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The Field of Eurocracy

Didier Georgakakis
and
Jay Rowell

Mapping EU Actors and Professionals

The Field of Eurocracy

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The Field of Eurocracy

Mapping EU Actors and Professionals

Edited by

Didier Georgakakis
Professor of Political Science, University of Paris I-Sorbonne

and

Jay Rowell
Research Director CNRS, University of Strasbourg

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

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Notes on Contributors

Editors

Didier Georgakakis is a professor of political science, University of Paris I – Sorbonne, Jean Monnet Chair in European Political Sociology.

Jay Rowell Research Director at the CNRS in political sociology and former director of the Center for European Political Sociology, University of Strasbourg.

Authors

Philippe Aldrin is a professor of political science, Sciences Po Aix.

Willy Beauvallet is a PhD in political science, Research Center Society, Actors and Government in Europe, University of Strasbourg.

Filippa Chatzistavrou is a PhD in political science and researcher at the ELIAMEP foundation, Athens.

Guillaume Courty is a professor of political science, Sciences Po Lille.

François-Xavier Dudouet is a senior CNRS researcher in political sociology, University of Paris-Dauphine.

Eric Grémont is an economist and president of the Politico-economic Observatory of Capitalist Structures (OpesC).

Frederic Lebaron is a professor of sociology, University of Picardie, and director of the Research Centre on Politics and Public Policy.

Sébastien Michon is a senior CNRS researcher in political sociology, Research Center Society, Actors and Government in Europe, University of Strasbourg.

Hélénè Michel is a professor of political science, University of Strasbourg, and director of the Research Center Society, Actors and Government in Europe.

Audrey Pageaut is a PhD candidate in political science, University of Strasbourg.

Cécile Robert is a senior lecturer in political science, Sciences Po Lyon.

Antoine Vion is a senior lecturer in political science, University of Aix-Marseille.

Anne-Catherine Wagner is a professor of sociology, University of Paris I Sorbonne.

List of Abbreviations

AEX 25	Amsterdam Exchange Index
BASF	Baden Aniline and Soda Factory
BEL 25	Belgian Exchange Index
BEPA	Bureau of European Policy Advisers
CAC 40	Cotation Assistée en Continu (French Exchange Index)
CEFIC	European Chemical Industry Council
CEO	chief executive officer
CEPR	Centre for Economic Policy Research
CEPS	Centre for European Policy Studies
CFDT	French Democratic Confederation of Labour
CFTC	French Confederation of Christian Workers
CGT	General Confederation of Labour
CNIL	French National Commission for Data-processing and Liberties
COFACE	Confederation of Family Organisations of the European Union
CONCORD	Confederation for Relief and Development
CONECCS	The database for Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSCG	Civil Society Contact Group
DAX 30	Deutscher Aktien indeX (German stock exchange index)
DG	Directorate General
DG COMM	Directorate General for Communication
DG ECFIN	Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs
DG PRESS	Directorate General for Press and Information
DGB	German Trade Union Federation
EADS	European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Commission
ECB	European Central Bank
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECOFIN	Economic and Financial Affairs Council
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ED	European Democrats

EEC	European Economic Community
EFA	European Free Alliance
EFPIA	European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations
ENSAE	École nationale de la statistique et de l'administration économique
EP	European Parliament
EPP	European Popular Party
ERC	European Research Council
ERT	European Round Table of Industrialists
ESP	European Socialist Party
EURAB	European Union Research Advisory Board
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
ETUI	European Trade Union Institute
EU	European Union
EUL	European United Left
FEBI	European Federations of Industrial Branches
FED	United States Federal Reserve System
FO	General Confederation of Labour – Workers' Power
FPRD	Framework Programme for Research and Development
GDF	Gaz de France
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOPA	Group of Political Advisers
GUE/NGL	Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ID	Independence/Democracy Group
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IIF	Institute of International Finance
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPA	International Press Association
LVMH	Louis Vuitton–Moët Hennessy
M&A	Mergers and Acquisitions
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MIB 40	Milano Italia Borsa (Milan Stock Exchange Index)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCB	National central bank
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMO	Open Market Operations
PES	Party of the European Socialists Group

PEST	political, economic, social, technological
PIIGS	Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain
PIS	Press and Information Service
PR	Permanent Representative
R&D	research and development
REFI	refinancing interest rate
RWE	Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk
SGB	Société Générale de Belgique
SPS	Spokespersons Service of the European Commission
SWOT	strength, weakness, opportunity, threat
TCE	Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe
TL	Treaty of Lisbon
TUC	Trade Union Congress
UEN	Union for Europe of the Nations
UNSA	National Union of Autonomous Trade Unions
VOICE	Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction: Studying Eurocracy as a Bureaucratic Field

Didier Georgakakis and Jay Rowell

During the 'empty chair crisis' of the mid-1960s, Altiero Spinelli published an influential book entitled *The Eurocrats* (1966). In this book, Spinelli wanted to go beyond the psychological and geopolitical interpretations of the 'empty chair crisis' by opening the black box of European institutions and studying the 'body of eurocrats' and its activities (Spinelli, 1966, p. 25). The central idea was that focusing on eurocrats was a better means to understand the evolution of Europe than the various existing interpretations of the dynamics of European integration. He did so by looking at the relationships among the various institutional players by using an interesting and extensive definition of eurocrats: not only the permanent staff of the European Communities, but also permanent representatives of Member States, members of the European Parliament and members of interest groups.

Nearly 50 years after the publication of *The Eurocrats*, and in a context of doubt on the future of the EU reminiscent of the mid-1960s, what do we really know about the complex web of relationships among the different actors participating in the daily workings of institutional Europe? Beyond the more or less mythical representations linked to eurocrats and Eurocracy, what do we know about members of the European Parliament, Commissioners, European civil servants, lobbyists and interest representatives, members of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, CEOs of big European companies, trade union representatives, diplomats, journalists specialized in European affairs and the wide range of consultants and experts? How do they interact in European arenas? What are the cleavages and oppositions within the collective they form and what are the elements of their sociological unity? How can the development of social sciences theories and methodologies since the 1960s offer new perspectives on the types of questions raised

by Spinelli on the career paths of the EU staff and professionals, their social and professional trajectories, the type of authority they possess, the sociological structure of their goals and preferences? Finally, how do these sociological structures and dynamics affect EU institutions, policies, power and broader evolutions? The *Field of Eurocracy* aims at answering these questions by mobilizing two sets of theoretical tools.

First, recent developments in the study of elites in history (Reinhard, 1996; Charle, 2001, 2005) and sociology (Bourdieu, 1994, 1998; Scott, 2007; Savage and Williams, 2008) provide new ways of studying European elites. Unlike studies that use institutional positions to define elites, these approaches emphasize the social processes of the construction of elites *as elites* by looking at the way they build their own authority. If this perspective highlights the sociological anchoring of these elites, the central question is not so much their social origins but their mid- and long-term social and professional strategies developed to achieve positions in different social and political fields, as well as the type of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986) they possess or do not possess: for instance, the resources, skills, networks, credibility and credentials accumulated during their careers. The differences between diverse types of actors and the effects of these gaps in terms of power and social resources explain the dynamics (or the crises) within a given social field (Fligstein, 2002), political regimes (Higley et al., 1991; Charle, 1997; Dogan and Higley, 1998) or field of power (Bourdieu, 1994, 1996).

Second, Bourdieu's theory of the bureaucratic field seems particularly heuristic for grasping the institutionalization process of the EU. Building on a remark by Fligstein about the three main fields of power – economic, legal, and bureaucratic (Fligstein, 2008) – we have tried to use the data collected on a variety of European actors in order to build a picture of the European institutions as the center of a new and emerging bureaucratic field, having strong links with the European legal field (Vauchez and De Witte, 2013) as well as partially overlapping with different political and economic fields and networks in a more or less integrated and specific European configuration.

This book is the first comprehensive attempt to generate a first-hand topography of the various social actors and groups which are central to contemporary Eurocracy. Drawing on a range of developments in the social sciences to renew Spinelli's initial insights, the goal of the book is to empirically study the diversity of actors who populate European institutions in order to make the complexity of the EU and its dynamics intelligible by mapping the actors and their relations. Studying the field of Eurocracy as a transnational equivalent of the bureaucratic field

theorized by Pierre Bourdieu, the book aims at providing new avenues to go beyond the apparent complexity and diversity of European actors and institutions to analyze the distribution of power resources and institutional authority as a key to understanding 'informal governance' (Christiansen and Piattoni, 2003), recent transformations in EU governance and its contemporary 'crisis.'

Who are the eurocrats?

The term Eurocracy exists in all European languages: *Eurokratie* in German, *Eurocratie* in French, Ευρωκρατία in Greek, *Eurokraty* in Polish, Еврокрация in Bulgarian, and so forth. Whether it has negative connotations or not, the term has strong evocative powers and has entered into general use to designate a new center of political power incarnated in the EU. In all contexts, the notion is also used to signify the distance between ordinary citizens and the European polity, or even a confiscation of democratic sovereignty by unelected experts only accountable to themselves.

Despite the emergence of Eurocracy as a common term in the 1960s,[1] what is signified by the notion varies greatly. For some, eurocrats are limited to the relatively small group of permanent civil servants of the EU, and in particular of the Commission, who are seen to be the driving force of European integration. For others, the term refers to political elites who negotiate in Brussels. For others, still, the term refers more to an opaque system of power which has replaced democratic institutions. In all cases, the term tends to symbolically unify a system of actors with seemingly convergent interests acting as a reified entity.

The sociology of political and administrative elites in national or even local or regional settings is a classic topic of enquiry, not only in political science, but also in sociology and history. This has, however, historically been far from being the case in the field of European studies, for a long time dominated by legal–institutional approaches and theories derived from international relations. The dominant intellectual currents in European studies, including the more advanced studies on European technocracy (Radaelli, 1999; Stevens, 2001), therefore, in their studies often inscribe actors as an afterthought, or as broad and disincarnated processes and entities such as the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, Members States or interest groups instead of concrete individuals or sociologically specified groups. Some of the 'founding fathers' of EU studies were interested in a more sociological study of Community elites, but they framed the question exclusively in

terms of socialization effects which 'convert' individuals to the European cause. This was the origin of the tradition of research on socialization which gave rise to a number of interesting case studies and results, for example, the differences in the relationship to Europe between diplomats and 'technocrats,' or the differences in values as a function of time spent working in the institutions. However, for the most part,[2] these studies, based on questionnaires and interviews, were often focused on attitudes toward the European project and conflicting types of loyalties, without taking into account sociological and professional backgrounds or positions (more on less dominant, recently arrived or established, generalist or specialized careers, and so on) in the field. This empiricist orientation on values has created a series of oppositions which dramatically reduce the scope of analysis.[3] For instance, is it really productive to study the 'conversion' to Europe as an irreducible opposition between national and European values? Can one then actually predict how elites will act from the measurement – through interviews or questionnaires – of their 'preferences' with regard to which model of Europe they favor or their political orientations or nationalities, without taking into account their individual or group trajectories, or the structures and configurations, both objective and subjective, in which they exercise their profession on a daily basis?

Over the past ten years, there has been a renewal of research on European actors which has tried to go beyond these limitations in studying more intensively individuals who belong to EU institutions or are in close contact with them. Beside some rare synchronic studies (Kauppi, 2005; Haller, 2008; Ross, 2011), this has given rise to a number of case studies, in general focusing on groups defined by their status or institutional affiliation. The Commissioners and MEPs have been the object of the most attention (MacMullen, 1997; Joana and Smith, 2002; Scarrow, 1997; Scully, 2005; Beauvallet and Michon 2010a), as well as, more recently, top civil servants of different European institutions (Egeberg 1996; Shore, 2000; Hooghe, 2001; Georgakakis, 2008; SuvaReirol, 2008; Ellinas and Suleiman, 2008; Egeberg and Heskestad, 2010; Seidel, 2010; Ban, 2013; Kassim and ali, 2013). Some recent research has focused on representatives of Member States (Chatzistavrou, 2010), representatives of interest groups (Coen and Richardson, 2009a; Michel, 2005; Smith, 2004), European lawyers and judges (Vauchez, 2008a; Madsen, 2010; Mudge and Vauchez, 2012), consultants, observers and commentators such as journalists, members of think tanks, essayists and academics (Baisnée, 2002; Bastin, 2002; Robert and Vauchez, 2010), but also on actors who structure political fields such as in the case of immigration,

home affairs or defense policies (Bigo, 2007), as well as international experts and technocrats (Misa and Schot, 2005) and European specialists in national (Geuijen, Hart and Princen, 2008) or local administrations (De Lassalle, 2010).

By constructing populations through institutional positions, these studies, however valuable, often only offer a snapshot of an institutionally defined population at a given time. As a result, the historical transformations of the group are often neglected, as are career trajectories from one institutional position to another, and therefore structural proximities or barriers between groups which are difficult to observe in case studies which isolate groups and fail to take a relational perspective.[4] Understanding what makes specific actors 'tick' can only be ascertained in a relational perspective. In other words, anticipations and margins of action of actors occupying a particular institutional position are not only the product of institutional interests derived from their institutional position, but are also the fruit of their own career trajectories and objectives as well as perceived opportunities, individual and collective resources, and the position they occupy in the field in relation to others. Finally, much of this literature has, explicitly or implicitly, sought to determine 'who governs' the EU, but in the absence of transversal and comprehensive research, this question is impossible to answer empirically and is therefore left to the sterile turf wars between competing theories on the nature of the European political system.

Between the accumulation of disparate case studies and the deep theoretical divides in European studies, the only subject of consensus is the extreme complexity of European institutions. This complexity is of course undeniable. European institutions are the fruit of the sedimentation of multiple compromises on formal and informal rules governing the mechanisms of cooperation and competition (Christiansen and Neuhold, 2012) and which have different configurations from one policy sector to another. At the same time, the perception of complexity has other reasons which make the system opaque to outsiders as well as to scholars well versed in national political and administrative institutions with more clearly identified centers of power and divisions of responsibility (Campana, Henry and Rowell, 2007). One may suspect that the argument of complexity actually serves the interest of 'insiders,' often the most central players, as the capacity to interpret what happens and how it is, in itself, an important resource in conditions of uncertainty.

These different factors have led to the relative closure of Eurocracy built around original institutional arrangements and forms of interaction which raises the costs of information gathering for 'outsiders,'

including many scholars of the EU. This book seeks to open up the black box of Eurocracy by providing a transversal topography of the actors and groups in a relational perspective. This systematic and transversal approach provides more interpretative leverage than isolated case studies. Furthermore, while the research presented in this volume corroborates the idea that Eurocracy is complex, we do so not by pointing to the complexity of the institutional arrangements, but rather to the sociological and professional diversity of the different actors who 'make Europe work' on a permanent and daily basis, such as civil servants of the Commission or well established Brussels lobbyists or, on a more temporary basis, permanent representatives, business leaders, or MEPs who aspire to return to a national career after their mandate in the European Parliament. Eurocracy is therefore not just limited to bureaucrats or representatives of European institutions, a point to which we will come back from a more theoretical angle. At the same time, this approach also allows the identification of cross-cutting trends and sociological and professional similarities across different regions of the field of Eurocracy which help to explain why – despite institutional complexity, the multiplication of veto points and the sense of 'crisis' and so forth – the EU still manages to churn out a variety of 'hard' and 'soft' norms.

Based on empirical political sociology, each chapter will focus on a particular type of actor by studying their careers and social trajectory in order to relationally understand the struggles for authority within this emerging political center. Some chapters address categories of actors defined by their institutional positions, such as MEPs, permanent representatives of Member States or the Governing Council of the ECB, while other chapters focus on social spaces which gravitate around European institutions, such as trade unionists, business leaders and organizations or experts. As it is impossible to mobilize case studies for all European actors, we selected a cross section of different types of actors involved in the space of European politics and policies by raising two types of questions. The first concerns the position which these groups occupy within Eurocracy and their distinctive features and relationships with other groups. The second seeks to specify the sociological processes of selection and attraction of European institutions which exert their effects differentially on social groups and individuals. These different areas of the field of Eurocracy will thereby be analyzed in terms of their sociological specificities, and the concluding chapter will provide a systematic synthesis of the structures of opposition and differentiation of the field of Eurocracy.

Studying EU institutions as a bureaucratic field

Now that we have begun to sketch out the contours of the social and institutional space of Eurocracy, it is high time to address some of the more theoretical issues of this type of approach. Pierre Bourdieu's field theory, developed over his long career through his empirical work on a number of fields is the central theoretical tool which we have used. Field theory has attracted new attention in recent years among leading scholars in European Studies (Fligstein, 2008; Stone Sweet, Sandholz and Fligstein, 2001; Kauppi, 2005; Bigo, 2007; Favell and Guiraudon, 2011; Vauchez and De Witte, 2013), but this approach has up until now not been systematically operationalized or has been limited to specific sectors.

Although Pierre Bourdieu never worked on European institutions directly, particular elements of his field theory have an important heuristic potential, and in particular his work on the field of bureaucracy. In his recently posthumously published lectures on the state, Bourdieu explained that a narrowly focused analysis on decision-making processes fails to grasp the bigger picture, both in terms of the inscription of a decision in the broader spaces of interaction and in a longer chronology (Bourdieu, 2012). Most of the time, a political decision is not the result of a clear choice promoted by a political majority, but the result of what happens simultaneously in multiple bureaucratic arenas, commissions, committees and interactions implicating actors of different statuses and backgrounds who seek to further their institutional, social and professional interests. Since it is empirically difficult to trace what happens in these myriad arenas which often overlap and work simultaneously rather than sequentially, Bourdieu proposed to construct bureaucracy as a *theoretical space* in which political compromises are forged or imposed by groups or coalitions of dominant actors possessing the forms of capital and institutional credit most recognized in the field. Grasping the dynamic of what happens in a multiplicity of arenas and committees by building the theoretical bureaucratic field appears particularly relevant in the context of the UE. Decision making in the EU indeed involves a multiplicity of ever-shifting arenas and discussion forums over an average of four or five years, which makes standard methods of tracing decision-making processes particularly difficult to implement. Building a theory of the field of Eurocracy by analogy to Bourdieu's bureaucratic field could provide valuable tools to unravel the complexities of the European polity.

Bourdieu's theoretical construct is based on empirical research in which actors with different institutional positions and resources (civil

servants, experts, representatives of interest groups, politicians) compete to define policies and political institutions in accordance with their institutional and social interests. Oppositions are structured around protagonists embodying general or particular interest, owning financial or cultural capital with varying degrees of social capital which works as a multiplier of other forms of capital. In this construction, therefore, study of the bureaucratic field is not limited to civil servants, but also includes the multiple interactions which gravitate around the administrative core of the state.

On a more theoretical level, the pertinence of this framework for studying European institutions appears even more clearly when one considers that much of Bourdieu's work on the state and bureaucracy was based on his reading of Max Weber's conception of bureaucracy and was centered on the construction of the modern state. As such, much of his reasoning was derived from his reading of the historical processes of the emergence and consolidation of the bureaucratic field generating a process of monopolization of physical and symbolical forms of domination. This is why it seems reasonable to try to transpose many of the concepts and forged by Bourdieu to study the process of state building to the emergence of a new center of political power in Europe. In many ways, the European institutional space shares the characteristics of early modern states in that it is marked by: a process of codification and institutionalization of the rules of interaction; the definition of specific rewards and specific bones of contention; the definition of specific efficient resources necessary to be a player in the field; and the gradual establishment of more or less rigid and objectified borders separating 'insiders' from 'outsiders.' These various processes of institutionalization, produced by and through interactions, are the underpinnings of the autonomy of the field relative to other existing social or (national) political and bureaucratic fields. In this conception, the struggles to define and impose political priorities and interests go hand in hand with the definition of legitimate social and professional properties and skills, as well as with appropriate forms of interaction which create a specific hierarchy of legitimacies.

Converging with new interdisciplinary perspectives (Smith, 2004; Kaiser et al., 2008; Mérand and Saurruger, 2010; Favell and Guiraudon, 2009; Kauppi and Madsen, 2013), the research collected in this volume tries to open the debate on institutions beyond the confines of the 'new institutionalisms.' What matters here is not only institutions as organizations or representations, but wider battles within the institutional field, involving the determination of legitimate social and professional

profiles, capital, resources and skills which generate structures as well as symbolic hierarchies. In Bourdieu's sociology, the elite are not predefined or merely identified by their holding of the most capital. One of the central stakes in the struggle within each field is the definition of the specific types of capital within the given field (Bourdieu, 1993). In other words, the status of being an 'insider,' a dominant player – or even the holder of a type of local charisma enabling actors to exert power effects within the field – can vary from one field to another, and one of the central hypothesis of the present volume is to identify the accumulation and deployment of specific forms of European capital. Along with other scholars who are promoting a social-field approach to the study of EU institutions (Cohen et al., 2007; Kauppi, 2005, 2010; Fligstein, 2008; Vauchez, 2008a), this volume focuses on the changing balance between temporary and permanent agents engaged in the field of Eurocracy. It raises the question of the emergence of a specific form of European institutional capital which is both objectively measurable in the analysis of the sociological characteristics and career paths and more qualitatively observable in the different reputations of actors; in other words, how actors perceive others and are perceived, characterize and describe their ways of doing things, or who they are socially and ascribe to themselves and to others different forms of institutional credit. The specifically European institutional capital (or credit) which has emerged over time is dominant in certain regions of the field of Eurocracy, but it is constantly challenged by resources and capitals (political or economic, for instance) accumulated outside the field of Eurocracy, but which provide agents holding these capitals with authority which remains effective in the field of Eurocracy. This feature represents a major difference from many constituted and more 'mature' bureaucratic fields with more consolidated borders and more homogeneous definitions of legitimate capitals and social profiles. This has consequences in terms of the integration process as well as of power relations and paves the way for the establishment of a wider map going beyond the strictly institutional players, an issue which we will formalize and address in the conclusion to this volume.

Mapping the field of Eurocracy

We will proceed by mapping the various actors who construct, through their interactions, the field of Eurocracy. This consists in showing their location within this field according to the distribution of a set of social, institutional, educational and economic resources, as well as their

anticipations and logics of action which depend on the position they occupy within the field and on their career trajectories. This makes it possible to study the underlying forces at work, the center of gravity of the field, shifts in power relations over time and centripetal and centrifugal forces.

In order to operationalize this perspective in fieldwork, the authors of this volume have mobilized both qualitative and quantitative material. The qualitative analysis (interviews, ethnographic observation, the mobilization of archives and 'grey' literature) has been used to provide insights into everyday practice, to get in depth information on backgrounds and career anticipations and to understand differences in reputation and authority (how actors in the field describe themselves and talk about others). Interviews were also used to feed into the more quantitative work. Completing the biographical data obtained through interviews, the various authors of the volume also used institutional documents, *Who's Who* biographical dictionaries and press reports to generate biographical databases which not only included nationality and institutional positions most commonly used, but try as well to capture their sociological backgrounds, career trajectories, distinctive skills and resources in order to describe, in a relational perspective, specific groups of agents in the field of Eurocracy.

Each chapter provides a partial answer to the overall questions we raise in this Introduction. As the goal was to reconcile the overall theoretical coherence of the volume with enough dense description of specific areas of the field of Eurocracy, we could not cover in depth the entire topography of the field. As a result, there are some empirical blind spots which other publications address: in particular, the legal field of the EU (Cohen and Vauchez, 2010; Vauchez and De Witte, 2013), the field of power (Kauppi and Madsen, 2013) or the more general questions of the articulation among the institutional field, the legal field and the economic field (Fligstein, 2008), not to mention a series of other studies using a similar framework.[5] At the same time, this volume can be seen as an initial attempt[6] at theoretical formalization, and as an invitation for further research: for example on the Regional Committee, the Economic and Social Committee and the recent European agencies.

Nonetheless, the following chapters provide valuable insights on several regions and groups active in the field. The overall picture provides a new way of looking at institutions of the 'institutional triangle' which are not constructed in terms of organizations with convergent or opposing interests, but rather as a structure of relations between agents

with differing trajectories, skills and forms of authority. This shift in perspective allows us to reframe several classical questions concerning EU institutions.

This is, for example, the case in the first chapter on the institutionalization of the European Parliament. If there is a broad consensus around the idea that the EP is playing an increasing role, the debate on the actions of MEPs has been centered on national and political cleavages. Willy Beauvallet and Sébastien Michon reframe these debates by looking at the sociological properties of MEPs and the links between these properties and internal distributions of power. By doing so, they show that if the integration of MEPs is not a linear and uniform process, one can identify a central core of parliamentarians who base their central positions in the EP on institutional capital specific to this institutional space. This 'avant-garde' core, according to the two authors, represents the driving force of the institutionalization of the EP – parliamentarians whose own careers and prestige are linked to that of the EP.

In Didier Georgakakis' chapter on the European Commission, the main thrust is to analyze the divergent socio-political trajectories of top civil servants and the Commissioners they serve since the Hallstein College. On the one side, the chapter demonstrates that the civil servants have undergone a process of differentiation generating specifically European careers. On the other side, pushing in a symmetrical and opposing direction, Commissioners have seen their national political capital increase to the detriment of specifically European skills and forms of legitimacy. Beyond the classic question of the differentiation between political and administrative personnel, the analysis offers new insights into the differential degree of integration of two types of actors of the field of Eurocracy. By showing the different forms of investment and anticipations and, subsequently, the tensions they generate, the analysis sheds light on the sociological dimensions of the political and administrative conflicts which have multiplied since the resignation of the Santer College. This approach gives new insights into the classical question of 'leadership' of the EU and the diffuse sense of crisis which pervades the entire institutional field of the EU.

If the Council, the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) and the working groups have been the object of much academic attention, little is known about the permanent representatives who are at the heart of the intergovernmental dynamics of the EU, the individuals who are most commonly assumed to play the role of ambassadors representing their nations' interests. Filippa Chatzistravrou demonstrates in her chapter that beyond the statutory aspects of the permanent

representative position, social and career trajectories have produced Europeanizing effects over time. Despite their official role as 'permanent' representatives, these ambassadors and their deputies are above all 'temporary' participants in the field, in that most of their careers take place in other diplomatic positions in central ministries or abroad. However, the chapter shows that a significant portion of the permanent representatives can be classified as 'semi-permanent' members of the field in that their longevity is often quite important, and they are engaged in specific forms of professional socialization with their peers – thereby placing a premium on compromise and giving rise to collective forms of solidarity vis-à-vis other competing protagonists. Although in a minority, a fraction of the permanent representatives go on to have strictly European careers, sometimes in very central positions of authority, revealing the pull effects of the European field and the value of specific European institutional resources in these types of career trajectories.

The theoretical perspectives of this book, therefore, help to better understand the institutional and social construction of authority and to provide insights on the shifting configurations of power relationships over time, in different areas of the field of Eurocracy and in the relationship between different levels of government (international, European or national). This last aspect is the central object of Frédéric Lebaron's chapter on the governors of the European Central Bank, which raises the essential question of the sociological conditions of the independence of the ECB. 'Independence' is the essential belief which is at the heart of the authority of central bankers, and Lebaron's chapter shows that the ability of the ECB to incarnate independence is in large part constructed on diverse forms of collective capital (academic, bureaucratic, professional). The analysis goes on to show that this independence is in fact constructed on a double form of dependence of the governors of the ECB. The governors posses a high degree of national capital, accumulated through their training and previous careers. The orthodox position of the ECB – superior to that of the U.S. Federal Reserve (FED) since 2007 – can be explained by the mobilization of a monetarist economic ethos to counter suspicions that they represent national interests: in particular, interests of countries considered to have 'lax' monetary traditions.

Philippe Aldrin mobilizes an historical focus to study the successive transformations of the field of communication and information, which includes Commission actors, specialized journalists and a variety of experts. Breaking with a strategic interpretation of the successive 'failures'

of EU communication policy, the chapter identifies a double dynamic. The first is the longstanding structural weakness of Commission civil servants specialized in communications and the resulting institutional fragmentation. The second historical process is the increasing attention paid to communication as a remedy to the 'democratic deficit' – an approach which has stimulated a process of professionalization resulting in the importation of professional norms and know-how coming from outside EU institutions, as well as an increasing recourse to outsourcing of communication and information activities. The example of communication and information sheds light on the porosity of institutional borders to circulations of personnel, resources and know-how.

The porosity of institutional borders in the field constitutes an overarching framework for the following four chapters, seeking to specify the relationships between EU institutions and groups of actors involved in European regulation. In this overall framework, the various chapters demonstrate that European institutions are not just organizations, but that they also institute forms of credit and certification which are selectively conferred upon organized 'stakeholders' who are more or less permanent players in the field of Eurocracy. These four chapters provide different vantage points by focusing on experts selected by Commission services (Chapter 6), interest group representatives (Chapter 7), trade unionists (Chapter 8) and European business leaders (Chapter 9).

In Chapter 4, Cécile Robert starts with the classic question of the functions and representativity of experts in the EU polity. Avoiding the inextricable normative debates on their legitimacy, Robert focuses on the practical processes of selection of experts, the resources and properties of those selected and on the construction of the authority of expertise. Beyond the apparent heterogeneity and pluralism of experts in terms of nationality and professional or institutional status, the chapter shows how the selection process (and the socialization to expectations regarding appropriate behavior) distributes European institutional capital to experts and more generally has brought about a relative sociological, practical and ideational convergence between Commission officials and their 'independent' experts. These experts sometimes go on to careers in the Commission or in other parts of the field of Eurocracy, such as consulting, think tanks or lobby groups.

In their chapter on lobbyists, Guillaume Courty and Hélène Michel formulate a strong hypothesis on the relationship between interest groups and the Commission. The authors start by underlining the issues raised by the identification and the determination of the number of active lobbyists, whose relationship to the Commission is not founded

just on the circulation of information and the forging of coalitions in the various policy sectors but, more fundamentally, on the production of legitimacy through recognition as a stakeholder. The construction of a space of interest representation in the field depends in large part on the structuring activity of the Commission, a hypothesis which is explored empirically through the activities of counting and registering lobbyists, the sector structuring of interest groups around policy areas and the importance of a specifically European capital of lobbyists which generates hierarchies of legitimacy to act as a European 'insider.' In this light, the analysis invites further research to go beyond the question of reciprocal influence of distinct institutions and to study this relationship in terms of sociological continuums and revolving-door career paths which cement these diverse relationships.

Within this general framework, the study of European trade unionists by Anne-Catherine Wagner shows that if this process of Europeanization is also at work in the Brussels offices of the European Trade Union Confederation through socialization and the hiring of young policy officers with diplomas in European studies and international capital, this has generated tensions within the structure. Trade union representation in Brussels has indeed generated a sociological cleavage: on the one side, older unionists with activist credentials who have worked their way up national ranks and progressively acquired European know-how; on the other side, one increasingly finds employees of the Brussels office with no activist past but with diplomas in European affairs and significant European capital whose resources and knowledge are better adapted tothe unwritten rules governing interactions in the field of Eurocracy.

On the 'opposing side,' that of leaders of big European firms, the chapter by François-Xavier Dudouet, Eric Grémont, Antoine Vion and Audrey Pageaut, shows how Europeanization in this segment of interest representation takes on other forms. The authors show that the space of European business leaders is relatively loosely linked and remains heterogeneous, but that collectives such as the European Round Table or financial 'cathedrals' can generate forms of Europeanization among leaders with particular properties.

The present volume's conclusion builds on the various chapters to lay the foundation for a synthetic overview of the field of Eurocracy, taking the form of a map of the topography of this field identifying the key structural tensions and divisions. This overview allows Didier Georgakakis to identify three structural oppositions traversing the field: (a) the overall volume of capital held by the various categories of agents; (b) the degree of permanence or intermittence in the field, which is

used as a proxy for the amount of specifically European capital which different categories of agents can accumulate and which confers upon them the reputation (among the most Europeanized central actors of the field) of being an insider or outsider; (c) the polarity between private (economic) interests and the public sector, which again cuts across the field. This representation and the evolutions of these configurations over time are important elements in understanding the current state of the European project and its evolutions over time. This first sketch of the topography of the field raises many new research questions but also provides new inroads into classic problems of European Studies which warrant further investigation: the differential speed and depth of European integration in various policy areas; informal governance and the production of public policy; the sociological foundations of the European 'regime'; and the structural conditions which contribute to new understandings of the crises which have regularly punctuated the history of the EU since the end of the Delors era.

Notes

1. One of the first uses of the term can be found in an article in *The Economist* from 1961. The term spread in the mid-1960s through Spinelli's book *The Eurocrats* (1966). In French, references, often positively loaded, can be found in the memoirs of one of the first two French Commissioners (Lemaignien, 1964) .
2. Between the 1970s and early 1990s there were some exceptions, in particular in political anthropology (Abélès, Bellier and MacDonald, 1993) or in history (Condorelli-Braun, 1972).
3. For a more in depth and critical summary of research on European socialization, see Michel and Robert, 2010.
4. With a few notable exceptions (Page, 1997; Haller, 2008), there has been little cross-sectional research, and even this research does not mobilize collective and individual biographical information, as is the case in this volume.
5. On journalists, see: Baisnée, 2003; Bastin, 2003; 2004; on diplomats: Buchet de Neuilly, 2005; on the Council secretariat: Mangenot, 2010; on the agents of the sector of justice and security: Bigo, 2007; Mégie, 2006; Mangenot, 2006; Paris, 2006; 2008. For a series of case studies on processes of European socialization, see Michel and Robert, 2010, or on the relationship between local and regional political spaces and the EU, see De Lassalle, 2010.
6. To be more precise, initial impetus for the project dates to the publication of a volume on the professionals of political Europe (Georgakakis, 2002).

1
MEPs: Towards a Specialization of European Political Work?

Willy Beauvallet and Sébastien Michon

Introduction

The degree of Europeanization of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) is a central bone of contention between inter-governmentalists and supra-nationalists in European Studies (Schimmelfeinnig and Rittberger, 2006).[1] The debate dates back to the normative arguments put forward by neo-functionalist theorists who claimed that the direct election of MEPs would produce a body of professionals dedicated to the promotion of the Community and its parliament (Haas, 1958; Cotta, 1984). From this perspective, European socialization, through membership in the institution, is perceived as a process of loyalty transfer from the national level to the European level. Other studies contest the evolutionist perspectives implied by spill-over theories. They underline the permanence of national ties and the ineffectiveness of spill-over in structural terms (no emergence of a European public or political space), ideological terms (no significant conversions to Europe) or sociological terms (no identifiable European political class). These scholars emphasize the pre-eminence of nationally centered political careers and the heterogeneity of national processes of selecting representatives (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) and of practices of representation (Navarro, 2009), as well as the lack of interest from representatives who are mostly nationally minded – as measured by their high resignation rates (Bryder, 1998). Accordingly, the importance of the internal socialization processes of the European Parliament (EP) is downplayed. The evidence of the pro-European position of many MEPs is ascribed to an effect of selection processes within national parties rather than to a conversion resulting from direct involvement in European institutions (Scarrow and Franklin, 1999; Scully, 2005).

These studies provide an alternative to the predictive and normative postures that are still present in the academic literature on the European Union (Hix et al., 2005). However, there are two limitations. First, these studies neglect the effects of closure linked to institutional construction. Numerous studies published since the 1990s have shown the specialization and rationalization of parliamentary work following the transformation of institutional configurations brought about by the succession of treaties since 1986 (Bowler and Farrel, 1995; Delwit et al., 1999; Costa, 2001). For instance, Hix and Lord (1997) document a shift from an 'exogenous' political system (based on external considerations and constraints) to an 'endogenous' one (based on considerations and constraints determined by the imperatives and specificities of internal factors). From a neo-institutionalist perspective based on a rational choice approach, Kreppel (2002) highlights the establishment of a 'supranational party system' influenced by external forces, and in which actors develop strategies and use their organization skills to respond to these evolutions. The second limitation of these studies – and of others inspired by neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism – is their lack of sociological depth. On the one hand, they neglect the effects of social and political trajectories on the forms of investment and the choices made by the actors in situ. The approach is too often descriptive and fails to use social and political biographies to put into perspective preferences and practices (votes, number of questions asked, parliamentary reports and so on). On the other hand, they tend to disregard the consequences of the transformation of the MEPs' profiles since the first direct election of 1979. These are significant, if not revolutionary, transformations. Verzichelli and Edinger (2005) have, for example, analyzed the constitution of a 'critical mass of EU representatives,' but have pointed out the permanence of the centrifugal forces limiting the autonomization and differentiation of a specifically European elite.

This chapter aims at going beyond the often-normative dilemmas inherent to these debates. It adopts a political sociology approach (Georgakakis, 2009; Georgakakis and Weisbein, 2010) and, more precisely, an approach labeled as structural constructivism (Kauppi, 2003). This entails studying Europe as a growing space of power, rather than as a system or a regime (Hix, 1999; Magnette, 2003a; Quermonne, 2005) resulting from economic, legal and ideological spill-over or as a mere bargaining arena controlled by member states (Moravcsik, 1998). In order to analyze the EP's institutionalization, we will mobilize tools from the 'sociology of the state' (Weber, 1959; Elias, 1991; Georgakakis and Weisbein, 2010). Along these lines, we will conceptualize the

differentiation of this space as the result of multiple processes of accumulation and concentration of specific resources as an often unexpected or undesired effect of the competitive cooperation between various actors (European and national civil servants, political representatives, members of interest groups and so on) who strive to increase their own capacities for action and decision making.

Structural constructivism emphasizes three complementary elements: first, the importance of the processes through which certain resources ('capital') are concentrated and redefined at the European level (Georgakakis and De Lassalle, 2007a; Rowell and Mangenot, 2010); second, the emergence of new 'breeds' of political professionals in charge of individual and collective political enterprises aimed at appropriating specific resources, whose management requires increasingly specialized knowledge and skills (Georgakakis, 2002a); third, the existence of specific socialization processes promoting shared values, skills and cultures that limit access to a field of power (Georgakakis, 2004b; International Organization, 2005; Michel and Robert, 2010). By combining these elements, we can study the invention of a European political and institutional order that is both partly differentiated from and interdependent with national spaces – a situation which has been termed a 'multi-level political field' (Kauppi, 2005).

The institutionalization of the EP needs to be put into perspective with the emergence of a new category of specialists in political work (Beauvallet and Michon, 2010b). This European professionalization is the product of social and political processes and not the result of ideological choices or a mechanical effect of new legal rules or treaty provisions (Beauvallet, 2007). The peripheral position of the EP in national political spaces makes it less attractive to political elites than many national political mandates. This situation has, in turn, favored more open recruitment, with the investiture of actors who are less endowed with the most legitimate national political resources. For a growing number of actors, the EP represents an opportunity to professionalize and acquire political capital, especially as the increasing importance of the EP within the European institutional triangle has helped make investment in parliamentary work more rewarding. Together with institutional and political evolutions, these socio-political transformations favor the emergence of actors who are more directly specialized in European affairs and are able to accumulate and concentrate enough internal resources to hold leading positions in the field of Eurocracy.

The persistent turnover of parliamentary personnel and heterogeneity of MEPs linked to its multinational character and the variety of

procedures to select candidates and electoral systems are, therefore, partly compensated for by internal dynamics restricting access to the European field, the clearest manifestation of which is the strong specialization of leadership positions within the EP.

In order to test these hypotheses, we have built a biographical database of elected MEPs of the sixth EP (2004–9), with data collected from the official institutional list (n=785).[2] Beyond the national logics and the strong heterogeneity inherent in a multinational population, the first section will aim at showing how their social and political recruitment have nonetheless tended to converge. The second section underlines the emergence of a parliamentary elite: that is, specifically European in terms of resources and career types, likely to occupy the main leadership positions within the EP.

The transformation and specialization of MEP recruitment

By studying MEP profiles, we can observe a degree of convergence of socio-demographic and political characteristics and a growing average length of seniority. The EP appears as a privileged space of political investment for political personnel climbing up the political ladder. One can identify a Europeanization of selection processes: that is, the emergence of explicit and codified norms, which apply to various national contexts. The differences in profiles between MEPs from countries of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and the other countries confirm this hypothesis: the former, recently subjected to European norms, are close to MEPs of the 1980s in terms of social and career characteristics.

The underlying convergence of socio-demographic characteristics

The EP is increasingly considered to be an area of political professionalization for a predominantly middle-aged, well-educated and partly internationalized and feminized elite. Professional backgrounds tend to reflect those of the general political personnel (Best and Cotta, 2004). MEPs come from the middle or upper-middle-classes, with a predominance of lawyers and academics (Hix and Lord, 1997; Norris and Franklin, 1997), who adapted to the field of Eurocracy that, as a whole, has historically favored law and expert competence (Vauchez, 2008a). The high level of the degrees obtained by MEPs confirms their intellectual profiles. For example, in the sixth EP, 81 percent held a university degree, and 27 percent had completed a PhD. MEPs from accession countries tend to be more academically qualified, and more often have studied economics, science and technology and health than law and the

humanities. They are more likely to have been active in scientific professions, as top civil servants or in the diplomatic corps than have their counterparts from older member states (see Table 1.1).

Through the increasing internationalization of elites and academic markets (Wagner, 1998), MEPs increasingly have international profiles. In the sixth EP, 12 percent had obtained a degree in a country other than their own (elsewhere in Europe, in the United States or even in Russia for some East European MEPs). Smaller countries with a relatively peripheral position in the EU are, not surprisingly, over-represented in this regard: Hungary, the Czech Republic, Malta, but also Portugal and Greece. Going across borders and attending prestigious universities abroad allows elites from 'small' countries to receive the same training as future elites from 'big' countries, allowing those from small countries to acquire resources that can be converted in both national and European spaces.

In terms of age, European representatives are, again, not much different from other political professions: most are middle aged (Best and Cotta, 2004). In 2007, their mean age was 53.8 years (standard deviation of 10.1 years) – the oldest being 83, whereas the youngest was 24, and the modal age class was between 50 and 60 (40 percent of MEPs). This situation results from a long-term evolution. In 1979, the European political profile was older: the notion of the 'end-of-career' MEP prevailed. During the late 1990s, it was the opposite; most MEPs (73 percent) were aged between 40 and 60 and 14 percent were under 40, whereas 13 percent were over 60 (Hix and Lord, 1997). Variations among countries need to be pointed out: Luxembourg, Cyprus and Estonia had high average ages (over 60), followed by France and Italy (56 and 57 respectively), while Bulgarian, Hungarian, Maltese and Romanian MEPs were under 50 on average.[3] Generally speaking, MEPs from left-of-center political groups tended to be younger (52 for the Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA) and for the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), compared to an average of 55 for the European Popular Party (EPP), and 57 for the Independence/Democracy Group (ID). Female MEPs were, on average, three years younger than their male counterparts (respectively 52 and 55).

The proportion of women, higher than in most national parliaments, doubled between 1979 and the last two EPs: 16 percent in 1979, 31 percent in 2004 and 35 percent in 2009. If the EP is one of the most feminized parliaments in Europe (Kauppi, 1999; Beauvallet and Michon, 2008), it has not yet achieved gender parity. Major variations remain among countries, indicating important differences among national

Table 1.1 Distribution of occupation and degree levels in the sixth EP

	Total		**First fifteen countries**		**Accession countries (2004 and 2007)**	
	Number of MEPs	**%**	**Number of MEPs**	**%**	**Number of MEPs**	**%**
Occupation						
Farmer	12	2	10	2	2	1
Craftsman-retailer	7	1	7	1	0	0
Company manager	45	6	34	6	11	5
Liberal profession	71	9	51	9	20	9
Civil servant, diplomat	49	6	29	5	20	9
Scientific profession	141	18	72	13	69	32
Primary or secondary school teacher	61	8	51	9	10	5
Senior executive – public sector	40	5	30	5	10	5
Information, communication or arts	84	11	59	10	25	12
Senior executive – private sector	92	12	67	12	25	12
Intermediary profession	36	5	35	6	1	0
Employee/worker	17	2	17	3	0	0
N/A	130	18	108	19	22	10
Total	**785**	**100**	**570**	**100**	**215**	**100**
Degree held:						
High school or lower	50	6	48	8	2	1
University (lower than PhD)	424	54	332	58	92	43
PhD	212	27	113	20	99	46
N/A	99	13	77	14	22	10
Total	**785**	**100**	**570**	**100**	**215**	**100**
Degree in:						
Law	158	20	128	22	30	14
Political science	55	7	42	7	13	6
Economics	106	14	63	11	43	20
Humanities	192	24	151	26	41	19
Science and technology	90	11	48	8	42	20
Health	39	5	18	3	21	10
N/A	145	18	120	21	25	12
Total	**785**	**100**	**570**	**100**	**215**	**100**

Table 1.2 Gender distribution in the sixth EP depending on country of election (in descending order)

	% men	% women	Total
Sweden	47	53	100
Estonia	50	50	100
Netherlands	56	44	100
Bulgaria	56	44	100
Denmark	57	43	100
Slovenia	57	43	100
France	58	42	100
Ireland	62	38	100
Lithuania	62	38	100
Hungary	63	37	100
Finland	64	36	100
Slovakia	64	36	100
Romania	66	34	100
Austria	67	33	100
Spain	67	33	100
Luxembourg	67	33	100
Germany	68	32	100
Greece	71	29	100
UK	74	26	100
Belgium	75	25	100
Portugal	75	25	100
Latvia	78	22	100
Czech Republic	79	21	100
Italy	81	19	100
Poland	85	15	100
Cyprus	100	0	100
Malta	100	0	100
Total	**69**	**31**	**100**

political systems. There are few female MEPs from Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Italy, the Czech Republic and Latvia. Women are better represented in Sweden – the only country where parity is achieved – and in the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, Slovenia and France, where more than 40 percent of MEPs are women (Table 1.2).

All in all, the MEPs from countries of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement are less feminized than those from the original 15 EU members (28 percent against 32 percent, respectively) and there are more women in center-left groups (Norris and Franklin, 1997) – Party of the European Socialists group (PES), 40 percent of MEPs, 47 percent for the Greens/EFA – than in the GUE, 31 percent, EPP, 28 percent, and especially the

ID, Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) and non-attached, between 11 percent and 16 percent. Generally speaking, the EP provides opportunities for political professionalization to actors whose socio-political profiles place them at a slight disadvantage in national political fields (Beauvallet and Michon, 2008).

Differentiated political careers

MEPs in the 1980s often had substantial political experience at the national level, but in the 1990s – regardless of the country – the EP became increasingly a means of access to political professionalization at earlier stages of a political career. In the sixth EP, being elected as an MEP is often a first important mandate after a local mandate (one out of four) or a first mandate (one out of three). It is thanks to Europe that an increasing number of MEPs were able to hold political mandates that for the first time provided them with full salaries.

A progressive differentiation in the paths to Europe can be observed over time. Compared with the past, MEPs today are less likely to have prior national parliamentary or governmental experience. For instance, 45 percent of MEPs from the first EP had already been members of their national parliament, 35 percent for the second EP, but only 28 percent for the fifth EP. These proportions increased in 2004 (39 percent were former MPs), and it was mainly due to the MEPs from the new accession countries, who tended to come from the center of national political fields. Indeed, for the first 15 countries, the percentages are close to those of the fifth EP (31 percent). Hence, these results show the disparities within the population of MEPs with regard to their political capital and the stages in their political careers. However, these disparities depend on the evolution of the modes of political recruitment rather than on strictly national differences (for example, German/French).

MEPs with substantial political experience at the national level are more likely to be older men from a right-of-center party and from countries of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement; 42 percent of the men had prior experience in one of the national parliaments (against 33 percent of women) and 18 percent had occupied governmental positions (12 percent of women). Most of the oldest MEPs already had a national mandate: 52 percent of those over 60 years of age against only 33 percent of those under 50; 38 percent of MEPs from the UEN group had ministerial experience, 19 percent from the PPE; the UEN and PPE being the two main right-of-center groups – only 16 percent from PES, one from the Greens/EFA and none from GUE.

MEPs from new member states (2004 and 2007) have profiles similar to those of MEPs from the mid-1980s. They are more frequently male, older, more right wing[4] and have previous national parliamentary experience (62 percent against 31 percent of the first 15), regardless of their nationality. Among the first 15, only Finland (77 percent), Portugal (71 percent), Ireland (69 percent) and Luxembourg (67 percent) have high rates as compared to those from Holland (7 percent), Germany (14 percent) and Britain (16 percent). In the same way, former ministers represent 78 percent of Latvians, 50 percent of Estonians, 43 percent of Slovenians, but only 5 percent of British MEPs, and no German or Dutch MEPs had prior ministerial experience. Among the first 15 countries, only Ireland and Portugal are exceptions (Table 1.3).

Bearing in mind that national differences are still present (as we will see), political careers clearly appear to be increasingly Europe-specialized. MEPs can no longer have double mandates (national and European): Under the first EP (1979–84), 31 percent of MEPs still held double mandates against less than 7 percent under the fifth EP (1999–2004) before the ban of this practice institutionalized a norm already implicit in many member states. This practice was, in fact, strongly contested and stigmatized in the EP itself.[5]

Mandates in the EP have become increasingly stable and durable: during the fifth EP (1999–2004), less than 15 percent of the MEPs resigned during their mandate (24 percent resigned during the first EP), and close to one MEP out of two was re-elected (Bryder, 1998; Corbett et al., 2000). Since the third EP (1989–94) longevity of service in the EP began to rise (Marrel and Payre, 2006); 56 percent of the MEPs in the sixth EP (2004–9) from the first 15 countries were re-elected. In 2007, MEPs from the first 15 countries had an average of 7.5 years of seniority and two mandates.

Variations among national delegations have tended to decrease, and an overarching pattern has gradually emerged. This reality is more explicit within major national delegations in which the number of MEPs allows for statistically significant historical comparisons. Between 1979 and 1994, 58 percent of the British and 43 percent of Germans accumulated more than 7.5 years of seniority at the EP against 25 percent of the French and 28 percent of the Italians (Scarrow, 1997). In the sixth EP, it is still the Germans and the British who have the most seniority (Table 1.4). During the 2004 elections, more than two-thirds of the German MEPs and nearly four-fifths of the British MEPs were re-elected. They average, respectively, 2.4 and 2.3 mandates compared with 2.0 for the French, 1.8 for the Italians, 1.4 for the Portuguese, 1.4 for the Swedes and 1.3

Table 1.3 Proportion of MEPs of the sixth EP having previously exercised a national mandate or been a member of government

	National MP (%)	**Former member of government (%)**
Finland	77	31
Portugal	71	38
Ireland	69	46
Luxembourg	67	67
Sweden	50	5
Austria	44	6
Spain	43	9
Belgium	42	33
Denmark	42	8
Italy	31	12
France	26	18
Greece	25	17
UK	16	5
Germany	14	0
Netherlands	7	0
Total first 15	*31*	*12*
Latvia	100	78
Romania	100	24
Estonia	83	50
Slovakia	77	31
Cyprus	67	17
Slovenia	57	43
Lithuania	54	31
Czech Republic	50	13
Poland	49	22
Hungary	46	29
Bulgaria	40	20
Malta	20	20
MEPs from 2004–7 enlargement	*62*	*27*
Total	**39**	**16**

for the Greeks.[6] This pattern also increasingly affects, for instance, the French (30 percent of re-elected MEPs in 1999, 48 percent in 2004 and 42 percent in 2009).

Beyond the persistence of national patterns linked to specific institutional and political factors, the relative convergence of parliamentary profiles tends to show feedback effects of the institutionalization of the EP. The national variations in the MEPs' recruitment are counterbalanced by forces increasing the autonomy of the EP's internal functions.

The emergence of a parliamentary elite and the relative closure of the space

By analyzing the distribution of power and leadership positions in the institution (presidency, vice-presidency and quaestors, presidency and vice-presidency of political groups and parliamentary committees)[7] we can demonstrate the importance of the types of legitimacy and resources specific to the EP. Over time, representatives who have the most European professionalization and the most internal political resources have taken control of leadership positions. In short, European resources have prevailed over national resources.

The study of the characteristics of MEPs holding leadership positions in the institution during the sixth EP confirms trends that were observed in the late 1990s, when there was a notable surge of Europeanization in the EP (Beauvallet, 2005). In addition to the stabilization of political personnel, access to these positions favors seniority, with an average of at least 2.4 mandates (against 1.7 mandates on average). The presidency of a political group is the most seniority-dependent function: the (former and current) group presidents have exercised close to four mandates on average.[8] Then comes membership in the bureau of the EP (2.9 mandates) and the presidency of a committee (2.8 mandates), which suggests that specifically European resources are key in order to reach central leadership positions within the institution.[9] Finally, vice presidencies of committees (2.3 mandates) appear to be more accessible and, therefore, less prestigious. Logically, when taking experience into account, the inclusion or the non-inclusion of MEPs from countries of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements alter the averages (Table 1.5).

The importance of seniority in the structuring of the parliamentary space is highlighted by a multiple correspondence analysis. This statistical technique associates several variables. By studying the proximities and the distances between variables and groups and distributing the main correspondences on different axes, this technique describes the principles that structure the field according to socio-political and institutional characteristics.[10] The two most important axes represent 15.28 percent and 12.48 percent of the total inertia. The first axis represents the MEPs' volume of political and educational capital. On the one side are those who have more capital (former ministers, members of a national parliament, PhD holders) – mostly men, older than average, from countries of the 2004 enlargement. On the other side are those whose political capital is often based on party or activist resources; they

Table 1.4 Indicators of seniority of the sixth EP MEPs (decreasing order)

Country of election	**Number of MEPs**	**Average number of mandates**	**Average number of yrs at the EP (July 2007)**
Germany	99	2.4	9.0
UK	78	2.3	8.2
Austria	18	2.2	6.9
Belgium	24	2.0	6.3
France	78	2.0	6.4
Luxembourg	6	2.0	6.1
Denmark	14	1.9	6.3
Spain	54	1.9	6.3
Finland	14	1.9	5.7
Italy	78	1.8	5.7
Netherlands	27	1.8	5.7
Ireland	13	1.5	3.9
Portugal	24	1.4	3.8
Sweden	19	1.4	3.7
Greece	24	1.3	3.5
Total first 15	*570*	*2*	*7.5*
Cyprus	6	1.0	2.0
Czech Republic	24	1.0	2.0
Estonia	6	1.0	2.0
Hungary	24	1.0	2.0
Latvia	9	1.0	2.0
Lithuania	13	1.0	2.0
Malta	5	1.0	2.0
Poland	54	1.0	2.0
Slovakia	14	1.0	2.0
Slovenia	7	1.0	2.0
Bulgaria	18	1.0	0.5
Romania	35	1.0	0.5
Total for MEPs from countries of the 2004 or 2007 enlargements	*215*	*1*	*2.4*
Total	**785**	**1.7**	**6.1**

are more often women, younger than the average, and possess less educational capital. The second axis represents seniority and responsibilities within the EP. On the north side of the figure, one finds MEPs who exercise or have exercised responsibilities within the parliament (members of the bureau, president and vice president of a committee or a group) and have had several mandates. On the south side, one finds MEPs with less experience and who are more often women, young, less educated

Table 1.5 MEPs of the sixth EP and leadership positions

	MEPs of the 27			MEPs without the 12 accession countries (2004 and 2007)		
	Number of MEPs	**Average number of mandates**	**Average number of yrs in the EP**	**Number of MEPs**	**Average number of mandates**	**Average number of yrs in the EP**
Bureau of the EP	33	2.9	11.8	32	2.9	12.1
Group president	14	3.9	17	14	3.9	17
Committee president	32	2.8	11.9	28	3.1	13.2
Group vice president	56	2.7	10.8	50	2.9	11.8
Committee vice president	121	2.3	8.9	96	2.6	10.7
Total Leadership Positions	200	2.4	9.7	167	2.7	11.1
Total/ average EP	**785**	**1.7**	**6.1**	**570**	**2.0**	**7.5**

and members of smaller parliamentary groups (GUE/NGL, Greens/EFA, Independence and Democracy) (Figure 1.1).

The prevalence of seniority on the vertical axis sheds light on the importance of institutional credit based on controlling internal networks, mastering specific skills and expertise and acquiring the practical sense of political interactions in the European space. These qualities allow actors to develop relevant political strategies. However, other elements should not be overlooked.

MEPs who hold leadership positions in the EP are more often men and former civil servants or diplomats. The clear domination of men reproduces the gender hierarchies of the political field. Even though women seem to benefit from an easier access to a political mandate in the EP than in national settings, gender inequalities remain: women represent around 31 percent of MEPs, but only 14 percent of presidents of a political group, 19 percent of the presidents of a committee, and 25 percent of the vice presidents of a committee. Although gender inequalities have tended to diminish in terms of access to the EP, they endure within the



Figure 1.1 A multiple correspondence analysis representing the distribution of socio-political and institutional characteristics of MEPs of the sixth EP (axis 1 and 2) (n = 732)

institution (Kauppi, 1999; Beauvallet and Michon, 2008), showing the effects of political capital and the importance of seniority.

The over-representation of former civil servants and diplomats (22 percent of presidents of committees and 12 percent of vice presidents of committees against 7 percent of the total population) shows the importance of skills and symbolic credit linked to the internationalization of political life within the parliamentary space. These professions require dispositions and skills which facilitate the acquisition of European institutional capital, such as familiarity with multinational political spaces, command of foreign languages, as well as the mastery of subtle forms of negotiation and compromise. These MEPs dispositions are activated in this arena; those who do not already possess them have to make a greater effort to acquire them and earn their place in the parliament. In fact, national experience does not appear to be significant in this regard, according to our data. National experience appears important only insofar as resources and political capital acquired on the national scene are Europeanized, consecutive with a substantial investment in parliamentary work. MEPs who have held leadership positions in the EP do not have more or less prior experience at the national level than average.

The role of some variables is quite obvious. But it is seniority in parliament which appears to be the most clear-cut, as shown by the logistic regression below. The proposed model, explaining the occupation of a leadership position, includes the main variables: the number of mandates, having formerly exercised a national mandate (member of the government and/or MP), highest degree obtained and gender. The model specifies the number of mandates at the EP as the most important variable (Table 1.6). In other words, MEPs with seniority are more likely to hold a leadership position, ceteris paribus. Apart from seniority, it is worth noting that, in the model below, only educational attainment is significant: the most highly qualified are more likely to hold a leadership position in the EP. On the contrary, political experience at the national level and gender are not significant.

Even though they still depend on other factors (configuration of the relationships between political groups and delegations within groups), the processes of internal mobility remain linked to the amount of European or Europeanized political resources held. The data confirms the increased autonomy and the growing professionalization of the European parliamentary space, with specific organizational forms, symbolic resources and practices (Beauvallet and Michon, 2007).

The emergence of European political careers and the identification of an institutional elite are related to processes of mobility within the

Table 1.6 Model of logistic regression of the occupation of a leadership position at the EP by MEPs of the sixth EP (c = 0.768; 74.3 percent concordant)[11]

	Odds ratio	**Occupation of leadership position**	**Significance**
Intercept		–0,8093	<0,0001
Number of EP mandates			
1 mandate	0.287	–1.6009	***
2 mandates	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
3 mandates	2.820	0.6827	***
4 mandates and more	5.086	1.2724	***
Former national mandate			
Already exercised	1.389	0.1642	(ns
Never exercised	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Degree level			
< or=high school	0.391	–0.7028	*
> high school and <master	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
> or=master's	1.257	0.4656	*
Gender			
Male	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Female	0.720	–0.1641	ns
N		635	

Statistical significance: *** at 0.01%; ** at 0.1%; * at 1%; ns: non-significant.

space. Actors coming from a core of professionals control the EP and its major organs (political groups and parliamentary committees). The data shows the importance of authority gained through long-term investment. The EP and its major internal structures are governed by actors with the profile of 'professionals of Europe' (Georgakakis, 2002a). These parliamentarians also represent the institution and embody its specific institutional charisma. From this point of view, the contrast with the 1980s now seems very strong. Between 1979 and 1987, figures such as Simone Veil (France, EP president 1979–82 and former health minister) or Pierre Pflimlin (France, EP president 1984–7), who had held important mandates at the national and regional level, seemed to embody the EP. Between 1994 and 2008, EP presidents such as Klaus Hänsch (Germany, 1994–7), José-Maria Gil Robles Gil-Delgado (Spain, 1979–99), Nicole Fontaine (France, 1999–2002) and Hans-Gert Pöttering (2007–9), with careers that were above all centered on the

institution and with little specifically national political capital, have prevailed.

Conclusion

The results show that positions in the European parliamentary space are structured around the distribution of specific resources linked to the exercise of a European mandate and to the effective participation of actors in political interactions in the field of Eurocracy. The control of these resources seems to be essential to the acquisition of particular forms of credit necessary for occupying leadership positions in the EP. The study of leadership positions through quantitative data shows the increasing importance of properties emanating from involvement and action within the parliamentary space itself (seniority, investment in the institution and its organs on a long-term basis). These properties seem ever more decisive in the access to the most central positions of the EP. These transformations attest to a process of Europeanization of the parliamentary elite. MEPs earn their positions by acquiring specialized resources. The control of these different elements and the progressive acquisition of a real practical sense of Europe give individuals a portion of this institutional charisma that is necessary for laying claim to the exercise of internal power.

Leadership positions in the EP depend on a particular form of symbolic internal political capital. Associated with continuous investment in the institution – and with a broad relational network and practical control of institutional and inter-institutional exchanges – this political credit is an alternative to other types of political capital, acquired at the national level, that are less valuable in the EP. In this sense, the EP indeed functions as a socializing environment in which MEPs can develop their knowledge and skills as well as their beliefs (legitimate ways of operating that have progressively become necessary for those who wish to enter the institutional game) and acquire their 'practical sense' (Bourdieu, 1998), and the MEP may obtain the available rewards.

Notes

1. We would like to thank Jean-Yves Bart, Didier Georgakakis and Jay Rowell for their helpful comments.
2. It includes indicators available on the EP website linked to demographic properties (gender, age), to socio-cultural properties (level and type of degree, past profession), to dispositions toward internationalization (foreign degrees), to their political careers (types of mandates, career characteristics), as well as to

their investment in the EP: Committee participation, number of mandates and years in the EP, positions of power exercised (presidency and vice-presidency of committees, of groups, member of the Bureau, delegation presidency). Most of the present material comes from biographical dictionaries. These data are completed by drawing on the existing literature to carry out historical comparisons.

3. French MEPs, among the oldest in the EP, 56 years and 2 months, are nevertheless younger than national MPs, 6 years and 9 months (Source: French National Assembly) and senators, 61 years (Source: French Senate, 2008).
4. The enlargement was beneficial to right-wing political groups: although MEPs from the ten accession countries of 2004 represent 22 percent of the parliament, a majority of the UEN group is composed of MEPs from accession countries, about a quarter of EPP, but only 15 percent of the three left-of-center groups are from these countries.
5. Included in several national legislations, the prohibition of the combination of European and national mandates was introduced in a 2002 reform of the Brussels' Act of November 20, 1976 on the election of MEPs.
6. On average, 10 and 9.2 years at the EP for the Germans and the British against 7.4 years for the French (in the fourth position); only 4.7 and 4.5 for the Swedish and the Greeks, 6.1 on average and 7.5 for those from the first 15. Owing to a number of elements specific to the United Kingdom (in particular, the mode of election), the British seem to have more Europe-specialized personnel than others (Westlake, 2004).
7. These positions are filled every 2.5 years, at the beginning and in the middle of each term. The bureau is elected by secret ballot and an absolute majority of votes, and the number of votes received determines the order of precedence. The group's presidents are elected based on principles that are similar in each group, whereas the committee presidents (in the same way as presidents of delegations and vice presidents of committees and delegations) are designated using the 'd'Hondt system': the number of each group's appointed positions depends on the number of members; the groups then share the positions that were attributed among their different delegations and, eventually, internal delegations in the groups submit names for given positions (but this choice must be endorsed by the group bureau). Their strategic character has considerably increased along with the complexity of parliamentary interactions, the growth of the institution's internal division of labor and the affirmation of the EP.
8. In this sense, the appointment of J. Daul in 2007 as the leader of the EPP group after only one and a half mandates is exceptional. As soon as he arrived in the EP, however, various elements gave him symbolic resources and specialized skills likely to be promptly made profitable in the EP.
9. The institutionalization of the EP and the development of the internal division of labor which has resulted from the diversification of its skills, match, on the institutional level, the increasing domination of hierarchical structures (the bureau), of political groups and parliamentary committees.
10. This analysis is based on the 732 MEPs of the sixth term in 2004. The active variables are: gender, four indicators of a political career (having formerly been a minister, national MP, local representative or mayor), one indicator of diploma and, finally, two indicators on careers in the EP (the number of

mandates and the occupation of a leadership position). Owing to an excessively large number of modalities and sometimes a small number of MEPs, the initial profession, nationality and detailed leadership positions (member of the bureau, presidency and vice presidency of committees and groups) are supplementary variables; they do not contribute to the construction of the axes but can be projected on the map with the active variables.

11. *Interpretation*: We aim to explain the factors determining the occupation of a leadership position in the EP. We perform a *logit* estimation of the model. A statistically significant and positive value shows that a modality increases the chances of an MEP holding a leadership position, ceteris paribus. A statistically significant and negative value shows that we are dealing with a modality that decreases the chances of an MEP holding a leadership position. The odds ratios are calculated based on the reference modality. The baseline ('ref') is a male MEP elected for the second time to the EP in 2004, one who has never had a mandate at the national level (member of a government or an MP) and whose degree level is greater or equivalent to high school but less than a master's.

2
Tensions within Eurocracy: A Socio-morphological Perspective

Didier Georgakakis

Introduction

In an interview given to the German daily newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in 2006, European Commissioner Günther Verheugen, 62 years old at the time and second-term commissioner, declared that 'the evolution over the last ten years has given so many powers to top-level officials that the most significant political task of the 25 commissioners now consists in controlling this system.' He then went on to say: '[W]hen I read certain statements by officials, I am baffled. Their tone is technical, arrogant and condescending'; he added: '[T]here is a constant turf battle between commissioners and high-level officials. Some of them seem to think: the commissioner will be leaving after his five-year term anyway, he is just a tenant in the house, whereas I am here to stay.' His statements caused an immediate uproar in EU circles. Sharp criticisms were not long in coming, from colleagues in the Commission, from the secretary general of the Commission and from European civil service unions. Within a week, Verheugen had no other choice than to back-pedal and stated before officials of his directorate general: 'I love you all, you got me wrong.'

This episode can be interpreted in several ways. In the context of EU politics, the Verheugen controversy might appear to be a 'political coup.' In keeping with the theme of German pressure to reduce the costs of the Brussels 'bureaucratic Moloch,' as Helmut Kohl called it in 1992, sparking a controversy was a way of closing ranks with the German government in the perspective of the German presidency, and possibly as a way to influence EU agenda. But the controversy also raises deeper questions concerning the transformation of the relationships between the commissioners and Commission officials. If these relationships

have long been considered as nearly symbiotic and a driving force of the Community in a way close to the Durkheimian model of 'mechanical solidarity,' the last ten years of the Commission have shown that the solidarity between commissioners and their civil service has been put to a strain on more than one occasion: the strike in 1997–8 (Georgakakis, 2004b); scandals under the Santer Commission (Georgakakis, 2001); criticism and resentment against the Kinnock reform (Bauer, 2008; Ellinas and Suleiman, 2008). The question might even be raised as to whether this lack of solidarity can be seen as a new and lasting feature of EU institutions (Wille, 2009).

In this chapter,[1] I suggest that these tensions are related to socio-morphological transformations which are due not only to a change in the 'division of labor' within the European Commission as an organization, but also reflect a change of the balance of socio-political power resources within the field of Eurocracy. To put it simply, the gap between commissioners and civil servants of the Commission has never been wider in this regard. The profile of commissioners is increasingly based on national political authority rather than on a long-term commitment and investment in EU politics. Conversely, EU civil servants increasingly owe their positions to long-term 'in-house' investments involving the simultaneous production and accumulation of specific EU resources, skills, networks and credibility. In other words, there is a growing gap between people who have invested *in* the EU and people invested *by* the EU as their political representatives.

This approach sheds some new light on the process of differentiation between political and administrative elites within EU institutions (Haller, 2008), and it explains divergent views at the top of the Commission as well as increasing internal tensions and 'crises' over the past 15 years. More importantly, analyzing such divergent trajectories can lead to a better understanding of some of the major ongoing institutional and political transformations within the EU institutional field, in particular with regard to the weakness of the Santer, Prodi and Borroso Commissions (Dimitrakopoulos, 2004; Hayward, 2008), including the recent thesis on the decline of the European Commission and its ability to provide political leadership (Kassim and Menon, 2010). During the 1990s, a number of scholars emphasized the importance of the leadership of the Commission. One of the conditions of the strength of Commission leadership was based on internal factors (Ross, 1995; Drake, 2000; Smith, 2003a), such as political cohesion between commissioners and top civil servants and internal collective mobilization within the Commission. The increasingly divergent socio-political trajectories show

that these conditions are today structurally more difficult to meet than in the 1980s and 1990s and go beyond managerial, organizational and even political issues in the sense that the relative socio-political proximity that used to support this cohesion is more and more tenuous. In spite of the ongoing integration process (such as the Europeanization of resources, skills and social networks within the administration), within the field of Eurocracy political power belongs more than ever to temporary agents – instead of to more permanent agents owing their position to their life commitment to the EU. This trend clearly shows some sociological limits to the process of building an integrated EU political center, and perhaps explains the weakening of the traditional belief in the 'community method,' as well as the declining appeal of federalist and technocratic definitions of the EU and its future.

What are the trajectories of commissioners and EU civil servants? How are they diverging and what difference does this make? To answer these questions, we have used instruments forged to study individual and collective biographies of civil servants and commissioners from 1957 to 2009 (Barroso I) drawn both from statistical and qualitative surveys.[2] From these biographies, we have built a collection of indicators to ascertain the different types of capital and investments within the EU institutions. We shall analyze successively civil servants and commissioners.

The formation of a core of European permanent staff: top civil servants of the Commission

The civil servants of the European Commission form a priori a relatively well-known group (Stevens and Stevens, 2001). Since the beginning of the Commission, a number of scholars have attempted to assess their loyalty to European institutions, discuss the contours of the group and identify its homogeneity. From this viewpoint, authors have especially insisted on internal differences by, for example: highlighting the weight of national cultures or of the role of member states in careers; the heterogeneity of the internal administrative cultures; or the differences of their political or economic 'preferences' (for a review: Eymeri and Georgakakis, 2008). However useful and sophisticated these studies have been, they mask a more fundamental feature. Indeed, the central core of European civil servants, who numerically as well as politically dominate agents with other statuses within the Commission (END, contractual agents, temporary agents[3]), represents one of the rare groups within the European political system to have grown in number while securing permanent positions based on the production and accumulation of an

EU institution-specific capital. This is significant not only in terms of power resources, but it is also important to understanding their particular relationship to the EU as well as the specific way they define its goals (mainly federalist or technocratic visions as Hooghe (2010) has recently shown). Both qualitative and quantitative analysis will help us to better grasp the contours and trajectories of this group.

The EU civil service as a status group (or Stand) in the making

Referring to European civil servants as a group does not imply that they all march in step. By group, I designate a collection of positions which may be both convergent (status-based social positions, levels of salary, lifestyle) and divergent (social and national origins, the admission path into public service and seniority, rank, their directorate general, the tasks they fulfill), but it is a group which is subjected to a process of historical and social unification. This is precisely the relevant point. From a history and political sociology perspective, this historical process of social unification represents a far-reaching and in-depth collective trend of identity formation, collective dynamics and inertia.

In relation to this collective trajectory, EU officials have become historically and socially a 'status group' (in the Weberian sense) in the making. 'Status group' (or Stand[4] in Weber's terminology) means a group the existence of which is guaranteed legally and which has a monopoly of a collection of resources which can be qualified as material (associated with social positions, life conditions, and so on) but also political. This aspect is important, as it enables us to situate the officials as a whole and, in particular, to identify what collectively distinguishes them (in every sense of the term) from other agents in the EU field (such as external members of Commissioners' cabinets, national experts, contractual agents, members of permanent representations, lobbyists and so on), to the extent that they are the only group possessing the status of permanent EU civil servants, and, consequently are the only ones to have permanent status within the EU field. As a result, their status derives from the EU institutions themselves, unlike other participants in the field.

This status is guaranteed by legal provisions that establish its permanence as a principle (Andréone, 2008). The legal aspect is important, as shown by the jurisprudential activity on staff regulations governing labor relations. This activity was at the origin of the creation of the Tribunals of First Instance, seeking to relieve the Court of Justice of the European Community, and (with the same causes producing the same effects) the creation of the Public Service Tribunal of the EU

in 2005. The development of a status group also rests on wider social processes. European civil servants go through a set of social filters which differentiate them from the other agents in the EU institutional field and which make them more likely to embody the 'European interest' more durably than other agents.

Among these filters, the 'Concours' (now more often referred to in English as the 'competition') is the major prerequisite for producing and reproducing the group in these forms, particularly in a context in which it is difficult to control other more conventional social institutions (family, schooling), which also play an important role in the formation of elites. What EU officials used to call the 'Concours' has not been sufficiently studied, with one notable exception (Ban, 2010)[5]. In short, this 'rite of institution' (Bourdieu, 1996) has a major (and causal) role in the definition of the group and its membership. In this regard, the 'Concours' is not only a selection process, but also a socialization and consecration process. It allows agents to be recruited who not only have the appropriate levels of qualification and linguistic skills, but who also possess a privileged relationship to Europe. This relationship can be gauged by degrees and experiences obtained in other countries, and possibly more directly by prior experience within, or in connection with, European or international institutions. As a socialization process, the 'Concours' contributes, *in fine* to produce significant differences between this category of staff and others. The duration of the 'Concours' (with over a year between the first and the last part, and close to two years before effective recruitment), the form of the tests and especially the very high selectivity are such that, in spite of the differences among the members of the group, they are like-minded people and, consequently, at the core of their identity share a collection of founding mythologies (meritocracy, competence, and so on). By consecrating them as the exclusive servants of Europe, entering the institution grants them a guaranteed income which makes them independent from the outside world and simultaneously dependent on the institution (at least for most, and to a varying degree according to their original social positions). It secures their position as permanent officials of Europe, a position which most of the time socially evolves into a position from which there is no exit (much like a cleric to some extent).

The institutions contribute to building this set of collective values and symbolic credentials. Due to the multinational character of the organization, career progress depends on elements that combine particular skills with the capacity to act and evolve, not only in a 'multicultural context,' but especially under the authority of a superior of another nationality.

Their work is the fruit of competitive processes, supported by multiple agents and socialization authorities. Autobiographies, internal newspapers, union journals or mobilizations organized by labor unions on various occasions (salary negotiations, reform of the European public service) are all instrumental in fortifying, updating and reproducing common representations. To name but a few examples, the watchwords used by unions to define collectively the European public service include 'competence, independence, and permanence.' At least until the beginning of the 2000s, the public portraits of exemplary officials celebrated the richness of the multicultural environment, the commitment to a long-term European project, and to values opposed to a grey and unimaginative bureaucracy.

From this viewpoint, the predominantly center-left political values of EU officials (as shown by surveys and union elections) seem to translate this public service ethos and the provisions that go with it. Of course, political differences should not be forgotten. In interviews, the DG Internal Market personnel reflect a more political DG, instilled with a neo-liberal doctrine, which is scarcely apparent in non-financial or economic DGs. In the absence of richer data, the evidence nonetheless suggests that sociologically the hard core of officials belongs to a kind of transnational *bourgeoisie de Robe*. Unlike an economic, industrial bourgeoisie, this core is characterized by a high cultural and linguistic capital and a commitment to a new form of public service. In view of the small number of open positions and the weight of national quotas in recruitment associated with successive enlargements, unlike state nobility (Bourdieu, 1996; Shore, 2000), the creation of lineages of officials is not an issue.

These trajectories and positions have had effects in terms of power (Shore, 2000). As administrators, they occupy a position that is different from professional politicians, such as commissioners or MEPs. Even if they are driven by deep-rooted political beliefs, this does not predispose them to act as the standard-bearers of supra-nationalism, but rather they adopt an attitude that is prudent and pragmatic. The central idea is to 'move things forward' on a step-by-step basis and not 'rock the boat' with ill-timed rigid political stands, and to elaborate 'lines of convergence.'[6] As agents who negotiate with the institutional partners of the Commission,[7] even if they cannot control the game, their position is defined by their capacity to keep the game within reasonable bounds and keep momentum going. The permanent position and the special relationship with the EU also give them the capacity to articulate, and possibly integrate, often extremely heterogeneous viewpoints voiced by the representatives of the member states and various lobby groups. From this viewpoint, their 'driving' role

(as the term 'governance' implies) is not necessarily a 'guiding' role. It is not that they would be unable to act in this capacity – they are in a very good position to invoke the 'European' interest and to express matters in terms of their 'legal basis' through their function as 'Guardians of the Treaties,' a function which is ascribed to the Commission. They are also the only group of actors, and quite understandably so (here again their social and permanent position is directly linked with this provision) to be able to place issues in a long-term perspective. The evolution of their social and political–administrative position goes hand in hand with the construction of Europe itself, and this position simultaneously determines their dependency on this process.

The EU institutional capital of the directors-general

The directors-general are central to this process. As they constitute a circumscribed and easily identifiable population, empirical observations regarding directors-general are facilitated. By focusing on this emblematic group, one can demonstrate that the social construction of EU civil servants as a status group is highly related to the building and accumulation of a specific capital. The directors-general might be expected to have a totally different profile from the mass of civil servants. Situated at the apex of the hierarchy of the administration of the Commission, the directors-general and deputy directors-general are indeed typical of a traditional dominant group. In terms of age (entering the position at an average age of over 50), level of education (more than 30 percent hold a PhD) and gender (women have only very recently been appointed to these positions), their profiles are enlightening. Furthermore, the directors-general are considered to be the most 'political' agents of the Commission, as member states play an important role in their appointment. The directors-general are also often considered as network heads, or 'points of entry,' for member states, on a par with the members of commissioner's cabinets. If these dimensions are important, studying career patterns shows that they combine these national properties with an institutional credit exclusive to the Commission.

European capital may be defined as a specific symbolic capital (Bourdieu) of directors-general, and liable to exert a kind of 'charisma' in European circles, possibly a 'service charisma' – to use the expression coined by Weber – which enables the holders to act with authority. This institutional capital can take different forms. From an ethnographic viewpoint, it is expressed in signs of deference (Goffman, 1967) that are demonstrated not only within the administration, but more widely in European circles when they take part in any event associated with

institutional life in the outside world. This symbolic capital is not apportioned equally. As in other administrations, there are indeed central figures within the Commission. These directors-general distinguish themselves through specific achievements, such as having succeeded in difficult negotiations or when they have been politically undermined by member states' power and differences. As an EU civil servant interviewee said:

> Some are good, others are not so good … there is an enormous difference. I mean somebody like Landabaru who, for example, goes from the Structural Funds to Enlargement, to RELEX obviously benefits from strong support, probably by certain Member States as well as commissioners with whom he may have worked, or thanks to decisions he may have made. What I mean to say is that he is objectively good. He is very good, everybody acknowledges the extent to which he is still widely supported and not the victim of any national equilibrium, a change in majority or whatever. He is someone who continues to be used by the institution simply because he is good.

The case of Landabaru mentioned in this interview unveils some of the principles and the oppositions upon which such charisma is based. The heart of the matter is the multisectorial nature of a career, having worked on important issues such as structural funds (when Spain and Portugal joined, but more generally with the subsequent increase in these funds), enlargement and external relations more recently. This charisma is related to the capacity to gather widespread support – that is, it is not related to partisan or national affiliation. It can also be defined *a contrario* by the opposition between what is considered as normal (how the institution may operate: the answer being stability and, there again, the permanence of administration) and what is termed as pathological, namely external political interference such as changes in national majorities or shifts in the power balance between member states.

This type of authority is not apportioned without reason. There is a particular career path which produces it. Landabaru's CV reveals characteristic properties. Although appointed directly (because of enlargement) and having previously held a political mandate (which is, in fact, rare), he had worked for the Commission for over 20 years in very senior positions. Other distinctive features are his open claim to being a member of Delorist networks (such as the think-tank 'Notre Europe'), which reflects a European rather than a partisan political commitment, while simultaneously demonstrating membership in an elite transnational circle.

His academic and economic credentials should also be noted. He was born and studied in Paris, worked in the administrative and financial department of a pharmaceutical company and then as a researcher in a center specializing in the study of multinational companies (Sleeman, 2004). It should be noted that he is a Spaniard who has spent most of his career in France, Switzerland or Belgium. Although his direct admission to a senior position in the Commission gives the impression that he was sponsored by his native country, he had nevertheless accumulated all the titles and undoubtedly all the predispositions that embody the perfect example of a top-rank civil servant of Europe.

Beyond this particular case, the production and accumulation of a specifically European institutional capital can be demonstrated in the quantitative study of directors-general careers (Georgakakis and De Lassalle, 2007a, 2010). The directors-general are high-level administrators whose careers are based on a long-term investment in national or European public service. As Table 2.1 shows, only 5 percent of the population comes from the private sector, and only 2 percent in the Barroso I Commission. Very few of the directors-general had a previous career in international public service. In terms of long-term trends – and this is a crucial point for understanding the European capital of directors-general – the portion of in-house careers has increased considerably. As we have shown previously (Georgakakis and De Lassalle, 2007a), the portion of the population with a majority of their careers in the EU before becoming directors-general has grown as the percentage of those with predominantly national careers has declined. Conversely, the portion of direct appointments has dropped, from around 25 percent, on average, to about 10 percent in recent years, including enlargement. With 78 percent of directors-general coming via internal promotion, the Barroso I Commission has a comparable rate to the time before the first enlargement (Table 2.1). However, on balance, the time spent within EU institutions is growing, and is now up to 67 percent with Barroso I (Table 2.2). The population is also less dependent on national consecration tools, such as holding a degree from the most prestigious national universities.

As a matter of fact, the number of directors-general having obtained a degree in a foreign country has increased regularly and is now 63 percent. It is difficult here to say if this is a result of the change of the recruitment procedure, but it has been a remarkable change (20 points) since the Prodi Commission (Table 2.3). Another key variable is the accumulation of in-house political resources. The number of directors-general who previously worked in a commissioner's cabinet has grown over time,

Table 2.1 Position before becoming DG

		Private	Public national	Commission	Other	Total
Hallstein_58–61	Staff member	0	5	5	2	12
	%	.0%	41.7%	41.7%	16.7%	
Hallstein_62–67	Staff member	0	7	18	3	28
	%	.0%	25.0%	64.3%	10.7%	
Rey_67–70	Staff member	0	3	28	4	35
	%	.0%	8.6%	80.0%	11.4%	
MalfattI_70–72	Staff member	0	3	24	1	28
	%	.0%	10.7%	85.7%	3.6%	
OrtolI_73–76	Staff member	4	6	27	1	38
	%	10.5%	15.8%	71.1%	2.6%	
Jenkins_77–80	Staff member	2	11	28	4	45
	%	4.4%	24.4%	62.2%	8.9%	
Thorn_81–84	Staff member	2	12	29	5	48
	%	4.2%	25.0%	60.4%	10.4%	
Delors_85–88	Staff member	7	13	40	6	66
	%	10.6%	19.7%	60.6%	9.1%	
Delors_89–92	Staff member	6	13	33	6	58
	%	10.3%	22.4%	56.9%	10.3%	
Delors_93–94	Staff member	4	11	31	6	52
	%	7.7%	21.2%	59.6%	11.5%	
Santer_95–99	Staff member	6	14	48	11	79
	%	7.6%	17.7%	60.8%	13.9%	
ProdI_99–04	Staff member	6	14	73	8	101
	%	5.9%	13.9%	72.3%	7.9%	
Barroso_05–09	Staff member	2	11	72	7	92
	%	2.2%	12.0%	78.3%	7.6%	
Total	Staff member	14	50	187	26	277

Table 2.2 Percentage of careers spent in business/national public service/EU careers

	NB	Business	Nat pub	Com/EU	Other
Hallstein_58–61	15	6.8	51.4	39.5	2.3
Hallstein_62–67	30	8.6	41.8	46.3	3.3
Rey_67–70	36	7.6	33.5	53.1	5.8
MalfattI_70–72	29	4.1	33.1	59.2	3.6
OrtolI_73–76	41	12.3	32.3	52.4	3.9
Jenkins_77–80	46	7.9	32.3	53.5	6.3
Thorn_81–84	51	9.8	30.0	51.7	8.4
Delors_85–88	68	12.5	24.7	54.4	8.4
Delors_89–92	61	11.3	22.7	57.0	8.9
Delors_93–94	54	9.1	21.5	61.1	8.3
Santer_95–99	82	7.2	22.5	63.9	6.4
ProdI_99–04	102	7.7	21.0	66.1	5.0
Barroso_05–09	93	7.0	19.8	67.0	6.0

as has the percentage of those who have belonged to several cabinets, including cabinets of commissioners of another nationality, which is, here again, a good indicator of EU capital in contrast to national capital (Table 2.4). Last, but not least, in many cases the directorate-general position is an end-of-career position, an ultimate indicator of their life-time involvement, which is corroborated by the fact that many stay in Brussels after retirement instead of going back to their native countries.

Political professionals and part-time Europeans: the EU Commissioners

In comparison, the trajectories of commissioners are altogether different. European commissioners nowadays clearly embody the *political* function within the European Commission. This embodiment is in no way self-evident. As Andy Smith showed (2003b), commissioners have in the past often been seen as technocrats, with an image not so different from top civil servants. They are political leaders of a specific type, and part of their job can hardly be compared with that of national ministers (Joana and Smith, 2002). The fact remains that, over time, the function has been increasingly construed as a political function, labeled and identified as such through a complex process of formation and circulation of European standards and norms. The existing literature dwells on this process, emphasizing that the group morphology the commissioners' profiles has tended to become increasingly political. However, we would

Table 2.3 Studies in foreign countries of directors-general

		Studies in foreign countries	
		Yes	**No**
Hallstein_58–61	Staff member	1	8
	%	11.1%	88.9%
Hallstein_62–67	Staff member	2	16
	%	11.1%	88.9%
Rey_67–70	Staff member	4	21
	%	16.0%	84.0%
MalfattI_70–72	Staff member	3	18
	%	14.3%	85.7%
OrtolI_73–76	Staff member	5	28
	%	15.2%	84.8%
Jenkins_77–80	Staff member	11	29
	%	27.5%	72.5%
Thorn_81–84	Staff member	10	32
	%	23.8%	76.2%
Delors_85–88	Staff member	14	41
	%	25.5%	74.5%
Delors_89–92	Staff member	11	38
	%	22.4%	77.6%
Delors_93–94	Staff member	13	32
	%	28.9%	71.1%
Santer_95–99	Staff member	25	41
	%	37.9%	62.1%
ProdI_99–04	Staff member	28	37
	%	43.1%	56.9%
Barroso_05–09	Staff member	28	16
	%	63.6%	36.4%
Total	**Staff member**	**62**	**116**

like to qualify this process (which might wrongly suggest a mechanical result of the process of political integration) and stress the fact that commissioners, unlike directors-general, accumulate little EU-specific capital.

Political biographies

Although studies on the EU have paid little attention to the biographies of Europe's political and administrative staffs, with a few exceptions (Page,

Table 2.4 DGs (and deputy DGs) who have been members of a cabinet of a commissioner (%)

Commission	Staff member	Cabinet (%)	Cab. same nationality (%)	Cab. different nationality (%)	Cab. same + different nationality (%)
Hallstein_58–61	15	6.7	6.7	0.0	0.0
Hallstein_62–67	30	3.3	3.3	0.0	0.0
Rey_67–70	36	16.7	16.7	0.0	0.0
MalfattI_70–72	29	27.6	27.6	0.0	0.0
OrtolI_73–76	41	31.7	26.8	9.8	4.9
Jenkins_77–80	46	26.1	21.7	8.7	4.3
Thorn_81–84	51	25.5	23.5	5.9	3.9
Delors_85–88	68	23.5	20.6	5.9	2.9
Delors_89–92	61	26.2	23.0	8.2	4.9
Delors_93–94	54	29.6	27.8	7.4	5.6
Santer_95–99	82	42.7	37.8	12.2	7.3
ProdI_99–04	102	38.2	34.3	12.7	8.8
Barroso_05–09	93	39.8	36.6	16.1	12.9

1997), there have been several studies on commissioners: two books (CoNdorelli-Braun, 1972, and 30 years later, Joana and Smith, 2002) and several articles (Page, 1997; MacMullen, 1997; Smith, 2003a; Döring, 2007, Wonka, 2007) have been published on the subject. This literature provides interesting insights on the historical dynamics of the morphology of this population, such as a certain differentiation along a technocratic/political axis (Wonka, 2007) or the growing politicization of the commissioner's functions, measured in terms of their previous ministerial experience. This is not a linear process, but some particularly interesting trends stand out: the elevation of the political level of the first Delors Commission (70 percent) and the decrease in the number of commissioners who previously served as MEPs, which we will study in more detail below. Döring (2007) also proves insightful when he switches to a different indicator to analyze former political positions more finely (MP, MEPs, junior ministers, ministers and important positions within a party).

Although these publications provide important empirical data, they share a common blind spot. The authors have neglected to consider what is particularly European, both in itself, and in comparison with other elites or professionals active in the field of Eurocracy. Here again, asking how they are European does not amount to asking who is most dedicated to the European cause or whether they are 'good' or 'true'

Europeans. We are considering here, in sociological terms, their experience, their resources and their European political credentials.

Here, again, symbols matter. As we know, the definition of the position of commissioner was institutionally constructed to promote the capacity to embody the Community interest. The treaties, but also the institutional rites involved in nominations, attest to this. On a legal level, the treaties emphasize the fact that commissioners have to be chosen for their general competence and must offer guarantees of independence, most notably from the governments of their nations of origin. Article 213 of the EU Treaty states:

> The members of the Commission shall, in the general interest of the Community, be completely independent in the execution of their duties. In the performance of these duties, they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other body. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. Each member state undertakes to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the Commission in the performance of their tasks.

This institutionalized position of independence codified by the European treaties also implies taking an oath at the Court of Justice, which is a major consecration rite.

As in the case of directors-general, EU political capital is important in the accumulation of credit. Like directors-general, commissioners stylize their biographies to make them fit this ideal of embodying the Community interest. Jose Manuel Barroso's official biography is emblematic of the biographical construction of 'Europeanness.' A short analysis shows three relevant aspects. Firstly, we observe the importance of redefining a national political career as a European career. One could expect his mandates as foreign minister and prime minister to be sufficient references, but, on the contrary, the biography highlights Europe-related academic references and other political engagements in favor of Europe – with surprising categories, such as 'Europe related work while in Foreign Affairs' and 'Europe-related work while Prime Minister of Portugal.' So, the president of the Commission is portrayed as being already at the service of Europe while governing his country, and is showcased as having been particularly active in the accession process. Secondly, great emphasis is put on his academic career (master's degree in political science, with honors, from the Department of Political Science of the University of Geneva, with a thesis on '*Le système politique portugais face à l'intégration européenne*'; internships and short courses at Columbia University (New

York), Georgetown University (Washington, D.C.), the International University Institute (Luxembourg) and the European University Institute (Florence). Thereafter, it is indicated that he was a teaching assistant at the Law Faculty of the University of Lisbon, a teaching assistant at the Department of Political Science, University of Geneva, and a visiting professor at the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown (1996–8) and head of the International Relations Department, Lusıada University (1995–9). The centrality of these academic credentials (as well as an exhaustive list of publications), seeks to underscore the skills and intellectual values which have been a trademark of Commissions in the past. Thirdly, the list of 'decorations, prizes and distinctions,' such as doctor *honoris causa* in nearly all EU member states, also seeks to showcase Barroso's European credentials.

The point here is that this biography is more representative of a desire to be perceived as a European leader and to conform to the commissioners' traditional self-presentation, than of an underlying general trend. In the early years, biographies presented in the *Bulletin of the European Communities* or in illustrated form in the *Staff Courier* provided elements of career paths very similar to Barroso's self-presentation. Compared to national biographies, two additional dimensions were systematically included: former European investments (negotiations, belonging to the field in another position, activism, expertise), and publications, which held a rather systematic place. European capital and intellectual capital went hand in hand, and Barroso's official biography seems to conform to that tradition. In the past this presentation also appears as a collective process in the sense that biographies were homogeneous, contrary to what can be observed in more recent years.

Currently, the perception of normative constraints and the institutional investment in the building of a collective (and here an EU) group identity seems to have weakened. All commissioners have their CVs or profiles on their websites (probably written by members of their cabinets), but political and technical competencies are much more central in their presentations of themselves than in the past. In addition, biographical information is published and edited by external agents, such as consultancy cabinets or the weekly European press (*European Voice*, for instance). Besides, public commentaries, which are freer to define and which impose their own categories, show similar trends. For instance, rankings and evaluations of commissioners and their track records take on different forms in accordance with the venues in which they are published, such as formerly the French economic magazine *L'Expansion* or, nowadays, papers such as *The Bulletin*, an English-language weekly that targets expatriates in

Brussels. Most often, judgments are based on criteria such as media skills and political ability rather than 'faith in Europe.'

Here, some external factors need to be integrated into the analysis, including the growing weight of the pressroom and, broadly, the growing pressure coming from member state governments with regard to public opinion. The more political turn of the stylization of biographies shows that their objective constraints as well as their symbolic values differ significantly from that of civil servants. While expertise, long-term vision, discretion, and skills in bringing to fruition sensitive negotiations are highly valued for civil servants, commissioners have to demonstrate more charismatic traits: communication skills and the capacity to win in short-term bargaining more than 'conceptualizing' and pushing ideas incarnating the EU's long-term general interest. To some extent, this pattern is very classical in terms of the differentiation between political and administrative elites, but it has some important consequences for the capacity of commissioners to be more integrated in the EU institutional field and be recognized as 'good' EU leaders by the EU milieus, including their own civil servants. Considering that they have no direct public support or electoral mandate, this pattern also makes them more vulnerable to the governmental agendas of member states.

The decline in EU capital

This transformation is not only relevant for symbolic legitimacy. It is embedded in structural processes, such as the objective changes in commissioners profiles and skills. From this point of view, a comparison of commissioners' profiles clearly shows an accentuation of the political profile which goes hand in hand with a decline in the prior investment in the EU field.

The level of EU experience is a first indicator. Since the inception of the Commission, many commissioners had prior European experience before nomination. Many were European affairs ministers for their countries, or had relationships with European institutions as diplomats or negotiators (especially in pre-accession periods). Some (few and far between) had been high ranking European officials (such as Narjes, Ortoli or Deniau); some were permanent representatives (Borschette or Balasz), and some were members of other European institutions (such as Coppé). There have also been major federal European actors, such as Spinelli, who was one of the founding fathers of the European federalist movement during World War II and a strong European activist before his nomination as commissioner in 1970. However, the fact remains that in that period this population was characterized by specific elements

Table 2.5 Pre-commissioner career: highest former position*

	Number	Percentage
Prime Minister	7	5.0
Minister – Foreign Affairs	15	10.6
Minister – Finance	20	14.2
Minister – Interior/Defense	6	4.3
Minister or Secretary – Other	43	30.5
Other national political position	13	9.2
MEP	4	2.8
Diplomat	19	13.5
High official – Other	11	7.8
University/Research	1	.7
Other	2	1.4
Total	**141**	**100.0**

*When several types of positions were held successively or simultaneously, the order of preference was generally followed.

in terms of the dimension of their European investments. The configurations of the members of the Commission are also significant. For instance, the Malfatti Commission and its nine members reflected the image of a relatively homogeneous 'club,' formed by figures identified with European movements (Borshette or Spinelli – the day of his nomination the Belgian newspaper *Le Soir* wrote that he was 'a first class European'), high academic credibility (Dahrendorf, Barre, Coppé), or were at least experienced commissioners.

Today, things have changed in several ways. First, the share of prior investment in Europe in previous roles is now rather marginal. In practice, few commissioners have had prolonged and significant European experience. When one considers the highest position held in the political hierarchy, ministerial positions within a member state unsurprisingly and overwhelmingly prevail, as shown in Table 2.5. As other studies have shown, this is an increasingly strong tendency. As Table 2.6 shows, the percentage of 'high level' ministers has increased, including ministers of defense and home affairs, ministerial positions which in the past did not lead to a mandate as a commissioner.

As commissioners now possess more political resources, one could expect to see an increase in the number of commissioners who have previously served as MEPs. However, despite a few exceptions, there is little correlation between experience in the European Parliament and entry to the Commission. After 50 years of institutional history, there could conceivably have been, as in national polities, a particular

Table 2.6 Last experience before Commission

	Hallstein1	Hallstein 2	Rey	Malfatti	Ortoli	Jenkins	Thorn	Delors1	Delors2	Delors3	Santer	Prodi	Barroso
Prime Minister							6				10	6	10
Minister FA					12	8	12	6		17	15	11	21
Minister Fin	25	20	21	20	12	15	12	22	35	22	5	9	14
Minister Interior/ Defense						15			6	6	5	9	
Sub-total Government ++	***25***	***20***	***21***	***20***	***24***	***38***	***29***	***28***	***41***	***44***	***35***	***34***	***45***
Minister/ Secretary – Other	25	30	21	10	18	15	29	28	29	33	30	31	38
Other national political position			14	20	12	23	18	17	18	17	10	9	7
MEP			7	10	6			6	6		5		
Diplomat	25	40	21	30	35	15	18	6	6	6	5	14	7
Other high official	17	10	14	10	6	8	6	17			10	6	
University/Research												3	3
Other	8										5	3	
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

Table 2.7 Commissioners having been MPs, by nationality

Country of origin	Number	Former or future MEPs	%
Germany	13	1	7.7
Austria	2	0	0.0
Belgium	8	4	50.0
UK	12	0	0.0
Bulgaria	1	0	0.0
Cyprus	2	0	0.0
Denmark	6	1	16.7
Spain	6	3	50.0
Estonia	1	0	0.0
Finland	2	1	50.0
France	15	6	40.0
Greece	7	2	28.6
Hungary	2	0	0.0
Ireland	8	1	12.5
Italy	21	6	28.6
Latvia	2	0	0.0
Lithuania	1	0	0.0
Luxembourg	11	3	27.3
Malta	1	0	0.0
Netherlands	8	2	25.0
Poland	1	0	0.0
Portugal	4	1	25.0
Romania	1	0	0.0
Slovakia	1	0	0.0
Slovenia	1	0	0.0
Sweden	2	0	0.0
Czech Republic	2	0	0.0
Total	141	31	22.0
Europe of the 6	76	22	28.9
9 countries 1st enlargements	49	9	18.4
12 last accessing countries	16	0	0.0

European political career path with a progressive move upward towards the top (that is, commissioner), along the lines of what we observed for directors-general. This is, however, far from the case. First, experience in the EP is relatively rare. As Table 2.7 shows, less than a quarter of commissioners have served in the European Parliament. With such a small sample it is hard to draw conclusions on national variations. Still, the link is noticeably stronger for Belgians (4/8), Spaniards (3/6) and French (6/15) than for British (0/11) or Germans (1/13).

Table 2.8 Commissioners having been MEPs

Name	**Country**	**Begin com**	**End com**	**Date EP**	**Before after**
Bangemann	Germany	Jan-89	Sept-99	73 Feb to 84	EP before EC
Bonino	Italy	Jan-95	Sept-99	79 to 89; 99 to April 2006	EP before and after EC
Busquin	Belgium	Sept-99	June-04	99 (July to Sept); since 2004	EP before and after EC
Cheysson	France	Apr-73	Jan-89	89 to 94	EP after EC
Cresson	France	Jan-95	Sept-99	79 to June 81	EP before EC
Dalsager	Denmark	Jan-81	Jan-85	73 to 74	EP before EC
De Clercq	Belgium	Jan-85	Jan-89	79 to 81 then 89 to 2004	EP before and after EC
Delors	France	Jan-85	Jan-95	79 to 81	EP before EC
Deniau	France	July-67	Apr-73	84 to April 86	EP after EC
Lardinois	Netherlands	Jan-73	Jan-77	63 to 67	EP before EC
Mac Sharry	Ireland	Jan-89	Jan-93	84 to March 87	EP before EC
Martino	Italy	July-67	June-70	64 to 66	EP before EC
Matutes Juan	Spain	Jan-86	Apr-94	94 to May 96	EP after EC
Oreja	Spain	Apr-94	Sept-99	89 to June 93	EP before EC
Palacio Valle-Lersundi	Spain	Sept-99	Nov-04	99 (July to Sept)	EP before EC
Papoutsis	Greece	Jan-95	Sept-99	84 to Jan 95	EP before EC
Pisani	France	May-81	Dec-84	78 March to May 81	EP before EC
Reding	Luxembourg	Sept-99		89 to 99	EP before EC
Rehn	Finland	July-04		95 to Nov 96	EP before EC
Rey	Belgium	Jan-58	June-70	79 to July 80	EP after EC
Ripa di Meana	Italy	Jan-85	Jan-93	79 to 84 and 94 to 99	EP before and after EC
Santer	Luxemburg	Jan-95	March-99	74 to July79 and 99 to 2004	EP before and after EC
Scarascia Mugnozza	Italy	March-72	Jan-77	61 to 72	EP before EC
Scrivener	France	Jan-89	Jan-95	79 to Jan 89	EP before EC
Spinelli	Italy	July-70	July-76	76 Oct to May 86	EP after EC
Tajani	Italy	May-2008		94 to May 08	EP before EC
Thorn	Luxemburg	Jan-81	Jan-85	59 March to July 79	EP before EC
Van Miert	Belgium	Jan-89	Sept-99	79 to Nov 85	EP before EC
Varfis	Greece	Jan-85	Jan-89	84 to Jan 85	EP before EC
Vitorino	Portugal	Sept-99	Nov-04	94 to Oct 95	EP before EC
Vredeling	Netherlands	Jan-77	Jan-81	58 to 73	EP before EC

This reality did not fundamentally change with the direct election of MEPs in 1979. Up to and including Barroso I, 11 commissioners served less than one full-term in the EP, including nine who served fewer than three years and several only a few months. Conversely, only four commissioners (Bangemann, Redding, Scrivener and

Patoutsis) served in parliament for two or more terms before becoming commissioners (Table 2.8). Although the number of presidents and vice-presidents of committees is relatively high – half of these commissioners – this score is more related to the amount of political capital possessed before entering the EP than to a long-term European investment. Only a few cases combine significant longevity in the EP and the possession of a major mandate within the parliament. Few of them then go on to be MEPs, and even fewer do so for a long period of time.

It is clear that in contrast to the increasing in-house careers of the directors-general, the effects of European integration has collectively had no impact in terms of a significant Europeanization of political profiles. Another indicator, longevity, yields observations that are again different from those made for the top European civil servants and members of national governments.

As Table 2.9 shows, out of 142 commissioners, more than half (76) served in only one Commission, 46 served in two and 19 in three. But these populations deserve closer scrutiny: of the 19 who served in three Commissions, only nine had 12 years of experience – that is, have effectively completed three terms. Another significant element is that all commissioners who served for three terms left in 1999, at the time of the resignation of the Santer Commission. During the Barroso I and Prodi Commissions, there was no longer a political staff endowed with such long-term experience. In other words, the EU political staff is increasingly temporary, at least until Barroso II.

In terms of other Europe-related engagements that might demonstrate the accumulation of resources before nomination as commissioner, we might argue that past European activism is a counter-balancing value for commissioners coming from the supposedly most Eurosceptic countries, such as being the president of the Danish European movement. The case of former European officials is also different – for instance, Deniau and

Table 2.9 Number of mandates in the EC

Number of mandates in the EC	Number
1	76
2	46
3 or more	19
Total	**141**

Ortoli were nominated to the EC after a relatively traditional path in France, while Narjes had greater European longevity.

The indicator of academic achievement should also be considered, especially in terms of its socio-political implications. This indicator can be compared with the equivalent indicator for top European civil servants, and comparisons between commissioners can be made across time. The image of the technocrat was constructed in the opposition to member states and involved the valorization of expertise and intellectual capital (Georgakakis, 1999). In terms of representations, this opposition was very close to that between the temporal (embodied by government members) and the 'eternal' (the forward-looking vision of the long-term interest defended by Commission members). This image was displayed in the official biographies, a striking element of which was that they contained all of their publications. The singularity of Commissions such as the Malfatti Commission, comprising Dahrendorf, Barre and Coppé, is noticeable. The percentage of commissioners with a PhD has declined steadily over time, with the exception of the most recent Commission, due to the academic profiles of commissioners from the new member states. Lastly, commissioners do not invest in Europe-related careers after leaving office.

Career patterns after the Commission mandate are diverse, but they mostly involve either a return to a national political career, or, in most cases, taking up a position in the economic field. This can be seen in the structure outlined in Table 2.10, which shows that service in the Commission does not necessarily boost a career. It is either the end point of a career, or a time of re-conversion. This is the case for those who went on to hold economic functions. For former ministers who take up a ministerial portfolio again at the end of their EC mandate, having worked in the Commission is not necessarily a springboard to a higher position. This is an important point, as it is counter-intuitive and undoubtedly obscured by some major exceptions, such as Hillery, who became President of Ireland, or more recently Grybauskaite, who became President of Lithuania. One might think that, as Döring (2007) states, the expected return of commissioners to national politics constitutes a way for national governments to apply indirect pressure based on the hope for a promotion on return. This is actually an infrequent scenario, which does not mean that commissioners do not think it is a possibility. Among the 11 former ministers who resumed ministerial duties after being commissioners, 2/3 of the 'minor' ministers were promoted, and there were seven new ministers. The essential point however is that service as a commissioner rarely leads to a European political career,

Table 2.10 Types of post-Commission careers (most significant position)*

	Numbers	**Percentage**	**'Net' percentage****
End of career (retirement, death)	16	11.3	
Career still ongoing	27	19.1	
Government	18	.8	18.9
Higher position	*8*	*5.7*	*8.4*
Equal position or new member	*10*	*7.1*	*10.5*
MEP	7	5.0	7.4
International organization	1	0.7	1.1
Diplomacy	13	9.2	13.7
Private company	24	17.0	25.3
Banks	*14*	*9.9*	*14.7*
Industry	*8*	*5.7*	*8.4*
Consulting	*2*	*1.4*	*2.1*
University	8	5.7	8.4
Local/national representative	8	5.7	8.4
Party direction	5	3.5	5.3
Think tank/advisor	6	4.3	6.3
Direction of a major national organization	5	3.5	5.3
Other or N/A	3	2.1	
Total	**141**	**100.0**	**100.0**

* When several types of positions were held successively or simultaneously, the order of preference was generally followed.

** Except end of career, ongoing career in the Commission and other or N/A. n = 95.

but rather allows political elites to convert the time they have invested in their contacts in the economic field into more opportunities in the same field. The meaning of such paths also resides in their broader elite strategy, and not necessarily in the construction of a specific European path.

These different elements form an overall picture which allows us to see that the morphological and career trends of commissioners as a collective body are very different from that of EU civil servants and, more importantly, are increasingly divergent. This is significant, as the way in which people think and behave is related to their relative location within the field. This leads us to an important methodological point. Insofar as most research on the EU Commission is based on interviews with civil servants, it obliges scholars to be careful not to overestimate 'crisis symptoms' (and to express them as a 'crisis of Europe') – symptoms which are in reality the reflection of the growing distance between

the Commission's political and administrative elites and which generates a 'natural' anxiety about a loss of power or political prestige for civil servants. Conversely, Verheugen's statement, which opened this chapter, should not be taken at face value and even less as an objective description of how the Commission works, but as a product of the same tensions. It remains that the commissioners' growing distance from specific EU investments is still a serious matter. With regard to this trend, it is highly probable that their medium-term social interests and strategies (as well as their beliefs or, more psychologically, their drives or instincts) are related less to the EU in itself. In this way, new political mottos, such as 'Europe of results,' according to the expression of the President of the European Commission,[8] might reflect the short-term pledge that EU political staffers are required to give to their counterparts in member states for political reasons, rather than for any commitment to 'governance' or the desire to make Europe a more concrete reality for citizens. This does not mean that integration has slowed down, which Egeberg has shown (2008) by focusing on the European administrative space or, as Fligstein demonstrated with macro-sociological indicators (2008), but it clearly means that the EU political center of gravity that was at least supposed to be the European Commission is moving away from its former base, with the result of a transformation of political practices within the EU institutional field.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the structure of the commissioners' and top officials' positions, and (especially) the evolution of their long-term collective career paths, have diverged. In addition to the differentiation between professional politicians and top civil servants, the administrators of Europe tend to be involved in a long-term process of constructing European social positions closely linked to European institutions, while those who embody political authority (commissioners) are less and less involved in this process. In other words, there is a growing gap between people who have invested *in* the EU and people invested *by* the EU as their political representatives.

In this sense, this chapter contributes to a better understanding of the European Commission and its profound transformations (Egeberg, 2008). By revealing a new cleavage related to investments in Europe, it complements various studies that have sought to qualify the general hypothesis that Commission agents embody supranational values and interests (Hooghe, 2001; Egeberg, 2008). It also allows for a better understanding

of a number of contextual tensions that have occurred, such as the Verheugen controversy mentioned in the chapter introduction, the debates and general misunderstandings around administrative reforms (Bauer, 2008; Ellinas and Suleiman, 2008), or the interpretations of the crisis of Europe (Ross, 2008). These episodes can indeed be understood as the product of the collision of deep sociological transformations and contextual singularities.

Commissioners and top civil servants now face a difficult situation. On the one hand, the officials who constructed themselves by 'building' Europe are jeopardized in a context in which the reform of the European Commission questions the ethos of European civil service and places the emphasis on 'morality' (Cini, 2007), and where they have constructed an undifferentiated role for themselves compared to other administrative and management positions or even to the increasingly numerous contract workers. On the other hand, by being less and less 'European' and more and more political, commissioners are responding to a situation defined by commentators and other actors placing issues such as popular dissatisfaction, the 'constitutional crises' or the renewed control of the Commission by member states at the forefront of attention. In such conditions, it is difficult for both groups to anticipate the best way of playing their role as the 'motor of Europe' and, most of all, doing so legitimately. To some extent, this observation validates the recent scholarly debate: the thesis of the Commission's decline as a *political* and autonomous entity, as well as the way in which its role has been challenged within the EU administrative space (Egeberg, 2008).

Converging with new interdisciplinary perspectives (Smith, 2004b; Kaiser et al., 2008; Warleigh-Lack, 2008; Mérand and Saurruger, 2010; Favell and Guiraudon, 2009), this study enlarges the scope of European Studies. It also tries to open the debate on institutions beyond the confines of the new institutionalisms. What matters here are not only institutions as organizations, but wider battles within the institutional field, involving profiles, capital, resources and skills, as structures as well as symbolic constructs. Along with other scholars who are promoting a social field approach to the study of EU institutions (Cohen et al., 2007; Kauppi, 2005, 2010; Fligstein, 2008; Vauchez, 2008b), this contribution focuses on the changing balance between temporary and permanent agents. This feature represents a major difference with many constituted political fields and has consequences in terms of the integration process as well as power relations. This perspective paves the way for the establishment of a wider map, including many other actors in this institutional field, which we will return to in the conclusion of this volume.

Notes

1. A first draft of this chapter was presented at the 2009 European Union Studies Association (EUSA) biannual meeting in Los Angeles, and a revised version to a UACES session in Angers later that year. Thanks to Alex Warleigh-Lack and Antonin Cohen (panel discussants), to the anonymous referee from the first version published in *French Politics*, as well as to Andrew Appleton and Robert Elgie for their comments. Many thanks also to Jay Rowell, Carolyn Ban, Jean-Yves Bart, Patrice Cochet-Balmet and Christian Reilly for their help for the translation and stylistic suggestions.
2. Statistical elements are drawn from a database on directors-general assembled by the Centre for European Political Sociology (GSPE-Strasbourg) between 2001 and 2010. This database was funded through the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme d'Alsace (MISHA) and integrates a number of classical indicators (gender, age, studies, profession, and so on), as well as a year-by-year mapping of entire careers. This enables us not only to consider the last position held, but also to more largely typify career trajectories. Further details on this database can be found in Georgakakis and De Lassalle (2010a). I would like to thank the many colleagues who have contributed to it, especially Marine de Lassalle, Philippe Juhem and, currently, Victor Lepaux who was very helpful in collecting and building new data and tables. The more qualitative elements are drawn from the author's ongoing research on the genesis of European top civil service. Sources include archives of the European Commission and the University Institute of Florence, internal written sources such as Commission staff correspondence, the magazines of unions, institutional autobiographies or biographies, interviews, and direct observation.
3. Despite their growing numbers, the contractual agents still remain on the margins of the institution, numerically as well as in terms of authority. EU organizations are in this respect different from other international organizations.
4. As T. Parsons noted, there is no English term that approaches the concept of *Standische Herrschaft* used by Max Weber. According to his English translator, one can say that the term 'refers to a social group, the member of which occupies a relatively well-defined common status, particularly with reference to social stratification, though this reference is not always important. In addition to this common status, there is [the] further criterion that the members of a Stand have a common lifestyle and more or less a code of behavior.' (Weber, 1947, pp. 347–8).
5. For details on my own work in progress, Georgakakis (2008).
6. These expressions are extracted from interviews.
7. It should be mentioned here that an increasing number of officials dedicate their work to managerial tasks.
8. Inaugural speech of the President of the European Commission, plenary session of the European Parliament, Strasbourg, February 13, 2007, Speech/07/77.

3

The Permanent Representatives to the EU: Going Native in the European Field?

Filippa Chatzistavrou

Introduction

Situated at the interface between national and European institutions (government and ministries, the other permanent representations, the EU Council), the permanent representations of the member states to the European Union are institutional spaces in which multiple mediation processes occur. Representatives are part of national diplomacy and require skills in inter-governmental negotiations and European expertise. Endowed with the status of ambassadors, permanent representatives (PRs) who manage and steer the representations have various and changing roles (as a governmental agent, a national representative, a European partner). Their formal mission and ambassador status notwithstanding, little attention has thus far been devoted to the career trajectories of the permanent representatives, their resources (beyond those conferred upon them by their state's representation), or more simply to the question of how Europe affects their careers. This lack of knowledge is remarkable, as the scientific literature and commentators of the EU consider PRs as central to decision-making processes. It is even more remarkable if we consider that it is often their personal dispositions and experience that explain the importance of their informal activity (Christiansen and Piattoni, 2004), their ability to form close contacts with others, to adjust their positions and even that of others in order to promote compromise. Without overestimating their margins of maneuver with regard to their national governments, knowledge of what PRs do, or are able to do, would benefit from a better understanding of who they are, of how they position themselves in relation to their peers, and how they differ, collectively, from other actors in the field of Eurocracy.

The purpose of this chapter is to conduct such an analysis. By combining a socio-morphological analysis with an interactionistapproach (Rosenau, 1980),[1] we will raise the following issues: To what extent do PRs form a homogeneous elite group with specific sociological attributes? Does analyzing their biographical characteristics reveal typical careers before or after becoming a PR? To what extent do PRs commandpartial or occasional autonomy from their national governments? What type of specific skills – in particular EU-related ones – do they develop? And, finally, how does the EU, or the PR's job in Brussels, influence their subsequent careers? In order to provide some answers, we will proceed with biographical analysis. Even though permanent representatives are indeed diplomats whose sociological dispositions and careers are closely related to their national socialization, they nevertheless develop – more or less strongly, depending on the case – a number of characteristics that are specifically associated with the structure of the European institutional space which sets them apart from other diplomats.

This chapter attempts to underscore the existence of a professional identity, or even of an identity of a professional group as defined by Dubar (2003)[2] and the structural tension involved in being a representative of a national government but working in a European field governed by specific practices and norms. While this approach points to the components of an embryonic form of Euro-diplomat, re-examining these 'dual positions' between the national and European fields reveals the various internal differences within the group, thereby bringing us to formulate new hypotheses concerning their capacities of action. By identifying what differentiates these agents from those serving in the administrations of their member states, we hope to provide a new approach to analyzing their autonomy of action and, more generally, to contributing to a better understanding of the structure of trans-governmental spaces.[3]

The fieldwork

This chapter is based on a survey conducted as part of a post-doctoral project at the Centre for European Political Sociology at the University of Strasbourg in the framework of the program entitled 'The Professionals of the European Union.' It also uses data collected in previous research, including 14 interviews with PRs and high-ranking Council officials (Chatzistavrou, 2010). The survey focused on the life trajectories of PRs and of their deputies since the creation of the various permanent representations of the 15 EU member states. A second survey was conducted in 2011 with the same methodology and focused specifically on the

ambassadors of the EU-15 and of the 12 states that joined the EU in the 2005 and 2007 enlargements (see box at the end of the chapter).

Data was collected from various directories and sources, such as the *European Companion, Quid, Trombinoscope, Eurosource, Dod's* and the *Who's Who* of the member states and Europe. The biographies for interviewees from all countries were compiled in a standard format that always presented the same data in a formal and concise manner. It should be noted that while this biographical formalism tends to homogenize data, it also reinforces the uniformity of our vision of life trajectories as, indeed, this format is valid for almost all countries. Out of this target population of 189 individuals, we were able to fully complete 145 profiles. Only a rather small number of cases are incomplete; 81 percent of the theoretical population was covered.

Our work is based on the 145 completed biographies and results are analyzed by country and individual characteristics: length of time spent in the position, social origin, educational profile and international dimension of the training received (mobility outside Europe is a useful indicator for measuring the degree of internationalization), linguistic skills, career type and path, technical profile, EU-related skills, European professional mobility, age when appointed PR, and political or voluntary engagements. The sample is structured as follows: 50 percent of permanent representatives (N=73), 40 percent deputy permanent representatives (N=58), 10 percent who occupied the two positions successively (N=14). The coverage per member state is presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Coverage rate per member state (by 'double' we mean dual role of deputy PR and ambassador)

Representations	PR Ambassadors	Deputy PRs
Austria	2/2 : 100 %	1/1 : 100 %
Belgium	6/6, incl. 1 double : 100 %	9/9 incl. 1 double : 100 %
Denmark	6/6 incl. 3 doubles : 100 %	9/8 incl. 3 doubles : 100 %
Finland	2/2 : 100 %	1/2 : 50 %
France	13/13 incl. 3 doubles : 100 %	11/11 incl. 3 doubles : 100 %
Germany	9/11 : 91 %	3/6 : 50 %
Great Britain	7/7 : 100 %	5/6 : 83 %
Greece	7/ 9 incl. 1 double : 78 %	6/7 : incl. 1 double : 86 %
Ireland	3/6 incl. 2 doubles : 50 %	5/8 incl. 2 doubles : 63 %
Italy	11/12 : 92 %	8/11 : 73 %
Luxembourg	5/6 incl. 2 doubles : 83 %	7/13 incl. 2 doubles : 54 %
Netherlands	6/7 incl. 2 doubles : 86 %	5/11 incl. 2 doubles : 45 %
Portugal	4/7 incl. 1 double : 57 %	3/6 incl. 1 double : 50 %
Spain	5/5 incl. 2 doubles : 100 %	3/3 incl. 2 doubles : 100 %
Sweden	3/3 : 100 %	2/2 : 100 %

A group of national diplomats playing a central role in European politics

Although the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is mentioned only marginally in the treaties, its visibility and political significance have increased over time.[4] The permanent representatives' ambassador status was officially established in 1958 when the COREPER was created, and in practice this gradually became the norm in all countries. It is the first level of decision making in the EU Council in which technical and political issues can be discussed and agreements reached. Thus, it has become a central space in the Council. Decisions made by the Council of Ministers are, in most cases, matters of formality, even though more recent studies have attempted to show that ministers' involvement is, in certain configurations, more important than has been generally believed (Häge, 2008). Empirical studies from the 1990s showed that the Council made decisions on only 13 percent of the subjects on the agenda and that 65 percent were decided at the level of the preparatory bodies, while remaining issues remained under discussion (Van Schendelen, 1996; Wallace and Hayes-Renshaw, 1995; Engel, 1992; Wessels and Rometsch, 1996). As several indicators show, its statutory particularity has important consequences on the sociological profiles and careers of this group.

Social elites

As a whole, the permanent representatives form a mostly male and highly educated population (although the information collected on education is sometimes sketchy), and unsurprisingly come from predominantly upper-class social backgrounds. Many of the PRs in our surveys are sons of diplomats, businessmen, executives, politicians and lawyers. The predominance of men in these types of positions is indisputable since, out of 145 in our sample, only three are women, all from northern Europe (Sweden, Austria and Ireland). Women only started appearing on the scene, and in very small numbers, in the 1990s.

Though the results are not complete (17 percent missing information), the general trend concerning educational attainment is clear. The vast majority of the surveyed population – 57 percent of the 123 individuals for whom the education trajectory was specified – received post-graduate education or graduated from elite *Grandes Ecoles* (Madrid's Diplomatic School, the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, the Stockholm

School of Economics, the Hague Academy of International Law). Despite incomplete information, we can still confidently say that two thirds of the population surveyed held a post-graduate degree. Luxembourg and France are the countries with the largest number of PRs with post-graduate educations or who were trained in the *Grandes Ecoles* (Ecole Nationale d'Administration, Paris Institute for Political Studies, Ecole Normale Supérieure, ESSEC).

An interesting, and partly counter-intuitive, observation is that their international mobility is relatively low during their studies. The percentage of PRs who studied abroad seems surprisingly low, even though it is still higher than national averages, elites included. Where we could ascertain the educational background, we found 29 percent of the 126 PRs had done at least part of their studies abroad. Although the patchy nature of data must be taken into account, we find that the PRs from small countries were most likely to have studied abroad: Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark (in descending order). The overall picture of the favorite destinations for studying abroad are, in descending order, the United Kingdom (8 percent), France (8 percent), the United States (7 percent, Harvard, Columbia and Yale being the most attended) and Belgium (6 percent).

The fact that a relatively low percentage of PRs went abroad for their initial degrees corroborates another piece of biographical information – which is also relatively incomplete: the unexpectedly low level of multi-lingual proficiency. Indeed, only 12 percent of the total population of PRs can be identified as polyglot – that is to say, fully commanding three languages. Furthermore, few PRs come from bi-national families. These indicators highlight the contrast between a majority of PRs and a minority which is most integrated in the EU institutional space, which we will come back to.

Finally, the permanent representatives do not deviate from other diplomats with regard to the hierarchy of prestige within the diplomatic corps. Generally speaking, generalist work is considered noble in diplomacy, reflecting the qualities of versatility in high-ranking diplomats (Kingston de Leusse, 1998). In fact, PRs are no exception to this rule. Although the essence of their function has become progressively more complex with the broadening of the scope of European policies, the prevalence of the generalist profile does not seem to have diminished significantly over time. At first sight, the biographical results indicate a relatively low level of diversification in the PRs' career paths (for example, a low percentage of mixed carriers, see below) and average performance in terms of specialized skills acquired through experience,

Table 3.2 Profile of the permanent representatives

Number of PRs with a 'generalist' profile	80/87 (including PR ambassadors and those who were deputies before becoming PRs	92 %
Dual profile	3 (PRs who were deputy PRs and then PR ambassadors	
Number of deputy PRs with a 'technical' profile	23/58	40 %

even including deputy PRs (on percentages of specialized experience, see page 73).[5]

An examination of the positions occupied by PRs within national central administrations reveals that out of the 87 PRs who served as ambassadors, 80 have a generalist profile. This finding must, however, be qualified, particularly, as we shall see, in the case of those deputy PRs who have a more specialized profile.

The correlation between the sociographic characteristics of PRs and other career diplomats confirms their status as part of the national social elite. The relatively low international mobility of PRs during their initial education implies that the construction of their identities and legitimacy takes place for the most part at the national level. Their resources (skills and accumulated social capital) are first and foremost developed within member states.

Careers linked to the state

Permanent representatives are without a doubt members of an elite. They owe their positions to the state and pursue their careers within national administrations. Most PRs began a diplomatic career immediately after their degree. Thus, unsurprisingly, the professional identity of the vast majority of PRs was forged within the public sector and, more specifically, in national bureaucracies. The biographical data show that a large majority of PRs spent their entire careers in the senior public service (78 percent of the total population), and of this majority, careers were primarily in national civil service (94 percent). About one in ten held jobs in European institutions previous to being appointed to the position of PR; and even fewer (2 percent) had prior experience in international organizations. Most PRs, particularly early in their careers, had jobs in ministerial departments, mostly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before going on to different posts abroad.

In contrast, only 22 percent of the population had dual careers (to various degrees) in terms of experience in the private sector, mainly at the very beginning or very end of their careers. Some started their careers in the private sector, mostly as lawyers, and later joined the senior national civil service.[6] But in most of these cases they ended their careers in senior managerial positions in private firms.[7] Finally, some occupied managerial positions in large public enterprises, while a small number accepted university positions. One example is Werner Ungerer, a German diplomat who, after serving as PR ambassador, held for a duration of 13 years positions at the University of Bruges, then at Bonn. In some even-rarer cases, PRs first had jobs in local administrations or associations (including in trade unions). This is, for example, the case of Swedish diplomat Lars-Olof Lindgren, who began his career as an economist at the Swedish Trade Union Confederation. There are also PRs who go on to political careers, although they are few and far between.[8] The member states with the greatest number of individuals who have not exclusively worked for the national administration, and have worked in the private sector at some point in their careers are – in descending order – Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and Great Britain. However, given that our information is complete for only 70 percent of Luxembourg's PR population, and that Austria and Spain are among the most recent members, the size of their sample is very limited (3 and 6 respectively), so the most significant cases are those of Great Britain and the Netherlands.

If, initially at least, the predominance of diplomats who spent most of their careers in their country's central administration is a relatively classic phenomenon, one could expect that this tendency would decline with the institutionalization of the EU. However, what we observe is precisely the opposite. It should be noted that dual careers (professional activity in the public and private sectors) prevailed mostly among the older generations of PRs. The closer we get to the present – and in particular since the 1980s – the greater the prevalence of purely diplomatic careers.

In the vast majority, and depending on their diplomas and on the competitive examinations passed, these diplomats began their careers in central administration (ministry of foreign affairs), then took on a series of assignments abroad lasting three to four years each on average. These typical, mostly undiversified, career trajectories of PRs who combine diplomatic positions at the ministry of foreign affairs, positions abroad and within the permanent representation to the EU, represent 105 out



Figure 3.1 Unmixed careers over time (exclusively in the civil service)
Source: author.

of the 145 individuals in our sample. It is, therefore, the most common PR profile.

The increasing standardization of PR careers can be seen as the result of member states' decisions to send well-seasoned professional diplomats to Brussels. Those with careers spent serving exclusively in the public sector gradually increased proportionally between 1957 and 2000, representing the entire PR population during the 2000s (Figure 3.1).

In addition, the average age at the time of appointment to the position of PR is also decreasing, which points to the increasingly demanding nature of the position and to the fact that the member states increasingly consider this position to be strategic. In the first decades of the EC, the position was partly honorific, often a reward at the end of a successful career. Of the population about whom we obtained information, 58 percent were appointed PRs after the age of 50 (note that the average age of appointment to the traditional post of ambassador is 58). The number of appointments to the post of PR as a reward for deserving individuals in their later careers has progressively decreased. Thus, between 1950 and 1980, the proportion of PRs appointed before reaching the age of 50 was less than half of what it was after 1980. For the new generations of PRs, the number of cases in which an individual is appointed PR as a sign of recognition is declining slightly, and there

has been an acceleration of the professionalization of the function, with appointments of younger diplomats in their middle of their careers. This is more pronounced in northern European countries, but is a general trend. Thus, of these increasingly prestigious and exposedPR positions are more and more offered to younger diplomats on a fast track for career advancement.

Lastly, this professional dependence on national civil service careers is seen in their post-PR trajectories. Once they have completed their mandates, most PRs resume a traditional diplomatic career and take on positions either abroad or in their national administrations. This tendency reveals the prevalence of the national habitus in their career strategies and expectations. However, some diplomats continue to serve the European institutions once their mandates as PRs expire, indicating their ability to use their PR experience as a pivot in what will then become a European career in its own right. Generally speaking, though, their PR careers are primarily 'temporary' phases of professional investment in national careers, which, as we shall see, can provide valuable resources for the rest of their professional lives.

The biographical data show that a PRs' career progressions are primarily characterized by a promotion to very senior civil service positions or positions of power. Once their assignments as permanent representatives have been completed, many take on functions at the top levels of their country's political decision-making centers as (diplomatic) advisers or as chiefs of staff for ministers (ministry of foreign affairs or a sector ministry), as advisers to the heads of government or to government secretary generals. Others pursue their diplomatic career which, in many cases, can be directed towards high-profile diplomatic posts such as ambassadors in important countries. In addition, as we have already seen, some diplomats can use their PR positions as springboards to other sectors (for example: higher-learning, consultancies, or business management).

According to the data collected, 39 percent of the population in our survey goes on to hold central positions in policy making at the national or European level (57 out of 145). With regard to this criterion, we find that the proportions of former PRs who are appointed to top civil service positions and, therefore, influence decision making at national and European levels, range from a high of 81 percent in the case of French PRs, followed by 67 percent of Portuguese PRs (although this country is a recent entrant), to 64 percent of Belgian PRs and 50 percent of Swedish PRs. Looking at evolutions over time, we observe a rise in the number of PRs who occupy positions of responsibility at the top level of the



Figure 3.2 Access to positions of power after transition as PR
Source: author.

administrative hierarchy, reaching 58 percent of the PR population in the 2000s (Figure 3.2).

In short, the position of diplomat in Brussels is strongly anchored in the framework of national career opportunities, structures and social profiles (initial education characterized by a relatively low level of international mobility, careers spent mostly in the civil service of the country of origin, and so forth).

Diplomats … of the EU? The effects of the accumulation of European capital

Although the weight of the 'national' in the PRs' role and career expectations is extremely important and is reinforced by their legal status as representatives of their state, we will show here that they have characteristics that nevertheless set them apart from other diplomats, in that they develop specific characteristics during their time in Brussels. Indeed, through their positions as EU diplomats, PRs accumulate political and social capital as well as an EU-related competence – all of which distinguish them from other diplomats. This specific capital proves essential for subsequently accessing positions of power within the European institutional field or obtaining promotions to the top of the national field of power.

A group of semi-permanent agents

Permanent representatives differ in at least two ways from their peers posted abroad. They spend more time at their posts, which, in combination with the specificity of their tasks, modifies their relationship to their governments. Collectively, they form a club – if not a constituted group – that meets on a regular basis, which creates a high density of internal relations among PRs.

For the vast majority of PRs, their time in this position does not just represent a transitional phase in a long traditional diplomatic career. It is often a pivotal moment in their careers. They stay in office for seven to eight years on average. They live and work in a multicultural environment in which the rules are much more flexible, but the demands for adaptation are also more strenuous.[9] The fact that PRs find themselves in a socially structured environment, or even in a diplomatic area of action in which they share common interests and goals with other PRs (Adler-Nissen, 2008) reinforces their internal cohesion and, therefore, also their decision-making autonomy with regard to their national administrations (Chatzistavrou, 2004).

From the moment PRs assume office, they take part in a social process that is both cooperative and competitive. A place of potentially conflictual interactions, the COREPER becomes, in the medium term, a semi-permanent – rather than episodic – site of socialization. The COREPER meets twice a week. During meetings, which are quite long and often slow-paced, the PRs accustom themselves to exchanges that are based on a shared technical vocabulary. When dealing with complicated or contentious issues, working lunches are frequent, and informal bilateral or multilateral meetings may also be added to facilitate compromise – to ascertain how much decision-making leeway their peers have, or to better prepare the ministerial-level negotiations. During these exchanges, PRs develop a form of implicit alliance, and even personal friendships, with diplomats with similar backgrounds and, more generally, with other actors involved in the field of Eurocracy.[10]

This insertion into the group results in what the neo-institutionalists call a learning process of the logics of appropriateness. Thus, these semi-permanent agents have sufficient time to convert to the culture of European compromise, to get accustomed to the behavioral norms specific to the COREPER – diffuse reciprocity, opaque trust, mutual reactivity (Lewis, 2000, 2002) – and to master negotiation techniques and decision-making practices particular to the EU sphere of action (Baisnée and Smith, 2006). Thus, PRs develop the ability to construct

shared representations of their tasks and of the common difficulties they encounter: for example, tense relations with some ministers or rivalries with the senior sectoral committees for authority. There has, over time, undoubtedly been an intensification of interpersonal relationships between the PRs and, consequently, a certain routinization of their relationships. The informal consensus norm creates asymmetry in terms of information, which also tends to personalize the processes of negotiation (Heisenberg, 2005).

Gradually, the conviction of a common interest has arisen among permanent representatives. It is a kind of common interest that could be described as functional. Indeed, by virtue of their function, the PRs find themselves involved in a semi-formal cooperation network in which they must invest themselves in order to be able to process various issues on the agenda and do the groundwork for decisions to be made at the ministerial level. Except in cases where the benefits of non-cooperation are greater than those of cooperation within the group (Mercer, 2005), these relations serve their main purpose, which is to maximize the chances of reaching an agreement at their level or at least at the Council level (Bostock, 2002). The cohesion of the group plays an important role, given that the COREPER (especially COREPER II) faces competition from the sectoral committees within the Council, which requires that PRs must invest themselves fully and collectively to maintain their authority. Similarly, the COREPER must speak with one voice in the face of lobbies, at the risk of weakening its collective position. When the COREPER maintains strong cohesiveness, it gives its individual members an edge in the competition with other institutional actors, and especially their respective national administrations.

This cooperation does not automatically imply a convergence of preferences or the strategies to achieve them. Different variables explain the formation of national preferences and their relative weights according to the policy areas (Copsey and Haughton, 2009). Though the PRs have close interaction, they do not all share the same views on all issues, and their positions and alliances shift from issue to issue. They may reveal or conceal their preferences and, as a consequence, relations remain fluid and, thereby, in most cases give room to modify interests and positions to further interests, but also to reach collective compromises. It is within this group that PRs build their credibility, that is to say, their ability to influence. Given their interdependence (Rosenau, 1980), finding the best possible agreement requires the engagement of all stakeholders; so much so that the phrase 'trans-governmental collegiality' is sometimes used in this context.[11]

A partial Europeanization of PR trajectories

To what extent do these specific features of the role allow us to talk about a European specialization of the permanent representatives? Can one talk of a 'tipping point' (to use a term used in the sociology of professions) where national diplomats become European diplomats? Can one identify a turn to a European career in the sociological sense of the term (Georgakakis, 2002b)? We can outline a nuanced answer using three indicators: the technical competence acquired before being appointed as a PR; professional experience throughout their careers tied to European affairs; and other positions they occupied within the European institutional sphere after their mandates as a PR.

While we mentioned earlier the high proportion of generalists among ambassadors, we must also note that the preparation of decisions requires that PRs possess sufficiently diverse skills to enable them to master a wide scope of often-technical issues, and to better communicate with their counterparts about strategy and expected results. In other words, even though the PRs' mission is primarily political, the increasingly technical nature of EU policies has produced effects. The biographical data provides information on a number of important characteristics concerning the technical nature of PRs' profiles. This so-called 'technical' competence essentially encompasses the experience the PRs acquired while working in ministerial departments other than a ministry of foreign affairs or as advisers or deputy PRs.[12] Such skills, however, can also derive from (albeit much more rarely) experience in Commission DGs, or in a specific field of the private sector.

Thus, this technical dimension is particularly visible in the case of the deputy PRs. Of the population in question, 40 percent (23 out of 58 individuals) have a technical background (most deputy PRs were detached from a ministry of economy and a few others from the ministries of trade, finance or employment). In these specific cases, some are high-ranking civil servants with highly technical backgrounds and most are not part of the diplomatic corps. This is the case of, for example, Judith Gebetsroithner, a high-ranking Austrian civil servant and deputy PR who, before joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and earlier in her career, held several positions in the private sector. Another case is that of Marc Lepoivre, a Belgian senior official who worked at the Ministry of Finance and served as consultant for various sectoral ministries. He was subsequently appointed to the post of Deputy PR before holding executive positions in various DGs of the Council of Europe.

Among the PR ambassadors who first served as deputy PRs, three representatives are characterized by both a technical and generalist profile. Two interesting cases are noteworthy for their singularity: that of Gunnar Lund, a Swedish diplomat and ambassador, who had a relatively technical profile when nominated as PR ambassador. Another exceptional case is that of Rolf Lahr, a German senior civil servant with a technical background who was delegated from the Ministry of Economy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before taking on diplomatic functions and eventually serving for a brief period as PR ambassador to the EU.

Among the various member states there are significant variations in the balance between generalist and technical profiles. Countries such as Belgium and Sweden have the highest percentage of PRs with technical profiles, whereas the majority of the member states have PRs with classic diplomatic backgrounds. Furthermore, the deputy PRs from Austria and Finland (recent EU entrants), as well as those from Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, all have technical profiles. These technical profiles of the deputy PRs of the northern countries constitute powerful assets at the negotiating table (Figure 3.3).

The second important specific characteristic of this population is that prior experience in European affairs is increasingly important in PR careers. The biographical data show that, as time has gone by, the number of PRs with prior experience in the field of European affairs has progressively risen. This dynamic is illustrated by the case of the deputy PRs who become PRs: 10 percent (14 individuals) of the population studied have successively occupied both positions. But this figure should be put in perspective; indeed, there tends to be an increasing differentiation between the function of PR and that of deputy PR, and the more recent trend is that fewer move up from a position of deputy to become PR (Figure 3.4).

Having occupied both positions is not the only indicator of the Europeanization of a career. By using more subtle indicators we can observe that some PRs and deputy PRs have, in the past and relatively consistently, occupied 'EU Affairs' positions within national ministries and/or have worked on this specific theme in inter-ministerial committees. This experience in EU affairs can also be acquired while working as a consultant to the permanent representation, as a member of a state's mission in EU accession negotiations: having previously served in the European institutions; having attended a conclave concerning the European Union – such as the representation of the Commission abroad; taking part in all sorts of European negotiation delegations and



Figure 3.3 Technical profile of deputy PRs per country (percent)
Source: author.



Figure 3.4 Successive combination of the positions of deputy PR and PR
Source: author.

delegations to inter-governmental conferences (IGCs); having teaching experience in European affairs; or having published on the subject.

If we examine the experience that PRs had in EU affairs prior to their assignment to Brussels, we note that a relatively significant proportion (one in two) meet at least one of the criteria listed above and had significant experience and expertise in the field. In this category we find some

members of diplomatic corps with primarily technical profiles. These diplomats are more likely to be found among deputy PRs than among PR ambassadors.

We note that the profiles with the least experience in EU affairs – prior to one's appointment as PR – are, in descending order, those of the Greek, Austrian and Portuguese PRs. In contrast, the Danish, Finnish, Spanish, Luxembourg and British PRs are those whose prior European experience is most pronounced. In addition, Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom are the countries which present not only the highest proportions of PRs with technical profiles, but also the most diversified EU-related career paths.

Twelve percent of the PRs had prior experience working in European institutions (we include the position of advisers to the permanent representation). Luxembourg and Denmark are the countries in which this type of career trajectory is most present. Indeed, they present the highest percentages (40 percent each) of individuals who, prior to their being permanent representatives, worked in European institutions or organizations. The data collected shows that a significant number of PRs who occupied positions in EU institutions prior to being appointed PR served as advisers or administrators. Generally speaking, these individuals present career paths with two balanced components: a diplomatic career at a ministry of foreign affairs or abroad, and the PR position. The member states that present the largest number of PRs with career paths characterized by those two components are, in increasing order, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Over decades and, generally, in all countries, the proportion of individuals who managed European issues prior to their becoming PRs, has grown. The biographical data indicates that, during the 1950s and 1960s, the proportion of PRs who had prior experience in EU matters was approximately 35 percent, whereas since 2000 that percentage was about 70 percent. Though quantitatively marginal, the percentage of PRs who continue to serve in European institutions after their mandates is nonetheless qualitatively significant. It shows that the position of permanent representative can represent an important turning point, albeit for a minority of agents (10 percent overall), which gives them access to powerful permanent positions within the field of Eurocracy. This post-PR mobility within the EU arena reached a peak in the 1960s (whereas the mobility of PRs within European institutions prior to their appointment to the post of PR increased during the 1980s). In fact, the time-related indicator shows that post-PR mobility was not higher for the younger generations than for the older generations of PRs, at least

until the 2005 enlargement. The last few years have, therefore, seen a process similar to that which occurred in 1960 when a number of PRs joined the College of Commissioners. This was the case for, example, of Péter Balázs, the Hungarian ambassador to the EU, who in 2004 became European Commissioner for Regional Policy.

From a national perspective, Luxembourg presents the highest percentage (about 50 percent) of post-PR mobility towards European institutions. This observation is quite consistent with the low proportion of Luxembourg PRs, whose profiles combine the three classic components of a diplomatic career path (a diplomatic career at a ministry of foreign affairs and abroad, and the PR position). In this respect, Luxembourg PRs are followed by the Danish PRs (20 percent), the British (15 percent) and Belgium PRs (14 percent) (Figure 3.5). Incidentally, this observation is in keeping with other observations made in the political field, both in relation to Luxembourg PRs, whose appointment at the College of Commissioners is part of a classic upward progression in a national career (see, in particular, the cases of G. Thorn and J. Santer) and more generally in relation to small countries for the political and administrative staff, as European careers are more prestigious and represent a career progression (also see in this volume the chapters by Beauvallet, Michon and Georgakakis).

Nevertheless, the 10 percent of PRs who continue to serve in EU institutions after their mandate as PR are examples of a Euro-diplomat's career. These PRs with high European 'post PR mobility' have insider knowledge of the functioning of the EU and even – in the case of those who work for a long time within the European institutions – of the EU institutional habitus, which brings them closer to the central European elite both sociologically and in terms of outook and perceptions (Bourdieu, 1994; Georgakakis, 2002b). The data clearly indicate that the PRs who later occupy top positions in the directorates general of the Commission or serve as consultants or chiefs of staff to the European commissioners or the Council's General Secretariat, are primarily those who were PRs for a long time (10 years on average).

In this respect, there are several cases of PRs appointed to positions in political or administrative functions at the top of the EU hierarchy. For example, the post of European Commissioner obtained by Jean Dondelinger, Luxembourg ambassador RP to the EC. Another example is Jim Cloos, Luxembourg deputy PR who became head of cabinet to Jacques Santer and, later, head of the Directorate for General Policy Questions of the European Council Secretariat. Other examples are Giorgio Bombassei Frascani de Vettor, Italian ambassador PR, appointed vice-president of the European Investment Bank; Pierre de Boissieu,



Figure 3.5 European Institutions – 'port of call' (percentages)
Source: author.

French RP ambassador, nominated to the post of Secretary General of the EU Council. One can also mention Pierre Vimont, French PR ambassador, appointed Executive Secretary General of the European External Action Service, or Jean Mischo, Luxembourg deputy PR assigned to the position of Advocate-General of the ECJ or, finally, Jürgen Trumpf, German PR ambassador appointed Secretary General of the EU Council. While they represent a minority of PRs, they have become dominant players within the institutional sphere of the EU, with properties that are central (in all senses of the term) to the game and have passed the tipping point between national and European careers.

Cross-cutting career paths with strong ties to European institutions

Pierre Yves de Boissieu (France): Graduate of the École Nationale d'Administration (1971); head of the sub-directorate for Central Europe – ministry of foreign affairs (1971–2); first secretary to the French embassy to the Federal Republic of Germany (1972–7); adviser to (1972) and later head of cabinet of François-Xavier Ortoli – vice president of the Commission of the European Communities responsible for economic, monetary and financial affairs (1978–4); head of the Department for Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1985–9); director of Economic and Financial Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1989–93); ambassador, permanent representative of France to the European

Community (1993–9); deputy secretary general of the EU council (2000–9), secretary general of the EU council (2009–11).

Pierre Vimont (French): Graduate of the École Nationale d'Administration (1977); second secretary at the French embassy in London (1977); first secretary at the French embassy in London (1978–1); head of the Press and Information Department – Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1981–5); Institute for East West Security Studies, New York (1985–6); second counselor at the PR to the European Community (1986–90); chief of staff to the minister delegate of European affairs, E. Guigou, (1990–3); director for Development of Scientific, Technical, and Educational Cooperation – Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1993–6); director of European Cooperation – Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997–9); ambassador and permanent representative of France at the European Union (1999–2002), chief of staff for the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002–7); ambassador to the United States (2007–10), executive secretary general of the European External Action Service (2010).

Even though for most diplomats the position of PR ultimately is a transitional phase in their professional development, the subsequent progression of their careers, whether at European, national or international levels, is largely dependent on their diplomatic experience as PR and the various resources (recognition, networking, and practical skills) accumulated through their positions as semi-permanent EU agents.

The post-enlargement PRs: convergences and divergences

The career paths of the current ambassadors of the 27 EU member states tend to confirm the key traits outlined throughout this chapter. In terms of social properties and accumulated experience, the PRs of the 12 new EU member states converge, with a few exceptions, with the typical characteristics of the PRs of the original 15 member states. The vast majority have a master's or PhD. The PRs of the countries which joined the EU in 2005 and 2007 had more often pursued their studies abroad than the PRs of the first 15 member states of the EU. Furthermore, we note that these new PRs (more specifically those for whom we obtained information on linguistic skills) also have multilingual profiles.

The great majority of the PRs currently in office are career diplomats, confirming the finding that nationally oriented career profiles remain prevalent. There is only one woman in this sample, which confirms the previously observed gender imbalance. Half of current PRs have substantial experience as diplomatic representatives to international organizations; a trend which has established itself in recent years. Of

the 27 PRs, exceptions to the typical career diplomat profiles have sharply declined in number compared to previous periods. Most of those atypical profiles belong to PRs from new EU Members, except that of PR Luis Planas Puchades, a Spanish politician whose career trajectory we shall discuss below. Among these exceptions, the case of the Czech politician Milena Vicenova is an excellent example. After completing her veterinary studies, she began her career in the fields of specialized journalism and education before beginning a political career in environment and agriculture. She worked in various public and private administrations before becoming minister of agriculture and was later appointed ambassador to the EU. Maltese PR Richard Cachia Caruana, has a similarly atypical profile, in that he combined activities in the fields of private banking and business with a political career that led him to serve in the prime minister's office before his nomination as PR. Finally, let us mention the technical profile of Slovenian PR Rado Genorio who, after pursuing a scientific career, was appointed to a ministerial position, which eventually led him to the post of ambassador in Brussels.

The previous professional experiences of the 27 PRs to the EU show a dual tendency. The great majority of the current PRs of the EU-15 countries worked for more or less long periods within the permanent representations as advisers and, in some cases, as deputy PRs. In contrast, only a small number of the PRs from the new member states served their country as heads of mission or advisers in EU-related issues during the accession phase. On the other hand, these PRs acquired extensive prior experience in European affairs while working in their country's public administration, which was suffused by European norms during the accession process.

As far as the general trend to a younger PR population, described above, this trend shows a notable acceleration over the past several years. The average age of appointment as PR is declining in the case of the EU-15 countries (55 years on average), and even more markedly in the case of the 12 new entrants (48.5 years on average). Looking at the 27 PRs' profiles, we find, among those of the EU-15 countries, individuals who highly involved in European politics before they were nominated as ambassadors. The examples of the German and Spanish PRs whose career paths are detailed below are noteworthy. They may signal a new turning point in terms of mobility. Thanks to strong specific qualities derived from the increasing overlap between national and European levels of action, these individuals move several times from one level to the other and are assigned central functions at the EU institutional level,

which facilitates their subsequent integration as ambassadors. The question is whether these situations of prior integration into the EU institutional arena will become a long-term trend or represents a temporary and reversible development.

Peter Tempel: School of Diplomacy (Bonn, 1983); Foreign Office, second secretary; Office of the State, secretary (1985–6); German Embassy in the United States, first secretary; Department for Economic Affairs (1986–9); German embassy in Mali, first secretary (1989–91); Foreign Office, counselor, responsible for Common Foreign and Security Policy (1991–3); permanent representation of Germany at the EU, counselor, responsible for the Inter-governmental Conference (Amsterdam Treaty) (1993–7); Foreign Office, counselor, Task Force EU-Enlargement (1997–8); Foreign Office, head of the Private Office of the State Minister for European Affairs in Germany (1998–9); deputy head of the Private Office of Günter Verheugen, commissioner responsible for Enlargement (1999–2002); head of the Private Office of Günter Verheugen (2002–4); head of the Private Office of the Vice-President of the European Commission, responsible for Enterprise and Industry, Günter Verheugen (2004–6); director-general for European Affairs, Federal Foreign Office (2006–10); PR of Germany to the EU (since 2010).

Luis Planas Puchades: MP for Córdoba and spokesperson of the socialist parliamentary group for European Affairs (1982–6); MEP (1986–93); minister of agriculture and fisheries of the Junta de Andalusia (1993); director of the presidency of the Junta de Andalusia and member of the EU Committee of the Regions (1994); head of the Private Office of Manuel Marin, Vice-President of the European Commission, responsible for relations with Mediterranean, Asian and Latin American countries (1994–9); head of the Private Office of Pedro Solbes, Spanish member of the European Commission, responsible for economic and monetary affairs, (1999–2004), ambassador of Spain to Morocco, (2004–10), ambassador, PR of Spain to the EU (since 2010).

Conclusion: towards an analysis of the uses of the PR function

The structure of this group and the relations of its members with their countries and their colleagues in Brussels show that their twofold property (national and European) corresponds to both their roles as mediators and to the more general structure of the EU institutional sphere, which is only partially autonomous (Georgakakis and De Lassalle, 2007a). The research presented here opens two new paths for understanding the

practices of these agents compared to the existing literature. The first path is to use the biographical approach to study individual and collective resources and authority. The second is to approach the insertion of this group into the field of Eurocracy in terms of the collective dynamic of interdependencies.

The first proposition consists in establishing the relationship between what these actors are and their latitude for action and degree of autonomy. This chapter demonstrates that the two dimensions – national and European – are not contradictory, but an integral part of the status of PRs. They are, at times, required to increase their bargaining power in order to promote the interests of their countries and, at other times, to reinforce the cohesion of the group so as to consolidate its collective ascendancy over competing players. Though the idea of the complementarities of national and supranational affiliations has already been formulated (Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal, 2003), the results presented here invite us go further by considering that this complementarity operates according to a dynamic of identity interchangeability. In expectations and actions (Beyers, 2005) this means that various rationalities of action could then be identified, placing emphasis alternatively on the vertical power relations (with the central administration – national identity) and on the horizontal relations (between PRs–European identity). Though their belonging to a particular nation partly explains their stance on particular issues, (structurally, strong national preferences for large countries, a more 'European' stance for the PRs of small countries, Beyers, 1998), this analysis invites us to take a closer look at the possible variations in this 'national' structuring of behavior by considering situations in which PRs can exploit their status as trans-governmental actors to free themselves of the direct authority of those they represent. From this point of view, the PRs' years of experience and their proximity to ministers and, in a few cases, the degree of their existing relations with economic and European spheres, serve as veritable enablers of autonomous action.

This possibility of relative autonomy is structurally embedded in the requirements of their dual role. PRs must learn to efficiently use negotiation techniques specific to the EU institutional space and, in particular, to manage and establish informal agendas, to master the norms of interaction and, above all, reach compromises at the COREPER level. In this respect, it is not so much their formal mandates as their social properties and accumulated experience that condition relationships within the 'club' of PRs. Thus, PRs' leeway (Risse-Kappen, 2000) in negotiations should, in our view, be related to their sociological characteristics,

and especially with their prior professional experiences (international mobility, administrative culture, linguistic resources, a technical or generalist profile, prior experience in European affairs), accumulated in the field (time spent performing a function, transnational political and social capital, experience as deputy PR, European capital acquired in the function). From this perspective, institutional affiliations do not necessarily have the same signification or produce the same effects, nor are they experienced by all agents in the same way. As we have shown, the profiles of influential PRs combine various resources and, more specifically, properties they have been inherited, acquired and accumulated through practice, often at the interface between national and European spaces. These dimensions affect both their bargaining capacity and their perceptions of issues. In the transactional logic of the COREPER, this dimension causes PRs to be guided alternatively (and sometimes simultaneously) by 'national interests' or 'EU interests' depending on the plan of action and the configuration.

The second proposition consists in approaching these actors as a social group through the lens of a collective dynamic of interdependencies. One of the central components of the concept of 'elite' is the internal cohesion of the group and the multiplicity and strength of established networks which can be summarized by the 'three Cs': 'cohesion, consciousness and conspiracy or cooperation' (Burton and Higley, 1987). Our goal here has been to complement this definition by approaching PRs as a group that is not merely the sum of its members. This chapter has attempted to underscore the existence of a professional identity which is not just limited to the skills shared by PRs, but extends to a collective sense of belonging to the group, defined by a common know-how and a certain autonomy of action partially relying on the ability to act collectively. The collective dimension is based on two essential pillars: On the one hand, we note a relative homology between the trajectories; a homology that concerns more than just their common institutional status. An examination of the data has revealed a much more complex puzzle, characterized, simultaneously, by a convergence of the national sociographic profiles and a relative Europeanization of PRs' profiles. On the other hand, there is a certain group cohesion and complicity deriving from the way in which members of the COREPER work and function together.

The modes of interaction within the COREPER produce powerful socialization effects between individuals of different national origins and representing various political and administrative cultures and negotiation traditions (Bellier, 2000). The convergence of the political programs

and practices probably does not eliminate the differences in the political methods and cultures (Abélès, 2000), which may even have become stronger since the last EU enlargements (Delhey, 2007). But my research points to the emergence of a group spirit or identity as PRs interact intensely within a space of competition and alliances, train in EU techno-diplomacy practices (Chatzistavrou, 2004) and weave horizontal, semi-formal and routinized relationships with one another. The COREPER, more than a club, is a social group whose objective positioning is reinforced by the behavioral (communication and exchange) norms its members develop, and by the power they confer upon those who follow them.

From this point of view, although PRs are by definition dependent on their national government, they accumulate European capital during their terms in office. In comparison with members of the European civil service, they have more national resources and careers (Georgakakis, 2002b), as shown by their career trajectory prior to their appointments as PR and following their terms. But, over time, especially for the PRs who remain in office for longer periods, the acquisition of European capital is a source of power that increases the credibility of their arguments (Flynn, 2004) and can strengthen the group and its decision-making autonomy, particularly when the COREPER demonstrates unity. The intergovernmental dimension is considered as an obstacle to further integration, but if we take a relational approach – or, in other words, examine how PRs who operate in the intergovernmental arena, relate with one another within the COREPER – we can see signs of integration, even though this integration is non-linear and varies from agent to agent (Chatzistavrou, 2010). In other words, the characteristics of these agents point to their collective ability to exert influence on the decision-making processes by positioning themselves near the center of gravity of the European institutional sphere (Georgakakis, 2008a).

Notes

1. We draw on the sociology of professions and the sociology of international relations and, more particularly, on the multi-agent approach based on Rosenau's theory of interdependence.
2. According to Claude Dubar, the concept of a 'professional group' is considered to be more neutral than that of 'profession' (Dubar, 2003). It is a concept that widens the spectrum of enquiry into professions; it considers that not only the members of recognized professions, but also of any 'professional group' or occupation, can possess distinctive skills and contours. In the case of PRs, the notion of 'professional group' emphasizes the fact that the vast majority of PRs belong from the start to a distinct professional category,

that of traditional diplomats. But PRs, as Euro-diplomats, are not part of a recognized profession, but rather belong to an open professional group the members of which exercise their functions as PRs for a limited period of time.

3. Trans-governmental relations refer to the relations between the sub-units of the various governments when they work jointly and operate in relative autonomy from the central administration (Keohane and Nye, 1974, and Thurner and Binder, 2009).
4. According to the treaties (Art. 151 TEC; art. 16 § 7 of the EU Treaty), the action of the COREPER is preparatory and is devoid of legal effect. However, the COREPER does have de facto decision-making power in the adoption of legal acts. The decision to validate the legal act is reserved to ministers but, in practice, it is often a mere formality. In fact, Article 12 of the rules of procedure of the Board Council (Decision 2004/338/EC) confirms this de facto power. In addition, the same regulation lists a number of instances in which the Committee may, like the Council, exercise procedural decision-making power. Finally, the COREPER is being increasingly recognized, as illustrated in Article 240 § 1 of the Lisbon Treaty (ex-article 207 TCE) TL (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU): 'The Committee may adopt procedural decisions in cases provided for in the Council's Rules of Procedure.'
5. In general, PRs also serving as ambassadors manage foreign policy, institutional affairs, budget and other portfolios. Deputy PRs manage sector policy portfolios. This distribution of portfolios is indicative of the distinctive nature and characteristics of the respective roles of PRs and deputy PRs.
6. In this category, we find William Nicoll who, after working for the British Chamber of Commerce (a private organization in the United Kingdom) joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a senior public servant before being appointed deputy PR in Brussels.
7. This was the case for French diplomat Jean-Pierre Brunet, and for British diplomats Michael Butler and Michael Palliser, all of whom served as chairpersons or directors in private banks and companies. Other examples include Luc de La Barre de Nanteuil, a French ambassador, who in his later career served as chairman of the media group *Les Echos*, and Renato Ruggiero, an Italian ambassador who, in his later career, held top management positions in the Italian auto industry.
8. We found three cases in our sample: Georges Gorse, a French ambassador, who combined a diplomatic career abroad with a short two-year period as PR before going on to a political career as MP, mayor and minister; Renato Ruggiero, who held political positions at the national level and ended his career as minister of foreign trade. Finally, in the same category, we find another rare case; that of Johannes Linthorst Homan, a Dutch lawyer and diplomat. Linthorst spent most of his career in politics, serving as mayor and governor, but he also worked as an executive in a private-sector organization (president of the Olympic Committee of the Netherlands), and at the end of his career spent four years in Brussels as a PR ambassador.
9. Member states shape their positions differently with regard to the Commission's propositions, depending on their administrative culture and governmental structures; the degree of centralization or decentralization of decision making, for example.

10. An embassy, just like the central government, has a hierarchical structure, and personnel are partitioned into multiple categories (A, B and C, as well as into a category of agents recruited locally, some of whom are nationals of the embassy's state). The structure of the permanent representation is much less hierarchical than that of an embassy, and the thematic EU policy portfolios are managed either by detached national officials or by experts recruited locally.
11. The construction of Europe has facilitated the development of closer relationships between the various governmental agents. The widening scope of European policies and the gearing of State apparatuses for cooperation has favored the development of trans-governmental networks.
12. An individual is assigned to a position in the permanent representation to the EU, either directly, as a PR, or, initially, as a consultant. In most cases, the deputy PRs are, first and foremost, sector advisers. Most of the sector advisers who work within the permanent representations previously had positions in sector ministries.

4

ECB Leaders. A New European Monetary Elite?

Frédéric Lebaron

Introduction

The members of the Governing Council are often described as belonging to different factions. Some are 'doves,' others are 'hawks.' To which faction do you belong?

> As chairman of the ECB, I am talking on behalf of the Governing Council. It is an excessive simplification for summing up the positions of the various members of the Council that way. We have a thoroughly close-knit Governing Council; the entity making the decisions in the ECB is the Governing Council, properly speaking, and not a fraction thereof. Each of us is responsible for the stability of the whole eurozone, and none of us represents any particular lobby, any particular economy or notion whatever it may be. Moreover, I consider that collective wisdom is fundamental and, de facto, each of us integrates others' wisdom and views and reserves the right to change his approach according to this interaction. As a chairman, I see to it that the Governing Council fulfils his mandate as inscribed in the treaty price stability. (Inverview Jean-Claude Trichet, 2006).[1]

> The councils of the central banks include hawks and doves, such has always been and will always be the case. Two of the worst hawks of the Governing Council of the ECB are Jürgen Stark, a member of the executive board, in charge of monetary policy, and Axel Weber, the chairman of the Bundesbank. Both have indeed stated that the European interest rates might increase. To what extent should these signals be taken seriously? (*Eurointelligence ECB Watch*, 2007)

> Personalizing the decisions, which media in particular are logically inclined to do, risks focusing on public attention rather on the

> decision-making process and the individual opinion than on the effective results of the meetings and the relevant economic arguments. (Issing, 2008, pp. 160–1)

Confronted with a financial crisis of unexpected magnitude in September–October 2008, central banks rapidly deployed an arsenal of means of monetary intervention in order to deal with the threatening collapse of the world financial system. By providing liquidities to the financial markets by: rapidly reducing their leading interest rates until they reached historical lows; granting banks and financial institutions extended refinancing opportunities; and widening the forms of interventions in the markets (the so-called 'non-conventional policies'[2]), they fulfilled their function of stabilization, which makes them essential institutions to the world financial order.[3] They also developed a discourse on the necessary 'regulation' of world finance. This was also the case with the European Central Bank, which was – and is – active on this double front: immediate and urgent response to the crisis on the one hand, and propositions to reform financial regulation on the other.[4]

Often described as rational actors reacting through their monthly decisions to a changing environment,[5] central banks are complex organizations driven by social agents coming from specific factions of the field of power: administration, politics, academia, finance. Monetary policies are implemented by 'committees'[6] made up of prominent individuals – appointed by political authorities – who possess different types of legitimacy: academic, political and financial. These committees make decisions, which are presented in a second stage as those of the institution as a whole. Having held the monopoly of monetary policy since the global shift towards their 'independence,' central bankers also play a structural political role in the promotion of public and private financial stability. This is particularly the case in Europe, where they became the tireless campaigners of the 'stability and growth pact' and, in the context of the ongoing crisis, of a rapid reduction of budgetary imbalance. To a great extent, they are the spearheads of a 'reformist' (neoliberal) coalition which advocates 'structural reforms' of the goods and services markets, of the labor market, a regulated growth of the financial markets and a reduction in public spending (Marcussen, 2009).

In the world of central banks, the ECB has gained a reputation based on its anti-inflationist rigor (often described as 'excessive' by various economists and political actors, in particular in France), its low sensitivity to the value of the euro, and more recently its strong commitment to market regulation (which nevertheless was placed on the backburner

during the periods of market euphoria), as well as its reactivity in the face of the crises. During the subprime crisis, if the ECB did not anticipate the violent reversal of expectations during the summer of 2008 (the latest increase in its interest rates was in July 2008), it reacted vigorously by using various instruments and going as far as implementing non-conventional policies since 2010, by a willingness to hold public obligations of countries in distress, such as Greece, under specific conditions. The ECB's behavior was not very different from that of its American counterpart or of other countries,[7] even though it did not go as far in lowering interest rates, since the REFI rate reached the floor of 1 percent (later 0.75 percent), nor into the *credit easing* policy, which developed in the United States with the *quantitative easing* policies.

Origins of an institution and the value of a biographical approach

The literature tracing the history of this unparalleled institution is abundant. In his book *La victoire de Luther. Essai sur l'Union économique et monétaire (Luther's victory. Essay on the economic and monetary union)*, Pascal Morand indicates that 'the Economic and Monetary Union could not have existed without the will of Heads of State such as François Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl and Jacques Delors' (Morand, 2001, p. 13). The usual list of 'builders of the euro' would not be complete without various other contributors, often prominent North American or British theoreticians, such as the Canadian Robert Mundell, inventor of the theory of the 'optimal monetary zones'[8]; pro-European senior state officials, such as the Italian Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa,[9] who coordinated a 1987 report on monetary unification – a report mandated by the European Commission; and a set of central bankers (Hans Tietmeyer, of course[10]) and ministers of finance gathered within the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) (Morand, 2001; Quatremer and Klau, 1999).

The paradoxes and the unresolved issues of the brief history of the single currency are well-known (Dyson, 2008): low macroeconomic performance of the eurozone, at least according to usual criteria (GDP growth); no clarification of responsibilities for economic policy between the federal and national levels; no change of the constitutional framework in spite of numerous attested defaults; slow response with respect to the conjunctural evolutions, such as occurred in July 2008.

In this chapter, the analysis will focus on the Governing Council of the ECB[11] composed of the six members of the executive board appointed by the European Council and of the governors of the national central

banks (17 governors in 2011 at the time of the survey) belonging to the eurozone and appointed by national political authorities. The Governing Council fulfils an essential function as a place of consensual elaboration of European monetary policy (Issing, 2008). Its internal deliberations, which are not made public, lead to essential decisions and to a single strategy carried collectively by all the members of the ECB Council.

Studying the Council is not an easy task. Without the availability of 'direct' observation data on the positions taken by individual members (for example, on the internal debates on key decisions during the financial crisis), one is led by necessity to conduct a more 'external' analysis, combining biographical information, public statements, expressions (even limited) of divergences or disagreements. This study is akin to a particular kind of 'sovietology,' which has developed among observers of the world of finance, given the limited information that can be collected on the internal workings of this institution.

The study of the characteristics of the members of the Governing Council is nevertheless a useful tool to open the 'black box' of the functioning of the Council and of the management of European monetary policy. Observers of the policies of the ECB are not mistaken about that: they regularly produce more or less detailed comments on various biographical data collected on members of the Council.[12] They regularly try to characterize the members' (possible) positions, in particular on scales of monetary orthodoxy (the 'hawks vs. doves' opposition being central), which enables them to better understand the possible disagreements on rate movements or any other issue of monetary policy or of financial stability.

Based on a synthesis of biographical data on central bankers in Europe and in the world, our idea is here to understand the way the destiny of the single currency is controlled by a small group of European actors central to the field of Eurocracy within a wider process of redefinition of national and transnational elites. Analyzing, successively, the different types of legitimacy existing within this Council, and their effects, will thus enable us to discuss the specificity and, more generally, the characteristics (especially of the relation to Europe and to 'Europeanization,' durable or temporary) of the new European monetary elite (see Georgakakis in this volume). If, in many respects, knowledge of the sociological properties of the members of the Council is helpful in properly understanding the foundation of beliefs in their 'independence' (a value which is quite central to the legitimacy of the institution), it simultaneously reveals a double dependence: much closer in their characteristics to the managers of the Fed than one often thinks, the 'guardians of the euro' are also 'servants' of Europe, which they associate with a particular conception of economic liberalism.

Text box 1: data issues

The data used in this chapter essentially derive from our database BANQCENT, created in 1999 and regularly updated and enriched, comprising the leaders (presidents, chairmen, governors, deputy-governors, members of monetary policy councils) of all the leading central banks in the world over the last 20 years. It currently includes about 600 profiles. The following types of information were collected: birth year; nationality; diplomas; professional career; international experience; publicly known doctrinal profile.

Also compiled are data relative to the central banks (year of creation, type of property, indicators of independence), to the countries (population, GDP per capita, and so forth), and to monetary policies. The database is currently being extended to include any type of relevant information such as social origin and salary.

The sources of this biographic information are multiple: *Who's Who in Central Banking; Newsmakers: Central Bankers in the News*; websites of the central banks; biographical directories online (such as the 'China vitae' for Chinese elites) and newspaper articles. The information is continuously controlled and completed.

Complementary and competing legitimacies

The world of central bankers is characterized by the coexistence of several forms of legitimacy, which are both complementary and competing: a form linked to monetary expertise as it is deployed within a central bank (with monetary policy, properly speaking, on one side and the various functions of supervision on the other side: conjuncture macroeconomic expertise, financial expertise, and so on.); a form of knowledge legitimacy; one which is financial, properly speaking; finally, political and bureaucratic legitimacy. How do these diverse forms of legitimacy combine within the ECB, shape its functioning and generate beliefs on its degree of independence?

The creation of the ECB, of federal essence, adds to this plurality another type of legitimacy which is linked to the diversity of the nations involved in the organization. As in the United States, where the monetary policy committee (the Federal Reserve System's Federal Open Market Committee*)* brings together 'governors' from the Federal Reserve Board and five presidents of Federal Reserve district banks (some on a rotational basis), 'intra-regional' diversity is incorporated into the functioning of the ECB's Governing Council. This feature is even stronger in the case of the ECB, as the relation between national banks and the federal level (the executive board) is, at least quantitatively, more favorable to the former than is the case for the Fed.

Even if the ECB was born out of a Franco-German political agreement which crystallized in the Maastricht treaty, every country has since then brought to the collective edifice its 'tradition' and its national 'habits' in economic and monetary matters. The so-called 'club Med' countries (to repeat the stigmatizing designation sometimes used in Germany and in northern Europe), or the 'PIIGS' (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain), are described as opposed to the mainly Protestant northern countries, supposedly less 'lax' on monetary and budgetary issues, whereas France, spurred on by Jean-Claude Trichet, relentlessly endeavored to be recognized as part of the 'virtuous' group; the 'ex-communist' Eastern countries, which started to enter the ECB with Slovenia (2007) then with Slovakia (2009), appear as newcomers representing an economic system which quickly and radically switched from planned economies to market economies. These major oppositions do not sum up the complexity of the processes at play in the representation of national 'interests' within the councils: the levels of prices, productivity and inflation strongly vary across Europe; their budgetary situations are quite diverse and tensions have worsened ceaselessly in this respect since 2010; their economic and financial infrastructures remain quite different. The tri-partition North/South/East still reflects three economic and social 'models' which currently coexist within the ECB and, to a greater extent, the European Union, whether these countries belong to the eurozone or not.

A social 'elite'

The sociological profile of the Euro-central bankers corresponds to the eminent political and economic status that its promoters assigned to the monetary project, which was designed to enable the euro to compete with the U.S. dollar in the world monetary order. Within the world of central banking the representatives of the ECB are on average older, more often males (in a globally very male universe[13]), with more prestigious diplomas, and are relatively more 'experienced.' As such, they form a kind of 'elite' within the very rarified world of central bankers.

A first, more specific, comparison with the profiles of the central bankers of the countries of the EU which are not (or not yet) members of the eurozone, to which Iceland, Norway and Sweden were added, shows a set of systematic variations summed up in Table 4.1. The 32 governors of the 17 national central banks of the eurozone who held office between 1999 and 2011 have been older, on average, than their counterparts at the other banks. There are slightly more male governors, and they more often held PhDs. The proportion of bankers with degrees

Table 4.1 The governors of the eurozone and the other European governors

Governors between 1999 and 2011	Governors of NCB of the eurozone (n = 32)	Members of the executive board (n = 12)	Other Europe (n = 104)
% Born 1950 and later	28.1	33.3	61.2
% Women	0	16.7	6.9
% Doctorate (PhD., JD)	59.4	81.8	58.3
% Legal studies	18.8	8.3	5.3
% Economic sciences	59.4	91.2	73.7
% Studies abroad	28.1	50	30.8
% Studies in the United States	9.4	33.3	23.7

in law is slightly higher among the central bankers of the eurozone, but it is overwhelmingly economics (to which we merged management) which dominates in terms of degrees in both cases. Differences with respect to having accomplished part of their studies abroad are more marked: it is more frequent for the European countries outside the eurozone, and most particularly concerns degree courses in the United States.

There is, hence, a distinct profile of the Euro-central bankers within the European space which links them more strongly to national trajectories: a prevalence of legal (or administrative) studies, and relatively limited exposure to higher education systems outside their own countries. At the heart of this 'model' we find France, with the predominance of the National School of Administration (J.-C. Trichet and C. Noyer are graduates), which reflects fairly well the prevalence of a peculiarity of the training of national elites[14] which can be opposed to the increasing presence of central bankers trained in traditions of 'Anglo-American based' economics within the ECB. However, this trend is more marked in the other European central banks, with more than one third of the sample trained at least partially in the United States.

The types of careers of the Euro-central bankers diverge from those of other European central bankers. Euro-central bankers have tended more often to work in more than one sector. When considering the 'dominant aspect' of their professional careers, that is to say the sectors in which the major part of their careers took place (measured in number of years, at least as it can be determined from the available biographical data), most Euro-governors have mainly practiced within the central bank, or in public economic and financial administration (ministry of economics

Table 4.2 Dominant sector of the career

Governors between 1999 and 2011	**Governors of NCB of the eurozone (n = 32)**	**Members of the executive board (n = 12)**	**Other Europe (n = 104)**
% 'Internal'	31.2	33.3	19.5
% University	18.8	25	24.4
% Politics	6.2	8.3	9.8
% Bank and finance	15.6	8.3	17.1
% Private sector, others	3.1	0	2.4
% Economic and financial administration	12.5	25	14.6
% Other administration	12.5	0	12.2

and finance, public financial institutions …). Conversely, they less frequently originated from the political field or from academia.[15]

Therefore, their low previous involvement in the space of European institutions is a salient feature which differentiates central bankers from the other actors of the Commission (Georgakakis and De Lassalle, 2007a): too young an institution to have produced its own elite, the bank based in Frankfurt is not a simple appendage of the Brussels institutions, either.

The dynamics of the enlargement process, which affects a supranational institution only partially covering the countries of the EU, then corresponds, at least as a tendency, to an evolution of the characteristics of the governors of the national central banks towards those of the other European governors: rejuvenation, growing sway of the American model, especially through studies in the United States, weight of political trajectories.

The arrival of governors from Central and Eastern European countries with particular biographical characteristics is illustrated by the governor from Slovenia, a country which joined the eurozone in 2007. Born in 1940, Marco Kranjec holds a PhD in economics obtained in the faculty of Ljubljana, where he worked as an assistant in public finance and where he is still teaching. Kranjec was a researcher in economics in a think tank for a number of years. He was also a macroeconomist at the OECD between 1976 and 1978, then at the World Bank in Washington between 1984 and 1986. He was minister of finance in the Republic of Slovenia in 1990 and 1991. He has fulfilled functions inside the central bank (as a member of the Council and deputy governor) then as an

ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia in Brussels. Typical of the 'the post-socialist transition elites' with a career built upon international and European capital, Kranjec has redeployed his academic and expertise capital in the new political space, in which the central bank perfectly corresponded to his highly academic profile.

In the context of the enlargement, the increased presence of small countries within the Council of the ECB is at the origin of a complex reform which established a weighting system, while still maintaining the general principle of 'one man, one vote' within the Council (Issing, 2008). This method consists in the rotation of voters, which took effect as soon as 16 governors of national central banks were part of the Council, which has been the case since January 2009. Since then, the international tensions within the Council have gained in visibility, especially around the issue of the 'non-conventional' policies affecting national economies with mixed fortunes.

The members of the executive board, an elite within the elite?

The sub-population of the National Central Bank (NCB) governors since 1999, on which the preceding comparison is based, is only a sub-set of the members of the Governing Council of the ECB, to which the members of the executive board, the key executive structure of the ECB, need to be added. As permanent members of the ECB in the sense that they exercise their activity entirely in Frankfurt, prepare and implement the policies decided collegially by the Governing Council, this small group embodies the 'internal' control on the orientations of the ECB and incarnates the heart of the 'technical' and 'scientific' legitimacy necessary to the functioning of the institution. Originating predominantly from the 'major countries' (France, Germany, Italy and Spain permanently have had a member on the executive board since 1999 until very recently), the members of the executive board are also public figures recognized for their 'international stature.' As indicated by Otmar Issing,

> [the executive board's] members – contrary to the governors of the national central banks – are appointed by the Council of the EU, comprising the heads of State and of government, and are exclusively in charge of the 'European' functions of the ECB. Besides, the success [of the creation of the Euro] largely depended on the national central banks and their organizational structures accepting that the ECB and the executive board should play such role. The prerequisite indispensable for that was that the 'head office' should be recognized for its adequate professional competence. (Issing, 2008, p. 132)

One of the members of the executive board is thus responsible, at the beginning of each meeting of the Council, for giving a summary of the economic, monetary and financial situation, by relying on the data of the 'orange book,' and to enlighten the discussions of the Council with the latest conjunctural information to facilitate the reaching of a 'consensus,' subsequently made public and supported by all the members of the Council.

The members of the executive board have particular characteristics which make them an 'elite within the elite.' They are far more likely to hold a PhD (81.8 percent), a degree in economics, and have studied abroad, particularly in the United States. They are also younger and more often have experience in academia. Incarnations of an economic legitimacy of American origin, the members of the executive board are also often described as the strongest supporters of an orthodox interpretation of official doctrine and the 'European' anchor of the central bank.

The case of Otmar Issing illustrates this status. A professor of economics in Würzburg, he became a member of the Council of the Bundesbank in 1990. In 1998, he was appointed chief economist of the ECB and a member of its executive board, an office he retained until 2006 when he was replaced by the German Jürgen Stark. Issing was depicted by Jean-Claude Trichet as 'a living symbol of the successful transition of national currencies to the Euro,' and as 'the intellectual force behind the first decade of the ECB,' to use the expression of Mervyn King.[16] Issing is the economist who forcefully promoted the doctrine at the heart of the bank's strategy until today, the so-called 'two-pillar strategy,' the first being a monetary pillar and the second an economic pillar. He rejected competing options and theories such as the mechanical application of rules of monetary policy (such as the 'rule of Taylor,' linking the key interest rates to inflation and product deviations), inflation targeting (used for example by the Reserve Bank of New-Zealand and the Bank of England), or monetary targeting. Issing proposed a combination of monetary dogma riveted to a 'primary objective' (price stability), while at the same time exercising statistical pragmatism by taking into account the difficulties of measuring monetary magnitudes and the variability of national contexts across Europe. Confronted with severe criticism from European macroeconomists and conjuncture economists concerning, in particular, slow economic growth and the parity of the euro which penalized exports, Issing thought he had nonetheless overcome the doubts of his skeptics: '[O]n the basis of that strategy, the Governing Council of the ECB was capable of pursuing

a monetary policy, which even the most reluctant had to consider successful' (Issing, 2008, p. 118). Otmar Issing finally considers that the Governing Council 'made the first monetary decisions at the right time' (Issing, 2008, p. 149).

Logics and dynamics of stances

Over the past years, several economists have followed Alan Blinder in his call to base the interpretation of central bank decisions on knowledge of the functioning of the committee, hence, starting from the individual stances of their members (Blinder, 2004). The collective nature of evaluation and action through the confrontation of informed viewpoints is seen in this research to be a guarantee of efficiency in comparison with decisions made by a single individual, whether a governor or a minister of finance.

To understand the differences between the policies of two central banks, their different social compositions, and not only their 'objectives' and their legal frameworks (which may be substantially different) therefore need to be taken into account.[17] How can the specificities of the monetary policy of the ECB be construed in a global comparison? The singularity of the policy and of the stances of the ECB is, first of all, associated with the individual features that we have just described. Rich in various forms of capital (academic and bureaucratic most importantly), the ECB has rapidly established its credibility by maintaining a relatively orthodox stance. This has translated into a policy of high key interest rates relative to other central banks and the maintenance of a currency strategy demonstrating little sensitivity to the high value of the euro. Finally, it has adhered strongly to the doctrine of neoliberal reforms of the labor market and of the goods and services markets, reasserted with continuous calls for 'structural reforms.'

Text box 2: The Fed and the ECB in the crisis (Bentoglio, Guidoni, 2009)

The Fed and the ECB have, in more than one way, made similar decisions, and they have often acted in a coordinated fashion. They have both innovated quite quickly to meet the cash flow needs of the banks. In both cases, the intensification of the crisis in September–October 2008 was a sharp break; it has led to the adoption of non-conventional policies, especially by the extension of the balance sheet of central banks. (Bentoglio and Guidoni, 2009)

In the face of the violence of the crisis on the interbank market in August 2007, the Fed turned towards 'credit easing' by using different techniques: principally, the injection of cash flow through open market operations (OMO) and immediate reduction of the key interest rate. Confronted with the failure of these measures, the Fed launched the Term Auction Credit Facility: the idea is to lend to banks while accepting as securities a very wide range of assets and thereby to replace the traditional interbank circuit. New types of interventions have been created to keep up with the spreading crisis. In September–October 2008, the Fed offered far larger amounts of cash flow and extended its range of accepted securities.

The ECB operated relatively less rapidly and decisively between August 2007 and September 2008. Interest rates remained high and the injection of cash, although significant, and more flexible than in the past, remained limited. On October 8, 2008, a radical change occurred with the abrupt reduction of interest rates and an unlimited injection of fixed-rate cash flow, before the extension of its balance sheet, but in a lesser proportion than the Fed.

The domination of the Anglo-American model and European specificities

The European monetary 'elite' is characterized, as seen briefly above, by its inclusion in a space strongly dominated by Anglo-Saxon references and models. The national traditions in the monetary field, for example German and French, appear more 'doctrinal' and 'practical' than 'theoretical.' They seem to carry little weight in the face of a general movement bringing European central bankers closer to their peers in other countries. This has led to the formation of an integrated transnational group in which American norms dominate, and to which the function of ensuring the stability of the world monetary and financial system is devolved. In this global space, the European space exhibits a rather limited degree of autonomy.

The comparison between the members of the Governing Council of the ECB since 1999 (44 individuals) and an equivalent number of members of the Federal Open Market Committee allows us to see to what extent the European monetary elite resembles American central bankers, who traditionally occupy a dominant position in the global space and serve, therefore, as a sort of implicit 'model.'

To conduct this comparison in a more 'global' framework, we have added the members of the political council of the Bank of Japan as well as those of the monetary policy committee of China for which information was available.[18] The social profiles of the councils of these two Asian central banks are incarnations of specific monetary strategies. Analysis of these profiles enables us to perceive the existence of a global field of monetary policies which does not boil down to the exchange-

Table 4.3 Social composition indicators of the different monetary policy councils (1999–2009)

	Governing Council ECB	**Federal Open Market Committee**	**Political council Bank of Japan**	**Monetary policy committee Bank of China**
% Born 1950 and later	29.5	35.7	19.1	54.5
% Women	5.3	19.4	8.3	13.3
% PhD	63.6	76.2	28.6	33.3
% Legal studies	15.9	9.5	19.1	6.1
% Economic sciences studies	68.2	76.2	57.1	54.6
% Management-finance studies	9.1	14.3	14.3	12.1
% Studies abroad	34	4.8	42.9	24.2
% Studies in the United States	15.9	100	38.1	18.2

rate policies and the accumulation of currency reserves (according to the current descriptions of the 'international financial imbalances').

The data reveal the relative proximity between the ECB and the Fed, especially when compared with both Asian banks: a high proportion of PhD holders and a strong predominance of studies in economics. However, the specificity of the ECB is quite visible : the relative weight of legal studies, a low representation of members with degrees in management, very low female membership, relatively higher average age, and a high proportion of studies abroad (in particular in the United States and the United Kingdom). The 'pilots' of the single currency, hence, exhibit certain specific 'secondary' features, at least with regard to their social and academic trajectories. The same goes for their professional careers. As at the Fed, in the ECB the proportion of mainly, or partially, internal careers is important, which constitutes a legitimacy indicator exclusive to the bank, properly speaking, and undoubtedly a contributing factor to monetary orthodoxy or conformism. Careers in administration (financial or other) are also frequent in the ECB, backing up the hypothesis of a strong 'technocratic' anchoring of the bank. By comparison, only the Chinese central bank outperforms, by far, the other banks on this indicator: the members of the Chinese monetary policy committee present in the database have, indeed, quite often spent their careers within the Chinese state in non-financial sectors, which can be explained by the

Table 4.4 Dominant aspect of the career

	Governing Council – ECB	Fed Open Market Committee – Fed	Political council – Bank of Japan	Monetary policy committee – Popular bank of China
'Internal'	31.8	33.3	19.1	27.3
Bank and finance	13.6	19.1	14.3	6.1
Private sector, others	2.3	14.3	28.6	0
Financial administration	15.9	14.3	4.8	12.1
Administration, other sectors	9.1	4.8	9.5	24.2
Politics	6.8	0	0	9.1
University	20.5	14.3	23.8	21.2

strong interpenetration between the state, the party and the publicly held companies. Academic careers are prominent within the ECB, as incidentally they are in the Bank of Japan. Finally, careers in banking and the private sector are less common within the ECB than within the Fed. When taking the dominant sector of the career as an indicator, the Fed is more closely linked to the private sector and, in particular, to the financial sector, than are the other central banks. These trends are confirmed when taking into account the succession of positions throughout careers, except that the ECB is characterized by a stronger propensity toward sectoral diversification.

Hawks vs. doves?

How are positions produced within the Governing Council of the ECB? What is the respective role of national origins, of social and academic trajectories in the 'ideological,' 'doctrinal' or 'theoretical' orientations of its members, in particular on monetary and budgetary subjects? What is at stake here is understanding the way the collective strategy of central banks is forged, strategy which results from internal deliberation in the case of the ECB.

One of the main sources commonly used to ascertain the degree of monetary orthodoxy lies in the 'minutes' of the councils and voting reports, which provide precise and valuable pieces of information on the positions and the votes of the members. Unfortunately, this source is not accessible in the case of the ECB and we are, hence, reduced to relying

on the various public statements of individual members, most often in times of particularly weighty debates, to sketch out hypotheses about their 'orientations,' which can incidentally vary over time. An originally *hawkish* orientation can thus mutate into a *dovish* orientation or vice-versa. It is thus that the ECB-Watchers, like the 'Buba-Watchers' before them – but also like certain specialists on the Fed, on the BoJ and even on the Chinese popular bank – regularly establish degrees of orthodoxy or assign individuals to the categories of 'hawks,' 'doves,' or moderates somewhere in between. It is easy for the members of the central banks to dispute the oversimplifying character of such interpretations of their monetary policy orientations. However, without more detailed information, it remains that these publicly available indications enable us to partially enter the 'black box' of central bank councils – in the present case, the Governing Council of the ECB.

According to the coding we used for 32 individuals of the ECB and the Fed, the former included a smaller number of well-known 'hawks' over the period 1999–2009 and an even smaller number of clearly identified 'doves.' These categories are by definition quite relative, and the comparison between two central banks raises difficult problems, inasmuch as the contexts of the stances may greatly differ.

The main identifiable 'hawks' of the Governing Council of the ECB are members of its executive board: Otmar Issing then Jürgen Stark, Wim Duisenberg, Jean-Claude Trichet (who was the governor of NCBs before he became chairman of the ECB). But such is also the case with some of the most well-known 'doves,' such as Jose-Manuel Gonzales-Paramo or Lorenzo Bini Smaghi. Undoubtedly, belonging to the executive board or to the NCBs is but a partially explanatory cleavage on the question of sensitivity to inflation or to the 'dangers' of the public debt. Globally, it should be noted that, in the data in our possession, the most clearly identifiable 'hawks' have a tendency to be found among the holders of doctorates in economic sciences which can be interpreted as a dogmatic *habitus*, illustrated most clearly by Otmar Issing. This 'habitus' can be associated with the kind of doctrinal bias dominating the judgment of certain theoreticians with the monetarist vision of economics, for whom the real world must first and foremost resemble the ideal theoretical model of a frictionless market economy in which the neutral central banks only supply private agents with the right amount of money necessary to the smooth working of the economy, while maintaining the stability of the system and securing its reliability. In France, it is, rather, trajectories inside the 'aristocracy' of high civil servants which is most associated with this type of posture.

This, however, covers postures which are perhaps less dogmatic with regard to economic theories, but nevertheless relatively rigid in terms of politico-economical *ethos*, as illustrated by the inflexible doctrine of Jean-Claude Trichet.

The other factor which might condition monetary policy orientation is national tradition. The Bundesbank, the Bank of the Netherlands and the National Bank of Austria traditionally have very 'monetarist' doctrines, particularly since the 1970s. National central banks can be viewed as socialization frameworks and most certainly weigh on the representations and world views of their leaders and former officials. Certain national macroeconomic trajectories, such as those of France and Italy, reveal a greater historical tolerance to deficits and to public debt, if not an 'inflationary' bias. It is nevertheless difficult to infer mechanically a differential sensitivity of their current leaders, because the mediations in this regard are so numerous. The different macroeconomic contexts within the eurozone weigh obviously on the governors of the national central banks (who represent the diverse conjunctures within the ECB) and probably on the members of the executive board as well. The balance of power between doves and hawks then appears to be in flux and relatively uncertain.

Text box 3: The denial of inter-individual differences

When talking about the ECB, the words 'hawks' and 'doves' are heard increasingly often. You, yourself belong to the doves, whereas Trichet and Weber, the number one of the Bundesbank and a former German statesman, guide the hawks. Is it a correct characterization?

No, the division between hawks and doves is hardly meaningful for those who take part in the internal debates and make the decisions. Of course, everyone has his own way of thinking and assessing the underlying developments of economics. But at the end of the day, the decisions are made with a wide consensus, including the latest increase in interest rates. (Interview with Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, member of the Executive Board of the ECB, published on December 9, 2005 and conducted by Angelo Allegri. (*Il Giornale*)

Conclusion

This multi-level approach, based on the inter-individual diversity and articulating it with the macroeconomic and the 'macrosocial' levels, enables more refined analyzes, often sketchy and biased by the choice of simplified indicators, which seek to ascertain to what extent the monetary strategies of the Fed and the ECB differ.

Our approach is an attempt to pry open the black box of institutions which appear at first view opaque and complex, by keeping in mind that these institutions have their own social logics, largely dependent on the properties of their members. This type of analysis can be extended to the study of the governments, which are also institutions formed by individuals with differentiated social features, international institutions and any other organization with leverage on the economy.

In this case, the differentiated space of the European central bankers is only homogeneous in appearance or when observed at a distance. Prosopographical investigation and paying attention to the positions of the agents reveal clusters forming a sub-space which is both quite specific and structured according to principles which can be found in other sectors of the field of Eurocracy.

Notes

1. Interview of December 11, 2006 with Jean-Claude Trichet, Chairman of the European Central Bank, conducted by Irini Chrysolora *(Ta Nea),* Moritz Döbler *(Der Tagesspiegel)* and Pierre Leyers *(Luxemburger Wort),* published on December 18, 2006.
2. For a synthetic presentation (Bentoglio, Guidoni, 2009).
3. Public institutions strongly related to banks and to private financial actors, intervening continuously in the world markets and fueled by the research of economists, central banks are at the same time political actors accountable to elected officials and to citizens, thereby placing them at the heart of the field of power.
4. One can refer to the dialogue between Romano and Padoa-Schioppa (2009). A former member of the executive board of the ECB and one of the architects of the Economic and Monetary Union, Padoa-Schioppa embodied the most 'renewing' faction of the world of central bankers.
5. A vast body of literature with a strong economic orientation models the actions of the central banks as the products of strategic behavior in a changing macroeconomic context (inflation, GDP ...) and studies the respective merits of monetary policies obeying fixed rules (such as the 'rule of Taylor'), of the independence of the central bank, of inflation targeting or monetary targeting (See, for example, Goodhart, 1994). On the new conditions governing the 'profession' of central bankers in the global economy, see Patat, 2003.
6. This 'silent revolution' of the committees has been aptly described by Alan Blinder, a Democrat, academic economist and former vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve (Blinder, 2004).
7. See Text box 2.
8. Awarded a 'prize by the Central Bank of Sweden in memory of Alfred Nobel', Robert Mundell is a theoretician of monetary economics and has ties to the U.S. Republican Party.
9. Padoa-Schioppa epitomizes European careers within the world of central bankers and constitutes one of the strong links between the ECB and the European Commission.

10. Holding a PhD in theology, Hans Tietmeyer, the former chairman of the Bundesbank, is also one of the doctrinaires of the social market economy and of neoliberalism ('ordoliberalism' in Germany), as it ought to be understood in the original meaning of the word (Denord, 2007).
11. Several recent analyses develop a socio-political study of the first years of the ECB (Dyson, 2008; Dyson and Marcussen, 2009).
12. See 'Newsmakers – Central Bankers in the news' prepared by Central Banking Publications Ltd, which supplies, almost day by day, quite valuable indications on current occupational and personal affairs of the actors of 'central banking' in the world.
13. This has recently become a public issue with the opposition of the European Parliament to the total masculinization of the Governing Council, opposition supported by the Spanish government.
14. This has recently changed a bit with the opening of positions to the Polytechnique-ENSAE graduates with more pronounced econometric bureaucratic training, as evidenced by the appointment of Benoît Coeuré to the ECB Governing Council.
15. When considering the periods spent, even relatively briefly, in a professional sector, the majority of Euro-bankers continue to have worked in different sectors, other than politics. The academic careers (even parallel to another activity) are also frequent in both sub-populations.
16. Quotations reproduced on the back cover of Issing's book, *The Birth of the Euro,* in which he ascribed to himself a central role.
17. Differences in mandates are nevertheless limited, as even between the Fed and the ECB, price stability is in both cases the primary objective.
18. China Vitae, http://www.chinavitae.com/ This online biographical source provides information on 4,000 individuals holding leading positions in China.

5
The World of European Information: The Institutional and Relational Genesis of the EU Public Sphere

Philippe Aldrin

Introduction

Neither the EU communication policy nor the criticism it is subject to are new. Born with the integration process itself, the question of Community communication can be traced back to the 1950s, when the 'High Authority' sought to develop the 'public relations' of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community).[1] A first report by the European Parliament devoted to the 'information problem' of the European community project was published in the 1950s (Carboni, 1957). Although this question was from the inception an important issue in inter-institutional debates (the Parliamentary Assembly adopted resolutions on the information–communication policy in 1960, 1962, 1972 and 1986), it was only from the 1980s onwards that information–communication policy became the subject of recurrent controversy, particularly around the themes relative to the excessive power of the Commission and the 'democratic deficit' of Europe – until then synonymous with parliamentary impotence (Marquand, 1979). Sporadically, crisis after crisis, and controversy after controversy, the paradigms on which the conceptual frameworks of European communication were based shifted. First of all, the 'challenges' facing European leaders in terms of opinion and the media were not the same in 1952 as they were in 1992 or today. From the end of the 1990s onwards, the diffusionist approach to communication that prevailed in the first decades of the European project, based on a pedagogy instrumentalizing 'opinion makers' as relays of information (Aldrin, 2009), progressively lost ground to a more procedural conception. On the one hand, communication was integrated upstream from policy formulation, mobilized dialogue and deliberative democracy mechanisms; on the other hand

communication perspectives sought to give substance to the 'governance' framework (Georgakakis and De Lassalle, 2007b).[2]

But how can one better understand, beyond this paradigmatic shift, the concrete functioning of and transformations in European communication? On this question, the academic literature contains a peculiar bias. Most authors start from the end of the process and focus on the effects of the EU's communication policy and, ultimately, on its supposed inefficiency, in order to identify the causes. Attempting to diagnose Europe's inability to address the communication 'challenge,' observers tend to focus on identifying the 'strategic errors' that could explain its 'failure' (Dacheux, 2004). Though the inventory of arguments characterizing the successive controversies in the history of EU communication policy probably predisposes to such an interpretation, a more structural approach can help shed some light on the institutional and sociological roots of the 'problem.'[3]

To do so, one must first take into account the transformations resulting from the successive political changes in the European community. With the direct elections of MEPs,[4] citizen behavior and opinions – measured with regular opinion polls (Eurobarometer) – have progressively become the main indicator of the EU's political legitimacy. Since the principles of legitimization of political Europe became aligned with those of any other 'public democracy,'[5] each 'crisis' (low voter turnout, negative referendum) has had a magnifying effect on the EU's 'communication strategy,' giving critics the opportunity to express themselves (Kingdon, 1984). But here, too, discourse accounts only imperfectly for the reality of the situations and practices, and even more so for the changes in this reality. Against the impression generated by the steady stream of accusations made by active Eurosceptics, who qualify the EU communication as structurally dysfunctional,[6] the information–communication mechanism has undergone successive adjustments and experienced objective successes such as the constitution of a substantial press corps in Brussels. As early as Delors's first mandate, 'information policy' was officially renamed 'European communication.' The completion of the Single Market and the new treaty provisions – including EU citizenship and the second 'pillar,' has partly eroded the states' resistance to Brussels attempts' to communicate its 'propaganda' directly to citizens (Foret, 2008, p. 63). Thus, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EU's information and communication policy asserted itself more openly as a program for the integration of national opinions, even though, as we shall see, this objective had been conceptualized and operationalized much earlier.

But it is the 'nature,' scope and horizon of Europe itself that have changed. It is now not only possible, but accepted, to use proactive rhetoric on strategic communication to serve the European project. The Maastricht moment, marked by voters' unexpected timidity and the recommendations provided in the de Clercq report[7] accelerated the transformation of the communications apparatus as well as the public justification of this transformation. Commercial communication techniques were used in the 'information effort.' Marketing principles and terminology, as well as the figurative fictions of the general public (the 'European citizen,' 'European Youth') became part of the discursive and action repertoires of the Commission (Tumber, 1995). For a long time considered as an artificial institutional posture aimed at making EU action more natural and attractive in the eyes of citizens of the member states (Memmi, 1991), communication was no longer limited to providing information on Europe. It was embraced as a key instrument for political legitimization. From the 1980s onward, the EU agents most interested in the integration process (commissioners, spokespersons, DG X agents) and, soon after, other European public affairs professionals (international journalists, members of think tanks, lobbyists, communications consultants) started working more openly at conquering 'European opinion,' as the struggle to win the hearts and minds was constructed as the new frontier and central challenge of political Europe.

To get to the root causes of the 'problem' behind the controversies one must first examine the factors that have led, in the last decade, to a politicization of debates around the EU communication policy. A steadily declining turnout at the European Parliament elections (1999, 2004, 2009), referendum failures (2001, 2005, 2008), the avowed Euro-phobia of some national governments: the frequency of 'crises' seems to have spun out of control, bringing more opportunities for an ever-increasing number of European information specialists to publicly question EU policy on this topic. The Santer scandal marked a highpoint in the criticism and the beginning of a new stage in the institutional conception of EU communication. The dramatic collective resignation of the commissioners in 1999 was almost unanimously considered (Meyer, 1999)[8] as the consequence of the inept management by the Commission of its relations with the press.[9] Thus, as soon as he was appointed, President Prodi promised the rapid adoption of 'an information strategy' and a complete overhaul of the incriminated services – the Directorate General for Communication or DG X – as part of a comprehensive reform of the entire administrative apparatus (Cini, 2002). After dissolving DG X,[10] and setting it up again in 2001 as DG PRESS under parliamentary

pressure,[11] the Prodi Commission adopted legislation which sought to define 'a new framework for cooperation' (European Commission, 2001b) and thereby promote better 'inter-institutional collaboration' (European Commission, 2002b) for the information and communication policy of the EU, in accordance with the governance principles theorized in the 2001 white paper (European Commission, 2001b). Confronted with yet another record-low turnout at the European elections of 2004, the Prodi presidency came to an end amidst renewed criticism of the weaknesses of EU institutional communication (Anderson and McLeod, 2008). As a result, the Barroso College, formed in 2004, appointed the Swedish commissioner, Margot Wallström, as the first vice president in charge of 'institutional relations and communication strategy.' Her mission statement includes re-shaping of EU communication policy. Following the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, Wallström concentrated attention on the 'professionalization' of the European services (European Commission, 2005b), routinely made use of the provisions on participatory democracy (European Commission, 2005c) and proposed, in a white paper published in 2006, a 'true break' from existing political objectives and a modification of the division of labor in the field of European communication (European Commission 2006). The propositions put forward by the Commission were met with open opposition from the Commission's main institutional partners (European Parliament, 2006).[12] The ensuing debate, which think tanks, information sites and specialized agencies heavily influenced and were largely engaged in, led to a compromise agreement for greater inter-agency cooperation (European Commission 2007; 2008a).

Since the late 1990s, a shared diagnosis has thus ascribed the misfortunes of political Europe to poor management of the media and public opinion. From this perspective, one can get a first understanding of the reasons for the success of this rhetoric of the 'insurmountable' challenge and its corollaries, delay and failure.

We do not situate our analysis within this rhetoric, or to put it differently, we do not use the same framework. The question of the relevance or effectiveness of the EU's communication policy will not be raised here, and we shall only examine it as a belief of the actors studied. Rather, our approach is to attempt to analyze the process which constructs European communication (Rowell and Mangenot, 2010). For this purpose, we will endeavor to explore a world at work (Becker, 1988), that of the professionals of European information, with its routines, contingencies and conflicts, in the same way as other worlds of Europe have been studied in their concrete reality (Georgakakis, 2002a; Michel, 2005; other chapters

in this volume). When one distances oneself from institutional discourse or from media products to conduct the sociology of their producers, the question of European communication no longer appears as a mere phenomenon of discursive ballistics and, instead, comes into view as a universe of multiple and complex interactions. Multiple, firstly, because the production and publicizing of information on EU activities as well as the interpretations they generate, are the products of the activities of a wide range of actors; and most notably of the agents of EU institutions: policy makers and their staff, the administrative personnel in charge of communication (in parliament, within the Commission, the Council, and member states); but also, and increasingly, of private producers of information, discourse and analysis on Europe: journalists, activists of political parties and movements, interest groups, think tanks and so on. They are complex, too, in that the interactions between 'producers,' 'developers' and 'reporters' of European news cannot be reduced to purely functional (and sometimes dysfunctional) relationships aimed at informing the public of the 'sensitive and significant' facts, to use an expression borrowed from Molotch and Lester (1981). Indeed, these relationships are caught in tensions and competition of various kinds.

In order to gain insight into this world of European information co-production, we aim in this chapter to examine the historical and sociological process structuring a relational and transactional space governed jointly by producers, go-betweens, and mediators of European information or, to put it more simply, to do the sociology of the professionals of the 'EU public sphere.' To make sense of the organization of these transactional games, we will proceed in three stages. We first focus on the agents of the Commission – including the DG COMM,[13] who, today as in the past, are in charge of organizing European information, and whose practices as well as discourse convey traces of the organizational sedimentation of EU bureaucracy (Pierson, 1996). We will in particular examine the origins of the organizational stigma attached to these agents. Maintaining an historical perspective, we will then seek to re-situate the information–communication activities at the heart of the institutional and political tensions characterizing a Europe under construction, this time placing more emphasis on jurisdictional disputes, hierarchical issues and the political heteronomy that impact the manufacturing of European information. Finally, we will study the more contemporary transformations this field has undergone, through the changes in the division of labor, the reallocation of resources[14] and the reconfiguration of the relations among civil servants, journalists, consultants and experts. Our analysis will be structured around pairs

of oppositions, such as administrative–political, independence–interdependence, autonomy–heteronomy, permanence–intermittence, and hierarchy–fragmentation. The aim of this method of analysis is not to distinguish between different types of information producers, but to uncover the tensions and the logics that make them belong to the same world the morphology of which is shaped by an institutionalized system of co-production and is the place from which European affairs are being increasingly managed.

'Information people' in the EC/EU bureaucracy

Decisions made in the 1950s concerning the distribution of information-related tasks have had instituting and institutionalizing effects on the organization of this sector of activity, particularly in terms of hierarchies, monopolies and resources. Although, objectively speaking, they cannot be proved or disproved, the founding myths that inhabit social organizations bring to the surface discourse on the historical foundations and structural mechanisms underpinning the principles of classification of contemporary positions. Like any institution, the EU bureaucracy has its own founding myths of the 'European adventure,' with its cohorts of 'crusaders' and 'pioneers.' Such myths offer a useful entry point for analyzing the morphology of the positional and relational space in which the agents of EU communication and their know-how and reputations evolve and are perceived. Thus, the reputation that 'information people' acquired within the Commission early on provides the first tangible indications of the objective and structural reasons underlying the internalized principles of hierarchies that continue to this day to guide the EU administration. In opposition to a strategic analysis of 'European Communication,' our study reveals that the world of EU information specialists is, from the outset, divided and offers uneven legitimacy resources depending on the actors' mandate and scope of action.

'The DG of the good-for-nothings'

The way it is told by its past and present protagonists, the history of European information agents is nonetheless a golden legend that mirrors the golden legend of the corps of European civil servants based on the memoirs of its 'founders' (Dumoulin, 2007). The intrigue of this story is always the same and makes use of the same idealized narrative figures. First, there were uncertain beginnings during which a small team of committed 'adventurers,' galvanized by their faith in Europe and backed

and managed by a handful of courageous and rebellious 'captains,' advanced despite political resistance and skepticism. Then, with the success of the integration process, the service started to grow and to lose its pioneering charm but earned its stripes as a professional corps within the EU administration. This replacement of activism by bureaucratic specialization, and of the 'forefathers' genius with the professionalism of the highly qualified graduates of EU competitive examinations is accepted as a natural evolution. But there is more, or rather something else, in the etiological myth of the institutional communicators. In the testimonies that they readily give to observers, all the actors who were involved in the early years of the European adventure in communication recall their reputation as 'entertainers' within the nascent administration. In these narratives, compared to other agents the EU civil servants assigned to information missions are depicted as having suffered more, and longer, from a reputation of amateurism.[15] Traditionally, the DG COMM has had the reputation (an unenviable one in a corps known for its high qualifications level) as the 'DG of the good-for-nothings,' of the 'poets.' In an institutional field celebrating technical, legal or economic skills, the poet or entertainer is seen as involved in literary and otherwise futile tasks.

> The personnel of the communication department are always seen as thoughtless hippies. We, at DG COMM, have a bit of a reputation for being the DG of the good-for-nothings … It's partly true … though we don't always mess up everything! Not all of us in any case [laughs]. This is partly true, especially because the other DGs tend to not take us seriously. This does have effects. The up-and-comers and outstanding civil servants generally want to be recruited in the Secretariat-General or in the DG Competition, not with us. (Interview with an agent who spent his ten-year career in the DG COMM, first in Brussels and then in the Commission representation in a member state, February 2008)

One is repeatedly reminded of this disqualification in discussions within the Commission, both in the in-group (DG COMM agents) and the out-group (agents of the other DGs), that one can consider it as part of the indigenous objectification of the symbolic order of the DGs and, more broadly, as an element of the symbolic hierarchy of the space of the EU administration's positions and jobs. This depreciation is confirmed by the political value commissioners traditionally attach to DG COMM, but also by the structural analysis of the differential desirability of positions within

the Commission administration. With respect to the low political 'value' of the DG COMM, it must be noted that the information and communication portfolio has systematically been allocated to commissioners as a secondary portfolio (see Appendix 1). In their survey of European commissioners, Joana and Smith talk about the poor image that sticks to DG COMM in the successive colleges, and illustrate their analysis with anecdotes and testimonies of commissioners and their cabinet members that leave no ambiguity (Joana and Smith, 2002, p. 76, p. 177). They go so far as to claim that 'between 1958 and 1999, the overall responsibility for information within the Commission was always seen as an unrewarding portfolio for a commissioner and a thankless task for the DG X' (Joana and Smith, 2002, p. 193). Concerning the low level of benefits gained from a position in DG COMM in terms of career promotion, the study of high-ranking European officials conducted by De Lassalle and Georgakakis highlights that the career-boosting effects of working in certain DGs such as the DG Administration and the DG COMM, are more limited than in those of the big 'historical' DGs (Competition, Internal Market, for instance) or cabinets (Stevens, 2001). For this reason, the DGs that provide little European institutional capital (Georgakakis and De Lassalle, 2007b) have low relative value in comparison with the DGs that ambitious elite agents aspire to serve. The low political value of the DG COMM, and the low prestige of administrative positions, combine and reinforce each other. The lack of a 'heavyweight' commissioner or of a commissioner truly dedicated to communication issues results in a shortage of important missions and major challenges and, consequently, a lack of opportunities for agents to be spotted as good candidates for positions in a cabinet, which is the most effective career-booster.

The 'genetic' reasons for the stigma

The tensions that accompanied the creation of the Joint Press and Information Service (1958–61), the frequent name changes (DG X, DG PRESS, DG COMM), the elimination of the DG from the Commission's organizational structure between 1999 and 2001, the conflictual relationships with other services (the Spokesperson Service, DG III[16]), were all symptomatic of the contingent nature of the administrative and political issues that affect this directorate, and therefore its unattractiveness in terms of career prospects. But, among the reasons that historically explain the stigma, the first lies in how information and communication missions were distributed at the time of the establishment of the Communities. Following the model of the administrative structure implemented by Jean Monnet in 1952 for the High Authority

of the ECSC, the executive heads of the EEC and Euratom appointed a spokesperson to inform and liaise with the press.

Spokespersons act as press officers. Their main functions consist in writing press releases, conducting briefings, holding press conferences and ensuring close contact with journalists. In this organizational rationale, the spokesperson is literally the link between the cabinet and the outside world: their functions are therefore political and in no way administrative. Indeed, though the frontier between the political (the cabinet) and the administrative is often fuzzy in the daily work of the institutions, one can still identify a general distinction: the political is what is 'sensitive' in the political arena (Weber, 2003, p. 119). Sensitivity, defined not materially but relationally and contextually, can therefore be measured by the (potential or actual) degree of interest it receives from the players in the political game, the press, the mass media and therefore, possibly, public opinion. In this perspective, the job of the spokesperson for EU executives is sensitive and, consequently, explicitly political. This is why, as early as the 1950s, they were considered as informal members of cabinet of the heads of the three Communities (Bastin, 2003, p. 265). But, in order to inform the groups affected by Community decisions and activities, the spokespersons need staff to write brochures and summary sheets; they need personnel to ensure that EU-related information is disseminated to the member states. This task – which is more administrative in nature as it is more technical and less sensitive to current events – cannot be carried out by the spokespersons.

On the initiative of members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Communities, the Joint Press and Information Service (PIS) of the European Communities[17] was created in the early 1960s. The work of the PIS focused on 'specific audiences' – that is to say groups who were either directly concerned by EU decisions (economic policy makers, farmers, trade unionists) – or who were intended to relay a positive image of European integration to a wider audience, and particularly to the youth (teachers and academics, for example). Communication by the PIS was clearly distinct from the work of the spokespersons in that it was directed primarily to audio-visual media services and came in the form of various publications or information disseminated at trade shows and exhibitions in the member states and outside the Communities. Thus, since the early 1960s, a principle of division of tasks within the European institutions crystallized: the PIS produces pamphlets on EU activities and maintains 'public relations' with specific groups while the spokesperson explains the positions of the Commission on sensitive and important issues.

Text box 1: The division of information-related tasks within the Commission

In a comminatory internal service note, Giuseppe Caron, vice president of the Commission in charge of information, describes the respective tasks of the Spokesman's Group and of the PIS:

Following an agreement reached on March 1, 1960 between the presidents of the three Executive bodies, and the decisions made by each Executive, the spokesman Groups shall, from January 1, 1961, report for all matters to the Executive Body they are attached to, and no longer to the Joint Press and Information Service. Furthermore, the Commission also approved, during its 114th meeting held on July 27, 1960, a definition of the tasks as well as of the structure of its own spokesman Group, as shown below:

A. the Commission's spokesman's Group
The Spokesperson must primarily follow in detail the daily activities of the Commission and be able to interpret its politics at all times. The action of information s/he performs is therefore a short-term, rapid and official one. The task of the Spokespersons Group is one of general rather than technical information …

B. Joint Press and Information Service of the European Communities
The Press and Information Service Executive is common to the executives of the three European Communities. […] The task of the Service is to ensure information in the long run […]. In conclusion, I ask that, in compliance with the decisions made by the Commission, the services conduct their relations with the press only through the intermediary of the spokesman's group.' (Excerpts from an internal note, 'Tasks and Functions of the Commission's Spokesman's Group and coordination of its activities with those of the Joint Press and Information Service of the European Communities.' February 1961, CEAB 2/2930)

Sociologically, this functional distribution of communication-related tasks can be interpreted as an implicit distinction between the noble tasks and the thankless ones, defined in terms of skills (verbal dexterity, political sense, a thorough understanding of technical issues and political affairs) and of partners routinely involved in each profession. In this regard, sociology has shown the effects of this principle of the division of labor on representations of the relative prestige of professional groups, with the formation of an elite group whose members are deemed pretentious by the other groups in the same professional environment, groups who, for their part, are associated with more menial tasks (Hughes, 1996). Transposing this framework of professional hierarchies to our context reveals the elitist nature of functions assigned to the Spokespersons (working directly with their commissioner at the heart of the political game or being on the front line with journalists in the newsroom) and, by contrast, the subordinate and less prestigious position of the PIS staff who write pamphlets, prepare press reviews and spread the European message in public events.

The Paradoxical management of EU information communication

The institutionalization of this original division of information–communication tasks partly explains its susceptibility to conflicts setting the directorates of the Commission in opposition to one another, but also to the tensions

among the Commission, parliament and national governments. We shall see now that the institutionalization of the spokesperson was not the only obstacle to the efforts made by the DG COMM agents to impose it as the EU's administrative center for information and communication activities. The specialized services of the other DGs and EU institutions have also contributed to fragmenting communication-related work, just as differences between the leaders of a European political arena have been transformed by the deepening process of integration and the entry of the new member states.

Institutionalizing fragmentation

At the time of the merger of the executive bodies, the 'inter-executive' structure (1965–7) responsible for reorganizing the services chose to redefine the hierarchy of the functions for the agents in charge of relations with the press and public opinion. Thus, the PIS became directorate-general (DG X) of the unified Commission. In the meantime, a unique Spokesperson Service was created and prolonged the Spokesperson Group in place since 1958 within the EEC. The relations with the press were therefore officially split into two distinct areas: the Spokesperson Service, headed by Bino Olivi, was in charge of the accredited press in Brussels. DG X managed relations with the non-accredited press, therefore mostly with the regional press of the member states. This functional and territorial division fostered lasting rivalry, embodied in the opposition between the leaders of the DG X and those of the SPS – an opposition which its protagonists, J.-R. Rabier and B. Olivi, turned into a legend and which has made the reconciliation of the two services impossible.[18]

Text box 2: Nothing personal …

The dispute between J.-R Rabier and B. Olivi symbolizes the tensions between Spokespersons and the communicators in the EU bureaucracy.
J. R. Rabier, a former French civil servant at the Plan Commission, joined Jean Monnet in Luxembourg in 1954 and became chief of staff to the president of the ECSC High Authority. In 1960, this Catholic personalist and graduate in political science was appointed Director-General of the PIS and remained at this post until the PIS became DG X in 1967. He was re-appointed Director-General of the DG X in 1970 but was replaced by a high ranking Irish official when the directorate was expanded in 1973.

B. Olivi was an Italian civil servant and law graduate appointed in 1960 to work with Commissioner Giuseppe Caron (whose mandate included information) as Deputy Head of Cabinet. When, in 1962, a new EEC Commission spokesperson was to be appointed, Caron recommended his collaborator. Olivi held this position until 1977 and implemented the Commission Press Room

system based on the accreditation mechanism, the 'Midday Express' and a 'code' for the relations between the Commission and the press (see below).

In interviews with a team of historians led by Michel Dumoulin, Rabier, Olivi and some of their former collaborators (Paul Collowald, Colette Le Bail, Max Konsthamm, Manuel Santarelli) described at length the various episodes of the duel (Oral History Project, the Historical Archives of the EU, European University Institute, Florence). About the respective profiles of the two heads of EU information affairs and their relationship in the 1960s, Santarelli volunteered the following interpretation: 'There were power struggles […] but never any personal rivalry between them: they had different views on what needed to be done, not about the goal of European action, but about the means of achieving it. Rabier was certainly much more engaged, in a radical federalist manner; whereas Olivi, who was a federalist as well as a loyal follower of Spinelli, was less dogmatic and more convinced of the necessity of taking into account national realities and was more wary of the risks for Europe of a rushed supra-nationality.'

The hierarchy between the DG X agents and the spokesperson is reinforced by the differential relationship to institutional constraints and career prospects. More than one out of two spokespersons are former journalists who were personally hired by commissioners (Joana and Smith, 2002), whereas the majority of the DG X agents are civil servants with, in general, high longevity in this Directorate General, in which promotions are rare because there is little turnover among directors and heads of units (see below). With regard to the 'information people,' it should be noted that the specialization and professionalism the institution attributes – both objectively and subjectively – solely to the spokespersons, rest primarily on the internalization of skills acquired in fields of activities (mostly journalism) that lie outside European institutions.

The relative centrality of the central services

Though the influence of a DG in the EU space is subjectively measured through the DG's reputation, it can, as we have seen, be objectively evaluated by using a number of indicators, such as the political value it gives a commissioner's portfolio or the amount of European institutional capital it confers upon its staff. It can also be measured more directly through its ability to impose its functions, by the amount of human and financial resources it is allocated or the quality or the power of external actors who support it.[19] If DG COMM has performed the statutory role of a 'central service' at the Berlaymont or in the Commission's representations in the member states,[20] its capacity to coordinate EU

communication activities has traditionally been restricted. Indeed, ever since the EU administrative mechanisms were implemented, a number of communication agents and services have escaped centralization. It is the case, as we have seen, of spokespersons who serve as press officers to the various commissioners, directly manage their relations with the accredited correspondents in Brussels and report directly to the President of the Commission (the head spokesman is the president's spokesperson). This is also the case with each DG's communication service staff, whose numbers started to increase in the late 1960s. Their role is to manage, for each DG, their own circuits of public relations with professional groups and national administrations. It is, finally, the case of the press services and communication personnel of the other European institutions, such as the parliament's DG-Press or the Communications Department of the ECB.

Quantitatively, the number of personnel working for DG COMM increased rapidly. The hundred or so civil servants who moved from the PIS to the DG X, rapidly increased to 200 agents. In 1972, a parliamentary report indicated 215 civil servants and 71 'other agents.' Today, almost a thousand staffers work for DG COMM,[21] which is more than the average number of agents per DG (around 600). But this figure needs to be put into perspective by taking into account the situation in other DGs: over 1,000 agents in DG Agriculture, Energy, Transport, Business and Industry and around 2,000 in DG Research. The figure becomes even less extraordinary when one takes into account the fact that 90 of these agents report to the Spokesperson Service and that over 500 work in the representations in the member states. Furthermore, the communication services of some DGs are substantial. In the 'historic' DGs, we can observe the presence of sizeable teams structured into true communication services. A good illustration is Unit R4 for Communication and Information in DG ECFIN which employs 25 agents, or Unit 1 of DG Competition which comprises 16 agents, or Unit A4 for internal and external communication of DG Internal Market and Services, numbering over 30 agents.

These communication services have no hierarchical relationship with DG COMM. They are allocated their own budgets and operate under the authority of their Director-General who, in turn, reports to the commissioner in charge of the DG. Thus, the campaign for the launch of the euro in 2002 – which, as a result of its success, has become a benchmark campaign for the Commission – was initiated and managed by the commissioner for Economic, Monetary and Financial affairs, Yves-Thibault de Silguy, with the support of its own communication

services.[22] But this type of communication work is in no way limited to such high profile and 'general public' campaigns unanimously backed by all EU institutions. It is mostly used as an instrument in power relationships between the services or institutions, as is illustrated by the following interview extract.

> In the Commission, as in most DGs, there wasn't a highly developed communication culture. For the line managers of my generation (28 years seniority in the Commission), communication was kind of an obscure issue, an additional problem. We were concerned about votes in Parliament and in the Council. There are several reasons for this. The first is we didn't need to do any marketing: the interest is ipso facto self-evident. And for us, there was the Big Bang of the internal market completion. Without much professionalism, with little resources, we started doing communication work. But our problem is not only communication with businesses. It's not structured clearly enough, but it does exist. It always has. The problem is that when a service prepares an action or a policy, we know that each institution is going to look after its own interest. We know now that we need to win over public opinion and the media to be able to win the inter-institutional battle. The political generates too much disturbance. Look at the Bolkestein directive initially … and how it ended up. Same thing with the new public procurement directives. A few hundred amendments were made and some are contradictory. That's the problem. In its infinite wisdom [smile] Parliament is capable of voting for everything and its opposite. There's been a drift among the politicians who play the technocrat. And if we, of all people, don't communicate, we'll lose the battle. (Interview with a top civil servant of DG Internal market and services, 2007)

For this reason, the Commission's (mostly operational) competence to govern communication is a politically sensitive issue that recurrently arises between the main institutions of the EU – whether it is deemed responsible for its failures or suspected by MEPs or national governments of spreading its own message – 'propaganda' – directly to the publics of the member states. In this perspective, the position and legitimacy of the DG COMM's agents within the world of EU communication vary according to the political circumstances and are subject to the influence of the Commission in inter-institutional relations. Just as we observe differences in statutes, missions and symbolic positions – between the

spokespersons (appointed by the commissioners and assigned to politically sensitive missions) and the DG COMM's agents (most of whom are civil servants performing more 'invisible' tasks) – we also notice a certain correlation between the profile and relative permanence of this DG's Directors-General and the degree of conflict between EU institutions.

Since the creation of DG X in 1967, 14 directors-general have held this position and all shared the characteristics of an internationalized elite (postgraduate degrees, experience abroad, multilingual abilities); a longitudinal examination of their respective careers reveals two distinct profiles:

(1) Political collaborators, often ranking civil servants in their country (jurists or diplomats), engaged in politics, who have served in the cabinets of European commissioners or ministers. These are intermittent agents of the EU administration community. The time they spend serving the EU – under five years on average – is related to that of the political leaders they work for;

(2) The 'servants of Europe', who have the status of EU civil servants, have seldom worked in a cabinet, and have worked their way up the ranks. These are permanent agents of the EU (over 20 years of service on average), and spend a longer time at the helm of the DG COMM (over five years) than their 'political' counterparts. The presence of the political collaborators at the head of the DG COMM corresponds to periods of high political heteronomy in the EU information and communication apparatus (see Appendix 1).

But this political heteronomy must not overshadow the equally profound changes related to the emergence of a veritable market of expertise in the field of European information and discourse. Indeed, from the late 1980s onwards, one can observe a change in the economics and the division of labor in the sector, resulting in changes in the principles of co-production and, therefore, in the interactions between the intra-institutional professionals (DG COMM agents, spokespersons, specialists of other DGs) and extra-institutional agents. The emergence of new professions in the field of EU information (communication agencies, think tanks and specialized Internet websites) coincided with the assertive development of a space of activity which remained highly heteronymous but became based on a rationalization and a greater recognition of specific skills.

The field of information professionals

Though the mediocre results recorded by many indicators[23] have led to widespread criticism of the EU's information policy, these debates mask structural changes in the relations between 'rival partners' in the production of communication. The production of content, analysis, advice and even criticism regarding EU information–communication policy has turned into a market in which positions of recognized experts and contracts can be acquired, and in which professional strategies, economic enterprises and individual careers are developing. In theory, the division of labor between the specialized personnel of public institutions and political journalists is clear-cut but, in practice, the frontiers are fuzzy (Accardo, 1995). In addition to the socialization effects generated by the transactional relations characterizing this professional activity, an examination of careers in the 'world of European information' (Bastin, 2003) reveals that the frontiers are extremely porous. News agencies, consultants and polling agencies work permanently and, in some cases exclusively, with EU institutions. Some staffers go on to employment in European institutions (Bastin, 2003, p. 258), while former EU staff members can be found in private organizations specializing in European affairs. This process reveals a diversification of the professions and careers around EU information. But it is even more revealing of the intense circulation of the same cognitive and relational resources within a field of activity whose borders (which extend beyond the institutional boundaries of the EU) and rules have stabilized around two contiguous, but symbolically differentiated, areas of professional practice. The first is content production, for the most part subcontracted; and the second is strategic analysis, generally offered by specialized organizations claiming to contribute to the production of frameworks of perception, interpretation and transformation of the European communication 'problem.'

Being a journalist in Brussels: towards the normalization of a profession

Since the early years of European integration, journalists were enrolled in various capacities in EU information politics, initially as 'defectors.' At the head of the ECSC, J. Monnet surrounded himself with journalists like Paul Collowald (former correspondent of *Le Monde* in Strasbourg) and François Duchêne (former correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* in Paris), to infuse professional practices and know-how into press-relations. Most spokespersons were recruited from the ranks of experienced journalists committed to the integrationist cause and who developed

personal relationships with to the entrepreneurs of Europe by reporting on their work (Collowald, 1993). Journalists were also enrolled as mediators in an ongoing effort to inform the public about advances made in the integration process. The history of 'Agence Europe' (created in 1952 in Luxembourg, it was relocated to Brussels with the establishment of the EC) and the career of its emblematic founder, Emanuele Gazzo,[24] show quite well the 'pro-European' leaning (Lelu, 2000) of the first press agencies established in Brussels – such as the Agra agency or Europe Information Service – and the importance of financial support from the Commission, taking the form of a self-interested subscription policy. In return for a few dozen subscriptions, the agencies or national newspapers would send a permanent correspondent to Brussels. Finally, journalists served Europe as experts in editorial work as subcontractors or external collaborators. As part of its increasingly massive diffusion of information and communication materials (brochures, fact sheets, newsletters, studies and reports), the Commission increasingly started, from the late 1960s onwards, to resort to freelance journalists.

On a more statutory level, the implementation of an original and sophisticated accreditation system, co-managed with the professional association of international journalists in Brussels (see box below), created the conditions for the formation of a European press corps in Brussels. By bringing the news media to Brussels to report on a daily basis, the Commission also sought to impose its image of a center from which political impetus was created in the geographically fragmented (Brussels, Strasbourg, Luxembourg and, more recently, Frankfurt) and technically complex political system. This integration of the European landscape by media companies from the various member states resulted in the emergence of a new profession: the 'European journalist' in Brussels. The presence at the 'Midday Briefing' of an increasing number of accredited journalists contributed to the gradual introduction of 'news on Europe's current affairs' (synonymous with EU political affairs) in major media.

Text box 3: Accredited journalists at the Berlaymont

In the early 1960s, the Commission established rules governing access to the press room of the Berlaymont building (the Commission's headquarters) and turned the press briefings given by the commissioners (or most often their spokespersons) into daily briefings called the 'Midday Briefing' or 'Midday Express.' Accreditation was co-managed by the Spokesman's Group (headed by B. Olivi from 1962 to 1977) and the International Press Association, representing the permanent correspondents in Brussels. What some have called

the 'Olivi system' (Bastin, 2007) rests primarily on the 'daily briefing' concept but also on a number of advantages reserved for accredited journalists, such as a temporary guarantee of exclusivity on information collected in the press room. In an interview with Gilles Bastin, B. Olivi justified the daily nature of the briefing in the following way: 'Why? To give journalists as much as possible and to keep a bit of a hold on them, control them a little. Without that, they were scattered all over the house, there were rumors, leaks … It was a way to serve journalists' (Bastin, 2003, p.74). Following the same rationale, the 'Europe by Satellite program' (television news service of the EU) has, since 1995, provided journalists with images, news items and audio-visual materials.

From 40 in 1963, the number of accredited journalists with access to the Berlaymont press room had increased to 1,300 in 2005 before declining to just under 800 in 2010, according to the IPA (excluding audio-visual technicians). This recent decline indicates a rejection of the 'propagandist' methods of the Commission, which confuses information and communication.

Several signs show that the unanimously integrationist spirit that characterized collaborations between information professionals across institutional boundaries in the 1950s and 1960s has today disappeared. The enlistment of journalists into the EU institutions, based on the European creed and selective affinities is fading. This trend is probably due to this creed having lost some of its mobilizing power, as much as to the normalization (or de-differentiation) of the sociological profiles, professional practices and ethics of the journalists.[25] The 'Santer scandal' in particular brutally revealed that the original rationales of collaboration or co-production between journalists and their informants at the Commission had lost their power. In some ways, the outraged reaction of the professional organizations of journalists in Brussels to the Commission's proposal to create its own press agency[26] is revealing of the exhaustion of a system whereby European information was co-produced with the accredited press.

Text box 4: A codification of the 'on' and 'off'

The 'Santer scandal' caused both sides to reflect on the relations between the Commission and the press. The agreement reached in 1995 between the IPA and the Spokespersons Group which was intended to provide a better regulatory framework for the relations between the two parties and a basis for the code of ethics of journalists reporting on the Commission's activity today serves to specify, in a novel way, the level of 'officiality' of exchanges between journalists and their informants:

'The status of statements made in the Press Room.
"On the record": this information can be attributed to the Commission's Spokesperson by name. Everything is on-the-record unless otherwise specified;

"Off the record": The information may be attributed to "Commission sources." Information will be given in the press room wherever possible. This obligation should not be regarded as an attempt to limit direct contact with the Spokesman's Service. It is intended to ensure that important information is not mentioned in the press room, but remains confined to small numbers of people with inside knowledge or to journalists specializing in certain areas. EBS transmission will be interrupted manually for "off-the-record" information. "Background": The information is not attributable.' (Extract from the codification of the agreements between the Spokespersons Service of the European Commission and the International Press Association).

Media coverage of the EU has increased significantly over the last 20 years thanks, in particular, to the rising awareness of EU-related issues in political debates in the different member states. But political Europe remains a fragmented political space. Its technical, complex and distant nature explains why it remains a peripheral subject in mainstream media which examine it through the prism of national issues (Schlesinger, 2003; Baisnée and Frinaut, 2007). What is more, the EU is virtually ignored by the primary news medium of the majority of European citizens: television. The Commission has therefore made several attempts over the last 20 years to encourage better coverage of EU activities such as the EbS, the EU portal, image banks, audio-visual reports and a European Radio Network. Although these initiatives have had limited effect due to the clear lack of public interest in the political life of the EU,[27] the explosion of the institutional production of media content has recently reignited the anger of accredited journalists. In February 2010, Frans Boogaard, Brussels correspondent of the *Algemeen Dagblad* and member of the board of directors of the API, published on the API website an article entitled 'Brussels deserves its watchdogs,' in which he denounced the development of the communication strategy of the Commission:

> With the decreasing presence of journalists, the institutions are adopting an ever more aggressive public relations policy, with web TV, which offers photos and interviews carried out by internal agents, for free. The Commission representations abroad organize their own press conferences. And, contrary to previous practice, almost all briefings, press conferences and public meetings can be followed on the Internet. And though the correspondents naturally take full advantage

> of this – to cover Strasbourg from Brussels, for example – the fact remains that some of the media believe that 'Brussels' news can be followed from abroad; a belief that fails to see the importance of direct contacts, of experience in the European labyrinth acquired over time, and of the background information. (source: www.api-ipa.eu)

This indignation, formulated in a rhetoric which is specifically professional (and therefore devoid of any pro-European creed) confirms, first of all, that a normalization of the profession of international journalist in Brussels is taking place; and, second, that a subcontracting sector specialized in the production of 'European' news content is emerging.[28]

The economics of expertise in the field of European information

Because of its decisional complexity, its physical distance and its reputation as an administrative and technical monster mired in its abstruse jargon, the EU has not yet taken concrete shape in the minds of the public (Gaxie, Hubé and Rowell, 2011), and remains a news topic that does 'not sell well' (Marchetti, 2003b). Paul Magnette talks of an 'Orleanist' public space (Magnette, 2003b) to express its limitations to the enlightened elites of Europe (Costa and Magnette, 2007). These conditions governing EU publicity are not foreign to the process of rationalization, which has gradually but profoundly transformed the European information economy. Economy must first of all be understood here in the broad sense as a heuristic metaphor designating the organized exchange of intangible goods on markets (places and techniques of exchange) involving participants with different roles (producers, brokers, buyers) and a system of rules and values. But we refer to economy in the stricter sense as well, meaning transactions with products or services involving monetary exchanges. As mentioned, since the 1950s, journalists called upon by the Commission to provide editorial services have created specialized enterprises to offer services tailored to the needs of the institution. Thus, agencies such as European Research Associates (established in 1979) and later GPlus Europe (see text box below) were founded by experienced specialists in European affairs: former accredited journalists, Commission spokespersons, former civil servants or collaborators who used their European and professional capital in their consulting activities. They offer the Commission their know-how in strategic studies as well as in public relations and press-relations. They also negotiate their knowledge of European institutions with lobbyists, private companies and international organizations that deal with the EU or wish to develop their activities in this market.

Text box 5: EU information markets and careers

Founded in 2000 by correspondents, former spokespersons and senior staff of the Commission, the GPlus Europe consultancy agency describes itself as 'expert in the mechanisms, policies and actors of the EU.' The firm's website places explicit emphasis on its internal knowledge of the EU machinery: 'The impact of the European Union on the economic and political life – of Europe and the rest of the world – is constantly growing. However, its internal decision-making mechanisms often remain opaque. The GPlus team helps its clients think through their entire approach to the EU and its Member States. And we help them make their voice heard.' (Source: www.gpluseurope.com). Private clients include Alstom, Walmart, Microsoft and Gazprom.

The trajectory of Peter Guilford, co-founder (with journalist and producer Nigel Gardner) of this consultancy is quite emblematic of a specialization in European affairs based on circulations between EU institutions and the Brussels consulting scene. After covering European affairs for two decades as an accredited journalist working for *The Times*, he joined the Commission and became spokesman for Leon Brittan (Commissioner for Competition), then media adviser to President Prodi. Guilford left the Commission in 2000 to found GPlus, and was joined by other former Commission advisers and spokespersons, including: Philippe Lemaître (former Brussels correspondent for *Le Monde*), Michael Tscherny (former journalist at Agence Europe), John Wyles (former Brussels correspondent for the *Financial Times*) and, recently, Bruno Dethomas (a former journalist at *Le Monde*, President Delors's spokesman in the late 1980s, and holder of several diplomatic functions for the EU).

Through the creation and proliferation of such agencies, and with the development of specialized information websites (such as Euractiv), a process structuring a market of EU information expertise is taking shape. The trajectories of the protagonists show that inside experience with EU institutions, as well as relations with actors in the Commission, constitute a highly sought-after professional capital. The flourishing sector of EU public affairs consulting (in 2010, the Euractiv site estimated that there were 10,000 European public affairs consultants in Brussels) explicitly values experience in the Commission services as a foundation for a consulting career. These profiles are also highly prized among Brussels think tanks which, like the Center for European Policy Studies (founded in 1983) and more recently the European Policy Center (also based in Brussels), intend to influence European public policy. Although the work of think tanks presents the more esoteric dimension of highly specialized,

forward-looking activity with a strategic purpose, such work competes with the agencies in Brussels that specialize in providing expert information to economic decision makers (the target of the EIS agency with its newsletter and now its Euro-politics website), lobbyists and institutional circles. Thus, a market of strategic expertise on how to better approach EU policies and how to 'better communicate Europe' has emerged. It is a market in which the functional distinctions among journalists, advisers, experts and lobbyists disappear. The professional competences of those prescribers of perceptual and interpretive frameworks for public policies are convertible and are functional in public institutional spaces as well as in the private sector. The only thing that differentiates them is the nature of their clients. Thus, think tanks operate as very elitist spaces of brokerage and co-production of EU affairs expertise.

Text box 6: The small world of EU affairs consultancy

The Euractiv site perfectly symbolizes the convertibility of the positions and relationships within the field of Eurocracy. Founded in 1998 by a former Commission official and MEP, the Euractiv site has positioned itself as a portal 'to all relevant documents and policy positions' on EU affairs, 'shortening the time to find the right information for EU Actors.' The site produces little content per se, but provides 'LinksDossiers' (a reasoned documentary database of web links) on key issues. Euractiv presents itself as 'an original business model, based on five elements (corporate sponsoring, EurActor membership, EU projects, advertising, and content syndication).' It is sponsored in part by the EU Commission. In 2006, the Euractiv Foundation presented M. Wallström with its Yellow paper on EU communication policy entitled 'Can EU hear me?' (source: www. Euractive.com).

Brussels think tanks illustrate the multipositionality of EU affairs experts. Combining economic decision makers, senior officials of national, international and academic institutions, they receive financial support from EU institutions, large international companies and private foundations. The Center for European Policy Studies is headed by the German economist, Daniel Gros. Its supervisory board, chaired by Peter Sutherland (Goldman Sachs International), is composed of former high-ranking officials or commissioners (Max Kohnstamm, Allan Larsson), journalists (Paul Gillespie, *The Irish Times*), and MEPs (Sylvie Goulard, Graham Watson), heads of consultancies (Philippe de Buck, BusinessEurope, John Wyles, GPlus), academics, representatives of other think tanks, NGOs and foundations. High-ranking officials,

parliamentarians and commissioners in office regularly attend seminars (see. www.ceps.eu) and breakfast briefings.

The convertibility of skills and the (sequential or simultaneous) multipositionality of experts have fuelled concerns about the various influences shaping EU decision making. Following a parliamentary resolution aimed at bringing greater transparency to the activities of lobbyists (Stubb report), the Commission adopted in 2008 a 'Code of Conduct for Interest Representatives,' establishing a voluntary register which lobbyists working in Brussels are invited to join. The code defines 'interest representation activities' as those carried out with the aim to 'inform and influence policy formulation and the decision-making processes of the European institutions.' Let us note, however, that the activities conducted 'in response to the Commission's direct request, such as ad hoc or regular requests for factual information, data or expertise, invitations to public hearings, or participation in consultative committees or similar bodies' are explicitly exempt. (European Commission, 2008a, p. 4).

Conclusion

Now, at the end of our exploration of the professional worlds of EU information, we hope to have contributed a more sociological understanding of the European communication 'problem.' Placing actors at the center of the investigation, analyzing trajectories, practices and interactions, and avoiding a teleological vision of 'European construction' – this has allowed us to examine the publicizing of political Europe without entering into a normative discussion of its successes and failures. The processes we have studied are governed by a strategic, yet fragmented communication apparatus that disseminates messages to 'multiplier relays' (media, opinion leaders, institutional partners, civil society). Although European issues and the institutional division of labor are still to some degree represented through the prism of the original conceptions and choices, the way European information is produced has changed. It is nowadays shaped by three overlapping trends.

The first pertains to the introduction into the specialized services of the EU of skills and know-how typical of the professional sector of business communication. The dialectic between the outsourcing and in-sourcing of skills has led to the gradual alignment of internal institutional practices with the methods of communication professionals. Identifying the 'best stories' in drafting fact-sheets by using the SWOT analysis tool used

in marketing to evaluate 'Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats' involved in a product launch. Writing a media impact report that analyzes the outcome of a press release, producing an editorial, arranging a commissioner's visit to a region or setting up an agenda for a communication campaign – these are all actions that nowadays are performed with the same tools and methods by EU agents and their sub-contractors. This sharing of a common language and professional tools shows how much institutional culture has changed. Formerly considered as a tool to be implemented after the essential political work of the Commission, information communication is now built in from the outset and is seen as an essential component of the legitimacy of political action. The main indicator of this evolution has been the recent effort to professionalize the staff of DG COMM[29] and rationalize the communication production chain within the institutions (advance planning, pooling instruments, and reinforcing inter-institutional coordination).[30]

The second trend, which extends the first, is related to the managerialization of the system of information co-production and dissemination. European integration has always involved the enlistment of external experts and professionals in its different fields of activity (Robert and Vauchez, 2010). With regard to the services in charge of information and communication, these collaborations – based on elective affinities around the idea of integration and original protocols of long-term public relations programs such as the 'Olivi system' – have brought some efficiency to the information system despite its functional fragmentation. This model has undergone a double rationalization in an effort to counteract the centripetal forces of a 'multi-organization' (Cram, 1994) such as the EU institutional system in which the existence of divergent sectoral interests and political visions inevitably leads to a fragmentation of the production of information. Initiatives undertaken in the aftermath of the failed referendums of 2005 and of the 2006 white paper have aimed to impose a more formalized and streamlined framework for inter-institutional discussion.[31] These efforts can be understood as an endeavor to generalize 'best practices' and principles of dialogue and not as an attempt to hierarchize information and communication functions. More procedural than organizational, the rationalization of this activity is therefore built around protocols through which the agents of the institution manage, in more de-personalized relationships that include intermittent workers (freelance employees, contractual staff, interns) and external service providers executing tasks for the EU.[32]

The third trend has to do with the standardization of how EU elites approach the 'issue' of the publicizing of political Europe. Considered until recently as a problem of didactics (helping the public understand what the EU is about, with the idea that the more citizens know about the EU, the more they will identify with it), it is now seen more as a problem (which anyone in power faces) of finding the balance between regulatory action and the necessity to legitimize its foundations, terms and objectives.[33] The succession of crises such as the 'Santer scandal,' diminishing voter turnout, or the referendum failures have caused a shock (De Swaan, 2007). In an entirely new development, commissioners today publicly comment on the EU's difficult relationship with citizens and on the need for a more participative communication policy. Following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, heads of state and government invited the Commission to manage a 'period of reflection to enable a broad debate' on the future of the EU (European Council, 2005). Commission agents began making more frequent appearances in their national public arenas. Commissioners have made their visits in the regions a systematic ritual. Behind the deliberative rhetoric and, beyond this multiplication of public appearances aimed at 'giving Europe a human face' (European Commission, 2006, p. 10), the public debate about EU action in the field of information and communication has become less sector-specific and a more global issue linked to the theme of 'good governance.' More than in the past, EU communication has been perceived, described and criticized from the policy angle by journalists, think tanks and national political leaders – whether pro or anti-European. With the installation in 2010 of the Barroso II Commission, DG COMM once again became a common operational service and communication a secondary mandate for Vice-President Viviane Reding. Although those in power also owe their existence to their appropriation of information (Balandier, 1981), this exercise necessitates, in a democracy, many compromises so as not to appear as an attempt by the institutions of power to manipulate or monopolize political expression. The EU is today caught in the tension typical of modern democracies: institutional actors have to develop strategies, means and tools to reduce uncertainty in a free, pluralistic, and sometimes oppositional public space (Negt, 2007) while avoiding accusations of distilling propaganda.[34]

Annex

The political and bureaucratic distribution of positions in information–communication in the European Commission

Mandate of the presidents and the Commissioners responsible for information and communication	Directors-general of information and communications
1958–67	
PDT:Walter HALLSTEIN (Jan. 1958–June 1967)	**1960, Creation of the EU Press and Information Service**
Administration	
INFO-COM: Giuseppe CARON	**1960–67, Jacques René RABIER* Responsible**
Vice President (Nov. 1959–May 1963)	
Internal Market, **Information (not explicitly mentioned in the mandate)**	(* Former Chief of Cabinet for J. Monnet at the ECSC High Authority)
Henri ROCHEREAU, Commissioner for Overseas Development (Ad interim between May 1963 and June 1964)	**Jean POORTERMAN, EURATOM spokesperson**
	Louis JANZ, ECSC spokesperson
INFO-COM: Guido COLONNA di PALIANO, Vice President	**Giorgio SMOQUINA and later Bino OLIVI, EEC spokesperson (GPP)**
Internal Market, **Information (not explicitly mentioned in the mandate)**	
1967–70	
President: Jean REY (July 1967–July 1970)	**1967– Merger of the Executives**
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, **Spokesperson**	**1967, Creation of DG-X and of the Spokesperson Service**
INFO-COM: Albert COPPE, Commissioner for Budgets, Credit, Investment, **Press and Information.**	**Louis Janz***
	Director-General of the DG-X (* Former ECSC spokesperson)
	1968–9, Karl Heinz NARJES**, Director-General of the DG-X
	(** Former Chief of Cabinet of W. Hallstein)
	B. OLIVI, Director of the Spokesperson Service
	P. COLLOWALD, Deputy Director of the Spokesperson Service
1970–3	
President: Franco Maria MALFATTI (July 1970–March 1972	**1970–3, Jacques René RABIER**
followed by Sicco MANSHOLT (=> Jan. 1973)	**Director-General of the DG-X**
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, **Spokespersons Group**	**1973– First Enlargement**
INFO-COM : Albert BORSCHETTE, Commissioner for Competition, **Press and Information**, Diffusion of Information, Regional Policy	
1973–7	
President: François-Xavier ORTOLI (Jan. 1973–Jan. 1977)	**1973–6, Sean RONAN**
	Director-General of the DG-X
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, **Spokespersons Group**	**1976, Paul COLLOWALD**
INFO-COM: Carlo SCARASCIA MUGNOZZA, Vice President	**Director-General of DG-X**
Parliamentary Affairs, Environmental Policy, Protection of Consumer Interest, Transport, **Information**	

1977–81

President: Roy JENKINS (Jan. 1977–Jan. 1981)

Secretariat-General, Legal Service, **Spokesperson Group, Information**

1977, President Jenkins merges the Spokesman's Service and DG-X

1981–5

President: Gaston THORN (Jan. 1981–Jan. 1985)

Secretariat-General, Legal Service, **Spokesperson Group**, Culture, Security Office

INFO-COM: Lorenzo NATALI, Vice President

Mediterranean Policy, Enlargement, **Information**

1977–82 Renato RUGGIERO ***

Director-General of DG-X

(* Spokesperson and Later also Chief of Cabinet of President Jenkins)**

1985–9

President: Jacques DELORS (Jan. 1985–Dec. 1985–Jan. 1989)

Secretariat-General, Legal Service, **Spokesperson Service**, Joint Interpreting and Conference Service, Security Office, Monetary Matters, Structural Funds

INFO-COM : Carlo RIPA DE MEANA, Commissioner for

Institutional Questions, **People's Europe, Information and Communication Policy**, Culture and Tourism.

1982–7, Franz FROSCHMAIER

Director-General of DG-X

1989–93

President: Jacques DELORS (Jan. 1989–Jan. 1993)

Secretariat-General, Legal Service, **Spokesperson Service**, Joint Interpreting and Conference Service, Security Office, Monetary Matters, Structural Funds, Forward Studies Unit

INFO-COM: Jean DONDELINGER, Commissioner for Audio-visual and Cultural Affairs, **Information, People's Europe, Office for Official Publications**

1987–90, Manuel SANTARELLI

Director-General of DG-X

1993–5

President: Jacques DELORS (Jan. 1993–Jan. 1995)

Secretariat-General, Legal Service, **Spokesperson Service**, Joint Interpreting and Conference Service, Security Office, Monetary Matters, Structural Funds, Forward Studies Unit, Inspectorate-General, Competition

INFO-COM: João de Deus PINHEIRO, Commissioner in Charge of **Relations with the European Parliament; Relations with the Member States on Transparency, Communication and Information**; Culture and Audiovisual Policy; Office for Official Publications

1990–7, Colette FLESCH

Director-General of the DG-X

1995–9	
President: Jacques SANTER (Jan. 1995–March 1999)	**1997–9, Spyros PAPPAS Director of the DG-X**
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Security Office, Forward Studies Unit, Inspectorate-General, Joint Interpreting and Conference Service, **Spokesperson Service**, Monetary Matters (with de Silguy), Common Foreign and Security Policy with Van den Broek), Institutional Questions for the IGC (with Oreja)	
INFO-COM: Marcelino OREJA, Commissioner for Relations with the European Parliament; Relations with the Member States on **Transparency, Communication and Information**; Culture and Audiovisual policy; Office for Official Publications, Institutional Questions, Preparation for the 1996 IGC.	
1999–2004	
President: Romano PRODI (Sept. 1999–Nov. 2004)	**1999–2000, Jonathan FAULL is Spokesperson, Head of Press and Communication**
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, **Media and Communication (until 2001) followed by**	**2001, Jonathan FAULL**
Antonio Vitorino, Commission for (2001–4)	**Director of DG-Press (Press and Communication)**
Justice, Home Affairs and **Communication**	**Spokesperson for President Prodi**
	2003, Jorge DE OLIVEIRA E SOUSA Director of DG-Press
2004–9	
President José Manuel Durão Barroso (Nov. 2004–Nov. 2009)	**2004, Colette LE BAIL**
	Director of DG-Press
INFO-COM : Margot WALLSTRÖM, first Vice President, **Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy**	**2005, Panayotis CARVOUNIS**
	Director of DG-Press
	2006–11, Claus SORENSEN
	Director-General DG Communication
Since 2009	
President José Manuel Durão Barroso (Nov. 2009–	**2011–, G. PAULGER**
	Director-General DG-Communication
INFO-COM : Viviane Reding, Vice President	
Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship	

Notes

1. In 1955, the High Authority commissioned Brose and Elvinger, a professional agency, to produce a report on the development of 'public relations' (Brose and Elvinger, 1955).
2. We must put this evolution in perspective and highlight the permanence, in EU institutions, of the diffusionist paradigm, through the continued existence of the four hundred 'Europe Direct' centers housed by the various partners (universities, local authorities, chambers of commerce).
3. In a sense close to the program defined by F. Bailey: 'We are looking for a level of knowledge of the game which those that play it might not have. It is that which the anthropologist or the political science specialist seeks to reach. Until s/he gets there, all s/he does is describe what the players themselves know and s/he has not begun to carry out his/her own analysis.' (Bailey, 1971, p. 22).
4. With, in particular, the 1976 reform introducing the election of MEPs by direct universal suffrage and the use of referendums for ratifying new treaties.
5. In this third age of democracy, described by Bernard Manin as dominated by the mass media, the personalization of politics and opinion polls, 'a new elite of communication specialists is replacing political activists and apparatchiks.' (Manin, 1995, p. 279)
6. Adopted by MEPs in 1986, at the threshold of a new political age galvanized by the prospect of a Single European Market, the Baget-Bozzo report demanded a 'true European communication policy' using, without limits, all available means and media (European Parliament, 1986).
7. Facing new criticisms formulated or relayed by the media following the difficult ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992 the Commission appointed a group of experts, eighty professionals from different fields (journalists, academics, artists, advertising, national and European civil servants). Under the chairmanship of the Belgian MEP, Willy de Clercq, the group was given a triple mission: 'Compile a descriptive review of the information and communication policies'; 'provide a diagnosis on the quality of the mechanisms, actions, behaviors and means' and 'formulate strategic recommendations' (Clercq, 1993).
8. The services in charge of press and communication were seen as having been incapable of coping with the media attention given to the rumors, first, and later to the public scandal triggered by the 'Wise man' report published in early 1999. This interpretation of the 'crisis' and its origins lingers on within the institutions, whereas a more socio-political approach to these events questions whether 'strategic errors' alone were responsible for the crisis (Georgakakis, 2001).
9. Gathered in Helsinki in December 1999, the heads of state and governments invited the Commission to 'study the general question of the Union's information policy, including improving coordination with its information offices in the member states and links with national information offices.'
10. DG X is divided into two broad services: the Spokesperson Service (which inherited the Media and Communication Unit) and the DG for Education and culture (which inherited the opinion surveys and publications

portfolios). Breaking with tradition, the president took on the Media and Communication portfolio.

11. This, following the European Parliament's adoption, in March 2001, of a 'resolution on the Information and communication strategy of the EU,' stressing that the 'communication policy of the European institutions requires urgent adjustment,' and 'noting with concern that the reallocation of responsibilities in the field of information policy is considerably delaying the adoption of decisions in this area.'
12. For more details on the institutional criticisms of the white paper, see Aldrin and Utard, 2008.
13. By convention, we shall use the current name – DG COMM – to generically designate the European Commission's Directorate General for Communication. Its previous names (DG X between 1967 and 1999; DG Press between 2000 and 2005) will only be used in reference to their precise historical contexts.
14. The term is not used here in its utilitarian sense. As noted by J. Lagroye, the 'notion of resources only makes sense relationally and relatively: relationally because a resource is what we have that our adversary does not; relatively because a quality or social position is only a resource according to the hierarchy of the qualities and positions recognized by the group' (Lagroye, 2002, p. 261).
15. The 'pioneers' surrounding Jean Monnet at the ECSC perceived themselves as, and called themselves, the 'missionaries' of Europe (Rabier, 1993, p. 25).
16. In the late 1980s, DG X and DG Internal Market waged a fierce turf war over the 'audio-visual policy' portfolio (see below).
17. Faced with a void in communication with regard to the development and decisions made by the Communities, MEPs adopted a resolution in June 1958 advocating the creation of the Joint Press and Information Service. Official Journal, July 26, 1958.
18. The SPS and DG X have been headed by the same person only three times: R. Ruggiero (1977–82) led both services after President Jenkins merged the SPS into the DG X; J. Faull (2001) carried out this double responsibility during the transitional period of recreation of the DG X by President Prodi; C. Le Bail was head of the SPS and Director-General of the DG COMM during the long process of development of the DG's organizational chart (November 2004 to November 2005) during the installation of the Barroso commission.
19. The 'coalitions of causes,' partly reinforced by support from outside the institutions, have non-negligible effects on the framing of public policies and the nature of their instruments (Sabatier, 1998).
20. The staff in the Commission's representations located in the capital cities of the member states is placed under the authority of DG COMM. These decentralized services used to be called press and information external offices. J. Delors wished to change their name and give them a more diplomatic function, hence the reform.
21. This figure is based on the Commission's organizational charts of 2008 and indicates that there has been a slight rise since the 1990s. In 1997–1998, an internal survey by the Commision estimated that the staff serving information–communication related functions was equivalent to 935 person/years. See DECODE report (DEcoder la COmmission de Demain), 1998. The latest

'Human Resources Report' (2009) indicates that 1,023 staff are allocated to 'information, communication and publication' tasks, representing 3 percent of the Commission's employees.

22. The Commission allocated over €200 million per year for this campaign in 1998 and 1999. ECFIN/R/4/2002/04 report, July 2003.
23. The recognized indicators of efficiency of communication policy are, among others, the level of electoral mobilization or support expressed by citizens and the intensity of media coverage of EU affairs.
24. E. Gazzo was an Italian journalist sent to Luxembourg in the early years of the ECSC. In 1952 he participated in the founding of the 'International Information Europe' agency, which later became Agence Europe. A staunch federalist, Gazzo enjoyed the Commission's support (in the form of subscriptions) for a long time.
25. On the basis of a quantitative study of accredited 'careers,' G. Bastin has observed a tendency towards a sociological as well as a professional standardization that began in 1980s. He bases this analysis on the existence of the following combined phenomena: a standardization of the presentation of a professional card to access institutional spaces; the shortening of the average duration of the careers of accredited journalists in Brussels; the upward mobility of journalists in this career path; a decrease in pluriactivity. In connection with these developments, he also noted a reduced capacity for self-regulation (Bastin, 2003).
26. Proposition presented in the 2006 white paper as a wish to 'explore the desirability of having an inter-institutional service operating on the basis of professional standards' (European Commission, 2006, p. 10).
27. This lack of interest has many reasons and explains why television operators avoid the topic of Europe (Baisnée, 2002). On the Euronews experiment, see Baisnée and Marchetti, (2000).
28. Examples of this include: Media Consulta Agency (whose Berlin-based parent agency has offices in all member states) which produces editorial material for DG COMM and other DGs under a framework contract; the Brussels-based Mostra Agency (with partner agencies in 25 member states), which has conducted several campaigns promoting European public policies (healthcare, fisheries, fight against discrimination) and produces the content of EuroparlTV, the European Parliament web television channel.
29. One can cite for example the relation of additional specific positions in the Commission's Representations since 2005, the creation, in 2006–07 of a 'communication master class' or the implementation of the first competitive examination in communications in 2007–08.
30. This is illustrated by a series of changes initiated by the Commission in 2005, such as the re-shaping of the DG COMM's central organizational chart, the reinforcement of the communication teams in Brussels and, in the representations, the development of EuropeDirect and local information networks and relays, or the re-shaping of the Europa portal.
31. The rejection by the parliament (European Parliament, 2006) and the other representative bodies (EESC, 2006) of the proposals in the 2006 white paper recommending the transformation of communication into a true common policy (European Commission, 2006, p. 4) resulted in the strengthening of inter-agency coordination through the extension of the prerogatives of the

Inter-Institutional Group on Information, or IGI (European Commission, 2007). The IGI is a joint body composed of the communication directors of the Commission and the EP. IGI's original mandate was to define and coordinate the priority information actions for campaigns on enlargement and the launch of the euro.

32. In terms of professional identity, we can note that in the absence of a recognized center or monopoly of expertise, civil servants assigned to these tasks always define themselves in relation to the institutions they serve and not in relation to the missions, technical competency or practical activity that correspond to their functions (Dubar, 1997).
33. For more details on this classical tension which opposes elites associated with regulatory work to the masses as recipients of the legitimation effort (Jobert and Muller, 1987; Duchesne and Muller, 2003).
34. I thank Didier Georgakakis for his meticulous reading of this text and for his comments and suggestions.

6
Expert Groups in the Field of Eurocracy

Cécile Robert

Introduction

The groups of experts convened by the European Commission have been, until recently, among the least visible actors of the government of Europe. Unlike the Council's working groups (gathering representatives of the member states in intergovernmental negotiations) or 'comitologycommittees' (consisting of officials from member states who assist the Commission in its executive functions), these groups of experts are solely accountable to the Community administration (De Maillard and Robert, 2008). Focused on preparatory and exploratory work, and composed of external actors with various statuses, these groups have a strictly consultative role. However, they are active in a crucial, nearly invisible, phase of the decision-making process: the preliminary stages of problem definition. Numbering approximately 800 in number, expert groups have rarely attracted the attention of the media, apart from a few notable exceptions, for example the 'Sapir group' (Peuziat, 2005).

Nonetheless, in the spring of 2009, expert groups found their way into the media spotlight during highly publicized and heated exchanges between certain interest groups and the Community administration. The NGO Corporate Europe Observatory, which has become visible over the past ten years through its crusades denouncing the power of business lobbies in the European political system, published a report on March 25, 2008 suggestively entitled, 'Culture of secrecy and companies' domination – a study of the composition and of the transparency of the Expert Groups in the European Commission' (ALTER-EU, 2008).[1] Published by the ALTER-EU (Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation) network, the document analyzed the composition of 40 expert groups. It simultaneously denounced the opaque operation

of these authorities and the massive presence of representatives of industry, which was seen to produce, both discreetly and efficiently, a strong pro-industry bias in decision-making processes. This controversy took place in a series of public actions raising issues relative to transparency and the problematic relationships between the Commission and interest groups; it also echoed repeated complaints from the European Parliament regarding the scarcity of information on expert groups.[2] The criticism was perceived as sufficiently important to trigger a response from the Commission the following day via its Spokesperson, Valérie Rampi, who emphasized the efforts to further transparency and balance to guarantee the independence of expertise elaborated within these groups.

These political skirmishes have brought to the fore questions on the roles and interests of the members of expert groups. More profoundly, they also raise questions on the social backgrounds, resources and positions of actors representing 'European civil society' in the EU governance model (Michel, 2007). If the sociology of these types of actors has unsurprisingly remained absent in political and media discourses, it is somewhat more puzzling that there has been little academic research seeking to characterize and closely study these groups (Georgakakis, 2009; Georgakakis and Weisbein, 2010). The first publications dedicated specifically to expert groups were indeed based on a macroscopic approach centered on the 'functions' they fulfilled within the European institutional system (Larsson, 2003; Larsson and Murk, 2007). A more refined sociology of these actors seems necessary to complete this type of analysis, as it is difficult to understand the political strategies conducted within or via these groups without paying attention to the social resources of their members – resources which make these strategies or 'functions' possible in the first place. When research has examined the composition of expert groups, it has focused on the most visible attributes of these actors and has adopted the categories used by the European bureaucracy itself: academics, government officials, scientists, stakeholders and so on (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2008, 2011). Although these studies provide useful information to gauge the heterogeneity of this population united under the common denominator of 'experts,' using official bureaucratic categories masks the fact that these actors also share a collection of common properties, as we will demonstrate in this chapter.

The purpose of this chapter is precisely to understand not only who these European experts are, but also how they become and remain experts. Analyzing the selection and self-promotion processes of experts enables us to go beyond the duality of a functionalist or essentialist

interpretation of expertise. Relying upon quantitative and qualitative data on the composition and functioning of expert groups (see text box below), we aim to identify the resources and the practices conditioning access and success in these functions. The goal is to better understand how and in which conditions expert authority can get the upper hand in policy arenas of the European field.

From this general perspective, we will first provide an overview of the sector of European expertise and its structuring principles. Highlighting the political uses of the groups enables us to explain the privileged recruitment of experts among certain categories of practitioners (academics, members of interest groups, national civil servants and so on). These political uses of expertise also contribute to promoting particular resources and practices, making it imperative to analyze the properties shared by experts beyond their apparent heterogeneity (second section). A number of these properties are, moreover, acquired in Community institutions, inviting us to take a closer look at the way these expertise functions are embedded in professional careers and partake in the general cleavages of Eurocracy (third section)

Text box 1: Research methodology and data on expert groups

Despite recent reforms, expert groups are difficult to observe and study. The constitution and the coordination of expert groups have indeed been considered as internal prerogatives of the Commission and were for a long time not perceived as activities requiring accountability to the outside world. Since these activities are carried out in a decentralized fashion, most often at the levels of DG Units and on the basis of very flexible administrative rules, record keeping on the activities of expert groups often existed only in departments, in highly variable forms. It was only in 2005, following a series of EP questions and following administrative reforms initiated by the white paper on governance (European Commission, 2001b), that a registry of these groups was prepared and made public (http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm). For the reasons mentioned above, the quality, coverage and reliability of information was quite low until 2011, after a 2010 reform improved the quality of the register (European Commission, 2010). For these reasons, and the plethora of existing groups (768 were listed in November 2012 on the website of the Commission), our research relies for the most part on qualitative data. The empirical research is centered on just over 30 groups registered in different directorates-general and departments: General Secretariat; DG Employment; DG Mobility and Transport; DG Education and Culture; DG Research; DG Home Affairs; DG Agriculture; the Group of Political Advisers and the Bureau of European Political Advisers. Administrative sources were completed by 80 semi-directive interviews with civil servants in charge of composing and following expert groups as well as with members of these groups.

The structuring logic of European expert groups: when expertise absorbs consultation

In this first section, we will outline the overarching structuring logics of European expert groups. We shall first of all touch on the rules governing their creation before going into more detail on their definition. The recruitment and composition of groups are viewed very directly through a 'consultative' lens. They are designed both as pre-negotiation tools and as the means of collecting resources useful to the decision-making process.

Initiated by the publication of *European Governance. A White Paper*, the recent reforms that regulate expert groups have given rise to vigorous reactions from different departments within the Commission. The groups are clearly perceived as one of the main instruments and guarantors of the autonomy of the European Commission. This perception has consequently led to the idea that expert groups should not be rigidly regulated and that their exact configuration should be determined on a case-by-case basis corresponding to the needs of the Commission. This flexible approach applies, moreover, to a decentralized practice as the vast majority of the groups are managed at the Unit level. As can be seen in the following text box, the only common *formal* features of expert groups is their strict consultative function and the fact that their members are 'external' to the Commission.

Text box 2: The administrative framework of expert groups

In the administrative texts governing expert groups (European Commission 2002a, 2005c, 2010), these groups are mainly defined by their functions and by the explicit denial of decision-making powers. They are purely consultative authorities aiding the initiative work of the Commission. As such, they are defined in contrast to the 'comitology committees' (see above), to the social dialogue committees (which may prepare propositions for the Council) and to the so-called 'mixed' entities (derived from international agreements and designed for controlling implementation).

According to the Secretariat General of the Commission, an expert group is 'a body set up by the Commission or its departments to provide it with advice and expertise, comprising at least six public and/or private-sector members and meeting more than once. They provide advice and expertise to the Commission and its departments in relation to: the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives (Commission's right of initiative); the preparation of delegated acts; the implementation of existing EU legislation, programs and policies, including coordination and cooperation with member countries and stakeholders in that regard. Expert groups are essentially a forum for discussions, providing high-level input from a wide range of sources and stakeholders in the form of opinions, recommendations and reports' (European Commission, 2012).

Although some groups (estimated at fewer than 10 percent of groups in activity) may be subjected to a formal decision of the College, most are appointed by departments (general-directorates), with the authorization of the Secretariat General. This distinction, as the one between permanent groups (created by a formal act or over five years) and temporary groups, does not give rise to any specific recruitment rules and practices.

It should be noted finally, as we will see further on, that experts belonging to national administrations or certain interest groups, may, under certain configurations, be designated by their own organizations and institutions. In this (frequent) case, departments first identify the organization, then ask them to delegate, depending on the subject, the person whom they deem most appropriate.

This loose administrative framework and the ad hoc character of the composition of these groups are in line with one of the principles guiding these practices: the management, during expertise procedures, of the logic of consulting 'interested parties.' In other words, if each expert group incarnates this combination to various degrees, their common feature is to claim double legitimacy for their expertise: that of specialized know-how intended to aid decision making, and that of having a viewpoint representing the public that may be affected by the issue being discussed. The presentation made by the Secretariat General in various documents (and notably on its website) is quite explicit on this point:

> The composition of a group varies according to the type and the field of application of the expertise sought after. The store of knowledge provided to the Commission should not only be excellent from a scientific viewpoint, it should also be in keeping with practical, legal, social, economic and environmental considerations; consequently, numerous groups include not only scientists but also executives from the public and private sectors and other similar actors. (European Commission, 2008b)

This definition of expertise is meaningful in light of the political issues associated with this form of consultation (Robert, 2009, 2010b). Indeed, since 2000, it has been the focus of an institutional discourse that aims to use expert groups as a means to demonstrate the openness of the Commission to civil society and the democratic character of its decision-making processes. If the argument is not new, it has benefited from more precision and increasing publicity since the publication of *European*

Governance. A White Paper (European Commission, 2001b).[3] Several other documents (European Commission, 2001a, 2002a) have contributed to formalizing a definition of expertise explicitly as being representative in two complementary ways: the first argues that it is necessary to avoid reducing expertise to scientific knowledge by bringing in other 'concerns' or 'points of view' to make policy more 'socially robust'; the second argument sees the very process of expertise as a tool to restore trust and strengthen ties with civil society.

These symbolic issues also relate to practical concerns. For the officials of the Commission, forming an expert group often aims at collecting information likely to improve the wording of Commission texts and to provide better knowledge on the area of proposed action. Whether this involves taking stock of the existing provisions in national legislations, surveying the socio-economic situation of a given category of population in the different member states, or gathering information on the manufacturing methods of a given industry, setting up a consultative procedure is also, intrinsically, a means to test the social and political acceptability of their initiatives (Robert, 2010b). By facilitating forms of consultation beforehand, Commission officials can identify possible sources of opposition and integrate these constraints into policy proposals in order to anticipate potential problems of implementation at the national level. The exchanges and the opinions voiced in the group are thus often presented as potential arguments meant to convince reticent actors or institutions (parliament, Council, particular member states, interest groups). In addition, the obligation imposed on departments since 2004 to provide, for each act of the Commission, an impact study as part of the 'better regulation' reform (European Commission, 2002b) has encouraged consultation with different actors potentially affected. On the other side, 'experts' closely monitor activities in relevant DGs. While bearing in mind that motivations are diverse, and that they are individual as well as institutional and collective, they also tend to turn these groups into a forum of pre-negotiation. For the experts interviewed, the purposes are manifold: to make oneself heard very early in the deliberation process of the Commission; to better understand the positions of competing organizations or of institutional partners; to make use of the presence of representatives from member states to get them to commit to a point of view; or to highlight gaps in the implementation of a guideline.

Regardless of the respective political or technical aspects of the expertise being sought, each recruitment is thought of, and performed, as choosing both a representative and an expert. This particular view of

expertise breaks with a common conception of experts as the recognized holders of specialized scientific knowledge. This type of expert knowledge is neither a prerequisite nor even a widely shared property. The 'knowledge' or the 'expert' skills sought after in this procedure are far from being limited to academia and are in fact highly dependent on belonging to different national, professional or activist organizations. To give just one illustration, one can cite the reasoning used to designate the members of the 'high level group on social integration of the ethnic minorities and their full participation to the labor market.' According to the Commission, Louis Schweitzer (former CEO of Renault) was appointed on the basis of his responsibilities in the Halde (French High Authority against Discrimination and for Equality); Lee Jasper, counselor for ethnic issues to the Mayor of London; Jarmila Balážová, member of the Rom community and host of a radio program dedicated to this community; or Rita Süssmuth, former President of the Bundestag, and former Minister of Family, of Feminine Condition, of Youth and Health, due to her participation in various national and international commissions on migratory issues.

Finally, if these experiences often replace academic diplomas, they may conversely devalue a candidacy, or even bar recruitment altogether. An emblematic example is provided by nationality, which may be a considerable asset or handicap for an individual, as geographical representation is often an important factor

> A geographical balance is still necessary, i.e. having Northern Member States only is not acceptable. Scandinavian countries are known to possess very similar legal systems, so if we do not have a representative from each of the three countries, it is not critical, but we must have at least one Scandinavian … A Common Law is necessary, the new Member States must participate; we cannot have all ten of them, but at least two or three … There are States which are still powerful in terms of votes in the Council, whereas if Lithuania does not agree, well you know how it is. … (Interview with an official of DG Home Affairs, 2008)

Far from following a unique model, the expert groups studied in our investigation display a wide diversity in their configurations which depend on the objectives pursued by the departments at the moment of their creation. They can however be distributed around different poles, corresponding to partially differentiated logics of recruitment. A first axis consists of the contrast between groups expected to be true initiators of

policy reflection and those playing a more symbolic role. Along a second axis, the groups are apportioned according to the nature of issues under discussion: from the more 'technical' ones requiring specific knowledge on issues most explicitly centered on determining what is politically feasible and structured by a logic of consulting representatives from national administrations and interest groups to determine the levels and sources of support or opposition to a given project.[4]

Groups may be positioned in each of these quadrants, even if a number of groups may, depending on the context, move from one quadrant to another over time. With regard to groups that are less associated with the preparation of the legislative proposals initiated by the Commission than to their legitimization, an authority such as the Michalski group, formed under Romano Prodi's presidency and working with the group of the political advisers to 'demonstrate the Commission's interest' in issues relating to the cultural and spiritual dimension of Europe, may be mentioned as closer to the 'political' pole. Closer to the 'technical' pole, one may think, for instance, of a series of groups composed mostly of academics which are presented, for example by DG Employment, as having a 'theorizing' and a 'formalizing' role of the initiative developed by the Commission.

Close to the initiation function and on the 'technical' pole, we can cite groups associated with the drafting process of proposals, such as a group of experts composed of specialists from the public and private sectors for advising DG Mobility and Transport on the methodology to improve knowledge about road accidents. With regard to the 'political side,' we can identify expert groups composed primarily of representatives from national administrations, for examining DG Home Affairs's exploration of the opportunity to harmonize national legal provisions regarding the 'patrimonial effects of marriage.'

Specifying the polarities structuring the field of European expertise enables us to understand why the members of these groups are mainly recruited in three broad categories (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2): academia, national administrations and 'organized civil society,' covering organizations representing public and/or economic interests.

While the tables provide a first picture of the European expertise field, they nevertheless raise several issues. In addition to the unreliability of the data of the on-line registry (having no updates, showing gaps, inaccuracy), the categories are, unfortunately, neither homogeneous nor clearly defined. For example, 'academics' are classified separately from 'members of national administrations,' when in a number of countries both 'statuses' often go hand in hand; 'academics' are also differentiated

Table 6.1 Participation in expert groups per category of actors

'Categories' of members of expert groups	**Number of expert groups in which the category is present**	**In proportion of the number of expert groups listed in the registry (%) (N = 1237)**
National administrations	864	69.8
Competent national authorities	422	34.1
Academics/Scientists	412	33.3
Industry/Companies	352	28.5
NGOs	207	16.7
Professionals	157	12.7
Social partners/Unions	146	11.8
Regional and local authorities	100	8.1
Consumers	96	7.8
International organizations	27	2.2

Table 6.2 Principal 'configurations' of expert groups

Types of composition of the groups	**In proportion to the number of expert groups listed in the registry (%)**
National administrations	26
National administrations and competent national authorities	11
Competent national authorities	6
Scientists	5
NGOs, social partners, industry and consumers	3
Industries	2
National administrations and competent national authorities and industries	2
National administrations and local and regional governments	2
National administrations and scientists	2
Scientists and industries	1
Sub-total	61

* The data used are extracted from the on-line registry on expert groups of the Commission. On this basis, the researchers have simply performed two types of calculations: for each 'category,' the percentage of groups in which it was represented; and the identification of 'types' of group composition.

** Inasmuch as the registry does not specify which proportion of each category forms the group, Table 6.1 does not differentiate between expert groups in which the category is represented by one expert only and groups composed almost exclusively of members of the category.

Source: Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2008.

from 'scientists,' a designation used for actors coming from public research as well as R&D departments of companies. But these forms of differentiation mask properties shared by the experts. It is precisely this aspect which we will now explore.

Social properties of experts and the efficient resources in the field of European expertise

The institutional design of expertise follows the principle of differentiating among actors in order to visibly demonstrate the inclusion of all pertinent points of view. It also contributes, for the same reasons, to the dissemination of the idea within the represented groups that expertise is a legitimate form of interest representation. It tends to promote experts as facilitators of compromise, which has effects on the importance given to certain social practices and properties compared to others (Joana and Smith, 2002). If these qualities do not constitute a prerequisite per se for an actor to be named as an expert, they strongly condition his or her success in this role and legitimacy in the group.

International openness

A first set of properties evident in expert groups pertains to 'international openness' (Dauvin and Siméant, 2004). On this aspect, the logics operating in this arena are in line with those in other areas of the European field, such as top civil servants (see Chapter 2), MEPs (see Chapter 1) or union officials of the ETUC (see Chapter 8). As one of our interviewees puts it: 'The rule of the game is to endeavor not to understand the problems from a national viewpoint, which is very difficult. The ideal choice is a person born in Sweden, having studied in Spain and worked in Germany.' (Interview with a member of the group of political advisers, July 2005.) The promotion of these resources takes on two complementary forms, referring not only to practical skills such as mastering foreign languages, but also to a form of symbolic credit associated with international trajectories and the predispositions they are thought to favor.

Often justified functionally, linguistic skills, and particularly fluency in English, are of paramount importance. The adhesion of the countries from Central Europe highlights one of the major effects of the enlargement on working practices: the now overwhelming domination of English as the working language in European institutions. For experts, this involves not only speaking English during most meetings – as only a few groups have interpreting systems available or work

within DGs wishing to maintain a multilingual framework – but also the obligation to read and write in the language. Being a polyglot, and more specifically being relatively fluent in English, often constitutes a more or less explicit recruitment criterion. If this 'rule' is mentioned by most Commission officials interviewed, often quite bluntly, it is also recognized as a criterion by experts: several interviewees, in particular French experts, thought they owed their appointment to their fluency in English and the scarcity of this skill in their own professional environments.

Some constraints may prevent a strict application of this 'rule.' Such is the case in particular for groups comprised of 'governmental' experts, which recruit from a pool of national officials with variable opportunities to work in English on a regular basis. However, linguistic resources are essential in practice as they are the condition of being heard and seen as credible by the other members of the group. The rare situations where the experts cannot express themselves in English are perceived, by the affected and by peers, as very handicapping or even embarrassing. Such was the case for a member of the group of experts on sugar, a Belgian farmer speaking only French: if his 'practical' legitimacy as a farmer was recognized by his counterparts through his nomination as chairman, he was almost totally cut out from the exchanges during, and especially outside, the meetings, and could not participate in the drafting of documents produced by the group.

Fluency in foreign languages is rooted both in national and social backgrounds and tends to disproportionately disadvantage representatives from Southern Europe. Moreover, depending on national contexts, having and acquiring these linguistic skills do not correspond to the same profiles and trajectories. The so-called 'governmental' expert groups, composed of officials from national administrations, are a particularly striking example, as they gather individuals with relatively similar education levels and positions, but extremely different levels of fluency in English. It is mainly when confronted with such situations that some experts embark on intensive learning strategies, thereby demonstrating the importance they ascribe to this skill ('I owe it to other members of the group,' it may 'prove useful later on,' are two common expressions in interviews).

Being a polyglot, on the other hand, is often the characteristic of experts who were raised in multilingual families, and/or whose university or professional trajectories led them to live and work in various countries. These international experiences can take different paths:

a university degree including a year abroad financed by the Erasmus program; a graduate degree from a prestigious British or American university; working in an international environment. These trajectories are particularly present among experts coming from academia, a profession that is highly structured around building and maintaining international networks. International experiences recognized as highly legitimate by both experts and Commission officials include working for international organizations or international negotiations: in addition to the European institutions – those that operate under the auspices of the United Nations, NATO, and OECD expert committees are mentioned most frequently.

These criteria tend to reproduce, in the arena of expertise, values and hierarchies common to the whole of the field of Eurocracy. The proven 'international dimension' of profiles has great symbolic value. In the context of expertise, it equates to open-mindedness, but also to the universality of the expert knowledge (Robert, 2010b). Comparative skills are particularly prized:

> Because what we are looking for, at this stage, is expertise … And of course people with many contacts abroad. Because our major problem, here, is the overabundance of super-skilled experts, but who are unable to communicate with other people, let alone with people from other legal systems. (Interview with a member of DG Home Affairs, 2008)

Embodying neutrality

For members of the Commission, certain backgrounds and professional trajectories are seen to predispose one to a greater degree of independence in providing expertise than others. Experts are always associated, to various extents, with one or several identities (national, professional, activist), which should be somehow 'consulted' via their mediation. But they are also expected, on account of their position as experts, and of the necessary 'neutrality' which this role implies, to relinquish, in word as well as deed, acting as 'representatives' (Bourdieu, 1987), in the sense of being a trustee (Pitkin, 1967), of the sectors from which they originate (Robert, 2010a). These logics are omnipresent. Therefore, even national officials, members of 'governmental expert groups' supposedly 'do not receive any instructions from their respective governments. They provide the expert group with their national expertise in a particular field' (European Commission, 2008b).

In this configuration, the (purported) autonomy attached to certain positions takes on significant value. The idea is to select experts whose professional positions theoretically enable them to neutralize conflicts of interest or avoid being a captive of the arenas from which they originate, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the group as a whole in defining a 'European public interest.' Different categories of actors particularly benefit from these recruitment logics. One of the directors of DG Employment thus stresses in an interview that his directorate is keen on recruiting former 'colleagues' who have retired as a formal guarantee of autonomy of their judgments:

> There is also a pool of independent experts provided by pensioners, those who worked for an administration, a professional union and then left, are not affiliated any longer, but when they belonged to these circles, they represented them, within the committees, notably comitology, and have demonstrated in this framework an authority, a skill that we wish to use further. (Interview with a member of DG Employment, 2004).

The same sort of reasoning applies for a second category of experts: expert academics who are highly visible[5] (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2010) because they are considered to be more 'independent':

> Yes, the Commission often resorts to academic expertise and in particular to Belgian expertise, as there are many academics in Belgium who are very independent and on top of that, they are not far away. Consequently, Belgium is an exceptional reservoir of expertise for the Commission. Are academics considered to be more independent than other experts? Certainly so, in particular less linked to particular interests than experts from companies, or administrations because, I forgot to mention, the whole expertise from companies and which is quite used by DG Enterprise and Industry. (Interview with a former director of the Prospective Unit, J. Vignon, 2004).

The particular credit ascribed to academics in the expertise procedures may be explained by the fact that they have accrued, sometimes exclusively, specialized know-how considered as useful to the decision-making process. Incidentally, the selection of experts reflects the extent to which certain disciplines, more than others, are perceived to yield sound knowledge for governmental affairs (Robert and Vauchez, 2010): for example, if lawyers and legal advisers are strongly represented in the

groups of DG Home Affairs and, to a lesser extent, of DG Employment, then they have lost ground to economists in the groups of the Bureau of European Policy Adviser.

Nevertheless, their selection rests significantly on this presumed independence from private and, in particular, economic interests, as from national interests, which are just as crucial (if not more) for members of the Commission. This dimension is particularly important in expert groups responsible for examining the transposition and application of European guidelines in the member states (such is the case for numerous groups of DG Employment and DG Home Affairs) or accompanying the coordination systems of national policies.

> To analyze national transposition measures, somebody independent is required. A person with an academic background, a university law professor, is usually the best choice. [...] When I say independent, I mean independent from the member states and the Commission. (Interview with a member of DG Home Affairs, 2006)

As shown by the example of the groups formed around the BEPA and the Commission presidency (see Text box 4), academics are particularly well represented in so-called 'high level' groups whose work and composition can be highly publicized. These profiles of academic experts match those of the Commission officials who recruit them: a common predisposition for international affairs, but also to the over-representation of holders of a masters degree or a PhD. More generally, the significant presence of actors originating from academia within expert groups may be understood as one of the manifestations of the close links which have been woven, since the 1950s, between European institutional elites and researchers specialized in European Studies in different disciplines (primarily Law, Economy and Political Science) (Robert and Vauchez, 2010).

Multipositionality as an inherent property of expertise

A closer examination of the careers and profiles of these academic experts highlights a third inherent property: multipositionality. In addition to their university titles and functions, all the experts mentioned above hold positions in other social and professional spaces. Such is the case, for instance, of the members of the Sapir group, who are implanted in the academic world but have also played roles in high-level public service and as consultants. The same goes for the academics of the Kok group, who have also had political careers and high-level national or

Text box 4: The weight of academic capital, the example of the high level groups of the GOPA and the BEPA

The weight of academic capital can be observed most clearly in the case of the Bureau of European Policy Adviser. The BEPA is an authority enjoying the status of a directorate-general, directly accountable to President Barroso. It replaced the GOPA (Group of Political Advisers) created by Romano Prodi and the Prospective Unit – created by Roy Jenkins and which played a highly visible role under Jacques Delors. During the last two Commissions, these structures have generated and led expert groups which have sometimes played a very public role, such as the Sapir group (Peuziat, 2005). All members of the three expert groups associated with the BEPA (the 'political analysis group,' the 'economic analysis group,' and the 'society analysis group') fulfill or have fulfilled teaching and research positions in academia, which was also the case with the previous groups and structures. Six of the seven members of the Sapir group were presented as professors. These three groups are accountable to 'special advisers' working within the BEPA, who also originate from the academic world. However, the weight of academic capital is not the exclusivity of the BEPA and can be observed in most groups benefiting from great visibility. For example, the 'Kok task force,' named after the former Dutch Prime Minister, Wim Kok, responsible for preparing in 2003 a report on the employment policies in Europe, included five professors among its the eight members.

European public service careers (Maria Joao Rodriguez) or as consultants for the public and private sectors (Carlo Dell'Aringa). One may also point to the profile of both special advisers of the 'political analysis group' of the BEPA. Loukas Tsoukalis holds a Jean Monnet university chair, is professor at the University of Athens and the College of Bruges, has been an ambassador, has held functions as a special adviser for several Greek governments, and has also been involved in consulting work for the EU. As for Dusan Sidjanski, he is the founder and former director of the department of political science at the University of Geneva. Known for his pro-European political commitments and for his positions in the federalist movement, he has also been a consultant for various international organizations.

Multipositionality is not exclusive to members of 'high level' groups. Its forms vary in relation to the sectors and administrations with which experts are connected. Law professors, lawyers and activists for human rights are closely linked to DG Home Affairs; professors and researchers go back and forth between consulting activities, academia and roles in the central administration of DG Employment; academics with political experience work side by side with academics with experience in the private sector in the BEPA, and so on.

The 'social surface' and the authority associated with these types of career profiles building on different kinds of capitals are obviously in line with the fact that multipositionality is sought after and promoted in the European field (Memmi, 1989; Peuziat, 2005). It is a good indicator of the scope and magnitude of social resources available to the expert and which can be activated in this context. This may explain why this property is particularly concentrated in the most visible expert groups such as the 'high-level' groups described above. For example, the Commission official responsible for following the Strauss-Kahn group[6] justified the decision to include Lord Simon in the following terms:

> Lord Simon had been part of several groups during the Delors era[;] he was chairman of British Petroleum, he was a member of parliament, he had a way with words, he had a good understanding of economic and social phenomena[;] it was perfect, for an expert practitioner's role. (Interview with a member of DG Agriculture, 2005)

The preference for multi-positioned experts has additional reasons. Specifically regarding academic experts, it touches on the idea that good experts must break from academic standards and practices to meet the expectations of the Commission. The transgression of the rules of scientific work in carrying out practical expertise is one of the fundamental characteristics of this activity (Robert, 2008). University professors unable or unwilling to break with their academic postures are particularly stigmatized:

> There is also here a great distrust against pure academics. I was recruited far more because of my experience in seeking relationships with authorities for promoting research, rather than because of my being a professor. The preconceived idea is that a professor is rigid, does not understand the expectations of a policy maker, is always concerned about his own image and communication, and what he does in the Commission is not so important, and this feeling is very widespread. And the truth is that anyone having dealt with academics will second that opinion. (Interview with a former member of the group of the political advisers, 2005)

This representation of academic 'conservatisms' could explain the privileged choice in favor of experts with regular experience outside academia. This is underlined, for instance, by an official of DG Home Affairs in charge of a group composed of law professors:

> Most had worked with public authorities so they were aware of the expectations, so they knew that what they were writing had to be relevant to build a policy of prevention, how this knowledge could be relevant for politicians. They knew it was different from academic circles where they just have to talk about their research. [...] Some had already worked with public authorities, as counselors for institutes or running institutes set up by public institutions ... or for international organizations such as the UN. I noticed that those who had this background were more accurate. They were not pure academics. (Interview with a member of DG Home Affairs, 2008)

Multipositionality is ultimately justified as legitimate selection criteria because actors having occupied several positions in contrasted social arenas are thought to be better equipped to have the necessary autonomy expected of an expert.

Just as transnational trajectories are associated with open-mindedness, it is thus thought to guarantee a kind of neutrality or 'sense of compromise.' These representations are even stronger where multipositionality goes hand in hand with strong investments in European matters, for example in the case of experts who navigate between teaching, consulting and administrative functions in and around Community institutions or issues. The distance they build with regards to their original national and professional circles conversely implies a social and spatial closeness with European institutions, as we will now see.

European trajectories and expert careers: expert groups in the European field

Regardless of the reasons for which they are invited to join groups, European experts share a number of properties. They are thought to be able to promote 'independent' viewpoints and have a sense of compromise which detaches them partially from the types of knowledge or interests they represent. These actors also converge in their common relation to the European institutional field. Upon observing the trajectories of experts, it appears that they are recruited predominantly among 'colleagues' and/or 'partners' of European institutions. Moreover, there are forms of European careers which can be identified, either by accumulating expert positions over time, or by reaching other positions in the field through functions in expertise.

'Regular visitors' to European institutions

Among the resources shared by members of expert groups, familiarity with the European institutions before being appointed as an expert is surely one of the most common. Such familiarity is the product of various professional or activist experiences bringing them into a relationship with the field of Eurocracy.

At first sight, this familiarity takes the form of an often in-depth knowledge of the functioning of European institutions and of the relationship of European policies to their areas of expertise. European civil servants and experts agree that expertise is only useful if the constraints and possibilities of actors to formulate concrete and defendable propositions are taken into consideration. This requires a mastery of institutions active in the given sector, as well as realistic knowledge of the apportionment of skills, the legal bases and the decision-making procedures governing it. This provides a relatively accurate picture of the positions of the main protagonists on the discussed issue, of the major lines of debate, and a sense of the political leeway that administrations asking for the expertise dispose of.

In certain configurations of expert groups extremely close to interest groups, the organizations will thus send, when they can, two experts: one being an activist belonging to the organization who covers the more technical side of issues under discussion, and the other, a permanent member of the Brussels office with many contacts with European institutions, and often holding a degree in European studies. For example, the Confederation of Family Organizations of the European Union (COFACE) is represented in a 'high level' expert group by one of its permanent employees of the Brussels office and by the director of one of its member organizations, a Belgian association, based in Brussels, representing families of children with multiple handicaps. The latter is not however devoid of skills adapted to European arenas. Due to the activity of his association, but also its geographic proximity with the institutions, this representative had already been involved in expert groups from the very start of consultations on handicap policy in the 1990s.

The means to acquire these attributes and skills are varied. Most experts share some, at least theoretical, knowledge of the way the UE works in their sector. This knowledge is often partially the product of experience and is coupled with more practical knowledge of policies and institutions. The existence of working relationships prior to accessing positions of expertise is indeed a second important dimension of the 'familiarity' of experts with the European institutions.

Text box 5: The importance of 'European experiences' for becoming an expert: The example of the consultative group on the integration of the ethnic minorities

The composition of the '[h]igh level consultative group on the integration of the underprivileged ethnic minorities in society and in the labor market' illustrates the importance of personal contacts with Commission officials. Asked about the criteria which governed the selection of the members on this group centered on the Rom community, the administrator of the Commission started by underlining the diversity of the members of the group at length and noted that interest and prior knowledge of the situation of the Rom minority was not the common denominator, to say the least. It is only when asked about how the members were identified, that he went on to explain: '[W]e knew all ten of them, because each of them, in the past, had collaborated with the Commission in various contexts' (Interview with a member of DG Employment, 2007). The careers of the experts testify to the density and the variety of these prior forms of collaboration. The Finnish expert, Tarja Summa, presented as a 'former mediator for refugees,' had held important functions with the Finnish government during the Finnish presidency of the UE. Ilze Brands Kehris, director in Latvia of a center for human rights, was a former member of the management committee of what has since become the European agency for fundamental rights. Bashy Quraishy, the Danish president of the European network against racism, has long maintained close relations with various departments of DG Employment. José Manuel Fresno was director general of the Luis Vives Foundation, which promotes the third sector and the social economy in Spain, and which is funded by the European Social Fund and benefits from strong recognition in the Commission. Jarmila Balážová, a journalist and activist in the Czech Republic for the defense of the Rom minorities, had close relations with Commissioner Vladimir Spidla. Finally, István Sértő-Radics, presented as the mayor of a small town in Hungary, Uszka, with a sizeable Rom minority, is also a member of the Committee of the Regions of the EU.

This example illustrates the existence of several logics. A first type of experience includes all forms of temporary contracts offered by the Commission to external operators. Such is the case, in particular, of experts from academia, almost all of whom have had prior experience in contract research with the European administration. Outside the Framework Programmes for Research and Development (FPRD), many DGs Commission studies on a very regular basis and authors are subsequently invited to join expert groups. These cumulated activities with expertise functions can also be observed in relationships with interest groups. Some are frequently called on and are at the same time beneficiaries of Community funds and privileged partners of Commission

departments within the framework of other types of consultations (forums, Internet-based consultations, and so on). In these instances, 'European capital' is less a personal than a collective resource.

A second point of contact between Commission officials and 'their' experts takes place outside the institutions. This may happen through think tanks and, more generally, arenas that promote relations between the academic world and European political and administrative elites. These encounters may also occur in other international arenas, such as OECD committees. As an illustration, we can take an example from the sector of data protection. An economist by training, Marie George is member of the group of the European control authorities in charge of data protection. After a brief career in banking, then in the French National Institute for Data-processing and Automation Research, she joined the French National Commission for Data-processing and Liberties (CNIL) in 1979. She was delegated from the CNIL to the Commission between 1990 and 1995 and was active in the preparation of several important European guidelines for data protection. George returned subsequently to the CNIL, where she was appointed division head of European and International Affairs and Prospective. In parallel during this period, she was member of several groups organized by the Council of Europe and the OECD. Finally, experts originating from national administrations have frequently been members of comitology committees. It is common that a group of experts composed of national officials overlaps, totally or partially, a comitology committee, meeting twice the same day in two different configurations.

'Expert careers': expertise as a cumulative resource

If most experts are thus recruited among the professional networks gravitating around the Commission, this element is often complemented by prior experience.

> And there is also an unwritten tradition. When we must form a group, we look at the groups formed in the past on the same subject. We ask how they have operated, who is a talented writer and who is not, how they behave in the group. There is a whole formal but also informal process for judging, storing, accumulating the experience of the groups who have already worked on that subject and for saying, for this particular aspect, that the contribution of that lady was extremely useful. And, consequently, she will be given a second chance. (Interview with a member of the GOPA, 2005)

As illustrated by this quote, adhering to a set of behavioral standards (sense of compromise, ability to effectively communicate) is recognized both as a central skill, by sponsors as well as by expert peers, and rewarded precisely by the possibility of accumulating, sometimes simultaneously, most often successively, expert positions.[7] In other words, a successful past experience as an expert can be a self-perpetuating capital. The significance ascribed to prior experience in the recruitment of experts thus reinforces these codes of conduct, but it can also be observed through the trajectories of actors in the field of European expertise.

Without going into too much detail (Robert, 2010a), two overarching types of norms can be mentioned. A first set of prescriptions or expectations is governed by the desire to neutralize links between institutional positions and positions in discussions. Recruited for their representativity, possibly on account of belonging to an organization or an administration, the expert should, however, not act explicitly as 'representing' a particular viewpoint. While the practices of experts are not insulated from outside interests, great care is taken for positions not to be seen as dependent on 'outside' interests. Experts are thus expected to give up any explicitly political or national argument and base their arguments on 'solid' knowledge bringing them to often resort to a technical register to state opinions.

A second type of norm regulating exchanges within the groups is the expected 'sense of compromise.' Taking advantage of their familiarity with the Community's political and institutional codes of conduct, they must not only be able to perceive what is negotiable within the group, or for the Commission with regard to the Council and the parliament, but also to adjust their positions accordingly. Even more than in other parts of the field of Eurocracy, experts are expected to prefer compromise within the group rather than cling to a firm defense of their own viewpoints.[8] As stated by a Commission official:

> A good expert is someone who has no strong individual project. [To] make a group work, nobody should dominate, even if it is the most intelligent person. If someone has very strong convictions, they should not be placed in a group of experts.

Experts who cannot concede defeat discreetly when the power struggle is not in their favor will be judged negatively. Those who, by their discourse or by their attitudes, highlight conflicts of interest and antagonisms, stand little chance of being asked to join another expert group in the future.

These norms are common throughout the field of Eurocracy. Such is the case, for instance, of the controlled use of references to national interest, of strategies for suppressing tensions and avoiding open conflicts, which have been documented in studies on working groups of the Council (Lewis, 2005; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006), the comitology committees (Eichener, 1992; Krapohl, 2003), in the European Parliament (see Chapter 1) and among officials of the Commission (Robert, 2005). Through the similarity of the logics of appropriateness throughout the entire field of Eurocracy, it can be seen why prior professional experiences in connection with European institutions, and most particularly in expert groups, appear particularly propitious to recruitment. They are, indeed, key moments of socialization (Robert, 2010a) and of learning the know-how and types of behavior which then facilitate continued access and success in the positions of expertise.

As the administrative data on expert groups are highly incomplete, it is difficult to measure the effects of the ability to conform to expectations with precision. From the qualitative part of our survey, it seems that between half and two-thirds of experts are asked to participate either in the group succeeding theirs, or in another expert group. An example of a typical ‘repeat player’ is that of an academic expert for DG Employment. This academic participated in several FPRD projects in the 1990s. Via the network formed around these European projects, he was noticed and approached by the departments of the Commission in 2000 for writing a report on the policies to fight poverty in his country. When three years later, DG Employment wished to set up a group of experts capable of following the developments of an open method of coordination procedure in this field, he was invited to join. Composed of 27 members, the group replaces on average two members every year, mainly those who are too frequently absent or not meeting expectations. Our expert was one of those who stayed on. After three years, the departments chose to reconfigure the group and did so by integrating experts co-opted by their peers. Our expert was approached by the Commission to be part of the new team and was appointed again in 2007. A few years before retirement as director of a department in a prestigious university, he did not rule out extending his activity as a European expert beyond 2010 (Interview with a member of the network of independent experts on social inclusion, March 2009).

Among career trajectories marked by an accumulation of positions, certain expert ‘careers’ take on even more specific forms. The trajectories may be so sustained over time that certain actors stand out as indisputable figures in their fields of intervention and beyond. This translates

frequently into participation in groups supervised by different departments, and even by different DGs. The probability of an expert being recognized and approached beyond his first network of interlocutors in the Commission thus provides a valuable indicator of the longevity of an expert career. Such is the case of Elspeth Guild, a well-known figure for her legal activism on migration issues. A professor at the University of Nijmegen, a member of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) think tank, she was also a partner in the Kingsley Napley law firm in London. She has not only participated in several FPRDs, but has also been an expert on several occasions and, since the beginning in the 1990s, for DG Employment (within the framework of the Observatory of the free circulation of workers) and DG Home Affairs via her participation in the Odysseus network.

Moreover, multi-positioned experts can use their roles in European expertise as career springboards towards more prestigious groups or more influential or lucrative careers. The trajectory of André Sapir, an economics professor at the Free University of Brussels, is a good example. A PhD from Johns Hopkins University, Sapir participated in two European think tanks (Bruegel and the CEPR). Concurrently with his various academic and consulting activities, he took on expertise functions for the DG Economic and financial affairs, from 1990 to 1993, then again from 1995 to 2001. He became an economic adviser to Romano Prodi, then was appointed in 2002 as president of the 'high level' group in charge of reviewing all economic policies of the UE. The group produced the influential report entitled 'An Agenda for a Growing Europe' in 2003. Under the Barroso presidency, and for the duration of the first mandate, he was president of the group of experts on the economy, accountable to the BEPA. In 2005, he was approached to join a high level group, composed of recognized economists and reporting to Commissioner J. Potočnik, for advice on the Lisbon strategy in the field of research.

Other indications on these mechanisms of selection and promotion are provided by Jean-Michel Eymeri-Douzans in a paper (2010) reflecting on his 'career' as a European expert. Initially a member of the European Institute for Public Administration of Maastricht, which the Commission contacts regularly for research reports, he was 'noticed' by a unit head of the DG Information society, for which he prepared three documents in 1999. He then took part, always for the same departments, in various juries, conferences and workshops. Later, he was involved in several FCRD research projects and became a regular collaborator for DG Research, which entrusted him with complementary expertise missions.

These joint activities for the DGs Research and Information society notably led in 2003 to his integration into a group of eight experts formed for advising Commissioner Erkki Liikanen in the preparation of the 'eEurope Action Plan 2005.'

The promotions may also, and sometimes jointly, take the form of new responsibilities within the group. They may, for example, be appointed chairpersons for the expert group. These are honorific functions, but they provide a certain renown, if only because the groups and the reports are given the name of their president. They also offer, in a number of cases, leadership resources such as determining the order of speakers, determination the agenda, and preparing of documents in close collaboration with the Commission. These experts may also be involved in the recruitment of peers, either as informal advisers to the Commission within the framework of peer-review procedures, or by creating a network around themselves to influence power relations within a group. Two examples can illustrate such processes.

A junior researcher in a research institute in Luxemburg, X had been involved since the end of the 1990s in different European projects on statistical indicators related to social protection. He wrote several reports for various international organizations and was involved as a political adviser in two presidencies of the UE regarding these issues. He had also regularly represented his government in certain arenas. He was then approached at the beginning of the 2000s by a member of DG Employment who sought to create a new group of experts on social inclusion. At the end of the mandate, the departments wished to replace the group with a network of independent experts and approached X informally, asking him to constitute, with another colleague, a network which he could coordinate. Shortly thereafter, X was appointed as president of a more selective and more visible group, a task force entrusted with generating a report on child poverty, addressed to the Commission and the member states. (Interview with a member of a group of experts of DG Employment, 2005).

Holding a PhD from Columbia University, a specialist in Social Studies of Science, Helga Nowotny had taught in several universities in Europe (Austria, France, Switzerland, Hungary). She had also held high-level functions in the European Science Foundation since the 1980s, and was a member of the board of administration of several research institutions in Europe. From the second half of 1990s onwards, she worked as an expert for DG Research, initially as an evaluator for FPRD projects. She was then called upon to participate in the expert group entrusted with preparing the guidelines for the Human and Social Sciences section of

FPRD programs. In 2001, she was offered the presidency of a new expert group entrusted with considering, along with academics and industrialists, the future of the Community research policy (ESTA, then EURAB – European Union Research Advisory Board). She was appointed vice president of the newly implemented European Research Council (ERC) whose creation had been a central recommendation of EURAB.

The analysis of these different illustrative trajectories demonstrates the weight of prior experience for accessing other, often more prestigious, functions of the same type. Such trajectories also highlight the contribution of experts to recruitment procedures. Among the forms of retribution that are offered to more regular experts, recruitment tasks are significant, and 'regulars' tend to co-opt peers who share their types of resources and profiles. When forming networks, for instance, they tend, for various reasons, to approach former colleagues. An edifying example was provided by the testimony of an expert who related that, at the end of the mandate of his group, he was approached by no fewer than five members of the group, each having been asked to help the Commission in the constitution of a network of experts which was to replace the expert group. Beyond their similarities, the careers and profiles analyzed in this chapter also serve to remind us that all expert-related experiences are not replicated with the same efficiency, and that the rewards for investment in expert groups can vary. It has been argued above that they are closely related to the capacity of the expert to conform to the unwritten rules governing work in the groups (Lagroye and Offerlé, 2010; Robert, 2010b). Future career development, as well as the succession of positions, remain dependent on the interplay between, on the one side personal resources (social surface, scientific renown, political and institutional networks, professional status, nationality, and so on) and their relevance in various institutional spaces on the other.

After expertise: possible reconversions to permanent European careers

The analysis of these trajectories brings us to the question of reconverting European capitals built on expertise-related experiences into European careers. While the expert's function remains, by definition, a position that is not only temporary, but also non-exclusive and unpaid, it is not without effects on the professional careers of those fulfilling such positions. Based on the experts studied in this investigation, two observations can be formulated.

It may first of all be underlined that the forms of 'Europeanization' promoted by unpaid expertise may offer lucrative opportunities when

converted in the experts' original professional arenas. This can explain why such time-consuming unpaid functions are attractive to many. In addition to the prestige associated with the title, having served as an expert for the European Commission is a golden opportunity for acquiring a collection of practical and symbolic resources. An expert position can offer a first working experience in an international environment in which the aim may be simultaneously to perfect and validate linguistic skills, furthering knowledge of a given Community policy, or to compare their own national practices with those of other nations and assert a 'European' viewpoint. Belonging to expert groups also gives access to relational resources, as it provides the opportunity to form or consolidate valuable networks at the European level. This is the case, for example, for a lecturer in law whose participation in an expert group enabled him to open new fields of research in comparative law. He mentioned in particular access via the group to foreign data and the building of a working relationship with European colleagues with whom he could more easily put together international research teams necessary for obtaining European research funding. For another expert, a senior scientist in a prestigious university, it was the 'European dimension' conferred to his CV by his six-year experience in a group of experts, associated with his commitment in research projects financed by the Commission, which contributed to his being appointed head of his department.

The establishment of close links with European institutions promoted by the multitude of expert positions also takes on more concrete forms. The most striking cases are those of actors who, after completing one or several mandates, were offered positions in the departments for which they had served as experts. Among the situations encountered during our survey, one can mention research positions within DGs open to academics on leave of absence for one or more years, the national expert positions offered to national civil servants, or temporary contracts of various lengths within the Commission. To this list should be added positions offered in agencies tightly linked to the Commission. This is the case of networks of experts financed by calls for tender for a three-year duration, in which the contract coordinators and holders are almost always former expert members of the group having paved the way for the network. It is also the case of certain agencies, for example the European agency for fundamental rights, which also are the heirs of former networks or expert groups and provide the backbone of its executive members.

Even if all these trajectories do not culminate in a permanent career within the Commission, other opportunities can result from this type

of experience, as illustrated by the following reconstruction of an expert trajectory. A regional economy and economic geography professor as well as director of a research center at the University of Ancona, Y was approached on several occasions by the Prospective Unit. Shortly after the term of her first contract, she was approached to become a temporary agent in the GOPA where she was entrusted in particular with coordinating the activity of high level groups initiated by Romano Prodi (Sapir group, Strauss-Kahn group, for example). Renewed twice, her temporary contract (three years) expired in a context in which the structural reorganization and the change in direction did not offer the same opportunities for her profile. Her contacts and her collaborations with DG Agriculture then opened to her the perspective of a new contractual position over several years, where she hoped to finish her career (Interview, 2005).

Conclusion

Forming a heterogeneous world with blurred contours, the members of the expert groups of the European Commission nonetheless share a number of common practices and properties: predispositions to an international environment; academic capitals; experience in negotiation and a sense of compromise. These properties (like the symbolic value conferred on experts) are not so remote from properties held and asserted by other more central populations of the European field, such as MEPs, lobbyists and European civil servants. These groups tend to recruit actors who already are 'intermittent' participants in the European political field. Finally, the expert's function, although temporary by definition, enables a number of its holders to become 'semi-permanent' participants in the field of Eurocracy (see the Conclusion in this volume). Thus, recruitment strategies and criteria, like the career patterns of the experts themselves, contribute to 'bringing experts and recruiters closer,' and to transform more generally the field of European expertise into an arena highly structured by, and dependent on, the specific rules and practices of the European institutional space.

These observations underline the importance of careers and social backgrounds in studying the European polity (Georgakakis, 2009). As emblems of the new 'European governance' (European Commission 2001a, 2001b), expert groups are indeed present in the official discourse, especially that of the Commission, and are portrayed as one of the tools enabling the participation of all 'interested parties' in the formulation of public policy. Consequently, these groups supposedly provide

decision makers with efficient and fair means of policymaking, based on a balanced synthesis of these various points of view. This vision is widely shared by the actors themselves, including the greatest detractors of expert groups as they function, such as the members of the ALTER-EU coalition and of the Corporate Europe Observatory. Centered on the reduced representation, numerically speaking, of NGOs in comparison with the weight of industry, the criticisms of these watchdogs paradoxically strengthen rather than question one of the essential postulates driving these schemes: the idea that the gathering, under the same authority, of individuals from varied walks of life (national, occupational, sometimes political) suffices to guarantee a multifaceted operation allowing for the definition of a European interest to emerge. In contrast, the investigation presented in this chapter invites caution on this point. It shows, first of all, that the diversity of the statuses and of the backgrounds of the actors gathered in the groups does not prevent them from also sharing a collection of similar resources, experiences, possibly aspirations, which may have the same structuring effect for defining their positions as their most visible identities. It also shows that due to the unequal distribution of these resources, crucial for access as well as success in this role, being part of a group does not guarantee the possibility of contributing to the construction of collective opinions and even less to engage peers possessing more adjusted resources on an equal basis (Jobert, 2003; Padioleau, 2000).

Notes

1. Expert groups have become one of the main focuses of ALTER-EU criticism questioning the 'fair balance' of interests. ALTER-EU published several reports: 'A captive Commission: the role of the financial industry in shaping EU regulation' (ALTER-EU, 2009); 'Whose views count? Business influence and the European Commission's High Level Groups' (Friends of the Earth Europe, 2009); 'Bursting the Brussels Bubble' (ALTER-EU, 2010); and, in 2012: 'Who's driving the agenda of DG enterprise and industry?'
2. The position advocated by the EP on expert groups echoes the positions of ALTER-EU. Since 2010, a group of MEPs (mainly from the Greens and from the European United left) have asked several oral and written questions and, in 2011 and 2012, used discharge procedures to push the Commission to increase transparency on the composition of expert groups.
3. For an analysis of the uses of the white paper on governance, see Georgakakis and De Lassalle, 2012.
4. The purpose here is obviously not to place technical and political expertise in opposition, as if it were possible to clearly distinguish between the two. In reality, 'political' or 'technical' issues refer to the way they are treated, prepared and represented at certain moments in the decision-making process,

which means that the same issue and, hence, the same group, may move along this axis at different stages of the policy sequence.

5. According to the registry of the Commission, close to one third of expert groups include experts belonging to the category of scientists and academics.
6. The Strauss-Kahn group, also known as the 'Round Table: a sustainable project for European society,' was set up under the Group of Political Advisers (GOPA). It was entrusted in 2003 with a reflection on the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development.
7. This leads us to consider expert groups as places of socialization. On this aspect as well as the contents of these norms, their political aspects and the way they contribute to delineate and direct the work of experts, see Robert, 2010a.
8. This posture is asserted even in official documents, as illustrated by one of the recommendations made to the administrators and to their experts in a document leading up to the white paper on governance: 'If the participants only attend the meetings to expose their own viewpoint without being open to others, there is a considerable waste of important information and the plurality does not translate into learning, but simple positioning.' (European Commission, 2001a, p. 9).

7

Interest Groups and Lobbyists in the European Political Space: The Permanent Eurocrats

Guillaume Courty and Hélène Michel

Introduction

Actors involved in lobbying, along with many observers and commentators, basically share a common vision of the 'European lobbying system.' Despite their different status (actors, observers, activists, experts, volunteers or employees) and at times conflicting positions on the question of transparency and the regulation of lobbying (Michel, 2012), all parties agree that the system is defined, first and foremost, by the relationships that each European institution establishes with various interest groups based on a 'system of exchange.' While the institutions, and especially the Commission, need information, expertise and legitimacy provided by interest groups, in exchange they must provide political and financial support to interest organizations they associate with in the development and implementation of public policies. Designated by political scientists as 'elite pluralism,' this system is described as being segmented into as many sectors as the European Union has public policies, each of which contains a plurality of actors defending their interests. Each segment has access points and intervention methods developed by interest representatives (Eising, 2007; Coen and Richardson, 2009b).

This vision of the 'European lobbying system' raises an important question: It often neglects the fact that not all groups are equal and not all are equal with respect to this system. It also implies a frontier between European institutions and interest groups, leading us to believe that lobbyists sit outside Eurocracy and their influence on decision makers depends on the lobbyists' dexterity in using a range of lobbying and persuasion techniques. Contrary to this view, we wish to emphasize that their power within the 'new European governance' (De Lassalle and Georgakakis, 2012), whether perceived or real, stems from the fact that

they are an integral part of this field, with many of them being permanent eurocrats.

How do interest representatives enter the field of Eurocracy, and how do they remain there? What individual and collective resources can be exploited in the development of public policies and the European construction process? These relatively simple questions invite us to analyze European lobbying as a space of competition between agents and practices – a space in which coexist interest representation workers and 'celebrities,' leaders of consulting firms and NGO activists, young people waiting for an EU position and former community officials starting a new career. These questions also allow us to identify what gives this professional group a form and cohesion ('lobbyists') and power – whether real or imagined – in the EU (Michel, 2005). They also lead to our examining the hypothesis of the central role played by European institutions – particularly the Commission – in the creation and development of the role of interest representatives. This central role is evident in the qualification and enumeration of the actors in lobbying, which helps to objectify their presence and identify their power. It is also visible in the institutional and political resources that each DG confers upon interest organizations, establishing differences and creating hierarchies among them. Finally, it can be seen in the career paths of interest representatives, whose careers change depending on the role that European institutions play in their activity. These 'European lobbyists,' therefore, form a group that is largely produced by European institutions: both a European group (in the sense that it is largely independent from the logics of national arenas) and a specialized group with specific skills – true European professionals (Georgakakis, 2002a), participating in the European construction process alongside other political and administrative groups.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first is dedicated to a review of quantitative data on interest groups to show the extent to which official statistics contribute to the institutionalization of interest groups and lobbyists. In the second section, building on empirical research on the development of interest organizations in Brussels, we demonstrate how the arena of interest groups includes not only organizations with different weights depending on their seniority, financial resources, staff and relationships with European institutions, but it also, and more importantly, includes forms of action and groups that are valued differently at different times by different administrations. Finally, going behind the acronyms to identify those who act and speak on behalf of the various interests, we discuss how these interest representatives – who at first glance appear to be non-permanent members of the field of Eurocracy

due to their high professional mobility – are actually part of a permanent group of agents, as they have the ability to steer their careers within and between interest organizations. Finally, the direction their career-paths take will allow us to understand the nature and volume of the political resources involved in this part of the field of Eurocracy.

Interest representation in words and figures

European lobbyists are an ideal starting point for studying Eurocracy. A wide range of concepts and figures used to define actors in lobbying have been developed by European institutions and are readily used by observers and scholars. This data serves institutional and political interests: professionals seeking to promote lobbying or legitimize the work of consultants, or EU officials seeking either to enhance the power of the Commission by showing a growing number of interest groups, or to relativize its role by highlighting the movement of groups towards the emerging power base, the European Parliament (Kohler-Koch, 1997; Wessels, 1999). Because they do not meet scientific requirements and purposes, these data must be re-examined, especially as they help to make the phenomenon visible, or even construct it (Rowell and Mangenot, 2010). Indeed, during early stages of European construction, interest groups were the subject of a double invention that was both theoretical and statistical.

The gradual discovery of interest representatives

With the coming into force of the ECSC Treaty, interest groups were identified as actors of European integration (Haas, 1958). With the Treaty of Rome, the Commission initially encouraged ‘consultation’ with interest groups (Lindberg, 1963); since then, however, the words used to describe these groups have varied, and their roles have been redefined several times.

Since 1960, interest groups have been listed in a Commission directory.[1] Their number increased from 136 in the first edition in 1960 to 284 in 1973; and from 541 (1986) to 568 (1992). In 2004, they numbered 737 and the official figure in 2009 was 900. However, this series was interrupted in 2008 as, from this date onwards, the Commission started instead to record ‘interest representatives,’ a unit of measurement used by the parliament in its own directory since 1997. This change of measurement is a source of misunderstanding. In 2012, a total of 5,349 individuals were identified, which should not be confused with the number of organizations.

Table 7.1 The Transparency Register

I. Professional consultancies, law firms, self-employed consultants	618
Law firms	42
Professional consultancies	402
Self-employed consultants	174
II. In-house lobbyists and trade/professional associations	2556
Companies and groups	718
Trade, business and professional associations	1514
Trade unions	128
Other similar organizations	196
III. Non-governmental organizations	1521
NGOs, platforms and networks and similar	1521
IV. Think tanks, research and academic institutions	338
Think tanks and research institutions	245
Academic institutions	93
V. Organizations representing churches and religious communities	35
Organizations representing churches and religious communities	35
VI. Organizations representing local, regional and municipal authorities, other public or mixed entities, etc.	281
Local, regional and municipal authorities (at sub-national level)	132
Other public or mixed entities, etc.	149

Source: http://europa.eu/transparency-register/index_En.htm, consulted October 3, 2012.

In order to assess these data, it should first be noted that these compendiums contain only the profiles of interest groups which have taken the optional step of filling out a form, despite the fact that the European Transparency Initiative supposedly imposed the requirement on organizations to publish client lists and budgets. To correct the biases inherent in the data (Courty and Devin, 1996, 2010; Laurens and Michel, 2012), we need to account for the logics of constitution of these sources, which change over time and space. From this perspective, the directories are a particularly useful working tool, as they compile, archive and store the different forms adopted by groups which mobilize resources in order to be visible in Brussels, albeit sometimes only symbolically.

Although in 1992 the European Commission once again took the initiative to update registers on interest groups (European Commission, 1992b), it gradually turned its attention to individuals, thereby aligning its approach with the European Parliament (Shepard, 1999; Chabanet, 2009). During this shift of focus, the term 'civil society' (Weisbein, 2003; Michel, 2007, 2008) was used to symbolically signify that the citizen was finally being placed at the center of the European system. In parallel,

'lobbyist' became the official term used to identify any interest representative (including those in the Green Paper on the European Transparency Initiative, published in 2006). By placing all representatives on the same level, the Commission sought to confer 'European' status to all actors who had a relationship with European institutions, thus putting an end to any debate on the definition of the nature of the interests defended, the type of organization concerned, their geographical location or the nationality of their members.

The number of groups: reality, or a registration effect?

These variations in registration definitions and procedures have implications for studies that seek to describe and explain the evolutions of interest representation. Few researchers have tried to assess the biases introduced by the plurality of sources and results. Although many authors have used this data on interest groups as an essential element of their research, it was not until very recently that the literature performed a critique of available sources (Berkhout and Lowery, 2008, 2010). Unlike in the United States (Mahoney, 2008), where figures on lobbying abound, the EU and its member states have unreliable data. This has led most researchers to choose between sources and available data. Thus, Chabanet and Balme focused on the European Commission's database, CONNECS, which only includes non-profit groups[2]; Lahusen (2002, 2003) only included companies listed under the heading 'consultancies and law firms' in the *Directory of Public Affairs*; Kohler-Koch based her research on the European Parliament register (1997), and Eising attempted to create a database from a survey of groups listed at both the European (using the *Directory*) and national levels (Eising, 2009). Using the selected source, they then proposed a chronology and typologies to describe this Brussels phenomenon. By using a single source, these studies provide a partial view of the phenomenon and can only identify that the number of groups and their growth are different in each directory (Figure 7.1).

Studies that only use a single source reach questionable interpretations. This includes the theory of the 'boom' in the number of groups with two creation peaks, one in 1957, and one in 1986 (Balme and Chabanet, 2002). However, depending on the source used, the average number of groups created annually varies from 1 to 5. It is therefore strange to use a single overall average (1.5 creations per year) and to argue that there was a sharp increase around the time of the Single European Act (Mazey and Richardson, 2001, p. 74). To demonstrate that the Single European Act imposed an international dimension on



Figure 7.1 Average number of groups created per year according to the various Commission directories

national politics (Grossman, 2004), one must be able to consider data prior to 1986. The argument is difficult to uphold as it is not based on an appropriate statistical corpus. Furthermore, to state that the volume of interest groups created varies according to the revisions and amendments of the treaties poses another more general problem – that of the causal relationship between legal transformations and the creation of groups. It remains, therefore, for us to understand why all the curves experience a peak in creation and then trail off. To explain this, authors have formulated the theory of the anticipation of the extension of EU powers by interest groups – groups which invest time and effort in this area (Kohler-Koch, 1994; Courty and Devin, 1996). However, this sense of anticipation is neither widespread nor uniform. Not all interest representation actors possess such political competence or always demonstrate such tactical thinking.

By comparing the different editions of the *Commission Directory*, it is clear that European construction did not take place in a space devoid of pre-existing transnational organizations. Its history runs parallel with an international and European structuring of trades and occupations created in the past. Before World War II, some economic agents had already formed international industry organizations, more or less coinciding with the geography of the Community of 1957 and successive enlargements. Many 'creations' of interest groups were, therefore,

merely the result of the transformation of the geographical scope of existing groups, while others were the result of the formalization by Community institutions of international groups, which changed their status or adopted a legal framework during treaty negotiations (Courty and Devin, 2010). Brussels therefore benefited from the existence of an elite, mobilized before World War II to the point that Meynaud and Sidjanski (1967a) usefully highlighted that the adjective 'international' had, de facto, a European meaning. However, in the late 1960s, the movement to a disassociation of the terms 'European' and 'international' was clearly evident. Thirty percent of transnational groups used the label 'European,' but this label became increasingly disjoined from other adjectives (international, global, primarily). This differentiation between 'European' and 'international' labels was further accelerated after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty: some groups (international or European), despite being created after 1958, changed their names and status to comply with the new conception of Europe.

The analysis of the directories allows us to understand that interest representation has its own dynamic. However, while some attempts have been made to explain it using quantitative variations,[3] we would like to emphasize its qualitative transformation as the result of symbolic strategies. From 1992 onwards, a process of 'rejuvenation' took place: the premium of being an historical player took a back seat to the need to focus on the issues and themes of Europe of the 1990s (25.8 percent of groups created after 1993 were, in fact, transformations of existing groups). In the 1992 edition of the *Directory*, 50 percent of groups had been created in the mythical period 1958–61. In 1996, 31 percent reported a creation date of between 1980 and 1992. The groups, therefore, declared different creation dates, which produced a new history of European construction, with a tendency to erase previous ones. Linguistic innovation can be added to this creation strategy: 36.5 percent of groups changed their names between 1992 and 1996, and almost all have done so since 1996. The term 'community' was used by only 1.3 percent in 2004, while it had been used in the title of the majority of groups until 1996. The term has now been almost completely replaced by 'European' (76.5 percent as opposed to 30 percent in 1996), which dominates 'international' (13.2 percent) or the absence of a geographical reference (7.8 percent). Thus, between 1992 and 2004, interest groups renewed their image, with some changing their status, others their names and yet others their creation dates. The creation curve becomes increasingly flat (the steepest part is in 1960 and the flattest in 2004), mainly due to two effects: the strategic change of image (previously

mentioned) and the new, but again not completely defined, effect of the turnover of interest groups. Indeed, 42 percent of groups in 1996 were not listed by the Commission in 1992, and 49.7 percent of groups in the 1996 directory were not included in the following edition. From one directory to the other, groups identify (or re-identify) themselves, introducing this surprising rejuvenation effect to the sample. An 'aging' effect should also be added to rejuvenation, corresponding to the entry into European politics of organizations created between 1885–1939, but which once again crossed paths with Europe in the recent history of European construction through the extension of Community competences. Thus, European construction dynamics solicited a 'reserve' of European groups, of which only a fraction is mobilized (or feels entitled to intervene), depending on the circumstances and issues established by European institutions.

A space for organizations

Organizations that become active in European politics are the result of the mobilization of resources, depending not only on marshalling available resources, but also on 'group entrepreneurs' who create organizations (Offerlé, 1997). These entrepreneurs adapt groups to institutional expectations. A Europe-specific 'repertoire of collective action' (Tilly, 1984) emerged and stabilized around the form of these groups, the combinations of which included labels ('European,' 'international'), status, number of members, nature of members (citizens, associations, companies or federations), geographic location, budget, size, skills and experience of staff, as well as forms valued and promoted by the European Commission.

Structuring European sectors

The successive policies of European institutions with regard to interest groups prompted interest representatives to adapt by adopting organizational forms which best suited the needs of the time. The European Commission has long favored Eurogroups (Mazey and Richardson, 1996). This concept forced organizations to restructure themselves around this new European dimension (and constraint). The European Trade Union Confederation, like most European trade union federations (Pernot, 2001), is based on an international organization of federations and central trade unions of countries that are not necessarily members of the European Communities or the EU (for example Turkey, Norway and Switzerland). International organizations were therefore able to become

Eurogroups – as was the case for many professional associations in their respective sectors, for which the 'international' dimension actually referred to the relationship between the six initial EEC member states (Meynaud and Sidjanski, 1967a) – or, alternatively, they existed alongside the European organization. This is the case for international NGOs such as Amnesty International (Poinsot, 2005) or international environmental protection NGOs (Berny, 2008), which maintain a presence in Brussels in the form of a 'European section.' This specialization also affects large international communications and public affairs companies such as Hill and Knowlton, Burson-Marteller, Fleishman-Hillard, or the Brunswick group. While their Brussels offices are definitely affiliated with the international network and can provide their clients with international coverage, their scope is determined by the issues addressed by European institutions with staff and clients in the EU geographical area. Thus, the 'European' dimension tends to be more closely linked to the competences of the EU. Although BusinessEurope, presenting itself as the Confederation of European Businesses, currently promotes the interests of its 40 member organizations in 34 European countries, it tends to focus primarily on EU policy, limiting new members to organizations in countries intending to join the European Union.

Being European is a quality that is systematically highlighted by organization representatives. To this end, they manage the different signals sent to institutions with the help of the prefix 'Euro' or the inclusion of the letter 'E' in their acronym. They promote the European dimension of their representation by mentioning their locations within Europe. Becoming European for some means to become a member of a European federation, while for others it means to open a representation office in Brussels in order to highlight the address of their head office, if possible located in the European business district. In some sectors, where it is impossible to reconcile the national differentiation of socio-economic interests born out of varying historical conditions (Kaelble, 2004), it means creating an ad hoc network, based not on national organizations but rather on common goals that have been redefined so that they can bridge national differences (Michel, 2010). Several observers have highlighted the different strategies and constraints producing these different forms of representation which relate to the nature of the interests to be represented. Thus, according to Bouwen (2006), there are four main forms of interest representation within the business community: national associations, European associations, business representation and consultants. With regard to social interests, trade unions appear to be the predominant form, but not without competition from NGOs, which

are considered to be better suited to represent 'diffuse' interests (Pollack, 1997). In a context in which European interests are often defined as being contrary to national interests, this 'non-governmental' form may hold certain advantages, especially as it allows emphasis to be placed on the role of citizens in the European project (Weisbein, 2003) and on the universal values supposedly espoused by 'civil society.' For observers, it is the nature of the interests being represented that leads to distinct forms of representation and action. However, the nature of these interests is not unrelated to the process of segmentation of European public policy. Forms of representation vary at the European level from one period to another, from one sector to another and from one country to another. Although French companies are often thought to be not particularly present in Brussels (Van den Hoven, 2002), they are central actors in Eurogroups, where they are often founding members.

The evolution of organizational charts of the European Commission over the last 50 years show that it has gradually divided itself into sectors of public action. For each sector, interest organizations were promoted to the status of preferred contacts and were even sometimes directly created to assist in the establishment and management of an area of EU competence. This was the case for policies related to young people (Eberhard Harribey, 2002), the elderly (with the creation of the Platform Europe for the Elderly), women (the European Women's Lobby), gender equality (Jacquot, 2009), consumers (the European Consumers' Organization), environmental policies (European Environmental Bureau) and development policies, with the VOICE and CONCORD (European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development) platforms (Sanchez-Salgado, 2007). The European Commission strongly supported these organizations, both financially and symbolically, inviting them to work on issues on the agenda and to make proposals on behalf of the entire sector. Indeed, although the establishment of large thematic platforms, such as the Platform of European Social NGOs, certainly provides small organizations with representation at a European level and allows them, at a lower cost, to receive information on their area of activity. But this also allows the European Commission to delegate part of their responsibility for assigning a weight to different sector organizations and for consolidating different positions into a common position. This is because the institutional recognition of organizations specialized in a particular interest does not merely involve the establishment of a European sector of public intervention, it also concerns the ability of each DG or Unit of the Commission to mobilize support.

Bureaucratic differentiation does not necessarily entail the creation of new interest groups. The European Association of Metals (Eurometaux, the former Liaison Committee of Non-Ferrous Metal Industries established in 1960) groups together European companies in this sector. Its structure is more akin to a platform divided into different sub-associations (known internally as commodities), each representing a different metal: nickel (via the Nickel Institute, created in 2004), zinc (via the European Zinc Association, established in 1990), aluminum (via the European Aluminum Association), and so on. Metal-producing companies are members of both the sub-associations and the general platform, Eurometaux. Members, office space and staff are shared; each association provides a sector-specific front, allowing representatives to have a presence in specialized committees and to discuss standards and regulations of a particular metal in more specific terms. In short, where researchers count the total number of interest groups and conclude that there is a proliferation of organizations (the lobby boom theory), what they are actually observing is the development of representation activities which leads either to a proliferation of different institutional fronts for the same organization or an increase in the internal division of labor.

In Brussels, Eurogroups are all shaped by institutional isomorphism. Although they are first and foremost a grouping of national organizations, they base their internal structures and operating rules on those of European institutions. For example, in BusinessEurope, the 'Council of Presidents' (of national employers organizations) is the 'executive' body, while the 'Committee of Permanent Representatives,' brings together the permanent representatives of national confederations in Brussels and works with various BusinessEurope CEOs to coordinate different sectors and ensure that the 'working groups' do not operate in isolation. The internal structure and agendas of industry federations, consulting firms and NGOs also depend heavily on European institutions. We are, therefore, relatively removed from the classical view of pressure groups which try to impose their views on the political powers from 'outside,' and whose main organizational challenge is to reconcile positions and member organizations to speak with a single voice. Interests and the forms of representation are co-productions, whereby the work of EU institutions and that of representatives converge and adjust to one another. The type of group is therefore not strictly determined by the nature of the interest, nor is it the result of a deliberately chosen strategy of action. It is rather the product of an arena that is both 'European' and 'sector-based,' both competitive, but also marked by isomorphism and

constant adjustments and exchanges between European institutions and interest groups.

A divided space: generalists vs. specialists

Contrary to the theory generally put forward, lobbying in Brussels is not an elite pluralist system but a differentiated and 'census-based' system. This theory stems from research which does not focus exclusively on the Commission DGs (so-called economic research) and which no longer supports the theory, as activist literature often does, of the primacy of the 'dangerous liaisons' between business and the Commission, or the confusion between the world of lobbying and industrial and financial interests (ALTER-EU, 2010; Dinan and Miller, 2007). Under the 'differentiated system' reading, so-called social or civil interests also have their representatives and organizations, even though they were only included in directories of interest groups at a later date and scholars and observers studied them as social movements distinct from 'interest groups' (Offerlé, 2009). As more recent observers emphasized the differences between sectors, they rejected the relevance of the Manichean vision of lobbying, with dominant industrial lobbies on one side and humanitarian activists on the other. This allowed them to focus on the weakness of business associations and the financial strength of large NGOs (Greenwood, 2007; Grant and McLaughlin, 1993). These different debates brought to light the heterogeneity of organizations and interests: the 'world of lobbying' is not limited to consulting firms, and 'civil society' does not only consist of non-profit organizations.

Studying the field of European interest organizations raises another difficulty: its structure is difficult to identify as it is masked by the representations provided by the institutions themselves. The field is not divided up according to the 'administrative cultures' of the Commission, nor do we see organizations representing private interests on the one hand and those representing public interests on the other, which implicitly refers to differences in the sources of their funding. Rather, it is an area that is structured both by its integration into European political and administrative life and by the specialization of its organizations. These two criteria are not independent; they overlap and sometimes reinforce each other. Together, they account for the relative positions of the various organizations and the 'strength' of the interests represented.

Thus, on the one hand we have the sector-based organizations that are close to the European Commission and receive its support, while on the other we have the generalist organizations that are more remote and probably also more financially independent. Sector-based organizations such

as the arts and culture platform (Culture Action Europe), the European Public Health Alliance, or industry federations such as EURELECTRIC for electricity, CEFIC for chemistry or EFPIA for the pharmaceutical industry, can be opposed to more generalist organizations such as BusinessEurope (defined as a cross-sector employers' organization), AmCham EU, the French Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry or even the Civil Society Contact Group, created as part of discussions on the European Constitution. This does not mean that these generalist groups do not maintain close ties with sector-based organizations: for example ALTER-EU and its links with Friends of the Earth – Europe, or CSCG, which is extremely embedded in the structure of the Social Platform, or even BusinessEurope's relationship with the FEBI industry federations. However, as we have seen, the categorization of an organization as generalist or specialist is not based on its nominal definition but rather on its ability to articulate forms of representation and the presence of specialists within a more generalist form of action. Thus, the European Consumers' Organization plays a central role in the field of consumer protection; however, its intervention ability and actions are hampered because it has only a limited capacity to intervene with DG Trade or DG Internal Market. On the other hand, BusinessEurope, a 'big machine' which is often considered by its national members as ineffective, draws its strength from its ability to know what is happening in each of the sectors and to attempt to coordinate integrated thinking in the various sector-specific proposals. Similarly, the strength of consulting firms such as Hill and Knowlton relates more to its internal division of labor, which allows 55 consultants to collectively cover all sectors, rather than 'techniques' used in each of the case studies listed on its website.

This capacity for action and coordination across different sectors relates to the organizational resources which are not unrelated to their degree of political and administrative integration. Given the role that the Commission plays in the institutionalization of organizations (Coen and Richardson, 2009a), it is true that specialization is often associated with integration. The more specialized an organization, the more likely it is to be integrated and to participate in public policy formulation. This integration also allows it to increase its resources, both financial and symbolical: to be invited to key meetings and be consulted on draft projects are signs of institutional recognition. Regular contacts with the administration allows organizations to obtain information on calls for proposals and their objectives in order to respond to them more effectively and to obtain financing that can, in turn, develop additional expertise. While specialization allows organizations to integrate into

European political life, it can also be a disadvantage as it 'imprisons' an organization in a sector-based structure. In this regard, generalist groups – although a priori less integrated because they are less specialized – have a distinct advantage. Thus, even if Commission agents prefer to work with representatives of sector-based federations rather than with consultants working for various clients, the latter sometimes have more weight, not because of their specific skills or better lobbying techniques, but because they have the means to rise above a sector-specific view through their presence in a variety of forums (for example, sector-specific committees in different DGs, working groups, breakfasts). Based on the relationships that interest organizations are able to develop and maintain through their membership in networks, funding received from federations or participation in decision-making activities, their representatives have an increased ability to act, and the power of the organization is strengthened. 'Influence' is measured not merely by the quantity of available resources (Dür, 2008; Dür and De Bièvre, 2007), but also by the relationships an organization succeeds in building and maintaining by means of these resources.

It is therefore important to distinguish between organizations, not according to their status (for-profit, non-profit), or the nature of the interests, but according to their position in relation to other organizations in an area structured both by the European Commission and its sectors of intervention and by the relationships developed between these structures. However, while many of these relationships are organizational with strongly interwoven structures, the majority are associated with the career-paths of lobbyists, through intersections or, conversely, the structural obstacles to connections. It is therefore fruitful to study the more or less visible links between organizations by following individuals and their career trajectories.

'European' and 'Europeanized': two profiles of interest representatives

During their careers, interest representatives move from one organization to another, from interest groups to European institutions, and vice versa. This circulation allows them to maintain a presence in Europe and thus become permanent European players. Contrary to an approach focusing only on times of mobilization and during 'lobbying campaigns,' interest representatives perform a variety of tasks on a daily basis (some more rewarding than others), both with the agents of the European institutions they support as part of their task of collecting and analyzing information,

and with their clients or members. Most interest representatives do not generally view their jobs as a vocation, but rather as an interim solution (Michon, 2005) or a stop-gap job while waiting for a career in one of the EU institutions, a senior position in a company, to resume a career in politics or to move to an international position. A businessman who made his fortune by selling his small agency to a large group, the general secretary of an industry federation or the activist in an environmentalist NGO all have one thing in common: they move in the same geographical (Brussels and the European quarter), professional (defined by the various interest organizations based in Brussels) and, sometimes, personal circles. However, they do not all follow the same path and their individual paths do not necessarily intersect. Although interest representatives move from one sector to another, from one organization to another, this movement is neither random nor the result of a personal career strategy. Movement within the area of interest representation in Brussels obeys a logic that is related to the means of entry into the European arena and the types of organizations in which the representatives develop their skills.

A geographical and social position in Brussels

To be a permanent figure in the European political arena means, first of all, to base one's professional career in one specific location (Brussels), exclusive of any other. European representatives willingly stigmatize Paris-based representatives who only occasionally come to Brussels, or their London-based equivalents whose Eurostar is running late. A physical presence in Brussels is seen as a necessity. It is also an indicator of the autonomy of European politics in relation to national arenas. Very few lobbyists are involved in several different political levels at one time: Parisian consultancy firms do not care about European affairs, Washington firms hardly have a presence in Brussels and, while some British companies have established a presence in Brussels, they have done so in name only. Behind the brand names of large networks (Hill and Knowlton, Burson-Marsteller, Fleishman-Hillard, Edelman, Weber Shandwick, APCO) are Brussels agencies which specialize in European affairs and primarily employ 'European' staff. This does not mean that they do not have relationships with their counterparts in London, Washington and Tokyo, however staff mobility between the various offices is very limited. The specific nature of European administration requires representatives to be specialized and based in Brussels in order to develop relational capital. Those who are only 'passing through' Brussels tend to be executives of multinational companies who have a successful in-house career and for whom a position in Brussels is just

another temporary international assignment. Some, however, remain and settle in Brussels, which means that they pursue their careers in the city, possibly leaving their company, but remaining in European affairs.

This is the case for John,[4] 55, a former corporate executive who moved to Brussels in the early 1990s as the head of European and international relations. This position required him to maintain a regular relationship with the professional association of which his company was a member. Solicited by the secretary general of the association to replace him, John took on this position for eight years. Last year, he joined another Brussels firm as a senior consultant, primarily for his excellent industry knowledge but also with a view to diversifying his activities. It is perhaps for this reason that he also became involved with the European association of consulting firms.

The same scenario is valid for 'international' activists, such as Amnesty International's Peter Benenson (Poinsot, 2005) or some other well-known figures of the environmental movement. Despite the high visibility of such activists, these profiles are the exception rather than the rule. The grouping of international assignees into a 'Brussels office' or a 'European section' tends to evict most (even well-known) activists from the area of European representation in favor of staff more specialized in European affairs and with more European resources (see Chapter 6), namely a special relationship with agents of the European Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament, through an internship or a parliamentary assistant position.

To be a permanent employee in European affairs, therefore, means to have a long-term view of one's career, involving all aspects of life (personal, professional and social), sometimes over several generations. Most of these representatives have been working in Brussels for ten, 20, or even 40 years. They have established themselves and have acquired a reputation. They have personal, professional and social relationships. They live in fashionable neighborhoods in Brussels and the surrounding area, such as Woluwe, Uccle, or Etterbeek, where European officials they work with also live (Georgakakis, 2010a). They met Commission officials when they passed through EU institutions, either as interns, on a temporary contract, or later, as part of their lobbying activity. Their spouses sometimes work for these institutions. The permeability between European institutions and the organizations working in partnership with them is very high and is reinforced by marital alliances, friendly relations through alumni or friendship circles.

Helen and Richard are fairly representative of this collective destiny. Helen is 40 years old and a consultant with a large firm in Brussels,

where she holds a senior position. She is a British citizen of Italian descent through her father. She has always lived in Brussels, as has her husband. Of French descent through his father and Italian through his mother, Richard attended the European School, where he was taught by Helen's father. However, they did not meet during their time at school as they studied in different language sections. They met later, during their studies in law at the Sorbonne in Paris. Richard already had his degree and Helen was on a study-abroad program to complete her studies at Oxford. She wanted to attend the College of Europe in Bruges while he wanted to become an EU official, like his parents. Required to do his military service, he obtained a Voluntary Service Overseas position in Rome. She followed him and took up a position as an intern at the Italian National Assembly. When they returned to Brussels they both sought employment in public affairs. Richard registered to become an EU official and, in the meantime, worked as a consultant with a professional federation and then with a consulting firm. After having spent nine years of his career in interest representation, he joined the European Commission. He is satisfied with his experience in the private sector. According to him, it was thanks to his contacts that he was able to get a job in the desired DG, and in his current job, he understands the expectations and functioning of lobbyists better than do his colleagues. Helen is considering leaving the firm where she has worked for over ten years. Her job is very demanding and she does not want to give as much time anymore. She understands that, at 40, she does not have much room for salary negotiation and cannot become an associate. She says she earns as much as her husband but has longer working hours, the stress of clients, and more travel. She would like to slow down, earn a PhD in political science to enhance her experience as a lobbyist, and remain in contact with the community she has been part of for 15 years. Above all, she wants to devote more time to her two children, who will start primary school at the European School. This change of school means that they will see less of their cousins, who live in the same neighborhood, not far from their grandparents. She is not surprised that her parents decided to remain in Brussels upon retirement: 'Where could they go?' Like her brother and sister, she knows that her life is here, where she 'knows everybody.'

Lobbyists are even more permanent when they are mobile within the field. The goal of inter-organizational mobility is usually to obtain better-paid and more-prestigious positions. Contrary to accounts that speak of 'chance' and 'opportunity,' this mobility does not occur in a random manner. Career-paths generally take individuals from the sector-based to the general, both in the field of social interests and in industrial sectors.

There are also career shifts within the same company, but more often by changing from one organization to another, either by enlarging their area of specialization to include related sectors (for example the head of the gas and electricity sector in a firm may also handle issues related to climate change) or by acquiring a new specialization in addition to their existing one (a former Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries employee can become a specialist in the Internal Market). The process is essentially the same for NGOs where, upon arrival, interest representatives find themselves in charge of a specific issue on the agenda of the EU and gradually acquire broader expertise in this area. In order to remain in the organization or obtain a new position in another organization, they are required to extend their areas of expertise by following changes in the institutional agenda. However, there is almost no movement from 'private' to 'public' or 'social' sectors, partly because of the salary gap and partly due to the social organizations' mistrust of those who have worked for industry. However, this movement is possible on condition that time is spent working in another institution to enhance their technical skills and thus 'wipe the slate clean.'

Sebastian is 35 years old and has recently obtained a master's 2 in European affairs. Through his activist networks, he obtained an internship in the European Parliament with the French Green Party, however he turned it down for an internship in a professional association, as it seemed to be a good opportunity for him to improve his English. The association was growing and, at the end of his internship, he received a job offer which he accepted. Sebastian knew that he would not do this job forever; still, he had to remain long enough to show that he had learned 'everything that needs to be learned,' without staying too long, with the risk of being permanently associated with, and confined to, that specific sector. He feels that he had defected to the side of the 'bad guys'; at the same time, however, he reminds that 'everyone has the right to defend his interests.' After gaining sufficient experience, he looked for opportunities to change positions. He reactivated his old relationships by returning to the parliament as the assistant of a Green MEP. With the term nearing its end, the MEP will not stand for re-election. However, Sebastian knows that his move to the parliament has opened many doors for him. He says that he will not knock on the door of industry, despite the fact that from a salary perspective, apart from the European institutions, he will have trouble finding better.

This movement through institutions is more likely if the representative has been able to specialize and thus become highly integrated in political and administrative life. 'For-profit' organizations seek people

who have worked for NGOs or social associations. 'Sector switchers' are those who hold technical expertise and have been identified through their work on a dossier at meetings organized by the DG. However, this is not a regular pattern. If representatives of NGOs are tempted by higher salaries and career prospects early on in their careers, at that stage they are not yet 'experts' in their sector and do not attract much interest from business or industry organizations. The greater their expertise in a subject, the greater the foothold within their organization or network of organizations, which goes hand in hand with the confidence and recognition received from EU administration officials. 'To change sides' could have serious consequences if these representatives want to continue working in the same sector. This inter-sector mobility of representatives is accepted among European Commission agents, as it is not so far removed from what they themselves experience in their administrative careers. It allows them to keep the same references: 'Mr X – Copper Expert' or 'Mrs Y – Public Health Expert.' Interest representatives know this and strive to maintain close interpersonal relationships, even when professional destiny threatens to stretch and even eliminate them.

This sense of place is acquired gradually. Interest representatives learn what they can do and how to go about getting what they want. While representatives move from one position to another, from one organization to another, they nevertheless remain in Brussels, generally in the same issue area. A change of area can be made once the required resources have been accumulated in another area or are sufficient to neutralize the potentially stigmatizing marks of the initial area.

The two paths of entry into the field of lobbying

There are two main means of entry into the field of Eurocracy in general and the world of lobbyists in particular: interest representation in national arenas and a specialized degree in European affairs. Both paths can lead to Brussels, and representatives from these backgrounds carry out the same work. However, the way they get there is different, and this impacts how they perceive their jobs and how they work.

The first trajectory is one that can be described as the Europeanization of representatives. These representatives begin their careers at the national (and sometimes the local) level and climb the rungs of the career ladder, first in Europe-oriented positions at the national level and then in Brussels. John's case presented above provides a good example of this process. The same is true of social NGOs, where a position in a Brussels office is seen as an extension of a career that most often begins in a member state. For trade unionists, the move from a national to the European level is

fairly obvious, insofar as the European Trade Union Confederation is the federal structure of national confederations and federations. However, even when no counterpart organization exists at a European level, a move to Europe is still possible. Such is the case of Jean-Paul who, after a long career with the *Ligue de l'enseignement* (Education League) in France, gradually became active in European matters before taking a position in a European NGO of which the League is a member. His position in Brussels represents a Europeanization of his career while still remaining within the area of interest representation and advocacy.

During their time spent in local and national organizations, these representatives accumulate specific resources which allow them to become experts on European affairs. They remain with the organization if it provides them with promotion opportunities or new career prospects. However, if the organization cannot offer sufficient opportunities to recognize and develop this 'European' expertise, the temptation is great (as is the ability) to move to other European organizations. It is nevertheless important to have the required resources to pursue a career in representation in Brussels after a career at the national level. Among these resources, proficiency in several languages, necessarily including English, is essential. However, the important role of English does not mean that English-speaking nations are better represented or that their nationals are advantaged. The size of the member state and its position in European construction play a role as does the implication of national organizations in the constitution and development of European interest groups in a particular sector. For example, in the transportation sector, representatives historically were largely French-speaking (French or Belgians); lately, however this area increasingly involves representatives of the new member states. Conversely, in the much more recent sector of computers and electronics, representatives are mostly English-speaking – Dutch, Irish and British. Language aside, social capital accumulated during international training, and meetings of these organizations also play an important role in Europeanization as do their links with other European groups and institutions. The relationships developed and maintained through these means can add value to national diplomas with relatively low status and prestige in European milieus – with, for the younger generations, an increasing prevalence of study abroad thanks to the internationalization of schools and universities (Lazuech, 1998). Activist organizations in the social sector (trade unions, mutual insurance groups, civic associations.) also can provide social capital for 'career starters,' thus enabling them to get a foothold in the European field. Representatives who move to Brussels following careers as activists or

interest representatives at the national level have career-paths which cause them to be highly attached to the interest they represent and be concerned about the relationships between the basis and the 'top' of the umbrella organization. They are also more likely to favor repertoires of action borrowed from social mobilization, particularly numbers-based activities such as petitions and mobilization ability.

A second path of access to the field is represented by actors who enter directly into the field after their studies, not necessarily in positions of interest representation. It is possible to further distinguish between those who arrive in the field of Eurocracy following a specialization in this field (primarily graduates with degrees in European affairs) and those who regard Europe as one possible option among a range of international positions. The former are more permanent and often remain in Brussels to become interest representatives. The latter are less stable and Brussels represents just one step in their international careers. They can be identified by the type of qualification held and by their international capital. The 'Europeans' view Brussels as a labor market for which they have accumulated specific and adapted skills and academic titles. They are sociologically relatively similar to the Commission officials whom they regularly encounter in working groups, in meetings or at appointments. In a nutshell, they all have the same qualifications and the same expectations of Europe. They have in common, probably, the Brussels tropism: to find a position and stay in Brussels (for example, to accompany a spouse, to continue the experience begun during a master's in European Affairs, to obtain an international position at any cost). In this regard, Eurogroups are good ways of reconciling the two requirements of being based in Brussels and obtaining a position compatible with their specific qualifications favoring expertise in writing, office management and organizational management in a multilingual working environment, not to mention the social and family relationships that these new recruits may already have with members of European institutions, companies or representative offices (Cavaillé, 2005). They have a very technocratic view of Europe, which is reflected in their repertoires of action, prioritizing textual work, sending written contributions and writing research reports. By contrast, 'internationals' – although they also have qualifications obtained abroad with a specialization in international affairs – are less directly focused on the EU even though, for some, their international activities in Europe are difficult to distinguish from their action at a European level (Visier, 2010). However, their job and career prospects extend beyond the scope of the EU, as their profiles are more generalist. Unlike the 'Europeans,' they are more temporary European players.

Conclusion

By studying interest representatives in their professional, personal and social environments, we have shown how interest representation contributes to sustaining the field of Eurocracy. In his seminal study, Ernst Haas (Haas, 1958) pointed out that members of interest groups were converted to the idea of Europe by attending meetings. This socialization in terms of contacts no longer appears to be the dominant mode of Europeanization. Another form of socialization can be seen among those who were born and educated in Brussels in a social and personal environment that is linked to the European careers of their parents or even their grandparents. Their European socialization begins in childhood, where institutional Europe is part of everyday life, is taken as a given and represents a 'natural' place to exercise their future professions. Their socialization and destinies are not unrelated to that of many European civil servants. Given the constant redefinition of the paths of access to European civil service and the place held by interest groups within the governance structures of Europe, interest representation is a career option that is both close and accessible to European actors and Europeanized actors. In this sense, it is clear that both sociologically and in their professional practices, lobbyists are part of the field of Eurocracy and contribute to its structure and institutionalization.

Notes

1. The Commission published its first directory in 1960. It was updated and reissued in 1969 and 1973. It then went through a publishing company for the 1986, 1990 and 1992 editions. The last paper edition was published in 1996. After that, we have the database, CONECCS, 2004, and the register of interest representatives, opened in 2008.
2. The CONECCS Directory (*Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society*) includes only non-profit voluntary organizations. Published online in 2002, this directory was replaced in 2007 by the Register of interest representatives, which is also voluntary, but covers a wider population. https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do?locale=en. The principle of a common directory for the parliament and the Commission was adopted in 2011, and an invitation was sent to the Council of Ministers to participate in this new formula.
3. Gardner (1991) and Greenwood (2002) both deployed an arithmetical approach, highlighting the doubling in the number of groups between 1970 (300) and 1986 (654), but by taking some liberties with the already unreliable sources.
4. For the sake of anonymity, the names have been changed.

8

The Personnel of the European Trade Union Confederation: Specifically European Types of Capital?

Anne-Catherine Wagner

Introduction

In May 2011, at the launch of the 12th congress of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), delegates were greeted by protesters shouting 'ETUC bureaucrats go home.' A union representative commented with dismay, 'It is an unusual experience for us to be on the other side of the protest, to be associated to international financial organizations rather than to the trade union movement.'[1]

Nonetheless, ETUC represents nearly every European trade union at the European level, specifically 85 trade union organizations from 36 European countries and 10 industry-based federations. But the ETUC remains a distinct entity from its affiliated national trade unions. Indeed, unlike national confederations, it did not arise from a grouping of local federations or structures. It was built 'from the top down' through negotiations between trade union leaders and in close connection to the construction of Europe (on the history of the ETUC and the effects of this 'top down' construction, see Gobin, 1997; Martin and Ross, 1999; Hyman, 2005; Hassenteufel and Pernot, 2009).

An examination of the characteristics and practices of trade union agents involved in the field of Eurocracy provides us with a perspective which can shed light on the relationship between European trade unionism and union leadership at the national level. In particular, it can help us to understand the surprising public demonstration, with which we opened this chapter, of hostility by rank-and-file trade unionists to 'ETUC bureaucrats.' In addition, it will allow us to address a series of related questions. Which trade unionists specialize in European issues and what are the resources allowing them to do so? How do the trade unionists who are most involved in European activities act as

go-betweens between the trade union movement of their home country and Europe?

After tackling the difficulties in defining the contours of a population of European trade unionists, we will examine the specific type of capital which is mobilized in the space of European trade unions. This will lead us subsequently to examine the transformations in the patterns of access to this field.

'European union leaders': the core and the concentric circles

How can we establish the morphological contours of a population of European trade unionists distinct from national trade union representatives? Several degrees and forms of European engagement coexist within the ETUC, involving agents with contrasting statuses and properties.

The congress meets every four years and constitutes the supreme authority of the ETUC. Almost a thousand delegates from the various member organizations meet at this congress to vote on the ETUC's main orientations. A number of the regular attendees who meet there have known each other for decades. In addition, a significant number of delegates who do not have a specific knowledge of European issues are sent on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, a majority of the members of the managing committees of ETUC, the executive committee or the steering committee, are not experts in European matters per se. These members are often general secretaries or leaders of member organizations who devote only a small part of their time to European issues. It is within the ETUC secretariat, which expresses the supranational character of the organization, that the most 'European' agents are to be found, in the sense that they represent the ETUC rather than the individual organizations they originally came from. Not all of these agents are trade unionists: most of the members of the secretariat are contractual workers recruited into technical positions. The secretariat, based in the International Trade Union House in Brussels, has seven political secretaries and approximately 50 administrative assistants and employees, to which must be added the staff of the institutes and structures for trade union research and training.

The European trade union staff does not consist solely of persons who reside in Brussels on a more or less permanent basis. A significant share of the work is carried out by working groups, where representatives from various countries prepare the stances of the ETUC. These working groups involve experts with strong experience of European matters as

well as trade union representatives appointed on an ad hoc basis by their organizations for their expertise in a particular area.

Thus, at first glance, the world of trade union agents involved in European matters appears to be a complex web with blurred contours. It includes a mix of elected representatives and technicians, experts on European matters and trade unionists participating occasionally in European meetings. This difficulty in objectifying specifically European positions is partly due to the way the institution presents itself – as an organization representing 'the voice of 60 million workers.' The image of the 'European expert' lacks legitimacy in the field of trade unions, and the interviewees like to highlight instead the uniqueness of a form of trade unionism whose difficult task is to represent the interests of ordinary workers in the plush world of European institutions.

> ETUC is not a superstructure. This is a misconception that needs to be corrected. We work in networks. The ETUC and its loose affiliates, that's a hundred people. But by telling you this, I'm giving you the wrong idea, because participation can be broader. We end up working with very diverse individuals, who come from the affiliated confederations or from the federations, because they specialize in such or such a topic. Our task is precisely not to stay in Brussels, but to reach out to our members. (Interview with a public relations manager of the ETUC)

The ETUC does not involve all trade union members in Europe; far from it. But it is also not a private space reserved to a small number of Brussels-based experts. In order to describe its structure, interviewees use the image of concentric circles around a central core. At the center, in the secretariat in particular, a small group of trade unionists form the backbone of the ETUC; a first circle gathers national leaders who contribute closely to European projects; then other circles further out gather agents who participate less frequently in European meetings, or who have started doing so more recently.

This image fulfils ideological functions in the trade union world and consolidates a consensual representation of European trade unionism. It is not so much political or trade union orientations which determine hierarchies, but rather the distance to the center and to its codes and practices. For example, the newcomers to this world (CGT[2] and the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe) are recognizable by their lack of familiarity with European issues and the 'proper' ways of behaving in European meetings.

The social space may be analyzed through Maurice Halbwachs' interpretation of the principles of the social hierarchical structure as concentric circles fitted together around a central point, 'a warm and lively place, which represents the most intense social life imaginable' (Halbwachs, 1913). In any social configuration, those who possess the highest amounts of 'the most desirable and respected goods' are at the center. The further we go from the center, the more social relations weaken, and the less agents are integrated in the networks of sociability.

This conceptualization allows us to depart from an essentialist or institutional approach of European trade unionism. Indeed, the point is to examine the adequate properties and specific types of capital structuring this field, rather than to attempt to identify a group of union activists who could be clearly defined as European. What then are the 'most respected goods' in the field of European trade unionism? Which resources act as principles of hierarchy in this field?

A European trade union capital

While the presence of trade unions in Brussels remains limited in comparison to that of business lobbies (Michel, 2005), they have managed to achieve recognition within European institutions. Indeed, the treaties specify that 'social partners,' namely European employees' and employers' organizations, should participate in the elaboration of European social policy. The type of trade union activity which results from this allotment of tasks allows us to understand the characteristics of a trade union capital which adapted to the field of Eurocracy.

A form of trade unionism adapted to European institutions

The successful integration of the ETUC into the world of European institutions results in a highly specific mode of organization which is both diplomatic and technocratic. The formalism of European meetings, made unwieldy by the practices of simultaneous translations and the systematic quest for consensus, the absence of in-depth debates, the slow pace of European time frames, or the dependency – both financial and ideological – on the European Commission (Didry and Mias, 2005), are distinctive traits which surprise trade unions who discover this environment for the first time.

In this social microcosm, resources which were constructed in the national trade union context, are of limited value and often even counterproductive. Trade union capital which is mobilized in European institutions is specific in several respects. First of all, it consists of social

capital and a capacity to manage social relations of a particular kind – with trade unionists of course, but also with employers' representatives, high-ranking civil servants and politicians. To know one's interlocutors, and also to be known and respected by those 'at the center,' namely by those occupying the central arenas dedicated to social dialogue at the European level, are critical resources. The intensity and duration of exposition to the central space is another fundamental aspect of the development of specifically European know-how. It takes time to understand the workings of the institutions, the critical issues in European debates, to know the various key actors within the European institutions, and to be recognized as trustworthy in these arenas. The capital of personal relations and the quality of interpersonal relations are essential to the efficient elaboration of policies satisfactory to all parties. In the words of one of these central actors: 'For the time being, about a hundred people meet, who know each other well enough to understand what lies behind the words' (Interview with the president of Eurocadres).

Keeping national context at a distance

Trade unionists have to familiarize themselves with negotiations with foreign colleagues who often have very different notions of what trade unionism means. Beyond the language barrier, they have to learn to 'think European,' and to distance themselves from national categories of analysis. The contacts with representatives coming from other trade union and national backgrounds lead many to relativize the importance of national trade union issues. This seems to be one of the key elements of European trade union properties.

> It is important to realize that for many countries, we are nothing. For a Dane, French trade unionism doesn't exist. What aggravates the Scandinavians or the Germans, what they can't understand, is that five of us turn up, and we speak five times (the CFDT, the CGT, FO, the UNSA, the CFTC[3]). We don't represent much in Europe, so at the very least they would like us to speak with one voice. (Interview with a federal assistant in the chemical-energy federation, CFDT)

The opposition between the center and the periphery can thus be understood as an opposition between a European viewpoint on the one hand, and more national perspectives on the other. For the most European of trade unionists, the long period necessary to acquire specifically European knowledge and skills goes hand in hand with an increasing indifference to issues and divisions in their national spaces

of origin. Thus, the division of unions in France is stigmatized on a regular basis (including by Europeanized French union personnel in Brussels) as being 'archaic,' or as hindering the necessary 'modernization' of trade unionism. More generally, in the trade union field, we come across a rhetoric opposing the national and the international in the same way as the past and future: rigidity and flexibility, particularism and universalism.

> You know, we feel that Brussels is not that far away, but by living there, by working on European affairs, you lose touch with French affairs, including networks, relations. It is very difficult to go back to a strictly national context once you've been in the international context. I think we don't think the same way anymore. There is some sort of incomprehension on both sides. (Interview with a former general secretary of a European federation)

Competing national models

The shapes taken by ETUC trade unionism contribute to the growing autonomy of a trade union elite, characterized by a specific culture. Nonetheless, the relationship with national origins is ambiguous. European trade unionists may have distanced themselves from national categories of analysis and action, but national membership remains a structuring principle. In ETUC meetings, national trade unions occupy different positions in relation to one another. Membership numbers offer an important criterion in defining hierarchies, since this is used to calculate the number of delegates in the congress and in the executive committee. This criterion consecrates the domination of mass trade unions, such as the German Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) or the British Trade Union Congress (TUC), which weigh heavily in union leadership. Among the types of capital that are pertinent, linguistic, relational or political resources accumulated in the home organization vary according to national origin. The 'big' unions are the most present in Brussels, and they make their mark on the mode of organization and the tactical and ideological orientations of European trade unionism.

The German domination is particularly marked in the heavy industry sector: in the European Metalworkers' Federation, the European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers' Federation or the European Transport Workers' Federation, the majority of the political and technical staff is German.[4] This overrepresentation is largely due to the financial resources at the disposal of German trade unions. Another reason for the leading

position of German trade unionism in the ETUC is the symbolic value of a particular model of professional negotiation which is well adjusted to the codes of European social dialogue.

> The Germans have the means. They are very numerous, so they occupy all the positions. They are a point of reference in terms of negotiation. On the 'consultation-information' scale that we established during the seminar in Berlin the other day, they are at the top, at all levels. They are a more powerful driving force than the others. It is a giant in Europe. It is better to be with them than against them. (Interview with the head of European affairs, Chemical and Energy Federation, CFDT)

In the same way, the membership criterion further marginalizes peripheral countries, which are already marginalized by their language, their geographic distance or a more militant definition of trade unionism. In classifications which interviewees proposed spontaneously, Germany was at the center of European trade unionism, while countries such as Greece, Portugal or the Eastern countries embodied the periphery. Their more recent adhesion to the EU, their economic difficulties, the geographic distance and language issues all combine to restrict communication and internal legitimacy. Thus, the hierarchies within trade unionism reproduce those existing between national economies. While European trade unionism claims to be shaped in opposition to national particularisms and selfishness, paradoxically, it may institutionalize a hierarchy between unions or even freeze cultural differences between union models.

The acquisition of resources for European trade unionism

How are European trade union resources constituted and maintained? Generally speaking, international social and institutional spaces are characterized by the social selectivity of their recruitment methods. However, trade unionists, in particular in France or Italy, have traditionally accessed European positions through militant careers. Having first worked on the ground, they have climbed the ladder according to the elective principle governing trade unions. Such career paths are at the basis of their legitimacy in the trade union movement. They often go hand in hand with a working-class origin, which is highlighted in order to emphasizes their social proximity to the workers they represent.

Emilio Gabaglio, general secretary of the ETUC from 1991 to 2003, is presented in his biography as coming from a family of 'ordinary, hard-working people.' His mother started working at the age of 12; his father, a

clock salesman, was a 'discreet man (who) had not been to school much' (Gabaglio, 2003). The trade unionists who represented France in the ETUC secretariat until 2011 had exemplary careers as militants, having worked their way up. Jean Lapeyre, deputy general secretary (and as such 'number two') from 1991 to 2003, was a former glassworker, holder of a vocational certificate and an industrial training certificate. A CFDT trade union activist in Thompson-CSF, he was first appointed shop steward, then secretary of the Works Council, before being elected general secretary of the metalworkers' federation. He was then elected main editor of the CFDT weekly paper and in 1986 was appointed to the ETUC secretariat. His successor, Joël Decaillon, secretary from 2003 to 2011, came from the CGT. He was also promoted by, and into, the trade union movement. A former railway worker, he climbed the trade union ladder rapidly. At the age of 26, he became secretary of the Railway Workers' Union in Soissons and, three years later, secretary of the Railway Workers' Federation. In the French national railways (SNCF), he was secretary of the group committee, deputy secretary of the Central Works Council, president of the Economic Committee, before being appointed to the European Economic and Social Committee in 1989. Then aged 44, he obtained a university degree in European law, while taking intensive courses in English.

Thus, European trade unionism took its shape from specific patterns of internationalization and legitimization. These patterns involve a number of contradictions.

International militant career paths

'European' dispositions often take shape through activities within and through trade union organizations. The capacity to adapt to varied social contexts and to manage interactions with interlocutors whose status and positions differ widely are skills which are progressively integrated as trade union responsibilities succeed each other. An ethos of asceticism and a disposition towards cultural acquisition – characteristics which are frequently associated with a militant culture – facilitate the ability to progressively master even the most austere of European issues.

Furthermore, in order to become integrated into European social spaces, trade union representatives know how to mobilize social resources which are distinct from those provided by a classical, bourgeois education. Sometimes, these resources may have been hastily put together, and dispositions for European trade union activities may have existed before. For example, activists residing in border areas (Hamman, 2005) and migrant workers have a personal experience of living in foreign countries and interacting with other nationalities, which allows

them to connect more easily with foreign trade unionists. Thus, the European trade union movement can also be supported by familiarity with mobility and transnational professional networks which, for example, constitute the collective capital of the transport workers' unions (Hilal, 2007).

Thus, the type of capital, which is simultaneously relational, political and symbolic, and which has been constituted in the workers' internationals, can also be invested profitably in the field of the European trade union movement. The International Federation of Christian Trade Unions and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions are the most frequent contact points.[5] But membership in the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the international connected to the communist movement, can also prove beneficial. Experience of international trade union work, familiarity with international organizations – the WFTU was represented at the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the UN – produces systems of dispositions and capitals which can be converted in the European trade union movement. Thus, the European branch of the CGT includes some former permanent members of the WFTU who returned from Prague when the CGT left this international.

Interviewee Daniel Retureau, for instance, had an exemplary career as an international militant before turning to European affairs. He came from a working-class background, studied accountancy and taught for a few years in a technical school before becoming a full-time representative in the CGT Education federation. At the age of 28, he joined the headquarters of the WFTU in Prague. The headquarters of his organization, the education federation, moved to Berlin, where he stayed for 11 years to work on educational issues in Africa, Latin America and India. He then represented the WFTU at the ILO in Geneva, where he served on the committee on human rights. At the same time he obtained a master's in public law and a master's in European law. Paradoxically, despite the differences between his ideological orientations and those of the ETUC, this interviewee embodies the legitimate properties in this field: an international relational network, fluency in four languages, knowledge of law and an international 'political culture,' for which other interviewees expressed respect.

This type of international competency is original. It was not acquired through academic training, but was shaped by the experiences of immigration, exile or international militant career paths. Militant career paths present themselves in a specific ethos: maintaining proximity with working-class manners, displaying an amused distance; a way of being in this world while keeping one's distance. In the words of Retureau:

'We always have one foot in and one foot out: it's unavoidable. We can't forget where we come from.'

We may, thus, define an international militant capital as being shaped by self-directed learning, by experience through the trade union movement or by the re-conversion to the international context of other forms of family and militant socializations. This type of capital differs from the international capital of other elites in the way it was acquired. It is indeed constituted by skills which were integrated collectively, as opposed to resources presented as individual gifts in the typical stance of heirs.

The devaluation of militant capital

A number of limitations are inherent to such career paths and their efficacy in the field of Eurocracy. Firstly, they are necessarily limited to a small number of trade unionists, who became European following atypical experiences, such as immigration or exile or ascetic personal work. The interviews with these agents often convey the idea that it is difficult to find other 'good militants' who, in addition to being skilled trade unionists, speak foreign languages and are willing to accept and adapt to the constraints of European work.

This militant capital is confronted with increasing competition from academic capital. Qualifications and languages acquired academically provide a more obvious guarantee of one's familiarity with a technical and sophisticated vocabulary which is at the heart of European practices. Trade unions increasingly hire young graduates who are recruited on the basis of their academic titles rather than on the basis of their militant or political credentials. The reduced importance of militant capital in favor of academic capital leads to a situation in which two models of European trade unionists coexist and compete. Those from a militant background tend to be men of working-class origin, aged over 50, more likely to hold technical qualifications and/or to have acquired degrees during the course of their life. The 'experts' are younger, holders of university degrees, from higher social backgrounds and are more likely to be women.

Within the ETUC, the decline of the militant model is visible in the evolution of the patterns of recruitment into the secretariat. The 1991 and 2003 secretariats still had a number of secretaries, including the two mentioned above, whose career paths can be described as militant, although they were already a minority in comparison to university graduates who were recruited directly into the structure from outside the trade union movement, typically in the research division. In the 2011 secretariat there were no longer any secretaries who had worked

their way up the ladder. The career path of the new secretary of the Confederation, Bernadette Segos, differs greatly from that of her French predecessor. A holder of a degree in philosophy, she never worked within a French trade union, and she spent her entire career in international, then European, trade union organizations, as an assistant to the general secretary in the International Textile Workers' Federation, then in the European trade union federation for services and communication. Her career path is very similar to that of the other members of the secretariat. All are university graduates who started their careers as consultants, research assistants or research officers, often outside the trade union movement. The visible feminization of the secretariat of the ETUC is a further reflection of this evolution.[6]

The contradictions of European trade union training

A study of the content of European trade union training organized by the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), the training agency of the ETUC, allows us to objectify a definition of European trade union capital as well as the transformations in its patterns of transmission. The courses are systematically organized in a way that creates an international mix and aims to transfer specific forms of European know-how and to consolidate transnational networks. The ETUI organizes language courses and presentations of the various national systems of worker representation as well as modules in intercultural communication.

The European training for young union leaders course is aimed at 'young trade union officers' likely to be considered for positions at the European level. This is a long course, which spans six months and includes three courses of one week each in three different European cities. The first week introduces European trade union structures as well as the labor movement in the various European countries; there are also sessions focused on how workers are represented in companies, as well as language courses. The second week is in Brussels. It focuses on European institutions. The third week introduces students to the positions of the ETUC; it includes a simulation of a congress, during which trainees submit resolutions. A trainer insists on the qualities in terms of personal conduct which are expected in group work: 'democratic spirit, tolerance, participative vision, capacity to be constructive.' The internal debates concerning this training course are clear indicators of the contradictions inherent in the European trade unionist recruitment process. Who should be trained and groomed for future leadership roles? What should be the relationship between technical competency and the other forms of trade union legitimacy? As a trainer stated:

> Technical skills are not enough. A trade union is not an administration or a company with long-term career plans. There are the election results, these are political choices. Nothing guarantees that our trainees will go on to be appointed for Europe by their organizations.

The recurring question of the age of participants is at the core of this ambiguity. The training courses gather individuals characterized by disparate career paths, which is due to the diverse methods of training and promotion of trade union representatives at the national level. In some countries, young people use this European education as a springboard and go on to find employment in European institutions outside the world of trade unions. Elsewhere, in France for instance, trade union representatives come to European functions only after a long national career. It is not uncommon for French representatives over 50 to take part in the training courses for the 'young.' 25-year-old Hungarians in search of European training, and to participate alongside Italians nearing retirement age. Scandinavian and German trainees are often multilingual university graduates, whereas trade unionists from the Mediterranean countries, who have been promoted within their unions, are older, less likely to hold university degrees and are not fluent in another European language.

The pedagogy used in the training courses is undeniably better suited to the properties of young graduates. The representatives coming from militant backgrounds are puzzled by some of the exercises, which are both playful (role playing, for example) and school-like, and therefore far from their individual, ascetic relationship to knowledge. An illustration of this is the 'European quiz,' a game based on the mechanisms of European decision making, accessible on the official EU website. The trainees are divided up in teams and prepare three short questions and concise answers on one of the themes presented on the website, such as monetary union, enlargement, and the history of the construction of Europe. They are required to set aside political debates, and the questions must lead to one single answer and leave no room for interpretation. This is far removed from the culture of trade union debating. However, replacing a political perspective with a purely technical one is presented explicitly as one of the necessary conditions to access positions of responsibility at the European level.

Older militants are often disconcerted by the new managerial instruments promoted by the institute to analyze trade union organizations, such as PEST and SWOT. PEST (political, economic, social, technological) is a method used by strategy consultants to analyze the external

environment and to evaluate the efficiency of a strategy; and SWOT (strength, weakness, opportunity, threat) analysis was imported from management. These instruments contribute to an increasingly technical and depoliticized perception of trade union choices and options. While union training usually aims at socializing members to militant roles, here it gives way to the forging of experts on Europe centered on the mastery of managerial principles. In this model, the young union leaders differ little from experts operating in any other part of the European field.

The properties of European trade unionists are therefore increasingly similar to those of other 'European professionals': their resources consist of technical knowledge, skills and ways of seeing and doing things which determine integration into the key institutions of Europe. Representatives must mobilize and maintain appropriate social relations, consolidate connections with their foreign counterparts and adopt a European lifestyle and outlook. In other words, they must put national, and explicitly political, categories of analysis at a distance, and avoid being identified with an exclusive trade union membership.

Conclusion

In the case of the trade union movement, there are different pathways to European positions: following a long militant career or a more accelerated career by entering into the ETUC shortly after obtaining a university degree. These two pathways do not necessarily translate into different stances in the European context. They do, however, have a particular significance. In the current trend, the militant acquisition of European competencies is devalued in favor of academic knowledge. This questions the ability of the trade union movement to construct its own autonomous definition of legitimate European competencies according to criteria and models of legitimization specific to the trade union movement. Increasingly, recruitment into the European trade union movement parallels the other models of European excellence.

This question leads us to that of the position of trade unionists in the European institutional field. The devaluation of types of capital which are specific to the labor movement is connected to an increasingly dominated position of trade union representatives in the European institutional and social space. Thus, a weakening of a definition and consecration of European competencies specific to the trade union movement follows the marginalization of trade unionism in this institutional space, while also possibly contributing to the acceleration of this process.

Notes

1. This chapter is based on a survey conducted among members of the ETUC and French trade unionists involved in trade union activities at the European level. Interviews were conducted in two phases. A first set of interviews was conducted between 2001 and 2004. A second set, focusing on the training agency of the ETUC, was conducted in 2009–11. For a more exhaustive presentation of the first phase of the survey, see Wagner (2004, 2005).
2. The French trade union, Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor).
3. The French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT), The General Confederation of Labor (CGT), General Confederation of Labor – Workers' Power (FO), the National Union of Autonomous Trade Unions (UNSA) and the French Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC) are all affiliated with the ETUC.
4. The German domination was already a feature of the first workers' internationals (Dreyfus, 2000).
5. The ETUC was created in 1973 by the European affiliates of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), followed in 1974 by the unions affiliated to the international Christian workers' movement, the World Confederation of Labor, then by the trade unions that left the Communist International. The ETUC and the ICFTU still share the same address in Brussels and have remained very close.
6. Claudia Menne, a German, holds a doctorate in history and started her career as a researcher in the German Institute for Labor Movements; Judith Kirton-Darling, from the United Kingdom, holds a master's degree in European Social Policy Analysis and initially worked for the Quaker Council for European Affairs; Veronica Nilsson, from Sweden, holds a master's in economics and was formerly a research assistant in the Swedish Institute for International Affairs; Patrick Itschert, a Belgian with a degree in economics, worked as a researcher at the 'Fondation Roi Baudouin'; Luca Visentini, comes from the Italian UIL union, where he was appointed as manager of the 'youth' section directly after finishing his studies; Josef Niemiec, from Poland is a graduate in Romanic philology and is closer to the militant pole. He established a *Solidarnosc* branch in a telecommunications company, then was an active unionized schoolteacher.

9

European Business Leaders. A Focus on the Upper Layers of the European Field Power

François-Xavier Dudouet, Eric Grémont, Audrey Pageaut and Antoine Vion

Introduction

In *Euro-Clash*, Neil Fligstein (2008) states that the constitution of a transnational capitalist class in Europe is not manifest, even though recent decades have been marked by the structuring of vast European markets. Following the insights of Hall and Soskice (2001), he stresses that globalized economic activities are compatible with a strong national anchorage with regard to ownership, governance or employment relations. In other words, increased trade and financial, market and economic integration does not automatically translate into social integration. Fligstein's assumptions are all the more important as they break with a long-standing research tradition postulating the formation of a transnational capitalist class (Hymer, 1979) and conceptualize Europeanization as not only a mechanical byproduct of economic relations, but as a more complex social process.

A long-standing problem when using the notion of a capitalist class is the substantialism of the Marxist definition of social classes. As underlined by Pierre Bourdieu (1984), among others, conceiving classes as the simple result of the social relations connected to production, reduces analysis to a one-dimensional and determinist proposition. Bourdieu, without neglecting the importance of production in social relations, promotes a more topological approach which relates the formation of social groups or forces to the position agents hold in various social fields. The notion of the 'field of power' is defined as follows by Bourdieu:

> The field of power is a field of forces structurally determined by the state of the relations of power among forms of power, or different forms of capital. It is also, and inseparably, a field of power struggles

> among the holders of different forms of power, a gaming space in which those agents and institutions, possessing enough specific capital (economic or cultural capital in particular) to be able to occupy the dominant positions within their respective fields, confront each other using strategies aimed at preserving or transforming these relations of power. The forces that can be enlisted in these struggles, and the orientation given to them, be it conservative or subversive, depend on what might be called the 'exchange rate' (or 'conversion rate') [...]. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 264–5)

Applying this theoretical framework, Yves Dezalay (2013) proposed to extensively study the constitution of the European economic field of power. He focuses on lawyers and interest brokers as part of a larger research program. In this chapter, we propose to build on these perspectives and investigate the extent of the Europeanization of a social field of business leaders. Investigating transnational business elites is a long-standing academic tradition. In the first section, we present the various approaches before detailing, in the second section, our conception of the European economic field of power and its topology.

Renewing perspectives on European business elites

In the field of European studies, business elites have mainly been considered from the perspective of the influence of interest groups on the setting of agendas. This focus was notably developed at the beginning of the European Economic Community in order to understand the empowerment of the European Commission and the management of economic activities at the European level (Courty, 2006). These neo-functionalist approaches emphasized 'spill-over' and 'spill-around' effects on processes of regional integration as almost mechanical adjustments among a large range of actors (Haas, 1958; Lindbergh, 1963; Schmitter, 1970). However, as some critical voices have pointed out, neo-functionalism has often limited its focus to formal members and formal integration, and led to a teleological position that dictates how other integration processes should advance by comparing them to the EU integration process. Comparably, the neo-institutionalist stream presented interest groups as direct motors of European integration (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998). These approaches have been challenged by newer perspectives, such as the so-called cognitive approaches of the processes of Europeanization (Palier and Surel, 2007), which have paid greater attention to sequencing

such processes and combining the observation of top-down, bottom-up and transnational dynamics.

However sophisticated this debate has been, it misses some essential points. Our main point is that, as some early studies noted (Meynaud and Sidjanski, 1967b), this tradition of European studies does not focus on the types of arrangements that firms and their executives elaborate at the margins of institutions – and which 'make Europe' as well. In other words, studying the formal institutions which 'represent' business interests is too narrow a scope. Informal forms of socialization and arrangements made outside the institutional forms of lobbying may, indeed, be at the heart of the expression of Europeanized collective action, as Dezalay has argued (2013).

The transnationalization of European business elites

The emergence of a transnational business elite in Europe is generally considered as a proven social fact, which has been mainly assessed through the measurement of board interlocks[1] (Fennema, 1982; Carroll and Fennema, 2002; Carroll and Carson, 2003; Staples, 2006; Caroll, 2010), or the activism of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) in their interactions with European institutions (Cowles, 1995; Van Apeldoorn, 2000; Balanya et al., 2005; Pageaut, 2010).

Even though the business elites who compose this specific group can be analyzed as sharing views (Sklair, 2001), it is far less evident that they have common practices and goals (Morgan, 2001; Wagner, 2007). Furthermore, nothing proves that business elites are the main producers of ideology; Dezalay and Garth (2002) have demonstrated that agents who may be considered as subaltern can play a major role in the construction and circulation of political models. Furthermore, sharing a neo-liberal vision does not, by far, mean that economic patriotism has disappeared (Gaxie and Hubé, 2010). Franco-German dissensions within the governance of EADS, the recent difficulties of its merging with BAE systems, or the interrupted cooperation between Areva and Siemens in the nuclear industry, show that national considerations are still vivid. The repatriation of Dutch assets in the context of the bankruptcy of Fortis in 2008 is another good example of the resistance of even the most liberal and open countries towards the consequences of deregulated globalization.

In addition, the patterns of social reproduction of business elites remain national (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1996; Hartman, 2005; Massol et al., 2010; Dudouet and Joly, 2010). Beyond the common criteria of economic capital and professional curricula, specificities of

national social stratification, educational backgrounds and symbolic forms of prestige remain essential. Moreover, the weight of intra-firm careers differs from one country to another (Joly, 1996). Nationalities also matter in terms of domination in top management teams, even if the proportion of foreign managers has tended to increase (Staples, 2006; Dudouet and Joly, 2010; Massol et al., 2010; Dudouet et al., 2012).

These elements show that it is premature to talk about a common framework of elite social reproduction in Europe. Similar resources (holding economic capital, advancing one's career in a firm) do not suffice to constitute a group, as long as such resources coexist more than interpenetrate between countries. Analyzing the dynamics of a European business milieu thus requires the identification of the relationships between managers and the resources they manage.

The field of European business elites

Fligstein (2008), as far as he focuses on business elites, grounds his analysis on the creation of the Common Market and, more generally, on the objectives of the Rome Treaty. He develops a very extensive definition of what a field is, as his work is based on a mix of the neo-institutionalist conception of multi-organizational fields, on game theory, and on Bourdieu's approach to the field of power. This conception leads Fligstein to define a field as an arena of interactions between social organizations (political institutions, firms, NGOs and so on) which share common representations on the nature and the goal of the field. Specific rules govern social interactions and the structure of power in the field. Social, political and economic fields emerge from routinized interactions between actors (individuals or organizations). According to Fligstein, national economic fields polarized around the state and principally organized by national firms have gradually disappeared as a vast European market was becoming structured. Firms committed to European competition now agree to play under supranational rules and define their activities and their ambitions on the European scale. Fligstein's scope is the functioning of the economic field viewed from an institutionalist perspective of macroeconomic dynamics, including attention to property rights, governance structures, exchange rules and concepts of control. For him, the integration of markets can be compatible with national frameworks of governance, such as models of corporate governance or corporate control. He considers the 'Europeanization' of big firms mainly from this institutional perspective, with a special focus on joint ventures, which are the most numerous in Europe, but he does not fully give credit to the existence of a European capitalist class.

This point is relevant, but interlocking directorate studies have nonetheless provided useful empirical data on the emergence of a European business community (Nollert, 2005; Heemskerk, 2011; Dudouet et al., 2012). However, as such studies do not subsume the whole structure of the European field of power, we will refer in this study to the economic upper layers. Following Useem (1984), it seems conceivable to define the most central elite within corporate networks as a particularly powerful and structuring group. In the European context, such a group would be structured by a core of transnational relations that would interpenetrate national business communities and more or less contribute to their transformation.

In order to theorize the European economic field of power, four types of resources can be taken into account: relational capital, financial capital, symbolic capital and political capital. These resources are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.

(1) Relational capital can be understood as a portfolio of social ties an actor maintains with others. Measured by the degree of centrality of business leaders,[2] this type of capital helps provide a first topography of European business milieus.

(2) By financial capital, we mainly mean the effective control of financial flows, that is the ability to harness and orient them. Owning a firm's capital is part of this definition, but this is not the whole picture: managing companies without owning them de facto confers strong financial capital, insofar as managers are able to allocate huge amounts of economic capital (dividends, investment choices, levels of revenues). Yet, the distribution of this kind of capital is highly unequal: the size of the firm matters, but the type of business does as well: financial companies control the largest share of financial capital, primarily because they harness public savings, but also because banks control the access to money in general (credit, cash flow, stock markets) (Hilferding, [1910] 1981; Schumpeter, 2005).

(3) Symbolic capital refers to the set of properties which ensure social positions and status by rendering them visible and recognizable. This, for example, is measured by proxy through co-optation onto a board or a top management team, as well as into select clubs such as the ERT, the Bilderberg or the Trilatérale.[3] Such social recognition precedes formal acts like a nomination. It is, as Merton (1968) showed, the precondition of being considered a suitable candidate for a specific condition. Conversely, as Bourdieu remarked, the magic

of rites of enthronement confers new status (director, chair, and so forth) and symbolically integrates the holder of a position into an exclusive group.

(4) Finally, maintaining regular relations with political institutions and authorities allows for the accumulation of political capital. Beyond crucial but largely invisible informal contacts, measuring and comparing political capital can be achieved in three ways: by observing how and when political authorities mandate emblematic managers for writing official reports or to sit on special committees; by comparing professional trajectories and paying attention to the porosity between the high civil service and top management positions; and by identifying the former politicians or top civil servants who are members of company boards and committees. Accessing all these channels favors cumulative processes of strengthening political capital.

Considering the European context, it is worth assessing how far transnational relations contribute to producing such kinds of capitals as specifically European ones or not. By specifically European, we refer to any kind of capital related to values, negotiations and institutions within the European space. A portfolio of ties with European peers makes relational capital specifically European. Relations developed with European institutions make political capital specifically European as well, which is distinct from national political capital. Regarding symbolic capital, belonging to the ERT provides a distinctive and exclusive status and the opportunity to present oneself as a European business leader. In a nutshell, European ties shape specific resources, which reveal a higher level of social integration, according to Norbert Elias's conceptions of integration (Elias, 1990). It must be pointed out that the forms of capital constructed at the European level are not, in essence, very different from capitals which are nationally constructed. Indeed, most resources that are exchanged at a transnational level are most often national in origin but are converted to European capital through participation and interaction in European arenas. It would therefore make little sense to oppose national and European capitals by their origin: the latter do not replace national capitals but emerge as a continuation of them and can increase the resources of their holders in European arenas, as international resources can be advantageous in national arenas. Assessing how far business elites who hold the strongest European capitals also dominate national fields is an inescapable question – the upper layer of the European economic field does not come out of nowhere.

The existence of European political capitals thereby raises the question of the embedding of the European economic field in a broader European field of power. Nationally, the category of business elites only makes sense if it is related to a specific political and economic framework (social and educational background, relations to political authorities, market rules, employment relations). The business elite occupies the upper regions of the economic field, which is itself a particular region of the field of power (Bourdieu, 1996). By extension, getting a better idea of the shape and morphology of this part of the European field of power is an exciting challenge. This allows us to avoid considering the European business elites as a strictly separate category, and invites us to specify and locate this group within a social space made of relations with other actors who 'make Europe' (Guiraudon, 2000; Georgakakis, 2002a).

In the remainder of the chapter we will seek to empirically measure the constitutive relations of this upper layer of the European economic field on the basis of five central countries of the eurozone, namely: Germany, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Italy. We will try to appraise the European resources which are produced and negotiated by this milieu, and to consider, then, how they fit into the European field of power.

Methodology

Our use of the notion of 'business leaders' is an adaptation of the French category of *grands patrons*. This category in France remains fuzzy, as it includes representatives of business organizations, heirs of industrial dynasties, self-made men and non-owner managers (Dudouet and Grémont, 2007). The variety of legal forms of firms and the effective distribution of power within each kind of firm invites us to pay attention to institutions which construct homogenous categories out of such diversity. In the following study, we consider as business leaders those who chair boards or act as chief executive officers (CEO) of the largest European public limited companies.[4] We define the major European public limited companies as those listed on the main stock exchange indices of European countries. For the present study, we will include only the indices of five of the six original countries of the EEC, all belonging to the eurozone. The indices are the AEX 25 (Netherlands), the BEL 25 (Belgium), the CAC 40 (France), the DAX 30 (Germany) and the MIB 40 (Italy). As a result, 148 companies are taken into account: 23 for the AEX, 18 for the BEL, 37 for the CAC, 30 for the DAX and 40 for the MIB.[5] This produces a final panel of 262 business leaders. Data

is based on a systematic census of boards and committees of European companies taken in December 2006. We will also include the members of the ERT, who correspond, for the most part, to our definition of business leaders.

The empirical data comes from annual reports of the companies, business and financial newspapers, biographical notes (constructed from professional or media sources as well as biographic dictionaries like the *Who's Who*) and interviews with managers, especially members of the ERT and some of their assistants.

After a structural analysis of this upper layer of the European economic field, we will focus on specific organizational and personal profiles – financial cathedrals, ERT membership and activism, political and economic intertwining. This will allow us to specify and describe the kinds of capitals produced and exchanged at the European level.

Structural analysis

As a point of departure, we will investigate the relational capital of business leaders from the point of view of the ties they maintain with one another. This is a way to ascertain whether or not this relatively small group really represents a coherent, if not cohesive, milieu.

Graph 1 shows the inter-corporate ties structured by business leaders on 31 December 2006. Of the 148 companies which form the corpus, 6 are isolated dyads and 31 are not connected with another (1 for the CAC, 3 for the DAX, 11 for the MIB, 7 for the AEX and 9 for the BEL). The majority of companies (111) are linked into one overarching network, which indicates the existence of a social space. This is all the more significant as this network retains only the relations maintained by chairmen and CEOs, or a maximum of two persons in each company. The graph shows that these agents regularly meet one another and constitute a specific professional group.

The graph shows that transnational linkages, although they may appear highly integrated at first glance, are not as intense as one could have expected. Only a minority of ties are transnational (162 as opposed to 636 domestic links) and, conversely, the vast majority of relations remain national within each stock exchange index. Table 9.1 shows that relations outside of the national stock exchanges are always a minority, ranging from 13 percent for German companies to 37 percent in the Belgian case, where the vast majority are Franco-Belgian. This is directly related to the integration of Walloonian capitalism with French capitalism over the past three decades and which symbolically ended with

Figure 9.1 Corporate networks of the companies listed in the five main stock exchange indices of the eurozone, December 31, 2006 (valued)

*Notes*The size of the nodes indicates the degree centrality of the firms. Light grey: CAC 40 (France); black: DAX 30 (Germany), medium grey: AEX (The Netherlands); white: MIB 40 (Italy), dark grey: BEL 20 (Belgium)

Table 9.1 Distribution of the links through stock exchange indices

Index	CAC 40	DAX 30	MIB 40	AEX 25	BEL 20	Domestic links (%)	Transnational links (%)
CAC 40	204	26	13	13	14	76	24
DAX 30	26	248	11	1	0	87	13
MIB 40	13	11	108	2	1	80	20
AEX 25	13	1	2	50	0	76	24
BEL 20	14	0	1		26	63	37

Table 9.2 Density of the inter-corporate network, December 31, 2006 (binary)

Index	Density
AEX 25	0.09
BEL 20	0.07
CAC 40	0.13
DAX 30	0.22
MIB 40	0.06
Global	0.03

the merger of Fortis and BNP-Paribas in 2009 (Dudouet et al., 2012). Transnational relations are not evenly distributed among countries. CAC companies concentrate 41 percent of all transnational links in the sample, against 23 percent for DAX companies, 17 percent for the MIB, 10 percent for the AEX and 9 percent for the BEL. Companies affiliated with the non-French indices systematically maintain a large share of their extra stock exchange links with the CAC firms. Among other counter-intuitive results, the complete absence of Belgian–Dutch links is remarkable. The social space formed at the upper layer of the European economic field is thus unevenly Europeanized and polarized around French companies.

When comparing domestic networks to the whole European one, the latter shows a very weak density[6] (0.03), while national scores are higher (Table 9.2). Here, again, the heterogeneity of domestic configurations is striking. As far as density scores allow the measurement of social cohesion, this is not highly developed at the European level, and highly differentiated from one country to another (from 0.06 for Italy to 0.22 for Germany).

A loose European business community is observable. It is mainly anchored in domestic business communities and connected by a few

Table 9.3 Distribution of relational capital from its proximity toward transnational actors

	Main network					Isolates		Total
	1st circle	**2nd circle**	**3rd circle**	**4th circle**	**5th circle**	**Isolate networks**	**Full isolates**	
Individuals	25[a]	50	80	33	5	62	7	262
Domestic relational capital	178	308	448	87	9	78	0	1108
Domestic relational capital (average)	7.12	6.16	5.60	2.64	1.80	1.26	0.00	4.23
European relational capital	131	79	0	0	0	4	0	214
European relational capital (average)	5.24	1.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.82

Notes: [a]The 26th transnational interlocker belongs to an isolate triad.
1st circle: Business leaders sitting on boards of companies from different indices
2nd circle: Business leaders sitting on boards where people from the 1st circle sit, while not belonging to the latters' index of origin.
3rd circle: Business leaders sitting on boards where people from the 1st and 2nd circle sit, while belonging to the same index of origin.
4th circle: Business leaders sitting on boards where people from the third circle sit, while not belonging to the 1st and 2nd circles.
5th circle: Business leaders sitting on boards where people from the fourth circle sit, while not belonging to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd circles.
Isolates: Business leaders sitting on boards which are not connected to the main network.

individuals who are in a position to establish weak ties, as Granovetter (1973) defines them. Only 26 agents out of 262 manage transnational links. This extreme concentration is a clue to the very strategic position of this core of individuals and of the fragility of the European configuration. Indeed, if only a few of these business leaders were to cease to exercise some functions abroad, the whole structure would be profoundly modified. For example, Gerhard Cromme (chairman of ThyssenKrupp) abandoned four positions between 2006 and 2007, which 'destroyed' no fewer than 12 transnational links.

Yet, these transnational interlockers do not represent on their own the whole reality of transnational relational capital. To assess it more accurately, one should also take into account business leaders who meet

foreign peers[7] in boards affiliated to their own stock exchange indexes. For example, Claude Bébéar (AXA), by sitting in BNP-Paribas's board, is in relation with Gerhard Cromme (ThyssenKrupp). These 'secondary' transnational links also contribute to building European relational capital, which is distinct from strictly domestic relational capital. Regarding the business leaders' network, 193 of them are part of the same component while 62 form separate structures of links (principally dyads within a same company) and 7 are fully isolated. It is thus possible to compare groups within the main network on the basis of their proximity to transnational actors and assess the distribution of relational capital from this viewpoint.

Business leaders with a European relational capital number 75 out of 193 in the main network, and 78 out of 262 in the full network. People sitting on boards of companies affiliated with two different stock exchange indices are logically the ones who have the highest European relational capital, but they are at the same time the business leaders with the most domestic capital as well. There is therefore a high correlation between European and domestic relational capital. Relationally speaking, the upper layer of the European economic field can be characterized as a system of concentric circles, with a limited core network strongly connected to domestic fields, thereby allowing a majority of business leaders to be linked to Europeanized peers. This means that the process of accumulation of European relational capital is less a matter of bypassing strategies pursued by leaders dominated in their national spaces than a cumulative process leading to a 'virtuous circle' of (concentric) social integration. This dynamic of concentration was already visible through the formation of a wide range of M&A operations producing industrial and financial giants. The fact that it is replicated into a social configuration reveals the gradual emergence of a European field of economic power. The European layer of business leaders corresponds to a new level of interdependency (Elias, 1993) in which economic concentrations favor tendentiously the formation of a monopolistic elite.

Financial cathedrals

Exploring the contours of financial cathedrals is a good way to appraise the interweaving of relational and economic capital in the eurozone. Financial cathedrals are socio-capitalistic business groups embodied in complex mazes of subsidiaries and crossed ownerships built around a keystone holding company. Understanding such kinds of structures requires taking into account social, industrial and capitalistic criteria. Time also matters, as these business groups are more sophisticated than the simple

giant joint ventures which can be quickly generated by standard law processes. Financial cathedrals are produced by social relations – such as family ties – and intense capitalistic relations, sometimes maintained over several generations: we here get back to the original sense of the old *affectio societatis*. In this sub-section, we focus on the two major financial cathedrals in the eurozone, Pargesa and Mediobanca, before evoking Banca Leonardo which can be seen as their common progeny.

Pargesa

Pargesa is the most spectacular illustration of the existence of socio-financial links between Belgium and France functioning as a driving force behind the integration of the jewels of the Belgian economy within French capitalism between the 1980s and the 2000s (Société générale de Belgique, PetroFina, Electrabel). The constitution of regular relations through generations (Moussa, François-Poncet, Lévy-Lang in Paribas, Frère and Desmarais families) preceded the merging of companies. Belgian and the French business leaders got closer through Pargesa long before the merging of Belgian assets by Suez, Total or BNP-Paribas. Such operations may even be seen as the fruits of sustained sociability throughout decades (Dudouet and Grémont, 2010). The Pargesa cathedral now looks like a cascade of holdings managing the interests of three parent companies: BNP-Paribas (France), Frère-Bourgeois (Belgium) and the Power Corporation of Canada (Canada), which derive from the keystone, Pargesa Holding (Switzerland) (see Figure 9.1). This central status of Pargesa is indicated by the confluence of the three firms' shareholdings in its capital, and by the composition of the board, which is the only one that groups the leaders (Albert Frère, Paul Desmarais, Michel Pébereau) of the three parent companies.

Pargesa is undoubtedly transnational: the origin of its capital (French, Belgian, Canadian) and the nationalities of its leaders confirm this. But being transnational does not mean being European. De facto, it looks risky to confer such a property to the whole set of companies controlled by this business group. Suez manages a lot of activities in France and Belgium and outside Europe, but manages few activities in the rest of the eurozone. Total is even more internationalized but never puts forward a European strategy per se.

As a result, Pargesa strictly corresponds to a genuine pattern of transnational capitalism with a European core network. Making French and Belgian capitalisms converge through M&A processes has not been an exclusive and unfriendly dynamic: the durable and decisive role of the Frère family indicates that the Belgians have durably obtained



Figure 9.2 Pargesa, December 31, 2008

substantial rewards. Moreover, Pargesa business leaders still belong to well-identified national configurations. For example, the French leaders come from what Bourdieu (1996) called the *Noblesse d'Etat* (graduating from *Grandes Écoles* such as Polytechnique or the Ecole nationale d'administration and having experience in the cabinets of ministers at early stages in their career). Transnational cooperation may therefore combine with the persistence of national logics, even if exceptions, like the Mediobanca–Generali axis, are observable.

The Mediobanca–Generali axis

Mediobanca is historically the pivotal investment bank of Italian capitalism. Contrarily to the Lazard Bank, in which associated managers are the sole owners, Mediobanca's capital is widely open to the leading

firms of Italian capitalism, which is a remarkable specificity in Europe. The board of directors of the bank welcomes the most prestigious names of Italian finance and industry. The confluence of relational and economic capitals is rarely so clearly and openly exhibited. The effective control of the bank is ensured by a sophisticated set of agreements between the dominant shareholders. In other words, a consequent economic capital is required to be a player, but this only impacts the governance of the company if it is incorporated into the legal structure of shareholders' agreements: integration must be validated by the members of the 'club.' This institution today is the main shareholder of Generali, the most important Italian asset manager whose decisions impact the share value of all listed Italian companies. Controlling the capital of Mediobanca is, subsequently, highly strategic. Everyone who counts in Italy is there: the Berlusconi families via Fininvest, the Pesantis (cement), the Benettons (clothes and highways), the Ligrestis (insurance), the Tassaras (metallurgy), the Unicredit bank, but also French financial actors like Groupama or Vincent Bolloré. The Agnelli family has long been tightly connected to Mediobanca, especially after the strategic alliance between Enrico Cuccia and Giovanni Agnelli, seeking to slow down Carlo De Benedetti's ascension in the 1980s. But this alliance broke down, and the Agnelli clan took some distance from Mediobanca in the 2000s, before Cuccia and Agnelli died.

The specificity of the Mediobanca–Generali axis is the very atypical position of foreigners in it. French business leaders, such as Bolloré or Jean Azéma, are part of the board (Groupama is present in the capital of Mediobanca), but above all Generali was, until 2010, chaired by a French citizen, Antoine Bernheim, whose relational capital in Italy was as great as those of the major Italian financial tycoons. The position of Antoine Bernheim had no equivalent in the European economic field. Indeed, if some business leaders managed to maintain their positions in foreign companies, very few of them have managed to chair a foreign financial group while keeping a foothold in the financial core of their country of origin. Until his death in June 2012, Bernheim also remained a shareholder and a member of the supervisory board of Eurazeo, the holding of the David-Weil family, founder of the Lazard Bank.

Son of a wealthy family, Bernheim was born in Paris in 1924. In the resistance movement during World War II, he managed to develop the family business after the war, until he was discovered by André Meyer, the chairman of Lazard. In 1967, Bernheim integrated the bank by holding

8 percent of its capital and committed it to investment banking. He thus contributed, as a corporate banker, to financing the expansion of business empires like those of Bernard Arnault or Vincent Bolloré. Above all, he inherited the ties made by André Meyer with Enrico Cuccia, and subsequently with the Agnelli family. However, Cuccia, in 1999, led the coalition that forced him to resign from the chair of Generali, which he had occupied since 1995. After Cuccia's death (2000), Vincent Bolloré's participation in Mediobanca's capital supported Bernheim's return as Generali's chairman from 2002 to 2010.

Though exceptional, this trajectory is not due only to the personal merits of the individual. Reaching the top of Italian capitalism would simply not have been possible without the investments of Lazard at the time Cuccia and Meyer had their 'daily calls' (Orange, 2006). Bernheim inherited and built on a relational and economic capital accumulated through at least half a century. In 2010, aged 85, he was again pushed out of Generali's chair and replaced by Cesare Geronzi, but it would be hasty to assume there was a full decline of transalpine financial ties, as Bolloré is still a shareholder of Mediobanca and vice chairman of Generali.

Banca Leonardo, a tiny and recently founded bank,[8] illustrates the ongoing Europeanization of finance that builds upon this transalpine experience. Among its shareholders are: the Compagnie Nationale à Portefeuille, managed by Albert Frère (Pargesa); Eurazeo, the holding of the David-Weill family (ex-Lazard); the Ifil, which was the holding of the Agnelli family; Allianz, the German insurance group; Italmobiliare, the holding of the Pesenti family (Italcementi); the Benettons via their holding Edizione; the Bellos, a family connected to Spanish finance via Torréal. France, Italy, Germany, Belgium and, indirectly, Spain, are thus the arena of this new bank. Enrico Cuccia's motto reaches its full relevance: 'Shares? Don't tally them up, weigh them.' That is to say that economic capital has to be measured by the yardstick of relational capital. In this case, the Agnellis and the David-Weills have maintained relations over several generations. The founders of the Banca Leonardo thus share common values such as tradition, money and a sense of family solidarity. Banco Leonardo may materialize the rapprochement of the two main European financial cathedrals, Pargesa and Mediobanca. From a social point of view, the bank shows an original attempt at socio-capitalistic integration in Europe. Though national tropisms remain, the way financial cathedrals are constructed indicates that transnational structures 'naturally' emerge when business relations have been tied for decades and when the main players share common values.

European business leaders and EU institutions

One of the most well known forms of institutionalization of ties within the European business community and European institutions is undoubtedly the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), which was founded at the beginning of the 1980s by Pehr Gyllenhammar (Volvo). From its inception, it was strongly supported by the European Commission, and especially by Etienne Davignon, commissioner in charge of industry. Founders intended to alert governments on the situation of the European economy, and relaunch the European construction.

The ERT as a club

This club has always sought to broaden and deepen the EU Single Market, and has more recently focused on European competitiveness and growth. The strength of the ERT lies in the 45 to 50 business leaders of big European industries from 18 European countries.[9] This organization, self-presented and perceived as exceptional,[10] recruits its members on the bases of self-commitment, co-optation and a *numerus clausus*.

The ERT is generally considered as the main platform of European business elite. Its long-standing activity has been seen to announce the constitution of a transnational capitalist class (Van Apeldoorn, 2000) or at least an inner circle (Nollert, 2005). However, the homogeneity of the group is not as obvious as is generally presumed. The biographies of current members[11] reveal that their common characteristics are not so numerous: gender,[12] age (all are between 45 and 65), and a dominant situation within their firm.; 28 members are managers of companies which are part of the Forbes 200 top companies (according to the 2007 *Forbes Global 2000*). Others manage lower-ranked companies, especially in Greece, Turkey and Portugal. Among German, French and Italian members, all head multinational companies listed on their main national stock exchange indices. However, the existence of a unique model of European top executives is not evident. Beyond regularities, the diversity of its membership transpires through several factors: school curricula, having worked in or managed a firm in another country, holding key positions in international or foreign organizations. As a result, international capitals are quite unevenly distributed among the members of the ERT. As more than a third of them have a typical national career, the internationalization of professional trajectories is not a prerequisite to accessing this transnational milieu. Moreover, even though most of its members have held key positions in several domains (such as employers' organizations, cultural institutions, universities), not all positions have

the same value. Actually, only a few of these business leaders have a very remarkable social capital in terms of quality, volume and diversity (Bertrand Collomb, Jorma Ollila, Peter Sutherland, Louis Schweitzer, Thomas Leysen, Hans Wijers, among others). Regarding political capital, only a quarter of the ERT members have previously held positions in national or international institutions, whether in ministers' cabinets or in executive settings (such as the European Commission or the IMF).

Three main profiles can be highlighted from this diversity of trajectories. The first profile: 'heirs,' which concerns five members (for example Rodolfo De Benedetti Cir/Cofide and John Elkann, the heir to the Agnelli family, Fiat). The second profile: 'hybrid trajectories' – a quarter of the members have successively held positions in political institutions and firms (for example, Louis Schweitzer or Peter Sutherland). Last, a majority of the members have had careers within one firm only, some them being national managers, the others corresponding to the profile of 'international managers' (Wagner, 2007).

These profiles show that the upper layer of the European economic field is emerging and is not constituted out of persons commanding a priori a great deal of European capital. A better understanding of this process is provided by looking closely at the management of the ERT. If the ERT is generally presented as a powerful European interest group (Cowles, 1995; Balanya et al., 2005), its functioning as a club gives it a particular organizational form. This ensures the closure of the group: the 2008 version of the internal chart of the ERT shows a *numerus clausus* of 50 members. This means that being a top executive is not in itself sufficient for membership; what matters is to be known and recognized as holding relational, economic and symbolic capitals that count in national or international fields. Recruitment is managed by the steering committee – nine elected members who are also the most active members of the ERT – and propositions must be accepted in one of the bi-annual plenary sessions. The list of potential candidates is established on the basis of respectability, reputation and political capacity. In addition, the company managed must be European. It is generally a giant of European industry, but exceptions can be made if the profile of the top executive matches with the other main criteria. The European criterion is not negotiable: no executive of an American firm can be part of the club. It is the nationality of the firm which is key, so non-European personalities can be recruited if they manage a European firm. For example, David Brennan was co-opted in 2007. Although American, he had been the CEO of Astra Zeneca, a big British pharmaceutical firm. One can note that the non-executive chair of Astra Zeneca is Louis Schweitzer, who

had chaired Renault until 2009 and has been a member of the ERT since 1995.

Beyond social diversity, this functioning as a club actually ensures social cohesion:

> Chairmen of big companies do tend to see themselves as a group apart. […] Certainly they enjoyed the club aspect. Where else could they meet leaders from other industries and other countries in such a congenial atmosphere? […] There was ample opportunity for informal and private conversations in the wings […]. (Keith Richardson, former general secretary, 2009)

As a club, the ERT is a remarkable vector of accumulation of transnational resources. Firstly, it is a locus of European sociability among the most highly ranked business leaders. This has indeed been one of its main purposes since the outset. During the plenary sessions of the ERT, which are the only moments when all members meet, part of the schedule is designed to foster conviviality, with the systematic planning of the social program. It is pure leisure time, with such activities as visiting a museum where wives are welcome. This is generally followed by an invtitation-only dinner.

> Yes, it is knowing each other, too. We have made a club where everybody knows everybody. So if we need something, we know whom to call, we know him personally. We had a program jointly with his wife, we have done things together during the meetings. So there is an aspect of personal affinities through joining the club. (Interview with a current ERT member)

Nevertheless, the ERT does not consist in managing business sociability as its ultimate purpose. The influence of the club on European political agendas is directly related to the political discourse it develops. Speaking for European business leaders, the organization defines priorities and methods for Europe without systematically involving itself in the writing of EU legislation. ERT members thus prefer personal contacts with high level authorities managing national governments, EU institutions (Commission, ECB) or international organizations (IMF, World Bank). These meetings are reciprocated through invitations to take part in the plenary sessions of the club. For example, this was proposed from the start, through the invitation of Etienne Davignon, the commissioner in charge of industry, and illustrated by

his central position on a photo taken during a Paris meeting in 1983. The proximity with European institutions is also exemplified by the co-opting of former commissioners such as François-Xavier Ortoli or Peter Sutherland when they accessed top positions in European companies. Belonging to the ERT provides opportunities to increase European political capital. With respect to symbolic capital, the selection process managed by the steering committee of the ERT consecrates the happy few as 'European business leaders.' The ERT group benefits from the aggregated properties of its members to present itself as European, and its members acquire a specific form of credit which contributes to reproducing their identities as business leaders and signaling their European status.

Toward a European field of power?

As indicated by the ERT case, the social space of European top executives is not strictly separated from other spaces, especially from European institutions. Multipositioned trajectories like those of Etienne Davignon or Peter Sutherland invite us to more deeply explore the interpenetration of the economic and political fields in the EU, and especially the mobility of some actors between them.

We can exemplify this by selecting 15 multipositioned trajectories presented in Table 9.4. The key categories of these trajectories have been classified as follows: (a) politico-administrative positions held at the national level; (b) functions in European institutions; (c) positions held in big companies; and (d) a category named 'Others' which groups functions in important organizations (ERT/IMF/WTO) or in universities.

(a) The national positions have been divided into three categories: parliamentary mandates, experience in a ministerial cabinet and other functions such as party leader or high civil service. (b) European functions were also divided into mandates in the European Parliament, and experience as a commissioner or a member of a Commissioner's staff. (c) Positions held in big companies were divided into mandates in boards and executive functions. (c) 'Others' corresponds to a set of secondary positions, for example, in universities and international organizations.

The trajectory of Etienne Davignon is emblematic. Davignon is a Belgian, born in Budapest in 1932. After a PhD in law, in 1959 he entered the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he entered the cabinet in 1961. He then headed the staff between 1964 to 1969 under Paul Henry Spaak and Pierre Harmel. In 1969, he was named general director of the ministry, before becoming, in 1981, vice chairman of the European Commission for Industry, Energy and Research. In 1985, he

Table 9.4 Individual trajectories

Actor	Birth year	Nationality	Nation-State			Europe			Big companies		Others		
			Parliament	Minister's staff	Other functions	European Parliament	Commission/ EBRD	Other functions	Mandates in boards	Executive functions	WTO /IMF	Univ.	ERT
Sutherland	1946	Irish			X		X		X	X	X	X	X
Van Miert	1942	Belgian	X			X	X	X	X			X	
Lamy	1947	French		X	X		X	X		X	X	X	
Davignon	1932	Belgian		X	X		X		X	X			X
Cox	1952	Irish	X			X			X			X	
Silguy	1948	French		X	X		X	X	X	X			
Spinetta	1943	French		X	X			X	X	X			
Bolkestein	1933	Dutch	X	Minister			X		X			X	
Larosière	1929	French		X	X		EBRD		X		X		
Secchi	1944	Italian	X			X			X			X	
Winnacker	1941	German			X			X	X			X	
Peijs	1944	Dutch		Minister	X	X			X				
Van der Burg	1952	Dutch			X	X			X				
Brittan	1939	British	X	Minister			X		X				

All actors identified have sat on the board of a European company. This is due to our starting point, which was precisely the relational capital of top executives. Another significant observation is the systematic participation in the political field (national or European) at the highest positions (parliament, cabinet staff, EU Commission). This indicates a real porosity between the two fields.

became member of the board of the Société Générale de Belgique (SGB), one of the two control towers of Belgian capitalism. This provided him the opportunity to be admitted as a member of the ERT, which he had strongly supported as European commissioner. A member of the executive committee of the SGB in 1988, he was a central actor of the saga of the missed merger of the SGB with the Carlo de Benedetti holding, and one of the drivers of the improbable coalition of Belgian, French and Italian capitalisms. The Compagnie Financière de Suez, chosen as the white knight, was supported by Michel David-Weill, chairman of Lazard, by Enrico Cuccia (Mediobanca) and Giovanni Agnelli (Fiat). The merging of the SGB with the Compagnie Financière de Suez led to one of the biggest industrial and financial integration processes in Europe, which accelerated the Franco-Belgian rapprochement. Davignon then became the chairman of the SGB from 1989 to 2001 before the fusion with Tractabel. Placed at the heart of European capitalism thanks to the SGB saga, Davignon was then co-opted into many boards in Belgium (Sofina, Umicore, Petrofina) and abroad (Accor, BASF, GDF-Suez). Although he never was number one (even when he was chair of the SGB, the latter was a subsidiary of the Compagnie financière de Suez), Etienne Davignon has always occupied central positions in the European political and economic fields of his time: Belgian Foreign Affairs, the EU Commission, Franco-Belgian capitalism.

This exceptional trajectory resembles Bernheim's. Both have in common a pivotal role in capitalism's control towers such as SGB, Suez, Pargesa and Mediobanca. This means that the search for the particular properties that constitute European capitals have to be found outside of European institutions. Mobility through heteronymous fields means that relational capital eases the conversion of capitals between national and the European fields. All the fields in which the multipositioned actors listed in Table 9.4 are active share the characteristic of being power centers, where the concentration of specific capitals and the cost of entry is so high that a small number of central players can dominate the arena and maintain their centrality. The existence of a competition for the control of resources may be interpreted as a dynamic process of monopolization, in line with Elias (1990).

This means competition itself is monopolistic, that is, reserved for an oligarchy capable of controlling the space through the mobilization of their specific resources and their ability to command mechanisms of co-optation, such as membership to the ERT. The question now is to understand how monopolized resources are combined, as they are not radically autonomous and may be converted from one field to another.

In the bourdieusian conception of the field of power, the state, insofar as it plays the role of meta-capital holder, guarantees the convertibility of the different kinds of capital. In the European context, there might be something else than a state: a larger European social space in which interdependent actors know and recognize each other beyond the kind of capital they control. For example, the economic capital mobilized for M&A operations is not indifferent to EU rules of competition, and vice versa. What is gained in one field can be put to work in another. Karel Van Miert, who as a European commissioner was in charge of the Single Market and competition, was then recruited to teach about market competition in Nyenrode University. He also accessed the boards or advisory boards of numerous companies[13] which, like Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk (RWE), were active players in big European M&As. There seems to be, therefore, a nascent European field of power. This field of power is partly emancipated from nation-states. Groups of actors who accumulate European capitals develop them, and convert them on a basis of reciprocity.

Far from constituting an autonomous entity, the upper layer of the European economic field is tightly connected to other European actors, especially to those who govern states and manage European institutions. These results invite us to deepen the study of the social embeddedness (Granovetter, 1984) of the field of power. In that sense, the European field of power is not fully subsumed by European institutions, although the latter indeed constitute an important part of the field of power. However, the existence of very few business leaders who make Europe through interlocks or ERT raises new questions: Is this small inner circle the sign of a huge concentration of economic power or the evidence of weak social integration among business elites? Deeper analysis of the economical pole of the European field of power could provide new insights on the social underpinnings of the European integration process in these influential circles.

Notes

1. For an overview of interlocking directorate studies, see Mizruchi (1996) and Scott (1997).
2. The degree of centrality is the number of direct relations a node maintains with other nodes in a network (Scott, 1991).
3. The Bilderberg Group, named after the hotel which welcomed its first meeting in 1952, organizes annual meetings for about one hundred personalities of business, media, and politics in order to favor transatlantic cooperation. The Trilatérale, founded in 1970, has similar goals but is also open to Asia.

4. In some cases (especially in France), both functions (chairman of the board of directors and CEO) may be held by the same person, but in other cases, such as Germany and the Netherlands, the two functions are strictly separated: chairman of the supervisory board and chairman of the managing board, who can be considered as a CEO in the United States or the United Kingdom sense of the term.
5. STMicroelectronics, a Franco-Italian company, is listed in the CAC and the MIB. We subtracted it from the CAC due to the Italian nationality of its executive. We did the same with Dexia and Suez, both registered in the BEL and the CAC. Following the nationality of the CEO, Dexia was subtracted from the CAC, while Suez was removed from BEL. Arcelor-Mittal was not retained in the corpus because of the impossibility of defining a relevant affiliation.
6. Density measures the number of existing links related to the total number of possible links.
7. Such extraterritoriality does not systematically mean a difference of nationality. For example, Antoine Bernheim, though French, was the top executive of the Italian Mediobanca and was member of the board of Louis Vuitton–Moët Hennessy (LVMH).
8. We qualify it as tiny because it only showed €100 million in net income in 2007, which is low compared even to medium-sized European banks.
9. Fifteen are part of the EU (United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Finland, Hungary, Sweden, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark) and three are not (Turkey, Norway, Switzerland).
10. See the website at www.ert.be/. In 2008, the ERT indicated a cumulated turnover of €1,600 billion and claimed to employ 4.5 million people.
11. The corpus is composed of 49 biographies corresponding to ERT membership between December 2007 and May 2008.
12. At the end of 2008, the traditional all-male membership of the ERT came to an end with the admission of Güler Sabanci, a Turkish woman who manages Koç et Sabanci, two family business groups.
13. Agfa Gevaert, Anglo American, Carrefour Belgium, De Persgroep, Fitch, Goldman Sachs, Munich Re, Philips, Rabobank, RWE, Solvay, Unicredit and Vivendi.

Conclusion
The Field of Eurocracy: A New Map for New Research Horizons

Didier Georgakakis

Concluding a book of this type is no easy task. By developing tools for a sociological analysis of European politics, this book provides a more concrete and, in many aspects, more human or at least more incarnated understanding of what is at play in the EU's central institutional space, understood as a social arena of political and administrative delegation. Consequently, this book is less the outcome of an overall thesis than a common endeavor to respond to the many invitations to operationalize the concept of field inspired by Bourdieu's sociology as a step towards further studies. It is hoped the various chapters have convinced the reader of the fruitfulness of this approach, but what overall picture, in the full sense of the word, do the chapters present, and what is the contribution of the book as a whole to EU studies? Without enclosing the analysis by drawing overly definitive conclusions, we would nonetheless like to highlight two broader contributions.

A new picture of the 'Brussels complex'[1]

To use a pictorial metaphor, the first type of contribution lies in the precision as well as the depth and emphasis this framework confers on the scientific depiction of European institutions. In addition to the analysis and hypotheses defended by each author, this book provides the first substantial and first-hand – if not exhaustive – sociological description of the main protagonists of the EU institutional field. This strong empirical focus deserves some discussion, as it is at the origin of the misunderstandings and criticisms about the supposed 'empiricism' of this type of approach.[2] In the symbolic hierarchy of scientific research, particularly in European studies, theory dominates fieldwork, where intellectual theorizing or 'headwork' is seen as superior to empirical

'legwork.' However, several reasons lead us to challenge this value hierarchy which is at the heart of spontaneous conceptions of intellectual work and its relative value, and defend a more inductive approach.

From a general standpoint, the break from the dominant hypothetico-deductive model, in the current positivist framework of political science (for more on the subject and some remedies, see Keating and Della Porta, 2010) seems, first of all, to be a matter of common sense and a necessity. In the field of European studies, as in others, many supposed theories are nothing like theories at all except in name or in their formal appearance.[3] On the contrary, bringing together studies based on original empirical data and on varied research methods is not necessarily being 'empiricist' or atheoretical. It is, in reality, the prerequisite to building theoretical foundations based on new observations of the actors of this 'hybrid sphere,' to use the expression coined by Ernst Haas (1958) to qualify the EU institutional arena.

Secondly, the small amount of knowledge available on European actors makes empirical research a necessity, if only to verify and refine research questions in order to go beyond the almost ideological oppositions on the 'nature' of the European polity – oppositions which are still very present in EU studies. From a sociological perspective, there is still little known about the agents and groups who people the EU institutional field. In comparison to the heads of state and government, or to the pantheon of great figures (or 'founding fathers') of Europe, these agents and groups represent a hidden and discreet side of European politics. They serve as behind-the-scenes workers in projects and in the day–to-day running of organizations and are, therefore, less well-known and recognized than the visible and most colorful 'leaders' (Foret, 2008; Smith, 2010).[4] Whether this lack of knowledge leads to fantasies about faceless bureaucrats or ignorance, it is damaging for a social field that has constituted itself as a major arena of circulation and development of policies. Shedding some sociological light upon those who operate in this hidden, but important, facet of institutions seems, therefore, useful in itself and fleshes out the significant intuitions developed by Christiansen and Piattoni on the importance of the informal dimensions of European politics (2003).

Lastly, in terms of the theory of European studies, it is reasonable to assume that an inductive approach can usefully foster the desire, expressed by many authors in the last 15 years, to break from the models of international-relations inspired analysis of EU institutions. By definition, inductive reasoning is a call to go beyond a 'school vs. school' debate which is simultaneously confined to a scholastic turf war and

its pernicious corollary: the endless (and irrelevant) multiplication of supposedly new models or paradigms, which is particularly pronounced in this field of study. Thus, the creation of a map, resulting less from a metaphysical deductive process than from measurements and projections, is particularly appropriate for overcoming the fascination that the creation of new institutions and their normative power seems, almost naturally, to exert. The contributions in this volume clearly demonstrate that the research presented here is far from being devoid of theory and that, on the contrary, it draws more readily from general social science concepts – just as does the (bureaucratic) field theory – than from an a priori philosophical debate on the EU. By collecting new material generated by these concepts, we have hoped to sketch a new and different picture of this space and its driving forces.

As this project draws to an end, the overall picture does indeed give rise to a new representation of EU institutions. In this volume, institutions are not presented in the traditional form of organization charts or by means of boxes and arrows indicating their respective formal competencies. Nor are they portrayed in the form of a battlefield (albeit pacific) in which states wrestle with one another, member states fight against European institutions, representatives of different interest groups battle one another or against the institutions or the European institutions clash with one another. In the perspective of this book, European institutions are, rather, represented in the form of an arena for negotiation and competition, one that is sociologically structured – that is to say, populated with actors and groups among whom the proximities and distances are less a function of their national and institutional affiliations than of the structure of the sociological capital and skills they have accumulated during their lives' trajectories. By conceptualizing this arena as a social field – in the sense of the theory of social fields – EU institutions can be represented in the form of an entirely new map.

Figures 10.1 and 10.2 (below) are the schematic maps of the field of Eurocracy.[5] Though they borrow from the cartography models resulting from geometric analysis of data, the two graphs are not generated by statistical analysis. In a form close to that proposed by Bourdieu in *Distinction* (1979, pp. 139–45), the purpose of these graphic representations is to illustrate the conceptualization presented in this conclusion to facilitate discussion and specify the indicators that would be useful in future research for the development of a more refined model. We have superimposed, over the overall respective positions of the groups of agents, the processes (the two black arrows in each graph) discussed on the final section of the conclusion.



Figure 10.1 Representation of the field in terms of the distribution of overall capital linked to the degree of permanence in the field

How is this map constructed and what do the axes mean? The vertical axis reflects a hierarchically ordered system, structured according to the overall amount of capital of all types that different groups of actors possess. Some of these players and groups count more than others. Indeed, between a director-general at the Commission and a counselor at the permanent representation or a project coordinator in an NGO, the probability of exerting effects in the field is not the same. Similarly, there is a difference between a representative of a small member state and that of a large one, or between a CEO of a multinational company and the representative of a local association, to name just a few examples.

This difference is not, however, only related to the overall volume of capital proxied by the hierarchical position and credit associated with the position. It also pertains to the nature of this capital, indicated by the horizontal axis. Thus, the field appears to be structured by the opposition between, on the right side, actors who tend to be insiders and permanent in the field and, on the other, those whose presence is

more intermittent – that is to say actors who are present in the field but not permanently, and whose dependencies and relations with the EU operate in large part from outside the field: for example, non-permanent representatives of member states, members of the international business world, of international organizations, regional authorities.

As far as the permanent actors in the field are concerned, they are endowed with international social capital and, above all, enjoy the authority they have earned through their experience as insiders with responsibilities in institutions, and through capturing EU specific trophies and distinctions (proxied by their prestigious positions within institutions or 'high level' groups of experts, a reputation and sometimes even a 'legendary' status based on an attested 'miracle' performed during a particular European negotiation process). They are in a position to embody Europe or at least are perceived to legitimately represent a common European interest. It is here, on the right hand side of the diagram, that we find senior civil servants with long careers in European institutions, but also the representatives of interest groups with long careers in Brussels.

Often trained in one or more member states, these actors are by definition not completely lacking heteronymous capital. They all come from somewhere, were trained in one or (often) several member states and many of them practiced their professions somewhere else beforehand. Let us note, in passing, that statistically speaking there are very few purebred *homo communautarus* – that is to say, sons of EU officials, educated at a European School, and recruited into a European institution directly after a degree in European affairs. This notwithstanding, although heteronymous capital does count and exert some effect (particularly on the structure of the networks that can be mobilized, on the probability of being offered a particular position, especially one considered to be tied to a 'flag,' that is to say requiring national political support), it matters less, relationally speaking, than does field-specific capital. Possessing field-specific capital establishes an objective difference from the actors who are devoid of such capital. As much a mark of distinction, it is on this European recognition (although it is sometimes experienced in the form of more personal values such as one's dedication, being a competent negotiator or being learned), that the position and opportunities associated with it are, for the most part, founded.

In contrast to this, and on the left hand side of the diagram, actors and groups are more dispersed and occupy intermittent positions in the field. These actors owe their positions to organizations which, although in more or less permanent relationships with the field, conduct most of

their activities outside it and act mainly with respect to constraints and opportunities outside the European institutional space. Again, the 'pure-bred' outsiders are rare: these could typically be: a new minister who had no previous European experience before participating in negotiations at the Council of Ministers; a business executive who goes to Brussels to plead for a cause but without the assistance of a team, or specialized consultants. Such cases exist and are often objects of sarcasm for insiders who are amused by such 'amateurism.' However, most of the actors in this category possess some European capital (through their training or previous experience) but, globally, in much smaller proportions than the actors in the other category. Their trajectories are often marked by the to-and-fro between this space and others, but their European capital is not sufficient to be the primary determinant of what these individuals think and do; while not ruling out that this European capital may be the key to adjustments that these actors are able to make when they interact in the European space. In the case of the permanent representatives, for example, we are dealing with diplomatic personnel whose careers in the EU field are, sociologically speaking, rather 'temporary' – contrary to what their name (permanent) implies – and by definition are largely dependent on national administrative and political constraints. Even so, within this group there are some important differences. For some, the EU represents a short-term stepping stone toward other embassies or higher responsibilities in their central administrations. Others, by contrast, have greater longevity within the field. To their longevity in the positions they occupy one can, in this case, take into account a long-term view of their trajectories which are marked, for example, by comings and goings between European affairs positions within their states' central administrations and other, initially more subordinate, positions within the permanent representation. Similar examples can be found among representatives of economic or social interests.

Although in this volume less emphasis is placed on other polarities, these exist at a finer level of analysis. For example: those opposing the actors endowed with technical or sector-specific skills to those who have authority in more general, transversal, political or diplomatic functions; oppositions between the business world and the public sector, the frontier of which appears more or less hermetic depending on the type of actors or spaces of interaction. It is important to clarify these oppositions (see Figure 10.2), because they show internal differences of groups on the first map, such as the PRs of the member states or lobbyists, or heads of government of small countries and leaders of large multinational corporations. Academic trajectories and, through them, the different types of



Figure 10.2 Representation of the field in the form of two structures of opposition: between insiders and outsiders and between the public sector and the business world

skills, are also important to consider. Their differences can give rise to tensions observable in the different positions of economists and jurists in most institutions, or of diplomats and technicians.

This picture of the distribution of the different types of capital leads us to examine the EU institutional space from a very different angle. Indeed, in this map, the protagonists are constructed differently, with the institutions at the top of the list. The organizational and institutional boundaries are thus transcended in that the effects of proximities and distances cannot be reduced to institutional positions in the strict sense. For example, the figure clearly shows that there is a greater difference between a member of the Commission's DG for Communication and a member of the DG for Internal Market, than between the latter and a member of the Governing Council of the ECB. The member of DG Communicaétion is usually a technician and the probability of his moving to a more generalist position, such as that occupied by the second, is low. On the contrary, a director-general for Internal Market and services and a member of the Governing Council of the ECB can relatively easily swap functions, at least in theory.

The boundaries between the EU institutional world and that of interest group representatives are also revisited. Beyond the possible moves from one to the other, the most permanent EU interest representatives appear to enjoy a status bordering on that of an institutional auxiliary. A substantial part of their competence and legitimacy to act is conferred by the European institutions (having worked there, networking with their members, or being reputed to 'have their ear'). Similarly, experts are more or less far from the center, depending on whether they possess field-specific properties and know-how. The supposed divisions among 'state,' 'intergovernmental' and 'supranational' institutions (and thus, the supposedly divergent interests that actors represent) thereby appear in a different light. In concrete terms, the interests at stake belong to a more complex structure. For instance, in the European Parliament party discipline tends to dampen divergences during votes. Yet, due to the various positions in this field, MEPs' positions with regard to the Commission differ depending on their degree of integration in the EU field. In the first case, the interdependent relationship is strong (though it may manifest itself more or less alternately through the public assertion of independence vis-à-vis the Commission or through virtuosity in the art of compromise). In the second, the interdependent relationship is weaker and, in all probability, so is the engagement in the EU and its specific challenges.

This does not, however, mean that institutions and organizations do not exist in this picture. They do count and, as discussed elsewhere (Georgakakis, 2010b), are major producers of capital and authority within the field. But, far from being homogeneous blocs, they appear here in the form of regions of a space whose weights vary – both on the map and in social reality – under the effect of the concentration or dispersion of their agents' capital. Their margins of action, that is to say the ability to be at the heart of compromise, must be put in relation to the area they occupy in the field. In this sense, the diversity of capital held by the agents of an organization enables them to activate diverse ties and sometimes find unexpected proximities which can be created through objective proximity in the field, at times through a coalition against a third party. To mention but one example: it is difficult to understand one of the turning points of the negotiations on the directive on the liberalization of the postal services, if one does not see that one of the main actors involved, a member of a French commissioner's cabinet (reputed, as a Frenchman, to defend the interests of public services *à la française*) is also an intermittent agent who owes his legitimacy to his involvement in the economic and budgetary side of the provision

of public services, but whose position in the field is shifting towards that of a permanent agent of the field's business side (see Figure 10.2).[6]

Finally, this broad description helps to clarify the position of European institutions and, therefore, also their power. Figure 10.1 shows that, overall,[7] EU institutions and their permanent personnel occupy an intermediate position in terms of the quantity of their political resources. Thus, they are distinct from political authorities – embodied by heads of states and of governments or ministers – situated, abstractly, more to the north of the map and, furthermore, are more dispersed on other dimensions of the map. Despite being further down in the vertical hierarchy, the position of the Commission civil servants in the center of the map does account for their power to shape the scope of negociations and acceptable practices margins and practices, which derive less from a direct delegation of power than from their role as intermediaries and their centrality in the field of Eurocracy.

To clarify this picture, we can note that the profiles of European institution agents change according to their hierarchical positions, and consequently, affect the type of political relationships they are likely to form. For instance, European commissioners combine the political capital of an EU intermittent agent and the highest political positions in the European institutions, while the directors-general of the Commission combine high longevity in EU institutions and less national capital (even though this capital is useful for obtaining the support of their national governments when they are appointed directors-general). These properties seem quite essential for understanding not only the weight and room for maneuver that these social agents have, but also the collective capacity of institutions. Their ability to exert political effects is related to their location at the center of the field, that is to say, in a position that enables them to be the link – less in a relation of homology than of objective proximity – with their political partners in the Council or the EP. From this point of view, the picture offers a different vision of the 'center of the EU center,' if we may call it so, and of the power practices that these central positions authorize.

The new picture of the EU institutional field that flows from this description is not without some consequences. Placing emphasis on European institutional capital makes it possible, for instance, to specify the social skills that matter in the EU's bureaucratic field, and thereby to provide a valuable complement to research, which in the United States as well as in Europe, makes use of the notion of a European political field or sphere (Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein, 2001; Fligstein, 2008). Drawing attention to the permeability of the boundaries between

governmental and supranational institutions – and thinking of this distinction in terms of structure of resources and capital – leads broadly to reconsider the pertinence of institutionalist theories of principal/agent which view EU institutions as the agents of the member states (Pollack, 2003). Quite clearly, here, the agent is the field itself and that is what makes the focus on these institutions as a social field of delegation and competition interesting. Beyond what such a picture brings empirically and theoretically, it is useful as it leads to the formulation of new hypotheses on several theoretical and practical questions that are at the heart of European studies.

A variable-geometry institutionalization

Let us mention, first of all, the issue of the institutionalization of the EU. This question has been raised by major authors of EU studies since the 1990s. It is also one of the fundamental dividing lines – or even the hinge – of the central theoretical debate in the field. To summarize briefly, let us say that there are those who believe in the coherence of these institutions and who, consequently, ascribe some specific effects to them; and there are those who, inversely, do not believe in this consistency and consider these institutions as a mere relay or clearing house for geopolitical and economic power relations. The contributions of this book invite us to ask this question differently. First of all, they do not so much examine the institutionalization of the EU as such, as they do the institutionalization of the field of these institutions in the form of a relatively autonomous social space. Based on a series of indicators, and particularly on the analysis of the agents' properties and capitals, the analysis developed here points to a relative closure effect, or even to a field that is split at its core by a dividing line between a zone that is subject to strong autonomization and routinization processes on the one hand, and another characterized by highly persistent heteronomy.

On the one hand, there is indeed an integration effect and closure around a 'central core' of agents who accumulate properties of insiders, based in particular on what has been called in this book European institutional capital. As mentioned before, this capital is manifested through the acquisition of credentials, or credit recognized by other agents in the field and explains the capacity to exert power in the field. From an ethnographic perspective, this capital is revealed by the reputation (credentials) of some agents and in their recognized capacity to serve or to have served the common European interest. It is also objectively measured through the possession of European 'trophies' and of successive

and prolonged positions in the field. European institutions are the primary suppliers of this capital, through the positions they offer and the recognition they confer not just to their own agents but also to lobbyists, journalists, experts or academics. In this regard, we can say that they 'accredit,' beyond the narrow sense of the word, through an effect of certification of authority ('director at,' 'expert to,' 'Jean Monnet Chair,' and so on.).

Whether this practice of certification and/or consecration – and with it the construction of networks extending beyond the institutions – is an organized policy or an embodied one implemented through the effects of a strong dependency between the trajectories of these agents and the construction of Europe, it has always existed (for an example concerning the academic sphere, see Bailleux, 2010, and the chapters in this volume by P. Aldrin and C. Robert). But one can say that it has tended to increase, at least up until the end of the 1990s, a point I will come back to. Beyond the formation of a central core, we have another indicator of ongoing institutionalization. The construction of the EU has led to the re-qualification of international organizations or collectives as 'European' organizations. As a result, other organizations (historical interest groups, for instance) also participate in the production and distribution of these social capitals in the form of relatively long-term positions, or symbolic gratification, such as the 'European of the Year Award' in a given sector of economic or political activity. It follows that the acquisition of this European institutional capital is a stake in a struggle that extends beyond EU institutions. What is more, possessing it increases the probability of being recognized within the field and of circulating from one side to the other. As several chapters in this book have shown (concerning these aspects, see also Bastin, 2004, and Michon, 2005), these actors do circulate, to some extent, between the positions of journalists, experts, consultants, parliamentary attachés and lobbyists, permanent representatives, or to a lesser extent, to the civil service of the various institutions.

This relative enclosure effect is another indicator of the institutionalization of the central field. Indeed, entering this world has human and social cost, not only in terms of time, but also in terms of the required career path, of accumulation of an appropriate transnational social capital and of a stock of the necessary practical skills (including, among other things, an intimate understanding of the formal and informal rules of the institutions, of sociability or of the appropriate behavior in a multicultural environment). These properties, until recently, had to be confirmed by a jury of examination for recruitment into European

institutions – and before them it was the members of a jury selecting candidates most able to work for more or less long periods of time in this milieu. These properties are acquired all the more easily when these actors already possess a number of international (social and cultural) predispositions, through family socialization or previous experience abroad. But this probability has to be studied more thoroughly. Reading the chapters of this book, one can see that these international skills are not necessarily those of the most dominant actors of the international upper class, individuals who are more readily motivated by top positions in multinational companies than in the administration of European institutions. Furthermore, all agents with international competencies do not necessarily have vocation for careers in the EU institutional field, which, as an 'international environment of proximity,' implies a political or public service vocation.[8]

While an integration and closure effect do exist, it is relative. In other words, institutionalization occurs very unevenly in other areas of the field. In the case of intermittent agents, acquiring this capital is important, but it is not crucial, and even less of a life's mission. For a hypothetical example: after a transitional period in the EU, a young adviser in the permanent representation of a large member state, with good career prospects and trained in the best schools of his country (Oxbridge in the United Kingdom, or the ENA in France, for instance), will in all probability seek a position in the trade and investment services of an embassy in the Far East rather than invest in a career as a EU insider. This Asian economic experience will allow him to hope to go back to an interesting position in a central administration, credited with competence in a sector considered as a central challenge for the future. Although there is no doubt that such an agent will perform his tasks to the best of his ability during a mandate in the EU, he will do so only for the time necessary to obtain a 'check-out slip' and will not see this position in terms of a long-term investment or the beginning of a true vocation. This has, therefore, consequences with regard to the perception of what has to be done and of the respective importance of short- or long-term effects, for instance. Another example: an MEP with a limited investment within the European Parliament will, most probably, choose a committee through which she is likely to gain credentials outside the institutions and policies of the EU, particularly in the case of national elections creating opportunities for positions at a ministerial level, which means that the engagement in the EU will be different to that of an MEP who is more integrated in the European field.

These observations are important. Indeed, intermittent agents are not necessarily situated at the margin of the field. On the contrary, many are in positions of authority, particularly when they represent member states or large economic or social interests. The positions founded on European institutional capital described above correspond to dominant positions only in certain very particular forums and situations; they dominate in the realm of administrative work, of permanent and highly structured sectors, rather than in the more temporal areas of political decision making. The closer we get to an agent vested with 'political' authority, and recognized as such, the more distinct the properties are and the greater the chance that the structure of the agents' capital loses its European dimension. From this perspective, it is not surprising that in the common language of EU institutions, the problems perceived as 'political' are those that constitute salient political issues for individual member states. (Concerning the confusion between the categories of the political and the national in the EU, see Bellier, 1999). This trend is clear in the case of permanent representatives and MEPs from large countries and large lobby firms, most of which are international, and also commissioners. This partitioning of the field is clearly visible in the case of long-term career choices that agents in intermediary positions must make. One can specialize outside the field – for example, by taking on European functions within member states – but for careers that bring them close to the center of the field of Eurocracy, these paths face two antagonistic constraints: either the necessity to renew their capital on a regular basis by holding national functions (as diplomats often do when they return to positions in the central administration); or the need to abandon a national career in order to bring to fruition the national capitals in the context of the opportunities that European institutions offer. This is true at high level positions in particular, in contexts where appointments take into consideration the balances between nationalities in 'flagged positions.'

To sum up, the observations made in this volume indicate that a process of institutionalization does exist, but in the form of a differential objectivation of this field, or its 'degree of reality,' sociological density or coherence, which vary from one area of this space to another. Thus, to borrow a formula from two different forms of structuralist thought (the sociology of networks, and intuitions from Lacanian psychoanalysis) this structure can be defined as a structure having holes: that is to say a social structure with a highly uneven consistency, between zones that are firmly structured around specifically European capital, and zones-more directly exposed to external forms of authority and, more generally, to outside determinations.

This difference in structuring is fundamental. It sheds a different light on the questions of the autonomy and heteronomy of the field, and beyond, of the integration process. On the basis of these indicators, the integration process is, first of all, no longer just a question of conversion of loyalty and values (in the sense of ideals), because it is considered (in most studies dealing with socialization) to be inspired by neo-institutionalist approaches. It is, rather, measured through the Europeanization of the agents' capitals or, in other words, through the distribution and the relative value of the forms of accreditation and legitimacy specific to the field of Eurocracy. Although the deepened integration of this field is indeed related to a conversion issue, this conversion of capitals implies significant investments which are often more time-consuming and in-depth than a change in political preferences, even though these two dimensions are related in the long term. Looking at the acquisition of specific resources from this viewpoint, integration in the field appears, in both intensity and duration, in a non-linear form. Indeed, it varies according to the positions within the field; in this case, it is slower on the political than on the administrative side; it is more extensive on the 'political' side of the administration than on its strictly technical side; it is stronger on the public and legal side than on the strictly economic side.

The highly variable distribution of specifically European capitals has effects on the possibilities of attraction that institutions can exert externally. How can one ascertain the attraction effects of the field of Eurocracy on other social fields? Even though pull effects undoubtedly exist, they are limited by the double games and language allowed by the dual nature of this structure, and also by the intermittent engagement granted by organizations (member states, industrial actors, political parties) which the agents situated on the non-permanent side represent (Dezalay and Madsen, 2006). As deplored by the most-engaged agents in the field, these double games include the ability of national political elites to not support, and often to publicly denounce, Eurocracy – or what they themselves had negotiated or accepted in Brussels. This conceptualization makes it possible to simultaneously approach the question of internal and external determinations, insofar as the dual structure of the field of Eurocracy appears to depend simultaneously on the investments granted by those represented by the agents situated on the west side of Figure 10.1, and in particular, the political leaders of the member states and economic elites. This is a change from the 1980s, which was clearly a time when these elites invested heavily in a European agenda, and were given credit for this. It is unclear whether this concerted investment was

exceptional or if it will be a lasting feature, in which the current situation could thus be just a passing phase.

Bringing to light these limited attraction effects makes it possible to adopt a reflexive approach to European Studies (Rosamond, 2000; Kauppi and Madsen, 2008) and to formulate a hypothesis on the endless debates placing the proponents of the institutionalization thesis in opposition to those who dispute it, or the supporters of the so-called endogenous and exogenous explanations for the changes in the EU and its policies. Indeed, for reasons that often pertain to differences in personal experiences with the EU,[9] scholars themselves base their observations on positions and grounds that are structured very differently. By giving a 'view on the various points of view' of the space, the theory of fields indeed provides a different angle on these ontological debates by integrating them into a broader picture.

Functioning, change and crisis in the EU regime: new avenues

Let us now look at another aspect of the contributions in this volume. The overall picture sheds a different light on what takes place in the routine political exchanges of European institutions. It helps lay the groundwork for a sociology of the EU regime and, in doing so, proposes new ways to understand both the ongoing changes and the sense of crisis experienced in these institutions which, as we shall see, is not entirely well founded.

Firstly, conceptualizing the EU polity as a field offers a different way of looking at the functioning of the EU, thereby providing original ways to understand processes that are generally the most difficult to empirically observe. Admittedly, in the most formal situations, or those in which divergent points of view are aired publicly or dramatized, the institution one belongs to and the blocks of member states that coalesce around different issues remain heavy variables. The fact remains that such pitched battles are not ordinary occurrences in the EU's institutional field, and most policy processes in EU actions unfold in a medium-term and long-term temporality, with little public posturing and involving a diverse set of actors in a series of differently structured arenas. In this temporality, the field theory's conception of complexity is particularly heuristic. It is also the substance of what authors have called the 'informal governance' of the EU (Christiansen and Piatoni, 2003). Because it attempts to construct a matrix of everyday relations between these agents, the conceptualization of EU institutions in the form of a

social space represents a concrete attempt to formalize the matrix of informal governance of the EU and to identify its effects on political and public policy practices.[10]

Indeed, the different oppositional structures which this picture brings to light (dominant/dominated; permanent/intermittent, business/public sector) represent the underlying matrix of many battles that play out both overtly and, most often, in subtle negotiations within this field. Between the insiders and the intermittents, the conceptions differ with regard to politics, Europe, the EU, its function, what needs to be done and what should be done. It would be a mistake to see insiders as just staunch federalists; positions are more diverse, and they integrate tensions, among other things, between federalist ambitions to build a European order and more technocratic designs based on the 'Monnet method' of integration (Hooghe, 2012). At a more general level, these actors have demonstrated their political pragmatism since the beginning of the European institutions (Seidel, 2010). The fact remains that, on this side of the map, agents construct their long-term positions by constructing Europe, whereas those situated on the other side make a more temporary use of their positions in the field to wage battles related to different motives and following logics largely determined outside the field of Eurocracy (economic interests, material or symbolic positions of, or in, member states).

This leads to effects on engagement and anticipations. The nature and consistency of the field's issues vary from one spot of this map to another. For the most permanent agents, the EU is almost the story of their lives. Some of these careers are 'one-way' careers. This is what differentiates the careers of 'servants' of Europe and the European public service from 'jobs' – and with them a number of abilities to engage on long-term issues and to potentially hold positions based on a conception of the European general interest. In this case, the EU puts into play, not only their careers, but the medium-term and long-term personal and family trajectories of these agents. For the others, this overlap is a more or less occasional – useful or restricting, depending on the individual situation. At a different level of analysis, the sectoral impact of a policy represents one question, among others, to be addressed in the long term, whereas for the others it is a question that justifies total commitment, but in the short term.

These different positions generate a rather different relationship to time and, consequently, to expectations. In essence, on the intermittent side, the temporality underlying the ways of thinking and acting is the that of national political and communication agendas, or even of more or less abrupt economic and financial variations. Incidentally, for

the agents on this side, temporalities are asynchronous – as shown for example by the differences in national electoral cycles – which makes it more complicated for these agents to coalesce around common positions. Temporality plays out differently for the permanent EU agents. It is the longer temporality of European construction, according to a hierocratic, rather than political, definition,[11] and which predisposes to judging things according to a medium-term to long-term future, and to considering 'crises' as risks that are actually recurrent and can be overcome. These different temporalities have effects on the practical concepts of what a result is and what means can be used to achieve that result. Schematically, for an intermittent actor a result is a relatively short-term gain based on a rational cost-benefit ratio. For the others, a result lies in the momentum or process itself. What is essential is that everything continues to move forward and, to put it bluntly, almost any direction will do as long as it does not jeopardize the integration process itself. On the one hand, we have national embodiment and economic interests and even arrogance; on the other, there is caution, listening, the practice consisting of positioning oneself at the geometric point of convergence of these perspectives, exercising the art of European compromise, sometimes to the extreme point of 'art for art's sake.'

Thus, the map helps in understanding how the system of relations resulting from the differential possession of these capitals produces political effects. Although these effects cannot be measured by votes in the Council or parliament – in view of all the different positions taken and preliminary transactions made (in working groups and their entourages for the Council, in the delegations and political groups of the EP), possessing European institutional capital is without a doubt one of the conditions for rallying the most endowed agents to positions close to the Commission's propositions, in order to avoid the 'failure of a compromise,' to 'not run against the tide of history,' to 'maintain contact for the sake of other issues' or for similar motives. Thus, the model makes it possible to account for the rationale behind positions taken on issues – positions which would otherwise be difficult to understand. It is in this context, for example, that the split of the French socialist delegation at the European Parliament took place during the debates on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (Redondo, 2003). Another example is the debate around the managerialization of the Commission administration, setting in opposition the contenders to positions of political power and the civil servants with longer careers – which can be related to the positions these rivals occupied within the broader field of Eurocracy and the forms of authority and legitimacy which they carry.

A function of one's relative position, the probability of moving towards one or the other of these career types, also raises the question of the center of gravity and the pivotal group of the field. This question is essential for grasping the singularity of different policy sectors. Beyond the thesis of the complexity and fragmentation of policies, the map helps to get a grip on the underlying differences between the various sectors of EU policies. For example, between a competition policy whose center of gravity lies in the northeast quadrant of the map in Figure 10.1 (that is to say where the actors of the Commission are dominant) and a defense policy situated in the west-central region of the same map, where members of the military establishment and diplomats more readily position themselves, the structural differences are clear. And this is probably all the more true given that the position of these policies is also different relative to the third axis – business/civil service – highlighted in Figure 10.2. It is no wonder that in the first case, critics sometimes refer to the Commission's abuse of a 'dominant position,' whereas in the second case, it is the capitals of the large member states that dominate. Depending on whether it concentrates agents from the northwest or southeast regions of the map, one can predict the probable structure of what is going to emerge, how it is going to emerge and the different weights of the endogenous and exogenous determinations. The contributions in this volume on central bankers and the field of European information confirm this, and more studies should be conducted along these lines to refine the hypotheses.

By extrapolation, the map also points to the more general question of the sociology of the EU regime: of its changes and, probably, of its crises. The academic literature on the EU regime is abundant and has taken a new turn with the conceptualization of transnational regimes. For the purpose of defining a research agenda, it might be beneficial to encourage interaction between this literature and that on the political regimes, which has emerged from different theoretical angles in sociology and history (for example, in each discipline, Higley, Hoffman-Langue and Kadushin, 1991; Charle, 1997). The literature on the sociology of political regimes has shown that the degree of diversity and unity of elites is one of the key elements determining a regime's structure. As specified in the introduction, the field of Eurocracy is not to be confused with the European field of power, the study of which would require that other actors and elites be integrated (Bigo, 2011; Kauppi and Madsen, 2013). The field of Eurocracy covers the specific political administrative field of the EU. Indeed, although it does not just include agents from the administration, it is situated in a position that

is functionally equivalent to the bureaucracy in the member states, that is to say, following Charle, the space of competition in which the input given by the various competitive elites of the regime is translated and transformed into law and policies. The fact remains that, beyond the coincidence that the motto chosen for the European Union happens to be 'united in diversity,' this question of unity and diversity is particularly relevant in the case of the field of Eurocracy which, as we know, includes actors who are very different – not only in terms of nationality, institution and function as is often underlined in the academic literature – but also in terms of capital and type of authority.

From this point of view, a more detailed analysis of the proximity and distance between these actors will, in all probability, help in more precisely understanding the fluidity of institutional workings and historical changes. For example: Although the enlargement of the EU has had an undeniable morphological effect, both in terms of national and linguistic diversity and overall size, does it produce equivalent effects from the point of view of the agents in this field and of their relevant properties? Many observations show that the most recent enlargement, even though it probably disrupted the political order of things in terms of relations between the national capitals, has not in fact produced a radical transformation of the routine institutional space of the EU. Put simply, agents from new countries employed in the institutions were recruited on the basis of educational titles – properties and experiences equivalent to those of agents already present in the institutions (Ban, 2012), and the first indications presented in this volume (on MEPs, for example) show that divisions between permanent and intermittent players are being reproduced.

In the same vein, these questions invite us to examine the political changes that have taken place in successive historical junctures: What degree of dispersion or, on the contrary, of concentration, characterized the Hallstein, Jenkins, Delors and Barroso commissions? Where was the pivotal group situated on the map then? Taking our cue from the literature on Delors's leadership and our own research, we can make the hypothesis that the dispersion of the institutional elite was less pronounced during the Delors era. At that time of strong mobilization for the European project, the permanence of a number of actors situated on the west side of the map (heads of states and governments, ministers, representatives of the member states) was reinforced by the relative stability in the political majorities in the large member states, in particular, while the relative politicization of profiles of community elites (within the Commission, just as, in some ways, in the top positions in

its administration) drew the agents situated on the east side of the map in Figure 10.1 closer to its center. One may think that this configuration had as much – and probably more – influence, as the often mentioned 'personal factors,' on the relative consensus that emerged in the 1980s around Europe's necessary political revival. The energy behind the European project now seems to be less present, less embodied by the Commission, which in the 1980s and early 1990s, constituted the pivot of the field.

These examples plead for making a radical break with the simplistic idea that focusing on political and social *structures* makes it impossible to study *change*. On the contrary, the perspective proposed here studies change on the basis of new indicators. Focusing attention on the social foundations of political changes leads us to investigate transformations which, though not immediately perceptible, are at the heart of recent institutional, political and administrative changes.

It suffices here to give a few examples in the form of possible questions for future research. Is it not productive to study the effects of the Lisbon Treaty, which has led to the appointment of a more permanent president of the European Council and granted the European Parliament more power, in the context of the more general modifications of the balance of power between permanent and intermittent agents that structures this field? Is the increasing weight of the member states in European processes – or even the more general trend towards the 're-nationalization of the EU' that underlies the perceptions of many agents positioned on the East side of the map – related to conjunctural effects, or does it reflect a deeper underlying devaluation of European institutional capital and, consequently, a lasting shift in the social and morphological balances indicated on this map? To measure the ongoing changes with these indicators would most probably help to better understand what generated the crisis of the previous EU model and the associated loss of meaning. Moreover, how can one explain the increasing weight of the economy, or of a certain (financial and monetary) definition of the economy? Is it a temporary phenomenon linked to the centrality of financial issues and the debt crisis, the increasing centrality of positions and capital linked to the financial and monetary expertise in the field, or both? And what of the structural European governance reforms that have marked the last decade? Does the outsourcing of part of the tasks allocated to the European Commission, as well as the managerialization of the administration, push (setting aside debates on their functional necessity) towards a more general transformation of power relations within the field of Eurocracy or, in more radical terms, of the political

definition of the European project and its capacity to be a driving force? We shall not answer these complex questions here. But one may assume that the studies that will follow these avenues, with the map guiding them, so to speak, will place more attention on the sociological tensions that structure this field and, in so doing, will shed new light on the battles of definitions and classifications (from the most technical to those on Europe itself) which, beyond the functioning and crises of the EU, tend more and more, to structure the lives of Europe's citizens.

Notes

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1. This expression was coined by Stone Sweet, Standholz and Fligstein, 2001.
2. See for example the reviews of *Les métiers de l'Europe politique,* and more generally the debate among scholars specialized in the sociology of European politics, (Saurugger, 2008; Mérand and Saurugger, 2010).
3. It would be pointless here to 'name names' and the list examples, but they range from the vote count at the Council to regression analysis of all kinds. It is not the method itself that is questioned, but its uses. Is it really necessary to seek correlations between the influence of member states and the geographical proximity between their capitals and Brussels, between the degree of mutual knowledge between parliamentary assistants and the political positions of the MEPs they work for, to use examples presented as 'theories' in key international conferences.
4. For a sociological approach of the perceptions of Europe by ordinary citizens in four countries, see Gaxie, Hube, De Lassalle and Rowell, 2010.
5. I wish to thank L. Godmer, G. Marrel, F. Lebaron and S. Michon for encouraging me, during the different stages of this project, to develop this graphic representation.
6. Example given by a former member of cabinet of Commissioner Bolkestein, who has since become a conservative MEP (Eppink, 2007).
7. For lack of space and sound empirical material, we cannot here go into the details of their internal differences, nor of those that exist between the organizations of the institutional triangle and the others (Committee of the Regions, the Economic and Social Committee), or those related to the variable credit agents earn through their experience in a particular institution.
8. For a broader perspective on upper class international capital, see Wagner, 2003, 2007. For more on the internationalization of training of elites and the differences between small and large countries, see Saint-Martin and Gheorghiu, 1992; Brody and Saint-Martin, 1993.
9. Relativism and national disciplinary cultures aside, there is most probably a fundamental difference between a Harvard-educated scholar working in high level U.S. diplomacy and European scholars (many of whom developed an interest in EU studies after an internship in the European Commission) in the

way they develop knowledge constructs on the EU and on their relationship to their object of study.

10. Although the analysis of public policy draws much attention (probably due to the contractualization of research and of the pressing demand for research to yield operational results) and has not been directly addressed in this volume, the field approach has much to contribute. We shall simply indicate that, as an avenue for future research, the overall picture provided here can help in better understanding the specificity of the various public policy sectors by revealing their relation to the sociological structure of their pivotal actors, as indicated earlier, with regard to the different centers of gravity of competition or defense policies, to name just two examples. Some initial work in this direction can be found in Rowell and Mangenot (2010).
11. Max Weber (1947) sets the hierocratic order, based on faith – and for which churches are the model – in opposition to the political order, based on violence, and which the state embodies.

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