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Spice-Models with Independent Agents

  • Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
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Abstract

In this paper, the models of social and private interests coordination engines (SPICE-models) with equal independent agents are studied. The existence and uniqueness of Nash and Pareto-optimal equilibria are proved. These equilibria satisfy resource monotonicity (RM) but not population monotonicity (PM) and anonymity (ANO). Also a result on the system compatibility of the model is established.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 18-010-00594.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia

    O. I. Gorbaneva

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  1. O. I. Gorbaneva
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Correspondence to O. I. Gorbaneva.

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Russian Text © The Author(s), 2018, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Prilozheniya, 2018, No. 4, pp. 3–15.

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Gorbaneva, O.I. Spice-Models with Independent Agents. Autom Remote Control 80, 1745–1753 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919090145

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919090145

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