

# Appendix 1: The Results Analysed

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## Introduction

At first glance, the outcome of the 2015 election looks like a return to normality. In 2010, no one party managed to secure an overall majority, only the second time that this had happened since 1945, and the country found itself undergoing the uncommon experience of being governed by a peacetime coalition. This time around, however, one party did manage to secure a majority and Britain returned to single-party majority government. True, at just 12 seats, the Conservatives' majority still looks rather small by the standards of many a previous post-war British election, and indeed it may not be enough to ensure that the party has a majority throughout its five-year term.<sup>1</sup> But given that at 6.6 points (in Great Britain), the Conservatives' lead in votes was rather smaller than it had been in 2010 (7.3 points), the first-past-the-post electoral system had at least proven rather more effective at delivering a clear majoritarian outcome than had been the case in 2010.

Yet if we look more closely, the outcome of the 2015 election also looks nothing like 'normal'. In many respects it represented a radical break with the past. The Liberal Democrats won fewer votes and seats than at any time since 1970 and the party lost its position as the third party in British politics, which it had occupied ever since 1922. Third place in terms of votes was now held instead by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a party that was only founded in 1993 and which had previously never managed to win more than 3% of the vote in a general election. However, when it came to seats, it was the Scottish National Party (SNP), which had hitherto never had more than 11 MPs, that now claimed the honour by winning no less than 56 of Scotland's 59 seats. In achieving that feat, the nationalists shattered Labour's previous dominance of Scottish politics, leaving the party with its worst Scottish result since 1918. Meanwhile, the Greens, who had been fighting elections for 40 years without a great deal to show for it, also secured a higher share of the vote than ever before.

One consequence of these developments is that rather than comprising one Britain-wide election, the 2015 election looks like

two separate contests – one in England and Wales, and the other in Scotland.<sup>2</sup> For, as an examination of Table A2.4 in Appendix 2 shows, the outcomes in these two parts of Britain were very different from each other. Both the Conservatives and Labour enjoyed a modest increase in support in England and Wales (the first time that this has happened since 1951), with Labour advancing the more. In Scotland both parties fell back, Labour especially so. UKIP registered a double-digit increase in its share of the vote in England and in Wales, but in Scotland barely advanced at all. Equally, the increase in support for the Greens was much weaker north of the border. Above all, not only did the SNP win almost every seat in Scotland, it also secured half the vote, whereas the party's counterpart in Wales, Plaid Cymru, barely did any better than in 2010.

We therefore have a relatively familiar question to address: how and why did the Conservatives manage to win the principal battle for power with Labour? That contest has preoccupied the analysis of many a previous British election.<sup>3</sup> But we also have three more unusual questions to consider. First, how did the Liberal Democrats manage to fall so far? Second, what lies behind the unprecedented success of UKIP on the one hand and the Greens on the other? And, third, what did happen in the apparently wholly *sui generis* contest in Scotland?

Our evidence consists of the election results themselves. In particular, we focus on how the level of support for the parties changed between 2010 and 2015, how this change varied from one kind of constituency to another, and how the parties' performances were reflected and refracted by the electoral system. This is far from being the only way of addressing our questions. Much analysis and commentary about voting behaviour is based on the evidence of sample surveys, and such surveys are invaluable to any attempt to ascertain why, in general, voters behaved as they did. However, voters do not vote in isolation, but do so in particular constituencies that differ in terms of their social character and political complexion. By examining where parties did particularly well and particularly badly, we can secure vital clues as to how voters might have been influenced by these considerations. Meanwhile, it is only by examining the election results themselves that we can understand how the electoral system converted votes into seats.

### **Measuring change**

Usually, measuring the extent to which a party's vote has risen or fallen since the last election is relatively straightforward. We simply ascertain the difference between the percentage of the vote a party won this

time and the share it won at the previous election. Moreover, we do so irrespective of the share of the vote that a party won last time around. We do not anticipate that the change in a party's share of the vote will or should be proportional to (or in any other way related to) the share of the vote it won last time around.<sup>4</sup>

Table A1.1 summarises the level and distribution (across all constituencies in Great Britain) of this measure of change in the share of the vote for those parties that fought all or most of the seats in 2015. It shows the change in each party's overall share of the vote across Britain as a whole, the average (mean) change in that share across all of the seats that the party contested this time and last time, and the median of the change across all those constituencies, that is, the value which divides those changes into two equally sized groups. The table also shows the standard deviation, a measure of the extent to which the change in vote share varied from one constituency to another.

What immediately stands out is the scale of the losses suffered by the Liberal Democrats. On average, their vote fell by around 15 percentage points. However, we can also see that, as measured by the standard deviation, the scale of the party's losses varied considerably from constituency to constituency. At 5.0, this figure is higher than at any previous election since the then Liberal Party started fighting elections on a Britain-wide basis in 1974. Moreover, at 14.6, the median drop in the party's share of the vote is rather less than the mean drop; this indicates that there were some constituencies where the Liberal Democrat vote fell especially heavily, falls not counterbalanced by a similar number of particularly small drops.

There is a simple reason why this is the case. Given that the party only won 24% of the vote in 2010, there were many constituencies – no less than 152 – where the party did not win as much as 15.5% of the vote in 2010. In these places it was arithmetically impossible for the Liberal Democrat vote to fall by as much as it did nationally. Consequently, the Liberal Democrat vote must to some degree have fallen more heavily in those places where the party had previously been stronger – and perhaps on occasion very heavily indeed.

The extent to which this happened is illustrated in Table A1.2, which shows the average drop in the Liberal Democrat share of the vote broken down by how well the party performed in 2010. In seats where the Liberal Democrats won less than 16% of the vote in 2010, the party's vote fell on average by just over ten points. In those where it won more than 28% five years previously, its vote fell by almost twice as much, that is, by nearly 20 points. This does not mean that the scale

*Table A1.1* Measures of change since 2010

	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>
Change in Con vote	+0.8	+1.0	+1.2	3.9
Change in Lab vote	+1.5	+1.4	+2.6	8.0
Change in Lib Dem vote	-15.5	-15.4	-14.6	5.1
Change in UKIP vote	+9.7	+10.3	+10.1	4.8
Total vote swing	-0.7	-0.2	-0.3	4.3
Two-party swing	-0.7	-1.0	-1.4	5.5
Change in turnout	+1.1	+1.1	+0.6	3.1

*Note:* Buckingham (no Labour or Liberal Democrat candidates in 2010 and 2015) is excluded from the calculation of the mean, median and standard deviation of all statistics apart from turnout. The seat is also excluded from all analysis of party performance in this appendix. Note that UKIP did not fight 19 seats (all of them in Scotland) and, of the remaining 614, only fought 552 seats in 2010 as well. Total vote swing is the average of the change in the Conservative share of the vote and the Labour share of the vote. Two-party swing is the change in the Conservative share of the votes cast for Conservative and Labour only (that is, the two-party vote). In both cases a plus sign indicates a swing to the Conservatives and a minus sign a swing to Labour.

of the Liberal Democrat losses was simply proportional to their share of the vote – the losses in the seats where the party was weakest represent 80% of the vote the party won in these seats in 2010, whereas the losses in those where it was strongest constitute only just over half of its previous vote. But the pattern does mean that in assessing how well a party performed in a constituency, we often need to take into account how strong the Liberal Democrats were in that seat beforehand. In some cases the change in a party's share of the vote may be relatively low or high simply because there were relatively few or relatively many Liberal Democrat votes to be lost.

*Table A1.2* Change in Liberal Democrat share of the vote since 2010 by Liberal Democrat share of the vote in 2010

<i>Liberal Democrat % share of the vote 2010</i>	<i>Mean change in Liberal Democrat % share of the vote 2010–15</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Less than 16%	-10.4	170
16–22%	-14.4	179
22–28%	-17.8	121
More than 28%	-19.8	161
All seats	-15.4	631

This is potentially less of a problem if we deploy one of the traditional tools of British psephology to assess the performance of the Conservatives

and Labour: swing. Swing is a measure of the relative performance of the two main parties. So long as both parties suffer or profit equally from a relatively large or small drop in the Liberal Democrat vote, the swing should be unaffected.<sup>5</sup> There is more than one way of measuring swing, but at this election, the two measures give very similar results. We have thus opted to use the more familiar measure, total vote swing, which is simply the change in the Conservative percentage share of all votes cast less the equivalent Labour change, with the resulting sum divided by two.

We begin by examining the performances of the parties in England and Wales, starting with the Conservatives and Labour before turning to the performance of the smaller parties. Our analysis of what happened south of the border then concludes with an assessment of the degree to which some voters might have voted tactically in their constituency. We then turn to the results in Scotland. Finally, after looking at the pattern of turnout across Britain as a whole, we assess how the electoral system rewarded – or otherwise – the performances that the parties did achieve.

## **England and Wales**

### **The Conservatives and Labour**

Governments are often thought to be rewarded for economic good times and punished for bad times.<sup>6</sup> The economy, together with the state of the country's public finances, was a central concern and point of political contention during the Coalition's term of office (see pp. 6–9), and there is thus every reason to anticipate that the reaction of voters and communities to the Conservatives' record in office would depend on both the state of the economy locally and the degree to which the area was reliant on a reduced number of public sector workers. The Conservatives might be expected to perform better (and perhaps consequently Labour worse) in places where the economy was more robust, as measured, for example, by the level of unemployment. Equally, voters in areas with relatively large numbers of public sector workers might have reacted less favourably to the Conservatives' record in office than those where private sector employment predominated.

However, before we embark on whether these expectations are fulfilled, we need to assess the extent to which the performance of both the Conservatives and Labour depended on the prior strength of the Liberal Democrats. Table A1.3 shows quite clearly that both the Conservatives and Labour performed better the bigger the Liberal Democrat share of the vote last time. For example, support for the

Conservatives actually fell back slightly on average in those seats where the Liberal Democrats won less than 16% of the vote in 2010, whereas it increased by two and a half points in constituencies where the Liberal Democrats won more than 28%. Yet there is little evidence that either the Conservatives or Labour consistently secured a relative advantage where the Liberal Democrats were at risk of losing an especially large share of the vote. The average total vote swing (which anticipates that any gains from the Liberal Democrats will be shared equally between the Conservatives and Labour) is much the same in those places where the Liberal Democrats were previously strongest as it is in those places where the Liberal Democrats had been hitherto weakest.

*Table A1.3* Conservative and Labour performance in England and Wales by Liberal Democrat share of the vote in 2010

<i>Liberal Democrat share of the vote, 2010</i>	<i>Mean change in percentage share of the vote 2010–15</i>			<i>Seats</i>
	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Total vote swing</i>	
Less than 16%	-0.6	+1.4	-1.0	134
16–22%	+1.3	+2.2	-0.5	172
22–28%	+1.8	+4.4	-1.3	121
More than 28%	+2.5	+5.7	-1.6	145
All Seats	+1.2	+3.3	-1.1	572

This is not to say that this is necessarily true of every constituency. In Table A1.4 we look in particular at the fortunes of the Conservatives and Labour in those seats that the Liberal Democrats were trying to defend, distinguishing between those where the Conservatives had been second in 2010 and those where Labour had been. It shows that Labour's vote advanced very strongly indeed – on average by more than 12 points – in those seats in which the party had started off second to the Liberal Democrats, while the Conservatives, if anything, performed less well in these circumstances (an observation to which we will return in our discussion below about tactical voting). In contrast, the total vote swing in seats where the Conservatives had previously been second is little different from that across England and Wales as a whole. A not dissimilar, though much less marked, difference is also apparent between those seats in which the Liberal Democrats started off second to the Conservatives (and won at least 28% of the vote in 2010) and those where they were behind Labour. In the former, there was on average a -0.3 total vote swing to Labour, whereas in the latter there was a -3.4 swing. In short, it looks as though former Liberal Democrat

voters were more likely to switch to Labour in areas of relative Labour strength, perhaps because in such seats these voters were more likely to be ex-Labour supporters in the first place.<sup>7</sup>

*Table A1.4* Conservative and Labour performance in England and Wales in seats being defended by the Liberal Democrats

<i>Second party 2010</i>	<i>Mean change in percentage share of the vote 2010–15</i>			<i>Seats</i>
	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Total vote swing</i>	
Conservative	+2.0	+4.3	-1.2	34
Labour	-3.3	+12.3	-7.8	11

*Note:* one seat, Ceredigion, where Plaid Cymru was the second party in 2010, is excluded.

So we need to bear in mind the link between past Liberal Democrat strength and the change in Conservative and Labour support when looking at whether the Conservatives performed better (and Labour worse) in seats where the economy was relatively buoyant and where public sector workers are relatively few and far between. It could be the case, for example, that the Liberal Democrats were previously relatively weak in seats where the local economy was relatively buoyant; in that event, any link between Conservative performance and the local state of the economy could be an artefact of the pattern of the collapse in Liberal Democrat support. But first of all in Table A1.5, we examine whether there is any apparent link between party performance and the state of the local economy at all. The latter is measured with reference to the level of unemployment as a proportion of the electorate as measured shortly before the election.<sup>8</sup>

*Table A1.5* Conservative and Labour performance in England and Wales by local level of unemployment

<i>Unemployment level</i>	<i>Mean change in percentage share of the vote 2010–15</i>			<i>Seats</i>
	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Total vote swing</i>	
Less than 1%	+3.0	+2.7	+0.1	155
1–1.7%	+2.2	+2.1	+0.1	146
1.7–2.5%	+0.8	+2.5	-0.8	121
More than 2.5%	-1.1	+6.0	-3.6	150

*Note:* Unemployment level: Jobseeker's Allowance claimants as a proportion of the registered electorate in March 2015.

The table shows that the higher the level of unemployment, the less well the Conservatives performed. Indeed, the party's vote actually fell on average in those seats with the highest level of unemployment. In the case of Labour, the picture is not quite so clear – while the party performed especially well in those seats with the highest level of unemployment, its performance did not vary consistently with the local level of unemployment. It appears that while voters were less willing to back the Conservatives in places where the local economy was relatively weak, Labour was not always the beneficiary of this apparent disenchantment.<sup>9</sup>

But does this pattern still stand once we take into account the previous level of the Liberal Democrat vote locally? It does. Indeed, if anything it becomes clearer, and especially as far as Labour is concerned. In Table A1.6 we illustrate this point by looking at the link between the local level of unemployment and party performance in just those seats where the Liberal Democrats won between 16% and 22% in 2010. It remains the case that the Conservatives performed less well where unemployment was higher, while the opposite is now consistently true of Labour. The equivalent analyses for seats with other levels of Liberal Democrat support in 2010 show much the same pattern.<sup>10</sup>

*Table A1.6* Conservative and Labour performance by local level of unemployment in seats in England and Wales where the Liberal Democrats won between 16% and 22% of the vote in 2010

<i>Unemployment level</i>	<i>Mean change in percentage share of the vote 2010–15</i>			
	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Total vote swing</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Less than 1%	+2.4	+0.4	+1.0	30
1–1.7%	+2.5	+1.6	+0.4	56
1.7–2.5%	+1.2	+2.1	–0.5	45
More than 2.5%	–1.1	+4.4	–2.8	41

*Note:* Unemployment level: Jobseeker's Allowance claimants as a proportion of the registered electorate in March 2015.

Other evidence also points to a link between local economic prosperity and party performance. For example, the Conservative share of the vote fell on average by one point in seats where the average household income was less than £23,000 a year, but rose by 2.4 points in those constituencies where the average income was more than £30,000 a year.<sup>11</sup> It looks as though voters were more likely to back the Conservatives if the area in which they were living was relatively



prosperous and thus perhaps was more likely to feel that it was enjoying some of the fruits of economic recovery.

But what of the suggestion that voters were less willing to support the Conservatives in places that were relatively dependent on public sector employment?<sup>12</sup> Table A1.7 suggests that there is at least some truth in this. Support for the Conservatives increased by just over one point less in seats with a relatively high proportion of public sector workers than it did in those with relatively few such workers. The opposite is true of Labour. This remains the case when we take into account the level of support for the Liberal Democrats in a constituency in 2010 (and indeed the state of the local economy). Given that a similar pattern was also evident in 2010,<sup>13</sup> it seems that the electoral division between those working in the public and the private sector has recently become a more prominent feature of British electoral politics.<sup>14</sup>

*Table A1.7* Conservative and Labour performance in England and Wales by local level of public sector employment

<i>% of workforce employed in public sector</i>	<i>Mean change in percentage share of the vote 2010–15</i>			<i>Seats</i>
	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Total vote swing</i>	
Less than 26%	+2.0	+2.9	–0.5	130
26–29%	+1.2	+3.2	–1.0	189
29–32%	+1.0	+3.5	–1.2	143
More than 32%	+0.8	+4.1	–1.7	110

*Note:* % of workforce in public sector: % of those aged 16–74 and in employment who are engaged in public administration and defence, health or education according to the 2011 Census.

Another pattern that was in evidence in 2010 and again in 2015 was a tendency for Labour to perform rather better in seats with relatively large numbers of voters from an ethnic minority background.<sup>15</sup> In seats where, according to the 2011 Census, more than 15% come from such a background, Labour's share of the vote increased by 6.8 points, or more than twice the increase the party enjoyed on average across England and Wales as a whole. Nearly all of these seats are ones in which there is a relatively large Muslim population and it is in these that Labour's advance was strongest; in seats where over 4% told the 2011 Census that they were Muslim, Labour's vote increased on average by 7.1 points. Following the UK's involvement in the Iraq War, Labour lost ground heavily in 2005 in constituencies with relatively large Muslim communities. That erosion of Labour support, already seemingly

partially reversed in 2010,<sup>16</sup> was apparently repaired yet further at this election.

However, Labour's performance in more ethnically diverse constituencies also depended on the ethnic background of the party's candidate. In line with previous research showing that ethnic minority voters are more likely than white British voters to vote for such candidates,<sup>17</sup> those Labour candidates in these constituencies who were from a minority background themselves saw their vote increase on average by 2.1 points more than did those from a white background. In contrast, in seats with fewer than 15% from an ethnic minority background, ethnic minority Labour candidates on average saw their vote increase by 1.7 points less than their white counterparts. A similar pattern is apparent wherever an ethnic minority (Labour or Conservative) candidate replaced a white one or vice versa. But whereas Labour increased their number of ethnic minority MPs from 16 to 23 mainly by fielding more such candidates in ethnically diverse constituencies (including five seats they had not previously won), the number of Conservative ethnic minority MPs rose from 11 to 17 as a result of more ethnic minority candidates fighting safe Conservative seats in which ethnic minority voters are relatively rare. Only one ethnic minority Conservative MP represents a constituency in which more than 15% of the population belong to an ethnic minority, whereas all but two Labour ethnic minority MPs do.

Many of the seats with relatively large ethnic minority populations (some 45% of them) are in London. This largely accounts for the relatively large increase in Labour support in the capital (see Table A2.4), making it an increasingly fruitful battleground for the party. At 7.2 points, the average increase in the Labour vote in seats in London with a relatively large ethnic minority population is little different from that in similarly diverse seats elsewhere (6.5 points). Meanwhile, in the half-dozen seats in the capital that do not have a substantial ethnic minority population, Labour's vote only increased on average by 2.6 points, slightly less than the average increase in the party's support across England and Wales as a whole.

But not all of the regional variation evident in Table A2.4 can be accounted for by the patterns we have examined so far. Although unemployment in Wales was slightly above that across Britain as a whole, Labour's vote increased least there, and as a result there was actually a small net swing to the Conservatives. Meanwhile, in a partial echo of the long-term tendency for the North of England to become relatively fertile territory for Labour while the Conservatives have

become relatively strong in the South and the Midlands, on average the Conservative performance was weaker and the Labour one stronger in both the North West and in Yorkshire & the Humber.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, these were the only two regions where support for the Conservatives actually fell, albeit only slightly. This finding cannot be accounted for by any of the patterns that we have identified so far. For example, in the 49 seats across the two regions in which the unemployed represented more than 2.5% of the electorate, the Conservative vote fell on average by 2.2 points, twice the 1.1 point drop found in all seats in England and Wales with similar levels of unemployment (see Table A1.5). Equally, at 6.7 points, the increase in the Labour vote is rather higher too.

However, the relatively strong Labour performance is not universal across these two regions. While it is apparent in the more urban environments of, for example, Merseyside, Greater Manchester and South Yorkshire, it is not for the most part to be found in more rural counties such as Cheshire, Cumbria or North Yorkshire. Although the average swing in the North East region as a whole was little different from that in England and Wales as a whole, Labour did relatively well in Tyne & Wear, but not in Northumberland or Durham. In short, despite the Conservatives' proposal to offer more devolution for provincial England's metropolitan centres, the party appears to have had particular difficulty in winning over voters in and around many of the North of England's large cities.<sup>19</sup>

If the Conservatives' promises of more devolution brought them little apparent benefit, they do seem to have profited from another phenomenon that has become a regular feature of recent British elections. It involves MPs who are defending for the first time a seat that they gained at the last election from their principal opponents. MPs who have won a seat in this way have a strong incentive to be active locally in the hope that having a high profile in their constituency might enable them to win a 'personal' vote. Recent elections have suggested that such activity does indeed make a difference.<sup>20</sup>

Because the Conservatives made as many as 87 gains from Labour in 2010, there were plenty of Conservative-held seats being defended by first-term incumbent Conservative MPs who five years previously had captured their seats from Labour. Table A1.8 shows that, on average, these MPs clearly outperformed their party. The pattern was strongest in those seats – shown in the first row of the table – where an incumbent Conservative MP was defending for the first time a seat he or she had wrested in 2010 from an incumbent Labour MP who was not standing again. In these seats, not only had the new Tory MP had a chance to develop a personal vote during the previous five years, but any personal

vote that may have been developed by the former Labour MP would most likely have been lost. And in these seats the Conservative vote rose on average by no less than 4.5 points, while Labour support actually fell back a little.

Of course, if the former Labour MP did stand again, then he or she might succeed in retaining some of his or her personal vote. Certainly the second row of Table A1.8 suggests that in these circumstances, the Conservatives' relative advantage, though still noticeable, was rather less. Meanwhile, if in fact the former Labour MP never defended his or her seat in 2010 in the first place, then his or her personal vote may well have already been lost five years ago, and certainly the third row suggests that in this circumstance, the Conservative advantage was again rather less.

*Table A1.8* The incumbency effect in Conservative/Labour contests in England and Wales

<i>Incumbency status</i>	<i>Mean change in percentage share of the vote 2010–15</i>			<i>Seats</i>
	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Total vote swing</i>	
Con incumbent won against Lab incumbent 2010	+4.5	-0.9	+2.7	38
Con incumbent won against Lab incumbent 2010; ex-Lab MP stood again	+3.8	+1.3	+1.2	10
Con incumbent won seat from Lab 2010 when Lab incumbent did not stand	+3.7	+1.9	+0.9	32
Con won seat from Lab 2010; Con incumbent did not stand again; ex-Lab MP did not stand	+1.0	+0.7	+0.2	7
Con held seat before 2010; Con incumbent stood again; 2010 majority less than 20%	+1.1	+1.9	-0.4	11

Given that most of the constituencies where any of these three sets of circumstances pertained were marginal seats, we might equally suggest that an above-average Conservative performance in these seats was occasioned by a successful concentration of the party's campaigning efforts in such constituencies. But if that were the case, we would expect the Conservatives to have performed well in such seats irrespective of who was defending the seat for the party. However, the last two rows

of Table A1.8 show that is not the case. The fourth row indicates that the Conservative advance was much weaker in those seats that the party had captured from Labour in 2010, but where the incumbent Conservative MP did not stand again. Meanwhile, although they might not be regarded as the most marginal of seats, in the just under a dozen constituencies where the 2010 Conservative majority was no more than 20 points and which were being defended by a Conservative MP who had held the seat since before 2010, again the increase in the Conservative vote was not particularly high. In these seats there was actually a small swing to Labour.<sup>21</sup>

So how voters in England and Wales responded to both the Conservatives and Labour was shaped by the experience of the previous five years. Voters were more inclined to back the Conservatives in places where the economy was relatively buoyant and which were less dependent on public sector employment. At the same time, voters were seemingly more resistant to the Conservatives in ethnically more diverse Britain and in many of the more urban areas in the North of England. In combination, these patterns helped ensure that England and Wales became yet politically more divided. While there was a clear total vote swing to Labour of 2.4 points on average in those seats that the party already held, there was actually a small swing (of 0.3 points) to the Conservatives in places that they were defending. Yet it was in marginal seats that were being defended by first-term Conservative MPs that the Conservatives performed especially well, thanks not so much to what voters thought of the party's record in government as what they thought of their local MP. Far from simply reflecting a uniform nationwide judgement, this was an election in which locality mattered.

### **The Liberal Democrats**

As already noted, the Liberal Democrat vote fell more heavily the better the party had performed in 2010, an almost inevitable consequence of the fact that the party lost as much as two-thirds of the vote it won in 2010. A party that had long profited from its ability to garner the support of voters who were wanting to register a protest against the performance of the party in government (or indeed politics in general),<sup>22</sup> it now found itself losing ground heavily as a result of voters' disillusion with its own performance in office.

No decision had caused the Liberal Democrats more difficulty than the increase in university tuition fees, in direct contradiction of the party's manifesto pledge to abolish them entirely (see pp. 103–6). This policy had seemingly enabled the party to perform particularly well at recent

elections in seats containing large numbers of university students.<sup>23</sup> We might anticipate that the party would have suffered especially badly in these circumstances. Of this there is some sign, at least in those seats where the party had previously been relatively strong and where it may well have been particularly successful in winning support from students. Amongst those seats where the party won over 28% of the vote in 2010 and which were not being defended by an incumbent Liberal Democrat MP (on which see further below), the party's vote fell on average by 23.9 points where students are relatively numerous compared with 21.0 points where they are relatively few.<sup>24</sup> A similar, though smaller, gap (a drop of 17.7 points versus one of 19.3 points) is also evident in those seats where the party won between 22% and 28% of the vote last time.

Yet if the party to some extent lost ground in student communities, this was not true of those constituencies where university graduates are relatively numerous. Relatively liberal as they tend to be in their social and political attitudes, those in receipt of a university education have long been disproportionately likely to support the Liberal Democrats and their predecessors.<sup>25</sup> Thus, more likely perhaps to be attracted to the party by its core beliefs rather than as a vehicle of protest, they might be expected to have proved relatively loyal at a time when the party was haemorrhaging support. Certainly, as Table A1.9 shows, once we take into account how well the party performed locally in 2010, the drop in Liberal Democrat support tended to be a little less marked – albeit no more than that – in seats that contained a relatively large proportion of graduates.

*Table A1.9* Average change in Liberal Democrat share of the vote in England and Wales by prior strength and proportion of graduates

	% of adults with a degree		
	Less than 20%	Between 20 and 35%	More than 35%
Lib Dem 2010 share of vote			
Less than 16%	-11.3 (58)	-10.7 (68)	-10.2 (8)
16–22%	-14.7 (45)	-14.4 (111)	-13.5 (16)
22–28%	-18.6 (11)	-17.8 (83)	-17.4 (27)
More than 28%	-20.7 (7)	-20.5 (109)	-19.5 (28)

*Note:* figures in brackets show the number of seats on which the mean change is calculated. Note that in this table, the result in Bradford East, where the result for all the main parties was unusual, is excluded.

In contrast, the party certainly did not profit from a locally buoyant economy. In fact, support for the Liberal Democrats actually fell away rather more in places with relatively low unemployment (-17.6) than it did in those with relatively high levels of joblessness (-15.5). True, this gap disappears once we take into account the strength of the Liberal Democrats locally – unemployment was typically low in places where the Liberal Democrats had previously been strong and this explains why its support fell so heavily on average in such seats – but the party's hopes that it might receive some of the credit where the Coalition's economic policies appeared to be paying dividends were apparently dashed. That credit was evidently all too easily garnered by their Conservative coalition partners.

But perhaps the biggest hope that the party carried into the election was that voters would be willing to vote for their local Liberal Democrat MP irrespective of what they thought of the record of the Coalition. It has long been the case that the ability of Liberal Democrat MPs to win and retain their seats has rested not so much on the national standing of the party as on their own ability to develop a personal profile for getting things done in their constituency, combined with intense local campaigning by their constituency party.<sup>26</sup> If this continued to be the case, then perhaps many of the party's MPs would be able to save their seats even if the party was losing ground heavily across the country as a whole.

In the event, those Liberal Democrat MPs who were attempting to defend their seats often did perform relatively well. On average, their support fell by 14.9 points, well below the 24.6 point drop suffered by the party where the Liberal Democrat MP was not attempting to defend his or her seat (and thus where that MP's personal vote was at risk of being lost), or indeed the 21.8 point drop that occurred on average in those seats that the party did not win in 2010, but where it won more than 28% of the vote. The 14.9 point drop also proves on average to be 10.8 points less than the 25.7 point drop that would have been expected if the relationship between the level of Liberal Democrat support in 2010 and the fall in Liberal Democrat support had been in line with the relationship between those two phenomena in those seats that the party did not win in 2010.<sup>27</sup>

But relatively good though the performance of Liberal Democrat MPs might have been, given how many votes they had to defend, this still meant that on average their support fell by almost as much as the party's vote did across England and Wales as a whole (-15.8 points). The party's expectation that the personal popularity of Liberal Democrat

MPs would mean that their vote would drop by much less than the party's vote was falling across the whole country was not fulfilled – with the inevitable consequence that the party was left with just a handful of seats. Nevertheless, if incumbent Liberal Democrat MPs had not typically performed relatively well, the party would have won even fewer seats, with perhaps Tim Farron in Westmorland and Lonsdale left as the only Liberal Democrat MP anywhere in England and Wales.

As we might expect, one group of incumbents that did particularly well are those (seven in all) who were defending their seat for the first time, and thus who had had the opportunity during the previous five years to develop a personal vote for the first time. Their vote fell on average by just 9.9 points, though this still proved insufficient to save any of what were typically relatively marginal seats. Much of the relatively strong performance of this group is accounted for by the outcome in three seats (Burnley, Bradford East and Cambridge) where the MP was a relatively regular rebel in parliamentary divisions. In these three cases, Liberal Democrat support fell on average by just 4.9 points, whereas in the case of the other new MPs, it dropped by as much as 13.7 points. More generally, the dozen more experienced MPs who were ministers in the Coalition at the time of the election saw their vote fall on average by 17.0 points, whereas the dozen MPs who had never had been ministers in the Coalition – and who had been free to speak out against it – saw their vote fall by 14.9 points. The Coalition was, it seems, nothing but toxic for the party.

## **UKIP**

UKIP stood in all 573 seats in England and Wales, the first time it had done so. Of these, 529 were seats in which the party also stood in 2010, and our analysis here focuses on the change in the party's share of the vote in these seats, which averaged 10.7 points. As we might anticipate given that it was advancing from a relatively low base, the kinds of places where the party's vote increased most since 2010 are also the kinds of places where its share of the vote was highest, albeit that the only seat the party won, Clacton, was amongst the minority of seats that the party did not contest in 2010.

Analysis of UKIP's growth before the election suggested that the party's support would come primarily from economically struggling 'left behind' white working-class voters with few educational qualifications and for whom immigration was a particular concern.<sup>28</sup> Table A1.10 reveals that those expectations were largely fulfilled. It shows how the increase in UKIP's share of the vote between 2010 and 2015 varied according to



a constituency's demographic characteristics. To simplify matters, we simply show how the party performed in those constituencies where the characteristic in question is relatively common and those where it is relatively rare.

*Table A1.10* Change in UKIP support 2010–15 in England and Wales by demographic character of constituency

<i>Mean change in UKIP % share of the vote 2010–15 in constituencies where incidence of characteristic is:</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>
% with a degree	+14.9 (142)	+6.4 (132)
% unemployed 2015	+9.3 (150)	+11.8 (129)
Change in % unemployed 2001–11	+8.5 (126)	+13.1 (130)
% born in the UK	+7.9 (148)	+11.7 (149)
% white British	+8.2 (125)	+11.5 (125)

*Note:* % with a degree: Low = less than 21% of adults with a degree; High = more than 31%. % unemployed 2015: Low = Jobseeker's Allowance claimants represented less than 1% of the registered electorate in March 2015; High = represented more than 2.5%. Change in % unemployed 2001–11: Low = % of 16–74 year olds who said they were unemployed fell by two percentage points between 2001 and 2011; High = Proportion increased by more than 1.4 points. % born in the UK: Low = less than 86% of the resident population born in the UK; High = more than 95%. White British: Low = less than 79% describe themselves as 'white British'; High = more than 95%. The data come from the 2011 Census, except the % unemployed 2015, which is based on Jobseeker's Allowance statistics reported by the Department for Work and Pensions (March 2015 release). Numbers in brackets show the number of seats on which the average is based.

The educational background of those living in a constituency was especially important in distinguishing between those places where UKIP did particularly well and those where its advance was less marked. As the table shows, the increase in UKIP's support was as much as 8.5 points higher in seats containing relatively few graduates than it was in those where graduates are relatively plentiful. This pattern helps explain why Douglas Carswell was able to retain the Clacton seat that he had won in a parliamentary by-election the previous year. Only 13.4% of adults in his constituency have a degree, one of the lowest proportions of any constituency in the country. Meanwhile, UKIP performed even better if a constituency not only had relatively few graduates but also relatively few public sector workers.<sup>29</sup>

UKIP also performed relatively well in less economically prosperous constituencies. As Table A1.10 shows, UKIP support increased on average by 2.5 points more in seats where unemployment was currently relatively high than it did in those where it was relatively low. However, the contrast is even more marked if we compare constituencies in which unemployment fell most between the 2001 and 2011 Censuses

– not least perhaps because they were particularly affected by the 2008 economic crisis – and those where unemployment rose most.<sup>30</sup> Here the equivalent gap is almost five points.

However, while economic conditions played a role in UKIP's growth, it has been issues of identity and immigration that have been emphasised most by the party. That though does not mean that the party performed especially well in places which have experienced relatively high levels of immigration. Rather, as Table A1.10 shows, UKIP typically did less well in those places where a relatively large proportion of the population was born outside the UK. This is because the largest migrant inflows during the past decade have tended to be in seats in London and other large cities that have ethnically diverse populations, large numbers of graduates and buoyant economies, all circumstances that are the very opposite of where UKIP typically does well.

In order to understand how immigration influenced UKIP's performance, we have also to take into account the existing ethnic composition and sense of identity of those living in a constituency. UKIP advanced by over three points more in seats in which a relatively large proportion of the population described themselves on the 2011 Census as 'white British' than it did in constituencies where relatively few people did so (see Table A1.10). And it was in these, the less ethnically diverse parts of England and Wales, where UKIP's anti-immigration message, and especially its attacks on migration from those Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004, mattered. As Table A1.11 shows, in seats in which over 85% considered themselves to be 'white British', UKIP's vote increased by nearly three points more where a relatively large proportion of the population was born in one of the EU accession states than it did in those constituencies where relatively few were born in that part of the EU. In contrast, UKIP performed relatively badly in seats that contain a relatively large proportion of people born in Eastern Europe but where the population is also diverse in other ways.

*Table A1.11* Change in UKIP share of the vote 2010–15 in England and Wales by proportion with a white British identity and the proportion born in one of the EU accession states

<i>% population born in a EU accession state</i>	<i>% describing themselves as 'White British'</i>	
	<i>Less than 85%</i>	<i>More than 85%</i>
Below 1%	+12.3 (10)	+11.2 (189)
Above 2.5%	+8.1 (95)	+14.0 (24)

*Note:* figures in brackets show the number of seats on which that statistic is based.

The strongest UKIP performances thus came in seats that are not ethnically diverse, have populations with relatively low levels of educational attainment, rising unemployment and a high level of concern about immigration. This pattern is very similar to that for support for the British National Party (BNP), a more extreme radical-right party that also focused on immigration, which won on average 3.8% of the vote in the 338 seats it fought in 2010, only to collapse financially and organisationally shortly thereafter. UKIP's vote increased by no less than 17.0 points between 2010 and 2015 in those seats where the BNP won over 5% of the vote in 2010, by only 9.6 points in those constituencies where the BNP won less than 3%, and just 8.3 points where the BNP did not stand at all. This may in part be the result of former BNP voters switching directly to UKIP (the former BNP party leader, Nick Griffin, endorsed UKIP in 2015), but it is also most likely the result of the success of both parties in mobilising a similar set of concerns – political disaffection, economic exclusion, ethnic identity politics and anxiety about immigration.

But what impact did UKIP's performance have on that of the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats? The common expectation in the run-up to the 2015 election was that UKIP would primarily damage the Conservative Party by 'splitting the right'. Support for UKIP's core messages of Euroscepticism, opposition to immigration and English nationalism was higher among Conservative voters than amongst supporters of other parties, and survey evidence consistently suggested that UKIP was winning over more support from 2010 Conservative voters than Labour or Liberal Democrat backers.<sup>31</sup> However, even if that is the position amongst voters across the country a whole, it does not necessarily follow that the Conservatives will have suffered particularly badly where UKIP advanced most. UKIP may have appealed to a somewhat different combination of voters where it did particularly well. Moreover, perhaps when UKIP did do particularly well, the party was picking up voters who, if they had not voted UKIP, would have voted Labour or Liberal Democrats even though they might not have voted for those parties in 2010.

The Conservatives certainly lost more support where UKIP did best. But then the same also happened to Labour (though once we take into account how well the Liberal Democrats performed in a constituency in 2010, it seems that how well or badly UKIP did had no impact at all on the Liberal Democrats' fortunes). As a result, it seems that an above-average UKIP performance had at most only a marginally greater impact on the Conservatives than Labour. This can be seen by

comparing the third row with the second row of Table A1.12. In seats where UKIP's vote increased by more than 13.5 points, the Conservative vote fell on average by 0.7 points, whereas in seats where UKIP's vote rose between 7.5 and 13.5 points, it rose on average by 2.2 points, a difference of 2.9 points. In contrast, the equivalent figures in Labour's case are increases of 1.6 and 2.6 points respectively, a difference of just one point. This contrast in the performance of the two largest parties is reflected in the slightly higher total vote swing to Labour in seats where UKIP performed well.

However, even this difference needs to be interpreted with care. As we have already noted, many of the seats in which UKIP advanced most were seats in which the BNP performed relatively well. And where the BNP performed well in 2010, they did so primarily at Labour's expense.<sup>32</sup> Thus, one possible reason why the Conservatives appear to have suffered slightly more where UKIP advanced most is that some former Labour voters had already switched in 2010 to a party with a strong anti-immigration message. Certainly, if we leave aside those seats where the BNP won over 4% of the vote in 2010, the total vote swing in seats where UKIP advanced by more than 13.5 points (-0.1) was on average almost exactly the same as it was in seats where it advanced between 7.5 and 13.5 points (-0.0), suggesting that in these seats at least, an especially strong UKIP performance hurt the Conservatives and Labour to much the same extent.

*Table A1.12* Change in Conservative and Labour share of the vote 2010–15 by change in UKIP share of the vote 2010–15 in England and Wales

<i>Change in UKIP % share 2010–15</i>	<i>Mean change in percentage share of the vote 2010–15</i>			<i>Seats</i>
	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Total vote swing</i>	
Up less than 7.5	+1.4	+6.9	-2.7	133
Up between 7.5 and 13.5	+2.2	+2.6	-0.2	284
Up by more than 13.5	-0.7	+1.6	-1.2	155

*Note:* in this table, seats not contested by UKIP in 2010 are classified according to the share of the vote won by UKIP in 2015.

Moreover, the astute reader will also have noticed something else – that, according to the first row of Table A1.12, it was Labour that did especially well where UKIP's advance was relatively weak. This is certainly not consistent with a story that suggests that UKIP's success in the 2015 election simply hurt the Conservatives; rather, it suggests that it is Labour that might have benefited the more if UKIP had not enjoyed

the record-breaking advance it achieved in 2015, profiting more perhaps from the political and economic disillusion that in practice helped feed UKIP support.

We might wonder whether there are other features of those seats where UKIP advanced less that helps explain why Labour did so well in them. They tend, as we have seen, to be seats that are more ethnically diverse and Labour generally did relatively well in such seats. But they also tend to be seats where unemployment was relatively low, and those were not the kind of seats where Labour tends to do relatively well. In practice, the pattern is still in evidence even if we take into account the ethnic composition or the economic circumstances of a constituency,<sup>33</sup> although it is less strong in seats that were won by Labour in 2010 than in those won by the Conservatives.

The suggestion that UKIP might have been winning some votes that might otherwise be going to Labour secures further support if, as in Table A1.13, we look at the relationship between the performances of the parties over two election cycles rather than just one, that is, since 2005. Here we find that Labour have actually increased their vote on average in seats where UKIP's long-term advance has been weakest, whereas the party's support has fallen heavily elsewhere. In contrast, the Conservatives' advance has been only very slightly higher in seats where UKIP have made little progress than it has in places where UKIP have advanced strongly.

*Table A1.13* Change in Conservative and Labour share of the vote 2005–15 by change in UKIP share of the vote 2005–15 in England and Wales

<i>Change in UKIP % share 2005–15</i>	<i>Mean change in percentage share of the vote 2005–15</i>			<i>Seats</i>
	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Total vote swing</i>	
Up less than 7.5	+5.4	+3.2	+1.1	117
Up between 7.5 and 13.5	+6.3	–4.6	+5.5	261
Up by more than 13.5	+4.0	–7.8	+5.9	194

*Note:* in this table, seats not contested by UKIP in 2005 are classified according to the share of the vote won by UKIP in 2015. The 2005 result in each constituency is an estimate of what the outcome in that seat would have been if that election had been fought on the same boundaries as those that were in force at the 2010 and 2015 general elections.<sup>34</sup>

In part, this divergent pattern reflects the fact that the kind of constituencies in which UKIP have prospered most are the kinds of places that rejected Labour most heavily in 2010. In 2010 Labour did worst in relatively working-class seats that had experienced a sharp increase in

unemployment between 2005 and 2010, had low proportions of public sector workers and were not ethnically diverse.<sup>35</sup> The overlap between the places where Labour did badly in 2010 and UKIP performed well in 2015 does not necessarily mean there has been a direct switch of support from Labour to UKIP in these constituencies, but it does suggest that UKIP have prospered most in areas where disenchantment with the previous Labour government was most widespread.

### **The Greens**

Although UKIP's advance was the more dramatic, the Greens also enjoyed their best general election result ever. The party stood in 542 constituencies in England and Wales. On average, the party won 4.3% of the vote in the seats that it fought, compared with just 1.7% in 2010. But with its vote still relatively evenly spread, the party did no more than retain the Brighton Pavilion seat that Caroline Lucas first won in 2010. Moreover, it only managed to secure second place in four seats, in only one of which, Bristol West (Labour majority, 8.8%), did it come anything like close to winning.

As at previous elections, support for the party was strongest in areas with large concentrations of university graduates and students, reflecting the appeal of the party's socially liberal and environmental politics for such voters. On average, the party won 5.6% of the vote in seats where more than 31% of adults are graduates, compared with 2.9% in those where less than 21% fall into that category. Equally, in those seats that the party also fought in 2010, its share of the vote increased on average by 3.8 points in places where graduates were relatively plentiful and by only 1.8 points where they were scarce. The Greens also performed better in constituencies where unemployment fell markedly between 2001 and 2011 than they did in seats where unemployment had increased most during that period, suggesting that, despite their opposition to the Coalition's financial austerity policy, their appeal was stronger in places that had been insulated from the worst effects of the financial crisis.<sup>36</sup>

At previous elections, a relatively strong Green performance has often seemed to come at the particular expense of the Liberal Democrats, reflecting an overlap in the ideological values and social bases of the two parties.<sup>37</sup> It thus comes as little surprise that the party performed particularly well where the Liberal Democrat vote fell most. The party's share of the vote rose by as much as 4.7 points on average in seats where the Liberal Democrat vote fell by more than 20 points, but by only 1.8 points in constituencies where Liberal Democrat support fell

by less than ten points. Equally, Liberal Democrat support fell most heavily where the Greens performed best. In contrast, and despite much speculation that the advance of the Greens posed a risk to Labour, Labour often performed relatively well in the same seats as the Greens. For example, Labour's vote increased by 5.5 points in those seats where Green support in 2015 was four points or more higher than in 2010, much larger than the 2.7 point increase in the Labour vote registered elsewhere.<sup>38</sup>

### **Plaid Cymru**

The surge in nationalist support in Scotland was not in evidence in Wales, even though Plaid Cymru, the country's nationalist party, received considerable UK-wide media attention thanks to the appearance of Leanne Wood in two of the three televised leaders' debates. The party won 12.1% of the vote in Wales, up 0.8 of a point on 2010, but still below the record 14.3% the party won in 2001. It retained the three seats it already held, but added no others to its tally, though once again it ran Labour close in Ynys Môn.

Unlike her predecessors as Plaid Cymru leader, Wood lives in South Wales rather than in heavily Welsh-speaking North and West Wales, and indeed is not a native Welsh speaker. She is also on the left of the party, and shared much the same anti-austerity position adopted by the SNP and the Greens. These characteristics appear to have had some impact on the party's progress. Although its support was still heavily concentrated in those seats where Welsh is widely spoken, its support fell on average by 1.1 points in the 12 seats where more than one-fifth of the population speak at least some Welsh, whereas elsewhere it increased by 1.8 points. Support for the party increased on average by 2.5 points in the 20 Welsh seats with the highest levels of unemployment at the time of the election, whereas it fell by 0.7 of a point in the 20 seats with the lowest levels of joblessness. But it is still some way from being the party of all of Wales as opposed to the country's Welsh-speaking heartlands.

### **Tactical voting**

One of the notable features of how voters behaved at the three elections that Labour won between 1997 and 2005 was a marked willingness amongst both Labour and Liberal Democrat voters to vote tactically in order to try and secure the defeat of the local Conservative candidate.<sup>39</sup> Where the Liberal Democrats were placed third, some of the party's supporters switched to backing Labour. Conversely, where Labour started off in third place, some of the party's supporters switched to

the Liberal Democrats. Moreover, there was no consistent evidence that this pattern reversed itself in 2010, even though by this stage the Conservatives were not so unpopular.<sup>40</sup>

The formation of the Coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats might be expected to have caused some of these tactical voters to reassess their options. Third-placed Labour supporters might feel there was little point voting tactically for a Liberal Democrat party that had gone on to share power with the Conservatives. Meanwhile, third-placed Liberal Democrat voters might feel less impetus to help Labour defeat the candidate who was representing their Conservative coalition partners locally. On the other hand, we might find that third-placed Conservative supporters were now willing to lend their support to their local Liberal Democrat candidate in the hope that this might help defeat Labour locally.

If the previous pattern of tactical switching between Labour and the Liberal Democrats did unravel, we should find that Labour performed relatively well in places where the party started off third, while the Liberal Democrat vote should have fallen back especially heavily in seats where the Liberal Democrats were previously third. However, as we have already seen in Table A1.3 above, there is little sign that Labour did especially well in those seats that the Liberal Democrats were trying to defend against a Conservative challenger. Labour's vote increased in these seats by just one point more than it did across England and Wales as a whole, while the Conservative vote increased by 0.8 of a point more too. In short, both parties seemingly profited from the Liberal Democrats' difficulties. The picture is little different in those Conservative-held seats where the Liberal Democrats were in second place with more than 28% of the vote in 2010. Despite the typically very heavy drop in Liberal Democrat support in these circumstances (on average it fell by 21.2 points), Labour's vote again only increased by 4.3 points, just a point above the England and Wales average. It appears that those who at recent elections had opted to vote tactically for the Liberal Democrats were no more likely than those who had voted sincerely for the party to have switched back to Labour.

Meanwhile, there is little sign that the Liberal Democrat vote fell away particularly heavily in seats that were marginal between the Conservatives and Labour. Amongst those seats where the Liberal Democrats won less than 16% of the vote in 2010 and which the Conservatives held with less than a five point lead over Labour, the Liberal Democrat vote fell on average by 11.4 points. The drop amongst seats with a similar level of Liberal Democrat support in 2010 but where



the Conservatives enjoyed more than a 20 point lead over Labour was, at 11.3 points, almost exactly the same. Similar analyses of those seats where the Liberal Democrats won between 16% and 22% of the vote and of those seats that Labour were defending also fails to show any substantial or systematic difference between marginal and safe seats so far as the scale of the Liberal Democrat decline is concerned.

However, as we had noted earlier, the Conservatives did perform relatively poorly in seats that the Liberal Democrats were trying to defend against a Labour challenge. Table A1.3 showed that the Conservative vote fell on average by over three points in these circumstances. Indeed, where the incumbent Liberal Democrat MP was standing again, the average drop in Conservative support was no less than 5.3 points. This suggests that in these seats, some third-placed Conservative supporters made a tactical switch in favour of the Liberal Democrats. Conservative support also fell away heavily (on average by 9.3 points) in three Liberal Democrat seats in which, although the Conservatives started off in second place, they were less than ten points ahead of Labour in 2010 and where, as a result, Labour might also have been thought capable of mounting (and indeed in practice did mount) a challenge locally.<sup>41</sup> As it happens, the tactical support of third-placed Conservative voters proved insufficient to enable the Liberal Democrats to stave off defeat against any of their second-placed Labour challengers, but it appears to have been instrumental in enabling the Liberal Democrats to retain two of the three seats where previously second-placed Conservative supporters switched to the Liberal Democrats.<sup>42</sup>

So much for how the local tactical situation influenced support for the three parties that have traditionally dominated elections in England and Wales. However, the rise of UKIP and the Greens raises another possibility we should consider. This is that, aware of the fact that their preferred party was unlikely to win, some UKIP and Green supporters may have been especially likely to have been discouraged from voting UKIP or Green in those seats which were marginal between two or more other parties, instead opting to vote for whichever of those two parties they preferred to win.

Table A1.14 suggests that this pressure did have some impact on both UKIP and Green support. UKIP support increased on average by one and a half points less in those seats where the two leading contenders were less than 5% apart locally in 2010 than it did in those seats where the winner locally enjoyed more than a 20 point lead. In the case of the Greens, there is a similar difference of just over half of a point. These differences cannot easily be accounted for by the social character of

marginal seats; on average, they are little different from the country as a whole when it comes to those demographic or economic characteristics that we showed earlier generally made a difference to the level of UKIP and Green support.

*Table A1.14* Mean change in UKIP and Green support in England and Wales by marginality of seat

<i>Lead of the largest party over the second party 2010</i>	<i>Mean change in UKIP % share of vote 2010–15</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Mean change in Green % share of the vote 2010–15</i>	<i>Seats</i>
0–5%	+9.5	78	+2.6	45
5–10%	+10.0	97	+2.9	49
10–20%	+11.4	138	+3.3	84
More than 20%	+11.0	216	+3.2	127

*Note:* based on all seats fought by the party in question in both 2010 and 2015, except that in the case of the Greens, Brighton Pavilion, which was won by the party in 2010, is excluded.

The rise in UKIP support was especially low in marginal seats that the Conservatives were defending. In seats where the Conservatives started off just five points ahead of Labour, UKIP support increased on average by 8.8 points, while in those where the Conservatives had previously only been narrowly ahead of the Liberal Democrats, the UKIP rise was no more than 7.2 points. This might be thought to indicate a wish on the part of some UKIP supporters not to see the Conservatives defeated locally. However, it is far from clear whether the apparent squeeze on UKIP support in marginal seats was of particular benefit to the Conservatives. Across all seats in which the lead of the winning party in 2010 was less than ten points and UKIP's vote increased by less than 7.5 points, there was on average a total vote swing to Labour of 1.5 points. The swing was almost exactly the same (1.4 points) in seats where UKIP's vote increased by 13.5 points or more. Meanwhile, as in our earlier analysis of UKIP performance, if we confine our attention to just those seats that were previously marginal between Conservative and Labour, it was Labour rather than the Conservatives that performed relatively well where the UKIP advance was weakest.<sup>43</sup>

## Scotland

One feature dominates the election outcome in Scotland: a 30 point increase in SNP support that left the party with just under half (49.97%) of the vote. This result far outshone the nationalists' previous best

performance in a UK general election (30.4% in October 1974) and even the 45% that the party won in the 2011 Scottish Parliament election. It was the biggest advance between two UK elections registered by any party since that achieved by Sinn Fein in Ireland in 1918. However, the SNP did just fail to emulate the Conservatives' record achievement, 50.1% of the Scottish vote, in 1955.

Labour's share of the Scottish vote, meanwhile, fell to its lowest level since 1918. Much like the Liberal Democrats across Britain as a whole (and in part for the same arithmetical reason), in general the stronger Labour had been in a seat in 2010, the more the party's vote fell (subject only to the extent to which the Liberal Democrat vote was declining locally), while equally it was in areas where Labour had previously been strongest – and where often the Yes vote had been relatively high in the independence referendum held the previous September – that the SNP advanced most. On average, in seats where Labour won over 40% of the vote in 2010, its vote fell by 22.5 points compared with just 9.9 points elsewhere, while the SNP vote increased by 33.6 points, well above the 23.8 point increase in other constituencies. Conversely, the nationalist advance was typically weakest in those seats where not only had Labour previously not been especially strong, but where the SNP itself had been. In seven seats where the SNP won over 25% of the vote in 2010 (six of which they had won) and Labour less than 40%, the SNP vote increased on average by a relatively modest 14.8 points. Whereas hitherto SNP-held constituencies had been relatively isolated beacons of nationalist strength, now those beacons look much like the rest of the country.<sup>44</sup>

The prospect that the SNP might perform exceptionally well had persuaded some of those who want Scotland to remain in the Union to urge voters to vote tactically for whichever candidate appeared best placed locally to defeat the SNP. Some Conservative voters certainly appear to have responded to this call (and in so doing helped push the Conservative vote to its lowest level ever). The phenomenon was most apparent in seats that the party's coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, were trying to defend. On average, support for the Conservatives fell by 5.4 points in such seats; indeed, Conservative support even fell, with one exception,<sup>45</sup> in those Liberal Democrat-held seats where the Conservatives had been second in 2010 – in stark contrast with what happened in equivalent seats in England and Wales (see pp. 392–3).

However, Conservative support also often – though not always – fell in seats that Labour was trying to defend, and especially so in more middle-class parts of Scotland where the Conservatives themselves were still relatively strong.<sup>46</sup> In nine Labour-held seats where the

Conservatives won over 20% of the vote in 2010, the party's vote fell on average by 2.9 points. A particularly striking example was the 8.4 point drop in Conservative support in the East Renfrewshire seat of the Scottish Labour leader, Jim Murphy. But perhaps the most important instance was Edinburgh South, where the Conservative vote fell by 4.1 points. This seemingly tactically induced drop in the Conservative vote, in combination with a very sharp fall in the Liberal Democrat vote (see further below), may well have helped Labour to retain what proved to be its one and only Scottish seat. Otherwise the campaign to promote tactical voting had very little to show for its efforts so far as seats saved is concerned.<sup>47</sup>

Thanks to the apparent willingness of some Conservative supporters to vote tactically for the Liberal Democrats,<sup>48</sup> many Scottish Liberal Democrat MPs were relatively successful at stemming the outgoing tide for their party. The party's vote fell on average by 11.7 points in the nine seats where an incumbent Liberal Democrat was trying to defend, not only far less than the 28.6 point drop that the party suffered in other seats in Scotland where it had won at least 28% of the vote last time (a group that included Edinburgh South, where the party suffered a 30.3 point drop) but also noticeably better than the 14.9 point drop that Liberal Democrat MPs suffered on average in England and Wales. However, similar to the position south of the border, this pattern of relative success in seats that the party was trying to defend (which, however, unlike in England and Wales, also extended to the two seats where the incumbent Liberal Democrat MP stood down)<sup>49</sup> simply meant that on average the party's vote fell in these seats in line with the drop in the party's share of the vote across Scotland as a whole. Otherwise, as in England and Wales, the more popular the party had been in 2010, the more heavily its support fell. However, because it was not very popular in much of Scotland in the first place, overall the party's vote simply had less far to fall.

UKIP has never enjoyed the same degree of popularity in Scotland as it has done in England and Wales. The party's relative weakness was reflected in the fact that it fought just 41 of Scotland's 59 seats, of which it had contested just 22 in 2010. The party managed on average to win just 2.3% of the vote where it stood, and increased its share by just 0.9 of a point where it had fielded a candidate in 2010. In stark contrast to the position in England and Wales, UKIP remained a bit player north of the border. The Greens too fared less well than elsewhere. The party won on average just 2.6% of the vote in the 31 seats that it fought. That represented an average increase in support of only 1.2 points in

the 16 seats that the party also contested in 2010, little more than a third of the increase that the party secured on average in England and Wales. In short, Scotland emerged from the election looking in almost every respect like a very different country politically from the rest of Great Britain.

## **Turnout across Great Britain**

The officially recorded level of turnout depends in the first instance on how many voters are recorded as registered to vote. That figure was influenced at this election by the initial steps that had been taken to switch from a process of household to individual registration. The change particularly affected university students living in a hall of residence as well as anyone who had recently moved (a group that consists disproportionately of younger people). Although the switch also involved the introduction of a new online system of registration, which was quite heavily used (see pp. 22–3), the growth in the electorate in seats where younger people and students were more numerous was still relatively low. In seats in England and Wales with the most students, for example, just over 250 more names appeared on the register than had done five years ago, well down on the average of just under 800 across England and Wales as a whole.<sup>50</sup>

Amongst those affected by the change of procedure but who were determined to vote, there is little reason to believe that the changes to the system of registration acted as a barrier to registering. On the other hand, amongst those with less interest in the election, there might have been a risk that they did not make it on to the register. If so, then we should find that the official level of turnout increased most in constituencies where the registered number of voters had grown least since 2010.

This is indeed what we find. Across England and Wales as a whole, turnout increased on average by just half a point. But in those 183 seats in which there were fewer registered voters than in 2010, turnout increased on average by 1.6 points. Conversely, it actually fell slightly – by 0.4 of a point – in those 175 seats where the electorate had increased by more than 1,600 voters. Equally, turnout increased rather more in constituencies with more young people and more students.<sup>51</sup> True, some of this difference might be attributed to differential changes in the accuracy of the register, that is, that in seats where the electorate had fallen, greater efforts had been made to exclude from the register those who should not have been there in the first place. However, the

pattern is certainly consistent with the proposition that, thanks to the change of procedure, those who were inclined to abstain in the election were less likely to appear on the electoral register than had been the case five years previously.<sup>52</sup>

There were certainly plenty of voters in England and Wales who did abstain. At 66.0%, the overall level of turnout in this part of the UK was still well below the turnout recorded at any election between 1922 and 1997, when turnout never fell below 70%. This is despite the fact that the opinion polls had suggested that the outcome would be close and that more parties than ever before appeared to have a realistic prospect of winning a significant share of the vote. This election appeared to confirm, if confirmation were needed, that there has been a long-term decline in the willingness of voters to make it to the polling station.

There was, however, one marked exception to this picture of low and largely stable turnout – Scotland. The referendum on Scottish independence held the previous September had secured a turnout of 84.6%, higher than at any previous nationwide vote in Scotland since the advent of the mass franchise. The importance of the choice and the intensity of the referendum debate had seemingly made an impression on voters, and this continued through to the general election. At 71.0%, turnout north of the border was 7.2 points higher than in 2010. The increase was on average rather higher in less affluent constituencies, in many of which the vote in favour of independence had been relatively high the previous year.<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, the level of turnout was still lower than that recorded north of the border at any election between 1950 and 1997. Even the intense political debate during and since the referendum did not ensure that turnout returned to a level that would once have been regarded as the norm.

## **The electoral system**

After the 2010 election, we wrote that the electoral system continued to be strongly biased towards Labour and that, given the high level of support for and seats won by third parties, it would be difficult for the Conservatives to secure an overall majority in future unless they secured a double-digit lead over Labour.<sup>54</sup> Yet they proceeded to win a majority, even though their lead over Labour was actually 0.6 points lower than in 2010. How did they manage it? And does this mean the electoral system is now likely to produce single-party majorities in future?

Extrapolations of how many seats a party might win for any given share of the vote are commonly made on the basis of the assumption

that the changes in party support will be ‘uniform’ across Britain as a whole. If a party’s support is up overall by say, two points, we assume that its support will increase by two points in each and every constituency. Of course, we do not anticipate that this is exactly what will happen, but we do assume that any seats that a party gains because it does better locally than it is doing nationally will be counterbalanced by a similar number of seats that it fails to win because it underperforms locally. In effect, we are assuming that the overall geographical distribution of each party’s support across constituencies stays the same.

However, if we extrapolate the Britain-wide changes in party support to seats in Scotland and Wales, we in effect have to assume that there is little or no change in the level of support for, and thus seats won by, the nationalist parties that only contest elections in those two parts of the UK. Because those parties fight relatively few seats, the Britain-wide change in their support will always be relatively small – even the surge in SNP support between 2010 and 2015 represented an increase of only 3.2 points in the party’s share of the Britain-wide vote. While the assumption of little or no change in nationalist support is one that can again be applied in Wales, it is manifestly not one that can be used on this occasion in Scotland. Consequently, any attempt to estimate how the electoral system would have treated the parties if the ups and downs in party support had been ‘uniform’ has to be made on the basis of two separate calculations. In other words, we assume that the overall changes in party support across England and Wales would have applied in each and every constituency there, while in Scotland we assume that the outcome in every seat would have reflected the (very different) overall changes in party support that were in evidence in that part of the UK.

If that had indeed been what had happened at this election, the Conservatives would not have won an overall majority – but they would not have been far short of one. The party would have won 320 seats, six short of an overall majority, while Labour would have 243, the SNP 55, the Liberal Democrats 10, Plaid Cymru three and the Greens one. UKIP, meanwhile, would not have won any representation at all. While the Conservatives would have lost a dozen seats to Labour, they would have won no less than 26 from the Liberal Democrats. From this it is clear that the collapse in support for their junior coalition partners was a crucial foundation of the Conservatives’ success.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, all that would have happened to the Conservatives in Scotland under our extrapolation is that the party would have lost their one and only seat – so the divergent outcome north of the border is not in any way responsible for the Conservatives’ success.

But how did the Conservatives manage to win an overall majority rather than just falling short? Here what is crucial is the party's success at avoiding losses to Labour. If the outcome had been in line everywhere with our model of uniform change, the party would have lost a dozen seats to Labour. In the event, it suffered a net loss of just two. There were in fact exactly ten seats that the Conservatives successfully held that would have been lost if the outcome had been in line with our uniform change projection.<sup>56</sup> Eight of these were constituencies where the seat was being defended by a Conservative MP who gained the seat in 2010 from Labour, circumstances in which we have seen there was typically a swing to the Conservatives. It was above all – perhaps somewhat paradoxically – the personal votes won by first-time incumbent Conservative MPs as a result of their local constituency activity that gave the party the crucial additional stepping stone it needed to win a nationwide majority.<sup>57</sup>

These were not the only seats being contested between the Conservatives and Labour that failed to conform to the pattern of uniform change. In fact, the Conservatives gained as many as eight seats from Labour against the tide, only for these gains to be matched by eight gains that Labour made from the Conservatives where the swing required for victory was greater than our model of uniform change would anticipate. In truth, given that it was an election in which in England and Wales at least there was only a relatively small swing between the two parties (exactly 1% to Labour), some gains and losses in both directions were likely to occur simply as a result of random variation from one constituency to another. There was, however, some pattern to these gains and losses.

No less than five of the eight 'unexpected' gains made by Labour were seats with relatively large ethnic minority populations, and indeed all five of these seats are amongst the top 10% of constituencies in respect of the proportion of Muslims that they contain. We showed earlier that Labour generally performed well in such seats. Of the remaining three seats, two were in the North West, where Labour performed relatively well, while one was a seat in which the incumbent Conservative MP stood down. However, we should also note that all but one of them were seats where UKIP's advance was relatively weak, circumstances in which, as we have shown, Labour consistently did better, underlining our earlier conclusion that UKIP's advance was not self-evidently simply a problem for the Conservatives.

In contrast, the eight seats the Conservatives gained from Labour are more variegated in character.<sup>58</sup> Two were constituencies in which the



incumbent Labour MP retired, while two (including one of the seats where the MP retired) were in Wales where there was a small net swing to the Conservatives (see Table A2.4). At the same time, in none of the seats was unemployment particularly high, while three had relatively low proportions of people working in the public sector. But beyond this, there is little about these constituencies that would lead one to anticipate a swing from Labour to the Conservatives. It looks as though in many cases, specifically local circumstances played a role in bringing about a Conservative victory, the most notable of which was the capture of the Morley and Outwood seat of the Labour Shadow Chancellor, Ed Balls.

Apart from these three sets of seats involving the Conservatives and Labour, there are relatively few discrepancies between the expectations generated by our model of uniform change and the actual outcome. UKIP held one of its two by-election gains (Clacton) from the Conservatives, thereby ensuring that the party was not entirely denied representation. The SNP made three gains where the swing required locally was greater than that occurring across Scotland as a whole,<sup>59</sup> but in each case this simply reflected the fact that Labour's vote was falling more heavily, and the SNP's vote increasing most, in seats where Labour had previously been strongest. As we noted earlier, Labour saved one Scottish seat (Edinburgh South) from the SNP thanks to anti-nationalist tactical voting, while the Conservatives hung on to their one and only Scottish seat (Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale) by increasing their vote in line with the party's performance south of the border and also perhaps as a result of some tactical voting. Although the Liberal Democrats retained two seats that they might have been expected to have lost to the Conservatives, they lost three others they might have hoped to retain (including one where the incumbent MP stood down).<sup>60</sup> The party also lost one 'extra' seat, Bristol West, to Labour, almost undoubtedly as a result of the 23.1 point increase in the Green vote in the constituency, the highest in the country. But none of the departures from the expectations of a model of uniform change involving one of the smaller parties had a major impact on the overall outcome.

This leaves us with a paradox about the way in which the electoral system operated at this election. For all of the parties, the amount by which their vote increased or fell varied from one constituency to another to a greater extent than at any other recent election (see the standard deviation figures in Table A1.1), while some were experiencing falls in support that made it impossible for their performance to be uniform across the country. This suggests that the outcome should have been very different from what we would expect if the pattern of

movement were largely uniform. Yet we have to take just two sources of geographical variation into consideration to be able almost wholly to account for the outcome in seats – these are the very different outcomes for nearly all of the parties in Scotland and the relative success of the Conservatives in fending off a Labour challenge in marginal seats being defended by a first-time incumbent. There was nothing inevitable about this – there was, for example, no necessary reason why the Liberal Democrats' performance in seats being defended by an incumbent Liberal Democrat MP should have more or less matched the drop in the party's support across the country as a whole. It just so happened that for the most part, the various sources of variation largely cancelled themselves out so far as each party's tally of seats was concerned.

But that does not mean that the way in which the electoral system operated largely remained unchanged. The Conservatives' success in defending a number of marginal seats against the tide, the collapse in Liberal Democrat support and the rise of the SNP in Scotland between them had profound implications for the way in which the system now translated votes into seats. Moreover, despite the Conservatives' success in winning an overall majority even though they enjoyed a lower lead over Labour in terms of votes, the ability of the system to ensure that whichever party comes first in votes secures a majority in the Commons – one of the system's key attributes according to its advocates – remains in question.

The ability of the single-member plurality system to provide whichever of the Conservatives or Labour secures most votes with a majority in the House of Commons – even though that party may have much less than 50% of the vote – depends on three phenomena.<sup>61</sup> First, there needs to be a reasonably large number of seats that are marginal between those two parties and which thus can be expected to change hands in response to what might be no more than a switch from a small lead nationally for one party to a small lead for the other. Second, the system needs to be even-handed in its treatment of the Conservatives and Labour; if the two parties secure the same share of the vote, they should win the same number of seats, such that, for example, a two point lead nationally for, say, the Conservatives should result in the same-sized majority as a two point lead for Labour. Third, the system should give third parties little or no representation, for the more third party MPs there are in the House of Commons, the greater the probability that no one party will win an overall majority.

In some ways the system did what it was meant to do so far as the treatment of third parties is concerned. The UKIP upsurge was rewarded with just one seat. The collapse in Liberal Democrat support saw the party's representation plummet. As a result, less than 2% of the seats in England and Wales were won by third parties, fewer than at any time since 1979. Nevertheless, the overall tally of third party MPs was still as high as 87, two more than were elected in 2010 and second only to the 92 that entered the Commons in 2005. The explanation, of course, lies in the success of the SNP. Far from discriminating against this party, the 4.7% of the UK-wide vote that it won was rewarded with no less than 8.6% of the seats in the House of Commons. Here at least was one third party that profited from the first-past-the-post system.

The contrast between the way in which the system treated the SNP and the way in which it gave the Liberal Democrats and (especially) UKIP just a few spoils is, of course, a reflection of the very different way in which those parties' votes are distributed geographically. The SNP's vote is confined to Scotland and was big enough there to sweep almost everything before it. In contrast, support for the Liberal Democrats and (especially) that for UKIP, is scattered relatively evenly across the country.<sup>62</sup> At the same time, all 18 seats in Northern Ireland are entirely the preserve of parties (and an independent) that do not contest elections in Britain, while Plaid Cymru can gain representation thanks to a concentration of its support in those parts of Wales where Welsh is widely spoken. The ability of the first-past-the-post system to discriminate against third parties has always been contingent on the geography of their support;<sup>63</sup> what this election did was to provide a vivid illustration of that truth. It does, however, mean, that the system ensures that third parties that represent particular territorial interests and identities may find it easier to secure leverage in the House of Commons than those that represent much larger bodies of voters scattered across the UK as a whole.

But if the electoral system proved relatively ineffective at keeping third parties out of the House of Commons, has there been any increase in the number of seats that are marginal between Conservative and Labour, thereby making it more likely that the largest party will secure an overall majority? Previous research has uncovered a long-term decline in the number of such seats.<sup>64</sup> And the number of such seats fell even further at this election. We can define as a marginal seat a seat in which the Conservative share of the votes cast for Conservative and Labour (the two-party vote) would lie between 45% and 55% should both parties secure the same share of the vote across Britain as a whole.

The number of seats falling within this category fell from 85 in 2010 to 74 now, fewer than ever before.

The reason for this is simple. As we have shown, within England and Wales, Conservative support generally increased most in relatively affluent constituencies, those with few public sector workers and those with predominantly white populations, all characteristics that tend to be associated with relatively high Conservative support in the first place. The fact that the party performed relatively well in such seats meant that England and Wales polarised yet further politically, with the Conservatives' share of the two-party vote falling less on average in seats that the party already held (by 0.9 of a point) than in those that were already in Labour's hands (2.4). As a result, there were yet fewer constituencies in which the two parties are likely to be close combatants in an election that is closely fought across the country as a whole.

So if the number of marginal seats fell, how then did we still end up with a Conservative majority? The answer lies in how some of the patterns of geographical variation we have identified, together with the collapse in Liberal Democrat support, turned a system that hitherto appeared to be biased in Labour's favour into one that now treats the Conservatives more kindly than it does their principal opponents.

The first crucial reason why this happened was the success of Conservative incumbents who were defending a marginal seat for the first time. Under the first-past-the-post system, a party will always be more richly rewarded if it wins plenty of seats by relatively small margins rather than piling up large majorities in safe seats or losing narrowly in marginal ones. At recent elections, it has been Labour's vote that has been the more efficiently distributed in this way.<sup>65</sup> However, the relative success of the Conservatives in the most marginal seats that they were defending meant that this advantage was reversed. Of the 74 seats that we defined earlier as marginal, 45 would be won by the Conservatives if the two parties were equal nationally, while only 29 would be won by Labour.<sup>66</sup>

The second reason lies in the profound change that occurred in the character of third party representation. Because the Liberal Democrats have tended to perform better in seats where the Conservatives are relatively strong, and because hitherto the principal third party has been the Liberal Democrats, until now the Conservatives have 'wasted' more votes than Labour in seats that were won by a third party. For example, while Labour on average won 16.6% of the vote in seats won by third parties in 2010, the Conservatives won 28.4% of the vote in such circumstances. But the collapse of the Liberal Democrats in 2015

meant that the Conservatives now wasted far fewer votes in seats captured by that party, while 40 of the 50 seats gained by the SNP were constituencies that had previously been held by Labour. It was Labour (average vote in third party seats 23.3%) that was now piling up more votes in third party seats, not the Conservatives (15.6%).

So, rather than representing a restoration of the electoral system's ability to deliver an overall majority to the largest party in a reliable and consistent manner, the Conservative success in winning an overall majority was the product of a reversal of the unequal way in which it treated the two largest parties.<sup>67</sup> Even then, thanks to the fact that there are fewer marginal seats nowadays, the Conservative overall majority of 12 is less than that enjoyed by the party in 1955, 1959 or 1970, or indeed the majority that Labour won in 2005, even though at each of those elections the lead of the largest party in votes was smaller than the 6.5 point lead the Conservatives enjoyed on this occasion. The result is that if the level and character of third party support remains as it is at present, the system still does not look like one that can be relied upon to produce overall majorities.

This feature – together with the way in which the system now treats the Conservatives more favourably – is illustrated in Table A1.15, which shows what the outcome would be as the result of various possible swings from Conservative to Labour, assuming: (i) that these occurred uniformly in each and every constituency; (ii) that the current parliamentary boundaries remain in place; and (iii) that the level and distribution of support for third parties is unchanged. First of all, we should note the wide range of results, that is, anything in between a Conservative lead of 5.8 points to a Labour lead of 12.5 points, which would, if our assumptions held, result in a hung parliament. Never before has this range been as wide as it has proven to be after the 2015 election.

*Table A1.15* The relationship between votes and seats following the 2015 general election

<i>Swing to Con from 2015 result</i>	<i>Con lead over Lab (% GB Vote)</i>	<i>Seats (UK)</i>		
		<i>Con</i>	<i>Lab</i>	<i>Others</i>
-0.4	5.8	327	236	87
-3.3	0.0	302	256	92
-6.9	-3.7	279	278	93
-9.6	-12.5	229	326	95

Meanwhile, we can observe that the range is asymmetric. In order to be able to win an overall majority, Labour need more than twice as large a lead as the Conservatives. That in itself is an indication of the way in which the system now treats the Conservatives more favourably. But, in addition, we can note that the Conservatives would win 46 more seats than Labour if the two parties were to win the same share of the vote and that Labour would need to be 3.7 points ahead of the Conservatives before they achieved parity in terms of seats. In 2010, in contrast, the equivalent calculations put Labour 51 seats ahead in the event of a tie in votes, while the Conservatives needed to be 4.1 points ahead in order to win as many seats as Labour.

Not the least of the reasons why Labour would require such a large lead to win an overall majority is that even a 9.6% swing from the Conservatives to Labour would result in the party gaining just one seat from the SNP, so far ahead are the SNP in most of the seats that they won. The electoral system is, in truth, likely to continue to operate to Labour's relative disadvantage for so long as the SNP are anything like as successful in Scotland as they were in 2015. On the other hand, if SNP support were to decline as well as Labour's to rise, then Labour would begin to win back seats. For example, if SNP support fell by 9.6 points everywhere at the same time as Labour's increased by that amount, Labour would capture a dozen seats from their nationalist opponents.

However, the next election is not only due to be fought under new, more equal electoral boundaries, but also following a reduction in the number of constituencies from 650 to 600 (see p. 22). Making the sizes of constituencies more equal is likely to make the system even less favourable to Labour because the average Labour held seat contains some 3,800 fewer registered voters than the average Conservative constituency. However, reducing the number of constituencies could make the system somewhat better able to produce overall majorities as increasing the sizes of constituencies increases the likelihood that they are socially and thus politically more heterogeneous.

Although the single-member plurality system has been the only system used to elect MPs since 1950, there was nothing inevitable about its continued use at this election. It only continued to be used because in 2011 voters rejected in a referendum a proposal to use the Alternative Vote system instead (see p. 20). Yet, ironically, according to calculations made by the Electoral Reform Society, it would have made very little difference if voters had backed the Alternative Vote system, under which voters are invited to place candidates in rank order and the votes of less successful candidates are redistributed in accordance

with voters' second and lower preferences until one candidate secures a majority of all votes cast.<sup>68</sup> It is estimated that the Conservatives would have won 337 seats (six more than they actually won), Labour 227 (-5), SNP 54 (-2) and the Liberal Democrats 9 (+1), while UKIP and the Greens would still have had just one seat each. It is perhaps ironic that the Conservatives might have been the principal beneficiary of a system whose possible introduction they strongly opposed, while the Liberal Democrats, who insisted that the referendum be held as their price for participating in the Coalition, would apparently have profited little. In any event, the likely similarity of the result in 2015 suggests that the Alternative Vote system is unlikely to be regarded as a worthwhile alternative by critics of the current system in future.

Rather, these critics are likely to point to the extent of the mismatch between votes won and seats secured across all the parties that contested the 2015 election. According to one index of disproportionality at least, only on one previous occasion (1983) was the outcome as disproportionate as that in 2015.<sup>69</sup> Far from signalling a return to service as normal, the way in which the electoral system operated in 2015 seems set to ensure that the debate about its merits will continue.

## Notes

1. As indeed proved to be the fate of the last majority Conservative government to be elected, that is, the one elected in 1992 with an initial majority of 21.
2. This appendix does not attempt to analyse the result in Northern Ireland, where elections are dominated by parties that do not field candidates in Great Britain. Although the Conservatives, the Greens and UKIP stood in some constituencies in Northern Ireland, they each won less than 3% of the vote. The results in the 18 constituencies in Northern Ireland are shown in Table A2.5, while Table A2.3 provides a summary for the region as a whole.
3. For example, see, J. Curtice, S. Fisher and M. Steed, 'Appendix 2: The Results Analysed' in D. Kavanagh and D. Butler, *The British General Election of 2005*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; J. Curtice, S. Fisher and R. Ford, 'Appendix 2: The Results Analysed' in D. Kavanagh and P. Cowley, *The British General Election of 2010*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
4. I. McLean, 'The Problem of Proportionate Swing', *Political Studies*, 21(1) (1973): 57–63.
5. Though the two measures of swing define 'suffer or profit equally' differently. See M. Steed, 'Appendix II: An Analysis of the Results' in D. Butler and A. King, *The British General Election of 1964*. Macmillan, 1965, pp. 337–8.
6. See, e.g., R. Duch and R. Stevenson, *The Economic Vote*. Cambridge University Press, 2008 and citations therein.
7. Even so, the two-party swing (which anticipates that former Liberal Democrat voters would switch to the Conservatives and Labour in proportion to their prior strength) was higher (-10.7) in Liberal Democrat seats where Labour

started off second than it was in those where the Conservatives had been second (–6.7).

8. The measure of unemployment is the share of the registered electorate who were claiming Jobseeker's Allowance in March 2015, the latest month for which data were available prior to the election (ONS regional labour market statistic JSA02 – Claimant Count for Parliamentary Constituencies). This 'claimant count' measure produces a lower estimate of unemployment than others, such as the Labour Force Survey, which counts people who are looking for work but are not claiming unemployment benefits. However, it is more regularly updated and the two series track each other closely (Office for National Statistics, 'UK Labour Market March 2015', [www.ons.gov.uk](http://www.ons.gov.uk)). Unemployment statistics are commonly reported as a share of the active labour force, but we report them as a share of the electorate as this is the more relevant measure for our purposes: the political impact of economic changes will be more muted in areas where many voters are out of the labour force through, for example, retirement or full-time study.
9. J. Curtice, 'A Defeat to Reckon with: On Scotland, Economic Competence, and the Complexities of Labour's Losses', *Juncture*, 22(1) (2015): 42–7.
10. Regression analysis confirms that the relationship between the local level of unemployment and both Conservative and Labour performance is statistically significant after controlling for the prior Liberal Democrat share of the vote.
11. Data on incomes by parliamentary constituency are for the tax year 2012/13 and come from the Survey of Personal Incomes. See [www.gov.uk/government/statistics/income-and-tax-by-parliamentary-constituency-2010-to-2011](http://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/income-and-tax-by-parliamentary-constituency-2010-to-2011).
12. Exact data on the proportion of people in each constituency who are employed in the public sector are not available. But those who work in the industrial sectors, 'public administration and defence', 'education' and 'health and social care' for which data are available from the 2011 Census are mostly employed in the public sector and these groups constitute the majority of public sector workers.
13. Curtice, Fisher and Ford, 'Appendix 2', pp. 390–1.
14. P. Dunleavy, 'The Political Implications of Sectoral Cleavages and the Growth of State Employment: Part 2, Cleavage Structures and Political Alignment', *Political Studies*, 28(4) (1980): 527–49.
15. Curtice, Fisher and Ford, 'Appendix 2', pp. 391–2.
16. *Ibid.*
17. S. Fisher, A. Heath, D. Sanders and M. Sobolewska, 'Candidate Ethnicity and Vote Choice in Britain', *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(4) (2015): 883–905.
18. References to regions of England here and later in this appendix are to the UK government region of that name.
19. Thus, in the 40 seats in the North of England with a population density of more than 25 persons per hectare (as measured by the 2001 Census), the Conservative vote fell on average by 2.1 points, while Labour's increased by 6.9 points. In contrast, in the 24 seats with a population density of less than three persons per hectare, the Conservative vote actually increased slightly more (by 2.3 points) than did the Labour vote (1.7 points).



20. See, for example, T. Smith, 'Are You Sitting Comfortably? Estimating Incumbency Advantage in the UK: 1983–2010 – A Research Note', *Electoral Studies*, 32(1) (2013): 167–73 and citations therein.
21. Further evidence in support of the argument that incumbency mattered comes from the fact that although there were no instances of a Labour MP defending a seat gained from the Conservatives in 2010, whether or not a seat was being defended by the incumbent MP also made a difference to Labour's performance in the seats that it was defending. The party's vote increased on average by 3.4 points in seats in which the incumbent retired, but by 5.1 points where the local MP was standing again.
22. A. Russell, E. Fieldhouse and I. MacAllister, *Neither Left nor Right: The Liberal Democrats and the Electorate*. Manchester University Press, 2004.
23. See S. Fisher and N. Hillman, 'Do Students Swing Elections? Registration, Turnout and Voting Behaviour among Full-Time Students', [www.hepi.ac.uk](http://www.hepi.ac.uk) (2014) and citations therein.
24. Seats with relatively large numbers of students are defined as those in which more than 9% of those aged 16–74 were classified as students in the 2011 Census. Those with relatively few students are those in which less than 6% were classified as students.
25. A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice, *How Britain Votes*. Pergamon Press, 1985.
26. Smith, 'Are You Sitting Comfortably?' and citations therein.
27. This observation is based on a regression model of the relationship between prior Liberal Democrat strength and the fall in Liberal Democrat support that is confined to those seats the party did not win in 2010. It includes both linear and log-linear terms that between them summarise the pattern whereby Liberal Democrat support fell more heavily the better the party did in 2010, but that in places where the party was stronger, the drop represented a smaller proportion of the party's prior support. This, of course, presumes that we can extrapolate accurately from this model what would have happened in seats in which the party won very high shares of the vote in 2010, in all of which, inevitably, the party came first.
28. R. Ford and M. Goodwin, *Revolt on the Right*. Routledge, 2014.
29. As defined in Table A1.7 above. UKIP's vote increased on average by 15.5 points in seats with less than 29% employed in the public sector.
30. As a percentage of those aged 16–74 who were economically active.
31. See, e.g., G. Evans and J. Mellon, 'Working Class Votes and Conservative Losses: Solving the UKIP Puzzle', *Parliamentary Affairs* (2015); R. Ford and M. Goodwin, 'Different Class? UKIP's Social Base and Political Impact: A Reply to Evans and Mellon', *Parliamentary Affairs* (2015).
32. Curtice, Fisher and Ford, 'Appendix 2', pp. 407–8.
33. In any event, it might be the case that one of the reasons why Labour performed relatively well and UKIP relatively badly in many ethnically diverse constituencies is that Labour voters in such seats were less willing to switch to UKIP.
34. C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, *Media Guide to the New Parliamentary Constituencies*. Local Government Chronicle Elections Centre, 2007.
35. Curtice, Fisher and Ford, 'Appendix 2', pp. 389–93.
36. In seats where the proportion of those aged 16–74 classified by the Census as unemployed fell by two points or more, the Greens won on average 5.7%

of the vote and saw their vote increase by 4.2 points in those seats they also fought in 2010. In contrast, where the proportion unemployed had increased by 1.4 points, the Greens won just 3.2% of the vote on average and saw their vote increase by 2.1 points. However, there is little discernible relationship between Green performance and the level of unemployment in 2015.

37. See, for example, Curtice, Fisher and Ford, 'Appendix 2'.
38. This calculation is based on all seats that the party fought in 2015. Where the party did not fight the constituency in 2010 the increase in its share of the vote since 2010 is simply the share of the vote it won in 2015.
39. S. Fisher and J. Curtice, 'Tactical Unwind? Changes in Party Preference Structure and Tactical Voting from 2001 to 2005', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 16(1) (2006): 55–76 and citations therein.
40. Curtice, Fisher and Ford, 'Appendix 2', pp. 400–1.
41. Labour support increased on average by 13.5 points in these seats, a performance that emulated that achieved by the party on average in those seats where it started off second to the Liberal Democrats.
42. The two seats that were retained were Leeds North West and Sheffield Hallam. Cambridge, in contrast, was narrowly lost by the Liberal Democrats.
43. In Conservative/Labour marginals where UKIP's vote increased by less than 7.5 points, there was a swing to Labour of 0.6 points. In contrast, in seats where the increase was more than 13.5 points, there was a swing of 2.1 points to the Conservatives, while in seats where the increase was between 7.5 points and 13.5 points, there was a 2.5 point swing in the Conservatives' favour.
44. Not that the support for the party was the same everywhere. It was typically highest in less affluent constituencies as well as those where more people were born in Scotland or acknowledged a Scottish identity. For example, on average the party won 54.0% in seats where the current unemployment level represented more than 2% of the electorate, compared with 46.2% elsewhere. At the same time, the party won 53.3% in seats where, according to the 2011 Census, more than 83% of people were born in Scotland, compared with 46.0% elsewhere. Indeed, in both cases, the difference in the level of SNP support between the two types of seat was rather greater than it was in 2010.
45. This was Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk, where the Conservative vote increased by 2.2 points, where the party's credibility may have been unusually strong locally because polling undertaken by Lord Ashcroft had suggested the Conservatives might be able to win the seat, and because the Conservatives currently held the nearest equivalent Scottish Parliament constituency.
46. Indeed, we should note that in contrast to the pattern we have seen in England and Wales, there is no evidence that Conservative support fell less in places with relatively low levels of unemployment, while in fact Labour's vote fell most (and the SNP's rose most) in places with relatively high levels of unemployment.
47. Apart from Edinburgh South, it is possible that the Tories' success in narrowly retaining Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale was assisted by a small amount of tactical switching by both Liberal Democrat and Labour voters.

Both of those parties suffered a slightly bigger drop in support (of around two points) in the constituency than might have otherwise have been expected, given their respective prior levels of strength in the constituency in 2010.

48. And in a few instances probably Labour voters too. This certainly seems to be what happened in East Dunbartonshire, where Labour's vote fell by 21.8 points, well above the drop elsewhere in seats with a similarly sized Labour vote in 2010 and enough to ensure that the fall in the Liberal Democrat vote there (-2.8 points) was the lowest anywhere in Britain. But Labour's vote also fell by slightly more than we would otherwise expect (that is, given its previous strength locally) in the handful of other seats in which the party started off second to the Liberal Democrats.
49. The Liberal Democrat vote fell by just 3.3 points in Gordon, where Malcolm Bruce stood down and the seat was being contested for the SNP by the former Scottish First Minister, Alex Salmond, while in Fife North East (where Sir Menzies Campbell retired), the party's vote fell by 13.0 points.
50. Defined as constituencies in which more than 12% of those aged 16–74 were classified by the 2011 Census as students.
51. For example, turnout increased on average by 1.8 points in those seats where over 12% of those aged 16–74 were classified in the 2011 Census as students, well above the average of 0.5 of a point across all seats in England and Wales. As seats with relatively large numbers of students were disproportionately constituencies where Labour and the Liberal Democrats shared second place, this means that turnout also rose most in such contests, contests in which on average Labour tended to perform relatively well. However, given the apparent impact of the change of procedure on the level of registration in such seats, we clearly cannot presume that the relatively strong Labour performance in such seats was occasioned by the increase in turnout.
52. But note that although the level of turnout continued to be lower in places with relatively high levels of social deprivation, there is no evidence that the gap widened. Turnout increased on average by around half a point irrespective of the proportion of the population that in the 2011 Census said that they were in good health.
53. For example, on average turnout increased by 8.8 points in those seats where less than 79% said in the 2011 Census that they were in good health, compared with 6.6 points in those where more than 82% said they were in good health.
54. Curtice, Fisher and Ford, 'Appendix 2', pp. 410–17. See also M. Thrasher, G. Borisyuk, C. Rallings and R. Johnston, 'Electoral Bias at the 2010 General Election: Evaluating its Extent in a Three-Party System', *Electoral Studies*, 21(2) (2011): 279–94.
55. This calculation is itself not unproblematic. As we noted earlier, in around one in four seats the fall in the Liberal Democrat share of the vote was greater than the party's share of the vote locally last time, and thus it was arithmetically impossible for the Liberal Democrat vote to have fallen by the same amount everywhere. Equally, the Scotland-wide fall in Labour support was greater than its share of the vote locally in nine seats north of the border. However, examination of the cases where the uniform change assumption produces an estimated negative share for a party gives no reason

- to believe that in any instance the outcome could have been different, not least because in most cases the projected negative share for the Liberal Democrats/Labour is less than the projected majority for the winning party.
56. These constituencies were Amber Valley, Broxtowe, Cardiff North, Hendon, Morecambe and Lunesdale, Sherwood, Stockton South, Thurrock, Warwickshire North, and Waveney.
  57. If we add to our model of uniform change an estimate, derived from regression analysis of the party's performance, of the bonus that first-time Conservative incumbents secured on average (3.7 points), we secure the Conservatives' exact tally of 331 seats. The two other seats that the party held against the uniform trend were Cardiff North and Warwickshire North, in both of which the (first-time) Conservative incumbent actually stood down. There was, however, as we note below, a slight net swing to the Conservatives in Wales, which helps account for the result in Cardiff North, while Warwickshire North enjoyed relatively low unemployment and is home to relatively few public sector workers, both factors associated with an above-average Conservative performance in England and Wales.
  58. These constituencies were Bolton West, Derby North, Gower, Morley and Outwood, Plymouth Moor View, Southampton Itchen, Telford, and Vale of Clwyd.
  59. These seats are Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill, Glasgow North East, and Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath.
  60. The party held Carshalton and Wallington against the tide, together with Southport, but lost out in Bath, Twickenham, and Yeovil.
  61. G. Gudgin and P. Taylor, *Seats, Votes and the Spatial Organization of Elections*. Pion, 1979.
  62. The standard deviation of the Liberal Democrat vote across all constituencies is now 8.4, down from 10.4 in 2010. Meanwhile, the equivalent figure for UKIP (here also taking into account the ten seats it contested in Northern Ireland) is just 6.2. Support for both parties is markedly more evenly spread than that for both the Conservatives (standard deviation 16.9, after including 16 seats fought in Northern Ireland) and Labour (16.5).
  63. Gudgin and Taylor, *Seats, Votes and the Spatial Organisation of Elections*.
  64. J. Curtice, 'So What Went Wrong with the Electoral System? The 2010 Election Result and the Debate about Electoral Reform', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 68(suppl 1) (2010), 623–38.
  65. *Ibid.*
  66. More generally, the relative efficiency of the Conservative vote is indicated by the fact that the median Conservative share of the two-party vote across all constituencies is 2.1 points higher than the mean share. Because the median is less sensitive than the mean to especially high or low values, this difference suggests that, as compared with Labour, the Conservatives waste fewer votes through winning seats by relatively large majorities. See C. Soper and J. Rydon, 'Under-Representation and Electoral Prediction', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 4(1) (1958): 94–106.
  67. There is, however, one way in which the system continued to be biased in Labour's favour. This is a long-standing tendency for fewer votes to be cast in seats won by Labour than in those won by the Conservatives. This time, nearly 7,400 fewer votes were cast in the seats Labour won. This is both

because there were some 3,800 fewer registered voters in Labour seats (see also further below), while, at 61.9%, turnout in Labour-held constituencies was nearly seven points less than that in Conservative-held seats (68.7%). The Conservatives had hoped to reduce this source of bias against them by securing a redrawing of the parliamentary boundaries, but their plans were scuppered by their Liberal Democrat coalition partners (see p. 22). In the event, the size of this particular source of bias remained much the same as in 2010.

68. J. Garland and C. Terry, *The 2015 General Election: A Voting System in Crisis*. Electoral Reform Society, 2015.
69. This is the so-called Loosemore–Hanby index (see J. Loosemore and V. Hanby, 'The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion: Some Analytic Expressions for Electoral Systems', *British Journal of Political Science*, 1(4) (1971): 467–77), which is the sum of the differences between the parties' shares of the vote and their shares of the vote divided by two. This index (calculated for the result across the whole of the UK) is 23.9, the same as in 1983. However, according to an alternative index which places greater weight on large discrepancies between votes and seats, the result in 2015 was slightly less disproportionate than in 2010, and the least disproportionate since and including 1997 (see M. Gallagher, 'Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems', *Electoral Studies*, 10(1) (1991): 33–51).

# Appendix 2 :The Voting Statistics

Table A2.1 Votes and seats, 1945–2015

	Electorate/ turnout	Votes/ seats	Conservative <sup>a</sup>	Labour	Liberal (Democrats) <sup>b</sup>	Scottish and Welsh Nationalists	Other
1945 <sup>c</sup>	73.3%	100%–640	39,8%–213	48.3%–393	9,1%–12	0,20%	2,5%–22
	32,836,419	24,082,612	9,577,667	11,632,191	2,197,191	46,612	628,251
1950	84.0%	100%–625	43,5%–299	46,1%–315	9,1%–9	0,10%	1,2%–2
	34,269,770	28,772,671	12,502,567	13,266,592	2,621,548	27,288	354,676
1951	82.5%	100%–625	48,0%–321	48,8%–295	2,5%–6	0,10%	0,6%–3
	34,645,573	28,595,668	13,717,538	13,948,605	730,556	18,219	180,750
1955	76.8%	100%–630	49,7%–345	46,4%–277	2,7%–6	0,20%	0,9%–2
	34,858,263	26,760,493	13,311,936	12,404,970	722,405	57,231	263,951
1959	78.7%	100%–630	49,4%–365	43,8%–258	5,9%–6	0,40%	0,6%–1
	35,397,080	27,859,241	13,749,830	12,215,538	1,638,571	99,309	175,987
1964	77.1%	100%–630	43,4%–304	44,1%–317	11,2%–9	0,50%	0,8%–0
	35,892,572	27,655,374	12,001,396	12,205,814	3,092,878	133,551	215,363
1966	75.8%	100%–630	41,9%–253	47,9%–363	8,5%–12	0,70%	0,9%–2
	35,964,684	27,263,606	11,418,433	13,064,951	2,327,533	189,545	263,144
1970	72.0%	100%–630	46,4%–330	43,0%–288	7,5%–6	1,3%–1	1,8%–5
	39,342,013	28,344,798	13,145,123	12,178,295	2,117,033	381,819	524,527
Feb 1974	78.1%	100%–635	37,8%–297	37,1%–301	19,3%–14	2,6%–9	3,2%–14
	39,770,724	31,340,162	11,872,180	11,646,391	6,058,744	804,554	991,036

Oct 1974	72.8%	100%-635	35.8%-277	39.2%-319	18.3%-13	3.5%-14	3.2%-12
	40,072,971	29,189,178	11,464,817	11,457,079	5,346,754	1,005,938	914,590
1979	76.0%	100%-635	43.9%-339	37.%-269	13.8%-11	2.%-4	3.3%-12
	41,093,264	31,221,361	13,697,923	11,532,218	4,313,804	636,890	1,039,563
1983	72.7%	100%-650	42.4%-397	27.6%-209	25.4%-23	1.5%-4	3.1%-17
	42,197,344	30,671,136	13,012,315	8,456,934	7,780,949	457,676	144,723
1987	75.3%	100%-650	42.3%-376	30.8%-229	22.6%-22	1.7%-6	2.6%-17
	43,181,321	32,536,137	13,763,066	10,029,778	7,341,290	543,559	852,368
1992	77.7%	100%-651	41.9%-336	34.4%-271	17.8%-20	2.3%-7	3.5%-17
	43,249,721	33,612,693	14,092,891	11,559,735	5,999,384	783,991	1,176,692
1997	71.5%	100%-659	30.7%-165	43.2%-418	16.8%-46	2.5%-10	6.8%-20
	43,757,478	31,286,597	9,602,857	13,516,632	5,242,894	782,570	2,141,644
2001	59.4%	100%-659	31.7%-166	40.7%-412	18.3%-52	2.5%-9	6.8%-20
	44,403,238	26,368,798	8,357,622	10,724,895	4,812,833	660,197	1,813,251
2005	61.2%	100%-646	32.4%-198	35.2%-356	22.0%-62	2.2%-9	8.2%-22
	44,261,545	27,123,652	8,772,473	9,547,944	5,981,874	567,105	2,234,267
2010	65.1%	100%-650	36.1%-307	29.0%-258	23.0%-57	2.2%-9	9.6%-19
	45,610,369	29,687,409	10,726,555	8,606,518	6,836,188	656,780	2,861,368
2015	66.2%	100%-650	36.9%-331	30.4%-232	7.9%-8	5.3%-59	19.4%-20
	46,354,197	30,697,525	11,334,226	9,347,273	2,415,916	1,636,140	5,963,964

Notes:

<sup>a</sup> Includes Ulster Unionists 1945-70.

<sup>b</sup> Liberals 1945-79; Liberal-SDP Alliance 1983-7; Liberal Democrats 1992-.

<sup>c</sup> The 1945 figures exclude university seats and are adjusted for double counting in the 15 two-member seats.

Table A2.2 Party performance (UK)

Party	Votes	% share (change)	Average % share	Seats (change)	Candidates	Lost deposits
Conservative	11,334,226	36.9 (+0.8)	35.8	331 (+24)	648	18
Labour	9,347,273	30.4 (+1.5)	32.3	232 (-26)	631	3
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	3,881,099	12.6 (+9.5)	13.4	1 (+1)	624	79
Liberal Democrats	2,415,916	7.9 (-15.2)	7.8	8 (-49)	631	341
Scottish National Party (SNP)	1,454,436	4.7 (+3.1)	50.2	56 (+50)	59	0
Green	1,157,630	3.8 (+2.8)	4.2	1 (0)	573	442
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)	184,260	0.6 (0)	29.9	8 (0)	16	0
Plaid Cymru	181,704	0.6 (0)	12.8	3 (0)	40	8
Sinn Féin	176,232	0.6 (0)	23.6	4 (-1)	18	4
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)	114,935	0.4 (0)	18.1	2 (+2)	15	2
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)	99,809	0.3 (0)	13.7	3 (0)	18	3
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI)	61,556	0.2 (+0.1)	8.9	0 (-1)	18	8
Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition	36,368	0.1 (+0.1)	0.6	-	134	134
National Health Action (NHA)	20,210	0.1 (0)	3.3	-	12	10
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV)	16,538	0.1 (0)	6.1	-	7	3
Respect	9,989	0 (-0.1)	6.1	-	4	3
Cannabis is Safer Than Alcohol (CISTA)	8,419	0 (0)	0.6	-	32	32
Yorkshire First	6,811	0 (0)	1.1	-	14	14
English Democrats	6,531	0 (-0.2)	0.5	-	32	32

Note: the cut-off for inclusion was 5,000 votes. Below that line are a variety of other parties, including the Monster Raving Loony Party, the Socialist Labour Party, the Christian Peoples Alliance, the Christian Party, the Workers' Party and the British National Party. The last polled just 1,667 votes in 2015, down from 564,321 in 2010. Not included is Lady Sylvia Hermon, who won North Down as an independent.



Table A2.3 Party performance (Northern Ireland)

Party	Votes	% share (change)	Average % share	Seats (change)	Candidates	Lost deposits
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)	184,260	25.7 (+0.7)	29.9	8 (0)	16	0
Sinn Féin	176,232	24.5 (-1.0)	23.6	4 (-1)	18	4
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)	114,935	16 (+0.8)	18.1	2 (+2)	15	2
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)	99,809	13.9 (-2.6)	13.7	3 (0)	18	3
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI)	61,556	8.6 (+2.2)	8.9	0 (-1)	18	8
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	18,324	2.6 (+2.6)	4.9	-	10	6
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV)	16,538	2.3 (-1.6)	6.1	-	7	3
Conservative	9,055	1.3 (+1.3)	1.5	-	16	15
Green	6,822	1 (+0.4)	3.5	-	5	3
Cannabis is Safer Than Alcohol (CISTA)	1,853	0.3 (+0.3)	1.2	-	4	4

Note: the calculations for the UUP are based on comparisons with the UCU in 2010. As in Table A2.2, not included is Lady Sylvia Hermon, who won North Down as an independent.

Table A2.4 National and regional results

UK

		Seats won in 2015 (change since 2010)			Share of votes cast in 2015 (change since 2010)																			
		Con	LD	Nat and other	Turnout	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Nat	UKIP	Green	Other												
319	(+21)	206	(+15)	6	(-37)	2	(+1)	England	66.0	(+0.5)	41.0	(+1.4)	31.6	(+3.6)	8.2	(-16.0)	0	(0)	14.1	(+10.7)	4.2	(+3.2)	0.8	(-2.8)
44	(+1)	110	(+6)	4	(-7)	0	(0)	North	63.5	(+1.2)	30.7	(0)	43.1	(+4.7)	6.7	(-15.7)	0	(0)	15.0	(+12.0)	3.4	(+2.8)	1.1	(-3.8)
66	(+2)	39	(0)	0	(-2)	0	(0)	Midlands	65.2	(-0.4)	42.5	(+2.3)	32.3	(+2.1)	5.5	(-15.1)	0	(0)	15.7	(+12.1)	3.1	(+2.6)	0.7	(-3.9)
209	(+18)	57	(+9)	2	(-28)	2	(+1)	South	67.7	(+0.5)	45.7	(+1.8)	25.5	(+3.5)	9.9	(-16.6)	0	(0)	13.1	(+9.5)	5.0	(+3.6)	0.8	(-1.8)
11	(+3)	25	(-1)	1	(-2)	3	(0)	Wales	65.7	(+0.9)	27.2	(+1.1)	36.9	(+0.6)	6.5	(-13.6)	12.1	(+0.9)	13.6	(+11.2)	2.6	(+2.1)	1.0	(-2.4)
1	(0)	1	(-40)	1	(-10)	56	(+50)	Scotland	71.0	(+7.2)	14.9	(-1.8)	24.3	(-17.7)	7.5	(-11.3)	50.0	(+30.0)	1.6	(+0.9)	1.3	(+0.7)	0.3	(-0.8)
331	(+24)	232	(-26)	8	(-49)	61	(+51)	Great Britain	66.4	(+1.1)	37.8	(+0.8)	31.2	(+1.5)	8.1	(-15.5)	5.5	(+3.2)	12.9	(+9.7)	3.8	(+2.9)	0.8	(-2.6)
0	(0)	0	(0)	0	(0)	18	(0)	Northern Ireland	58.1	(+0.4)	1.3	(+1.3)	0	(0)	0	(0)	0	(0)	2.6	(+2.6)	1.0	(+0.4)	95.2	(-4.2)
331	(+24)	232	(-26)	8	(-49)	79	(+51)	UK	66.2	(+1.1)	36.9	(+0.8)	30.4	(+1.5)	7.9	(-15.2)	5.3	(+3.1)	12.6	(+9.5)	3.8	(+2.8)	3.0	(-2.6)

Regions

		Seats won in 2015 (change since 2010)			Share of votes cast in 2015 (change since 2010)																			
		Con	Lab	Nat and other	Turnout	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Nat	UKIP	Green	Other												
138	(+3)	51	(+7)	1	(-11)	2	(+1)	South East	67.2	(+0.5)	45.3	(+1.2)	28.2	(+3.9)	8.4	(-15.6)	0	(0)	12.7	(+9.4)	4.7	(+3.3)	0.7	(-2.2)
27	(-1)	45	(+7)	1	(-6)	0	(0)	Greater London*	65.4	(+0.9)	34.9	(+0.4)	43.7	(+7.1)	7.7	(-14.4)	0	(0)	8.1	(+6.4)	4.9	(+3.3)	0.8	(-2.7)
5	(0)	23	(+2)	0	(-2)	0	(0)	Inner London	63.3	(+1.5)	26.8	(+0.7)	52.4	(+8.4)	7.9	(-15.8)	0	(0)	4.6	(+3.7)	7.1	(+5.0)	1.2	(-2.1)
22	(-1)	22	(+5)	1	(-4)	0	(0)	Outer London	66.8	(+0.6)	39.9	(+0.3)	38.3	(+6.1)	7.6	(-13.6)	0	(0)	10.3	(+8.0)	3.4	(+2.2)	0.5	(-3.0)
111	(+4)	6	(0)	0	(-5)	2	(+1)	Rest of South East	68.3	(+0.3)	51.3	(+1.8)	19.3	(+1.9)	8.8	(-16.2)	0	(0)	15.3	(+11.2)	4.6	(+3.4)	0.7	(-2.0)
59	(0)	3	(0)	0	(0)	0	(0)	Outer Met. Area	68.3	(0)	53.1	(+2.1)	19.7	(+2.3)	7.8	(-15.9)	0	(0)	14.9	(+11.1)	3.7	(+2.9)	0.8	(-2.4)
52	(+4)	3	(0)	0	(-5)	2	(+1)	Other South East	68.2	(+0.7)	49.4	(+1.4)	18.8	(+1.5)	9.8	(-16.6)	0	(0)	15.6	(+11.4)	5.6	(+3.9)	0.7	(-1.6)
51	(+15)	4	(0)	0	(-15)	0	(0)	South West*	69.5	(+0.5)	46.5	(+3.7)	17.7	(+2.3)	15.1	(-19.6)	0	(0)	13.6	(+9.1)	5.9	(+4.8)	1.2	(+0.3)
17	(+6)	1	(-1)	0	(-5)	0	(0)	Devon and Cornwall	69.4	(+0.1)	45.2	(+2.6)	16.2	(+3.7)	16.2	(-19.8)	0	(0)	14.4	(+8.6)	5.7	(+4.2)	2.4	(+0.7)
34	(+9)	3	(+1)	0	(-10)	0	(0)	Rest of South West	69.6	(+0.3)	47.2	(+4.2)	18.4	(+1.6)	14.6	(-19.5)	0	(0)	13.2	(+9.3)	6.0	(+5.1)	0.6	(-0.8)
20	(0)	2	(+2)	1	(-2)	0	(0)	East Anglia*	67.5	(-0.4)	46.9	(+2.2)	22.6	(+3.8)	9.8	(-17.2)	0	(0)	15.7	(+10.7)	4.9	(+2.5)	0.2	(-2.0)
32	(+1)	14	(-1)	0	(0)	0	(0)	East Midlands*	66.5	(-0.3)	43.5	(+2.3)	31.6	(+1.9)	5.6	(-15.3)	0	(0)	15.8	(+12.5)	3.0	(+2.4)	0.6	(-3.9)

34 (+1)	25 (+1)	0 (-2)	0 (0)	64.1 (-0.6)	41.8 (-0.2)	32.9 (+2.3)	5.5 (-14.9)	0 (0)	15.7 (+11.7)	3.3 (+2.7)	0.8 (-4.0)
7 (0)	21 (+2)	0 (-2)	0 (0)	60.5 (-0.9)	33.1 (-0.4)	42.5 (+4.8)	5.5 (-13.8)	0 (0)	15.5 (+11.6)	2.9 (+2.4)	0.6 (-4.6)
27 (+1)	4 (-1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	67.2 (-0.3)	48.7 (+4.3)	25.3 (+0.3)	5.5 (-15.8)	0 (0)	15.9 (+11.8)	3.6 (+2.9)	1.0 (-3.5)
19 (0)	33 (+1)	2 (-1)	0 (0)	63.3 (+0.4)	32.6 (-0.2)	39.1 (+4.8)	7.1 (-15.8)	0 (0)	16.0 (+13.2)	3.5 (+2.7)	1.6 (-4.6)
0 (0)	13 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	60.5 (-0.4)	17.4 (-3.2)	49.5 (+7.5)	8.2 (-15.6)	0 (0)	20.8 (+16.4)	2.7 (+2.1)	1.6 (-7.2)
7 (0)	14 (+1)	1 (-1)	0 (0)	64.5 (+0.5)	32.7 (-0.2)	42.2 (+4.8)	6.4 (-14.3)	0 (0)	13.6 (+12.3)	3.6 (+2.6)	1.6 (-5.1)
12 (0)	6 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	63.9 (+1.0)	43.5 (+1.8)	28.0 (+3.0)	7.3 (-17.8)	0 (0)	15.6 (+12.0)	4.1 (+3.2)	1.6 (-2.1)
20 (0)	48 (+4)	1 (-4)	0 (0)	64.1 (+2.3)	30.4 (-0.6)	45.9 (+5.7)	6.0 (-15.4)	0 (0)	13.7 (+10.5)	3.2 (+2.7)	0.8 (-2.8)
5 (+3)	22 (0)	0 (-3)	0 (0)	61.3 (+1.9)	26.4 (-0.9)	46.1 (+5.8)	7.1 (-16.7)	0 (0)	16.1 (+12.9)	3.5 (+3.0)	0.8 (-4.0)
0 (-1)	14 (+1)	1 (0)	0 (0)	65.7 (+5.0)	18.1 (-3.0)	61.7 (+9.4)	5.5 (-15.3)	0 (0)	10.3 (+7.1)	3.6 (+3.3)	0.8 (-1.5)
15 (-2)	12 (+3)	0 (-1)	0 (0)	66.3 (+1.3)	40.9 (+1.3)	37.3 (+3.3)	5.1 (-14.3)	0 (0)	13.3 (+9.9)	2.6 (+2.1)	0.8 (-2.3)
5 (+1)	29 (+1)	1 (-2)	0 (0)	62.6 (+0.3)	28.1 (+1.5)	43.8 (+2.6)	7.7 (-16.0)	0 (0)	16.0 (+13.4)	3.6 (+3.2)	0.8 (-4.7)
0 (0)	12 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	60.6 (+0.8)	20.3 (-1.1)	52.1 (+3.4)	5.5 (-16.1)	0 (0)	17.3 (+15.5)	4.1 (+3.4)	0.7 (-5.1)
5 (+1)	17 (+1)	1 (-2)	0 (0)	63.6 (+0.1)	32.1 (+2.9)	39.6 (+2.1)	8.8 (-15.9)	0 (0)	15.3 (+12.3)	3.3 (+3.1)	0.9 (-4.5)
11 (+3)	25 (-1)	1 (-2)	3 (0)	65.7 (+0.9)	27.2 (+1.1)	36.9 (+0.6)	6.5 (-13.6)	12.1 (+0.9)	13.6 (+11.2)	2.6 (+2.1)	1.0 (-2.4)
4 (+1)	20 (0)	0 (-1)	0 (0)	64.5 (+1.1)	24.1 (+1.2)	42.9 (+1.1)	5.2 (-14.4)	9.9 (+1.4)	14.3 (+11.9)	2.7 (+2.1)	1.0 (-3.3)
7 (+2)	5 (-1)	1 (-1)	3 (0)	67.7 (+0.6)	32.3 (+1.1)	27.2 (-0.3)	8.7 (-12.2)	15.8 (+0.1)	12.5 (+10.0)	2.3 (+2.2)	1.2 (-0.8)
1 (0)	1 (-40)	1 (-10)	56 (+50)	71.0 (+7.2)	14.9 (-1.8)	24.3 (-17.7)	7.5 (-11.3)	50.0 (+30.0)	1.6 (+0.9)	1.3 (+0.7)	0.3 (-0.8)
1 (0)	0 (-5)	0 (-1)	6 (+6)	Ayrshire and Borders	73.1 (+7.9)	24.4 (-1.4)	22.3 (-17.5)	4.3 (-11.9)	46.6 (+29.5)	1.8 (+1.2)	0.6 (+0.4)
0 (0)	0 (-19)	0 (-1)	20 (+20)	Clydeside	68.9 (+7.3)	9.3 (-2.1)	31.0 (-24.3)	3.8 (-9.0)	53.1 (+35.3)	1.3 (+0.9)	1.0 (+0.4)
0 (0)	1 (-9)	0 (-1)	10 (+10)	Rest of Central Belt	72.7 (+5.9)	15.0 (-1.8)	28.1 (-14.2)	5.6 (-14.6)	46.7 (+28.5)	2.0 (+1.4)	2.5 (+1.1)
0 (0)	0 (-7)	0 (-3)	15 (+10)	North East and Fife	70.7 (+7.2)	19.2 (-0.2)	18.1 (-14.5)	8.6 (-11.8)	51.2 (+25.7)	1.3 (+0.4)	1.3 (+1.0)
0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (-4)	5 (+4)	Highlands and Islands	73.6 (+8.9)	8.6 (-6.0)	9.4 (-11.7)	30.9 (-9.5)	46.8 (+27.4)	2.4 (+1.1)	1.1 (-0.2)
0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	18 (0)	N Ireland	58.1 (+0.4)	1.3 (+1.3)	0 (0)	0 (0)	2.6 (+2.6)	1.0 (+0.4)	95.2 (-4.2)

**Notes:**

The English Regions are the eight *Standard Regions*, now obsolete but used by the OPCS until the 1990s.

The *Outer Metropolitan Area* comprises those seats wholly or mostly in the Outer Metropolitan Area as defined by the OPCS. It includes: the whole of Surrey and Hertfordshire; the whole of Berkshire except Newbury; and the constituencies of Bedfordshire South West; Luton North; Luton South (Bedfordshire); Beaconsfield; Chesham and Amersham; Wycombe (Buckinghamshire); Basildon and Billericay; Basildon South and East Thurrock; Brentwood and Ongar; Castle Point; Chelmsford; Epping Forest; Harlow; Rayleigh and Wickford; Rochford; Rochford and Southend East; Southend West; Thurrock

(Essex); Aldershot; Hampshire North East (Hampshire); Chatham and Aylesford; Dartford; Faversham and Kent Mid; Gillingham and Rainham; Gravesham; Maidstone and The Weald; Rochester and Strood; Sevenoaks; Tonbridge and Malling; Tunbridge Wells (Kent); Arundel and South Downs; Crawley; Horsham; Sussex Mid (West Sussex).

*Industrial Wales* (a description that is no longer entirely accurate, but which has been used for continuity with previous volumes) includes Gwent, the whole of Glamorgan, and the Llanelli constituency in Dyfed.

*Ayrshire and Borders* comprises: Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock; Ayrshire Central; Ayrshire North and Arran; Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk; Dumfries and Galloway; Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale; and Kilmarnock and Loudoun.

*Clydeside* includes all Glasgow seats, both Dunbartonshire seats, both Paisley and Renfrewshire seats, plus Airdrie and Shotts; Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill; Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East; East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow; Inverclyde; Lanark and Hamilton East; Motherwell and Wishaw; Renfrewshire East; and Rutherglen and Hamilton West.

*Rest of Central Belt* includes all Edinburgh seats, plus East Lothian; Falkirk; Linlithgow and East Falkirk; Livingston; Midlothian; and Stirling.

*NE and Fife* includes both Aberdeen seats, both Dundee seats, plus Aberdeenshire West and Kincardine; Angus; Banff and Buchan; Dumfermline and West Fife; Fife North East; Glenrothes; Gordon; Kirrkaldy and Cowdenbeath; Moray; Ochil and South Perthshire; and Perth and North Perthshire.

*Highlands and Islands* includes Argyll and Bute; Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross; Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey; Na h-Eileanan an Iar; Orkney and Shetland; Ross, Skye and Lochaber.

In all but four cases, the European constituencies are covered in the table above. These constituencies are indicated with an asterisk (\*). The results for the four other European constituencies are:

Seats won in 2015 (change since 2010)		Share of votes cast in 2015 (change since 2010)										
Con	LD Nat and other	Lab	Con	Turnout	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Nat	UKIP	Green	Other	
3 (+1)	26 (+1)	0 (-2)	0 (0)	North East	61.8 (+0.7)	25.3 (+1.6)	46.9 (+3.3)	6.5 (-17.1)	0 (0)	16.7 (+14.0)	3.6 (+3.3)	0.9 (-5.2)
22 (0)	51 (+4)	2 (-4)	0 (0)	North West	64.3 (+2.0)	31.2 (-0.5)	44.6 (+5.2)	6.5 (-15.1)	0 (0)	13.6 (+10.5)	3.2 (+2.7)	0.7 (-2.8)
52 (0)	4 (+2)	1 (-3)	1 (+1)	Eastern	67.5 (-0.1)	49.0 (+1.9)	22.0 (+2.4)	8.2 (-15.8)	0 (0)	16.2 (+12.0)	3.9 (+2.5)	0.5 (-2.9)
79 (+4)	4 (0)	0 (-4)	1 (0)	South East	68.6 (+0.4)	51.6 (+1.8)	18.3 (+2.1)	9.4 (-16.8)	0 (0)	14.7 (+10.6)	5.2 (+3.7)	0.7 (-1.4)

*Table A2.5* Constituency results

These tables list the votes in each constituency in percentage terms.

With the exception of Scotland, the constituencies are listed alphabetically within counties, as defined in 1974. In Greater London the constituencies are listed alphabetically within each borough (and allocated to a single borough in cases where they cross borough boundaries). The Scottish results are not arranged within counties as too many of the constituencies cross boundaries.

The figure in the 'Other' column is the total percentage received by all other candidates than the parties listed in the table.

\* denotes a seat won by different parties in 2010 and 2015.

† denotes a seat that changed hands in a by-election between 2010 and 2015.

‡ denotes a seat held by the Speaker in 2010 or 2015.

The table provides a figure for the change in the share of the vote only where candidates from a party stood in both 2010 and 2015. There were six seats in which UKIP stood in 2010, but not in 2015. These were: Dumbartonshire West (2010 share: 1.6%); Dundee East (1.1%); Dunfermline and West Fife (1.3%); Fife North East (2.6%); Glenrothes (1.0%); and Stirling (0.8%). Similarly, there were nine seats in which the Greens stood in 2010, but not in 2015: Argyll and Bute (2010 share: 1.7%); Bolton West (1.1%); Chester, City of (1.1%); Devon East (1.5%); East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow (2.0%); Gordon (1.5%); Hertsmere (1.3%); Ochil and South Perthshire (1.2%); and Swansea East (1.0%).

Swing is given in the conventional (total vote or 'Butler') form – the average of the Conservative % gain (or loss) and the Labour % loss (or gain) (measured as % of the total poll). It is only reported for seats where those parties occupied the top two places in 2005 and 2010. This is the practice followed by previous books in this series since 1955.

ENGLAND		Turnout	Turnout	Con	Con	Lab	Lab	LD	LD	UKIP	UKIP	Grn	Grn	Other	Swing
	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	No and	%
Avon, Bath*	74.8	+4.2	37.8	+6.4	13.2	+6.3	29.7	-26.9	6.2	+4.3	11.9	+9.6	2 (1.2)	-	-
Bristol East	64.9	+0.1	30.7	+2.3	39.3	+2.7	5.8	-18.6	15.5	+12.1	8.3	+6.5	1 (0.5)	-0.2	-0.2
North West	69.3	+0.8	43.9	+6.0	34.4	+8.5	6.2	-25.3	9.4	+7.1	5.7	+4.7	1 (0.3)	-	-
South	62.4	+0.8	24.3	+1.4	38.4	-0.1	8.7	-20.0	16.5	+13.9	11.5	+9.0	1 (0.6)	-	-
West*	70.4	+3.5	15.2	-3.2	35.7	+8.1	18.8	-29.2	3.0	+1.8	26.8	+23.0	2 (0.5)	-	-
Filton and Bradley Stoke	68.9	-1.1	46.7	+5.9	26.6	+0.2	7.3	-18.0	14.8	+11.7	4.6	+3.7	-	+2.9	+2.9
Kingswood	70.6	-1.6	48.3	+7.9	29.6	-5.7	3.8	-13.1	14.8	+11.6	2.8	+2.0	3 (0.6)	+6.8	+6.8
Somerset North	73.5	-1.4	53.5	+4.2	14.3	+3.2	12.7	-23.0	13.0	+9.1	6.5	-	-	-	+7.7
Somerset North East	73.7	-1.8	49.8	+8.5	24.8	-6.8	7.9	-14.4	12.0	+8.6	5.5	+4.2	-	-	+7.7
Thornbury and Yate*	73.5	-1.7	41.0	+3.9	7.8	+0.8	37.9	-14.0	10.6	+7.0	2.7	-	-	-	-
Weston-Super-Mare	65.4	-1.7	48.0	+3.7	18.3	+7.3	10.4	-28.8	17.8	+15.2	4.9	-	1 (0.6)	-	-
Bedfordshire, Bedford	66.5	+0.7	42.6	+3.7	40.2	+4.3	4.2	-15.6	9.6	+7.1	3.1	+2.2	1 (0.3)	-0.3	-0.3
Bedfordshire Mid	74.0	+2.0	56.1	+3.6	15.9	+1.1	7.2	-17.7	15.4	+10.3	4.2	+2.8	2 (1.2)	-	-
North East	70.2	-0.9	59.5	+3.7	15.8	-0.4	5.8	-15.9	14.6	+10.5	4.3	-	-	-	-
South West	64.7	-1.6	55.0	+2.2	20.3	+0.7	5.2	-14.9	15.5	+11.3	4.1	-	-	-	-
Luton North	63.2	-2.3	29.9	-1.9	52.2	+3.0	3.1	-8.1	12.5	+8.9	2.3	+1.1	-	-2.4	-2.4
South	62.3	-2.4	30.7	+1.3	44.2	+9.3	7.5	-15.1	12.1	+9.8	2.9	+2.1	2 (2.5)	-4.0	-4.0
Berkshire, Bracknell	65.8	-2.5	55.8	+3.4	16.9	+0.1	7.5	-14.8	15.7	+11.3	4.1	+2.6	-	-	-
Maidenhead	72.6	-1.2	65.8	+6.4	11.9	+4.8	9.9	-18.3	8.4	+6.1	3.6	+2.7	2 (0.4)	-	-
Newbury	72.1	-2.0	61.0	+4.6	8.4	+4.2	15.0	-20.5	10.8	+8.3	4.1	+3.2	3 (0.6)	-	-
Reading East	69.0	+2.2	46.0	+3.4	33.1	+7.6	7.4	-20.0	7.2	+5.0	6.4	+4.2	-	-	+0.6
West	66.7	+0.8	47.7	+4.5	33.9	+3.4	4.9	-15.2	10.0	+6.8	2.9	+1.7	3 (0.6)	-	+0.6
Slough	55.9	-5.7	33.3	-1.0	48.5	+2.7	2.6	-11.9	13.0	+9.8	2.5	+1.4	-	-1.8	-1.8
Windsor	70.1	-1.2	63.4	+2.5	13.4	+3.5	8.6	-13.8	10.0	+6.7	3.7	+2.4	1 (1)	-	-
Wokingham	71.9	+0.5	57.7	+5.0	14.5	+4.4	13.5	-14.5	9.9	+6.8	3.7	+2.7	1 (0.6)	-	-
Buckinghamshire, Aylesbury	69.0	+0.7	50.7	-1.5	15.1	+2.5	10.6	-17.8	19.7	+12.9	3.9	-	-	-	-
Beaconsfield	71.1	+1.1	63.2	+2.2	11.4	-0.3	7.4	-12.2	13.8	+8.8	4.2	+2.7	-	-	-
Buckingham†	69.3	+4.9	64.5	+17.2	-	-	-	-	21.7	+4.4	13.8	-	-	-	-
Chesham and Amersham	72.7	-1.9	59.1	-1.3	12.7	+7.1	9.0	-19.5	13.7	+9.6	5.5	+4.0	-	-	-
Milton Keynes North	66.4	+1.1	47.2	+3.8	30.3	+3.5	6.2	-15.9	11.9	+8.6	3.9	+2.5	2 (0.5)	+0.1	+0.1
South	65.8	+1.8	46.8	+5.2	32.1	-0.1	3.9	-13.8	13.2	+9.5	3.3	+1.9	2 (0.6)	+2.7	+2.7

Wycombe	67.4	+2.4	51.4	+2.8	22.5	+5.2	8.8	-20.0	10.1	+5.7	6.0	-	1 (1.1)	-
<i>Cambridgeshire, Cambridge*</i>	62.1	-5.0	15.7	-9.9	36.0	+11.7	34.9	-4.3	5.2	+2.8	7.9	+0.3	1 (0.4)	-
Cambridgeshire North East	62.4	-8.7	55.1	+3.5	14.4	-3.4	4.5	-15.6	22.5	+17.1	3.5	-	-	-
North West	67.6	+2.1	52.5	+2.0	17.9	+0.9	5.7	-16.2	20.1	+11.8	3.5	-	1 (0.3)	-
South	73.1	-1.6	51.1	+3.7	17.6	+7.4	15.2	-18.9	9.8	+6.6	6.3	+4.5	-	-
South East	70.4	+1.0	48.5	+0.5	15.1	+7.5	20.2	-17.5	11.1	+7.4	5.1	+3.8	-	-
Huntingdon	67.7	+2.8	53.0	+4.2	18.3	+7.3	7.8	-21.1	16.9	+10.9	3.9	+2.7	-	-
Peterborough	64.9	+1.0	39.7	-0.7	35.6	+6.1	3.8	-15.9	15.9	+9.2	2.6	+1.4	2 (2.5)	-3.4
<i>Cheshire, Chester, City of*</i>	68.7	+2.0	43.1	+2.5	43.2	+8.2	5.6	-13.5	8.1	+5.5	-	-	-	-2.9
Congleton	70.3	+0.1	53.3	+7.5	20.4	+3.2	9.1	-22.8	13.6	+9.4	3.7	-	-	-
Crewe and Nantwich	67.3	+3.2	45.0	-0.9	37.7	+3.7	2.8	-12.2	14.5	+11.8	-	-	-	-2.3
Eddisbury	69.1	+6.1	51.0	-0.6	23.6	+2.1	9.1	-13.4	12.2	+8.0	3.4	-	1 (0.6)	-
Ellesmere Port and Neston	67.5	+1.0	34.3	-0.5	47.8	+3.1	3.3	-11.7	12.0	+8.3	2.1	-	2 (0.5)	-1.8
Halton	61.8	+1.8	17.8	-2.4	62.8	+5.2	2.4	-11.4	14.1	+11.1	2.3	+0.7	1 (0.6)	-3.8
Macclesfield	69.2	+2.7	52.5	+5.6	22.7	+2.4	7.7	-15.3	12.2	+9.3	4.8	+3.2	-	-
Tatton	69.7	+1.9	58.6	+4.0	18.3	+1.1	8.5	-14.1	10.8	-	3.8	-	-	-
Warrington North	63.0	+0.3	28.2	-2.1	47.8	+2.3	4.1	-16.7	17.1	-	2.8	-	-	-2.2
South	70.0	+0.7	43.7	+7.9	39.1	+6.1	5.6	-21.9	8.3	+5.3	3.0	+2.2	1 (0.4)	+0.9
Weaver Vale	68.5	+3.1	43.2	+4.6	41.4	+5.2	3.0	-15.7	9.7	+7.4	2.5	+1.8	1 (0.2)	-0.3
<i>Cleveland, Hartlepool</i>	56.5	+1.0	20.9	-7.2	35.6	-6.9	1.9	-15.2	28.0	+21.0	3.4	-	3 (10.1)	-0.2
Middlesbrough	52.9	+1.5	16.5	-2.3	56.8	+10.9	3.7	-16.2	18.7	+15.0	4.3	-	-	-
South and Cleveland East	64.2	+0.6	37.1	+1.4	42.0	+2.8	3.4	-12.5	15.2	+11.1	2.3	-	-	-0.7
Redcar*	63.1	+0.6	16.2	+2.4	43.9	+11.1	18.5	-26.7	18.4	+13.9	2.2	-	1 (1)	-
Stockton North	59.8	+0.7	28.0	+2.0	49.1	+6.3	2.2	-13.8	19.2	+15.2	-	-	1 (1.5)	-2.1
South	69.0	+0.9	46.8	+7.8	37.0	-1.3	2.6	-12.5	10.6	+7.7	1.8	-	1 (1.2)	+4.5
<i>Cornwall, Camborne and Redruth</i>	68.5	+2.1	40.2	+2.6	25.0	+8.6	12.4	-25.0	14.8	+9.7	5.7	+4.3	1 (2)	-
Cornwall North*	71.8	+2.9	45.0	+3.3	5.4	+1.2	31.2	-16.8	12.7	+7.8	4.3	-	2 (1.4)	-
South East	71.1	+1.5	50.5	+5.4	9.3	+2.2	16.9	-21.8	15.2	+9.0	5.4	+3.7	2 (2.7)	-
St Austell and Newquay*	65.7	+3.0	40.2	+0.2	10.2	+3.1	24.0	-18.8	16.9	+13.2	4.6	-	1 (4.1)	-
St Ives*	73.7	+5.1	38.3	-0.7	9.3	+1.2	33.2	-9.6	11.8	+6.3	6.3	+3.5	1 (1.1)	-
Truro and Falmouth	70.0	+1.0	44.0	+2.3	15.2	+5.5	16.8	-24.0	11.6	+7.7	8.7	+6.9	4 (3.7)	-
<i>Cumbria, Barrow and Furness</i>	63.3	-0.7	40.5	+4.2	42.3	-5.8	2.7	-7.3	12.4	+9.8	2.5	+1.3	1 (0.3)	+5.0
Carlisle	64.7	0.0	44.3	+5.0	37.8	+0.5	2.6	-13.0	12.7	+10.1	2.6	+1.2	1 (0.3)	+2.2
Copeland	63.8	-3.9	35.8	-1.3	42.3	-3.8	3.5	-6.7	15.5	+13.2	3.0	+2.1	-	+1.2
Penrith and The Border	67.4	-2.6	59.7	+6.3	14.4	+1.4	8.5	-19.9	12.2	+9.4	5.3	-	-	-

ENGLAND		Turnout	Con	Con	Lab	Lab	LD	LD	UKIP	UKIP	Grn	Grn	Other	Swing
		%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	No and	%
		%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	No and	%
Westmorland and Lonsdale		74.3	-2.6	33.2	-3.0	5.4	+3.2	51.5	-8.5	6.2	+4.6	3.7	-	-
Worlington		65.6	-0.2	30.1	-3.7	42.3	-3.2	4.4	-9.1	19.6	+17.4	3.0	-	-0.3
Derbyshire, Amber Valley		65.8	+0.3	44.0	+5.4	34.8	-2.7	3.0	-11.5	15.9	+13.9	2.4	-	+4.0
Bolsover		61.1	+0.7	24.5	-0.1	51.2	+1.2	3.3	-12.2	21.0	+17.1	-	-	-0.7
Chesterfield		63.6	-0.2	18.1	+2.3	47.9	+8.9	13.8	-24.0	16.5	+13.4	3.0	+1.7	2 (0.7)
Derby North*		64.1	+1.0	36.7	+5.0	36.6	+3.5	8.6	-19.5	14.6	+12.8	3.6	-	+0.7
South		58.1	+0.1	27.4	-1.1	49.0	+5.7	4.2	-16.3	15.5	+11.1	3.0	-	-3.4
Derbyshire Dales		74.6	+0.8	52.4	+0.3	22.7	+3.4	8.4	-14.1	11.6	+7.8	4.6	+2.9	1 (0.3)
Mid		70.7	-0.9	52.2	+3.9	25.4	+1.0	4.8	-15.7	13.6	+11.0	4.0	-	+1.5
North East		67.1	+1.2	36.7	+3.8	40.6	+2.5	4.2	-19.1	15.9	+10.3	2.2	-	+0.6
South		68.7	-2.7	49.4	+3.9	26.8	-4.6	3.7	-12.2	17.7	+15.3	2.4	-	+4.2
Erewash		67.2	-1.2	42.7	+3.2	35.3	+1.1	3.4	-14.1	16.1	+14.3	2.5	+1.3	+1.1
High Peak		69.3	-1.2	45.0	+4.1	35.3	+3.7	4.7	-17.1	11.4	+8.1	3.6	+1.7	+0.2
Devon, Devon Central		74.9	-0.8	52.2	+0.7	12.8	+5.9	12.2	-22.2	13.2	+7.8	8.9	+7.0	1 (0.6)
East		71.5	-1.1	46.4	-1.9	10.2	-0.6	6.8	-24.4	12.6	+4.4	-	-	1 (24)
North*		70.0	+1.1	42.7	+6.7	7.1	+1.9	29.4	-17.9	14.8	+7.5	5.8	+4.4	1 (0.3)
South West		70.9	+0.5	56.6	+0.6	16.7	+4.2	7.5	-16.7	14.5	+8.3	4.8	+3.5	-
West and Torridge		72.0	+0.5	50.9	+5.2	10.6	+5.4	13.2	-27.1	18.3	+12.9	7.0	+5.1	-
Exeter		70.2	+2.5	33.1	+0.1	46.4	+8.2	4.3	-16.0	9.4	+5.7	6.5	+4.9	1 (0.4)
Newton Abbot		69.0	-0.6	47.2	+4.2	9.8	+2.8	24.0	-18.0	13.9	+7.5	4.6	+3.1	1 (0.5)
Plymouth Moor View*		62.4	+1.4	37.6	+4.3	35.2	-2.0	3.0	-13.9	21.5	+13.8	2.4	+1.4	1 (0.4)
Sutton and Devonport		65.5	+5.3	37.8	+3.5	36.7	+5.0	4.2	-20.5	14.0	+7.5	7.1	+5.0	1 (0.2)
Tiverton and Honiton		70.5	-1.0	54.0	+3.7	12.7	+3.8	10.5	-22.9	16.5	+10.5	6.4	+4.9	-
Torbay*		63.0	-1.6	40.7	+2.0	8.7	+2.1	33.8	-13.2	13.6	+8.3	3.2	+2.3	-
Toines		68.6	-1.8	53.0	+7.1	12.7	+5.3	9.9	-25.7	14.1	+8.1	10.3	+7.8	-
Dorset, Bournemouth East		62.0	+0.1	49.2	+0.8	16.6	+3.4	8.4	-22.5	16.5	+9.6	7.3	-	1 (2)
West		58.0	-0.1	48.2	+3.1	17.7	+2.9	7.9	-23.9	18.5	+11.3	7.4	-	1 (0.2)
Christchurch		71.7	0.0	58.1	+1.7	9.5	-0.3	6.6	-18.7	21.5	+13.0	4.3	-	-
Dorset Mid and Poole North*		72.3	0.0	50.8	+6.3	6.0	+0.1	28.2	-16.9	12.2	+7.7	2.8	-	-
North		72.4	-1.0	56.6	+5.6	9.0	+3.6	11.7	-25.3	17.1	+11.9	5.7	+4.7	-
South		67.9	-0.6	48.9	+3.8	24.2	-6.1	6.0	-13.0	15.0	+11.0	4.7	+3.5	2 (1.2)



West	72.4	-2.2	50.2	+2.6	10.0	+3.3	21.6	-19.1	12.5	+8.7	5.7	+4.6	-	-
Poole	65.3	0.0	50.1	+2.6	12.9	+0.1	11.8	-19.8	16.8	+11.5	4.6	-	2 (3.8)	-
<i>Durham</i> , Bishop Auckland	59.6	-0.6	32.5	+6.2	41.4	+2.4	4.4	-18.0	17.8	+15.1	3.9	-	-	+1.9
Darlington	62.5	-0.5	35.2	+3.7	42.9	+3.5	4.8	-18.6	13.1	+10.3	3.5	-	1 (0.5)	+0.1
Durham, City Of	66.5	-0.7	22.2	+9.0	47.3	+3.0	11.3	-26.4	11.5	+9.6	5.9	-	2 (1.8)	-
North	61.4	+0.8	20.9	-0.1	54.9	+4.4	5.1	-15.9	16.0	+12.7	3.1	-	-	-2.3
North West	61.3	-1.0	23.4	+3.4	46.9	+4.6	9.1	-15.8	17.0	+14.1	3.7	-	-	-
Easington	56.2	+1.5	12.9	-0.8	61.0	+2.1	2.4	-13.6	18.7	+14.1	2.1	-	2 (2.8)	-
Sedgefield	61.6	-0.5	29.5	+6.0	47.2	+2.1	3.5	-16.4	16.6	+12.9	3.1	-	-	+2.0
<i>East Sussex</i> , Bexhill and Battle	70.1	+2.7	54.8	+3.2	14.1	+2.2	7.6	-20.4	18.4	-	5.1	-	-	-
Brighton Kemptown	66.8	+2.1	40.7	+2.7	39.2	+4.3	3.0	-15.0	9.8	+6.6	7.0	+1.6	2 (0.3)	-0.8
Pavilion	71.4	+1.4	22.8	-0.9	27.3	-1.7	2.8	-11.0	5.0	+3.2	41.8	+10.5	2 (0.4)	-
Eastbourne*	67.6	+0.6	39.6	-1.1	7.8	+3.0	38.2	-9.1	11.6	+9.1	2.6	-	1 (0.3)	-
Hastings and Rye	67.8	+3.1	44.5	+3.5	35.1	-2.0	3.2	-12.5	13.3	+10.5	3.8	-	-	+2.7
Hove*	71.0	+1.6	39.9	+3.2	42.3	+9.3	3.6	-19.0	6.3	+3.8	6.8	+1.7	3 (1.1)	-3.1
Lewes*	72.7	-0.2	38.0	+1.3	9.9	+4.9	35.9	-16.1	10.7	+7.3	5.5	+4.1	-	-
Wealden	71.1	-0.8	57.0	+0.5	10.8	+1.2	9.1	-16.2	16.7	+10.7	6.4	+3.8	-	-
Essex, Basildon and Billericay	64.9	+1.4	52.7	-0.1	23.7	+0.6	3.8	-11.9	19.8	+16.0	-	-	-	-0.3
Basildon South and East Thurrock	64.1	+1.8	43.4	-0.5	25.2	-5.8	3.0	-10.4	26.5	+20.6	-	-	3 (1.9)	+2.6
Braintree	68.4	-0.8	53.8	+1.2	18.5	-1.4	4.9	-13.8	18.8	+13.8	3.1	+1.7	2 (0.8)	+1.3
Brentwood and Ongar	72.2	-0.8	58.8	+1.9	12.5	+2.6	8.8	-14.6	16.8	+12.8	2.7	+1.5	1 (0.3)	-
Castle Point	66.7	-0.2	50.9	+6.9	13.8	-0.9	1.8	-7.6	31.2	-	2.4	-	-	-
Chelmsford	68.5	-1.9	51.5	+5.4	17.6	+6.7	11.9	-24.9	14.2	+11.4	3.5	+2.6	1 (1.2)	-
Clacton†	64.1	0.0	36.7	-16.4	14.4	-10.6	1.8	-11.1	44.4	-	2.7	+1.4	-	-2.9
Colchester*	65.5	+3.2	38.9	+6.1	16.2	+3.8	27.5	-20.5	12.1	+9.2	5.1	+3.6	1 (0.2)	-
Epping Forest	67.2	+2.7	54.8	+0.8	16.1	+1.9	7.0	-14.5	18.3	+14.4	3.6	+2.2	1 (0.2)	-
Harlow	65.1	+0.2	48.9	+4.0	30.0	-3.7	2.0	-11.6	16.3	+12.7	2.2	-	2 (0.7)	+3.8
Harwich and North Essex	69.9	+0.6	51.0	+4.1	19.7	-0.2	7.4	-16.2	17.5	+12.3	4.4	+2.5	-	-
Maldon	69.6	-0.1	60.6	+0.8	11.8	-0.8	4.5	-14.8	14.7	+9.6	3.1	-	2 (5.3)	-
Rayleigh and Wickford	69.0	-0.2	54.7	-3.1	12.6	-1.9	3.0	-12.1	22.3	+18.1	2.9	-	1 (4.5)	-
Rochford and Southend East	60.6	+2.4	46.4	-0.4	24.7	+4.4	3.3	-16.1	20.5	+14.7	5.0	+3.3	-	-2.4
Saffron Walden	71.4	-0.1	57.2	+1.7	11.8	+2.1	10.6	-16.9	13.8	+9.7	3.8	+2.4	1 (2.9)	-
Southend West	66.6	+1.4	49.8	+3.8	18.3	+4.9	9.3	-20.1	17.5	+13.6	4.7	+3.2	1 (0.4)	-
Thurrock	63.9	+5.0	33.7	-3.1	32.6	-4.0	1.3	-9.4	31.7	+24.3	-	-	3 (0.7)	+0.4
Witham	70.3	+0.4	57.5	+5.3	15.8	-2.7	6.1	-13.6	16.0	+9.5	4.3	+1.3	1 (0.2)	-

ENGLAND		Turnout	Turnout	Con	Lab	Lab	LD	LD	UKIP	UKIP	Grn	Grn	Other	Swing
	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	No and	%
<i>Gloucestershire, Cheltenham*</i>														
Cotswolds, The	69.5	+2.7	46.1	+5.0	7.3	+2.1	34.0	-16.5	7.1	+4.8	5.0	-	1 (0.5)	-
Forest of Dean	72.4	+0.9	56.5	+3.5	9.2	-1.5	18.6	-10.9	10.9	+6.7	4.6	+2.9	-	-
Gloucester	70.9	-0.4	46.8	0.0	24.6	+0.5	5.3	-16.6	17.8	+12.6	5.5	+3.6	-	-0.3
Stroud	63.4	-0.6	45.3	+5.4	31.5	-3.6	5.4	-13.9	14.3	+10.7	2.8	+1.8	2 (0.7)	+4.5
Tewkesbury	75.5	+1.5	45.7	+4.9	37.7	-0.9	3.4	-12.0	8.0	+5.7	4.6	+1.9	2 (0.6)	+2.9
Tewkesbury	70.1	-0.3	54.5	+7.3	14.8	+3.2	13.8	-21.7	12.9	+8.7	4.0	+3.0	-	-
<i>Greater London</i>														
<i>Barking and Dagenham, Barking</i>														
Dagenham and Rainham	58.2	-3.2	16.3	-1.5	57.7	+3.4	1.3	-6.9	22.2	+19.3	2.1	+1.4	1 (0.4)	-2.4
Barnet, Chipping Barnet	62.3	-1.1	24.4	-10.0	41.4	+1.1	1.7	-6.9	29.8	+26.3	1.9	+1.2	3 (0.8)	-5.5
Finchley and Golders Green	68.1	+0.8	48.6	-0.2	34.1	+8.9	4.5	-15.7	7.8	+5.0	4.7	+2.7	1 (0.2)	-4.6
Hendon	70.0	+3.3	50.9	+4.9	39.7	+6.1	3.3	-13.8	3.4	+1.7	2.7	+1.1	-	-0.6
Bexley, Bexleyheath and Crayford	65.9	+2.3	49.0	+6.7	41.5	-0.6	2.2	-10.2	5.2	+3.2	2.0	+0.9	-	+3.6
Erith and Thamesmead	67.4	+1.0	47.3	-3.2	26.2	-0.3	3.0	-9.7	21.0	+17.4	2.2	+1.3	1 (0.3)	-1.5
Old Bexley and Sidcup	60.5	-0.2	27.4	-4.0	49.8	+4.9	2.3	-9.8	17.3	+14.6	2.2	+1.4	2 (1)	-4.5
Brent, Brent Central*	70.8	+1.5	52.8	-1.3	19.0	-0.3	3.5	-11.9	18.2	+14.9	2.9	+2.0	3 (3.6)	-0.5
North	61.1	-0.2	20.3	+9.2	62.1	+20.9	8.4	-35.8	3.9	-	4.1	+2.6	3 (1.2)	-2.7
Bromley, Beckenham	63.5	+1.2	33.5	+2.0	54.3	+7.4	5.0	-12.0	3.9	+3.1	2.9	+1.6	1 (0.4)	-
Bromley and Chislehurst	72.4	+0.4	57.3	-0.6	19.4	+5.0	6.9	-13.7	12.5	+9.3	3.8	+2.8	-	-
Orpington	67.3	0.0	53.0	+5.6	22.2	+5.6	6.4	-15.5	14.3	+11.0	4.1	+2.8	-	-
Camden, Hampstead and Kilburn	72.0	-0.2	57.4	-2.3	15.6	+6.6	6.8	-17.7	16.7	+13.9	3.5	+2.5	-	-
Holborn and St Pancras	67.3	+1.6	42.3	+9.6	44.4	+11.6	5.6	-25.6	2.8	+2.1	4.4	+3.0	2 (0.4)	-1.0
Croydon, Croydon Central	63.3	+0.2	21.9	+1.5	52.9	+6.8	6.5	-21.4	5.0	+3.9	12.8	+10.1	3 (1)	-
North	67.7	+2.7	43.0	+3.6	42.7	+9.1	2.2	-11.0	9.1	+7.1	2.7	+1.6	2 (0.3)	-2.7
South	62.3	+1.6	22.7	-1.4	62.6	+6.6	3.6	-10.4	5.4	+3.7	4.7	+2.7	3 (1)	-4.0
Ealing, Ealing Central and Acton*	70.0	+0.8	54.5	+3.6	24.8	+4.8	6.0	-16.9	10.5	+6.1	3.7	+2.0	2 (0.5)	-
North	71.3	+4.1	42.7	+4.7	43.2	+13.1	6.1	-21.5	3.8	+2.2	3.6	+2.1	4 (0.6)	-4.2
Southall	65.7	+0.4	29.7	-1.2	55.1	+4.7	3.2	-9.9	8.1	+6.6	3.4	+2.3	1 (0.4)	-3.0
Enfield, Edmonton	66.0	+2.2	21.7	-8.1	65.0	+13.5	3.6	-11.4	4.1	-	4.6	+3.0	1 (1.1)	-10.8
Enfield North*	62.6	-0.6	24.1	-5.7	61.4	+7.8	2.2	-8.4	8.1	+5.6	3.3	+2.0	1 (0.9)	-6.7
Southgate	67.7	+0.6	41.4	-0.9	43.7	+5.2	2.3	-9.9	9.0	+6.8	2.8	+1.7	2 (0.8)	-3.1
	70.5	+1.4	49.4	-0.1	39.0	+6.8	3.3	-10.5	4.6	+3.5	3.7	+2.3	-	-3.4

Greenwich, Eltham	67.4	+0.4	36.4	-1.2	42.6	+1.1	3.0	-9.6	15.0	+12.6	3.0	+2.0	-	-1.1
Greenwich and Woolwich	63.7	+0.8	26.6	+2.1	52.2	+3.0	5.7	-12.5	8.3	-	6.4	+3.8	1 (0.8)	-0.5
Hackney, Hackney North and Stoke Newington	56.6	-6.3	14.7	+0.2	62.9	+7.9	5.0	-18.9	2.2	-	14.6	+10.0	2 (0.6)	-
South and Shoreditch	56.0	-2.8	13.5	0.0	64.4	+8.6	4.6	-17.8	3.8	+2.3	11.6	+8.1	6 (2.1)	-
Hammersmith	66.4	+0.8	36.4	0.0	50.0	+6.1	4.6	-11.3	4.4	+3.2	4.4	+2.9	1 (0.2)	-3.1
Haringey, Hornsey and Wood Green*	72.9	+3.0	9.3	-7.4	50.9	+16.9	31.8	-14.7	2.2	-	5.4	+3.2	3 (0.4)	-
Tottenham	60.1	+1.0	12.0	-2.9	67.3	+8.0	4.1	-13.6	3.6	+2.4	9.2	+6.8	2 (3.8)	-
Harrow, Harrow East	69.0	+0.9	50.3	+5.7	40.6	+3.1	2.1	-12.2	4.8	+2.9	1.7	+0.1	1 (0.4)	+1.3
West	66.9	-0.4	42.2	+5.4	47.0	+3.4	3.4	-12.8	4.4	+2.3	2.8	+1.5	1 (0.3)	+1.0
Havering, Hornchurch and Upminster	69.6	+1.7	49.0	-2.5	20.1	-0.7	2.7	-11.2	25.3	+20.0	2.6	+1.5	1 (0.3)	-0.9
Romford	67.7	+2.6	51.0	-5.0	20.9	+1.4	2.9	-9.1	22.8	+18.4	2.5	+1.5	-	-3.2
Hillingdon, Hayes and Harlington	60.2	-0.5	24.7	-4.7	59.6	+4.7	2.0	-6.8	12.0	-	1.8	+0.9	-	-4.7
Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner	70.0	-0.9	59.6	+2.1	20.1	+0.6	5.0	-11.7	10.9	+8.2	3.5	+2.0	2 (0.9)	+0.8
Uxbridge and South Ruislip	63.4	+0.1	50.2	+2.0	26.4	+3.0	4.9	-15.0	14.2	+11.4	3.2	+2.1	8 (1.1)	-0.5
Hounslow, Brentford and Isleworth*	67.8	+3.4	42.9	+5.7	43.8	+10.2	4.0	-19.6	5.6	+4.0	3.7	+2.2	-	-2.2
Feltham and Heston	60.0	+0.1	29.1	-4.9	52.3	+8.7	3.2	-10.6	12.6	+10.5	2.8	+1.7	-	-6.8
Islington, Islington North	67.1	+1.7	17.2	+3.0	60.2	+5.8	8.1	-18.6	4.0	+2.4	10.2	+7.2	1 (0.2)	-
South and Finsbury	65.0	+0.6	22.2	+2.8	50.9	+8.7	10.9	-23.2	7.6	+6.0	7.6	+6.0	1 (0.7)	-
Kensington and Chelsea, Kensington	57.0	+3.7	52.3	+2.2	31.1	+5.6	5.6	-13.9	4.5	+2.3	5.1	+2.9	4 (1.5)	-1.7
Chelsea and Fulham	63.4	+3.2	62.9	+2.5	23.1	+4.6	5.2	-11.0	5.1	+3.9	3.7	+2.0	-	-1.1
Kingston and Surbiton*	72.9	+2.5	39.2	+2.7	14.5	+5.1	34.5	-15.3	7.3	+4.8	3.9	+2.9	2 (0.6)	-
Lambeth, Streatham	63.1	+0.3	25.1	+6.8	53.0	+10.2	9.0	-26.8	3.2	-	8.9	+7.0	3 (0.8)	-
Vauxhall	58.3	+0.6	27.3	+5.7	53.8	+4.0	6.9	-18.2	2.9	-	7.6	+6.0	5 (1.5)	-
Lewisham, Lewisham Deptford	64.6	+3.1	14.9	+1.4	60.2	+6.6	5.3	-18.1	4.2	-	12.5	+5.8	5 (2.9)	-
East	64.1	+0.9	22.3	-1.3	55.7	+12.6	5.7	-22.4	9.1	+7.2	5.7	+4.2	2 (1.6)	-
West and Penge	66.6	+1.3	24.2	-1.3	50.6	+9.5	7.7	-20.4	7.8	+5.3	8.5	+6.4	3 (1.2)	-
Merton, Mitcham and Morden	65.9	-0.5	23.2	-2.1	60.7	+4.2	3.1	-8.8	9.5	+7.5	3.2	+2.3	1 (0.5)	-3.1
Wimbledon	73.5	+1.4	52.1	+3.0	26.0	+3.8	12.7	-12.3	5.1	+3.2	4.1	+2.9	-	-
Newham, East Ham	59.8	+4.3	12.1	-3.1	77.6	+7.2	1.6	-10.0	5.0	-	2.5	+1.3	2 (1.2)	-5.1
West Ham	58.2	+3.2	15.4	+0.8	68.4	+5.8	2.7	-8.8	7.5	+5.9	5.0	+3.6	2 (0.9)	-2.5
Redbridge, Ilford North*	65.0	0.0	42.7	-3.1	43.9	+9.6	2.3	-10.4	8.9	+7.0	2.1	+0.9	1 (0.2)	-6.3
South	56.4	-2.9	25.9	-1.5	64.0	+14.6	2.0	-15.0	5.2	+3.0	2.9	+0.3	-	-8.0
Richmond, Richmond Park	76.5	+0.2	58.2	+8.5	12.3	+7.3	19.3	-23.5	4.2	+3.0	6.0	+5.0	-	-
Twickenham*	77.3	+3.1	41.3	+7.2	11.5	+3.8	38.0	-16.4	4.9	+3.5	4.0	+2.8	2 (0.3)	-

ENGLAND		Turnout	Turnout	Con	Con	Lab	Lab	LD	LD	UKIP	UKIP	Grn	Grn	Other	Swing
		%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	No and %	%
Southwark, Camberwell and Peckham	62.3	+3.0	13.2	+0.1	63.3	+4.1	5.0	-17.4	4.7	10.1	4.7	10.1	+7.1	6 (3.8)	-
Bermondsey and Old Southwark*	61.7	+4.2	11.8	-5.3	43.1	+13.8	34.3	-14.0	6.3	-	6.3	3.9	+2.3	4 (0.6)	-
Dulwich and West Norwood	67.1	+0.9	22.7	+0.5	54.1	+7.5	9.8	-17.3	3.1	+1.7	3.1	9.4	+6.8	3 (0.8)	-
Sutton, Carshalton and Wallington	68.0	-1.0	31.7	-5.1	15.0	+6.3	34.9	-13.4	14.8	+11.9	3.1	2.1	+2.4	2 (0.5)	-
Sutton and Cheam*	72.1	-0.7	41.5	-0.8	11.1	+4.2	33.7	-12.0	10.7	+8.7	2.1	+1.6	2 (0.8)	-	-
Tower Hamlets, Bethnal Green and Bow	64.0	+1.5	15.2	+1.3	61.2	+18.3	4.5	-15.6	6.1	-	6.1	9.3	+7.6	6 (3.7)	-
Poplar and Limehouse	62.2	-0.1	25.4	-1.7	58.5	+18.6	4.2	-6.9	6.1	+4.9	6.1	4.8	+3.9	2 (0.9)	-10.1
Waltham Forest, Chingford and Woodford Green	65.7	-0.8	47.9	-4.8	28.8	+6.1	5.5	-11.3	12.9	+10.3	4.2	4.2	+2.7	2 (0.7)	-5.5
Leyton and Wanstead	63.0	-0.2	22.0	-0.3	58.6	+15.0	5.7	-22.0	5.8	+3.1	7.3	5.9	+5.9	1 (0.7)	-
Walthamstow	62.4	-1.1	13.4	-0.6	68.9	+17.0	4.0	-24.7	6.0	+4.0	6.4	4.5	+4.5	3 (1.4)	-
Wandsworth, Battersea	67.0	+1.4	52.4	+5.0	36.8	+1.7	4.4	-10.3	3.1	+2.1	3.3	+2.2	-	-	+1.7
Putney	67.0	+2.6	53.8	+1.7	30.0	+2.6	6.3	-10.6	4.6	+3.6	4.8	3.4	+3.4	1 (0.4)	-0.4
Tooting	69.7	+1.1	41.9	+3.4	47.2	+3.7	3.9	-10.9	2.9	+1.6	4.1	+2.9	-	-	-0.2
Westminster, Cities of London and W.	59.3	+4.1	54.1	+1.9	27.4	+5.2	7.0	-13.5	5.2	+3.4	5.4	+3.3	3 (1)	3 (1)	-1.6
Westminster North	63.4	+4.0	41.8	+3.3	46.8	+2.9	3.7	-10.2	3.8	+3.0	3.3	+2.1	2 (0.5)	2 (0.5)	+0.2
<i>Greater Manchester, Altrincham and Sale W.</i>	70.6	+2.2	53.0	+4.0	26.7	+4.3	8.4	-17.1	8.0	+4.8	3.9	-	-	-	-
Ashton-under-Lyne	56.9	+0.2	22.1	-2.6	49.8	+1.4	2.4	-12.4	21.8	+17.4	3.9	-	-	-	-2.0
Blackley and Broughton	51.6	+2.4	15.0	-3.3	61.9	+7.7	2.4	-11.9	16.5	+13.8	4.2	-	-	-	-5.5
Bolton North East	63.6	-1.2	32.8	-3.7	43.0	-3.0	2.9	-10.1	18.8	+14.6	2.6	-	-	-	-0.4
South East	58.5	+1.5	20.3	-5.3	50.5	+3.0	2.6	-13.2	23.6	+19.7	2.9	+1.4	-	-	-4.2
West*	66.8	+0.1	40.6	+2.3	39.0	+0.5	4.0	-13.2	15.3	+11.3	-	-	2 (1.1)	2 (1.1)	+0.9
Bury North	66.9	-0.4	41.9	+1.8	41.1	+5.9	2.1	-14.9	12.4	+9.5	2.5	-	-	-	-2.1
South	63.9	-1.7	34.6	+1.0	45.1	+4.6	3.6	-14.6	13.3	+11.2	3.0	+2.0	1 (0.4)	1 (0.4)	-1.8
Cheadle*	72.5	-0.8	43.1	+2.3	16.3	+7.0	31.0	-16.1	8.3	+5.6	-	-	3 (1.3)	3 (1.3)	-
Denton and Reddish	58.5	+1.7	23.7	-1.2	50.8	-0.2	2.5	-15.4	18.7	+13.2	3.8	-	-	1 (0.6)	-0.5
Hazel Grove*	68.5	+1.1	41.4	+7.8	17.5	+5.1	26.2	-22.6	12.2	+7.1	2.6	-	-	-	-
Heywood and Middleton	60.7	+3.1	19.1	-8.1	43.1	+3.0	3.3	-19.4	32.2	+29.6	2.3	-	-	-	-5.5
Leigh	59.4	+1.0	22.6	+1.7	53.9	+5.8	2.5	-15.6	19.7	+16.3	-	-	-	1 (1.2)	-2.1
Makerfield	60.3	+1.0	19.5	+0.8	51.8	+4.5	3.7	-12.5	22.4	-	2.5	-	-	-	-1.9

Manchester Central	52.7	+8.4	13.5	+1.7	61.3	+8.5	4.1	-22.5	11.1	+9.6	8.5	+6.2	3 (1.5)	-
Gorton	57.6	+7.1	9.7	-1.4	67.1	+17.0	4.2	-28.4	8.2	-	9.8	+7.0	2 (1.1)	-
Withington*	67.4	+6.9	9.8	-1.4	53.7	+13.3	24.0	-20.7	4.3	+2.8	8.1	+6.3	1 (0.1)	-
Oldham East and Saddleworth	62.2	+0.9	25.9	-0.5	39.4	+7.5	12.9	-18.8	19.2	+15.4	2.6	-	-	-7.0
West and Royton	60.2	+0.9	19.0	-4.7	54.8	+9.3	3.7	-15.4	20.6	+17.4	1.9	-	3 (4.8)	-
Rochdale	58.8	+0.7	17.0	-1.0	46.1	+9.8	10.3	-24.2	18.8	+14.4	3.0	-	3 (3.2)	-
Salford and Eccles	58.2	+3.2	20.4	-0.1	49.4	+9.3	3.7	-22.6	18.0	+15.4	5.2	-	-	-4.8
Stalybridge and Hyde	57.5	-1.7	28.7	-4.2	45.0	+5.4	3.1	-14.0	18.8	+15.5	4.5	+2.8	-	-4.0
Stockport	62.0	-0.2	24.5	-0.8	49.9	+7.2	7.7	-17.3	13.1	+10.9	4.4	+2.7	1 (0.4)	-2.6
Stretford and Urmston	67.2	+3.9	27.8	-0.8	53.0	+4.4	2.9	-14.0	10.9	+7.6	4.7	+2.7	2 (0.5)	-3.8
Wigan	59.6	+1.1	20.7	-4.0	52.2	+3.7	2.8	-12.6	19.5	+13.8	2.8	-	2 (2.1)	-1.9
Worsley and Eccles South	58.3	+0.7	30.1	-2.4	44.2	+1.3	2.6	-13.9	18.3	+13.4	3.0	-	3 (1.8)	-2.9
Wythenshawe and Sale East	56.9	+5.9	25.7	+0.2	50.1	+6.0	4.5	-17.9	14.7	+11.2	3.8	-	2 (1.2)	-
<i>Hampshire, Aldershot</i>	63.8	+0.3	50.6	+3.9	18.3	+6.2	8.8	-25.6	17.9	+13.4	4.4	-	-	-
Basingstoke	66.6	-0.5	48.6	-2.0	27.7	+7.3	7.4	-17.1	15.6	+11.5	-	-	1 (0.7)	-
Eastleigh*	69.7	+0.4	42.3	+2.9	12.9	+3.3	25.8	-20.7	15.8	+12.2	2.7	-	2 (0.4)	-
Fareham	70.9	-0.7	56.1	+0.8	14.3	+0.1	8.8	-15.0	15.4	+11.3	3.9	+2.4	2 (1.5)	-
Gosport	65.1	+0.6	55.3	+3.5	14.5	-2.4	6.9	-14.1	19.4	+16.3	3.6	+2.4	1 (0.2)	-
Hampshire East	72.7	+1.7	60.7	+3.9	10.1	+2.2	11.1	-19.4	12.0	+9.1	6.1	-	-	-
North East	70.2	-3.1	65.9	+5.3	9.8	0.0	10.5	-15.0	8.8	+4.6	4.4	-	1 (0.7)	-
North West	69.7	+0.2	58.1	-0.2	13.3	+0.2	9.3	-14.1	14.7	+9.5	4.6	-	-	-
Havant	63.5	+0.5	51.7	+0.6	15.9	-1.8	6.5	-16.9	20.6	+14.7	5.2	-	-	-
Meon Valley	71.1	-1.6	61.1	+4.8	10.9	+4.6	9.6	-22.9	14.8	+11.9	3.5	-	-	-
New Forest East	68.0	-0.7	56.3	+3.4	12.2	+2.3	9.4	-20.9	17.5	+12.5	4.7	+2.7	-	-
West	69.3	-0.4	59.9	+1.1	10.8	+1.0	6.9	-16.4	16.5	+10.6	5.8	+3.6	-	-
Portsmouth North	62.1	-0.6	47.0	+2.7	23.8	-3.9	6.2	-13.9	19.1	+15.0	3.2	+2.1	2 (0.7)	+3.3
South*	58.5	-0.3	34.8	+1.6	19.5	+5.9	22.3	-23.6	13.4	+11.2	7.5	+5.8	3 (2.5)	-
Romsey and Southampton North	72.8	+1.0	54.3	+4.6	11.9	+5.5	17.7	-23.5	11.4	+8.8	4.7	-	-	-
Southampton Itchen*	61.9	+2.3	41.7	+5.4	36.5	-0.2	3.6	-17.3	13.4	+9.1	4.2	+2.8	1 (0.5)	+2.8
Test	62.1	+0.7	32.5	-0.5	41.3	+2.8	4.9	-17.5	12.8	+8.8	5.9	+3.9	2 (2.7)	-1.6
Winchester	74.6	-1.2	55.0	+6.5	8.3	+2.9	24.4	-18.7	7.5	+5.4	4.8	-	-	+4.9
<i>Hereford and Worcester, Bromsgrove</i>	71.2	+0.5	53.8	+10.2	22.2	+0.4	5.0	-14.6	15.6	+9.9	3.3	-	-	-
Hereford and South Herefordshire	66.1	-1.1	52.6	+6.3	12.8	+5.5	10.6	-30.5	16.8	+13.4	7.2	-	-	-
Herefordshire North	70.7	-0.4	55.6	+3.9	11.4	+4.3	12.0	-19.0	14.0	+8.3	7.0	+3.7	-	-
Redditch	67.3	+1.2	47.1	+3.6	31.1	+0.9	3.1	-14.5	16.2	+12.8	2.2	+1.3	1 (0.4)	+1.4

ENGLAND	Turnout %	Turnout +/-	Con %	Con +/-	Lab %	Lab +/-	LD %	LD +/-	UKIP %	UKIP +/-	Grn %	Grn +/-	Other No and %	Swing
Worcester	68.6	+1.4	45.3	+5.8	34.0	+0.5	3.4	-16.1	12.8	+10.1	4.1	+2.6	2 (0.4)	+2.6
Worcestershire Mid	71.5	+0.9	57.0	+2.5	14.5	-0.5	7.2	-16.2	17.7	+11.7	3.7	+2.5	-	-
West	73.7	-0.6	56.1	+5.8	13.4	+6.6	9.7	-28.1	14.4	+10.4	6.5	+5.3	-	-
Wyre Forest	63.9	-2.5	45.3	+8.4	19.3	+4.9	2.5	-9.4	16.1	+13.2	2.3	-	1 (14.6)	-
Herefordshire, Broxbourne	63.1	-0.9	56.1	-2.7	18.4	+0.8	3.2	-10.2	19.7	+15.6	2.6	-	-	-1.8
Hemel Hempstead	66.5	-1.5	52.9	+2.9	23.8	+3.0	4.8	-18.0	14.6	+12.1	3.3	-	1 (0.5)	-
Hertford and Stortford	69.8	-0.8	56.1	+2.3	17.9	+4.2	7.8	-18.2	13.4	+10.3	4.8	-	-	-
Herefordshire North East	70.7	+0.8	55.4	+1.8	18.9	+2.4	7.6	-15.8	12.9	+8.8	5.3	+3.6	-	-
South West	71.9	-0.6	56.9	+2.7	16.3	+4.8	10.3	-17.7	11.5	+9.0	4.5	-	1 (0.4)	-
Hertsmere	67.9	+3.2	59.3	+3.3	22.4	+3.7	5.5	-11.8	12.7	+9.1	-	-	-	-0.2
Hitchin and Harpenden	68.9	-5.1	56.9	+2.3	20.6	+7.1	8.1	-18.6	8.9	+5.8	5.5	+4.0	-	-
St Albans	71.8	-3.6	46.6	+5.9	23.3	+5.7	18.5	-17.9	7.8	+4.0	3.7	+2.3	-	-
Stevenage	67.7	+2.9	44.5	+3.1	34.2	+0.8	3.3	-13.3	14.4	+9.9	2.9	-	3 (0.7)	+1.2
Watford	67.2	-1.1	43.5	+8.5	26.0	-0.7	18.1	-14.3	9.8	+7.6	2.4	+0.8	1 (0.3)	-
Welwyn Hatfield	68.5	+0.6	50.4	-6.6	26.1	+4.8	6.3	-10.1	13.1	+9.7	3.5	+1.8	2 (0.7)	-5.7
Humberside, Beverley and Holderness	65.2	-1.9	48.1	+1.0	25.0	+3.9	5.5	-17.2	16.7	+13.2	3.4	+2.1	1 (1.2)	-
Brigg and Goole	63.2	-2.0	53.0	+8.2	27.2	-5.9	1.8	-12.9	15.5	+11.5	2.1	-	2 (0.4)	+7.0
Cleethorpes	63.5	-0.5	46.6	+4.5	29.1	-3.4	3.0	-15.2	18.5	+11.4	2.2	-	1 (0.5)	+4.0
Great Grimsby	57.0	+3.2	26.3	-4.2	39.8	+7.1	5.0	-17.4	25.0	+18.8	2.3	-	2 (1.7)	-5.6
Haltemprice and Howden	68.5	-0.9	54.2	+3.9	21.0	+5.3	6.3	-20.2	13.9	-	3.7	+2.3	1 (1)	-
Hull East	53.5	+2.9	15.9	-0.7	51.7	+3.8	6.5	-16.3	22.4	+14.3	2.3	-	3 (1.2)	-
North	55.1	+3.1	15.0	+1.9	52.8	+13.6	9.0	-28.3	16.3	+12.2	5.8	+4.4	1 (1)	-
West and Hesse	53.8	-1.2	17.5	-2.7	49.2	+6.7	10.0	-14.3	19.9	+14.5	3.0	-	1 (0.5)	-
Scunthorpe	57.7	-1.0	33.2	+0.5	41.7	+2.1	2.1	-16.2	17.1	+12.6	2.4	+1.3	2 (3.5)	-0.8
Yorkshire East	61.7	-2.3	50.6	+3.1	20.7	+0.4	5.9	-15.2	17.9	+13.7	3.5	+2.0	1 (1.4)	-
Isle of Wight, Isle of Wight	64.6	+0.7	40.7	-6.0	12.8	+1.2	7.4	-24.3	21.2	+17.7	13.4	+12.1	1 (4.5)	-
Kent, Ashford	67.4	-0.5	52.5	-1.7	18.4	+1.8	6.0	-16.8	18.8	+14.3	4.3	+2.5	-	-
Canterbury	65.7	-0.7	42.9	+1.9	24.5	+8.4	11.6	-20.9	13.6	+9.8	7.0	+4.7	1 (0.3)	-
Chatham and Aylesford	64.9	+0.5	50.2	+4.0	23.6	-8.7	3.2	-10.2	19.9	+16.9	2.6	+1.7	2 (0.6)	+6.4
Dartford	69.7	+4.0	49.0	+0.2	25.4	-2.1	2.8	-11.9	19.9	+16.2	2.5	-	1 (0.4)	+1.2
Dover	68.9	-1.3	43.3	-0.7	30.7	-2.8	3.1	-12.7	20.3	+16.8	2.6	-	-	+1.0

Faversham and Kent Mid	65.9	-2.0	54.4	-1.8	16.2	-0.4	6.6	-13.0	18.0	+14.3	3.9	+2.0	2 (1)	-
Folkestone and Hythe	65.8	-1.9	47.9	-1.6	14.4	+3.6	8.9	-21.4	22.8	+18.2	5.4	+4.2	3 (0.7)	-
Gillingham and Rainham	66.3	+0.3	48.0	+1.8	25.6	-2.0	3.6	-14.5	19.5	+16.3	2.4	+1.6	3 (0.8)	+1.9
Gravesham	69.6	+2.2	46.8	-1.7	30.1	+1.3	2.2	-11.1	18.6	+13.8	2.2	+0.8	-	-1.5
Maldstone and The Weald	68.3	-0.5	45.5	-2.5	10.5	+0.8	24.1	-11.9	15.9	+12.5	2.8	+1.5	2 (1.3)	-
Rochester and Strood†	68.1	+3.1	44.1	-5.1	19.8	-8.7	2.4	-13.9	30.5	-	2.9	+1.4	1 (0.4)	+1.8
Sevenoaks	69.7	-1.3	56.9	+0.1	12.9	-0.4	7.9	-13.5	17.9	+14.3	4.5	-	-	-
Sittingbourne and Sheppey	65.0	+0.9	49.5	-0.6	19.6	-5.0	3.2	-13.2	24.8	+19.4	2.4	-	1 (0.6)	+2.2
Thanet North	65.8	+2.6	49.0	-3.7	17.9	-3.6	3.5	-15.9	25.7	+19.2	3.7	-	1 (0.3)	-0.1
South	69.6	+4.0	38.1	-9.9	23.8	-7.6	1.9	-13.2	32.4	+26.9	2.2	-	6 (1.6)	-1.1
Tonbridge and Malling	71.7	+0.2	59.4	+1.5	14.2	+1.5	6.8	-15.7	15.2	+11.5	4.4	+2.9	-	-
Tunbridge Wells	70.0	+1.9	58.7	+2.4	14.2	+3.4	8.4	-16.8	12.6	+8.5	5.2	+3.4	1 (0.9)	-
Lancashire, Blackburn	60.1	-2.8	27.3	+1.1	56.3	+8.5	2.2	-13.0	14.3	+12.2	-	-	1 (0.1)	+1.6
Blackpool North and Cleveleys	63.1	+1.6	44.4	+2.7	36.0	-0.5	2.4	-10.9	14.8	+10.7	2.3	-	2 (2.2)	-1.4
South	56.5	+0.7	33.8	-2.0	41.8	+0.7	2.3	-12.2	17.3	+13.5	2.6	-	-	-
Burnley*	61.6	-1.2	13.5	-3.1	37.6	+6.3	29.5	-6.2	17.3	+15.0	2.1	-	-	-
Chorley	69.2	-0.9	36.3	-1.7	45.1	+1.9	2.6	-11.4	13.5	+9.5	2.1	-	1 (0.3)	-1.8
Fylde	66.3	0.0	49.1	-3.1	18.8	-1.0	3.7	-18.3	12.8	+8.3	3.2	+1.7	2 (12.4)	-
Hyndburn	62.8	-0.7	31.9	-2.0	42.1	+1.1	2.0	-9.8	21.3	+17.9	2.6	+1.5	-	-1.5
Lancashire West	70.1	+4.4	32.4	-3.7	49.3	+4.1	2.6	-10.9	12.2	+8.5	3.2	+2.2	1 (0.3)	-3.9
Lancaster and Fleetwood*	67.4	+4.0	39.2	+3.2	42.3	+7.0	3.3	-15.8	9.7	+7.3	5.0	+0.6	1 (0.4)	-1.9
Morecambe and Lunesdale	64.6	+2.1	45.5	+4.0	34.9	+4.6	3.7	-9.6	12.4	+8.1	3.2	+1.8	1 (0.2)	+4.3
Pendle	68.8	+1.0	47.2	+8.3	34.9	+4.0	3.3	-16.8	12.2	+8.9	2.3	-	-	+2.2
Preston	55.8	+2.7	20.0	-1.7	56.0	+7.8	3.7	-20.7	15.4	+10.9	4.9	-	-	-
Ribble Valley	67.5	+0.3	48.6	-1.7	22.6	+0.5	5.3	-15.2	15.8	+9.1	4.2	-	3 (3.5)	-1.1
Rossendale and Darwen	66.4	+2.1	46.6	+4.8	35.1	+2.8	1.6	-16.5	14.0	+10.6	2.1	-	3 (0.6)	+1.0
South Ribble	68.5	+0.6	46.4	+1.0	35.1	+0.4	4.4	-9.7	14.1	+10.4	-	-	-	+0.3
Wyre and Preston North	70.6	-2.5	53.2	+0.8	24.8	+3.5	5.4	-16.1	13.2	+8.4	3.4	-	-	-
Leicestershire, Bosworth	67.2	-3.0	42.8	+0.2	17.5	+1.5	22.3	-11.0	17.4	+15.4	-	-	-	-
Charnwood	67.6	-4.3	54.3	+4.7	21.9	+2.2	6.9	-14.6	15.9	+12.6	-	-	1 (0.9)	-
Harborough	67.5	-3.0	52.7	+3.8	15.3	+2.6	13.4	-17.7	14.4	+11.7	4.1	-	-	-
Leicester East	63.7	-2.0	23.0	-1.5	61.1	+7.4	2.6	-11.6	8.9	+7.4	3.1	+1.5	2 (1.4)	-4.4
South	62.5	+1.4	21.0	-0.4	59.8	+14.2	4.6	-22.3	8.3	+6.8	5.5	+3.9	1 (0.8)	-
West	54.6	-0.6	25.6	-1.5	46.5	+8.1	4.4	-18.3	17.2	+14.8	5.4	+3.7	1 (0.8)	-4.8
North West	71.4	-1.5	49.5	+4.9	27.4	-2.7	3.9	-12.7	16.9	+14.7	2.3	-	-	+3.8

ENGLAND		Turnout	Turnout	Con	Con	Lab	Lab	LD	LD	UKIP	UKIP	Grn	Grn	Other	Swing
	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	No and	%
South	70.2	-1.0	53.2	+3.7	22.0	+1.1	7.4	-13.6	17.4	+13.7	-	-	-	-	-
Loughborough	69.2	+1.0	49.5	+7.9	31.9	-2.6	4.1	-14.2	11.0	+9.2	3.5	-	-	-	+5.3
Rutland and Melton	68.5	-3.0	55.6	+4.5	15.4	+1.1	8.1	-17.7	15.9	+11.3	4.3	-	-	1 (0.8)	-
Lincolnshire, Boston and Skegness	64.6	+0.4	43.8	-5.7	16.5	-4.2	2.3	-12.4	33.8	+24.3	1.8	-	-	4 (1.7)	-0.7
Gainsborough	66.0	-1.6	52.7	+3.4	21.3	+5.7	6.7	-21.2	15.7	+11.5	2.6	-	-	1 (1)	-
Grantham and Stamford	66.2	-1.4	52.8	+2.5	16.9	-1.1	6.1	-16.1	17.5	+14.5	3.5	-	-	2 (3.2)	-
Lincoln	63.2	+1.0	42.6	+5.1	39.6	+4.3	4.3	-16.0	12.2	+10.0	-	-	-	2 (1.3)	+0.4
Louth and Horncastle	67.2	+2.2	51.2	+1.5	18.0	+0.7	4.5	-17.7	21.4	+17.1	3.1	-	-	2 (1.8)	-
Shefford and North Hykeham	70.4	+0.2	56.2	+4.6	17.3	+0.4	5.7	-12.5	15.7	+12.1	-	-	-	1 (5.2)	-
South Holland and The Deepings	64.4	-1.5	59.6	+0.5	12.4	-1.6	3.0	-12.5	21.8	+15.4	3.2	+1.8	-	-	-4.6
Merseyside, Birkenhead	62.7	+6.4	14.9	-4.1	67.6	+5.1	3.6	-15.0	9.8	-	4.2	-	-	-	-
Bootle	64.4	+6.6	8.1	-0.9	74.5	+8.0	2.2	-13.0	10.9	+4.8	3.3	-	-	1 (1.1)	-
Garston and Halewood	66.4	+6.4	13.7	-2.5	69.1	+9.6	4.7	-15.5	9.2	+5.6	3.5	-	-	-	-
Knowsley	64.1	+8.0	6.6	-1.3	78.1	+7.2	2.9	-10.4	9.8	+7.2	2.5	-	-	-	-
Liverpool Riverside	62.5	+10.4	9.6	-1.3	67.4	+8.1	3.9	-18.9	5.7	+3.9	12.1	+8.6	-	-	-
Walton	62.0	+7.2	4.7	-1.8	81.3	+9.3	2.3	-11.9	9.0	+6.4	2.5	-	-	2 (0.2)	-
Wavertree	66.6	+5.9	10.0	+2.5	69.3	+16.2	6.0	-28.2	8.2	+5.9	5.2	+3.6	-	2 (1.2)	-
West Derby	64.5	+7.7	6.6	-2.6	75.2	+11.0	2.3	-10.2	8.5	+5.4	2.4	-	-	1 (5)	-
St Helens North	61.5	+2.0	19.6	-2.7	57.0	+5.3	4.4	-15.8	15.1	+10.4	3.8	-	-	-	-4.0
South	62.3	+3.2	15.9	-1.9	59.8	+6.9	5.7	-16.6	14.0	+11.3	4.6	-	-	-	-
Sefton Central	72.4	+0.6	29.6	-4.3	53.8	+11.9	4.3	-15.8	10.0	+5.7	2.4	-	-	-	-8.1
Southport	65.5	+0.4	28.0	-7.9	19.2	+9.8	31.0	-18.7	16.8	+11.7	2.8	-	-	1 (2.2)	-
Wallasey	66.2	+3.0	22.7	-8.7	60.4	+8.6	2.3	-11.3	11.7	+8.8	3.0	-	-	-	-8.6
Wirral South	73.5	+2.3	37.2	-2.2	48.2	+7.4	3.5	-13.0	8.9	+5.7	2.1	-	-	-	-4.8
West*	75.6	+4.1	44.2	+1.7	45.1	+8.9	3.4	-13.4	6.6	+4.3	-	-	-	1 (0.7)	-3.6
Norfolk, Broadland	72.2	-0.5	50.5	+4.3	18.8	+4.9	9.8	-22.6	16.7	+12.2	4.2	+2.8	-	-	-
Great Yarmouth	63.7	+2.5	42.9	-0.2	29.1	-4.1	2.3	-12.1	23.1	+18.3	2.2	+1.2	-	1 (0.4)	+2.0
Norfolk Mid	67.7	-0.7	30.9	+2.6	18.4	+0.9	6.3	-15.9	19.0	+13.5	4.2	+1.0	-	-	-
North	71.8	-1.4	52.1	-1.2	10.2	+4.4	39.1	-16.4	16.9	+11.5	3.0	+2.0	-	-	-
North West	63.7	-1.7	52.2	-2.0	22.8	+9.5	3.5	-19.7	17.8	+13.9	3.8	+2.2	-	-	-
South	70.8	-1.4	54.3	+4.9	18.4	+5.2	8.2	-21.2	13.7	+9.5	5.4	+3.6	-	-	-



South West	65.1	-1.5	50.9	+2.6	17.3	-1.3	4.4	-17.2	23.3	+17.0	4.1	+2.5	-	-
Norwich North	67.6	+1.9	43.7	+3.1	33.5	+2.0	4.3	-13.9	13.7	+9.3	4.4	+1.5	1 (0.3)	+0.5
South*	64.7	+0.2	23.5	+0.6	39.3	+10.6	13.6	-15.7	9.4	+7.0	13.9	-1.0	2 (0.3)	-
<i>North Yorkshire, Harrogate and</i>														
Knaresborough.	69.9	-1.2	52.7	+7.0	10.1	+3.7	22.1	-21.7	10.6	+8.7	4.4	-	-	-
Richmond (Yorks)	68.3	+2.0	51.4	-11.4	13.2	-2.1	6.4	-12.7	15.2	-	4.3	+1.4	2 (9.6)	-
Scarborough and Whitby	64.9	-0.4	43.2	+0.3	30.2	+3.9	4.5	-18.0	17.1	+14.1	4.6	+3.1	1 (0.4)	-1.8
Selby and Ainsty	69.4	-1.6	52.5	+3.1	26.8	+1.1	3.6	-14.1	14.0	+10.8	2.8	-	1 (0.3)	+1.0
Skipton and Ripon	71.2	+0.5	55.4	+4.9	17.4	+7.3	7.4	-25.0	14.0	+10.5	5.7	-	-	-
Thirsk and Malton	67.6	+17.7	52.6	-0.3	15.4	+1.9	9.0	-14.3	14.9	+8.3	4.6	-	2 (3.5)	-
York Central	63.3	+2.5	28.3	+2.2	42.4	+2.4	8.0	-17.2	10.1	+7.7	10.0	+6.5	2 (1.2)	-0.1
Outer	68.6	-1.6	49.1	+6.1	24.8	+7.7	11.6	-24.4	9.7	+7.7	4.7	-	-	-
<i>Northamptonshire, Corby†</i>														
70.4	+0.9	42.8	+0.6	38.5	-0.2	2.6	-11.8	13.7	-	2.4	-	-	-	+0.4
Daventry	72.1	-0.4	58.2	+1.7	18.1	+2.3	4.5	-15.0	15.8	+11.3	3.5	+2.0	-	-
Kettering	67.3	-1.5	51.8	+2.7	25.2	-4.8	3.2	-12.7	16.1	-	3.5	-	1 (0.3)	+3.7
Northampton North	66.6	+1.5	42.4	+8.3	34.1	+4.8	3.6	-24.4	16.1	+13.0	3.8	+2.7	-	+1.7
South	63.4	+1.7	41.6	+0.7	31.8	+6.4	4.3	-15.1	18.3	+13.4	3.6	+2.7	1 (0.4)	-2.8
Northamptonshire South	71.0	-2.1	60.1	+4.9	16.7	-0.6	5.9	-15.1	13.5	+9.5	3.7	+2.5	-	-
Wellingborough	67.9	+0.6	52.1	+3.8	19.5	-5.9	4.4	-12.7	19.6	+16.4	4.4	+3.5	-	+4.9
<i>Northumberland, Berwick-upon-Tweed*</i>														
71.0	+3.0	41.1	+4.4	14.9	+1.8	28.9	-14.8	11.2	+7.9	3.7	-	-	1 (0.2)	-
Blyth Valley	62.8	+1.5	21.7	+5.1	46.3	+1.8	5.9	-21.3	22.3	+18.0	3.8	-	-	-
Hexham	72.6	+0.6	52.7	+9.5	24.9	+5.9	6.8	-23.1	9.9	-	5.6	-	-	-
Wansbeck	63.5	+1.5	21.8	+4.2	50.0	+4.2	6.2	-21.2	18.2	+15.7	3.8	+2.2	-	-
<i>Nottinghamshire, Ashfield</i>														
61.5	-0.8	22.4	+0.2	41.0	+7.3	14.8	-18.5	21.4	+19.5	-	-	-	1 (0.3)	-
Bassetlaw	64.2	-0.6	30.7	-3.2	48.6	-1.8	2.7	-8.5	16.0	+12.4	2.0	-	-	-0.7
Broxtowe	74.5	+1.3	45.2	+6.2	37.2	-1.1	4.0	-12.9	10.6	+8.4	2.9	+2.1	1 (0.1)	+3.6
Gedling	68.6	+0.6	36.1	-1.2	42.3	+1.2	4.0	-11.3	14.4	+11.4	3.2	-	-	-1.2
Mansfield	60.9	+0.4	28.2	+1.8	39.4	+0.7	3.5	-12.0	25.1	+18.9	3.1	-	1 (0.7)	+0.6
Newark	70.9	-0.5	57.0	+3.2	21.7	-0.6	4.6	-15.4	12.0	+8.2	3.4	-	1 (1.2)	+1.9
Nottingham East	58.2	+1.8	20.8	-2.9	54.6	+9.2	4.2	-20.1	9.9	+6.5	9.9	+7.1	2 (0.7)	-
North	53.6	-0.6	21.0	-3.8	54.6	+6.0	2.4	-14.7	18.5	+14.6	3.1	-	1 (0.5)	-4.9
South	63.0	+2.5	31.7	-1.3	47.6	+10.3	3.5	-19.5	11.3	+8.9	5.4	+3.9	1 (0.5)	-5.8
Rushcliffe	75.3	+1.7	51.4	+0.2	26.3	+5.6	5.0	-16.7	10.8	+6.7	6.5	+4.1	-	-
Sherwood	69.1	+0.6	45.0	+5.8	35.9	-2.9	2.2	-12.7	14.6	+11.6	2.2	-	1 (0.2)	+4.4
<i>Oxfordshire, Banbury</i>														
67.1	+0.5	53.0	+0.2	21.3	+2.1	5.9	-14.5	13.9	+8.9	4.6	+2.9	-	1 (1.3)	-

ENGLAND		Turnout	Con	Con	Lab	Lab	LD	LD	UKIP	UKIP	Grn	Grn	Other	Swing
	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	No	%
Henley	70.9	-2.3	58.5	+2.3	12.5	+1.6	11.2	-13.9	10.9	+7.5	6.9	+4.4	-	-
Oxford East	64.2	+1.1	19.9	+1.0	50.0	+7.5	10.8	-22.8	6.8	+4.5	11.6	+9.2	4 (0.9)	-
West and Abingdon	75.2	+9.8	45.7	+3.4	12.7	+2.1	28.9	-13.1	6.9	+4.2	4.4	+2.3	2 (1.4)	-
Wantage	70.3	+0.3	53.3	+1.3	16.0	+2.1	13.1	-14.9	12.5	+8.2	5.1	+3.3	-	-
Witney	73.3	0.0	60.2	+1.4	17.2	+4.2	6.8	-12.7	9.2	+5.7	5.1	+0.9	7 (1.6)	-
Stroud	72.4	-0.7	54.3	+1.5	12.3	+5.6	13.5	-19.3	14.9	+10.5	5.1	+4.1	-	-
Shrewsbury and Atcham	70.8	+0.5	45.5	+1.6	27.8	+7.3	7.9	-21.1	14.4	+11.4	4.2	+3.1	1 (0.2)	-
Shropshire North	66.7	+1.0	51.4	0.0	20.1	+1.9	6.0	-15.0	17.6	+12.9	4.9	+3.3	-	-
Telford*	61.4	-2.1	39.6	+3.3	37.8	-0.9	2.3	-13.2	18.0	+12.2	2.3	-	-	+2.1
Wrekin, The	68.9	-1.2	49.7	+2.0	26.0	-1.1	4.3	-13.1	16.8	+12.3	3.2	-	-	+1.5
Somerset, Bridgwater and West Somerset	67.6	+1.3	46.0	+0.7	17.6	+0.5	12.4	-15.9	19.2	+14.4	4.8	+3.3	-	-
Somerton and Frome*	72.4	-1.9	53.0	+8.5	7.3	+2.9	19.4	-28.1	10.7	+7.5	9.0	-	1 (0.6)	-
Taunton Deane*	69.6	-0.9	48.1	+5.9	9.2	+4.1	21.3	-27.7	12.0	+8.3	4.5	-	3 (4.8)	-
Wells*	71.7	+1.3	46.1	+3.6	6.6	-0.9	32.8	-11.2	9.9	+6.9	4.1	+3.0	3 (0.4)	-
Yeovil*	69.1	-0.4	42.5	+9.6	7.1	+1.9	33.1	-22.6	13.4	+9.3	3.8	-	2 (2.9)	-
South Yorkshire, Barnsley Central	56.7	+0.2	15.0	-2.3	55.7	+8.5	2.1	-15.2	21.7	+17.1	2.6	-	4 (4)	-
East	55.7	-0.4	14.6	-1.9	54.7	+7.7	3.2	-15.0	23.5	+19.0	-	-	2 (1.6)	-6.3
Don Valley	59.6	-0.2	25.3	-4.4	46.2	+8.2	3.5	-13.6	23.5	+19.1	-	-	2 (1.8)	-6.7
Doncaster Central	56.8	-0.4	20.7	-4.0	49.1	+9.4	4.2	-16.8	24.1	+20.7	-	-	3 (2.2)	-3.9
North	55.6	-2.2	18.3	-2.7	52.4	+5.1	2.5	-12.3	22.6	+18.3	1.9	-	1 (1.1)	-3.9
Penistone and Stocksbridge	66.2	-1.8	27.7	-3.5	42.0	+4.3	6.3	-14.8	22.9	+18.8	-	-	1 (0.8)	-3.9
Rother Valley	63.3	-0.9	23.3	-5.1	43.6	+2.7	4.2	-13.1	28.1	+22.5	-	-	3 (2.1)	-6.2
Rotherham	59.4	+0.4	12.3	-4.4	52.5	+7.9	2.9	-13.1	30.2	+24.3	-	-	2 (1.5)	-
Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough	56.5	-0.9	11.0	-0.5	56.6	+1.6	4.5	-15.5	22.1	+18.0	4.3	-	5 (0.8)	-
Central	61.1	-0.3	11.1	+1.0	55.0	+13.7	9.7	-31.2	7.5	+5.9	15.8	+12.1	3 (0.9)	-
Hallam	76.7	+2.4	13.6	-9.9	35.8	+19.7	40.0	-13.4	6.4	+4.1	3.2	+1.4	2 (0.9)	-
Heeley	61.9	-0.5	16.2	-1.2	48.2	+5.6	11.3	-17.1	17.4	+13.7	6.1	+3.7	3 (1.3)	-
South East	59.2	-2.5	17.4	0.0	51.4	+2.7	5.3	-18.0	21.9	+17.3	2.7	-	1 (0.7)	-4.5
Wentworth and Dearne	58.1	+0.1	14.9	-2.7	56.9	+6.3	2.6	-13.5	24.9	+16.7	-	-	-	+4.8
Staffordshire, Burton	65.1	-1.5	49.8	+5.2	27.5	-4.3	2.5	-13.3	17.7	+14.8	2.5	-	-	-
Cannock Chase	63.2	+2.0	44.2	+4.1	33.7	+0.6	2.7	-14.3	17.5	+14.0	1.9	-	-	+1.7

Lichfield	69.3	-1.7	55.2	+0.8	19.8	0.0	5.2	-14.9	15.7	+10.0	3.8	-	1 (0.2)	-
Newcastle-under-Lyme	63.6	+1.4	36.9	+2.5	38.4	+0.5	4.2	-15.4	16.9	+8.8	2.9	-	1 (0.7)	+1.0
Stafford	71.0	-0.1	48.4	+4.5	29.6	-3.4	2.8	-13.6	12.9	+9.5	2.9	+1.7	1 (3.5)	+4.0
Staffordshire Moorlands	67.5	-3.0	51.1	+5.9	27.2	-2.7	4.1	-12.6	14.6	+6.5	2.9	-	-	+4.3
South	68.2	-0.1	59.4	+6.2	18.4	-1.9	2.9	-13.8	16.7	+11.2	2.6	-	-	+4.1
Stoke-on-Trent Central	51.3	-2.0	22.5	+1.5	39.3	+0.5	4.2	-17.5	22.7	+18.3	3.6	-	3 (7.7)	-
North	54.1	-1.7	27.4	+3.6	39.9	-4.4	2.9	-14.8	24.7	+18.5	2.8	-	2 (2.2)	+4.0
South	57.4	-1.1	32.7	+4.3	39.2	+0.4	3.3	-12.5	21.2	+17.8	2.6	-	1 (1)	+1.9
Stone	69.8	-0.6	54.7	+4.1	20.2	-0.5	5.3	-17.2	16.2	+10.9	2.5	+1.5	1 (1.1)	-
Tamworth	65.6	+1.1	50.0	+4.3	26.1	-6.6	3.0	-13.2	18.5	+13.6	2.4	-	-	+5.4
Suffolk, Bury St Edmunds	69.0	-0.3	53.6	+6.1	17.7	+1.1	6.0	-20.4	14.7	+9.6	7.9	+3.6	-	-
Ipswich	65.4	+3.4	44.8	+5.6	37.1	+2.4	2.9	-15.4	11.7	+8.8	3.6	+1.9	-	+1.6
Suffolk Central and Ipswich North	70.6	+0.1	56.1	+5.3	18.8	+2.6	6.1	-18.8	13.8	+9.4	4.9	+2.2	1 (0.3)	-
Coastal	71.4	-0.2	51.9	+5.5	18.0	+2.0	8.6	-21.2	15.6	+9.8	5.9	+3.9	-	-
South	70.3	-0.6	53.1	+5.3	19.3	+4.9	7.8	-23.1	15.2	+8.1	4.3	-	1 (0.3)	-
West	64.6	0.0	52.2	+1.6	17.5	+2.7	5.0	-18.4	21.7	+15.3	3.6	-	-	+1.6
Waveney	65.1	0.0	42.3	+2.1	37.7	-1.0	2.0	-11.3	14.5	+9.3	3.4	+1.1	-	-
Surrey, Epsom and Ewell	72.7	+3.9	58.3	+2.1	15.5	+3.6	8.8	-18.1	12.5	+7.8	3.7	-	2 (1.1)	-
Esher and Walton	71.3	-1.1	62.9	+4.0	12.7	+2.0	9.4	-15.4	9.7	+6.5	4.1	-	2 (1.3)	-
Guildford	71.3	-0.8	57.1	+3.8	12.1	+7.0	15.5	-23.8	8.8	+7.0	4.7	-	3 (1.8)	-
Mole Valley	74.5	-0.7	60.6	+3.1	8.3	+1.3	14.5	-14.3	11.2	+6.1	5.4	+3.8	-	-
Reigate	69.9	+0.1	56.8	+3.4	12.8	+1.5	10.5	-15.7	13.3	+9.1	6.7	+4.5	-	-
Runnymede and Weybridge	67.8	+1.5	59.7	+3.8	15.5	+2.1	6.7	-14.9	13.9	+7.4	4.1	+2.7	-	-
Spelthorne	68.6	+1.4	49.7	+2.6	18.6	+2.1	6.4	-19.4	20.9	+12.4	3.5	-	2 (0.9)	-
Surrey East	70.4	-0.7	57.4	+0.7	11.8	+2.8	9.2	-16.6	17.0	+10.1	3.8	-	1 (0.6)	-
Surrey West	68.5	-1.1	59.9	+2.2	11.2	+1.0	9.1	-16.8	14.3	+8.0	4.4	-	2 (1.2)	-
Heath	73.7	-1.2	59.9	+1.2	9.5	+3.5	6.3	-23.9	9.9	+7.3	5.4	+4.2	2 (9.1)	-
South West	70.0	-1.5	56.2	+5.9	16.1	+8.1	11.6	-25.8	11.3	+7.5	4.1	-	3 (0.7)	-
Woking	66.2	-0.1	17.4	+1.5	49.2	-0.5	12.2	-17.1	17.5	-	3.7	-	-	-
Tyne and Wear, Blaydon	58.8	+1.3	14.5	-0.4	56.8	+2.6	6.8	-14.5	17.8	+14.9	4.1	+3.1	-	-
Gateshead	56.3	+1.0	18.5	-3.0	55.1	+4.8	2.1	-11.9	21.5	+18.8	2.8	-	-	-3.9
Houghton and Sunderland South	60.3	0.0	17.1	-3.6	55.7	+1.7	3.2	-15.3	19.7	-	3.4	-	1 (1)	-2.7
Jarrow	60.3	+3.9	18.9	-0.5	55.0	+9.1	6.3	-17.8	14.9	+12.7	4.9	+3.3	-	-
Newcastle upon Tyne Central	61.1	+2.4	17.6	+1.5	49.4	+4.4	11.0	-22.2	12.5	-	8.7	+7.1	2 (0.7)	-
East	66.1	+0.6	23.5	+5.3	46.1	+5.2	9.7	-23.4	16.6	+13.7	3.4	+2.6	1 (0.8)	-
North														

ENGLAND		Turnout	Con	Lab	Lab	LD	LD	UKIP	UKIP	Grn	Grn	Other	Swing	
		%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	No and	%	
South Shields		57.8	+0.8	16.6	-5.0	51.3	-0.8	1.8	-12.4	22.0	4.5	+2.4	1 (3.9)	-2.1
Sunderland Central		57.2	+0.2	23.4	-6.7	50.2	+4.3	2.6	-14.3	19.1	+16.6	4.1	1 (0.5)	-5.5
Tynemouth		69.0	-0.6	32.8	-1.6	48.2	+2.9	3.0	-11.9	12.2	+10.5	3.8	-	-2.3
Tyneside North		59.0	-0.7	19.2	+0.9	55.9	+5.3	4.4	-18.5	16.3	+13.5	3.1	2 (1.1)	-
Washington and Sunderland West		54.6	+0.5	18.9	-3.0	55.0	+2.4	2.7	-14.4	19.6	+16.3	2.9	1 (0.9)	-2.7
Warricks/hire, Kenilworth and Southam		76.3	+1.0	58.4	+4.8	15.3	+1.0	10.1	-17.6	11.2	+8.7	4.0	2 (1)	+3.0
Nuneaton		67.2	+1.4	45.5	+4.0	34.9	-2.0	1.8	-13.6	14.4	-	2.8	2 (0.7)	+4.2
Rugby		68.4	-0.5	49.1	+5.0	27.9	-3.4	5.7	-14.2	14.0	+13.1	2.9	1 (0.5)	+2.9
Stratford-on-Avon		72.2	-0.5	57.7	+6.1	13.0	+3.5	12.0	-17.1	13.2	+9.6	4.1	-	+2.9
Warwick and Leamington		70.7	-1.7	47.9	+5.4	34.9	-0.5	5.0	-13.3	8.3	+6.4	3.9	-	+2.9
Warwickshire North		67.5	+0.1	42.3	+2.1	36.0	-4.0	2.1	-9.5	17.4	+14.6	1.9	1 (0.3)	+3.1
West Midlands, Aldridge-Brownhills		65.6	0.0	52.0	-7.3	22.4	+2.6	3.4	-14.3	19.6	-	2.1	1 (0.5)	-4.9
Birmingham Edgbaston		63.0	+2.3	38.3	+0.7	44.8	+4.2	2.9	-12.5	10.1	+8.3	3.3	2 (0.6)	-1.7
Erdington		53.3	-0.3	30.8	-1.8	45.6	+3.8	2.8	-13.4	17.4	+15.0	2.7	1 (0.6)	-2.8
Hall Green		61.6	-2.0	17.7	+2.7	59.8	+26.9	11.6	-13.0	4.5	+2.6	4.7	1 (1.7)	-
Hodge Hill		54.5	-2.1	11.5	-0.2	68.4	+16.4	6.4	-21.3	11.3	+9.7	2.0	1 (0.4)	-
Ladywood		52.7	+4.1	12.7	+0.8	73.6	+18.0	3.8	-23.6	5.0	+2.5	4.2	1 (0.6)	-
Northfield		59.4	+0.8	35.7	+2.1	41.6	+1.3	3.2	-12.5	16.7	+13.5	2.8	-	+0.4
Perry Barr		59.0	0.0	21.5	+0.2	57.4	+7.1	4.8	-17.1	12.2	+8.2	3.2	-	-
Selly Oak		60.3	-1.9	29.0	-2.1	47.7	+9.1	5.6	-16.7	12.7	+10.3	5.1	1 (0.8)	-
Yardley*		57.0	+0.6	14.0	-5.2	41.6	+9.4	25.6	-14.0	16.1	+13.2	1.7	3 (1)	-5.6
Coventry North East		56.0	-3.4	23.1	+0.9	52.2	+2.9	4.8	-11.9	14.9	+11.9	2.9	2 (2.2)	-1.0
North West		61.5	-2.4	31.0	+1.7	41.0	-1.8	4.0	-13.9	15.7	+12.9	4.3	1 (3.9)	+1.8
South		62.1	-0.3	35.0	+1.5	42.3	+0.5	4.1	-14.0	13.1	+9.2	3.9	2 (1.7)	+0.5
Dudley North		62.6	-0.9	30.8	-6.2	41.8	+3.2	1.3	-9.3	24.0	+15.5	1.4	2 (0.8)	-4.7
South		63.3	+0.3	43.8	+0.7	32.6	-0.4	2.2	-13.5	18.9	+10.7	2.5	-	+0.5
Halesowen and Rowley Regis		66.3	-2.7	43.2	+2.0	36.2	-0.4	2.1	-12.7	16.6	+10.2	1.9	-	+1.2
Meriden		64.2	+0.8	54.7	+3.1	19.0	-1.5	5.0	-12.8	16.9	+14.3	4.1	1 (0.2)	+2.3
Solihull*		70.3	-2.0	49.2	+6.7	10.4	+1.5	25.7	-17.2	11.6	+9.4	3.0	2 (0.2)	-
Stourbridge		66.6	-1.2	46.0	+3.4	31.5	-0.2	3.3	-13.0	16.9	+12.4	2.2	-	+1.8
Sutton Coldfield		67.8	-0.1	54.6	+0.7	22.3	+2.0	5.2	-12.9	14.7	+11.6	2.8	1 (0.3)	-0.7

Walsall North	55.0	-1.5	33.8	-0.5	39.0	+2.0	2.3	-10.9	22.0	+17.2	1.4	-	1 (1.5)	-1.3
South	61.8	-1.7	32.8	-2.5	47.2	+7.5	1.6	-12.8	15.6	+7.2	2.7	-	-	-5.0
Warley	59.4	-1.6	19.3	-5.5	58.2	+5.3	2.1	-13.4	16.5	+9.6	3.9	-	-	-5.4
West Bromwich East	58.9	-1.6	24.9	-4.0	50.2	+3.7	2.0	-11.2	21.2	+18.6	1.7	-	-	-3.8
West	53.5	-2.3	23.9	-5.5	47.3	+2.4	1.6	-10.4	25.2	+20.9	2.0	-	-	-3.9
Wolverhampton North East	55.7	-3.5	29.9	-4.4	46.1	+4.7	2.7	-10.8	19.2	+15.9	2.1	-	-	-4.5
South East	55.6	-2.4	22.3	-6.2	53.3	+5.8	2.3	-12.9	20.3	+12.6	1.7	-	-	-6.0
South West*	66.6	-1.6	41.2	+0.5	43.2	+4.2	2.1	-13.9	10.7	+7.0	2.6	-	1 (0.1)	-1.9
West Sussex, Arundel and South Downs	73.1	+0.3	60.8	+3.0	11.2	+2.6	7.2	-20.7	14.4	+8.8	6.4	-	-	-
Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	64.5	-1.6	51.3	-0.1	13.8	-0.2	9.0	-14.5	21.7	+15.3	4.1	-	-	-
Chichester	68.5	-1.1	57.7	+2.3	12.1	+1.7	8.5	-18.9	14.9	+8.1	6.5	-	1 (0.2)	-
Crawley	65.7	+0.4	47.0	+2.3	33.6	+1.3	2.8	-11.6	14.4	+11.5	2.3	+1.0	-	+0.5
Horsham	72.0	0.0	57.3	+4.6	11.4	+3.9	11.7	-20.5	14.0	+8.9	3.9	+2.8	3 (1.7)	-
Sussex Mid	70.9	-1.4	56.1	+5.4	13.9	+7.3	11.5	-26.0	12.0	+9.5	4.3	+3.1	2 (2.2)	-
Worthing East and Shoreham	66.7	+1.3	49.5	+1.0	19.5	+2.8	6.7	-18.8	16.6	+10.4	5.2	+2.9	1 (2.5)	-
West	67.1	+2.4	51.5	-0.3	15.7	+3.9	8.8	-19.0	18.3	+12.3	5.8	+3.8	-	-
West Yorkshire, Batley and Spen	64.4	-2.2	31.2	-2.3	43.2	+1.0	4.7	-11.1	18.0	-	2.4	+1.3	2 (0.3)	-1.7
Bradford East*	62.6	+0.5	11.3	-15.5	46.6	+13.8	29.5	-4.2	9.9	-	2.1	-	1 (0.5)	-
South	59.1	-0.7	26.3	-2.8	43.4	+2.2	2.9	-15.4	24.1	+20.6	3.3	-	-	-2.5
West†	63.6	-1.3	15.3	-15.9	49.6	+4.2	2.9	-8.8	7.8	+5.8	2.7	+0.4	3 (21.7)	-10.0
Calder Valley	68.9	+1.5	43.6	+4.2	35.4	+8.4	5.0	-20.2	11.1	+8.8	3.9	+2.2	2 (1)	-2.1
Colne Valley	68.8	-0.2	44.4	+7.5	35.0	+8.6	6.0	-22.2	10.1	+8.0	3.4	+1.8	2 (1.1)	-
Dewsbury*	67.2	-1.2	39.1	+4.1	41.8	+9.6	3.6	-13.4	12.4	-	2.5	+1.0	2 (0.6)	-2.8
Elmet and Rothwell	73.0	+1.3	48.4	+5.8	33.7	-0.8	4.6	-11.8	11.1	+8.3	2.2	-	-	+3.3
Hallifax	62.1	+0.2	39.0	+5.0	40.0	+2.6	3.7	-15.4	12.8	+11.3	2.6	-	2 (1.8)	+1.2
Hensworth	58.3	+0.3	22.9	-1.5	51.3	+4.6	3.2	-9.7	20.2	-	-	-	1 (2.4)	-3.0
Huddersfield	62.0	+0.9	26.8	-1.0	44.9	+6.1	5.8	-18.9	14.7	-	6.9	+2.9	1 (0.8)	-3.6
Keighley	71.3	-1.0	44.3	+2.4	38.1	+2.3	2.7	-12.1	11.5	+8.4	3.4	-	-	0.0
Leeds Central	55.1	+9.1	17.3	-2.9	55.0	+5.7	3.4	-17.4	15.7	-	7.9	-	1 (0.7)	-
East	59.0	+0.5	20.9	-2.2	53.7	+3.4	3.4	-14.1	19.0	-	2.9	-	-	-2.8
North East	69.9	-0.1	32.9	-0.2	47.9	+5.2	5.3	-14.3	7.7	+5.9	5.3	-	1 (0.9)	-2.7
North West	70.0	+3.5	18.6	-7.9	30.1	+9.1	36.8	-10.7	6.9	+5.5	7.0	+5.8	3 (0.6)	-
West	59.2	+1.7	20.1	+0.4	48.0	+5.7	3.9	-20.3	18.5	+15.5	8.4	+3.6	2 (1.1)	-
Morley and Outwood*	63.6	-1.6	38.9	+3.6	38.0	+0.4	3.0	-13.8	16.5	+13.4	2.6	-	1 (1)	+1.6
Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford	55.6	-0.6	20.8	-3.6	54.9	+6.7	2.9	-13.5	21.3	-	-	-	-	-5.2

ENGLAND	Turnout		Con		Lab		Lab		LD		LD		UKIP		UKIP		Grn		Grn		Other		Swing	
	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	No	and	%	
Pudsey	72.2	+1.3	46.4	+8.0	37.6	+2.5	3.8	-17.0	9.2	+6.7	3.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+2.7	
Shipley	71.7	-1.3	50.0	+1.4	31.0	+2.5	3.9	-16.2	8.9	-	5.3	+2.3	1 (1.1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.5	
Wakefield	60.9	-1.8	34.2	-1.5	40.3	+1.0	3.5	-12.9	18.3	-	2.5	+0.5	2 (1.3)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1.2	
Wiltshire, Chippenham*	74.7	+2.0	47.6	+6.5	8.2	+1.3	29.4	-16.4	10.6	+7.2	4.2	+3.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Devises	70.8	+2.0	57.7	+2.7	13.0	+2.8	8.1	-18.9	15.4	+10.9	5.8	+4.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Salisbury	72.9	+1.0	55.6	+6.4	15.3	+7.7	10.1	-26.9	12.1	+9.3	5.4	+4.4	1 (1.4)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Swindon North	64.5	+0.3	50.3	+5.8	27.8	-2.7	3.3	-14.0	15.3	+11.7	3.3	+2.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+4.3	
South	66.6	+1.8	46.2	+4.5	34.5	+0.2	3.7	-13.9	12.0	+7.7	3.6	+2.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+2.1	
Wiltshire North	74.5	+1.1	57.2	+5.7	9.8	+3.1	15.6	-20.6	11.5	+7.6	4.6	+3.4	2 (1.3)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
South West	70.7	+2.3	52.7	+1.0	13.5	+2.0	10.6	-19.9	17.5	+12.0	5.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

WALES	Turnout		Con		Lab		LD		LD		Plaid		Plaid		UKIP		UKIP		Grn		Grn		Others		Swing	
	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	No	and	%	
Clwyd, Aberconwy	66.2	-1.0	41.5	+5.7	28.2	+3.8	4.6	-14.7	11.7	-6.1	11.5	+9.4	2.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+1.0
Alyn and Deeside	66.6	+1.1	31.9	-0.3	40.0	+0.4	4.2	-14.1	3.9	0.0	17.6	+15.0	2.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.4
Clwyd South	63.8	-0.8	30.4	-0.2	37.2	-1.2	3.8	-13.4	10.3	+1.6	15.6	+13.3	2.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.7
West	64.8	-1.0	43.3	+1.7	25.6	+0.9	3.6	-11.6	12.2	-3.2	13.1	+10.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.4
Delyn	69.8	+0.7	32.7	-1.9	40.5	-0.2	3.7	-11.9	4.8	-0.2	16.4	+14.6	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.8
Vale of Clwyd*	62.4	-1.3	39.0	+3.8	38.4	-3.9	2.6	-10.0	7.1	+1.2	13.0	+11.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+3.9
Wrexham	64.2	-0.7	31.6	+6.2	37.2	+0.4	5.3	-20.5	7.6	+1.5	15.5	+13.2	2.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dyfed, Carmarthen East and Dinefwr	70.7	-1.9	21.2	-1.2	24.2	-2.3	2.4	-9.8	38.4	+2.8	11.1	+7.7	2.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
West and Pembrokeshire South	69.9	+0.2	43.7	+2.6	28.7	-4.0	2.4	-9.7	10.4	0.0	11.6	+8.8	3.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+3.3
Ceredigion	69.0	+5.1	11.0	-0.5	9.7	+3.9	35.9	-14.2	27.7	-0.6	10.2	+7.7	5.6	+3.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Llanelli	65.0	-2.3	14.3	0.0	41.3	-1.1	1.9	-8.5	23.0	-7.0	16.3	+13.5	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Presell Pembrokeshire	70.8	+1.8	40.4	-2.4	28.1	+3.0	1.9	-12.6	6.2	3.0	10.5	+8.2	3.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.3
Gwent, Blaenau Gwent	61.7	-0.1	10.8	+3.8	58.0	+5.6	2.0	-8.2	9.0	+4.9	17.9	+16.4	2.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Islwyn	63.6	+0.3	15.2	+1.2	49.0	-0.2	2.7	-7.7	10.7	-2.3	19.6	+16.9	1.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.7
Morrmouth	76.2	+4.2	49.9	+1.6	26.8	+0.9	5.3	-14.1	4.0	+1.2	10.4	+8.0	3.4	+2.2	1 (0.2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.4

Newport East	62.7	-0.6	27.3	+4.3	40.7	+3.7	6.4	-25.8	3.5	+1.4	18.4	+16.5	2.5	-	1 (1.1)
West Torfaen	64.9	+1.0	32.5	+0.2	41.2	0.0	3.9	-12.7	4.0	+1.2	15.2	+12.3	3.2	+2.0	+0.1
Gwynedd, Arfon	61.3	-0.2	23.1	+3.1	44.6	-0.1	3.4	-13.3	5.7	+0.4	19.0	+16.7	2.0	+0.8	+1.6
Dwyfor Meirionnydd	66.3	+3.0	13.1	-3.8	30.3	-0.1	2.7	-11.4	43.9	+8.0	8.5	+5.9	-	-	1 (1.5)
Ynys Môn	65.1	+1.4	22.7	+0.4	13.5	-0.4	4.0	-8.3	40.9	-3.5	10.8	+8.1	3.4	-	1 (4.8)
Mid-Glamorgan, Bridgend	69.9	+1.2	21.2	-1.3	31.1	-2.2	2.2	-5.4	30.5	+4.3	14.7	+11.2	-	-	1 (0.4)
Caerphilly	65.8	+0.4	32.2	+1.8	37.1	+0.7	4.2	-18.4	7.1	+1.1	15.0	+12.9	1.9	-	4 (2.7)
Cynon Valley	63.3	+1.1	16.6	-0.5	44.3	-0.6	2.3	-12.4	14.6	-2.1	19.3	+17.0	2.3	-	1 (0.4)
Merthyr Tydfil	59.3	+0.3	12.1	+2.0	47.7	-4.8	2.7	-11.1	16.8	-3.5	16.3	+13.0	2.6	-	1 (1.7)
Cynon Valley	53.0	-5.6	10.1	+2.5	53.9	+10.2	4.1	-26.9	9.5	+4.4	18.7	+15.9	1.8	-	2 (2)
Ogmore	63.4	+1.0	15.9	+0.4	52.9	-0.9	3.0	-12.1	10.1	+0.5	15.4	+13.1	2.1	-	1 (0.5)
Pontypridd	64.3	+1.3	17.3	+1.2	41.1	+2.3	12.9	-18.2	11.5	+4.2	13.4	+10.1	2.6	+1.6	2 (1.1)
Rhondda	60.9	+0.6	6.7	+0.3	50.7	-4.6	1.5	-9.1	27.0	+8.9	12.7	+11.5	1.4	-	-
Powys, Brecon and Radnorshire*	73.6	+1.1	41.1	+4.5	14.7	+4.2	28.3	-17.8	4.4	+1.9	8.3	+6.1	3.1	+2.3	-
Montgomeryshire	69.3	-0.1	45.0	+3.7	5.6	-1.5	29.3	-8.6	5.2	-3.1	11.2	+7.8	3.7	-	-
South Glamorgan, Cardiff Central*	67.3	+8.2	14.7	-6.9	40.0	+11.2	27.1	-14.3	5.0	+1.5	6.5	+4.4	6.4	+4.8	2 (0.4)
North	76.1	+3.5	42.4	+4.9	38.3	+1.2	3.8	-14.5	4.5	+1.2	7.7	+5.4	2.5	+1.7	2 (0.8)
South and Penarth	61.4	+1.2	26.8	-1.5	42.8	+3.9	5.0	-17.3	7.4	+3.2	13.8	+11.2	3.7	+2.5	1 (0.6)
West	65.6	+0.4	25.2	-4.5	40.7	-0.6	4.7	-12.8	13.9	+6.9	11.2	+8.5	3.9	+2.1	1 (0.4)
Vale of Glamorgan	70.5	+1.1	46.0	+4.2	32.6	-0.3	2.6	-12.7	5.6	+0.1	10.7	+7.6	2.1	+1.1	1 (0.5)
West Glamorgan, Aberavon	63.3	+2.4	11.9	-2.4	48.9	-3.0	4.4	-11.8	11.6	+4.5	15.8	+14.2	2.3	-	3 (5.1)
Gower*	69.2	+1.6	37.1	+5.1	37.0	-1.4	3.6	-15.4	7.1	+0.5	11.2	+9.6	2.7	-	3 (1.2)
Neath	66.2	+1.4	15.3	+2.3	43.8	-2.4	3.2	-11.8	18.1	-1.8	16.4	+14.2	3.2	-	-
Swansea East	58.0	+3.3	15.3	+0.5	53.0	+1.5	4.1	-14.2	10.4	+3.7	17.2	+14.6	-	-	-
West	59.8	+1.8	22.6	+1.7	42.6	+7.9	9.0	-24.2	6.4	+2.4	13.5	+11.5	5.1	+3.9	3 (0.8)

SCOTLAND	Turnout		Con		Lab		LD		SNP		UKIP		Grrn		Others		Swing
	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	No	%	
Aberdeen North*	64.9	+6.7	12.1	-0.3	25.9	-18.5	4.7	-13.9	56.4	+34.2	2.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
South*	71.3	+4.1	22.8	+2.1	26.8	-9.8	4.6	-23.7	41.6	+29.8	-	-	1.3	-	-	-	-
Aberdeenshire West and Kincardine*	75.2	+6.8	28.8	-1.4	4.5	-9.1	21.4	-17.0	41.6	+25.9	2.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Airdrie and Shotts*	66.3	+8.8	7.7	-1.1	34.1	-24.0	1.5	-6.6	53.9	+30.4	2.4	+1.2	1.1	-	1	0.2	-

SCOTLAND		Turnout	Con	Lab	Lab	LD	LD	SNP	SNP	UKIP	UKIP	Grn	Grn	Others	Swing	
	%	+/-	%	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-			No	%	
Angus	67.6	+7.2	29.0	-1.9	8.8	-8.4	2.7	-8.0	54.2	+14.7	2.3	+1.0	-	-	-	-
Argyll and Bute*	75.3	+8.0	14.9	-9.1	10.4	-12.3	27.9	-3.7	44.3	+25.3	2.8	+1.4	1.6	+0.5	-	-
Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock*	71.5	+8.9	19.8	-5.7	27.3	-19.9	1.6	-7.7	48.8	+30.8	-	-	-	-	-	+7.1
Ayrshire Central*	72.5	+8.3	17.3	-3.0	26.4	-21.3	1.8	-10.1	53.2	+34.1	2.5	-	-	-	1	(0.3)
North and Arran*	71.1	+8.9	14.8	-0.8	28.0	-19.4	1.7	-8.4	53.2	+27.2	2.1	-	-	-	-	+9.1
Banff and Buchan	66.5	+6.7	28.8	-2.0	5.8	-8.2	5.1	-6.2	60.2	+19.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk*	74.2	+7.8	36.0	+2.2	4.9	-5.3	18.7	-26.7	36.6	+27.4	1.0	-0.1	1.5	-	-	-
Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross*	71.9	+11.0	6.8	-6.2	9.0	-15.7	35.1	-6.3	46.3	+27.1	-	-	-	-	1	(1)
Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill*	68.6	+9.2	6.3	-1.8	33.9	-32.7	1.1	-7.4	56.6	+39.8	2.0	-	-	-	1	(0.5)
Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East*	73.6	+9.3	7.9	-0.4	30.0	-27.2	2.2	-7.3	59.9	+36.1	2.0	+1.2	4.0	+1.3	3	(0.9)
Dumfries and Galloway*	75.2	+5.3	29.9	-1.7	24.7	-21.2	1.7	-7.1	41.4	+29.1	2.6	+2.0	0.9	-	1	(0.5)
Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale	76.1	+7.2	39.8	+1.8	14.8	-14.1	2.7	-17.1	38.3	+27.5	1.3	-	6.2	+3.0	2	(0.9)
Dunbartonshire East*	81.9	+6.8	8.6	-6.9	12.3	-21.8	36.3	-2.4	40.3	+29.7	-	-	1.6	-	2	(1.2)
West*	73.9	+9.9	7.0	-0.6	31.3	-30.0	1.6	-6.5	59.0	+38.9	-	-	2.7	+0.2	2	(0.8)
Dundee East	71.0	+9.1	15.0	-0.3	19.9	-13.4	2.9	-7.7	59.7	+21.9	-	-	2.9	+0.5	1	(0.6)
West*	67.8	+8.9	8.6	-0.7	23.7	-24.8	2.4	-9.0	61.9	+33.0	2.4	-	1.2	-	1	(0.4)
Dunfermline and West Fife*	71.6	+5.1	11.9	+5.1	31.7	-14.5	4.0	-31.1	50.3	+39.6	1.6	+0.4	-	-	1	(0.5)
East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow*	72.8	+6.2	11.8	-1.2	28.3	-23.2	1.7	-8.2	55.6	+32.6	2.6	+1.3	-	-	-	-
East Lothian*	74.2	+7.2	19.5	-0.1	31.0	-13.6	2.6	-14.3	42.5	+26.5	2.7	-	-	-	-	+6.7
Edinburgh East*	70.1	+4.7	9.9	-1.0	29.9	-13.5	2.8	-16.6	49.2	+28.8	-	-	1.4	-	2	(0.8)
North and Leith*	71.7	+3.3	16.2	+1.2	31.3	-6.2	4.5	-29.3	40.9	+31.3	-	-	-	-	1	(0.6)
South	74.9	+1.1	17.5	-4.1	39.1	+4.4	3.7	-30.3	33.8	+26.1	1.6	+0.8	-	-	-	-
South West*	71.5	+3.0	20.2	-4.0	27.2	-15.6	3.7	-14.3	43.0	+30.8	2.3	+0.8	-	-	1	(0.6)
West*	76.5	+5.2	12.3	-10.9	11.7	-16.0	33.1	-2.8	39.0	+25.8	2.0	+0.9	2.1	+0.4	1	(0.3)
Falkirk*	72.4	+10.3	12.1	+0.9	25.1	-20.6	2.0	-8.3	57.7	+27.5	1.9	-	6.0	+0.9	1	(0.2)
Fife North East*	73.0	+9.2	16.3	-5.5	7.7	-9.5	31.3	-13.0	40.9	+26.7	1.5	-	5.4	+3.2	1	(0.2)
Glasgow Central*	55.4	+4.5	6.0	-1.1	33.1	-19.0	1.6	-14.8	52.5	+35.0	1.2	-	4.2	+2.2	1	(0.4)



East*	60.3	+8.3	6.0	+1.5	32.4	-29.2	0.7	-4.3	56.9	+32.1	2.1	-	3.8	+1.9	-	-
North*	61.4	+3.9	7.9	+0.8	27.9	-16.6	2.7	-28.6	53.1	+41.2	1.9	-	2.1	-	-	-
North East*	56.8	+7.6	4.7	-0.7	33.7	-34.7	0.8	-6.9	58.1	+43.9	3.0	+0.5	-	-	-	-
North West*	64.1	+5.8	8.4	-1.5	30.9	-23.2	2.7	-13.1	54.5	+39.3	2.7	-	-	-	1 (0.2)	-
South*	65.9	+4.3	9.7	-1.7	29.7	-22.0	2.1	-9.7	54.9	+34.7	3.1	+2.1	-	-	-	-
South West*	61.8	+7.2	5.0	-1.6	32.8	-29.7	1.0	-8.0	57.2	+40.8	2.4	+1.5	2.5	+1.0	-	-
Glenrothes*	68.2	+8.4	7.7	+0.5	30.6	-31.7	1.9	-5.8	59.8	+38.1	-	-	3.1	+1.5	-	-
Gordon*	73.3	+6.8	11.7	-7.0	5.9	-14.2	32.7	-3.3	47.7	+25.5	-	-	-	-	2 (0.9)	-
Inverclyde*	75.2	+11.8	10.0	-2.0	30.3	-25.6	2.5	-10.9	55.1	+37.6	1.8	-	2.0	+1.0	1 (0.3)	-
Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey*	74.2	+9.3	5.9	-7.4	7.5	-14.6	31.3	-9.4	50.1	+31.4	1.8	+0.9	1.6	-	1 (0.3)	-
Kilmarnock and Loudoun*	71.6	+8.8	12.5	-1.6	30.4	-22.2	1.5	-5.9	55.7	+29.7	3.0	+1.5	2.2	-	-	-
Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath*	69.6	+7.4	9.9	+0.6	33.4	-31.2	2.2	-7.1	52.2	+37.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lanark and Hamilton East*	69.1	+6.8	15.9	+0.9	30.5	-19.4	2.2	-9.1	48.8	+27.8	-	-	1.9	+0.5	2 (0.7)	-
Linlithgow and East Falkirk*	70.8	+7.2	12.0	0.0	31.0	-18.8	2.0	-10.8	52.0	+26.6	-	-	2.7	-	1 (0.7)	-
Livingston*	69.9	+6.8	10.3	-0.5	27.6	-20.8	2.1	-9.0	56.9	+31.0	-	-	2.1	-	-	-
Midlothian*	71.2	+7.3	11.9	0.0	30.2	-16.8	2.3	-14.8	50.6	+30.0	-	-	3.1	-	1 (0.7)	-
Moray	68.7	+6.5	31.1	+5.0	9.9	-7.1	2.8	-11.7	49.5	+9.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motherwell and Wishaw*	68.6	+10.2	7.7	-1.7	31.9	-29.2	1.2	-8.6	56.5	+38.4	2.0	-	-	-	-	-
Na h-Eileanan an Iar	73.2	+5.6	7.6	+3.2	28.6	-4.3	2.9	-4.6	54.3	+8.7	2.3	+0.7	-	-	-	-
Ochil and South Perthshire*	74.8	+7.6	20.7	+0.2	28.4	-9.5	2.6	-8.8	46.0	+18.4	3.9	+1.3	2.7	-	-	-
Orkney and Shetland	65.8	+7.3	8.9	-1.6	7.1	-3.5	41.4	-20.6	37.8	+27.2	2.3	+0.9	-	-	-	-
Paisley and Renfrewshire North*	76.2	+7.6	12.3	-2.3	32.7	-21.3	2.1	-8.4	50.7	+31.7	2.0	-	2.1	-	1 (0.7)	-
South*	75.4	+10.1	7.6	-2.3	38.6	-21.0	2.2	-7.3	50.9	+32.9	2.5	-	-	-	-	-
Perth and North Perthshire	74.8	+7.9	32.7	+2.2	8.1	-8.3	3.8	-8.5	50.5	+10.9	2.9	-	-	-	-	-
Renfrewshire East*	81.1	+3.8	22.0	-8.4	34.0	-16.8	1.9	-7.3	40.6	+31.7	2.1	+0.9	2.4	+0.7	1 (0.7)	+4.2
Ross, Skye and Lochaber*	77.2	+10.0	6.2	-6.0	4.9	-10.2	35.9	-16.8	48.1	+33.0	-	-	-	-	1 (6.6)	-
Rutherglen and Hamilton West*	69.6	+8.1	7.6	-2.1	35.2	-25.6	1.8	-10.2	52.6	+36.5	4.8	-1.6	-	-	-	-
Stirling*	77.5	+6.7	23.1	-0.9	25.5	-16.2	2.7	-11.8	45.6	+28.3	1.9	+0.1	2.5	+0.3	1 (0.5)	+7.7

NORTHERN IRELAND		Turnout	Turnout	UUP	UUP	DUP	DUP	APNI	APNI	SF	SF	SDLP	SDLP	Other
	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	+/-	%	%
Antrim East	53.3	+2.7	18.8	-4.8	36.1	-9.7	15.0	+3.9	6.9	+0.1	4.9	-1.7	18.2	
North	55.2	-2.6	12.1	+1.1	43.2	-3.2	5.6	+2.4	12.3	-0.1	7.0	-1.8	19.9	
South*	54.2	+0.2	32.7	+2.3	30.1	-3.8	9.8	+2.1	12.9	-1.0	8.2	-0.5	6.4	
Belfast East*	62.8	+4.4	-	-	49.3	+16.5	42.8	+5.6	2.1	-0.3	0.3	-0.7	5.5	
North	59.2	+2.7	-	-	47.0	+7.0	7.2	+2.4	33.9	-0.1	8.2	-4.1	3.6	
South	60.0	+2.6	9.1	-8.2	22.2	-1.5	17.2	+2.3	13.9	-	24.5	-16.5	13.0	
West	56.3	+2.4	3.1	0.0	7.8	+0.3	1.8	-0.1	54.2	-16.8	9.8	-6.5	23.2	
Down North	56.0	+0.8	-	-	23.6	-	8.6	+3.0	0.8	0.0	1.0	-1.0	66.1	
South	56.8	-3.4	9.3	+2.0	8.2	-0.4	3.8	+2.5	28.5	-0.2	42.3	-6.1	7.9	
Fermanagh and South Tyrone*	72.6	+3.6	46.4	-	-	-	1.3	+0.4	45.4	-0.1	5.4	-2.3	1.5	
Foyle	52.8	-4.7	3.3	+0.1	12.4	+0.5	2.3	+1.7	31.6	-0.4	47.9	+3.2	2.6	
Lagan Valley	55.9	-0.1	15.2	-5.9	47.9	-1.9	13.9	+2.5	2.9	-1.1	6.3	+1.3	13.8	
Londonderry East	51.9	-3.4	15.4	-2.4	42.2	+7.6	7.6	+2.1	19.8	+0.5	12.3	-3.2	2.7	
Newry and Armagh	64.2	+3.8	32.7	+13.6	-	-	1.7	+0.5	41.1	-0.9	24.1	+0.7	0.4	
Strangford	52.8	-0.9	14.3	-13.5	44.4	-1.5	13.8	+5.1	2.6	-1.0	6.9	+0.2	18.0	
Tyrone West	60.5	-0.4	15.9	+1.7	17.5	-2.3	2.2	-0.1	43.5	-4.9	16.7	+2.7	4.3	
Ulster Mid	60.3	-2.9	15.4	+4.4	13.4	-1.0	1.9	+0.9	48.7	-3.3	12.4	-1.9	8.2	
Upper Bann	59.0	+3.6	27.9	+2.2	32.7	-1.2	3.8	+0.8	24.6	-0.2	9.0	-3.8	2.1	

Notes:

UUP: Ulster Unionist Party. Comparison with 2010 is with the Ulster Conservatives and Unionists – New Force

DUP: Democratic Unionist Party

APNI: Alliance Party of Northern Ireland

SF: Sinn Fein

SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party

Table A2.6 Seats changing hands

*Con gains from Labour*

Bolton West  
 Derby North  
 Gower  
 Morley and Outwood  
 Plymouth Moor View  
 Southampton Itchen  
 Telford  
 Vale of Clwyd

*Con gains from Lib Dems*

Bath  
 Berwick-upon-Tweed  
 Brecon and Radnorshire  
 Cheadle  
 Cheltenham  
 Chippenham  
 Colchester  
 Cornwall North  
 Devon North  
 Dorset Mid and Poole North  
 Eastbourne  
 Eastleigh  
 Hazel Grove  
 Kingston and Surbiton  
 Lewes  
 Portsmouth South  
 Solihull  
 Somerton and Frome  
 St Austell and Newquay  
 St Ives  
 Sutton and Cheam  
 Taunton Deane  
 Thornbury and Yate  
 Torbay  
 Twickenham  
 Wells  
 Yeovil

*Labour gains from Con*

Brentford and Isleworth  
 Chester, City of  
 Dewsbury  
 Ealing Central and Acton  
 Enfield North  
 Hove  
 Ilford North

Lancaster and Fleetwood  
 Wirral West  
 Wolverhampton South West

*Labour gains from Lib Dems*

Bermondsey and Old Southwark  
 Birmingham Yardley  
 Bradford East  
 Brent Central  
 Bristol West  
 Burnley  
 Cambridge  
 Cardiff Central  
 Hornsey and Wood Green  
 Manchester Withington  
 Norwich South  
 Redcar

*SNP gains from Labour*

Aberdeen North  
 Aberdeen South  
 Airdrie and Shotts  
 Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock  
 Ayrshire Central  
 Ayrshire North and Arran  
 Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill  
 Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and  
 Kirkintilloch East  
 Dumfries and Galloway  
 Dunbartonshire West  
 Dundee West  
 Dunfermline and West Fife  
 East Kilbride, Strathaven and  
 Lesmahagow  
 East Lothian  
 Edinburgh East  
 Edinburgh North and Leith  
 Edinburgh South West  
 Falkirk  
 Glasgow Central  
 Glasgow East  
 Glasgow North  
 Glasgow North East  
 Glasgow North West  
 Glasgow South  
 Glasgow South West  
 Glenrothes

Inverclyde	Argyll and Bute
Kilmarnock and Loudoun	Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk
Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath	Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross
Lanark and Hamilton East	Dunbartonshire East
Linlithgow and Falkirk East	Edinburgh West
Livingston	Fife North East
Midlothian	Gordon
Motherwell and Wishaw	Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey
Ochil and South Perthshire	Ross, Skye and Lochaber
Paisley and Renfrewshire North	
Paisley and Renfrewshire South	<i>Other gains</i>
Renfrewshire East	Clacton UKIP from Con
Rutherglen and Hamilton West	Belfast East DUP from Alliance
Stirling	South Antrim UUP from DUP
	Fermanagh and South Tyrone UUP from SF
<i>SNP gains from Lib Dems</i>	
Aberdeenshire West and Kincardine	

Table A2.7 Exceptional results

TURNOUT			
<i>10 largest and smallest % turnout</i>		Inverclyde	+11.8
Dunbartonshire East	81.9	Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross	+11.0
Renfrewshire East	81.1	Liverpool Riverside	+10.4
Stirling	77.5	Falkirk	+10.4
Twickenham	77.3	Motherwell and Wishaw	+10.2
Ross, Skye and Lochaber	77.2	Paisley and Renfrewshire South	+10.1
Sheffield Hallam	76.7	Ross, Skye and Lochaber	+10.0
Edinburgh West	76.5	Dunbartonshire West	+9.9
Richmond Park	76.5	Oxford West and Abingdon	+9.8
Kenilworth and Southam	76.3	[...]	
Monmouth	76.3	St Albans	-3.6
[...]		Copeland	-3.9
Birmingham Erdington	53.3	Charnwood	-4.3
Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney	53.0	Foyle	-4.7
Middlesbrough	52.9	Cambridge	-5.0
Foyle	52.8	Hitchin and Harpenden	-5.2
Strangford	52.8	Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney	-5.6
Birmingham Ladywood	52.7	Slough	-5.7
Manchester Central	52.7	Hackney North and Stoke Newington	-6.3
East Londonderry	51.9	Cambridgeshire North East	-8.7
Blackley and Broughton	51.6		
Stoke-on-Trent Central	51.3		

*10 largest increases and decreases in % turnout*

Thirsk and Malton\* +17.7

Note: the election in Thirsk and Malton was delayed in 2010 due to the death of one candidate and was therefore held after the general election.

## MARGINALITY

*10 largest and smallest % majorities*

Liverpool Walton	Lab	72.3
Knowsley	Lab	68.3
Liverpool West Derby	Lab	66.7
East Ham	Lab	65.5
Bootle	Lab	63.6
Birmingham Ladywood	Lab	60.9
Liverpool Wavertree	Lab	59.3
Manchester Gorton	Lab	57.3
Birmingham Hodge Hill	Lab	56.9
Walthamstow	Lab	55.5
[...]	N	
Bury North	Con	378 0.8
Brentford and Isleworth	Lab	465 0.8
Vale of Clwyd	Con	237 0.7
Ynys Mon	Lab	229 0.7
Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk	SNP	328 0.6
Ealing Central and Acton	Lab	274 0.5
Croydon Central	Con	165 0.3
Chester, City of	Lab	93 0.2
Derby North	Con	41 0.1
Gower	Con	27 0.1

## CONSERVATIVE

*10 largest rises and falls in % vote share*

Bromsgrove	+10.2
Hampstead and Kilburn	+9.6
Yeovil	+9.6
Hexham	+9.5
Brent Central	+9.2
Durham, City of	+9.0
Watford	+8.5
Somerset North East	+8.5
Richmond Park	+8.5
Somerton and Frome	+8.5
[...]	
Argyll and Bute	-9.1
Thanet South	-9.9
Cambridge	-9.9
Sheffield Hallam	-10.0
Dagenham and Rainham	-10.0
Edinburgh West	-10.9
Richmond (Yorks)	-11.4
Bradford East	-15.5

Bradford West	-15.9
Clacton	-16.4

*Note:* this excludes Buckingham, where the Speaker (a former Conservative) was seeking re-election.

*10 highest and lowest % vote share (GB)*

Hampshire North East	65.9
Maidenhead	65.8
Buckingham	64.5
Windsor	63.4
Beaconsfield	63.2
Chelsea and Fulham	63.0
Esher and Walton	62.9
Meon Valley	61.1
Newbury	61.0
Arundel and South Downs	60.8
[...]	
Knowsley	6.6
Liverpool West Derby	6.6
Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill	6.3
Ross, Skye and Lochaber	6.2
Glasgow Central	6.0
Glasgow East	6.0
Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey	5.9
Glasgow South West	5.0
Liverpool Walton	4.7
Glasgow North East	4.7

*Note:* this list excludes Buckingham, where the Speaker (a former Conservative) was seeking re-election. It also excludes Northern Ireland. The worst Conservative performances all came in Northern Ireland. They polled lower than in any seat in Great Britain in all but one of the 16 constituencies in which they stood, and below 1% in eight. They saved a deposit in just one (Strangford, where they polled 6.39%).

## LABOUR

*10 largest rises and falls in % vote share*

Birmingham Hall Green	+26.9
Brent Central	+20.9
Sheffield Hallam	+19.7
Poplar and Limehouse	+18.6

Bethnal Green and Bow	+18.3	Montgomeryshire	5.6
Birmingham Ladywood	+18.0	Westmorland and Lonsdale	5.4
Walthamstow	+17.0	Cornwall North	5.4
Manchester Gorton	+17.0	Berwickshire, Roxburgh and	
Hornsey and Wood Green	+16.9	Selkirk	4.9
Birmingham Hodge Hill	+16.4	Ross, Skye and Lochaber	4.9
[...]		Aberdeenshire West and	
Inverclyde	-25.7	Kincardine	4.5
Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and			
Kirkintilloch East	-27.2	LIBERAL DEMOCRATS	
Glasgow East	-29.2		
Motherwell and Wishaw	-29.2	<i>10 least and greatest falls in % vote share</i>	
Glasgow South West	-29.7	Dunbartonshire East	-2.4
Dunbartonshire West	-30.0	Edinburgh West	-2.8
Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath	-31.2	Gordon	-3.3
Glenrothes	-31.7	Argyll and Bute	-3.7
Coatbridge, Chryston and		Bradford East	-4.2
Bellshill	-32.7	Glasgow East	-4.3
Glasgow North East	-34.7	Cambridge	-4.3
		Na h-Eileanan an Iar	-4.6
<i>10 largest falls in % vote share (England</i>		Ynys Mon	-5.4
<i>and Wales)</i>		Glenrothes	-5.8
Wellingborough	-5.9	[...]	
Brigg and Goole	-5.9	Manchester Gorton	-28.4
Dorset South	-6.1	Glasgow North	-28.6
Tamworth	-6.6	Weston-Super-Mare	-28.8
Somerset North East	-6.8	Bristol West	-29.2
Hartlepool	-6.9	Edinburgh North and Leith	-29.3
Thanet South	-7.6	Edinburgh South	-30.3
Rochester and Strood	-8.7	Hereford and Herefordshire	
Chatham and Aylesford	-8.7	South	-30.5
Clacton	-10.7	Dunfermline and West Fife	-31.1
		Sheffield Central	-31.3
<i>10 highest and lowest % vote share</i>		Brent Central	-35.8
Liverpool Walton	81.3		
Knowsley	78.1	<i>Note: the Liberal Democrats lost vote share</i>	
East Ham	77.6	<i>in every seat, thus making a table listing</i>	
Liverpool West Derby	75.2	<i>rises and falls impossible.</i>	
Bootle	74.5		
Birmingham Ladywood	73.6	<i>10 highest and lowest % vote share</i>	
Liverpool Wavertree	69.3	Westmorland and Lonsdale	51.5
Garston and Halewood	69.1	Orkney and Shetland	41.4
Walthamstow	68.9	Sheffield Hallam	40.0
West Ham	68.4	Norfolk North	39.1
[...]		Eastbourne	38.2
Wells	6.6	Twickenham	38.0
Dorset Mid and Poole North	6.0	Thornbury and Yate	37.9
Gordon	5.9	Leeds North West	36.8
Banff and Buchan	5.8	Dunbartonshire East	36.3

Ross, Skye and Lochaber	35.9	<i>10 highest and lowest % vote share</i>	
[...]		Clacton	44.4
Rhondda	1.5	Boston and Skegness	33.8
Kilmarnock and Loudoun	1.5	Thanet South	32.4
Barking	1.3	Heywood and Middleton	32.2
Thurrock	1.3	Thurrock	31.7
Dudley North	1.3	Castle Point	31.2
Motherwell and Wishaw	1.3	Rochester and Strood	30.5
Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill	1.1	Rotherham	30.2
Glasgow South West	1.0	Dagenham and Rainham	29.9
Glasgow North East	0.8	Rother Valley	28.1
Glasgow East	0.8	[...]	
UKIP		Edinburgh East	1.9
		Edinburgh West	1.9
		Aberdeen South	1.9
		Aberdeenshire West and Kincardine	1.8
<i>10 largest rises and falls in % vote share</i>		Inverclyde	1.6
Heywood and Middleton	+29.6	Renfrewshire East	1.6
Thanet South	+26.9	Edinburgh North and Leith	1.5
Dagenham and Rainham	+26.3	Glasgow North	1.3
Boston and Skegness	+24.3	Edinburgh South	1.2
Thurrock	+24.3	Dunbartonshire East	1.0
Rotherham	+24.3		
Rother Valley	+22.5	<i>10 lowest % vote share (England and Wales)</i>	
Hartlepool	+21.0	Finchley and Golders Green	3.4
West Bromwich West	+20.9	Streatham	3.2
Doncaster Central	+20.7	Dulwich and West Norwood	3.1
[...]		Battersea	3.1
Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey	+0.9	Bristol West	3.0
East Lothian	+0.9	Vauxhall	2.9
Renfrewshire East	+0.8	Tooting	2.9
Rutherglen and Hamilton West	+0.8	Hampstead and Kilburn	2.8
Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath	+0.7	Hornsey and Wood Green	2.2
Falkirk	+0.5	Hackney North and Stoke Newington	2.2
Inverclyde	+0.5		
Ross, Skye and Lochaber	+0.1	GREENS	
Dunbartonshire East	-0.1		
Orkney and Shetland	-1.6		

*Note:* the table lists constituencies in which UKIP candidates stood in both 2010 and 2015. The following three constituencies saw even larger increases in vote share, but where no UKIP candidate stood in 2010: Clacton (+44.4); Castle Point (+31.2); Rochester and Strood (+30.5).

<i>10 largest rises and falls in % vote share</i>	
Bristol West	+23.1
Sheffield Central	+12.1
Isle of Wight	+12.1
Brighton Pavilion	+10.5
Holborn and St Pancras	+10.1
Hackney North and Stoke Newington	+10.0
Bath	+9.6





Edinburgh West	39.0	Dwyfor Meirionnydd	40.9
Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale	38.3	Carmarthen East and Dinefwr	38.4
Orkney and Shetland	37.8	Ynys Mon	30.5
Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk	36.6	Ceredigion	27.7
Edinburgh South	33.8	Rhondda	27.0
PLAID CYMRU		Llanelli	23.0
		Neath	18.1
		Cynon Valley	16.8
		Caerphilly	14.6
		[...]	
<i>10 largest rises and falls in % vote share</i>		Vale of Glamorgan	5.6
Rhondda	+8.9	Montgomeryshire	5.2
Arfon	+8.0	Cardiff Central	5.0
Cardiff West	+6.9	Delyn	4.8
Blaenau Gwent	+4.9	Cardiff North	4.5
Aberavon	+4.5	Brecon and Radnorshire	4.4
Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney	+4.4	Newport West	4.0
Ynys Mon	+4.3	Monmouth	4.0
Pontypridd	+4.2	Alyn and Deeside	3.9
Swansea East	+3.7	Newport East	3.5
Cardiff South and Penarth	+3.2		
[...]		INDEPENDENT	
Neath	-1.8		
Caerphilly	-2.1	<i>10 best Independent results</i>	
Islwyn	-2.3	North Down	49.2
Preseli Pembrokeshire	-3.0	Devon East	24.0
Montgomeryshire	-3.1	Fylde	11.9
Clwyd West	-3.2	Preseli Pembrokeshire	9.2
Cynon Valley	-3.5	Hartlepool	7.5
Dwyfor Meirionnydd	-3.5	Stoke-on-Trent Central	6.8
Aberconwy	-6.1	Richmond (Yorks)	6.2
Llanelli	-7.0	Maldon	5.1
		Dwyfor Meirionnydd	4.8
<i>10 highest and lowest % vote share</i>		Isle of Wight	4.6
Arfon	43.9		

Table A2.8 By-election results, 2010–15

	Date	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	UKIP	Best other	Other candidates (N)	Turnout
Oldham East and Saddleworth	13.1.11	12.8	42.1	31.9	5.8	BNP (4.5)	5	48.0
Barnsley Central	3.3.11	8.3	60.8	4.2	12.2	BNP (6.0)	4	37.0
Leicester South	5.5.11	15.1	57.8	22.5	2.9	MRL (1.6)	0	43.9
		(SF)	(SDLP)	(PBP)	(DUP)	N/A	0	37.4
Belfast West	9.6.11	70.6	13.5	7.6	6.1		0	45.4
Inverclyde	30.6.11	9.9	53.8	2.2	4.9	SNP (33.0)	0	28.7
Feltham and Heston	15.12.11	27.7	54.4	5.9	5.5	BNP (2.3)	4	50.8
Bradford West	29.3.12	8.4	25.0	4.6	3.3	Respect (55.9)	3	
<i>Respect gain at by-election</i>								
<i>Labour regain at 2015 general election</i>								
Cardiff South and Penarth	15.11.12	19.9	47.3	10.8	6.1	Plaid Cymru (9.5)	3	25.7
Corby	15.11.12	26.5	48.3	4.9	14.3	BNP (1.7)	9	44.8
<i>Labour gain at by-election</i>								
<i>Conservatives regain at 2015 general election</i>								
Manchester Central	15.11.12	4.5	69.1	9.4	4.5	Green (3.9)	7	18.2
Croydon North	29.11.12	16.8	64.7	3.5	5.7	Green (3.5)	7	26.4
Middlesbrough	29.11.12	6.3	60.5	9.9	11.8	Peace (6.3)	3	25.9
Rotherham	29.11.12	5.4	46.5	2.1	21.7	BNP (8.4)	6	33.8
Eastleigh	28.2.13	25.4	9.8	32.1	27.8	Independent (1.8)	9	52.7
<i>Conservatives gain at 2015 general election</i>								

	(SF)	(Ind)	(SDLP)			
Mid Ulster	7.3.13	34.4	17.4	-	Alliance (1.3)	0
South Shields	2.5.13	50.5	1.4	24.2	Independent (5.4)	4
Wythenshawe and Sale East	13.2.14	55.3	4.9	18.0	Green (3.1)	2
Newark	5.6.14	45.0	2.6	25.9	Independent (4.9)	6
Clacton	1.10.14	24.6	1.4	59.7	Green (1.9)	3
<i>UKIP gain at by-election</i>						
<i>UKIP hold at 2015 general election</i>						
Heywood and Middleton	9.10.14	12.3	5.1	38.7	Green (3.1)	0
Rochester and Strood	20.11.14	34.8	0.9	42.1	Green (4.2)	8
<i>UKIP gain at by-election</i>						
<i>Conservatives regain at 2015 general election</i>						

Note: winning party at the by-election in bold. All held by the incumbent party, in both by-election and then 2015 general election, unless indicated otherwise.

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