

# Notes

## Introduction

1. Gerald Gruman (1966) provides a detailed description of various mythical, folk and historical searches for a way to live longer; Carol Haber (2004) discusses more recent endeavours, contrasting them with those of the Renaissance.
2. A position statement by S. Jay Olshansky et al. (2002) warns against popular claims that it will soon be possible to achieve considerable increases in longevity.

## 1 Longevity, Technology and Humanistic Values

1. The biblical claim that people will live for 70 years can be found in Psalms 90:10. This verse also maintains that some people, as result of their physical robustness, can expect to live for 80 years. This contrasts with Genesis 6:3, which maintains that human beings will live for 120 years.
2. Tom Kirkwood (2000, pp. 5–7) draws on data from the Registrar-General's report for England and Wales to compare life expectancy between the 1880s and 1990s, and show that life expectancy has risen from 46 years to 76 years. Olshansky et al. (2002, pp. B292–3) compare the average life expectancy of 47 years in the developed world in the year 1900 with the 77-year life expectancy of children born in the USA in 2002.
3. Bruce Carnes et al. (2003) do not draw the analogy with a machine, but, as I understand their idea of a biological warranty period, it lends itself to this. The analogy becomes more pertinent later in the chapter when considering the evolutionary basis for ageing.
4. I draw on the definition provided by John Maynard Smith (1962, p. 115) and Kirkwood's use (2000, p. 35) of a slightly rephrased definition by Maynard Smith.
5. Kirkwood (2000, p. 33) identifies the rate of ageing with the actuary, Benjamin Gompertz, who in 1825 identified the eight-year doubling of the probability of mortality. Steven Austad (1997, p. 11) identifies the rate of ageing with the more recent work of the neurobiologist Caleb Finch. Austad also observes that the rate of ageing is between seven and ten years, depending on various environmental factors. The rate of ageing has varied throughout history from between seven years and 26 years (Austad, 1997, p. 38). Not all animal species age. Kirkwood (2000, pp. 36–7) observes that sea anemones and freshwater hydra appear to be immortal.
6. Kirkwood (2005, p. 438) describes Peter Medawar's theory as the Mutation Accumulation Theory. Kirkwood (2000, pp. 78–9) provides a useful summary of this idea.
7. The elucidation of Kirkwood's Disposable Soma Theory draws on a number of his works (1977, 1997, 2000, 2005, 2008; Kirkwood and Austad, 2000;

- Kirkwood and Rose, 1991). His ideas were used to develop the notion of a biological warranty period (Carnes et al., 2003, p. 32).
8. For the influence of August Weismann on Kirkwood's ideas, see Kirkwood (2000); and for Weismann's influence on gerontology, see Kirkwood and Thomas Cremer (1982). Kirkwood and Cremer (1982, p. 112) and Kirkwood (2000, p. 55) describe the germ-line as immortal.
  9. Kirkwood (2000, 2005) provides details of the type of damage that is experienced at the cellular level. Austad (1997) provides a general description of the possible mechanisms of the ageing process, while Evan Hadley et al. (2005) outline the range of research areas into ageing therapies.
  10. Haber (2004) claims that throughout the nineteenth century scientific discoveries defined old age as a disease.
  11. Christopher Boorse (1975, p. 57) recognises that what is natural is also open to evaluation, but maintains that a purely descriptive account of the natural design of a function can be given.
  12. Richard Norman (1996) and Russell Blackford (2006) describe various problems that the argument from nature faces.
  13. Haber (2004, p. 516), when assessing literature on longevity from the eighteenth century, refers to Luigi Cornaro's claim that there are many virtues to ageing, if only it could be accompanied by good health.
  14. Eric Jeungst et al. (2003) also consider whether increases in longevity are a medical enhancement.
  15. The wide range of issues is discussed in Erik Parens (1998).
  16. Boorse (1977) identifies normal functions as the typical statistical range for a reference class. This class need not be a species but, to take into account changes in functions over time, specific age groups and sexes.
  17. On enhancements and how our vulnerability helps to shape our values, see Gerald McKenny (1998). Martha Nussbaum (1986) provides a fuller account of the importance of the fragility of goodness.
  18. Thomas Nagel (1971) considers various responses to the sense of the absurd.
  19. Sigmund Freud (1920, p. 317) describes the propulsion towards death as arising out of Necessity, that is, a law of nature.
  20. Page numbers for Martin Heidegger (1962) refer to those of the translation. I draw on Stephen Mulhall (1996, pp. 114–20) for this account of an authentic approach towards death.
  21. I utilise Joseph Raz's description (2001) of our activities and attachments as the content of our lives.
  22. Galen Strawson (2004) provides an insightful critique of the idea that we should seek consciously to provide our lives with a distinctive narrative.
  23. A distinction is drawn between being and Being. Human beings interact with a number of entities in different situations where each interaction and situation reveals an aspect of the entity's nature. In so doing, our interaction reveals what it is for an entity to be and for us to comprehend what they are. Being (upper case) refers to this understanding, that is, to the Being of being. For Heidegger, this ability to comprehend the nature of entities is an implicit capacity of human beings (Mulhall, 1996, p. 3).
  24. Heidegger's account of Dasein can be found in Heidegger (1962) and the clearing in Heidegger (1971). For this elucidation of his account of Dasein and 'thrownness', I have also drawn on Hubert Dreyfus (1991), Michael

- Inwood (1997) and Mulhall (1996). For the account of the clearing, I am indebted to Dreyfus (1993) and George Steiner (1989).
25. Michael Oakeshott (1948), for example, is critical of rationalism, specifically in relation to politics, which presumes that the only valid knowledge is that which can be taught by instruction. Rationalism is the search for a universal set of rules that can be applied with certainty. In contrast, Oakeshott argues that practice, participating in the activities of a culture, imparts the kind of knowledge that cannot be taught, such as with Dreyfus's example of how far to stand from one another. Oakeshott's criticism of rationalism has echoes of Heidegger's critique of technology.
  26. Peter Winch (1964) and Brenda Almond (1999) identify the commonality of such facts across human societies as grounds for some degree of commensurability between different cultures.
  27. John Mackie (1977) provides an account of morality along these lines.
  28. Heidegger (1962, pp. 91–148) distinguishes between objects that are ready-to-hand, such as a tools and those that are present-to-hand, objects that we contemplate. Don Ihde (1979) discusses this distinction.
  29. John Cottingham (1998) assesses the role of reason and rationalism in the pursuit of the good life and considers Heidegger's objections in the broader context of this debate.
  30. Dreyfus (1993) points to similarities between Heidegger's account of the clearing and Thomas Kuhn's description (1996) of scientific paradigms and the way that scientific revolutions leading to paradigm shifts occur when science seeks to accommodate the anomalies of a particular paradigm.
  31. Norman (1996) provides an account of the argument from nature, which is similar in many respects to Heidegger's description of the clearing and the role it plays with respect to our values. Blackford (2006) describes Norman's argument from nature as at best one supported by a particular group in society (just as the technological understanding of Being represents a sub-cultural view).

## 2 The Misfortune of Death

1. Christopher Belshaw (2009) discusses in detail the various definitions of death. Eric Olson (1997) and David DeGrazia (2005) support an account of personal identity based on the living body; Jeff McMahan (2002) supports an account for which the criterion of personal identity is psychological continuity. McMahan (2002, p. 424) argues that what matters to us is our psychologies and, although our existence ends when our consciousness irreversibly ceases, our organism may remain and may continue to be alive. This dualism will require two definitions of death.
2. For my description of the role of the body for personal identity, I have been influenced by Bernard Williams (1956), who draws on Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1967, II, iv) claim that we can only know another person's soul through their body.
3. On the importance of both psychological continuity and bodily continuity for personal identity, and specifically, as features of a person's biography, see David Wiggins (1979).

4. Emmanuel Levinas (2000) and Françoise Dastur (1996, pp. 42–9) point to the role that the death of others has in providing us with knowledge of death. In so doing, they draw upon but are critical of Heidegger's assessment (1962, pp. 281–5) of the role of the death of the other in revealing that only Dasein can die its own death.
5. The idea that more of a good is better than less, other things being equal, is promoted by Nagel (1970, p. 2), Williams (1973b, p. 84) and Jonathan Glover (1977, p. 55).
6. As was noted in Chapter 1, Williams observes that it is testament to the success of our activities and attachments, and hence our categorical desires, that the question of the meaning of our lives does not arise.
7. Frederick Kaufman (1999) maintains that all successful accounts of the badness of death are forms of the deprivation thesis.
8. The ontological problem is sometimes called the problem of the subject. I am grateful to Suzanne Uniacke for pointing out that one way of clarifying the distinction between the two Epicurean problems of non-existence is to describe them as phenomenological and ontological.
9. John Goodwin's notes to Lucretius make this point about infinity clear (Lucretius, 1994, p. 221, n. 113).
10. Stephen Rosenbaum (1989) maintains that to interpret Epicurus as claiming that it does not matter when we die is to misunderstand him. What Epicurus sought was to undermine the fear of death by observing that it involves non-existence and hence no good or bad experiences.
11. Gerald Gruman (1966, p. 14) suggests that one reason for the Epicurean view is that during his lifetime there was no appreciation of the control that could be obtained over nature or of the progress that might be made concerning human activities that would make prolonging life desirable. Gruman considers other arguments to be found in myth, religion and works of ancient philosophers that oppose seeking greater longevity, which he labels 'Apologist'. Christine Overall (2003, pp. 23–63) provides examples of more recent arguments against increasing life spans; Martien Pijnenburg and Carlo Leget (2007) provide an argument against extending life spans based on its consequences.
12. The tension between the subjective and objective views is a continuing theme in Nagel's work (1979b, 1986, 1991). Nagel argues that neither view can supersede the other: the objective view cannot account for the personal nature of the subjective view, while the objective point of view is never truly objective.
13. Nagel (1970, p. 6) queries whether the intelligent adult can be said to continue to exist after the accident.
14. This is complicated further by accounts of personal identity that use the living body as the criterion for personal identity, such as those of Olson (1997) and DeGrazia (2005).
15. A benefit of Nagel's argument is that it explains what is wrong with Lucretius' claim that it does not matter when we die. If death were of finite duration, to die later rather than earlier entails enduring less of death, thereby making it better to die later than earlier. The infinite duration of death, however, means those who die later will endure the same, infinite duration of death as those who die earlier. Yet, if it were the case that the

duration of death could determine whether it is better to die earlier or later, this must be because the duration of death is experiential, which contradicts both the Epicurean and Lucretian views and the deprivation thesis (Williams, 1973b, p. 84). What makes death bad is the loss of life, and this implies that to die earlier is worse than dying later, a point that becomes clearer as the argument progresses.

16. Similar arguments are made by Ben Bradley (2004), Neil Feit (2002), William Grey (1999) and Geoffrey Scarre (2007).
17. The average life expectancy for Shakespeare and Proust would have been less than 80 years.
18. The example of Keats and Tolstoy is from Nagel (1970, p. 9). Nagel cites Keats's age as being 24 when he died.
19. McMahan (1988, p. 45; 2002, pp. 113–14) relies upon David Lewis's description of the truth values of counterfactuals to identify the nearest possible world in which the immediate causes of *X*'s death are missing as the one in which the antecedent, 'if *X* had not died', is true.
20. The example of Joe is from McMahan (1988, pp. 42–9); he provides a more detailed discussion of these issues in his later work (McMahan, 2002).
21. This point is made by Belshaw (2009, p. 109) against McMahan's critique of the deprivation thesis. Nagel's account (1970) of the misfortune of death does seem to acknowledge this, and his atemporal account of the timing of death is consistent with his view that death is always bad.
22. McMahan (2002, pp. 124–7) is sceptical about the role the normal length of life can play in determining the misfortune of death.
23. Richard Wollheim (1984, pp. 265–6) argues that an objection to immortality is that the length of life would remove our present reasons for choosing certain of our activities.
24. This argument is made by Brueckner and Fischer (1986, 1993a, 1993b).
25. Nagel (1970, p. 8, n. 3) considers, albeit briefly, the possibility that someone could have been born earlier while retaining their genetic identity, drawing on an example by Robert Nozick, and concludes that this possibility suggests that the solution to the asymmetry problem depends upon our past and future concerns about our own lives.
26. Saul Kripke (1981, p. 62) argues that we do not need a precise date of birth for someone to be identified as the same person, so long as their origins remain the same. It should be noted that Kripke is not providing a theory of personal identity, although his ideas about origins have been used in this way.
27. In Karel Čapek's play, Elina Makropulos is 337 years old.
28. McMahan (2002, p. 100) rejects Williams's argument and maintains that it is rational for an individual now to have egoistic concerns about a future individual without them being one and the same individual.

### 3 Justifying the Means

1. R. G. Frey (1996) recognises, in the context of animal experimentation, that medicine becomes compromised by the use of immoral means.
2. An issue I will not consider is whether it would be morally permissible to use or to continue using information that was wrongfully obtained. For example, Nazi

- experiments on hypothermia were wrongfully conducted but the data collected is recognised by some as being scientifically useful (Moe, 1984; Post, 1991).
3. Two notable, recent attempts to show that animals cannot suffer are by Peter Harrison (1991) and Peter Carruthers (1992).
  4. Peter Singer (1995) provides a wide range of empirical evidence with the purpose of questioning the efficacy of animal experimentation.
  5. Tom Regan provides a detailed criticism of preference utilitarianism, the version of utilitarianism supported by Singer (Cohen and Regan, 2001, pp. 180–8).
  6. Williams (2006) provides a fuller account of his view on the ‘human prejudice’.
  7. Singer once used the example of a ‘moral ledger’ for calculating the aggregate of preference satisfaction, such as the ledgers used by accountants, which was criticised by H. L. A. Hart (Singer, 1993b, p. 128).
  8. The claim that morality is ‘about’ human beings raises questions regarding the possibility of aliens with similar intellectual and physical capacities to human moral agents. How we respond to aliens depends upon their morally salient features, as will become clear in later chapters. Rosalind Hursthouse (1987, pp. 247–55) and Williams (2006, pp. 148–52) raise and respond to the issue of aliens.
  9. The example of Jim and the Indians is similar in many respects to Philippa Foot’s (1967) example of the trolley problem. It is not obvious that Jim should probably kill one of the Indians. G. E. M. Anscombe (1967) and John Taurek (1977) argue that the numbers involved in such conflicts do not count.
  10. Williams’s comments during his discussion of integrity suggest he is aware of the problem I raise.
  11. Uniacke (2004a) discusses the role of the context of an act that harms, and so may cause suffering, in determining whether it is wrong.
  12. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2005, p. 7) notes that the precise numbers of animals used are difficult to obtain but are estimated to be between 50 and 100 million.
  13. Søren Holm (2002) provides an overview of the broad range of ethical issues involved in the stem cell debate, as does the Chief Medical Officer’s Report (Department of Health, 2000).
  14. Jenny Teichman (1985) provides an overview of the many different understandings of the term ‘person’ in philosophy; Michael Tooley (1998a) and Mary Anne Warren (1997) discuss the range of psychological characteristics that are often associated with Personhood.
  15. H. G. Woodger’s observation is also used by Holland (1990).
  16. Jason Eberl (2000) describes the potential Person and Persons as unified individuals with ongoing identity, which are ontologically unique.
  17. The problems of identity associated with the early embryo are well known in logic. Graham Priest (2000, pp. 68–9) discusses them in relation to amoebas and in so doing uses the example of either *X* or *Y* ceasing to exist the moment after division occurs.
  18. This was the conclusion of the Warnock Committee (Warnock, 1985), which set out the principles contained in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990.

19. The debate about using spare embryos and creating embryos for medical purposes is discussed by Nicole Gerrand (1993) and K. Devolder (2005).

#### 4 Longevity and the Problem of Overpopulation

1. The cultural background will define the ideal of the good life for a given society, which will determine the nominal optimal population level. Within each clearing will be sub-cultures that identify different ways for pursuing this ideal of the good life.
2. Typical examples are Glover (1977) and Derek Parfit (1984).
3. For this reason, as John Broome (2005) argues, the addition of people to a population is never value-neutral, a position supported by Jan Narveson (1973).
4. What constitutes deliberately having a child is contentious and is assessed by David Archard (2004).
5. Timothy Sprigge (1968, pp. 337–8) observes that it is possible to reverse Narveson's argument so that the actual person whom our actions affect, and benefit, is one whose life is worthwhile, but we do not prevent a person suffering if we fail to bring them into existence. McMahan (1981, pp. 99–109) offers an overview of the difficulties with Narveson's argument.
6. Tooley (1998b) provides a more detailed argument in favour of the asymmetry argument based on distinguishing between evaluative and normative properties. Broome (2005) also makes a similar distinction when he claims that bringing a person into existence is not value-neutral, but the normative requirements about so doing may be.
7. Gustaf Arrhenius (2008) provides a recent assessment of the dilemma between having more lives or longer lives.
8. My account of Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox draws on his shorter explanation of it (1986). A more detailed version is to be found in *Reasons and Persons* (1984), but this lacks his account of Perfectionism.
9. Alan Carter (1999, p. 300) makes this point. John Rawls argues that his two principles of justice are a special case of a more general conception of justice, which maintains that '[a]ll social values – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage' (1971, p. 62).
10. Carter (1999, pp. 296–7) refers to an example by Singer of the cost of the construction of the Sydney Opera House, when the then Australian government donated the equivalent of a twelfth of this sum to the Bengal refugee crisis.
11. To be fair to Parfit, the new Principle of Beneficence that he searches for, his Theory X, seeks more than to find a solution to the Repugnant Conclusion.
12. John Harris (2000) also points to the possibility of overpopulation and the potential consequences for having children, although he does not consider the implications to the extent outlined here. David Gems (2003) recognises the threat of overpopulation from increasing life spans, but is sceptical about it leading to overpopulation given the present decline of fertility in the West.

## 5 Ending Lives

1. Harris (1985, pp. 91–4) provides an outline of the argument, which is developed by Alan Williams (1997).
2. Harris (1985, p. 91) claims that to fail to live for the full fair innings is to suffer an injustice, although in what way it is an injustice is unclear.
3. Norman Daniels (2008, pp. 171–81) provides a lifetime account of healthcare distribution, which I consider in the following chapter.
4. Wiggins (1987) provides a thorough examination of this connection. Amartya Sen (1980) grounds the right to healthcare in capabilities rather than needs, but, as Daniels (2008, p. 78) observes, the general line of argument is similar to that of a needs-based approach.
5. What, if any healthcare would be available to those who live longer than the fair innings is open to question, which is why I refer to the ‘broad range’ of healthcare options, assuming that some healthcare, even if only palliative care, would be available. I will return to this issue later in my discussion.
6. To be clear, in considering what a policy limiting longevity might involve, I do not advocate restricting life spans. I am simply considering the implications of such a policy.
7. In making this assumption, I am discounting two possibilities: first, that the economic resources do not exist to develop the biomedicines necessary for increasing life spans; and, second, given the argument that there is no natural life span, and that there may be a need to restrict access to healthcare and other resources, a policy might be established that reduces life spans to below present levels, thereby releasing resources. How this might be achieved is not entirely clear, but it is a logical possibility given my argument about the relationship between how long we can live and human activities.
8. John Hardwig (2000, p. 129) does not restrict the duty to die to the elderly, but maintains that it becomes greater as one grows older and has experienced more of life than one’s family. Margaret Battin (2000) outlines a justification for a duty to die for reasons similar to those considered here, but she also proposes that a duty to die might, with the appropriate social institutions, be used to equalise life expectancies throughout the world. Overall (2003) provides a broad critique of the duty to die as an argument against prolonging life, raising different objections from those that I focus upon.
9. With this observation about the duty to die, I adapt a criticism by Anscombe (1967) of an example by Foot (1967) in her critique of the Doctrine of Double Effect.
10. The QALY has been accused of being an ageist means for distributing healthcare (Harris, 1987).
11. Harris (2000), and Robert Garland (1990, pp. 244–5) in relation to Herodotus, refer to the policy of killing people in order to distribute resources fairly as enforced euthanasia, but to do so is incorrect, as will become clear.
12. Hugo Bedau (1968) outlines the many different claims that the concept of the right to life has been thought to encompass, such as the right to various forms of welfare support.
13. John Keown (2002) and Richard Tur (2002) provide various definitions of euthanasia. Keown also describes suicide and assisted suicide.



14. There is some dispute about whether there is a substantive moral difference between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia (Keown, 2002, pp. 31–6). My assumption should not be taken to imply that there is no substantive difference; I maintain only that once the arguments are in place to justify suicide and voluntary euthanasia, then there is nothing more of any moral substance to add in order to justify assisted suicide.
15. In describing the sanctity of life doctrine in this way, I draw on David Oderberg's definition: '[i]t is always and everywhere a grave moral wrong intentionally to take the life of an innocent human being' (2000b, p. 147).
16. For a critique of Ronald Dworkin's secular (1994) account of the sanctity of life, see Uniacke (2004b).
17. Dworkin (1994, p. 85) and Uniacke (2004b) also observe that it is important to distinguish between the value of life and the conventions governing the ending of life.
18. An alternative explanation for why homicide in self-defence and just warfare may be permissible – and, in contrast to the Doctrine of Double Effect, intentional – is that they involve unjust conduct. Uniacke (1994) discusses the role of conduct in permissible homicide in self-defence.
19. W. D. Ross (1930, pp. 48–55) outlines the relationship between four logically independent statements connecting rights with duties. The statements are (p. 48):
  1. A right of *A* against *B* implies a duty of *B* to *A*.
  2. A duty of *B* to *A* implies a right of *A* against *B*.
  3. A right of *A* against *B* implies a duty of *A* to *B*.
  4. A duty of *A* to *B* implies a right of *A* against *B*.
20. Brenda Almond (1993) provides an account of rights as abstract nouns of a similar nature to duties and obligations. Ross (1930, pp. 50–2) appears to identify rights as markers delineating the nature of human powers and relationships, but I draw on the work of John Finnis (1977, p. 219) who describes them as markers.
21. Indeed, this is the reason why Feinberg discusses the three methods for resolving rights conflict: to consider possible ways of conceiving of the right to life as being absolute in some sense while also permitting killing in certain circumstances. On the basis of this analysis, Feinberg (1978, p. 104) denies that the right to life is absolute, but he instead claims it to be inalienable.
22. Wiggins (1998, p. 272) suggests Susan Hurley first used the term *pro tanto* in place of *prima facie* for the reasons cited.
23. Feinberg (1978, pp. 98–9) refers to William Frankena's (1955) description of *prima facie* rights, but I draw on Ross (1930) and Dancy's (1993a; 1993b, pp. 93–6) explication of Ross's ideas.
24. For example, Aristotle claims, 'for nothing perceptible is easily defined, and [since] these [circumstances of virtuous and vicious action] are particulars, the judgement about them depends upon perception' (1985, 1109b20–4, text in brackets is from the original translation). Wiggins (1975) provides a detailed analysis of Aristotle's account of practical reason.

25. Finnis (1977) describes the process of reasoning in natural law as practicable reasonableness. A. P. D'Entrèves (1970) describes the role of reason in determining natural justice. The natural law account of justice is influential for my understanding of resolving moral conflict.
26. Heidegger (1962, pp. 287–8) draws an analogy between the time of death and a ripening fruit. A fruit can die before it ripens, and so many people will die while their activities and attachments still make their lives fulfilling. A fruit can also become overripe, where a person might outlive their activities, as described, or experience the tedium of immortality.
27. Foot (1977) describes euthanasia as involving a conflict between the virtues of justice and charity.
28. There are a number of different interpretations of the perfect and imperfect distinction between duties. George Rainbolt (2000) identifies eight. I also draw on Onora O'Neill's description (1996, pp. 81–3, 86–8).
29. I have not addressed practical concerns about voluntary euthanasia leading to involuntary euthanasia. It is important to ensure that euthanasia is voluntary, and this will involve a number of difficulties, but sufficient safeguards can be put in place to prevent a slide from voluntary to involuntary euthanasia.

## 6 Partiality and Equality

1. The earlier discussion of using human embryos in medicine did not consider their right to life. It should become clear as the discussion develops why the embryo lacks a right to life.
2. The issue of intergenerational justice is often described as a conflict between the needs of the young and of the old, as is found with the Prudential Life Span Account, but this leaves open whether a 'middle' generation might have different needs.
3. The appeal and difficulty of explaining and uniting the idea of equality with claims for equal treatment of people are discussed by Isaiah Berlin (1956) and Wollheim (1956).
4. Nagel (1991) contrasts the personal perspective with the impersonal perspective, which I understand to be analogous to his earlier contrasting of the subjective and objective distinction (1979b, 1986). I retain the term 'subjective' to describe an individual's perspective on the world. The objective perspective can be either personal or impersonal. In the discussion of death, the objective perspective on the deceased is personal because it focuses on a particular individual. In the case of equality, the objective perspective is impersonal because it does not centre on a particular individual.
5. For my description of a person's character, I draw on Aristotle (1985) and Urmson's commentary (1988), although I have a broader view of the nature of character than Aristotle.
6. The elucidation of the partialist's critique of impartialism largely draws on Susan Wolf (1982). 'Morally beneficial' is Wolf's term (p. 422).
7. Whether or not acts can be supererogatory is greatly disputed. The debate between Elizabeth Pybus (1982), who denies their possibility, Patricia McGoldrick (1984) and Russell Jacobs (1987), who support supererogation,

- albeit to varying degrees, and Francis Kamm's (1985) discussion, offers an insight into the complex issues that it raises.
8. Cottingham (1996, pp. 68–70) observes that issues of justice prove difficult for partialism, but I propose a more constrained form of partialist concern, which, as I will argue, can take account of justice and fairness.
  9. Cottingham refers only to what Williams (1976a) and Nagel (1976) identify as 'constitutive' luck.
  10. Raz (2001, p. 126) describes the account of respect for people that I propose as the by-product view of respect, an account to which he once 'tended to lean'. The by-product view denies that there is a distinctive duty of respect; we respect people, on this view, when we treat them according to the fundamental moral requirements.
  11. Williams (1962, pp. 240–1) points to the relevance of reasons for or against claims of equality.
  12. McMahan (2002, pp. 233–65) provides an alternative account of equal respect.
  13. The account I provide is merely a brief sketch of the meta-ethical theory, which I consider best explains how we can know how to behave morally in a given situation, but it should provide a good idea of the approach I take.
  14. Both H. A. Prichard (1912, p. 7) and Ross (1930, p. 20, n.1) describe the immediacy of perceiving the saliency of a moral property, although only Prichard compares it to the immediacy of mathematics. Williams (1988a, pp. 182–5) draws a distinction between perceptual and mathematical intuitionism.
  15. I borrow Williams's use (1980) of  $\varphi$  for verbs of action and extend this to examples of the non-specific moral properties of a situation.
  16. I draw on Dancy's (1993b, pp. 93–6) elucidation of Ross.
  17. I draw primarily on Dancy (1993b, chs 4 and 7). Dancy (2004) provides a more recent and fuller statement of his account of particularism.
  18. Dancy (1993b, pp. 109–11) is responding to Williams's description (1965) of agent regret.
  19. Wiggins (1975) interprets Aristotle as a particularist about rules, of which Roger Crisp (2000) is critical.
  20. Dancy (1993b, pp. 4–5) points out the problem of evil, but also the difficulties that accidie and amorism cause intuitionist theories of moral epistemology.
  21. The example of kindness is John McDowell's (1979, pp. 332–3). Williams (1993, p. 217, n. 7) maintains that the link between being able to recognise an evaluative concept and being predisposed towards it is a Wittgensteinian idea, first recognised by Philippa Foot and Iris Murdoch in the 1950s.
  22. Cottingham (1996, p. 69) maintains that the patricians of the Roman Empire were able to live the good life despite the widespread injustices that existed beyond their social sphere.
  23. Anscombe (1958) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1985), for example, view the moral virtues and moral duties and obligations as, in O'Neill's phrase (1996), 'antithetical'.
  24. Cottingham (1996, pp. 68–9), for example, suggests that the virtues cannot provide an adequate account of justice. This is in part because the virtues are associated with partialist ethics, where justice implies impartialism (although this is not a difficulty for my account), but also because the virtue of justice can be neither excessive nor deficient, unlike the other cardinal virtues.

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