

Notes

1 Introduction

1. For instance, *Journal of Comparative Economics* 2/1983, special issue on women.
2. Tables of the percentages of employed men and women, divided by education or in age-groups, found in given wage-brackets, based on a survey of 310,000 households, sampling frame not reported.
3. There is, however, a loss of efficiency. That is, the expected values are the same as they would be with individual data, there is no systematic distortion, but random errors are larger.

2 Gender, Discrimination and Western Economic Theory

1. This survey spans a wide range of topics and cannot aim to be comprehensive. I refer to Blau and Ferber (1986), Humphries (1995a), Humphries and Rubery (1995) and Persson and Jonung (1997, 1998) for more extensive introductions to the economics of gender, and to Ferber and Nelson (1993) for feminist critiques of economic theories. The reader is also recommended the journal *Feminist Economics*, published since 1995. References to specific topics are interspersed in the text.
2. Excluding countries with extremely low female participation rates did not improve precision, nor did regressing the wage ratio on the participation and segregation measures simultaneously.
3. For hourly wage rates the difference was somewhat smaller than for annual earnings, but the trend similar.
4. Katz (1986), Himmelweit (1995).
5. In neoclassical economics what is sold by the employee is described as a quantity of labour, measured in hours of work. I consider more appropriate the Marxist view of the stylised employment contract, as a sale of the employee's labour power (capacity for work) for a certain period of time. This is more consistent with the form of most such contracts, and more fruitful, since it highlights the intrinsic conflict over intensity, forms and content of work.
6. Although it is rarely formally acknowledged, neoclassical microeconomics makes heavy use of metaphors. These are usually images of people as objects, or as treating themselves or each other as objects. Yet there is no *a priori* reason why atomistic market-exchange metaphors should describe outside-the-market behaviour better than metaphors from other social relations, such as gift-exchange or nurturing. (See Strassman, 1993, Klamer, McCloskey and Solow, 1988.)
7. Translated from the 3rd edition, 1928. This work, originally published as *Ocherki po teorii stoimosti Marksa*, probably remains the best exposition of the crucial concept of 'commodity fetishism' in Marxist political economy. Like

much of the best of the Marxist heritage, this was repressed and buried under decades of Stalinism.

8. Both approaches are 'individualist', in the sense of taking the individual as the unit of analysis. The traditional approach is also 'atomistic', that is, treats these individuals as disconnected from social interaction.
9. For a brief exposition, see Layard et al. (1991, chapter 3). For a discussion of how different versions of efficiency wage theory relate to neoclassical and critical economic theories, see Costabile (1995).
10. Akerlof (1982, p. 545) notes that the focus on effort in his article 'could also be expressed in Marxian terminology via the distinction between *labor power* and *labor*' (emphasis in the original). In my view, the emphasis on 'fair wages' and wage-dependent effort, on social conventions and worker/employer relations in Akerlof and Solow is in line with Marx's view of the wage as an historically constructed, socially defined subsistence, and, more generally, with the basic idea that wage labour should be analysed as a social relation. However, unlike Marx, they do not describe this in the context of a fundamental conflict between capital and labour. (See note 5 above.)
11. For instance, Layard et al. (1991, p. 156f) use one model where revenue is a function of effort, E , raised to a coefficient, α_i , which varies between jobs (indexed with i). Effort is specified as $E_i = (W_i - A)^\lambda$, where w_i is the wage and A is a constant. Applying the 'Solow condition' that $\frac{d \ln E_i}{d \ln W_i} = \frac{1}{\alpha_i}$ the wage is determined by $\frac{W_i - A}{W_i} = \alpha_i \lambda$ and hence varies over jobs even when workers have the same attributes. If, instead, we keep α constant over jobs, but let the effort function vary over groups of workers (with different reactions to wage rates, but otherwise equal) as $E_i = (W_i - A)^{\lambda_i}$ (where i is now a group index instead of a job index), the wage is determined by $\frac{W_i - A}{W_i} = \alpha \lambda_i$. Hence the efficiency wage varies with the sensitivity of effort to wage rates. If A is positive (Layard's specification [ibid., p. 156] implies it must be), the derivative of W with respect to λ is also positive. Hence, it is profitable for the employer to wage-discriminate if, hypothetically, men get more upset than women if their wages – absolute or relative to the other sex – are perceived as too low, and are more likely to reduce their effort, or if men hold more key positions where a slackening of effort affects profits more.
12. This concept was used to explain women's low wages by Millicent Fawcett at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was taken up and developed in the 1970s, most prominently by Barbara Bergmann.
13. Becker's model, which places power in the household in the hands of an 'altruistic household head', leads to similar conclusions and analogous criticisms apply.
14. This need not imply that he earns more, only that if her wage is higher, this difference is smaller than her advantage in non-market work.
15. For the United States, see Beller (1982) and Bergmann (1989).
16. Most prominently those by Catherine Hakim.
17. For white women the effect is significant, for black women it is not.
18. It is, of course, feasible that a more detailed classification of occupations would produce different results. A classification may, however, be too fine as well as

too broad. The same job could be labelled and paid differently according to the gender of the incumbent. Also, with the same qualifications and within the same field of activity, men might have easier access to positions with better promotion prospects.

19. The weak point of the argument is that the measure for 'job requirements' is the respondent's own estimate of how long it would take for a new employee to become fully qualified in the job.
20. Time in education is not included in 'time out of employment'.
21. Controlling for full-time/part-time changes and changes between 42 occupational categories.
22. Or, to be more precise, to increase the probability more for women than for men, in order to control for shifts in the overall occupational structure towards traditionally male-intensive occupations.
23. For a survey of literature and results up to the late 1980s, see Gundersson (1989).
24. They use a sub-sample from the National Longitudinal Studies of college graduates from the High School Class of 1972.
25. For the formal reasoning behind this, see Cain (1986) and Lundahl and Wadensjö (1984). As noted above (section 2.2), with above-productivity efficiency wages, discrimination need not mean competitive failure. It is possible to formulate conditions, also in a neoclassical framework, under which competition will not necessarily do away with discrimination, as in Becker (1993) and Goldberg (1982).
26. The occupational variables should, ideally, eliminate the effect of crowding, but in practice the occupational categories used had to be broad.
27. She defines 'male-dominated' as an occupation in which the proportion of males exceeds that in the overall civilian labour force by more than 5 per cent.
28. This social loss due to discrimination is noted by both feminist economists (e.g. Blau and Ferber, 1987) and Becker (1993).
29. '[S]elf-fulfilling prophecies have been shown to operate so as to confirm various social stereotypes. Expectancy effects have been implicated in the creation of apparent sex differences in behavior ...' (Darley and Fazio, 1980, p. 868).
30. Since this study is about gender differences, the rest of this chapter will focus on women. Obviously a lot of points about the effects of stereotyping and prejudice, about endogenous preferences, about 'cultural capital' and 'old boy networks' and about devaluation of work usually performed by a subordinate group, are relevant not only to gender, but also to race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and social class, but I will not explicitly deal with these, nor with the compounded impact on women in minority groups.
31. Inter-industry wage differentials could reflect unobserved differences in ability. Blackburn and Neumark (1992) find, however, that (net of standard 'human capital' factors) IQ and scores on a number of other psychological tests explain little of these wage differentials. These scores are not a perfect measure of ability, but should be positively correlated with it.
32. For an introduction to the gendering of jobs, see Cockburn (1988).
33. This notion has been dissected by critical economists from Veblen to Sen. For explicitly feminist criticisms, see Nelson, England and Strassman, in Ferber and Nelson (1993), Folbre (1994) and Grapard (1995).

34. Becker notes that 'specialized investments begin while boys and girls are young . . . prior to full knowledge of the biological orientation of children'. If most girls are, in his phrase, 'biologically oriented' (*sic!*) to household activities and most boys to market work, and if parents have to make choices before individual innate inclinations can show, it is optimal to train all little girls for 'non-market specialisation', but no little boys. But for the 'small fraction of girls [who] are biologically oriented to the market' or of boys 'biologically inclined to be househusbands, these 'investments' 'conflict with their biology' (Becker, 1991, p. 40). Becker sees a problem of information, but none of defining 'true preferences' (since inclinations are 'biological').
35. For an explanation of these terms and what the choice of such wage functions implies, the non-mathematical reader can consult the Appendix to this chapter.
36. Being married is usually positively correlated with wage for men, while for women the relation tends to be negative or insignificant. Korenman and Neumark (1992) emphasise the importance of the different effects marriage have on the wages of women and of men for the total gender gap.
37. The main idea can be understood informally from a fictitious example. (For simplicity we assume a linear wage function.) Suppose that the only difference between male and female workers we consider is that 15 per cent of men have technical-engineering degrees and 10 per cent of women. Assume also that male engineers receive 120 'monies' more than other men while female engineers get only 80 'monies' extra for being engineers.

We first divide the average difference in wages according to equation (2) (p. 40). The difference in number of male and female engineers times the wage premium for female engineers is $0.05 \times 80 = 4$. If as many women as men were engineers, the wage gap would be reduced by 4 monies. But there is also a difference due to the fact that the 15 per cent male engineers are paid $120 - 80 = 40$ monies more. On average this makes 6 monies due to preferential treatment of male engineers.

To follow equation (3) we multiply the difference in number of engineers by the wage premium that male engineers receive and get $120 \times 0.05 = 6$ monies which is how much less men would earn on average if as few men as women were engineers. The remainder of the wage gap is equal to the difference between the premia, $120 - 80$ monies times the number of female engineers, that is to say $40 \times 0.10 = 4$ monies due to discrimination of female engineers.

Thus, the total differential of 10 monies depends both on differences in characteristics and on discrimination. How much is ascribed to which depends on whether we believe that female engineers are paid too little or male are paid too much.

38. The arithmetic averages of the logarithms which are the logarithms of the geometric averages of the wages.
39. Some authors use this to define various measures of discrimination. Thus, the

unadjusted ratio $U_r = \frac{W_f}{W_m}$ where W_f and W_m are the average wages of women and men and the *adjusted ratio* $A_r = \frac{e^{b_f X_m}}{e^{b_m X_m}} = \frac{e^{b_f X_m}}{W_m}$ is equal to what men would get if they were paid like women, as a proportion of their actual wage; or what the female/male wage ratio would be if women were endowed like

men but paid as women are. These are used to define a measure, $G = \frac{1 - A_r}{1 - U_r}$ which can be interpreted as the proportion of the wage gap not attributable to endowments. (The notation follows Cain, 1986, p. 746. Cain, however, uses a linear, not a log-linear, wage equation and, thus defines $A_r = \frac{b_f X_m}{b_m X_m} = \frac{b_f X_m}{W_m}$.)

Another current indicator is the discrimination index $D_f = [e^{(b_m - b_f)X_f} - 1]$, or the percentage increase in pay that women would receive if they retained their present labour market characteristics but were paid according to the male wage function.

40. Of course, an analogous index problem arises with the measure described in note 39. One might equally well have used X_f as weights for the adjusted ratio.
41. When scalars (numbers) are used as weights as in equation (6), the same pair of weights – one for the ‘male’ and one for the ‘female’ – is used for every kind of parameter. With a matrix, as in equation (7), there is a special pair of weights corresponding to each variable.

42. $\Omega = (X^T X)^{-1} (X_m^T X_m)$ (I have changed the subscripts from w and b , for white and black, to m and f .)

$X^T X = X_m^T X_m + X_f^T X_f$ and $X^T Y = X_m^T Y_m + X_f^T Y_f$. Hence with this choice of Ω :

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_* &= \Omega \beta_m + (I - \Omega) \beta_f \\ &= (X^T X)^{-1} (X_m^T X_m) (X_m^T X_m)^{-1} (X_m^T Y_m) + (X^T X)^{-1} (X_f^T X_f) (X_f^T X_f)^{-1} (X_f^T Y_f) \\ &= (X^T X)^{-1} (X^T Y), \end{aligned}$$

where $(X^T X)^{-1} (X^T Y)$ is the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator for β on the pooled sample.

43. Formally, the utility function is assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero in the number of male and female workers for each category.
44. This effect would operate even with a textbook kind of market. It is all the stronger because the labour market is very far from the ideal type market of the textbooks.
45. I will omit a discussion of this method, since it is not used in the following empirical analysis. The same applies to Butler’s (1982) attempt to separate the effects of demand and supply factors in the formation of male and female wages and to the method of ‘reverse regression’ (Cain, 1986, Slotte et al., 1994). For summaries, see Katz, (1994).
46. The total ‘discrimination term’ does not change.
47. They estimate a joint semi-logarithmic wage equation for men and women with a dummy variable for sex.
48. If it is correlated with gender, however, we are back to square one. In the standard models a coefficient for gender tells us that something about being female, something which is not controlled for in the model, results in lower wages. In the individual-specific effect models, we find that some individual characteristic correlated with gender results in lower wages for individuals who are female. In neither case does this tell us whether to describe this ‘something’ as productivity or as being discriminated. If the assumption of no correlation is correct, then the OLS estimator is not biased, only inefficient, and it is surprising that with a relatively large sample, the difference it makes to their estimates is so large.
49. The simultaneous two equation model of Gronau (1988) showed a significant effect of low wages on labour force separations, while the ‘negative effect of

separations on wages seems to be an artefact created by the negative effect of wages on separations' (ibid., p. 285). According to Bergmann (1989), with equal earnings, men and women have almost equal quit rates.

3 Soviet Wages and Salaries

1. I have used Rofe et al. (1991) (a manual for trade union officials, published by Profizdat) and the *Short Economic Dictionary (Kratkii ekonomicheskii slovar'*, 1989) henceforth *Kratkii ...*, published by Politizdat. The number of articles drawn on multiplied in the course of the work, but nevertheless, this survey does not pretend to be comprehensive.
2. I am indebted to Ludmila Nivorozhkina, Lidia Prokofeva, Natalia Rimashevskaiia, Leonid Kunel'skii, Ludmila Rzhaniitsyna, Yuri Kokin and the late Marina Mozhina for patiently answering a great number of questions. They are, of course, not responsible for any remaining errors.
3. Furthermore, students could 'influence' their assignment by bribes or through 'friends' on the assignment commission, by getting a manager to ask for them to be assigned to his or her enterprise or by marrying someone in the place where they wanted to live. In the emigrant survey used by DiFranceisco and Gitelman, respondents were asked what a graduate should do if assigned a job in a remote area – 20 per cent would use bribes, 38 per cent 'connections' and only 21 per cent passively accept the decision! Graduates from technical vocational schools were given two-year assignments, but these appear to have been even less strictly enforced (Granick, 1987).
4. Big 'mobilisations of volunteers' lost importance after the 1950s. Labour allocation agencies as the Orgnabor or the Job Placement Bureaux and 'Komsomol appeals' accounted for a few percent each of hirings (Oxenstierna, 1990), but people were not obliged to accept the jobs they offered.
5. About trade unions as protectors of individual rights, see Godson, (1981) and Ruble, (1979). Victimisation of dissident workers is documented in Haynes and Semionova (1979) and for the wave of illegal industrial action of the early 1960s, see Holubenko (1975).
6. An earlier study, by Mary McAuley, found 52 per cent were reinstated in 1967.
7. Further (older) references in Granick (1987, p. 288).
8. The decile ratio (the ratio of the incomes/earnings of the two individuals who make up the bottom line of the top 10 per cent and the top of the bottom 10 per cent) is a crude indicator of income dispersion, but it was often used in Soviet and East European literature and requires less data than more sophisticated measures. For an East/West comparison it probably matters which measure of differentiation is chosen. The decile ratio does not take into account the extreme tails of the distribution, if these are smaller than 10 per cent. I suspect that the difference between the top 1–2 per cent and the rest of the population is larger in the Western market economies than it was in the USSR. (Certainly, if income from capital is included). In that case, the decile ratio would make the country look more inegalitarian compared with, say, the United States or the United Kingdom, than a Gini coefficient or Lorenz curve would.
9. First, regional differences cannot be taken into account. Second, the ministries, the central planning organs, the most prestigious academic

institutes, the top officials in the party and government, the most celebrated artists, are found in Moscow, Leningrad and the republican capitals, those next in rank live there or in regional (*oblast'*) capitals (which Taganrog is not). Third, being so dominated by heavy industry, Taganrog has an under-representation of the lower paid light industry, service or social sector jobs.

10. Chapman writes, in 1988, that 2 million workers had been made redundant as a result of the reform and a further 300,000 vacant positions had been eliminated. 1.6 million employees found other jobs, half of them in the same enterprise; 400,000 went into retirement.
11. Thus it was still possible in 1989 to use – with some caution – sources such as Kirsch (1972) and McAuley (1979).
12. Each new minimum was introduced sector by sector, and the sources differ as to when they prevailed in the whole economy (see Katz, 1994, p. 97).
13. See, however, Chapman (1983) on the difficulties of inferring from the available data what really happened in the 1968–76 period.
14. If this is not obvious, imagine an economy with three men, all working and with an average wage of 100, and three women, one of whom earns 80, and one the minimum wage of 40 and one is not employed. The female/male wage ratio is 60 per cent. An increase in minimum wage induces the third woman to join the labour force. If the new minimum is more than 50 the female/male average ratio increases, if it is less than 50 it falls. (Assuming the third woman earns the minimum.)
15. Rules regulating use of the Wage Fund were altered a number of times. For more detail, see Kirsch (1972, chapter 7), Oxenstierna (1990, section 3.5), *Kratkii ...*, (1989, p. 75f and 235ff) and Chapman (1988). Further, a number of experiments were carried out with individual enterprises. The best known is that of Shchekino, where management was allowed to use a part of savings from the Wage Fund made through reduction in staff numbers to increase the pay of the remaining workforce. (Among the literature on Shchekino, see Arnot, 1988.)
16. Transport and construction will not be discussed separately here, since their pay systems were very similar to that in industry.
17. English does not have corresponding terminology for these distinctions. 'Rabochii' corresponds to the French 'ouvrier', Spanish 'obrero' or Scandinavian 'arbetare' (or would, if it includes MOP), 'rabotnik' to 'travailleur', 'trabajador' or 'anställd', and 'slushashchii' to 'employé' or 'tjänsteman'.
18. 'Light industry' in Soviet terminology includes textiles, garments and leather, fur and shoe production. According to a table of industrial employment (*Trud v SSSR*, 1988, p. 50) these three sub-sectors make up 99.5 per cent of the 'production staff' of light industry. (Note that the distinction between 'light' and 'heavy' industry is not the same as between production of capital goods (means of production) and consumer goods (means of consumption).)
19. Some of the least skilled (MOP) and most skilled workers had monthly wages.
20. For the proportion of blue-collar wages paid as piece- and time-rates, see Katz (1994, p. 108), in different branches, *Trud v SSSR* (1988, pp. 215–20). For a full list of forms of payment in industry, see Rofe et al. (1991).
21. See *Trud v SSSR* (1988, p. 139) for the percentages receiving these benefits in industry and construction.

22. Quoted by Kirsch (1972, p. 56). For examples, see *ibid.* and Filtzer (1989).
23. See, for instance, Malle (1987, p. 363), Oxenstierna (1990, pp. 124f), Rofe et al. (1991, p. 107f), *Kratkii ...* (1989, p. 321).
24. Which includes the greater part of military production.
25. There are two kinds of day-care institutions for pre-school children, '*iasly*' for the smaller ones and '*detskie sady*' for the older. I use 'nurseries' and 'kindergartens' to distinguish them.
26. Cf. Chapman (1978).
27. For the education of women and men in each sector, see 1989 Census, vol. X, table 3 (diagram in Katz, 1994, p. 130f).
28. For reasons of space, I will not describe the pension system here. The reader is referred to McAuley (1981) or Katz (1994).
29. 'Tremendous' in comparison to the lives of ordinary Soviet citizens and in relation to what they admitted to having, but compared with the equivalent top few of Western countries, the luxuries of the Brezhnevite *vieillesse dorée* were probably not only less conspicuous but less sumptuous.
30. In the nurseries subsidised by enterprises, staff wages were still paid by the government but the enterprise paid for the premises, toys and other equipment and for better food.
31. *Vedomstvemaia zhilaia ploshchad'*. This includes hostels, but hostels made up less than 3 per cent of the housing stock (Pavlichenko, 1992, p. 90).
32. The survey was carried out by the All-Union Centre for the Study of Public Opinion, with 1,913 respondents in six republics. It is said to be 'representative of the employed population of the USSR with regard to sex, age, and spheres of employment ...' (Kupriianova and Kosmarskii, 1991, p. 61).
33. Quoted in *Vestnik Statistiki* 1/90, p. 45, without source or information about the sampling.
34. The interesting subject of extra benefits for those employed in the military-industrial complex is further obscured by the fact that most military production was hidden under other headings, mainly 'machine-building', which also included civilian industries.
35. Some of those on low incomes were pensioners, but some were 'workers in unprestigious occupations and low-skilled work, who were thus doubly disadvantaged' (Rimashevskaiia and Onikov, 1991, p. 16f).
36. See Arnot (1988, pp. 72–5) for references to Soviet accounts.
37. Jacoby (1975) describes how widespread this 'far from illegal' phenomenon was and comments that it was probably quite well accepted by both party officials and higher level educators since it benefited their children.
38. Income from subsidiary agriculture (gardens, allotments or 'private plots') and from renting housing, although legal and important, are not included here.
39. The female/male ratio for hourly earnings in private work was 0.73 as compared with 0.63 in the state sector, but this is a selection effect, not an indication of greater equality in the private sector. For those men and women who did private work, the wage ratio in the state sector was 0.90. Hence male/female wage differences were reinforced by private sector activities.
40. It is larger than in the Taganrog sample, but the number of respondents doing private work in this data set is too small for a reliable analysis. What little information can be found is reported in Katz (1994).

41. The Tbilisi Medical Institute was an extreme case (as is shown by the fact that its rector and some members of staff were actually convicted in 1975). Of 200 entrants in 1967, 170 were found to have been admitted illegally. 500,000 roubles (286 times the average yearly wage!) were confiscated from the arrested members of staff who had been bribed to admit 29 students (Dobson, 1988, p. 46).
42. No source or information on sampling is given.
43. 1,161 people who had left the USSR in 1977–80, interviewed in Israel, Germany and the United States. For more information on the sampling see DiFranceisco and Gitelman (1984). Their article also contains examples of corrupt practices, described by their respondents.
44. The figures are taken from a table of incomes of the 'shadow economy', which is said to be estimated from 'data from mass statistics, sociological investigations, materials from research on household budgets and estimates by experts of the minimal size of incomes' (*Nar. Khoz. v 1990 g.*, p. 50). The same figures are presented in Gur'ev and Zaitseva (1990, p. 29). According to them, 'illegal additions to income for staff' in trade, catering, housing and municipal services, etc. totalled 15 billion roubles, that is an average of 1,000 roubles per person per year, but there is little information on how this estimate was arrived at. See also Gorianovskii (1990).
45. Cherednichenko and Shubkin (1985), Babushkina and Shubkin (1986). For an English-language source, see Yanowitch and Dodge (1969). See further chapter 6, section 6.3.2.2, below.
46. G. Bel'skaia, quoted and translated in Buckley (1981, p. 92).
47. See Schwartz Rosenhan (1977), Liljeström (1993) and Atwood (1991).
48. '... a weak husband loathes his strong wife ... [but] a strong wife loathes with the same cruelty the weak husband ... She wants to be weak! And in the end we see that the ideal variant of family relations is a strong husband and a weak wife' (L. Zhukovskii in *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 10/1984, quoted in Liljeström, 1993). In the popular 'thaw period' film 'Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears', a professionally successful single mother carefully hides from her lover that she has higher pay and status than he – and he has a fit of hysterical rage when he finds out.
49. Soviet writers made this point early, for instance the sociologist G. M. Kochetov, quoted in Yanowitch and Dodge (1969).

4 Women and Men in Taganrog and in the USSR

1. Topics included incomes, employment, consumption, health, leisure and cultural activities and time-use. A series of studies were undertaken by researchers from the Central Mathematical-Economic Institute headed by Professor Natalia Rimashevskaiia. At about the same time, other studies were carried out in Taganrog, such as those by Gordon and Klopov on time-use, and by Grushev on leisure activities.
2. When the later studies were done, Rimashevskaiia was Director of the newly founded Institute for Socio-Economic Population Studies, to which most of her Taganrog team had also moved.
3. It had been designed by Professor Ludmila Nivorozhkina and by two feminist scholars, Anastasia Posadskaiia and Natalia Zakharova.

4. In 1989, 7 per cent of the adult population of Taganrog lived in hostels. Unpublished census figures from the Rostov *oblast'* statistical office.
5. Of the 58 individuals whose sex we don't know, 40 are children under 18.
6. Since the term 'wage function', explained in section 2.6.1, may feel unfamiliar to the non-economist, I use 'wage structure' instead to denote the relationship between individual wages and various wage determinants.
7. Aged 9–49. Among the urban population of this age, nearly 50 per cent of women and 70 per cent of men were literate in 1897 (Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR 1922–82).
8. Eleven in 1958–66. (see Swafford, 1979, Marnie, 1986).
9. SSUZ have several different names in English. Many translate it as 'specialised secondary schools', some use the current Russian term 'tekhnikum' or anglicise it as 'technical college'. Granick (1987) calls them 'junior colleges', Ofer and Vinokur (1992) 'secondary vocational (professional) schools and McAuley (1981) 'secondary semi-professional schools' or 'professional training institutions'.
10. I follow Soviet usage, according to which 'higher education' is at university level.
11. The proportions of women students in SSUZ and VUZ were published but not in the male-dominated PTU.
12. As usual no comparison with men is reported in the sources. Even when information on the situation of women is published, there is hardly ever a critical investigation of both male and female roles. For a rare exception, see Posadskaia and Zakharova (1992) and Posadskaia (1992).
13. Tables of education of men and women aged 10+ in Taganrog (sample and census data, are available from the author and in Katz, 1994, p. 173).
14. The parasitism laws applied only after a few months of non-employment. (Four according to Godson, 1981, p. 117, three according to Oxenstierna, 1990, p. 223. There may have been a change in legislation between the times of publication of these sources.)
15. Defined as the percentage of women who have higher, incomplete higher or specialised secondary education (see p. 87).
16. Technically, they use a logit model for participation and an OLS estimate for hours worked.
17. It is not clear from the text how large the sample was, nor, of course, the sub-samples of mothers of pre-school children or of non-employed women. Hence it is impossible to tell if the differences are significant.
18. Since selection of respondents favoured the employed, figures concerning rates of employment are for all household members.
19. Most of this section is based on Terebilova (1981).
20. It is not clear how many hours per week this comes to. Preceding paragraphs in the Labour Code defined working time in dangerous jobs as '6 hours per day or 36 per week', '5 hours per day or 30 per week', etc. In other words, they assume a six-day week, even though the same law stipulates a normal working week of five days! For teaching staff only hours per week are given and for health sector staff 'hours per day'. Probably the hours per day should be multiplied by six.
21. Co-operatives had been legalised by Gorbachev. At this time, they were better described as small businesses than as traditional worker co-operatives.

22. Since it is impossible to know whether teachers report their teaching hours or their total hours of work, respondents working in the education sector have been excluded in the calculations in this section.
23. Unfortunately, the coding of the answers makes it impossible to distinguish a non-answer ('don't know') from a zero answer ('no overtime').
24. In 1990, the annual official publication '*Zhenshchiny v SSSR*' ('Women in the USSR'), suddenly, and without giving any reasons, declared that homeworking and part-time work are 'the most suitable forms' of work for women with children.
25. Hence, without loss of pension rights or benefits.
26. Personal communication from Iraida Manikyna, Goskomstat.
27. For more detail on household composition, see Katz (1994).
28. Personal communication from Neli Pavlova, ISEPS.
29. The data were collected in one or a few cities per country. The Soviet data are from the Russian town Pskov and the Polish data from Torun.
30. Respondents were asked 'how many hours did you spend doing x?', which is to invite errors of recall. To weed out the worst measurement errors, observations for which the answers accounted for less than 20 hours of the previous working day have been excluded (6 per cent of respondents).
31. The problems with using 'working day' and 'day off' values are discussed below.
32. Compare p. 95, above.
33. Not controlling for the number of children, which may be lower in the second group. Swedish full-time employed mothers of young children also spend more time on housework if they are married than if they are single (SCB, 1992).
34. Their source is the so-called March census 1989.
35. These calculations were based on Newcity (1986) and took into account income tax and so-called bachelor's taxes. They are described in Katz (1994).
36. Average hours of work per week and hourly wage rates for female and male respondents in each sector are reported in Katz (1994).

5 The Wages of Soviet Women and Men

1. In the following, if nothing else is indicated, 'significant' is taken to mean at the 5 per cent level.
2. The significant differences are for agecube and pens for women. Since they change in opposite directions their combined effect in the two sub-samples is very similar.
3. Using the term ESS for the sum of squares of unexplained residuals and the subscripts a, r and nr to denote all observations, respondents and non-respondents, k for number of parameters, N for number of observations we have

$$F(k, N_a - 2k) = \frac{\frac{ESS_a - ESS_r - ESS_{nr}}{k}}{\frac{ESS_r + ESS_{nr}}{N_a - 2k}}$$

For men we get $F = 0.56$ and for women $F = 1.06$, both of which are well below the critical point for significance at the 5 per cent level at 1.6.

4. See appendix to Chapter 2.
5. As noted in chapter 4, wage data from the Taganrog survey are taken to be after-tax, unless otherwise stated. For imputed pre-tax wages, the female/male ratio is 64 per cent.
6. The ratio of 66 per cent for monthly wages was calculated for all household members, whereas we have information on working hours and, thus, on hourly wage rates only, for the main respondents. Among respondents monthly wages were slightly higher, but the female/male ratio was the same.
7. According to Table 4.12, average wages in the sample were low compared to national statistics, precisely in the sectors where bonuses are most important. This suggests that few respondents did include yearly and quarterly bonuses.
8. An attempt to approximate 'real' work experience by subtracting one year per child did not increase either the precision of the parameter or R^2 for the regression for women. (It did, very, very slightly for men!)
9. Coding involved finding the original questionnaires to compare data on hours and pay with the uncoded job title for approximately 60 individuals who stated that they worked 'not a full week' or 'not a full day'. Usually, classification was relatively straightforward, but in a few cases the guess was difficult. I am grateful to Ludmila Nivorozhkina who did this with me and supplied the necessary knowledge and '*fingerspitzengefühl*'. For those who stated that they worked 'a full working week' with usual hours of 39 or less 'short' was automatically set to one.
10. To include hours of work in the wage equation could involve an endogeneity problem. In that case, hours and wages ought to be estimated simultaneously. In this study, however, the wage equations estimated are not interpreted as models of individual choice, but as instruments to describe and investigate statistical relations. The relative inflexibility of hours of work in the Soviet context, given occupation, also weakens the influence of earnings on choice of working hours, compared to market economies.
11. For convenience, I will speak of qual4 as 'non-managerial white collar', even though among those not included in it are highly qualified employees who are not 'managers' (qual6).
12. The precision of a parameter is the probability that random variation would have made the estimate at least as large as it is, in the event that there was in fact no underlying relation. (It is, in unstatistical language, 'the level at which the estimate is significant'.)
13. See the appendix to Chapter 2.
14. These partial derivatives of hourly wage with respect to age take into account all three age terms.
15. The Pearson coefficients are 0.9 for age/*stazh*, 0.6 for age/seniority and 0.7 for seniority/*stazh*. (Of course, the observations with imputed values for *stazh* were not used in these calculations. See p. 150.)
16. 'Retirement age' here means 60 for men and 55 for women. Respondents who had retired earlier and started a new job between that and the usual retirement age cannot be identified in the data set.
17. This change in the model induced only minuscule changes in other parameters.
18. The parameters for 'administration' and 'health-care' also change, but are based on very few observations.

19. The word 'explained' is not really appropriate, first, since the difference in variable means themselves need to be explained and, second, because we have shown correlation, not causality.
20. These percentages are $[1 - \exp(D_i)] \times 100$, $i = f, m$, where D_m and D_f are the discrimination terms from equations (1) and (2) in section 2.6.2.1.
21. This is a minor problem for the predicted average male wage, since only one man in seven or eight worked in these sectors. It has a greater impact when we apply these coefficients to women, nearly a third of whom worked in the socio-cultural sphere.
22. Although the industrio-physiocratic Soviet usage of the terms 'productive' and 'non-productive' puzzles a reader of Marx, it does have familiar ring to those who have heard present-day economists proclaim that public sector services are a burden on the 'real' productive economy.
23. If the share of the workforce of the sector with a given level of education is N and the shares among men and women are N_m and N_f , respectively, the proportion of women in the sector is $\frac{N - N_m}{N_f - N_m}$. Since the N 's are given as (integer) number per 1,000 the numerator and denominator each has a maximal absolute rounding error of 1. The proportion of women is calculated as the ratio of two differences, both of which include a rounding error and both of which are usually small. Hence, the relative error in the quotient can be substantial. To reduce this error, the proportion reported here is calculated, using figures for the type of education in which, for this particular sector, the male/female difference is largest, and for which the expected value of the relative error should therefore be smallest. In most cases this choice is equal to the median of the seven proportions calculated for the sector, or differs from it by less than 1 percentage point. In no case is it more than 3 percentage points different from the median.
24. For branches of industry I did not have employment figures for 1989. Instead I used the numbers for 1987, scaled down by the 5 per cent decrease in overall industrial employment from 1987 to 1989.
25. Ideally, one would have wanted a variable for 'core' priority sectors, but since data were not published for mining or for nuclear or other power production and data for military industry were 'hidden' among those for broader branches, this did not succeed.
26. Half the interviews were done in March, and a further 45 per cent in April. If among those who received bonuses, the proportion who did so in March was p , and in February $(1-p)$, then the chance that the bonus would be in the month that the interview referred to is $(0.5-0.05p)$. In the judgement of Professor Nivorozhkina, who led the survey, because of the crisis of military industry, in 1989 those enterprises postponed the payment of yearly bonuses and were unlikely to have paid any in February.
27. Wage and monthly bonus for the preceding month plus a third of the latest quarterly and a twelfth of the latest yearly bonus.
28. These 45 per cent were intended to simulate the approximately 45 per cent of respondents in 'Obraz' receiving a yearly bonus who could have included it in the wage they reported. (The selection was done through a random mechanism.) The equations included first- and second-order terms for age, experience and seniority and distinguished nine levels of education, four job

types and eleven branches. They were estimated separately for men and women.

29. For the models where a normal distribution of residuals is not rejected, we can divide parameters into four 'probability value classes'. (Those significant at 1 per cent, those significant at 5 per cent, but not at 1 per cent, those significant at 10 per cent but not at 5 per cent and, finally, those that are not significant even at 10 per cent). For the models for which normality is rejected we can still calculate the probability values that the t-values would have implied if we did have a normal distribution of residuals. It turns out that almost every parameter is in the same probability value class in both types of models and in no case is the difference more than one step.

6 Pay and Education

1. Nevertheless, as noted in chapter 3, several Western studies of earnings and income differentiation in post-war USSR did not find them strikingly small, compared to Western Europe. (For references, see section 3.1.4.)
2. See section 4.3.2 for a description of the Soviet system of education.
3. V. A. Zhamin and G. A. Egiazarian, *Effektivnost' Kvalifitsirovannogo Truda* (Moscow, Ekonomika, 1968). I have not been able to consult this source in the original.
4. In 1982, 98.5 per cent of eighth-graders acquired some form of full secondary education (Marnie, 1986, n. 4).
5. *Nar. Kh.* (1982 p. 370), *Nar. Kh.* (1989, p. 76), McAuley (1981, p. 87).
6. There are many attempts to model maximising behaviour on the part of the Soviet enterprise. I will not go into this, partly because I share Alec Nove's doubts (1977, p. 95f) of its usefulness for empirical analysis. See, however, Oxenstierna's formal deduction of labour demand under various bonus regimes – as she notes, they help clarify the intentions imbedded in the bonus schemes even if they do not explain the actual behaviour of Soviet management. (1990, p. 181).
7. This section is mainly intended for readers interested in the econometric aspects.
8. Active party membership, however, had a significant positive parameter in an estimate of female monthly wages and probability values below 20 per cent for male wages and hourly female wages. Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) emphasise the positive wage coefficients they find for active regime loyalty, but the direction of causality is not clear – people may have got better jobs because they were active in the Party or they may have had to become active in the Party because this was expected of them when they got the job.
9. Average wages by educational group, for all household members, are reported in Table 4.14. For quartiles, geometric means and confidence intervals, see Katz (1994).
10. The procedure was repeated with a model including education and age only. Again, equality was not rejected at conventional levels and most education coefficients differ by only 1–2 percentage points between the sub-samples.
11. Ofer and Vinokur (1992) find that a postgraduate education results in wage increases, per year of study, of about a dozen percentage points more than those for undergraduate university studies. The Taganrog data do not

distinguish between different levels of university training. However, the sample of emigrants is largely metropolitan and highly educated, and must have had much higher frequency of advanced degrees than a provincial town like Taganrog.

12. There are only five female respondents with 'PTU2'. They all have unskilled manual jobs and three work very few hours per week. At least two are cleaners and one is a pensioner. The coefficient for PTU2 is highly influenced by these few individuals whose hourly earnings are likely to be atypical. (Note the coefficients for PTU1 and PTU2 in Table 6.6.)
13. The model was also run with seniority restricted to be uniform, but *stazh* divided, and vice versa. In the first case, both *stazh1* and *stazh3* have probability values below 6 per cent and are over 1 per cent in size. In the second, *senior1* increases to 1 per cent and is significant. (The whole procedure was repeated, starting from Model J. The results were very similar.)
14. These models are reported only in order to allow the reader to check the step-by-step transformation from Model E to Model H. The main result is, as was to be expected, that age variables lose somewhat in precision and the wage impact of levels of education that are common among pensioners is seen as less negative.
15. This is even despite the small group of women with 'unofficial part-time' work who inflate the hourly wage rates connected with unskilled blue-collar work.
16. The low precision of the parameters (probably due to the smallness of the sample) makes these conclusions very tentative.
17. Assuming, of course, that differentiation corresponded to productivity – there were Soviet criticisms of sector differentials not based on skill or schooling. (For example, Rimashevskaja and Onikov, 1991.)
18. Aage (1984) notes that this is generally assumed, though 'difficult to document'.
19. He therefore used pre-war wage rates instead.
20. Those 'seconded' were paid at the rates for their normal jobs, not those for the ones they were seconded to.
21. Survey data from Rutkevich (1984) are reproduced in Katz (1994, pp. 338–9): Swafford (1979) reports destination of year 8 graduates in 1980 from another Soviet survey. His figures are similar, except that only just over 20 per cent enter PTU. Neither source includes information on sampling.
22. S. A. Belanovskii (1988) *Faktory effektivnosti upravlencheskogo truda v promyshlennosti*. The study is based on a survey of 200 industrial enterprises. I have not been able to consult this source in the original and have no information about the sex composition of the sample or of responses.
23. For non-specialists holding specialist jobs in industry, see Gloeckner (1986).
24. Years in the occupation was checked against the ages of their children.
25. '... the medical profession was opened to women and adapted to their needs; the rate of pay was reduced accordingly,' write Ofer and Vinokur (1992).
26. Earnings were somewhat increased to make the profession at all attractive to men. According to several sources, men also needed to do less well in entrance exams to enter medical schools (Dobson, 1978, p. 286f, Dodge, 1966, pp. 113, 116f). In SOU 1938(!): 47, (p. 239), the economist Karin Kock, mentions a regulation aiming to increase the proportion of male medical students in

- 'Russia'. In 1960, 76 per cent of Soviet doctors were women, in 1988, 65 per cent, not much above the 1940 figure of 62 per cent.
27. Formally, the test was of the restriction that the wage effect of being a white-collar worker did not vary with education. Rejection of equality means that this simplifying assumption is not justified.

7 Taganrog post-USSR: Patriarchy, Poverty, Perspectives

1. For an introduction to the Russian art of survival, see Alashev and Kiblitkaya (1996). People survive in the sense that there is no mass famine. Health and life expectancy however, have declined drastically.
2. This is important because of what it reveals about voters' attitudes to women and power. The loss of these Soviet female deputies in itself did not make much difference.
3. As before, full compensation is paid no longer than 10 weeks after the birth. From then, until the child is 18 months there is a low, flat-rate benefit and from 18 months to three years none at all (except the universal, very meagre child benefit).
4. In Roshin's and Roshina's (1994) small survey of Moscow managers and businessmen, the majority of the male respondents wanted their wives to devote themselves to the household full-time.
5. According to the official statistics, there were nearly 650 alcohol-related deaths per million of the male population in 1995, which is four times as much as among women (and more than three times the rate in 1990) (*Rossiiskii ...*, 1996, p. 58).
6. The 1989 sample of all household members is also a probability sample, while the sub-sample of 'main respondents' was not. (See pp. 84 and 121.)
7. Tax evasion in Russia is generally believed to be quite widespread. Rimashevskaja (ed., 1998, p. 128) quotes unnamed 'experts' working for the tax authorities according to whom about 20 million Russians have declared supplementary work and an equal number work without declaring it.
8. The exceptions are booklets (*Zhenshchiny i muzhchiny Rossii*, 1997, 1999), produced in co-operation with *Statistics Sweden*. The 1997 edition includes examples of female/male wage ratios in professions and sectors and the 1999 one the ratios in all major sectors of the economy and several branches of industry.
9. See also the studies cited in the following and the RLMS web-site http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/rlms_home.html. and that of the University of Warwick: <http://www.csv.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/complabstuds/russia/rus-sint.htm>.
10. In international statistics this usually means 15–72 years.
11. But nearly 5 per cent of the employed women are on leave.
12. The data are census data 1989 are of employment. Since there was no open and little hidden unemployment in urban Russia, I have equated employment and participation. From 1992 Goskomstat applied the international standard.
13. *Rossiiskii ...* (1999, pp. 107 and 116–17).
14. These figures are calculated from *Rossiiskii ...* (1999). In this edition the figures for earlier years had been revised compared to previous yearbooks, some numbers by more than 2 million people. This explains some of the

inconsistencies in earlier publications but does not increase confidence in the statistics.

15. Clarke (1999b), based on LFS data.
16. Taganrog respondents define their 'main occupation' themselves and their definitions are unlikely to be exactly those of the statistical authorities. I have considered as employed those who either define themselves as 'working', 'working pensioner' or 'on maternity leave' or have reported earnings from the preceding month. In 1989 'labour force participant' is the same as 'employed', in 1993/94 it is employed or self-defined unemployed. Except in the 15–19 age group where the non-sampling of conscripts and hostel-dwellers creates a problem (see section 4.2) and near or over pension age where employment rates in Taganrog appear to have been above average the numbers are close. The figures are reported in table form in Katz (2001), with standard deviations and numbers of observations in sample cohorts.
17. Significantly at 5 per cent.
18. In the 30–49 age group the difference from the national rates becomes less than 1 percentage point. On the other hand, those who did 'work for pay or profit' but did not receive the payment due should have been included. Thus, if we had been able to follow the Goskomstat definition exactly, the Taganrog rate would have been lower than the ones in Figure A7.2 but less than 3 percentage points lower.
19. 1.2 in 1998 (*Rossiiskii ...*, 1999).
20. For reasons of space, I refer to Lissyutkina (1993), Bodrova (1994), Ashwin and Bowers, (1997) for different points of view.
21. Because of the oversampling of women in 1989 it is not meaningful to report totals.
22. *Zhenshchiny i muzhchiny* (1997) reported much higher figures for 1996 but a similar gender proportion. Foley (1997b) finds that just under 3 per cent of employed respondents in 1995 and 1996 were self-employed.
23. The percentages of those with any labour income or of self-defined working are the same.
24. This average may conceal large regional differences. Roshin (1995) finds a frequency of secondary employment of 18 per cent in Ivanovo, and 9 per cent in Nizhniy Novgorod.
25. Rimashevskaya (ed., 1998, pp. 121–36) provides a useful discussion of the different estimates of the share of the population with secondary earnings and the different definitions.
26. Calculated from *Trud ...* (1999, pp. 37, 118 and 145).
27. Rzhaniysyna (1993, p. 16) and Bodrova (1994, p. 41), however, emphasised the risks of unemployment of the least qualified manual workers.
28. Technically, these are uncompleted (right-censored) unemployment spells.
29. These are very small sub-samples so the figures should be taken with caution. For some individuals there could be a difference between employment status at the time of the interview and the previous month.
30. Khibovskaya (1995a, p. 39) finds that among the unemployed in VTsIOM samples more women (65 per cent) than men (48 per cent) would prefer lower income with more security to higher income and less security.
31. The rate is calculated as number unemployed divided by the sum of those working, unemployed and on maternity leave.

32. Estimates included respondents aged 18–pension age. They are reported in Katz (2001).
33. Both papers are based on Brainerd's dissertation, 'Distributional Consequences of Economic Reform in Russia and Eastern Europe', (Harvard University, 1996).
34. Monthly wage in primary job. For other wage measures, see below.
35. Age minus years of schooling minus school-starting age.
36. That is, excluding earnings from ITD, private plots or co-operatives.
37. It is respondents themselves who categorise their income as wages, ITD or entrepreneurial income.
38. Bruno (1996), while agreeing that gender stereotypes work against women in business, also suggests that this capacity for management has led some joint ventures to prefer hiring middle-aged women.
39. 'Male street vendors are seen as greedy speculators while female are poor mothers struggling to support their families', according to Bruno (1996). A number of authors discuss to what extent female entrepreneurs in Russia differ from the male, in terms of the sphere and size of activity and of manner, motives and ethos. (See *inter alia*, Bruno, 1997, Roshin and Roshina, 1994, Babaeva and Chirikova, 1995, Marchenko and Tetrenko, 1994).
40. Since I was primarily interested in the relative wage effects of characteristics, I used changes in the Russian average wage for indexation, rather than CPI. I was not able to take into account local or regional rates of price or wage change. See Table A7.2 on loss of observations due to problems with interview dates and indexation.
41. The coding of the data does not allow us to distinguish between people who did not receive a wage that was due to them; people who have a job at the date of interview but had not earned a wage the previous month; and refusals to answer the question. The ratios in Table 7.6 include only those who report earnings, assuming that all others either did not work the preceding month or refused to respond. The opposite assumption – that all who identify themselves as working but did not report earnings for the previous month were victims of non-payment – produces ratios that differ from these by a few tenths of a percentage point.
42. See Rimashevskaya (1997) for more information on poverty in Taganrog.
43. The Taganrog as well as the RLMS and VTsIOM data sets include data for one month. Due to the frequency of irregular earnings and of wage arrears, the difference between dispersion in monthly and yearly earnings is likely to be greater in Russia than in most countries and larger during transition than in the Soviet period. Having made this caution, we note that according a number of measures, earnings and income differentiation are far greater in Taganrog 1993/94 than in 1989. (See Katz, 2001.)
44. Estimates of the same model for monthly wages in primary job and of hourly total earnings in 1993/4 and for hourly wages in 1989 have been made. (They are reported in Katz, 2001. Estimates of a smaller, 'Mincer-type' model are available from the author.)
45. Estimates were made with potential experience, but it had lower precision than age.
46. Models including years of education and job-types were also tried.
47. Estimates without these variables are available from the author.

48. A probit equation was estimated for the likelihood of having reported earnings for the preceding months it included age-groups, levels of education, number of children (under one year, 1–3 years and of school-age) in the household, marital status, frequency of alcohol consumption, subsidiary agriculture and income of other household members. The inverted Mill's ratios were not significant in any of the earnings/wage equations, even at the 20 per cent level. Given the difficulty of specifying a good model of labour force participation and the sensitivity of this method to model specification, uncorrected OLS estimates were used instead. Estimates are reported in Katz (2001).

8 Summary and Conclusions

1. The male and female equations were used as weights.
2. The figures for the OECD countries refer to different years for different countries, ranging from 1980 to 1986, and are calculated from sample surveys.
3. The model includes those variables for which gender-specific means are reported by (or can be imputed from) Soviet official statistics. The mean gross wage outside forestry and agriculture predicted by this model is 6 per cent lower than the actual national average for all workers and employees in 1988, and 11 per cent lower than that for 1989, which gives an indication of the size of the error. (The sample data are from spring 1989.)
4. Since the estimated wage function is semi-logarithmic, these averages are geometric while those given above are arithmetic.
5. The difference in years of schooling would usually be 6–7 years.
6. For women the effect of higher education is smaller (40 per cent) if working conditions are not controlled for. For other education parameters and for all types of schooling for men, it makes much less difference. Note that the pay-off to higher education in terms of monthly wages is lower for women, less than 40 per cent when work conditions are controlled for.
7. Ofer and Vinokur note that 'so far the explanations of lower rates of return for investment in schooling [in the USSR, compared to the US] should not affect efficiency considerations as they are all consistent with free market forces under the system's constraints' (1992, p. 34).
8. For more detail on the rights of women workers – and of infractions of them – see McAuley (1981), Abramova (1989), Shineleva (1989). Shapiro (1992) describes the working conditions of women industrial workers and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of 'protection'.

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