transitional measures concerning the composition of the European Parliament*, 17196/09, POLGEN 232, Brussels, 4 December

- Council of the European Union (2012a) *Amendment of the Treaties – Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon*, 13181/11, CO EUR-PREP 32, POLGEN 127, INST 378, Brussels, 2 September
- Council of the European Union (2012b) *Amendment of the Treaties – Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the Czech Republic*, 13840/11, CO EUR-PREP 33, POLGE N 133, INST 400, Brussels, 6 September
- Craig, P. (2008a) 'The Detailed Mandate and the Future Methods of Interpretation of the Treaties', in Pernice, I. and Tanchev, E. (eds) *Ceci N'est Pas Une Constitution- Constitutionalisation Without a Constitution?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), pp. 86–98
- Craig, P. (2008b) 'The Treaty of Lisbon: Process, Architecture and Substance', *European Law Review*, 33 (2), 137–66
- Craig, P. (2010) *The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
- Crossick, S. (2006) 'A Three-Pronged Approach to Saving the Constitution', *European Voice*, 24 May, 17
- Crum, B. (2007a) 'Can the EU Presidency Make Its Mark on Interstate Bargains? The Italian and Irish Presidencies of the 2003–04 IGC', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14 (8), 1208–26
- Crum, B. (2007b) 'The EU Presidency – Comparing the Italian and Irish Presidencies of the 2003–04 Intergovernmental Conference', in Beach, D. and Mazzucelli, C. (eds) *Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 58–75
- Crum, B. (2008) 'The EU Constitutional Process: A Failure of Political Representation?', *RECON Online Working Paper*, 2008/08 (via www.reconproject.eu)
- Crum, B. (2012) *Learning from the EU Constitutional Treaty: Democratic Constitutionalization Beyond the Nation-State* (London: Routledge)
- Curtin, D. (2007) 'EU Reform Treaty: The Rhetoric of Transparency and Public Debate in the EU', *Statewatch Bulletin*, 17 (3–4) (<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/feb/07lisbon-curtin.htm>)
- Czech News Agency (2007a) 'Czechs might end up isolated as EU constitution opponents', 2 January
- Czech News Agency (2007b) 'Czech Republic not definitely against EU constitution – Deputy PM', 30 January
- Czech News Agency (2007c) 'Germany informally talks to Czech EU constitution negotiators', 16 April
- Czech News Agency (2007d) 'Czech Reps have talks about EU institutional reform', 27 April
- Czech News Agency (2007e) 'Czechs want "red card" included in new EU constitutional treaty', 9 May
- Czech News Agency (2007f) 'Czechs will support Polish demand for EU votes redistribution MEP', 17 May
- Czech News Agency (2009) 'Beneš decrees not in Klaus's opt-out', 27 October
- D'Alema, M. (2007) *Oxford – Europe at 50: Lessons and Visions for European Integration*, Speech, Oxford, 8 May (www.massimodalema.it/documenti/dett_dalema.asp?id_doc=2093)

- Daily Mail* (2007) 'EU treaty "96 per cent identical" to dropped constitution', 25 July 2007 (www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-470630/EU-treaty-96-cent-identical-dropped-constitution.html)
- Daily Telegraph* (2005) "'Time is ripe" for reviving constitution, say Britain's EU partners', 20 December (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1505943/Time-is-ripe-for-reviving-constitution-say-Britains-EU-partners.html)
- Daily Telegraph* (2006) 'EU constitution is dead, says Dutch minister', 12 January 2006 (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/1507646/EU-constitution-is-dead-says-Dutch-minister.html)
- Daily Telegraph* (2007a) 'Eight out of 10 "want a vote on EU treaty"', 20 August (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1560760/Eight-out-of-10-want-a-vote-on-EU-treaty.html)
- Daily Telegraph* (2007b) 'Brown faces Labour revolt over EU referendum', 23 August (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1561160/Brown-faces-Labour-revolt-over-EU-referendum.html)
- Daily Telegraph* (2007c) 'Gordon Brown dithers over EU treaty', 14 December (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/1572494/Gordon-Brown-dithers-over-EU-treaty.html)
- de Búrca, G. (2006) 'The European Constitution Project after the Referenda', *Constellations*, 13 (2), 205–17
- de Búrca, G. (2008) 'The EU on the Road from the Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty', *Jean Monnet Working Paper*, 03/08 (<http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/08/080301.pdf>)
- de Witte, B. (2011) 'The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability Mechanism', *European Policy Analysis*, No. 6, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Stockholm, June (<http://www.sieps.se/en/publikationer/the-european-treaty-amendment-for-the-creation-of-a-financial-stability-mechanism-20116epa>)
- Deloche-Gaudez, F. (2004) 'Le secrétariat de la Convention européenne: un acteur influent?', *Politique européenne*, 13, 43–67
- Department of Foreign Affairs (2008) *The EU Reform Treaty, Lisbon, December 2007 – White Paper*, Dublin, April (www.irishtimes.com/focus/thelisbon-treaty/referenduminformation/bill/whitepaper.pdf)
- Der Spiegel* (2007a) 'Merkel's European vision: Berlin pushes for a different kind of constitution', 23 April (www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,478852,00.html)
- Der Spiegel* (2007b) 'Poland might play along after all', 14 June (www.spiegel.de/international/europe/warsaw-under-pressure-ahead-of-eu-summit-poland-might-play-along-after-all-a-488566.html)
- Der Standard* (2007) 'Starker Druck auf die EU-Reformkritiker', 8 September (via www.derstandard.de)
- Der Tagesspiegel* (2007) 'EU Gipfel: Polens Regierungschef in der Kritik', 23 June (www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/international/eu-gipfel-polens-regierungschef-in-der-kritik/966992.html)
- Deutsche Welle* (2006) 'German aims to revive European Constitution', 25 September
- Deutsche Welle* (2007) 'Hard bargaining leads to success at EU Treaty Summit in Lisbon', 19 October (via www.www.de-world.de)

- Die Presse* (2006a) 'EU: "Nein zu neuem Verfassungstext"', 16 January (via www.diepresse.at)
- Die Presse* (2006b) 'Verfassungsvertrag: "So gut wie tot"', 19 January (via www.diepresse.at)
- Die Presse* (2006c) 'Nächster Anlauf für EU-Verfassung', 29 May (via www.diepresse.at)
- Die Presse* (2009) 'Vertrag: Faymann gegen Klaus-Forderungen', 15 October (via www.diepresse.at)
- Die Welt* (2007) 'Sarkozy-Vertrauter will Vertrag statt Verfassung für Europa', 9 February
- Die Zeit* (2006) 'Dieses Land ist versklavt worden', 8 June (www.zeit.de/2006/24/Prodi-Interview)
- Die Zeit* (2007) 'Verfassungskrise: Prodi will Europa der zwei Geschwindigkeiten', 22 May (www.zeit.de/news/artikel/2007/05/22/103587.xml)
- Die Zeit* (2009) 'CSU dreht bei Europapolitik bei', 17 August (www.zeit.de/online/2009/34/csu-lissabon-begleitgesetz)
- Dimitrakopoulos, D.G., Menon, A. and Passas, A.G. (2009) 'France and the EU Under Sarkozy: Between European Ambitions and National Objectives?' *Modern and Contemporary France*, 17 (4), 451–65
- Dinan, D. (2008) 'Governance and Institutional Developments', in Sedelmeier, U. and Young, A. (eds) *The JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2007* (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 71–90
- Dinan, D. (2009) 'Institutions and Governance: Saving the Lisbon Treaty – An Irish Solution to a European Problem', in Copsey, N. and Haughton, T. (eds) *The JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2008* (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 113–32
- Dougan, M. (2008) 'The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts', *Common Market Law Review*, 45 (3), 617–703
- Doukas, D. (2009) 'The Verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty: Not Guilty, But Don't Do It Again!' *European Law Review*, 34 (6), 866–88
- Drake, H. and Lequesne, C. (2010) 'France: From Rejection to Return', in Carbone, M. (ed.) *National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 34–50
- Duff, A. (2005) *The Struggle for Europe's Constitution* (London: Federal Trust)
- Duff, A. (2006) 'Plan B: How to Rescue the European Constitution', *Notre Europe – Studies and Research*, 52 (www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Etud52-fr.pdf)
- Duff, A. (2007) *Constitution Plus: Renegotiating the Treaty* (Brussels: Trans-European Policy Studies Association) (www.tepsa.be/docs/Constitution%20Plus%20final.pdf)
- Duff, A. (2009) *Saving the European Union: The Logic of the Lisbon Treaty* (London: Shoehorn)
- Duff, A. (2011) *Federal Union Now* (London: The Federal Trust)
- Emmanouilidis, J.A. (2007a) 'Das Ende der Ratlosigkeit. Optionen, Erfolgsvoraussetzungen und Fahrplan für ein neues EU-Primärrecht', in König, T. and Daimler, S. et al, *WeltTrends-Papiere 2: Die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2007 – Ende der Verfassungskrise?* (Potsdam: WeltTrends), pp. 83–104 (<http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2009/3170/pdf/wt02.pdf>)

- Emmanouilidis, J.A. (2007b) 'Die Zeit der Entscheidung Optionen, Erfolgsvooraussetzungen und Fahrplan für ein neues EU-Primärrecht, *CAP Analyse*, 1, February (www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/CAP-Analyse-2007-01.pdf)
- Emmanouilidis, J. and Missiroti, A. (2009) 'Lisbon mission accomplished? Not yet ...', *EPC Commentary*, Brussels, 5 October (via www.epc.eu)
- EU Business* (2007) 'Germany hopes to have new EU treaty agreed in December', 1 March (via www.eubusiness.com)
- EU Observer* (2005) 'Merkel champions adoption of "whole" EU constitution', 24 November (<http://euobserver.com/843/20402>)
- EU Observer* (2006a) 'Finnish presidency to accept changes to constitution text', 29 January (<http://euobserver.com/18/20792>)
- EU Observer* (2006b) 'Polish ruling party says EU constitution "dead"', 16 January (<http://euobserver.com/843/20688>)
- EU Observer* (2006c) 'Polish president calls for brand new EU constitution', 25 January (<http://euobserver.com/18/20762>)
- EU Observer* (2006d) 'Dutch open to EU treaty changes from 2008', 22 May (<http://euobserver.com/18/21669>)
- EU Observer* (2006e) 'Berlin wants EU constitution adopted under new name', 10 January (<http://euobserver.com/18/21342>)
- EU Observer* (2006f) 'Berlin and Paris in talks on EU constitutional revival', 6 March (<http://euobserver.com/18/21050>)
- EU Observer* (2006g) 'Dutch leader seeks to avoid new EU treaty referendum', 1 June (<http://euobserver.com/18/21742>)
- EU Observer* (2006h) 'Dutch "no" camp bikes EU constitution back to Brussels', 2 June (<http://euobserver.com/18/21747>)
- EU Observer* (2006i) 'Dutch PM in row with Kroes over EU constitution debate', 12 October (<http://euobserver.com/18/22625>)
- EU Observer* (2006j) 'Merkel says Germany "will not solve" EU constitution limbo', 30 October (<http://euobserver.com/18/22761>)
- EU Observer* (2006k) 'The Hague wants safeguards against EU powers in new treaty', 13 November (<http://euobserver.com/18/22843>)
- EU Observer* (2006l) 'Finns surprised by Austrian plans to revive constitution', 10 January (<http://euobserver.com/9/20648>)
- EU Observer* (2006m) 'Finland seeks better climate for revised EU constitution', 30 June (<http://euobserver.com/18/21995>)
- EU Observer* (2006n) 'Low public support for EU constitution in Finland', 2 June (<http://euobserver.com/18/21758>)
- EU Observer* (2006o) 'Prodi proposes to chop down EU constitution', 14 September (<http://euobserver.com/18/22405>)
- EU Observer* (2006p) 'Brussels to defend "core" of EU constitution in treaty talks', 19 October (<http://euobserver.com/18/22676>)
- EU Observer* (2006q) 'Irish Prime Minister defends EU constitution', 9 November (<http://euobserver.com/18/22821>)
- EU Observer* (2006r) 'Irish PM suggests EU leaders should learn from Nice Treaty rejection', 30 November (<http://euobserver.com/18/22982>)
- EU Observer* (2006s) 'EU constitution back on the political agenda', 15 December (<http://euobserver.com/18/23111>)
- EU Observer* (2006t) 'Germany wants EU constitution in place in 2009', 11 October (<http://euobserver.com/18/22616>)

- EU Observer* (2007a) 'Prague and Warsaw brief Merkel on EU charter plans', 29 January (<http://euobserver.com/18/23363>)
- EU Observer* (2007b) 'Dutch open to new-style EU constitution, poll shows', 19 January (<http://euobserver.com/18/23303>)
- EU Observer* (2007c) 'Spain pushes for extended EU constitution', 26 January (<http://euobserver.com/18/23355>)
- EU Observer* (2007d) 'Dutch government favours new look treaty for the EU', 11 April (<http://euobserver.com/18/23850>)
- EU Observer* (2007e) 'Prague faces head-on clash with pro-EU constitution camp', 30 January (<http://euobserver.com/18/23378>)
- EU Observer* (2007f) 'Czech government agrees EU constitution stance', 10 April (<http://euobserver.com/tickers/105607>)
- EU Observer* (2007g) 'France wants to save major part of EU constitution, Sarkozy aide says', 8 May (<http://euobserver.com/15/24015>)
- EU Observer* (2007h) 'Poland flights to keep "high ranking" status in EU', 30 May (<http://euobserver.com/18/24157>)
- EU Observer* (2007i) 'British guns blazing as EU summit opens', 21 June (<http://euobserver.com/18/24331>)
- EU Observer* (2007j) 'EU summit floats solutions to Polish voting problem', 22 June (<http://euobserver.com/9/24332>)
- EU Observer* (2007k) 'Poland "not optimistic" after late night talks', 22 June (<http://euobserver.com/18/24334>)
- EU Observer* (2007l) 'Poland rejects German package amid "veto" threat', 22 June (<http://euobserver.com/843/24339>)
- EU Observer* (2007m) 'New treaty outline creates fresh question marks', 23 June (<http://euobserver.com/9/24342>)
- EU Observer* (2007n) 'Treaty made unreadable to avoid referendums, says Amato', 16 July (<http://euobserver.com/843/24481>)
- EU Observer* (2007o) 'Poland predicts lively Portuguese finale on new EU treaty', 2 July (<http://euobserver.com/843/24403>)
- EU Observer* (2007p) 'Poland to join UK in rights charter opt-out', 7 September (<http://euobserver.com/18/24723>)
- EU Observer* (2007q) 'Personal data protection under threat in EU treaty draft', 27 September (<http://euobserver.com/22/24850>)
- EU Observer* (2007r) 'EU Treaty negotiations proceed slowly', 19 September (<http://euobserver.com/18/24783>)
- EU Observer* (2007s) 'Poland wooed by German and France over EU treaty', 8 October (<http://euobserver.com/843/24922>)
- EU Observer* (2007t) 'Belgium and Portugal at odds over EU summit location', 31 October (<http://euobserver.com/18/25067>)
- EU Observer* (2008a) 'Sarkozy heads to Prague for emergency EU treaty talks', 16 June (<http://euobserver.com/18/26331>)
- EU Observer* (2008b) 'Czech court green-lights Lisbon Treaty', 26 November (<http://euobserver.com/18/27183>)
- EU Observer* (2008c) 'Irish parliament to debate second Lisbon referendum', 26 November (<http://euobserver.com/18/27178>)
- EU Observer* (2009a) 'Polish president won't sign Lisbon before Irish referendum', 21 January (<http://euobserver.com/18/27446>)
- EU Observer* (2009b) 'Ireland says referendum on the line over Lisbon guarantees', 18 June (<http://euobserver.com/9/28330>)

- EU Observer* (2009c) 'German lower house passes EU treaty law', 9 September (<http://euobserver.com/9/28634>)
- EU Observer* (2009d) 'UK opposition leader backs Klaus on Lisbon Treaty delay', 23 September (<http://euobserver.com/9/28709>)
- EU Observer* (2009e) 'Czech MPs mull suspension of Klaus' powers over Lisbon Treaty', 25 June (<http://euobserver.com/843/28373>)
- EU Observer* (2009f) 'Irish vote unleashes flurry of EU activity', 3 October (<http://euobserver.com/9/28773>)
- EU Observer* (2009g) 'Czech Republic to table Klaus demand at EU summit', 12 October (<http://euobserver.com/9/28812>)
- EU Observer* (2009h) 'EU treaty closer to ratification after Czech deal agreed', 30 October (<http://euobserver.com/18/28913>)
- EU Observer* (2009i) 'Barroso unconcerned by Slovak Lisbon statement', 19 October (<http://euobserver.com/18/28850>)
- EU Observer* (2009j) 'Czech decision on Lisbon treaty only after summit', 28 October (<http://euobserver.com/9/28892>)
- EU Observer* (2009k) 'Post-war events intrude upon EU summit', 29 October (<http://euobserver.com/9/28911>)
- EU Observer* (2011a) 'Van Rompuy: EU could avoid full treaty change via legal trick', 7 December (<http://euobserver.com/institutional/114533>)
- EU Observer* (2011b) 'Legal gymnastics cause confusion in Brussels', 7 December (<http://euobserver.com/political/114534>)
- EUpolitix* (2006a) 'Spain against "mini" EU treaty', 12 October (via www.eupolitix.com)
- EUpolitix* (2006b) 'EU constitution lives after "accidental" no votes', 27 June (via www.eupolitix.com)
- Euractiv* (2005) 'Hampton Court summit "unlikely to go down in history"', 21 October (www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/hampton-court-summit-go-history/article-146672)
- Euractiv* (2006a) 'Danish PM wants a new Constitution', 27 April (www.euractiv.com/future-eu/danish-pm-wants-new-constitution/article-154553)
- Euractiv* (2006b) 'Interview with Jo Leinen, MEP and chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs', 25 September (www.euractiv.com/future-eu/interview-jo-leinen-mep-chairman-committee-constitutional-affairs/article-158122)
- Euractiv* (2007a) 'Nicolas Sarkozy: "La France est de retour en Europe"', 7 May (www.euractiv.com/fr/elections/nicolas-sarkozy-france-retour-europe/article-163581)
- Euractiv* (2007b) 'Brussels plays down EU Treaty competition fears', 27 June (www.euractiv.com/competition/brussels-plays-eu-treaty-competi-news-218485)
- Euractiv* (2007c) 'EU ministers predict plain sailing for Treaty summit', 16 October (www.euractiv.com/future-eu/eu-ministers-predict-plain-sailing-treaty-summit/article-167649)
- Euractiv* (2009a) 'EU leaders ink Czech Lisbon Treaty guarantees', 30 October (www.euractiv.com/future-eu/eu-leaders-ink-czech-lisbon-treaty-guarantees/article-186900)
- Euractiv* (2009b) 'Klaus signs, Lisbon Treaty is fully ratified', 2 November (www.euractiv.com/future-eu/klaus-signs-lisbon-treaty-fully-ratified/article-187007)

- European Central Bank (2007) *Opinion of 5 July 2007 at the request of the Council of the European Union on the opening of an Intergovernmental Conference to draw up a Treaty amending the existing Treaties (CON/2007/20)*, Frankfurt, 5 July
- European Commission (2005) *Plan-D as Democracy, Dialogue and Debate*, COM (2005) 494 final, 13 October
- European Commission (2006a) *The Period of reflection and Plan D*, COM(2006) 212 final, Brussels, 10 May
- European Commission (2006b) *A citizens' agenda – Delivering results for Europe*, COM(2006) 211 final, Brussels, 10 May
- European Commission (2006c) *The cost of the non-Constitution*, Staff Working Paper, Brussels, November
- European Commission (2007) *Reforming Europe for the 21st Century*, COM(2007) 412 final, Brussels, 10 July
- European Commission (2011) *Green Paper on the feasibility of introducing Stability Bonds*, COM(2011) 818 final, 23 November
- European Commission (2012a) *Opinion on a draft European Council decision in favour of examining the proposed amendment of the Treaties concerning the addition of a Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon*, COM(2012) 198 final, Brussels, 4 May
- European Commission (2012b) *Opinion on a draft European Council decision in favour of examining the proposed amendment of the Treaties concerning the addition of a Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the Czech Republic*, COM(2012) 197 final, Brussels, 4 May
- European Commission (2012c) *A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union – Launching a European Debate*, COM (2012) 777 final, Brussels, 28 November
- European Council (2009) *European Council – 10/11 December 2009 – Conclusions*, EUCO 6/09, CO EUR 6, CONCL 4, Brussels, 11 December
- European Council (2010) *European Council – 28–29 October 2010 – Conclusions*, EUCO 25/1/10 REV 1, CO EUR 18, CONCL 4, Brussels, 30 November
- European Council (2012) *European Council Decision concerning the number of members of the European Commission*, EUCO 176/12, INST 551, POLGEN 154, Brussels, 2 October
- European Parliament (2005a) *Draft report on the period of reflection: The structure, subjects and context for an assessment of the debate on the European Union*, 2005/2146(INI), 13 October (Rapporteurs: Andrew Duff and Johannes Voggenhuber)
- European Parliament (2005b) *Report on the period of reflection: The structure, subjects and context for an assessment of the debate on the European Union*, A6-0414/2005, 16 December (Rapporteurs: Andrew Duff and Johannes Voggenhuber)
- European Parliament (2006a) *Resolution on the period of reflection: The structure, subjects and context for an assessment of the debate on the European Union*, P6_TA(2006)0027, 19 January
- European Parliament (2006b) *Resolution on the next steps for the period of reflection and analysis on the Future of Europe*, P6_TA(2006)0263, 12 June
- European Parliament (2007a) *Programme of the German Presidency (debate)*, P6_CRE(2007)01-17(003), Strasbourg, 17 January

- European Parliament (2007b) *Follow-up to the Berlin declaration (debate)*, P6_CRE(2007)03-28(12), Brussels, 28 March
- European Parliament (2007c) *Debate on the future of Europe*, P6_CRE(2007)05-23(009), Strasbourg, 23 May
- European Parliament (2007d) *Debate on the future of Europe with the participation of the Prime Minister of Italy, Member of the European Council*, P6_CRE(2007)05-22(012), Strasbourg, 22 May
- European Parliament (2007e) *Report on the roadmap for the Union's Constitutional Process*, A6-0197/2007, 22 May (Rapporteurs: Enriquer Baron Crespo and Elmar Brok)
- European Parliament (2007f) *Roadmap for the European Union's constitutional process (debate)*, P6_CRE(2007)06-06(012), Brussels, 6 June (Rapporteurs: Barón Crespo and Brok)
- European Parliament (2007g) *Preparations for the European Council (21 to 22 June) and the situation with regard to the revision of the Treaties (debate)*, P6_CRE(2007)06-07(003), Brussels, 7
- European Parliament (2007h) *Resolution of 7 June 2007 on the roadmap for the Union's Constitutional Process*, P6_TA(2007)0234, Brussels, 7 June
- European Parliament (2007i) *Report on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC): The European Parliament's opinion (Article 48 of the TEU)*, A6-0279/2007, 9 July (Rapporteur: Jo Leinen)
- European Parliament (2007j) *Resolution on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC): The European Parliament's opinion*, P6_TA(2007)0328, 11 July
- European Parliament (2012a) *European Parliament resolution of 18 April 2012 on the draft protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 48(3) of the Treaty on European Union)*, P7_TA(2012)012e4, 18 April
- European Parliament (2012b) *European Parliament decision of 18 April 2012 on the European Council's proposal not to convene a Convention for the addition of a Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon, to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, P7_TA(2012)0123, 18 April
- European Parliament (2012c) *Second Draft Report on the draft protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the Czech Republic (Article 48(3) of the Treaty on European Union)*, 2011/0817(NLE), 4 April (Rapporteur: Andrew Duff)
- European Peoples' Party (2006) *For a Europe of the Citizens: Priorities for a Better Future ('Rome Manifesto')*, Rome, March (www.eppgroup.eu/press/peve06/eve003/manifesto-en.pdf)
- European Policy Centre (2006) 'Priorities of the German Presidency', *EPC Events Report*, 7 December (via www.epc.eu)
- European Policy Centre (2007) 'Over and Done With – At Last', *EPC Post-Summit Analysis*, 6 November (via www.epc.eu)
- European Voice* (2005) 'MEPs clash over the constitution', 27 October, p. 3
- European Voice* (2006a) 'Clouds clear in Klosterneuburg', 1 June, p. 18
- European Voice* (2006b) 'Trying again, without the "c" word', 22 June, p. 7
- European Voice* (2006c) 'Merkel rejects ideas to restart constitutional talks', 28 September, p. 4
- European Voice* (2006d) 'Sarkozy aide seeks support for constitutional fix', 23 November, p. 7

- European Voice* (2006e) 'Playing down those great expectations', 14 December, p. 24
- European Voice* (2006f) 'Top German diplomat sees deal on treaty by end 2007', 7 December, p. 3
- European Voice* (2007a) 'Germans eye constitutional revival', 8 February, p. 16
- European Voice* (2007b) 'Merkel seeks short and sharp talks on treaty', 16 April, p. 3
- European Voice* (2007c) 'Czechs back Poles on voting', 10 May, p. 2
- European Voice* (2007d) 'Parliaments offered greater EU power', 14 June, pp. 1–2
- European Voice* (2007e) 'Wallström wants to use schools to boost "limited" knowledge of EU', 27 September, p. 2
- European Voice* (2007f) 'Poles are in position to gain ground on treaty', 13 September, p. 1
- European Voice* (2007g) 'MEPs fear secret anti-terrorism measures', 27 September, p. 6
- European Voice* (2007h) 'Treaty deal delays ECJ powers over law enforcement legislation', 4 October, p. 2
- European Voice* (2007i) 'A deal to modernise Europe', 25 October, pp. 6–7
- European Voice* (2009a) 'Lisbon guarantees for the Irish', 26 March, p. 20
- European Voice* (2009b) 'Ireland seeks sign-off on treaty guarantees', 14 May, p. 2
- European Voice* (2009c) 'Concerns over Irish guarantees on Lisbon', 4 June, p. 2
- European Voice* (2009d) 'Klaus, defender of the Czech nation?' 15 October, p. 9
- European Voice* (2009e) 'Klaus gets his opt-out', 5 November, p. 5
- European Voice* (2010) 'Lisbon Treaty: "Phantom" MEPs to have votes from December', 24 June, p. 3.
- European Voice* (2012) 'Barroso sets course for revision of EU treaties', 13 September, p. 1
- Federal Constitutional Court (2009) *Judgment of 30 June 2009*, Press Release 72/2009, 30 June (www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg09-072en.html)
- Federal Government (2006) *'Europe – succeeding together' – Presidency Programme 1 January to 30 June 2007*, Berlin (www.eu2007.de/includes/Downloads/Praesidentschaftsprogramm/EU_Presidency_Programme_final.pdf)
- Ferreira-Pereira, L.C. (2008) 'Portugal and the 2007 EU Presidency: A Case of Constructive Bridge-Building', in Sedelmeier, U. and Young, A.R. (eds) *The JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2007* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 61–70
- Financial Times* (2005a) 'Rebuilding confidence in EU will help revive constitution, says Blair', 21 December, p. 6
- Financial Times* (2005b) 'Plea to save elements of constitution', 1 June, p. 7
- Financial Times* (2006a) 'Germany aims to rebrand rejected treaty', 17 March (via www.ft.com)
- Financial Times* (2006b) 'EU's divisive treaty stays on hold', 16 June, p. 8
- Financial Times* (2006c) 'Sarkozy proposal for "slimmed down" treaty', 13 January, p. 8
- Financial Times* (2006d) 'EU leaders aim to revive constitution', 16–17 December, p. 13
- Financial Times* (2006e) 'Hoon warns that EU constitutional issues is bound to return to fore', 15 June (via www.ft.com)
- Financial Times* (2006f) 'Europe's summiters duck the big issues', 17 June, p. 8

- Financial Times* (2006g) 'Bored by "results", Europe regains its taste for grand plans', 27 October, p. 13
- Financial Times* (2007a) 'Candidate's vision could threaten rescue of EU constitution', 19 January, p. 8
- Financial Times* (2007b) 'Blair urges limited EU overhaul', 17 April (via www.ft.com)
- Financial Times* (2007c) 'Merkel steps up effort to salvage EU treaty', 13 May (via www.ft.com)
- Financial Times* (2007d) 'Britain to be offered opt-out on EU justice', 15 May (via www.ft.com)
- Financial Times* (2007e) 'Union angry at UK's foreign policy plans', 19 June, p. 8
- Financial Times* (2007f) 'Poles cite war dead in voting dispute', 21 June 2007, p. 7
- Financial Times* (2007g) 'UK gives ground over treaty', 23–24 June 2007, p. 6.
- Financial Times* (2007h) 'London confident British "red lines" will hold out', 23–24 June 2007, p. 6
- Financial Times* (2007i) 'The battle of Brussels is only for show', 23–24 June 2007, p. 6
- Financial Times* (2007j) 'Polish PM threatens to reignited bitter EU summit row', 30 June, p. 9
- Financial Times* (2007k) 'Lisbon hails lifting of EU treaty obstacles', 24 July (via www.ft.com)
- Financial Times* (2007l) 'EU hopeful Polish vote will not hit reform', 10 September, p. 10
- Financial Times* (2007m) 'Hopes run high for deal on EU treaty', 8 October, p. 11
- Financial Times* (2007n) 'Europe confident of wrapping up treaty disputes', 17 October, p. 7
- Financial Times* (2008a) 'Ireland's future depends on EU treaty, says PM', 9 June, p. 5
- Financial Times* (2008b) 'France's blunt warning on Irish No', 10 June, p. 6
- Financial Times* (2009a) 'Posturing Klaus', 14 October, p. 16
- Financial Times* (2009b) 'Klaus taps into buried fear of German menace', 13 October, p. 8
- Financial Times* (2009c) 'Slovakia seeks Lisbon land assurance', 20 October, p. 11
- Financial Times Deutschland* (2003) 'Reinhard Silberberg: Graue Eminenz der deutschen EU-Politik', 11 December (www.ftd.de/politik/europa/1070700922856.html)
- Financial Times Deutschland* (2006a) 'Wien drängt bei EU-Verfassung zur Eile', 24 May (www.ftd.de/politik/europa/76355.html)
- Financial Times Deutschland* (2006b) 'Deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft ist voller Hürden', 10 October (www.ftd.de/politik/europa/120309.html)
- Financial Times Deutschland* (2006c) 'Initiative für Verfassung spaltet EU', 18 December (www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland/142752.html)
- Financial Times Deutschland* (2007) 'Prag hilft Merkel bei EU-Verfassung', 2 May, p. 11
- Fischer, K.H. (2008) *Der Vertrag von Lissabon: Text und Kommentar zum Europäischen Reformvertrag* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft)
- Fitzgibbon, J. (2010) 'Referendum Briefing: The Second Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland, 2 October 2009', *Representation*, 46 (2), 227–39

- Fletcher, M. (2009) 'Schengen, the European Court of Justice and Flexibility under the Lisbon Treaty: Balancing the United Kingdom's "Ins" and "Outs"', *European Constitutional Law Review*, 5 (1), 71–98
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2007) *The Reform Treaty: The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference*, July 2007, Cm 7174, London, July
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2007a) 'Dramaturgische Diskretion: Wie die "Berliner Erklärung entstand"', 23 March, p. 2
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2007b) 'Ein ganz gewöhnlicher Vertrag? Bemühungen um die europäische "Verfassung"', 16 February, p. 10
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2007c) 'Verzicht auf den Außenminister? Die deutsche Ratspräsidentschaft sucht nach einem Konsens für die erneute EU-Reform', 3 May, p. 10
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2007d) 'Berliner Bergungsversuche: Die Debatte über den Verfassungsvertrag tritt in die entscheidende Phase', 18 May, p. 12
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2007e) 'Vertrag ohne Ballast: Worüber in Brüssel verhandelt wird', 21 June, p. 2
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2007f) 'EU Einigt sich auf "Vertrag von Lissabon"', 19 October (via www.faz.net)
- Gaisbauer, H.P. (2010) *Nizza oder der Tod! Zur negative Dialektik von Erweiterung und Vertiefung der Europäischen Union von Nizza bis Lissabon* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft)
- Gazeta Wyborcza* (2007) 'The Polish problem in Europe', 18 June 2007 (<http://polishpress.wordpress.com/2007/06/20/the-polish-problem-in-europe>)
- German Council Presidency (2007a) *Declaration on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome*, Berlin, 25 March 2007 (www.eu2007.de/en/About_the_EU/Constitutional_Treaty/BerlinerErklaerung.html)
- German Council Presidency (2007b) *Questionnaire in View of the Bilateral Meetings with Focal Points to be held between 23 April and 4 May*, Berlin, April
- German Council Presidency (2007c) *Outline of a Possible Reform Treaty*, Berlin, 14 June
- Girvin, B. (2010) 'Ireland: More Referendums Anyone?' in Carbone, M. (ed.) *National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 126–43
- Goebel, R.J. (2011) 'Introduction: A Tribute to Jean-Claude Piris, Director-General of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union', *Fordham International Law Journal*, 34 (5), 1189–92
- Goosman, T. (2007) 'Die "Berliner Erklärung" – Dokument europäischer Identität oder pragmatischer Zwischenschritt zum Reformvertrag', *Integration*, 30 (3), 251–63
- Government of Finland (2006a) *Preliminary Agenda for Finland's Presidency of the EU*, Cabinet Committee on European Affairs, Helsinki, 24 May (via www.vnk.fi)
- Government of Finland (2006b) *Finland's Presidency of the EU – results*, 22 December (via www.eu2006.fi)
- Government of Finland (2006c) *Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen in the European Parliament on 18 December 2006*, 18 December (via www.eu2006.fi)

- Government of Finland (2007) *Finland's Objectives in Promoting the EU's Treaty Reform Process*, Press Release 159/2007, Helsinki, 1 June (www.vnk.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/tiedote/en.jsp?oid=195896)
- Government of the Netherlands (2007a) *Working Together, Living Together: Coalition Agreement between the Parliamentary Parties of the Christian Democratic Alliance, Labour Party and Christian Union*, The Hague, 7 February (www.government.nl/Government/Coalition_agreement)
- Government of the Netherlands (2007b) *Dutch Aims in Amending European Treaties*, Press Release, The Hague, 20 March (www.government.nl/news/2007/03/22/dutch-aims-in-amending-european-treaties.html)
- Gros-Verheyde, N. (2007) 'Négociation du Traité: Une préparation bétonnée! Récit de l'intérieur du sous-marin bleu', *Europolitique*, No. 3407, 7 November, pp. 38–9
- Hagemann, S. (2007) 'The EU Reform Treaty: Easier Signed than Ratified?' *EPC Policy Brief*, Brussels, July (www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/562373347_The%20EU%20Reform%20Treaty.pdf)
- Handelsblatt* (2005) 'Merkel will mit Sozial-Erklärung EU-Verfassung retten', 18 December (via www.handelsblatt.com)
- Handelsblatt* (2006) 'Juncker sieht EU in der Krise', 5 September (via www.handelsblatt.com)
- Handelsblatt* (2009) 'Bundesregierung in Zeitnot', 2 August (via www.handelsblatt.com)
- Handelsblatt* (2012) 'Merkel verlangt Preis für Griechenland-Rettung', 16 October (via www.handelsblatt.com)
- Hansard* (2007) – House of Commons Debates (via <http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/>)
- Harmsen, R. (2008) 'The Evolution of Dutch European Discourse: Defining the "Limits of Europe"', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 9 (3), 316–41
- Henderson, K. (2010) 'Czech Republic and Slovakia: Party Politics and the Travails of Ratification', in Carbone, M. (ed.) *National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 197–214
- Herma, C. (2008) 'Intergovernmental Conference on the Treaty of Lisbon', in Smyk, K. (ed.) *Treaty of Lisbon – Provisions, Evaluations, Implications*, UKIE Analytical Paper Series, 20 (Warsaw: Office of the Committee for European Integration – Department of Analyses and Strategies), pp. 38–76
- Herolf, G. (2007) 'European Partners' Perspectives on the German EU Presidency 2007', *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, 8 (21), 45–54 (www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue21.pdf)
- Herzog, P. (2007) *Un nouvel Acte unique au coeur de la relance européenne* (Paris: Confrontations Europe)
- Hobolt, S.B. and Brouard, S. (2011) 'Contesting the European Union? Why the Dutch and the French Rejected the European Constitution', *Political Research Quarterly*, 64 (2), 309–22
- Hogan, G. (2009) 'The Lisbon Treaty and the Irish Referendum', *European Public Law*, 15 (2), 163–70
- Holmes, M. (2008) 'The Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon in the Republic of Ireland, 12 June 2008', *European Parties Elections and Referendums Network*

- Referendum Briefing Paper No. 16* (Brighton: Sussex European Institute) (www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-ref-no16.pdf)
- Hoon, G. (2006) 'Written Ministerial Statements – Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Future of Europe (German Presidency)', *Hansard*, 5 December, Cols. 10–11WS
- Hough, D. and Quaglia, L. (2007) 'Italy and the German Presidency of the European Union', *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, 8 (21), 36–44 (www.deutschaussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue21.pdf)
- House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee (2007a) *Oral Evidence Taken Before the European Scrutiny Committee on Thursday 7 June 2007* (London: House of Commons) (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmeuleg/640-i/7060701.htm)
- House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee (2007b) *Oral Evidence Taken Before the European Scrutiny Committee on Wednesday 4 July 2007* (London: House of Commons) (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmeuleg/862/7070401.htm)
- House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee (2007c) *European Union Intergovernmental Conference – Thirty-Fifth Report of Session 2006–07*, HC1014, 9 October (London: The Stationery Office) (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmeuleg/1014/1014.pdf)
- House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2008) *Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty – Third Report of Session 2007–08*, Volume II – Oral and Written Evidence, HC 120-II, 16 January (London: The Stationery Office) (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmcaff/120/120.pdf)
- House of Lords (2007) *Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the European Union – Wednesday 19 September 2007* (London: House of Lords) (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/lddeucom/180/7091901.htm)
- House of Lords (2008) *Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the European Union – Wednesday 19 December 2007* (London: House of Lords) (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/lddeucom/62/7121902.htm)
- House of the Oireachtas (2008) *Ireland's Future in the European Union: Challenges, Issues and Options*, Report of the Sub-Committee on Ireland's Future in the European Union, Dublin, November (www.oireachtas.ie/documents/committees/30thdail/j-europeanaffairs/sub_cttee_eu_01122008-3.pdf)
- Iglesias, G.C.R. and Torreblanca, J.I. (2007a) *Superar la crisis constitucional profundizando en la integración europea. Cuatro propuestas* (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano) (via www.realinstitutoelcano.org)
- Iglesias, G.C.R. and Torreblanca, J.I. (2007b) *El futuro de la Constitución Europea: Opciones para España* (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano) (via www.realinstitutoelcano.org)
- IIEA (2009) *Lisbon: The Guarantees Explained* (Dublin: Institute of International and European Affairs) (<http://iiea.com/documents/lisbon-the-irish-guarantees-explained>)
- Institute of Public Affairs/The Polish Institute of International Affairs (2006) *The Future of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe – A Strategy for Poland* (Warsaw)
- Instituto de Estudios Europeos/Fundación Rafael del Pino/European University Institute (2007) *The Future of the European Constitutional Treaty and Scenarios*

- for Solving the Current Situation* (Brussels: Instituto de Estudios Europeos/ Fundación Rafael del Pino/European University Institute)
- Irish Independent* (2007) 'Ahern makes light of latest concessions on EU treaty', 24 June (www.independent.ie/national-news/ahern-makes-light-of-latest-concessions-on-eu-treaty-742671.html)
- Irish Times* (2006) 'Ahern declares support for changes to EU treaty text', 30 November (www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2006/1130/1164823694920.html)
- Irish Times* (2007a) 'Poland poised to block progress in EU treaty talks', 30 June, p. 9
- Irish Times* (2007b) 'Irish not slavishly following Britain in treaty opt-out', 13 October, p. 13.
- Irish Times* (2007c) 'Ahern informs EU of treaty opt-out', 13 October, p. 7
- Irish Times* (2007d) 'Ministers optimistic about EU Treaty', 15 October 2007 (via www.ireland.com)
- Irish Times* (2008a) 'Yes campaign gathers momentum but motivating voters to turn out will be key', 17 May, p. 6
- Irish Times* (2008b) 'Lisbon Treaty faces rejection as No vote doubles in latest poll', 6 June (www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/front/2008/0606/1212696236403.html)
- Irish Times* (2008c) 'Ministry officials imply Ireland may have to vote again', 14 June, p. 11
- Irish Times* (2008d) 'Voters may approve new Lisbon Treaty, poll reveals', 17 November (www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2008/1117/1226700659487.html)
- Irish Times* (2009a) 'Opting out of EU defence "on the table"', 9 January (www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2009/0109/1231454443038.html)
- Irish Times* (2009b) 'Government puts Lisbon protocols on fast track', 13 May (www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2009/0513/1224246387369.html)
- Irish Times* (2009c) 'EU members fear Lisbon guarantees may reopen whole debate', 11 June (www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2009/0611/1224248613128.html)
- Irish Times* (2009d) 'Martin "quietly confident" of EU backing for Lisbon guarantees', 16 June (www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2009/0616/1224248901789.html)
- Irish Times* (2009e) 'Protocol will blunt skepticism about status of guarantees', 20 June, p. 11
- Irish Times* (2009f) 'New Lisbon referendum in October as EU gives guarantees', 20 June, p. 1
- Irish Times* (2009g) 'Major Swing in favour of Lisbon Treaty as 51% would now vote yes', 16 February (www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2009/0216/1233867938989.html)
- Irish Times* (2009h) 'Irish Times poll on Lisbon – mind the gap!' 4 September (www.irishtimes.com/blogs/politics/2009/09/04/irish-times-poll-on-lisbon-mind-the-gap/)
- Irish Times* (2009i) 'Support for Lisbon Treaty increases to 54%', 1 June (www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2009/0601/1224247818463.html)
- Irish Times* (2012) 'Irish Lisbon guarantees approved', 18 April (www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2012/0418/breaking41.html)

- Ivaldi, G. (2006) 'Beyond France's 2005 Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty: Second-Order Model, Anti-Establishment Attitudes and the End of the Alternative European Utopia', *West European Politics*, 29 (1), 47–69
- Juncker, J.-C. (2006) *Discours ... à l'occasion de l'ouverture solennelle de l'année académique 2006/2007 du Collège d'Europe à Bruges le 30 octobre 2006* (www.coleurope.eu/file/content/news/Speeches/20061030_Juncker_Bruges.pdf)
- Justitsministeriet (2004) *Redegørelse for visse forfatningsretlige spørgsmål i forbindelse med Danmarks ratifikation af traktat om en forfatning for Europa*, Statsretskontoret, 2004-751-0081, Copenhagen, 22 November
- Justitsministeriet (2007) *Redegørelse for visse forfatningsretlige spørgsmål i forbindelse med Danmarks ratifikation af Lissabon-traktaten*, Statsretskontoret, 2006-750-0155, Copenhagen, 4 December (http://ec.europa.eu/danmark/documents/alle_emner/institutionelle/071204_justitsministeriets.pdf)
- Kaczyński, P.M., Kurpas, S. and ó Broin, P. (2008) 'Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: Ireland is Not the Only Problem', *EPIN Working Paper*, No. 18, September (<http://www.ceps.eu/book/ratification-lisbon-treaty-problems-not-only-ireland>)
- Kammholz, K. and Müller, P. 'Was in der dramatischen Nacht von Brüssel wirklich geschah: Anatomie des Europa-Gipfels', *Die Welt am Sonntag*, 15 Juli 2007, pp. 6–7 (available via <http://epaper.welt.de>)
- Kassim, H. and Dimitrakopoulos, D. (2007a) 'Leader or Bystander? The European Commission and EU Treaty Reform', in Beach, D. and Mazzucelli, C. (eds) *Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 94–114
- Kassim, H. and Dimitrakopoulos, D.G. (2007b) 'The European Commission and the Future of Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14 (8), 1249–70
- Keil, K. and Maršić, T. (2009) 'Die Ratifikation des Lisabonner Vertrags in Tschechien: die gesplante Ratspräsidentschaft und die letzte Mosaikstein', *SWP Diskussionspapier*, FG1, 2009/04, Berlin, February (www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/2009_02_27_CZ_update_mct_KS_final.pdf)
- Keller-Noëllet, J. and Milton, G. (2007) 'The Future of the Constitutional Treaty', in Ludlow, P. (ed.) *Setting EU Priorities 2007* (Ponte de Lima: European Strategy Forum), pp. 92–112
- Kiiver, P. (2009) 'Reflections on the Lisbon Judgment – How the Judges at Karlsruhe Trust Neither the European Parliament Nor Their National Parliament', *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law*, 16 (3), 263–70
- Klaus, V. (2009) 'Statement on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty', Prague, 9 October (www.hrad.cz/en/president-of-the-cr/current-president-of-the-cr-vaclav-klaus/selected-speeches-and-interviews/96.shtml)
- Koock, H.F. and Karollus, M.M. (eds) (2008) *Preparing the European Union for the Future? Necessary Revisions of Primary Law After the Non-Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft)
- Komárek, J. and Kühn, Z. (2008) 'The Czech Republic', in Koock, H.F. and Karollus, M.M. (eds) *Preparing the European Union for the Future? Necessary*

- Revisions of Primary Law After the Non-Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), pp. 53–67
- König T., Finke, D. and Daimer, S. (2007) 'Der Verfassungsvertrag: Die beste Lösung? Eine Analyse der Optionen der deutschen Ratspräsidentschaft', in König, T. and Daimer, S. *et al*, *WeltTrends-Papiere 2: Die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2007 – Ende der Verfassungskrise?* (Potsdam: WeltTrends), pp. 62–81 (<http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2009/3170/pdf/wt02.pdf>)
- König, T., Daimer, S. and Finke, D. (2008) 'The Treaty Reform of the EU: Constitutional Agenda-Setting, Intergovernmental Bargains and the Presidency's Crisis Management of Ratification Failure', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46 (2), 337–63
- Kuijper, P.J. (2009) 'The Second Irish Referendum: Finally a Fair Choice', *Legal Issues of Economic Integration*, 36 (2), 101–7
- Kurier (2006) 'Paris schert bei Verfassung aus', 5 January (via www.kurier.at)
- Kurpas, S. and Micossi, S. (2007) 'Will the European Council End the Institutional Deadlock of the EU? The Narrow Trail to an Agreement', *CEPS Policy Brief*, No. 130, May (<http://www.ceps.be/ceps/download/1330>)
- L'Express* (2007) 'Europe: la méthode allemande', 2 January (www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe-la-methode-allemande_462022.html)
- Ladenburger, C. (2008) 'Police and Criminal Law in the Treaty of Lisbon: A New Dimension for the Community Method', *European Constitutional Law Review*, 4 (1), 20–40
- Lamassoure, A. (2003) *Histoire Secrète de la Convention européenne* (Paris: Éditions Albin Michel)
- Lamassoure, A. (2006) 'Interview: "Pour un traité de Nice modifié"', *Europolitique*, 27 April (www.alainlamassoure.eu/liens/436.doc)
- Lamassoure, A. (2007) 'Le traité simplifié et la relance de l'Europe', *Revue Défense Nationale*, 63 (8–9), 13–21
- Laursen, F. (ed.) (2008a) *The Rise and Fall of the EU's Constitutional Treaty* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff)
- Laursen, F. (2008b) 'Denmark and the Constitutional Treaty: A Difficult Two-Level Game', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Rise and Fall of the EU's Constitutional Treaty* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff), pp. 249–77
- Laursen, F. (ed.) (2012a) *The Making of the EU's Lisbon Treaty: The Role of Member States* (Bern: Peter Lang)
- Laursen, F. (2012b) 'Denmark and the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: How a Referendum was Avoided', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Making of the EU's Lisbon Treaty: The Role of Member States* (Bern: Peter Lang), pp. 237–58
- Laursen, F. (2012c) 'The Making of the Lisbon Treaty: National Preferences, Inter-state Bargaining and Theoretical Debates', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Making of the EU's Lisbon Treaty: The Role of Member States* (Bern: Peter Lang), pp. 299–310
- Le Monde* (2006a) 'VGE réclame "une deuxième chance" pur le traité constitutionnel européen', 1 March (via www.lemonde.fr)
- Le Monde* (2006b) 'Il faut renforcer l'Etat pur que la France n'ait plus peur de la mondialisation', 22 June (via www.lemonde.fr)
- Le Monde* (2006c) 'Nous voulons maintenir la substance de la Constitution', 20 December (via www.lemonde.fr)

- Le Monde* (2006d) 'Angela Merkel reste hostile à un mini-traité constitutionnel', 23 September (via www.lemonde.fr)
- Le Monde* (2007a) 'Royal et Sarkozy tentent d'éviter un conflit avec Berlin', 18 January (via www.lemonde.fr)
- Le Monde* (2007b) 'Tony Blair: "Ouverture ou repli sur soi, c'est la bataille centrale pour l'Europe"', 21 April (via www.lemonde.fr)
- Le Soir* (2007) 'La Belgique empêchera-t-elle la conclusion du nouveau traité européen?' 31 October (via www.lesoir.be)
- Lequesne, C. (2007) 'Quelle Union européenne pour le futur hôte de l'Élysée', *Le Figaro*, 2 January
- Lequiller, P. (2007) *Europe: Comment sortir de l'impasse – un traité Institutionnel pour l'europe* (Paris: Fondation Robert Schuman) (www.robert-schuman.eu/doc/notes/notes-39-fr.pdf)
- Lewis, P. (2010) 'Poland: Domestic Discord Makes for a Problematic Partner', in Carbone, M. (ed.) *National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 108–25
- Lubbers, M. (2008) 'Regarding the Dutch "Nee" to the European Constitution: A Test of the Identity, Utilitarian and Political Approaches to Voting "No"', *European Union Politics*, 9 (1), 59–86
- Ludlow, P. (2006) 'The June European Council: Wolfgang Schäussel Leaves His Mark', *Eurocomment*, 4 (5–6)
- Ludlow, P. (2007a) 'A View on Brussels: March 2007 – A Tale of Two Councils – Angela Merkel's Master Classes', *Eurocomment Briefing Note*, 5 (1–2), Brussels
- Ludlow, P. (2007b) 'A View on Brussels: Angela Merkel's Mandate – The June European Council and Treaty Reform', *Eurocomment Briefing Note*, 5 (3–4), Brussels
- Ludlow, P. (2007c) 'A View on Brussels: The Lisbon Council of October 2007 – Wrapping Up the Treaty and Debating Globalisation', *Eurocomment Briefing Note*, 5 (6), Brussels
- Ludlow, P. (2009) 'A View on Brussels: Lisbon, Copenhagen and New Leaders – The European Councils of September to November 2009', *Eurocomment Briefing Note*, 7 (3–4), Brussels
- Maatsch, A. (2010) 'Between an Intergovernmental and a Polycentric European Union: National Parliamentary Discourses on Democracy in the EU Ratification Process', *RECON Online Working Paper*, 2010/18 (via www.reconproject.eu)
- Mangas, A. (2007) *El rescate del Tratado Constitucional: ¿qué y cómo se puede salvar?* (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano) (via www.realinstitutoelcano.org/)
- Maršić, T. (2009) 'Der Prager Regierungssturz und die Zukunft der EU: Gelingt die Ratifikation des Lissabonner Vertrags in Tschechien', *SWP Studie*, S13, Berlin, April (www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2009_S13_mct_ks.pdf)
- Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, J. (2007) *Soluciones al actual impasse constitucional en la Unión Europea: la opción del Tratado reducido*, Real Instituto Elcano, DT 16/2007, 13 June (via www.realinstitutoelcano.org)
- Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, J. (2008) 'Spain', in Koeck, H.F. and Karollus, M.M. (eds) (2008) *Preparing the European Union for the Future? Necessary Revisions of Primary Law after the Non-Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), pp. 325–47

- Mattera, A. (ed.) (2003) *Penelope – Project de constitution de l'Union européenne* (Paris: Clément Juglar)
- Maurer, A. (2007a) 'A Formal Outsider Becomes an Effective Player: The European Parliament in the Negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Constitutional Treaty', in Beach, D. and Mazzucelli, C. (eds) *Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 115–33
- Maurer, A. (2007b) 'Die Organisation widersprüchlicher Erwartungen: Perspektiven für die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2007', *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, 2007/1, 47–65
- Maurer, A. (2007c) 'Die Verhandlungen zum Reformvertrag unter deutschem Vorsitz', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 53 (43), 3–18
- Maurer, A. (2008a) 'Reflexionsphase und Regierungskonferenz 2007', in Lieb, U. et al (eds) *Der Vertrag von Lissabon: Kurzkomentar* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), pp. 5–9
- Maurer, A. (2008b) 'Pruning, Plundering and Reconstructing: Work on the Constitutional Treaty', in Kietz, D. and Perthes, V. (eds) *The Potential of the Council Presidency: An Analysis of Germany's Chairmanship of the EU, 2007*, SWP Research Paper 2008/RP 01, January, pp. 25–31
- Maurer, A. (2008c) 'The German Council Presidency: Managing Conflicting Expectations', in Sedelmeier, U. and Young, A.R. (eds) *The JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2007* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 51–9
- Maurer, A. and D. Schwarzer, D. (2006) 'Cards on the Table! Ideas for Tackling the EU's Constitutional Malaise', *SWP Comments*, 17, June (www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3104)
- Mayer, F.C. (2007) 'Die Rückkehr der Europäischen Verfassung? Ein Leitfaden zum Vertrag von Lissabon', *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*, 67, 1141–217 (www.zaoerv.de/67_2007/67_2007_4_b_1141_1218.pdf)
- Mazzucelli, C. (2007) 'Drawing Lessons in the Chair: Assessing the Dutch Presidency's Impact during the Maastricht and Amsterdam Conferences', in Beach, D. and Mazzucelli, C. (eds) *Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 38–57
- Melchionni, M.G. and Ducci, R. (eds) (2007) *La Genèse des Traités de Rome: Entretiens inédites avec 18 acteurs et témoins de la négociation* (Paris: Economica)
- Mendez de Vigo, I. and Stubb, A. (2005) 'A Five-Step Plan to Get Europe's Constitution on Track', *Financial Times*, 20 September, p. 23
- Merkel, A. (2006a) *Europa ist unsere Zukunft*, Speech to the WDR Europa-Forum, Berlin, 9 May (www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/060509_rede_merkel_europatag.pdf)
- Merkel, A. (2006b) 'Die deutsche Präsidentschaft der Europäischen Union zum Erfolg führen', *Deutsche Bundestag – Stenografischer Bericht*, 73. Sitzung, Berlin, 14 December, pp. 7210–14 (<http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16073.pdf>)
- Merkel, A. (2007a) *Speech ... to the European Parliament*, Strasbourg, 17 January (http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/Speeches_Interviews/January/Rede_Bundeskanzlerin2.html)
- Merkel, A. (2007b) *Speech ... at the Official Ceremony to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaties of Rome*, Berlin, 25 March (www.eu2007.de/de/News/download_docs/Maerz/0324-RAA/EnglishBk.pdf)

- Merkel, A. (2007c) *Policy Statement: Preview of the European Council Summit from 21 to 22 June 2007*, Berlin, 14 June (www.bundesregierung.de/nn_919436/Content/EN/Regierungserklaerung/2007/06/2007-06-14-regierungserklaerung-eu-gipfel_en.html)
- Miller, V. (2007) 'EU Reform: A New Treaty or an Old Constitution?' *House of Commons Library Research Paper*, 07/64, 24 July (www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-064.pdf)
- Miller, V. and Taylor, C. (2007) 'The EU Reform Treaty: Amendments to the Treaty on European Union', *House of Commons Library Research Paper*, 07/80, 22 November (www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-080.pdf)
- Millward Brown IMS (2008) *Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum Research Findings*, September
- Milton, G. and Keller-Noëllet, J. (2005) *The European Constitution: Its Origins, Negotiation and Meaning* (London: John Harper Publishing)
- Möller, A. (2008) 'From Idealism to Pragmatism: Germany and the Constitutional Treaty', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Rise and Fall of the EU's Constitutional Treaty* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff), pp. 145–60
- Moravcsik, A. (1991) 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community', *International Organization*, 45 (1), 19–56
- Moravcsik, A. and Nicolaïdes, K. (1999) 'Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, and Institutions', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37 (1), 59–85
- Moxon-Browne, E. (2008) 'The European Commission as a Strategic Agenda Setter: The Case of the Convention on the Future of European and the Ensuing Ratification Crisis', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Rise and Fall of the EU's Constitutional Treaty* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff), pp. 345–52
- Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. (2010) 'Deutsche Europapolitik unter Angela Merkel: Enge Gestaltungsspielräume in Krisenzeiten', in Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. et al *Deutsche Europapolitik: von Adenauer bis Merkel*, 2 Auflage (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), pp. 253–349
- Müller-Graff, P.-C. (2007) 'Die Zukunft des europäischen Verfassungstopos and Primärrechts nach der deutschen Ratspräsidentschaft', *Integration*, 30 (3), 223–37
- Nies, S. (2007) 'French Uncertainty as Liability for the German EU Presidency', *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, 8 (21), 19–24 (www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue21.pdf)
- Norman, P. (2005) *The Accidental Constitution: The Making of Europe's Constitutional Treaty* (new and revised edition) (Brussels: Eurocomment)
- Nugent, N. and Phinmore, D. (2010) 'United Kingdom: Red Lines Defended', in Carbone, M. (ed.) *National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 71–89
- O'Brennan, J. (2009) 'Ireland Says No (Again): The 12 June 2008 Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 62 (2), 258–77
- O'Neill, M. (2009) *The Struggle for the European Constitution: A Past and Future History* (Abingdon: Routledge)
- Official Journal* (1992) *Decision of the Heads of State and Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty of European Union*, C 348, 31 December

- Official Journal (2001) *Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts*, C 80, 10 March
- Official Journal (2007) *Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007*, C 306, 17 December
- Official Journal (2008) *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, C 115, 9 May
- Official Journal (2009) *Council Decision of 22 December 2009 appointing the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union for the period from 26 June 2011 to 30 June 2015*, L 347, 24 December
- Official Journal (2010a) *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, C 83, 20 March
- Official Journal (2010b) *Protocol amending the Protocol on transitional provisions annexed to the treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community*, C 263, 29 September
- Official Journal (2011) *European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro*, L 91, 6 April
- Open Europe (2008) *A Guide to the Constitutional Treaty*, 2nd Edition (London: Open Europe) (www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/guide.pdf)
- Oppermann, K. (2006) 'Die britische Ratspräsidentschaft 2005: Zwischen europäischen Erwartungen und innenpolitischen Restriktionen', *Integration*, 29 (1), 23–37
- Oppermann, K. (2013) 'The Politics of Avoiding Referendums on the Treaty of Lisbon', *Journal of European Integration*, 35 (1), 73–89
- Oppermann, T. (2007) 'Die Europäische Verfassung – Auf dem Weg zu einer immer engeren Union?' in König, T. and Daimer, S. et al (2007) *WeltTrends-Papiere 2: Die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2007 – Ende der Verfassungskrise?* (Potsdam: WeltTrends), pp. 6–16 (<http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2009/3170/pdf/wt02.pdf>)
- Paterson, W. (2007) 'The German Presidency of the European Union: A British Perspective', *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, 8 (21), 25–34 (www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue21.pdf)
- Pech, L. (2008) 'Ireland', in Koeck, H.F. and Karollus, M.M. (eds) (2008) *Preparing the European Union for the Future? Necessary Revisions of Primary Law After the Non-Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), pp. 213–66
- Pescatore, P. (1981) 'Les Travaux du "Groupe Juridique" dans la Négociation des Traités de Rome', *Studia Diplomatica*, 34 (1–4), 159–78
- Pfetsch, F.R. (2012) 'Germany's Role with Regard to the Reform Process of the EU', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Making of the EU's Lisbon Treaty: The Role of Member States* (Bern: Peter Lang), pp. 59–74
- Pick, O. (2007) 'The German Presidency – A View from Prague', *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, 8 (21), 61–4 (www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue21.pdf)
- Pijpers, A. (2007) 'Neue Nüchternheit und kritische Öffentlichkeit – die Niederlande und die europäische Integration', *Integration*, 20 (4), 449–62

- Piris, J.-C. (2006a) *The Constitution for Europe – A Legal Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
- Piris, J.-C. (2006b) *Le Traité constitutionnel pour l'Europe: une analyse juridique* (Bruxelles: Bruylant)
- Piris, J.-C. (2007) *Il processo di riforma dell'UE: Il trattato costituzionale nella prospettiva del trattato di riforma* (Roma: Cide – Centro nazionale di informazione e documentazione europea)
- Piris, J.-C. (2010) *The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
- Ponzano, P., Ziller, J. and Pii, S. (2007) 'Un référendum européen pour la Constitution européenne – problèmes juridiques et politiques', *RSCAS Policy Paper*, 2007/01, Florence (<http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/6953>)
- Portuguese Council Presidency (2007) *Informal European Council – Lisbon, 18–19 October 2007 – Presidency Press Release*, Lisbon, October
- Portuguese Government (2007) *Portuguese Presidency of the Council – A Stronger Union for a Better World, July–December 2007*, Lisbon
- Pöttering, H.-G. (2007) *Address by the President of the European Parliament at the Meeting of the European Council* (www.europarl.europa.eu/former_presidents/pottering/speeches/en/files/sp0035.htm)
- Quaglia, L. (2010) 'Italy: The Importance of Party Politics in Treaty Negotiations', in Carbone, M. (ed.) *National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 90–107
- Quinlan, S. (2009) 'The Lisbon Treaty Referendum 2008', *Irish Political Studies*, 24 (1), 107–21
- Qvortrup, M. (2009) 'Rebels Without a Cause? The Irish Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty', *The Political Quarterly*, 80 (1), 59–66
- Raad van State (2007) *A request for advice on the mandate of the Intergovernmental Conference to revise the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community*, W02.07.0254/II/E, 12 September (via www.raadvanstate.nl)
- Rasmussen, A.F. (2007) *Address by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Meeting with the Diplomatic Corps in Copenhagen on January, 12, 2007* (Copenhagen: Statsministeriet) (http://www.stm.dk/_p_11174.html)
- Reh, C. (2009) 'The Lisbon Treaty: De-Constitutionalizing the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47 (3), 625–50
- Reuters (2007a) 'France says agrees with Britain on EU treaty', 7 June (<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/06/07/uk-eu-treaty-idUKL0753627420070607>)
- Reuters (2007b) 'EU ministers upbeat on treaty deal', 15 October (<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/10/15/uk-eu-treaty-idUKL148287620071015>)
- Reuters (2007c) 'EU and Bulgaria agree to defer row over euro name' (<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/10/12/uk-eu-montenero-bulgaria-idUKHO27984320071012>)
- Reynolds, P. (2007) 'How Spin Muddies EU Foreign Policy Debate', *BBC News*, 24 June (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6235152.stm>)
- Riccardi, F. (2007a) 'Relaunching the Constitution: Mission (Nearly) Impossible', *Agence Europe*, 9 February, p. 3

- Riccardi, F. (2007b) 'Constitutional Debate is Resumed in France – Significant Contributions', *Agence Europe*, 27 January, pp. 3–4
- Riccardi, F. (2007c) 'Five Factors Could Make End of Year Deadline for Signing New European Treaty', *Agence Europe*, 28 March, pp. 3–4
- Riccardi, F. (2007d) 'Progress on the "Roadmap" to the New European Treaty has not Absorbed Fundamental Differences Among Member States on EU Policies', *Agence Europe*, 15 May, pp. 3–4
- Riccardi, F. (2007e) 'Preparation of a new European treaty: Latest developments', 7 June, p. 3
- Rovná, L. and Kasáková, Z. (2010) 'The Czech Republic: An Uncomprehending and Difficult Partner?' in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Making of the EU's Lisbon Treaty: The Role of Member States* (Bern: Peter Lang), pp. 173–205
- Roy, J. (2008) 'Between Cherry-Picking and Salvaging the Titanic: Spain and the Rescuing of the Essence of the EU Constitution', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Rise and Fall of the EU's Constitutional Treaty* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff), pp. 123–44
- Roy, J. (2012) 'The Lisbon Treaty and Spain: Background, Context and Impact', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Making of the EU's Lisbon Treaty: The Role of Member States* (Bern: Peter Lang), pp. 143–70
- Rüger, C. (2007) 'Mission erfüllt? Zur Bilanz der deutschen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft', *Einsichten und Perspektiven*, 02/2007 (http://192.68.214.70/blz/eup/02_07/4.asp)
- Sarkozy, N. (2006a) *Vortrag des Ministers für Inneres und Raumordnung – Nicolas Sarkozy*, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung/Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Berlin, 16 February
- Sarkozy, N. (2006b) *Intervention devant Friends of Europe/Amis d'Europe et la Fondation Robert Schuman*, Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels, 8 September
- Sarkozy, N. (2007a) *Je veux que l'Europe change*, Strasbourg, 21 February (www.u-m-p.org/site/index.php/ump/s_informer/discours/je_veux_que_l_europe_change)
- Sarkozy, N. (2007b) *Allocution de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, à l'occasion de la grande réunion publique sur le thème de l'Europe*, Strasbourg, 2 July (http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Allocution-du-President-Sarkozy-a_9200 – accessed 17 May 2012)
- Sarkozy, N. (2008a) *Un Traité pour l'Europe* (Paris: Dalloz)
- Sarkozy, N. (2008b) *Discours devant le Parlement européen*, Strasbourg, 16 December (<http://www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank/pdf/president-5238.pdf> – accessed 28 October 2011)
- Sarkozy, N. (2008c) *Allocution de Monsieur le Président de la République après le vote de la loi autorisant la ratification du Traité de Lisbonne*, Palais de l'Élysée, 10 février (via www.elysee.fr)
- Schmit, N. and Navarro, A. (2007) *Pour une Europe meilleure*, Madrid, 26 January (<http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2007/01/navarro1/index.html>)
- Schout, A. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2006) 'Evaluating Presidencies of the Council of the EU: Revisiting Nice', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44 (5), 1051–77
- Schünemann, W.J. (2010) 'Wieder ein Sieg der Angst? Das zweite irische Referendum über den Lissabon-Vertrag in der Analyse', *Integration*, 33 (3), 224–39
- Schwall-Düren, A. (2006) *The Way out of Europe's Constitutional Crisis* (London: Freidrich Ebert Stiftung)

- Schwarzer, D. (2008) 'The "Berlin Declaration" – Trial Run for Negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty', in Kietz, D. and Perthes, V. (eds) *The Potential of the Council Presidency: An Analysis of Germany's Chairmanship of the EU, 2007*, SWP Research Paper 2008/RP 01, January, pp. 19–24
- Secretaría de Estado para la Unión Europea, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (2006) *El futuro de la Unión Europea: Informe del Gobierno al Congreso de los Diputados*, 9 February (<http://ribei.org/1091/1/DT-002-2006.pdf>)
- Seeger, S. and Emmanouilidis, J.A. (2007) 'Ausweg oder Labyrinth? Analyse und Bewertung des Mandats für die Regierungskonferenz', *CAP Analyse*, 5, Juli (www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/CAP-Analyse-2007-05.pdf)
- Seldon, A. (2008) *Blair Unbound* (London: Pocket Books)
- Shaw, J. (2008) 'The Constitutional Development of Citizenship in the EU Context: With or Without the Treaty of Lisbon', in Pernice, I. and Tanchev, E. (eds) *Ceci N'est Pas Une Constitution – Constitutionalisation Without a Constitution?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), pp. 104–18
- Siebertson, S.C. (2008) *Dividing Lines Between the European Union and its Member States: The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon* (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press)
- Silberberg, R. (2006) *Ausblick auf die deutsche EU-Präsidentschaft: Stand der Vorbereitung in der Bundesregierung*, Berlin, 4 October (www.auswaertigesamt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2006/061004-SilberbergEuropa.html)
- Sinnott, R. and Elkind, J.A. (2010) *Attitudes and Behaviour in the Second Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon: Report prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs*, July (www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/EU%20Division/attitudes%20and%20behaviour%20second%20referendum2010.pdf)
- Sinnott, R., Elkind, J.A., O'Rourke, K. and McBride, J. (2009) *Attitudes and Behaviour in the Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon: Report prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs*, 6 March (www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/uploads/documents/ucd%20geary%20institute%20report.pdf)
- Ślōmczyński, W. and Życzkowski, K. (2010) 'Jagiellonian Compromise – An Alternative Voting System for the Council of the European Union', in Cichocki, M.A. and Życzkowski, K. (eds) *Institutional Design and Voting Power in the European Union* (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 43–58
- Šlosarčík, I. (2009) 'The Treaty of Lisbon and the Czech Constitutional Court: Act II', *CEPS Policy Brief*, No. 197, October (www.ceps.be/book/treaty-lisbon-and-czech-constitutional-court-act-ii)
- Šlosarčík, I. (2010) 'Czech Republic 2006–2008: On President, Judges and the Lisbon Treaty', *European Public Law*, 16 (1), 1–16
- Steinmeier, F-W. (2006) *Rede in der Haushaltsdebatte des Deutschen Bundestags*, 6 September (<http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16046.pdf>)
- Steinmeier, F-W. (2007) *Interview to the Berliner Morgenpost: Europe Turns 50*, 21 March (www.auswaertigesamt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Interview/2007/070321-MoPo-EU.html)
- Süddeutsche Zeitung* (2007) 'SZ-Interview mit Vaclav Havel "Die größte Gefahr für Europa ist Europa selbst"', 17 April (via www.sueddeutsche.de)
- Sunday Business Post* (2009a) 'Polls show Lisbon Treaty support remains strong', 13 September (via www.sbpost.ie)
- Sunday Business Post* (2009b) 'Poll shows Yes side on course for Lisbon win', 27 September (via www.sbpost.ie)

- Sunday Independent* (2009a) 'FF facing wipeout in Budget backlash', 19 April (via www.independent.ie)
- Sunday Independent* (2009b) 'FF hits new poll low but Lisbon looks like a "Yes"', 13 September (via www.independent.ie)
- Sunday Times* (2006) 'Prodi plan to leave Britain out in EU cold', 16 April (www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2136355,00.html)
- Tallberg, J. (2005) 'The Power of Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU Negotiations', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42 (5), 999–1022
- Tallberg, J. (2007) 'The EU Presidency: France in the 2000 IGC', in Beach, D. and Mazzucelli, C. (eds) *Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 22–37
- The Economist* (2006b) 'Back to the constitution', 19 December (www.economist.com/node/8450162)
- The Economist* (2006a) 'Europe's future: a venture at a standstill', 25 May (www.economist.com/node/6971160)
- The Economist* (2007a) 'Sarkozy plays the Hungarian card', 14 June (www.economist.com/blogs/certainideasofeurope/2007/06/sarkozy_plays_the_hungarian_ca)
- The Economist* (2007b) 'Poland and the European Union: The square root or death', 16 June, p. 42
- The Economist* (2007c) 'Europe: Treaty blues', 30 June, p. 52
- The Economist* (2007d) 'Europe's hold-out', 9 October (www.economist.com/node/9932934)
- The Guardian* (2005) 'Barroso's last rites for EU charter', 2 September, p. 17
- The Guardian* (2006) 'Hoon risks row with plan to reform EU', 3 November, p. 16
- The Guardian* (2007a) 'Germany pushes fast-track strategy for EU constitution', 9 March, p. 19
- The Guardian* (2007b) 'MPs point to flaws in Brown's "red line" EU treaty safeguards', 10 October, p. 15
- The Guardian* (2007c) 'Britain has reinforced its red lines on treaty, says Miliband', 16 October, p. 13
- The Guardian* (2007d) 'Brown flies to Lisbon for belated EU treaty signing', 13 December (www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/dec/13/politics.world)
- The Independent* (2007a) 'Merkel seeks treaty giving EU more powers by 2009', 26 March (via www.independent.co.uk)
- The Independent* (2007b) 'UK threatens to spoil EU deal on "mini constitution"', 19 June (via www.independent.co.uk)
- The Times* (2006) 'Merkel set for lonely battle to resurrect full EU constitution', 4 December (via www.timesonline.co.uk)
- The Times* (2007a) 'Leaders agree on a date to raise treaty from the dead', 26 March (via www.timesonline.co.uk)
- The Times* (2007b) 'British officials seek protection for foreign policy in EU treaty', 12 September (via www.timesonline.co.uk)
- The Times* (2007c) 'Treaty signing farce blights EU Showpiece', 2 November (via www.timesonline.co.uk)
- The Times* (2009a) 'Czech Republic "planning to delay signing Lisbon Treaty"', 21 September (www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6841622.ece)

- The Times* (2009b) 'Czech Cabinet in emergency session to force President Klaus to sign Lisbon Treaty', 12 October (www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6870167.ece)
- Thym, D. (2007) 'Ratifikation des Verfassungsvertrags: Neue Ära im europäischen Verfassungsrecht oder rechtliche Unsicherheit?' in König, T. and Daimer, S. et al (2007) *WeltTrends-Papiere 2: Die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2007 – Ende der Verfassungskrise?* (Potsdam: WeltTrends), pp. 7–34 (<http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2009/3170/pdf/wt02.pdf>)
- Thym, D. (2009) 'In the Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court', *Common Market Law Review*, 46 (6), 1795–822
- Tonra, B. (2009) 'The 2009 Irish Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 5 (3), 472–9 (www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/article/view/249/171)
- Trzaskowski, R. (2006) 'Nice is not as nasty as you might think', *European Voice*, 13 July, p. 9
- US Embassy Berlin (2007) 'German Presidency sees Climate/Energy and Progress on Constitution as Top Priorities', 07BERLIN520, 13 March (<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/03/07BERLIN520.html>)
- US Embassy Warsaw (2007) 'Will Poland Use its Veto on the EU Constitutional Treaty?' 07WARSAW1338, 8 June (<http://leaks.hohesc.us/?view=07WARSAW1338>)
- Ústavní Soud (2009) *Treaty of Lisbon and Its Ratification are Not Inconsistent with the Czech Constitution*, Brno, 3 November (<http://www.usoud.cz/view/2136>)
- van Rompuy, H. (2011) *Towards a Stronger Economic Union – Interim Report*, Brussels, 6 December
- van Rompuy, H. (2012) *Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union*, Brussels, 5 December
- Verhofstadt, G. (2005) *The United States of Europe: Manifesto for a New Europe* (London: Federal Trust)
- Walker, N. (2006) 'A Constitutional Reckoning', *Constellations*, 13 (2), 140–50
- Walker, N. (2008) 'Not the European Constitution', *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law*, 15 (1), 135–41
- Wallström, M. (2006) 'Constitution: From Reflection to Action', *European Voice*, 26 June, p. 9
- Walsh, D.J. (2012) 'Ratification by Referendum. How Ireland Changed from No to Yes', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Making of the EU's Lisbon Treaty: The Role of Member States* (Bern: Peter Lang), pp. 261–72
- Weidenfeld, W. (2008) 'Der Vertrag von Lissabon als historischer Schritt der Integration Europas – Aufbruch aus der Krise', in Weidenfeld, W. (Hrsg) *Lissabon in der Analyse: Der Reformvertrag der Europäischen Union* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), pp. 13–27
- Wessels, W. and Faber, A. (2007) 'Vom Verfassungskonvent zurück zur "Methode Monnet"? Die Entstehung der "Road Map" zum EU-Reformvertrag unter deutscher Ratspräsidentschaft', *Integration*, 20 (4), 370–81
- Wilga, M. (2008) 'Poland and the Constitutional Treaty: A Short Story About a "Square Root"?' in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Rise and Fall of the EU's Constitutional Treaty* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff), pp. 225–48

- Wilga, M. and Karolewski, I.P. (2012) 'Poland Fighting its Cause in the EU: A Long Story about the Lisbon Treaty', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Making of the EU's Lisbon Treaty: The Role of Member States* (Bern: Peter Lang), pp. 207–36
- Wolinetz, S. (2008) 'Trimming the Sails: The Dutch and the EU Constitution after the Referendum', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Rise and Fall of the EU's Constitutional Treaty* (Leiden: Nijhoff), pp. 181–200
- Zaun, N. (2008) 'Portugal: Das Parlament ratifiziert ein "historisches" Ergebnis', in Lieb, J. et al, *In 27+X Schritte: Die Ratifikation und Umsetzung der Lissabonner Vertrag*, SWP Diskussionspapier, Berlin, March, pp. 85–8
- Ziller, J. (2008a) *Les nouveaux traités européens: Lisbonne et après* (Paris: Montchrestien)
- Ziller, J. (2008b) 'The Law and Politics of the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty', in Griller, S. and Ziller, J. *The Treaty of Lisbon: EU Constitutionalism Without a Constitutional Treaty?* (Wien: Springer), pp. 309–35
- Ziller, J. (2012) 'The Treaty of Lisbon: Constitutional Treaty, Episode II', in Laursen, F. (ed.) *Designing the European Union: From Paris to Lisbon* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 244–68
- Zwolski, K. (2009) 'Euthanasia, Gay Marriage and Sovereignty: The Polish Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 5 (3), 491–9 (www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/article/view/248/173)

Index

- abortion, 163, 190, 254n18
absorption capacity, 250n48
accession criteria, 135–6 *see also*
 Copenhagen criteria,
 enlargement
accession treaties, 194, 196, 203, 207,
 255n28, 258n48
 Croatia, 193, 255n33
 Romania and Bulgaria, 230n16
Action Committee for European
 Democracy, 39, 230n8, 231n23,
 231n24
Adamkus, Valdas, 99, 100, 121, 122,
 126
Advocates-general, 161, 168, 169,
 171, 251n55, 251n56
Ahern, Bertie, 44, 49, 100, 143, 180,
 236n13
Ahern, Dermot, 249n47
Åland Islands, 257n46
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
 Europe (ALDE), 113, 153
Amado, Luís, 157
Amato, Guigliano, 8, 16, 25, 39,
 230n8, 231n23, 244n4
amending treaties, 1, 4, 7, 14, 16, 17,
 41, 64, 66–7, 71, 73, 76–8, 85–6,
 89, 95–6, 102–44, 107, 111, 113,
 126, 130, 134–5, 137–8, 145–6,
 147, 172–3, 177, 179, 211–16,
 218, 222–3, 229n1, 239n41,
 244n4, 253n7, 254n9
Angel Moratinos, Miguel, 44, 62
Ansip, Andrus, 49, 100
anthem, 5–6, 38, 86, 111, 138
area of freedom, security and justice
 (AFSJ), 136, 142, 146, 164–5,
 166–8, 197, 249n47
Article 136 TFEU, 223–4
Article 48 TEU, 143, 149, 177, 207,
 212, 222–4, 244n10
Ashton, Catherine, 205
asylum, 5, 77–8, 235n5
ATTAC, 40
Austria, 19, 23, 56, 89, 100, 162,
 169–70, 172, 182, 284, 187, 218,
 243n33, 250n48, 257n44
 Council Presidency (2006), 22–4,
 27, 32, 37
Auswärtiges Amt (Germany), 51, 53,
 226, 233n21
Balkenende, Jan-Peter, 36–8, 50, 51,
 61, 76–8, 100, 123, 138, 181, 217,
 235n7, 242n25, 253n6
Barnier, Michel, 34, 231n23
Barón Crespo, Enrique, 101, 153,
 250n51
Barroso, José Manuel, 21, 25, 28,
 31–2, 35, 56, 62, 97, 129, 161,
 205, 219, 231n23, 234n28,
 239n45
Barrot, Jacques, 40
Basic Treaty, 40
Basic Treaty for Europe, 29
Bayrou, François, 230n17, 230n18
Beckett, Margaret, 85, 92, 234n3,
 238n41, 250n55, 240n2
Belgium, 56, 89, 91, 123, 136, 159,
 174, 182, 184, 186, 187, 230n15,
 243n33
Beneš decrees, 202, 203, 257n44
Berlin Declaration, 2, 14, 49, 52, 55,
 60, 66–70, 72–4, 77, 79, 81, 84,
 88, 98, 126, 131, 232n10, 234n27
Berlusconi, Silvio, 30
Berman, Paul, 45
Blair, Tony, 21, 23, 35, 44, 49, 70, 78,
 85–7, 95, 100, 113, 116–17,
 119–20, 122–3, 125, 128, 165,
 211, 217, 230n20, 239n44,
 239n48, 239n51, 241n11, 248n38
Blanchet, Thérèse, 22, 54, 65–6, 107,
 121, 138, 145, 157, 233n22,
 233n23, 239n42
Bonde, Jens-Peter, 81, 87, 143

- Borrell Fontelles, Josep, 53, 232n3, 233n20
- Bot, Bernard, 36–8
- Brok, Elmar, 101, 153, 250n51
- Brown, Gordon, 44, 87, 120, 162, 174, 181–2, 186, 194, 211, 248n27, 249n46, 252n66
- Budget, 85, 121, 128, 225
- Bulgaria, 43, 45, 56, 168–9, 182, 184, 187, 230n16, 251n52
- Bundesverfassungsgericht (Karlsruhe), 187–8, 199 *see also* Constitutional Courts – Germany
- Bursik, Martin, 236n18
- Cameron, David, 224, 226, 256n35
- candidate countries, 17, 229n2, 245n8
- Carnero González, Carlos, 22
- Cavaco Silva, Anibal, 161
- Charter of Fundamental Rights, 5, 7, 34, 38, 40, 66, 74, 77, 81, 84, 86–7, 89, 94–5, 99, 101, 103–5, 111, 113, 116, 120–1, 123, 135–9, 150, 163–5, 167–8, 174, 197, 201–4, 221, 238n35, 238n38, 240n4, 244n7, 248n32, 249n47, 250n51, 256n42, 258n2
- Chefsache, 53, 55, 105, 107, 109, 213, 219, 222, 224
- cherry-picking, 26, 29, 24, 36, 85, 166
- Chirac, Jacques, 19, 21, 33, 61, 82
- Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 29, 72, 118, 242n25, 256n32
- Christian Social Union (CSU), 256n32
- Christianity, 43, 84, 237n28
- Cichocki, Marek, 58, 82–3, 115, 128, 153, 237n24, 237n26
- citizens' initiative, 35, 40, 77, 113, 140, 206
- citizenship, 159, 247n21, 250n48
- Civic Democratic Party (ODS), 81, 189
- climate change, 62, 77, 89, 91, 101, 118, 135, 136, 142, 221, 236n13
- Cloos, Jim, 54–5, 93, 130
- co-decision, 7, 33–4, 113, 223 *see also* ordinary legislative procedure
- Colonna, Catherine, 33, 57
- Commission, 4–6, 11, 16–17, 21–2, 24–5, 28, 30–1, 34–5, 39–43, 49–50, 53–4, 56, 62, 66, 70, 72, 84, 86, 93–4, 102, 112, 117, 119, 123, 131, 134, 140, 145, 149–51, 153–4, 156, 159–60, 162, 166, 169–70, 172–3, 175–6, 190–2, 195–6, 199–201, 205–9, 216, 218–19, 222–5, 227–8, 232n8, 233n17, 233n18, 234n28, 234n2, 239n45, 241n14, 243n34, 247n25, 250n48, 254n20
- Commissioners, 17, 40, 44, 229n7, 230n8, 231n23, 246n18, 250n48, 254n18, 255n21
- Plan D, 21–2, 24, 40
- Size, 5, 66, 131, 134, 140, 159, 190–1, 200, 208, 233n17, 233n18, 243n34, 250n48, 255n21, 258n52
- Commission Legal Service, 145, 175, 247n22
- Committee of the Regions, 245n2, 246n11, 247n21, 259n7
- Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 4–5, 74, 84, 94, 103–4, 111, 113, 117, 119, 135–6, 138–41, 159, 163, 196–7, 240n55, 240n4, 241n13
- Common Travel Area, 168
- communitarization of pillar III, 116, 142, 164, 166
- competences, 4, 6, 16, 18, 27, 28, 81, 84, 86, 91, 93–5, 98, 101, 103, 111, 113, 116, 118, 135–6, 138–9, 141, 160, 172, 191, 203, 219, 223–4, 244n10, 250n50, 251n59, 252n62
- competition, 119–20, 128, 135–6, 213, 241n14, 241n16
- conscriptio, 190, 194, 198, 154n18
- Constitutional Courts
- Czech Republic, 189, 201, 204, 254n14, 254n16, 256n39, 256n41
- Germany, 188, 199, 231n30 *see also* Bundesverfassungsgericht

- constitutional language, 89, 93,
102–3, 113, 132, 179, 213–14,
221
- Constitutional Treaty, 1–10, 12–14,
16–46, 47–9, 51–5, 59–71, 72–92,
94–9, 101–3, 105–8, 109–11, 113,
115, 118–20, 123–8, 130–2, 133,
135, 138, 143–4, 147, 153,
159–60, 165, 167, 174, 176–7,
178–9, 181, 209–10, 211–22,
227–8, 229n1, 229n2, 230n8,
230n10, 230n11, 230n12,
230n15, 230n16, 231n23,
231n24, 231n27, 231n1, 232n5,
232n13, 232n15, 233n22,
234n29, 236n13, 236n17,
236n18, 237n26, 237n28,
238n32, 238n34, 238n38,
239n44, 239n45, 241n14, 245n2,
245n9, 247n22, 247n 25, 248n38,
254n20
- draft, 17, 229n7, 236n16, 246n13
- Dutch Referendum and rejection,
1–3, 7–9, 13, 17–18, 20, 36–7,
45–7, 61, 63, 65, 72, 76–7, 80,
176–9, 211, 214–15, 218, 220,
228
- French Referendum and rejection,
1–3, 7–9, 13, 17–20, 31–6, 45–7,
60, 63, 65, 72, 76, 80, 127,
176–9, 211, 214–15, 218, 220,
228
- Ratification, 17–21, 23, 39, 42, 44–6
- constitutionalization, 8, 16, 221, 227
- convention-method, 35, 52, 64, 79,
207, 213, 220–2, 225–6, 228
- Copenhagen criteria, 39, 89, 91, 114
see also accession criteria,
enlargement
- Corbett, Richard, 22
- COREPER, 49, 55, 97, 105, 151, 154,
168, 245n2 *see also* Permanent
Representatives
- Corsepius, Uwe, 53–4, 56, 71, 74–6,
92–4, 96, 108, 125, 216, 232n5,
257n45
- Council
Agriculture and Fisheries Council,
151
- Klosterneuburg (informal) (May
2006), 27, 30, 66
- Viano de Castelo (informal)
(September 2007), 150, 154,
157–63
- Council Legal Service, 9–10, 29, 40–1,
54, 65, 75, 92, 106–7, 112, 123,
125, 129, 134, 138, 145–6, 148,
153, 156, 160–1, 164, 215–16,
218–19, 227, 233n24, 239n42,
252n68 *see also* Piris, Jean-Claude
- Council Presidency, 10–11, 13, 31,
153, 175, 214, 227, 243n28,
245n8 *see also* individual member
states
- Council Secretariat, 10–11, 29, 40–1,
43, 54, 67, 73–5, 95, 106–7, 112,
115, 125, 129–30, 150, 153, 190,
206, 215–16, 218–19, 227
- counterterrorism, 77, 141, 235n5,
248n40
- Court of Auditors, 246n11, 247n25
- Cowen, Brian, 185–6, 190, 192–4,
196, 199
- Croatia, 192–3, 207–8, 255n23,
255n28, 258n48
- Cyprus, 20, 56, 182, 186–7
- Czech Protocol, 3, 201–5, 207–8
- Czech Republic, 9, 17, 32, 56, 62, 65,
70, 74, 76, 80–2, 94–5, 112–13,
115, 131, 136, 171–2, 178, 180,
182, 186–9, 201–5, 208, 236n18,
239n45, 250n50, 253n8,
254n14, 254n17, 256n36,
257n42, 259n10
- Council Presidency, 189, 192
- D'Alema, Massimo, 231n24, 250n49
- Darroch, Kim, 29, 174, 248n29
- de Boissieu, Pierre, 54–5, 93, 130,
257n45
- de Gucht, Karel, 174
- de Serpa Soares, Miguel, 157–8, 161
- declarations, 1–2, 6, 22, 26, 41, 111,
119, 135–6, 139, 141, 143, 145,
155, 171–3, 189–92, 199, 221,
229n2, 246n11, 248n32, 252n62
- defence policy, 5, 62, 86, 192, 194,
196–8, 206, 223, 255n24

- democratic principles, 20, 103, 113,
138–40, 197 *see also* Commission
– Plan D
- Denmark, 7, 17, 19, 27, 56, 62, 74,
76, 80–1, 87–8, 95, 98, 111, 114,
160, 165, 178–9, 181–2, 185,
187, 192, 209, 214, 231n6,
241n8, 243n28, 253n7, 255n22,
255n24, 259n7
- Directives, 6, 138 *see also* framework
laws
- Doha round, 239n49
- double majority voting, 7, 34, 39, 66,
74, 82–4, 94–5, 98, 100, 103, 105,
107, 109, 113–16, 119–23, 127–8,
136, 140, 162, 217, 221, 236n22,
237n23, 237n24, 242n23
- double-hatting, 73
- Douste-Blazy Philippe, 33, 43
- draft IGC Mandate *see*
Intergovernmental Conferences –
2007 – draft mandate
- Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European
Community (2007), 144–6 *see*
also Reform Treaty – draft
- Draft Treaty embodying a Statute for
a European Political Community
(1953), 221
- Draft Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe (2003),
1–2, 6, 12 *see also* Constitutional
Treaty – draft
- Draft Treaty establishing the
European Union (1984), 221
- Duff, Andrew, 8, 22, 26, 39, 153, 208,
226, 245n9, 250n51
- Economic and Social Committee,
245n2, 246n11, 247n21,
259n7
- education, 77, 191, 194–7, 235n5
- Emergency brakes, 113, 141
- energy, 37–8, 62, 74, 77, 84, 91, 98,
101, 118, 127, 135–6, 142, 221–2,
235n5, 251n56
- enhanced cooperation, 35, 91, 111,
113, 123, 128, 135, 137–40
- Enlargement
2004, 1–2, 169, 222, 243n28,
255n28
2007, 1–2, 43, 45, 230n16
to include Croatia, 225n28
see also Copenhagen criteria, 5–6,
38–9, 66, 77, 85, 119, 221,
241n7
- Equal Influence System, 83, 114
- Estonia, 26, 57, 89, 100, 182, 184,
187, 230n15
- euro – spelling, 149, 168–9, 171,
250n52
- European Atomic Energy Community
(EAEC), 244n9
- European Central Bank (ECB), 79,
149–50, 160, 171, 224, 246n11,
247n24, 247n25, 250n47
- European Communities, 4, 18,
244n9
- European Community (EC), 5, 103,
138
- European Convention (2002–2003),
2, 6, 8–9, 11–12, 14, 16–17, 25–6,
33–4, 39, 41, 46, 54, 81, 83, 124,
230n9, 231n23, 233n22, 231n11,
243n1, 244n4, 246n13
- European Convention on Human
Rights, 87, 113, 141
- European Council, 2–4, 10, 25–6, 28,
42, 46, 48, 53–4, 79, 88, 95,
97–100, 106–7, 125–6, 132, 137,
140–1, 151–2, 171–2, 192, 198,
201, 207–8, 215, 217, 221–4, 226,
244n10, 246n11, 246n15,
252n65, 255n21, 258n52, 259n6,
259n7
- December 1992, 255n22
- December 2001, 1, 6
- June 2004, 2
- June 2005, 2, 13, 19
- October 2005 (informal – Hampton
Court), 21
- December 2005, 22, 29
- June 2006, 2, 23, 28, 30, 37, 48, 50,
66, 106
- December 2006, 43–6, 48, 52–3,
80
- March 2007, 49, 68, 237n30

- European Council – *continued*
- June 2007, 2, 7, 10, 13, 19, 37, 39, 47–9, 52, 55, 66, 71, 72–3, 87, 90, 92, 96–106, 109–10, 112–32, 133–8, 142–4, 146–7, 148–9, 152–3, 157–8, 162, 165, 167, 174, 176, 217, 220, 237n28, 238n36, 239n50, 240n55, 241n11, 241n12, 241n14, 242n21, 243n3, 244n5, 245n2, 245n6, 250n49, 259n4
 - October 2007 (informal – Lisbon), 3, 10, 13, 144, 148, 150–1, 153–4, 161–2, 168–73, 175, 177, 218, 247n26, 250n52, 251n54, 251n56, 252n61
 - December 2007, 144, 173, 180, 205–6, 251n57, 252n64
 - June 2008, 186, 254n14
 - October 2008, 186, 190
 - December 2008, 187, 191–2, 194–5, 197, 255n23
 - June 2009, 3, 192–9, 248n49
 - September 2009 (informal), 201
 - October 2009, 3, 202–3, 248n51
 - November 2009 (informal), 205
 - December 2009, 205
 - October 2010, 224
 - March 2011, 223
 - December 2012, 226
- European Council President, 34, 66, 73, 113, 140, 201, 205–6, 224, 227
- European Court of Justice (ECJ), 84, 86, 88, 99, 141, 160, 163, 166–8, 171, 229n6, 238n35, 240n4, 249n43, 250n48, 250n51, 251n55, 251n56
- European Data Protection Supervisor, 245n2, 246n11
- European Defence Agency, 192, 198
- European Defence Community, 221
- European External Action Service, 113, 119, 206, 240n55
- European Investment Bank, 162
- European Neighbourhood Policy, 127
- European Parliament (EP),
Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 22, 39, 56, 64, 208, 233n20, 244n12
- Elections (2009), 22, 28, 31, 35, 52, 64, 66, 69, 101, 124, 126, 131, 135, 190, 199–200, 206, 216–17, 225–7, 230n17
- redistribution of seats, 161, 169, 171, 251n57
- size, 171, 173, 206–8, 252n62
- European People’s Party (EPP), 22, 26, 112, 153, 236n21
- European Public Prosecutor, 250n48, 259n7
- European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 5, 196–8
- European Stability Mechanism, 223–4
- excessive deficits, 224, 259n9
- Fico, Robert, 202, 239n48
- Finland, 26–8, 42, 44, 57, 99, 182, 184, 187, 229n5, 230n9, 231n29, 257n46
- Council Presidency (2006), 23, 27, 42–3, 45, 174
- Fiscal Compact Treaty, 224–5
- fiscal union, 224–5
- Fischer, Jan, 201
- flag, 6, 38, 86, 111, 138
- flexibility clause, 87, 117, 141, 247n21
- focal points, 11, 15, 49–50, 53–9, 65, 67–8, 71, 73–5, 79, 81–3, 86, 88–9, 92–4, 96–8, 100, 102–3, 108, 110–12, 115, 118, 120–2, 124–5, 127–9, 133–4, 137, 147, 153, 174, 213, 215–16, 218–20, 227, 232n4, 232n5, 232n8, 232n9, 232n10, 232n11, 233n20, 234n2, 234n3, 234n4, 236n17, 237n24, 237n26, 238n38, 238n41, 240n54, 240n2, 240n4, 243n31, 246n12, 248n49, 251n53, 256n42
- bilateral consultations, 47–8, 55, 59, 68, 73–5, 82, 88, 90, 92, 96, 107, 124–5, 130, 137, 147, 216, 218–19, 232n11
- multilateral meetings, 49–50, 54, 74, 96, 98, 108, 110, 181, 215
- Fotyga, Anna, 83, 105, 152–3, 161–3, 245n6, 245n7, 246n11, 247n26
- framework laws, 89, 111, 137

- France, 1, 3, 7, 9–10, 13, 17–20, 24, 31–6, 45–6, 47, 57, 63, 65, 72, 76, 78–9, 80, 89, 93, 95, 100, 109, 113, 126, 131, 136, 169, 171, 178–9, 181, 182, 187, 211, 214–15, 217–18, 220, 224, 234n1, 235n11, 239n45, 242n18, 253n8, 259n4
 Council Presidency (2000), 51
 Council Presidency (2008), 31, 35, 40, 64, 79, 191–2
- Friends of the Constitutional Treaty, 14, 35, 45, 49, 60–3, 66–7, 69, 73, 88–9, 92, 99, 113, 118, 131, 214, 216, 232n15
- Fundamental Treaty of the EU, 73, 82, 231n22
- G8 (Heiligendam), 49, 239n51
- Gál, Zoltán, 57, 236n15
- General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), 50, 105–6, 110, 150–1, 153–4, 168, 250n52
- German Council Presidency
 Questionnaire, 15, 49, 55, 75, 82, 87–92, 95–6, 103, 234n1, 238n39, 238n40, 238n41
- German Council Presidency Reports (June 2007), 14–15, 48, 101–6, 133
- Germanophobia, 127, 242n23
- Germany, 28–9, 31, 34–5, 38, 42–4, 48, 52–4, 56, 61, 63, 66, 69–70, 79–80, 83–4, 89, 91, 93, 98, 100–1, 107, 116, 127–8, 160, 162, 173, 176–7, 181, 183–4, 187–8, 199–200, 206, 214, 224–5, 230n11, 230n18, 231n28, 231n30, 232n4, 232n12, 233n21, 242n18, 242n23, 257n44, 259n7, 235n4, 235n12, 238n38, 238n39, 241n6, 242n18, 242n23, 250n48, 253n8
 Council Presidency (2007), 2, 13–15, 29–32, 34–5, 37–9, 41, 43, 45–6, 47–71, 72–108, 109–32, 133–5, 143–7, 149, 157, 174, 176–7, 209–10, 211–21, 227–8, 232n5, 232n6, 232n11, 233n19, 233n22, 234n26, 234n2, 234n3, 238n32, 238n34, 238n35, 238n40, 239n41, 239n46, 239n47, 239n49, 240n1, 242n23, 243n28, 246n12, 248n29, 252n68, 253n70, 253n6, 254n20 *see also* ‘German Council Presidency Questionnaire’, ‘German Council Presidency Reports’
- Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, 25, 33, 39, 54
- Gloser, Günter, 101–2, 232n7
- Greece, 57, 159, 183–4, 187, 243n33
- Gulliver’s Travels, 249n44
- Gusenbauer, Alfred, 49, 100
- Gyuarcsány, Ferenc, 99–100
- Harry Potter, 133, 243n1
- Havel, Vaclav, 236n14
- Heathcoat-Amory, David, 81
- Herzog, Werner, 235n11, 238n38
- High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
 Policy, 84, 96, 93, 113–14, 119, 135–6, 140, 163, 169–70, 172, 201, 205–6, 240n55, 250n51, 257n45
- Hoon, Geoff, 11, 85, 238n32
- Hubner, Danuta, 231n23
- Hungary, 57, 89, 99, 181, 183, 187, 203, 236n15, 253n8, 257n43, 257n44
- identity cards, 87, 141
- IGC Mandate *see* Intergovernmental Conferences – 2007 – mandate
- immigration, 5, 38, 62, 77, 89, 91
- Instruments of Ratification, 19, 184, 187, 194, 200, 205, 230n15, 253n1, 254n9
- intellectual property, 88, 141
- intergovernmental conferences, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 42, 66–8, 72, 75, 79, 84, 96–7, 99, 102, 148, 156–7, 175, 206, 215, 221–2, 227, 232n11, 238n34, 246n13, 247n23
 2003–2004, 6, 41, 65, 143, 153–4, 156–8, 179, 213, 220, 222, 228, 237n22, 246n13, 258n3

- intergovernmental conferences –
continued
 2007, 148–77, 209, 212–13, 216–21,
 244n10, 245n2, 245n3, 245n4,
 245n7, 245n8, 246n11,
 247n23, 248n35, 248n36,
 249n46, 249n47, 250n50,
 252n68, 253n2, 253n6
 2007 – draft mandate, 2, 13–14, 50,
 109–18, 120–4, 128, 130,
 133–4, 136, 141–2, 146, 217,
 240n2, 240n3, 240n5, 241n8
 2007 – mandate, 2, 8, 10–11, 13–15,
 50, 73, 88, 90, 94, 96–7, 99,
 103–6, 109, 121–32, 133–47,
 148–54, 156–9, 161, 163–7,
 170, 172, 174–7, 179, 181, 192,
 212, 216–18, 220–3, 227,
 242n20, 243n28, 243n32,
 243n2, 244n5, 244n7, 244n8,
 244n13, 245n2, 247n20,
 249n47, 252n68, 253n6,
 257n42
- Ioannina compromise-*bis*, 123,
 136–7, 140, 152, 161, 163,
 168–71, 173, 176, 221, 242n26,
 244n5, 250n51, 252n62
- Ireland, 7, 12, 17, 26, 44, 57, 60, 62,
 100, 137, 142, 175, 178, 180, 209,
 235n13, 236n13, 242n20, 257n42
 ‘guarantees’, 3, 193–9, 202, 243n34
 opt out/opt in arrangements, 142,
 165, 167–8, 248n37, 248n40,
 249n47
- Ratification, 1, 20, 80, 180, 183,
 183, 186–94, 199, 200, 229n3,
 253n3, 255n25
- Referendum (2008), 3, 180, 184–6,
 206, 209, 254n18
- Referendum (2009), 3, 199–201,
 209, 255n21
- Irish Protocol, 192, 194, 207–8,
 255n23, 255n29 *see also* Ireland –
 ‘guarantees’
- Italy, 19, 30, 39–40, 43, 51, 57, 61,
 63, 73, 91, 159, 161, 169, 171,
 173, 183–4, 186–7, 194, 200,
 205, 231n24, 240n42, 244n13,
 250n49
- Jagiellonian Compromise, 83, 237n25
- Jouyet, Jean-Pierre, 100
- judicial cooperation, 95, 98, 111, 113,
 116, 135, 138, 164–6
- Juncker, Jean-Claude, 40, 44, 60, 64,
 74, 121–2, 126, 128, 130, 135,
 251n53,
- Jurist linguists, 168, 173
- justice and home affairs (JHA), 5, 37,
 86, 233n18, 240n4 *see also*
 United Kingdom – opt out/opt in
 arrangements
- Justus Lipsius building, 40, 248n35
- Kaczyński, Jarosław, 82, 100, 115,
 120–2, 125, 127–8, 152, 162, 170,
 217, 237n29, 240n52, 247n26
- Kaczyński, Lech, 27, 49–50, 70, 82,
 84, 100, 115, 119–22, 125–8, 152,
 162, 169–71, 188, 200, 217,
 236n20, 237n29, 237n30,
 237n31, 240n52, 240n53,
 242n21, 242n27, 247n26,
 251n56, 252n26, 256n34
- Kalvītis, Aigars, 49, 100
- Kanzleramt (Germany), 53–4, 74, 126,
 232n5, 232n7, 239n44
- Keller-Noëllet, Jacques, 41–2, 54–5,
 93, 215, 231n27
- Klaus, Vaclav, 49, 80–1, 88, 188–9,
 192–3, 200–4, 210, 223, 236n17,
 238n38, 239n48, 240n52,
 256n35, 256n36, 256n38,
 256n39, 256n41, 256n42 257n44
- Köhler, Horst, 188, 200
- Kok, Wim, 231n23
- Kouchner, Bernard, 185
- Lamassoure, Alain, 34–5, 39, 44, 78,
 85, 232n15, 233n24, 235n11
- Latvia, 19, 57, 89, 100, 183–4, 187,
 251n53
- laws, 6, 39, 89, 111
- legal experts, 10, 15, 46, 88, 146,
 148–50, 154, 156–61, 164, 167–8,
 172, 177, 216, 218–19, 221, 227,
 245n2, 246n11, 246n17, 247n19,
 247n21, 247n23, 248n34,
 249n45, 258m52, 258n3

- legal personality, 35, 84, 89–90, 95, 99,
 103–5, 113, 118, 128, 135–6, 141
 Leinen, Jo, 39, 231n22
 Lipponen, Paavo, 231n23
 Lithuania, 58, 89, 99, 116, 122, 126,
 183–4, 187
 Lobo Antunes, Manuel, 58, 169
 Luxembourg, 17, 20, 40, 44, 60–3, 74,
 91, 103, 126, 160, 173, 183–4,
 187, 214, 243n33, 251n53

 Malta, 20, 58, 181, 183, 187, 232n8
 Martin, Micheál, 192
 McAleese, Mary, 200
 Members of the European Parliament
 (MEPs), 12, 17, 21–2, 26–8, 34,
 39, 46, 81, 82, 101, 118, 121–2,
 129, 151, 153, 159, 161, 163–4,
 169, 171, 176, 184, 206–7, 213,
 218–20, 226, 229n5, 230n10,
 233n20, 234n2, 236n21, 242n22,
 244n12, 250n49, 250n51,
 253n69, 258n50
 Mendez de Vigo, Inigo, 22, 229n5
 Merkel, Angela, 26, 28–31, 35, 38,
 42–4, 48–54, 60–1, 63–71, 72–4,
 76, 78–9, 82, 84–8, 94–102,
 106–7, 109–10, 112, 115–16,
 118–26, 129–31, 133, 137, 146,
 170, 177, 214–19, 225, 230n12,
 231n23, 232n3, 232n, 232n7,
 233n20, 233n24, 234n28, 234n4,
 237n28, 237n29, 238n38,
 238n39, 239n48, 243n28,
 244n12, 248n27, 252n69,
 253n70, 257n44, 257n45, 259n4
 Meyer-Landrut, Nikolaus, 54, 74
 Miliband, David, 162, 164, 240n6
 Milton, Guy, 41–2, 54–5, 215,
 231n27
mini traité, 34–6, 28–9, 43–4, 78, 85,
 89, 102, 126, 131, 217
 Montenegro, 251n52
 Moratinos, Miguel Angel, 44, 62
 Motto, 5–6, 111, 138
 Murphy, Jim, 246n10

 national parliaments, 6, 12, 16, 20,
 33–4, 77, 84, 93–4, 103, 111,
 113–14, 117, 119, 123, 135–6,
 138, 140–2, 163, 220–2, 228,
 119n6, 233n17, 235n5, 250n48
 Navarro, Alberto, 59, 62, 67, 120
 Netherlands, 1–3, 7–10, 13, 17–20, 24,
 27, 32, 34–9, 44–6, 47, 51, 58, 60,
 63, 65–6, 68, 72, 74, 76–8, 80–1,
 88–9, 93, 98, 100, 103, 109,
 111–14, 117–19, 123, 131, 135–6,
 138, 141–2, 159–60, 176–7,
 178–80, 183, 186–7, 193, 211–15,
 217–18, 220, 234n1, 235n5,
 235n6, 235n7, 239n45, 241n7,
 245n9, 253n5, 253n6, 255n28,
 259n7
 Neutrality, 190–2, 194–6, 198

 Official Journal, 162, 164, 174
 orange card, 119, 136, 140
 ordinary legislative procedure, 112,
 223 *see also* co-decision
 ordinary revision procedure, 207,
 222, 224
 Ośniecka-Tamecka, Ewa, 58, 83, 100,
 115, 128, 237n24, 237n26,
 243n31

 Pandora's box, 65, 101, 107, 131, 154,
 254n20
Parti socialiste (PS), 33, 36
 Party of European Socialists (PES), 22,
 113, 153
 passerelle clauses, 33
 passports, 87, 141
 Patten, Chris, 231n23
 Penelope text, 25, 229n7
 Permanent Representatives, 52, 54,
 58, 69, 80, 93, 156, 232n8,
 242n24, 248n29, 251n53 *see also*
 COREPER
 personal data protection, 87, 111,
 141, 163, 245n2, 246n11,
 247n21, 250n48, 250n51
 Petite, Michel, 175–6, 247n22,
 248n33
 pillar structure, 33, 84, 86, 90, 99,
 103–4, 113, 116, 140, 142, 169,
 164, 166, 250n48

- Piris, Jean-Claude, 9, 31, 41–2, 54–5, 65–6, 92–3, 107, 129, 135, 137, 142, 145–6, 157–61, 164, 175, 177, 216, 232n7, 233n23, 242n26, 246n14, 246n15, 246n17, 246n18, 248n35, 252n68, 258n52, 259n7
- Plassnik, Ursula, 23–4, 27, 116
- Poland, 9, 17, 19, 27, 32, 58, 60, 62, 65, 68, 70, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82–4, 87, 89, 91, 94–5, 98–100, 103, 105, 107–8, 109, 111–16, 118–23, 126–8, 130–2, 136–8, 140, 152–3, 160–4, 168–71, 176, 178–80, 183–4, 187–8, 193, 200, 202–4, 212, 215, 236n21, 236n22, 237n23, 237n24, 237n25, 237n26, 237n29, 237n30, 237n31, 239n45, 240n53, 241n9, 241n12, 242n18, 242n19, 242n20, 242n21, 242n22, 242n23, 243n31, 244n5, 245n5, 245n6, 245n7, 246n17, 248n28, 250n48, 250n51, 251n56, 251n57, 252n62, 252n63, 252n66, 253n8, 254n10, 254n13, 257n42
- police cooperation, 95, 98, 111, 113, 116, 138, 164–6
- Popens, Normunds, 57, 251n53
- Portugal, 17, 19, 44, 50, 58, 60, 62, 122, 144, 161, 172–3, 183–4, 187
- Council Presidency (2007), 3, 48, 50, 52, 64, 71, 72, 95–6, 101, 112, 124, 126, 134, 144–5, 148–59, 161–2, 164, 168–72, 175–7, 181, 217, 220, 234n26, 245n2, 247n24, 247n25, 252n61, 252n68
- Pöttering, Hans-Gert, 35, 72, 100, 118, 234n28, 239n45, 252n69
- primacy of EU law, 27, 84, 89–90, 103, 104, 111, 118, 123, 138, 243n32
- Prodi, Romano, 25, 40–1, 43, 69, 99–100, 128, 171, 229n7, 239n50, 240n52, 243n33, 250n49
- protocols, 3, 22, 41, 66, 104, 111, 116–17, 120–1, 123, 128, 135–7, 139, 141–3, 145–6, 149–50, 155–6, 163–5, 167–8, 171, 173, 189, 192–5, 196, 199, 201–4, 206–8, 218, 224, 230n8, 231n22, 231n24, 233n22, 240n20, 243n33, 244n7, 244n9, 245n7, 246n11, 247n21, 248n31, 248n31, 248n38, 248n41, 249n44, 249n47, 251n56, 252n62, 255n23, 255n28, 255n29, 257n42, 258n48, 258n49, 258n50, 258n51, 259n9
- public health, 77, 88, 141, 191, 196, 235n5
- public opinion, 22, 37, 42, 64, 184–5, 190–1, 193, 199–200, 207, 220, 248n27, 253n6
- Public services, 114, 117, 142, 190–1, 196
- qualified majority voting (QMV), 61, 83, 94, 105, 116, 120–2, 128, 140, 152, 223, 226, 233n17, 240n4, 256n32 *see also* double majority voting
- extension, 4–5, 84, 86, 95, 99, 113, 116–17, 121, 127, 134
- thresholds, 115–16, 127
- Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, 27, 49, 62, 87, 100, 232n6, 232n14, 253n7
- Rasmussen, Poul Nyrup, 113
- Ratification, 1–3, 7–9, 12–14, 16–23, 26, 29, 31–3, 35–7, 39–40, 42–4, 46, 60, 64–5, 69, 75–8, 80–1, 86–90, 101, 114, 144–5, 159, 171, 174, 177, 178–210, 214–15, 221–4, 227, 230n15, 230n16, 231n30, 234n26, 235n10, 238n37, 244n4, 252n63
- red lines, 63, 84, 86, 91, 95, 98, 108, 117, 119–21, 166–7, 169, 213–15, 217, 239n44, 249n43
- Reflection period, 2, 11, 22, 23–46, 47–8, 63, 103, 131, 212, 214
- Reform Treaty, 15, 50, 68, 96, 102–3, 105, 109–11, 113, 117, 135, 137–8, 144, 147, 149, 151–4, 156, 161, 168, 180, 231n1, 245n5, 250n52
- draft, 144–7, 148, 154, 156–60, 163–5, 172, 176–7, 216, 247n20, 247n22, 252n62

- regulations, 138, 163, 224–5
 Reinfeldt, Fredrik, 49, 100, 201
 reverse engineering, 13, 63–7, 75,
 107, 145, 216, 221
 right to life, 191, 194–5, 197
 road map, 2, 24, 51–2, 63, 60, 71, 72,
 92, 97, 101–3, 106, 109, 118, 216
 Roche, Dick, 167
 Romania, 43, 45, 58, 184, 187,
 230n16
 Royal, Ségolène, 33, 36, 78–9, 126,
 230n18, 235n12
 Russia, 126, 162

 same-sex marriage, 163
 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 21, 26, 33–6, 38–9,
 41, 43–4, 49, 62, 73, 78–9, 85, 89,
 95, 97, 100, 119, 121–2, 126–8,
 131, 135, 170, 181, 184, 201, 211,
 217, 232n15, 233n24, 235n10,
 235n11, 239n51, 240n53,
 241n14, 241n16, 243n29, 243n3,
 255n23, 257n45
 Saryusz-Wolski, Jacek, 82–3, 127,
 236n21, 237n45, 242n19
 Schengen-lovers, 164, 166
 Schönfelder, Wilhelm, 52, 69, 80,
 242n24
 Schüssel, Wolfgang, 19, 24, 26, 30,
 230n13, 230n14
 services of general economic impact,
 91, 117, 119, 135–6, 142, 162,
 191, 196, 218, 221
 sherpas, 52, 232n4 *see also* Focal
 Points
 Silberberg, Reinhard, 51, 53, 56, 59,
 61, 66, 71, 74, 92–4, 232n5
 Single European Act (SEA), 1, 3–5, 41
 Slovakia, 183–4, 187, 202, 208
 Slovenia, 50, 59, 96, 181, 183, 187,
 206, 234n26, 255n28
 Council Presidency, 206
 Social Democratic Party (SDP), 51, 63
 Social dimension, 29, 63, 66, 89, 91
 social partners, 20, 250n48
 social security, 77, 86, 114, 117, 119,
 141, 235n5, 256n42
 Sócrates, José, 49, 95–6, 157, 171–2,
 177, 181
 Solana, Javier, 149, 244n1, 257n45

 sovereignty, 86–8, 114, 181, 190, 201,
 203, 241n8
 space policy, 88, 141
 Spain, 7, 17, 19, 26, 40, 44, 59–60, 62,
 67, 73–4, 83, 105, 120, 126,
 159–60, 173, 183, 186–7, 206,
 214, 232n13, 233n19, 237n22
 special revision procedures, 223
 square root, 83, 94, 114–15, 121, 127,
 237n25, 242n19
 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 29–30, 43,
 51–2, 64–5, 68, 70, 74, 101–2,
 106, 108, 244n12
 Stuart, Gisela, 243n1
 Stubb, Alexander, 22, 229n5
 subsidiarity, 34, 38, 76–7, 94, 101,
 136, 140, 203, 221, 229n6,
 230n21, 235n5, 238n32
 Sweden, 20, 40, 59, 62, 74, 83, 100,
 118–19, 183, 187, 193, 201

 taxation, 119, 190–1, 194–5, 197,
 235n5, 254n18
 Timmermans, Frans, 77, 114
 Topolánek, Mirek, 50, 80, 100, 189,
 236n17
 trade unions, 163, 202
traité institutionnel, 79, 102, 235n10,
 235n11
traité simplifié, 44, 62, 78, 97, 102,
 126–7, 131, 135, 217, 235n10,
 239n51, 243n3, 259n4
 Transparency, 16, 33, 38, 124, 215,
 220, 247n21
 Treaties of Rome, 18
 50th anniversary of signing, 14, 25,
 30
 Treaty establishing a Constitution for
 Europe (2004), 1–2, 6, 180, 252n65
 see also Constitutional Treaty
 Treaty establishing the European
 Atomic Energy Community
 (TEAEC) (1957), 142, 145, 173,
 206, 254n11
 Treaty establishing the European
 Community (TEC) (1957), 9, 33,
 50, 65, 96, 104, 107, 109–11,
 137–8, 141–2, 145, 151, 155, 156,
 165, 168–9, 173–4, 246n18,
 247n22, 257n47, 258n2

- Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (2011), 224
- Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), 1, 3–6, 134, 142, 232n5, 253n3
- Treaty of Maastricht, 5, 65, 232n5 *see also* Treaty on European Union
- Treaty of Nice (2001), 1, 4–7, 18, 28, 34, 37, 39, 51, 52, 60, 74, 76, 82–3, 88, 90, 92, 94, 121, 134, 177, 178, 185, 209, 232n4, 237n24, 237n30, 253n3
- Treaty on European Union (TEU) (1992), 1, 4–5, 7–9, 17–18, 33, 50, 65, 96, 103, 107, 109–11, 113–16, 119, 134, 136–8, 140–2, 145, 149, 151, 155–6, 159–60, 163–4, 167, 171, 173–4, 177, 178, 192, 194, 203, 207–8, 212, 221–5, 237n26, 237n28, 241n7, 241n14, 244n10, 245n2, 247n21, 247n22, 247n25, 250n50, 253n3, 255n2, 257n47, 258n48, 258n52, 258n1, 258n2, 259n7 *see also* Treaty of Maastricht
- Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (2012) – *see* Fiscal Compact Treaty, 224–5
- Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 96, 104, 111, 116, 137–8, 141–2, 145, 160, 163, 165, 167, 173–4, 194, 196, 203–4, 206–8, 222–3, 225, 244n10, 247n21, 249n48, 250n48, 258n48, 258n2, 259n7
- Tuomioja, Erkki, 42
- Tusk, Donald, 188, 252n63
- Ukraine, 127
- Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, 5–6, 73, 84, 86, 95, 114, 135, 137, 140
- United Kingdom, 9, 17, 19–21, 34, 59–60, 62, 65, 68, 70, 74, 76, 78, 81, 84–7, 89, 91–3, 95, 99–100, 103, 105, 111, 113–14, 116–20, 123, 128, 131, 133, 135–42, 146, 151, 159, 162–9, 171, 174, 178–9, 181, 184, 186–7, 193–4, 201, 203–4, 208, 211, 213–14, 221, 224, 226, 230n12, 230n21, 234n3, 238n32, 238n33, 238n34, 239n44, 239n50, 240n55, 240n2, 240n4, 240n6, 241n13, 243n33, 244n7, 246n10, 246n14, 248n27, 248n29, 248n36, 248n40, 249n43, 249n47, 250n48, 250n51, 253n8, 255n27, 256n35, 257n45
- Council Presidency (2005), 20–3
- opt-out/opt-in arrangements, 86, 89–91, 95, 98–9, 105, 116, 120, 136, 146, 160, 162–8, 221, 247n21, 248n38, 248n39, 249n44
- university admissions quota, 162, 169–70, 218, 231n24
- values, 24–5, 30, 62, 118, 141, 149, 160
- van Rompuy, Herman, 205, 224, 226, 259n9
- Vanhanen, Matti, 26, 43, 45, 48, 230n9
- Verhagen, Maxime, 77, 114
- Verhofstadt, Guy, 21, 35, 44, 49, 100, 123, 128, 174, 226, 242n25, 243n32, 244n6
- Vitorino, António, 231n23
- Voggenhuber, Johannes, 22, 26
- Vondra, Alexandr, 241n9
- Wallström, Margot, 40, 56, 84, 231n23, 246n18
- Welle, Klaus, 56, 233n20
- Westerwelle, Guido, 225
- workers' rights, 79, 190, 193–6
- Working Party of Legal Experts, 154, 157 *see also* legal experts
- World War II, 116
- Zahradil, Jan, 56, 81, 94, 98, 236n16, 236n17, 236n18, 256n42
- Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez, 44, 50, 61, 100, 122, 128