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Resistance against Napoleon in the Kingdom of Holland

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The police apparatus in Louis' Kingdom

The Napoleonic period, as the years of the Kingdom of Holland (1806–10) and the French Occupation (1810–13) were known, was of fundamental importance for the police in Holland. Before 1806 no separate police corps existed and the word police was commonly used in the traditional meaning of policy and regulation and not associated with police work, as we know it today.

The term police was certainly used by Louis in a modern sense when, soon after he was proclaimed king, he founded a Ministry of Justice and Police in July 1806. Louis was reluctant to create a separate Minister of Police on the French model, as the Dutch would find it controversial.¹ The main duties of the new Minister of Justice and Police were vigilance over state security, maintaining public order, observation of foreign nationals, press control and suppression of contraband and other illegal international trafficking, especially regarding navigation of waterways.² The Minister was largely dependent on the existing local administrative and judicial authorities such as the officers of justice in the towns (*hoofdofficier*) and the public prosecutors in the departments (*procureurs*). The King created new police officials only for the specific control of navigation.

The first true police force was set up in Holland by autumn 1806 under these terms. The Dutch coast was divided into three districts, with Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Harlingen as their centres. In each of these places a chief police commissioner was appointed. The joint police commissioners supervised a total of six police officers, who were assigned to control coastal navigation from six small harbours and seaside villages scattered along the coast.³ Thus, the first Dutch police force was small in number and limited in its competence to the control of navigation. Although the instruction for police officers issued in November 1806 ordered them to inform the Minister of Justice and Police about public opinion in their areas, this was only added because of the war.⁴

Louis' police and the continental blockade

After the proclamation of the Berlin Decrees of November 1806, Louis' police force became deeply entangled with the enforcement of the Continental Blockade. From the outset, a new and strict division was made between the police officials and the employees of the Ministry of Finance. Henceforth, the former were restricted to controlling illegal correspondence and passengers. The latter became exclusively responsible for the ships' cargoes. Louis' decree of February 1808, which closed all Dutch ports with immediate effect, led to a further reorganization of the police. The office of chief commissioner disappeared and his subordinates were renamed inspectors. Their number was increased to fourteen, but as the legal shipping trade was almost completely non-existent, their role henceforth appeared to be confined to the inspection of fishing boats for the presence of illegal passengers.⁵

Contrary to the common historiographical image, Louis seriously tried to enforce the Continental System. A series of decrees and regulations were issued, whose enforcement fell to a wide range of military and civilian authorities. His efforts notwithstanding, Louis failed. The Dutch estuaries in the southwest and the north made a total closure of coast and harbours practically impossible and Louis tried desperately to convince his brother that maintaining a blockade in Holland was like 'trying to stop skin sweating'.⁶

Moreover, an effective enforcement of the blockade was seriously hindered by the overlapping competences among the different departments and offices charged with the control of navigation. A clear-cut division between the control of illegal passengers and mail on coasts, ships and fishing boats on the one hand and commodities on the other, soon appeared very difficult, if not virtually impossible, to achieve. This operational overlap resulted in many disputes between police officials and employees of the Ministry of Finance, both when they were on missions or simply doing their daily, routine work.⁷

The reorganization of the police in February 1808 and the realization of Louis' long cherished wish to make Amsterdam his capital, prompted him to create a new branch of the police for his kingdom in April 1808. Louis was very suspicious of both British and French secret agents and therefore he created one police inspector and three assistant police inspectors for specific service in the capital, charged with high security surveillance. In Louis' initial plans the police officials of Amsterdam were also intended to deal with the public order. However, in the final instruction of July 1808, issued by the Minister of Justice and Police, the majority of the articles concerned the surveillance of foreigners; a separate additional instruction was drawn up to cover this aspect of the police.⁸

Louis was constantly overpowered in his attempts to enforce the blockade by his brother Napoleon, who operated according his own hidden agenda. From the end of 1808 tension mounted between them over the enforcement

of the Continental System. To reconcile Dutch interests and the Emperor's demands more satisfactorily Louis changed his policy and on 31 March 1809 he proclaimed a double decree in which the harbours were partly reopened and a customs system was announced on the French model. Paradoxically, Louis' final measures regarding the enforcement of the blockade effectively completed his reform of the Dutch police. The King explicitly stated that the Minister of Justice and Police was no longer authorized to interfere in affairs dealing with the Continental System and consequently he had to abolish his inspection officers as a service. As custom officials of the Ministry of Finance, they were now transferred to the new Directory of Customs, which was under the direct supervision of the King. This reorganization was seen by Cornelis Felix van Maanen, Louis' Minister of Justice and Police at the time, as an attack on his personal authority and as a result, he resigned.⁹

The police force during the Occupation

During the Occupation important changes were made to the police in Holland. As early as October 1810 a Director-General of Police, Paul-Etienne Devilliers Duterrage, was appointed to the General Government, the central French administration in the new Dutch Departments. In practice, nothing changed until the beginning of 1811 when, in the wake of the administrative reforms, the French police system was introduced at local level. The French police system originated under the Revolution but was only completed during the Consulate with the law of 17 February 1800. In October 1795 a police commissioner was established for every town with a population over 5,000. The new legislation confirmed this but now an extra commissioner had to be appointed for each additional 10,000 inhabitants. Moreover, in very large towns a General Commissioner of Police could be installed as head of the police. Unlike the ordinary commissioner, who got his orders mainly from the mayor and prefect, this General Commissioner was in direct contact with the officials of the *Ministère de la Police-Général*.¹⁰

In March 1811 special measures were taken in Holland to organize the police in Amsterdam. The city was divided into twelve police districts under their own police commissioners, each with his own inspector, two sergeants and four police agents. The appointment of the commissioners of police in Amsterdam had just begun when, on the 25 March 1811, an imperial decree issued a new *Règlement général à l'organisation de la police de l'Empire*. Four classes of police official were distinguished within an hierarchical framework: Directors-General, an office introduced in 1808; general commissioners; special commissioners, charged exclusively with the enforcement of the Continental System; and the ordinary commissioners of police in the towns. The appointments of all the police officers had to be made by the central government and, ultimately, by the Emperor. However, the towns in which the officer served were obliged to pay their salaries, or at least a substantial part of them.¹¹

With the exception of the special commissioners, these offices were already established, as were the police duties attached to them. However, under the new regulations, the local police commissioners were now thoroughly integrated into the central police machinery. Henceforth, the state had eyes and ears everywhere.

The first police commissioners appointed were the twelve commissioners of Amsterdam in March 1811. Almost all the other police commissioners in Holland were appointed in two successive waves of April and June 1811.

Regarding the appointment of the higher police officers in Holland, it is striking that only French officials were eligible, another clear instance of how important police organization was to the key interests of the central government. Devilliers was a protégé of the head of the first police district, Pierre-François Réal. Before his appointment in Holland he had served as general commissioner of Boulogne-sur-Mer. Little is known about the personal history of De Marivault who was appointed as general commissioner of Rotterdam in January 1811. However, he was certainly an experienced French police officer as were the special commissioners: Malleval (Island of Texel), Babut (Den Helder), Pondeville (Petten), Eymard (The Hague) and Mariandier (Island of Goeree). They had worked at the office of the general police commissioners of Livorno, Bordeaux, Marseille, Boulogne-sur-Mer and Genoa respectively before coming to Holland. The other four special commissioners had all been members of the State Council before they started their police work.¹²

Unlike the higher police officers, the ordinary commissioners of police were almost all Dutch, although some strategic exceptions were made, again for the most populated cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague.¹³

The role and impact of the police during the Occupation

As a result of the appointment of commissioners of police in the towns, the police force during the Occupation was greater than under Louis. There was also a significant change in its range of duties.

A police instruction drawn up by Devilliers in July 1811 probably best represents what the police was meant to do under the Occupation. In fact Devilliers captures in a nutshell the development of the police in the last two decades in France. In this circular the Director-General distinguishes three main fields of police activity: the supreme police, the municipal police and the judicial police. The first field covers everything involving state security, the regime and society in general. Devilliers typifies the task of the supreme police as the control of public opinion, the surveillance of religious and political gatherings, the control of internal order and the enforcement of the Continental System. Second, as a municipal police officer, the commissioner of police was especially responsible for maintaining public order in his

town. More specifically, he was to keep an eye on church services, markets and road safety, as well as on beggars, quack doctors and prostitutes. Third, the judicial police was concerned with guaranteeing the administration of justice, through arresting criminals and gathering evidence.¹⁴

Devilliers' instruction clearly demonstrates the difference between the police force under the Occupation and that of the Kingdom of Holland. While Louis' police force was mainly concerned with controlling suspicious foreigners, the force during the Occupation was basically designed to control the nation itself.

The permanent control of society was put into practice through strict press control, day and night street patrols, and the secret observation of public and private places such as societies, shops, inns and churches. Large sums were set aside for this kind of police work. In Devilliers' budget for 1811 this sum was already 10,000 francs, one fifth of the total amount his service was officially allowed to spend. In 1812 Devilliers' total budget was raised by an annual income of 20,000 francs, including a proportional raise for secret police work.¹⁵ At police headquarters in Amsterdam a special *Bureau de la Police Secrète* was also set up. According to a list, which is kept in the Archives Nationales in Paris, it employed at least 35 secret agents in 1812.¹⁶

This secret police work made a great impact on the daily lives of ordinary people. Fear of secret police activity coloured private life; as memoirs show, people often went on reading illegal anti-Napoleonic writings among family and friends in their private homes, but only after taking intensive precautions.¹⁷ Jokes about the Emperor, which were made in tow barges, shops or just on the street could get someone into very serious trouble. In June 1811 a man in Amsterdam was even sentenced to death by a Military Commission, which accused him of taking part in an uprising in the city in April 1811. He had not been on the scene but was nevertheless arrested that day because he had insulted Napoleon in a private conversation on his doorstep, which unfortunately was overheard by a police spy.¹⁸ In this respect, it is significant that the police could arrest citizens considered to be suspect, without the knowledge of the judiciary. These suspects could be held for unlimited periods in special police prisons, the *prisons d'Etat* in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Groningen, which were established under the decree of 3 March 1810.¹⁹

The significance of the police in Holland and Dutch protest during the Napoleonic period

It is important to remember that the police were not the only repressive force at the disposal of the Napoleonic regime in Holland.²⁰ In brief, two major observations about Napoleonic repression in Holland can be made.

Firstly, there were general and special forces of control. The general forces included the regular administrative and judicial institutions and, after 1806, the new police authorities. Under Louis, the local administrative authorities,

especially the burgomasters of the big cities, were primarily responsible for maintaining public order in the towns, although in case of riots there was often a conflict over competence with the judicial authorities, especially with the *hoofdofficier*. During the Occupation the number of special corps increased rapidly. Besides *gardes champêtres* and the different corps of customs officials, who could also act as a fierce instrument of repression, were paramilitary units like the National Guard, or truly military forces, such as the Departmental Guards and, of course, the Gendarmerie. Under both the Kingdom of Holland and the Occupation military forces were used regularly in times of trouble to restore civil order.²¹

Secondly, repression under Louis differed significantly from that under the Occupation. Louis was reluctant to use violence and preferred a policy of civil reconciliation, whereas, from the outset of the annexation Napoleon initiated a policy of harsh military repression and coercion, including the use of arbitrary Military Commissions.²²

In contrast to the long-standing image of peace and passivity presented by Dutch historiography, the Napoleonic period should really be considered as a time of turmoil rather than one of peace. Literally hundreds of protests are recorded for the Napoleonic years, when a wide variety of acts of unrest, incitement and protest are taken into consideration. These actions included more than eighty revolts, which we can define under the terms of the *Code Pénal* as breaches of the peace in which twenty or more people, collectively and violently, challenged the authorities in public. Even though Louis' government had already had to deal with considerable unrest, protests intensified enormously after June 1810. Fifty-nine revolts, or 67 per cent of the total revolts in the Napoleonic years, took place under the Occupation.²³

The difference between the police in the two periods of the Kingdom and the Occupation is reflected in the way people protested. During the Kingdom of Holland, opposition to police officials was minimal; occasionally a skirmish occurred between the locals and a police officer in the coastal villages, as in April 1808 in Egmond on Sea, where a police inspector was attacked with stones and his daughter threatened by local seamen with a vicious dog, but the connection between the police and the state was never made.²⁴

However, during the Occupation such a connection was certainly present, and various major conflicts between the people and police did occur. The riots in Arnhem, Rotterdam, Scheveningen and The Hague in 1812 and the great Amsterdam conscription revolt in April 1811 are all examples of this.²⁵

Yet the most violent protest against the police was the November rising in 1813 in Amsterdam. This revolt started on the evening of 15 November 1813 with a march on the town centre by some women, agitated by anti-French and pro-Orangist rumours. Soon they were joined by a wide cross-section of the working classes, and within an hour the city was in total revolt. Terrified by the angry masses, Lebrun, the French Governor-General, fled to Utrecht in the early morning of 16 November and went on almost

immediately thereafter to France. In his wake, all the French high officials fled Amsterdam, including Devilliers. On the second day of the uprising, the masses surrounded the police prison in the town and liberated between 130 and 180 prisoners.²⁶ After freeing political prisoners in other jails, the crowd marched from one police post to the next and assaulted the police headquarters, which was thoroughly ransacked and finally set alight. By then, Devilliers' flight was already known, so it seems this collective action was less of a practical and more of a symbolic significance. By attacking the police, the crowd was attacking the regime itself!

After the proclamation of a provisional administration at the city hall, the riots were all but over by the night of 16–17 November 1813. Nevertheless, the impact of the revolt was enormous, the instantaneous flight of Lebrun virtually terminated French rule in Holland.

State Police and Police State and the limits of Napoleonic repressive police power

By concentrating our attention on the relationship between the origins of the police and the development of the modern state, it is clear that the police in Napoleonic Holland was certainly an instrument of the state. It was the central government which took the initiative of setting up a police force and later it was that same government which exercised control over it. However, again it is essential to stress the great differences between the organization of the police force during the Kingdom of Holland and under the Occupation. In the first period, the police was literally a marginal phenomenon. The true police force was very small and competent only in the specific field of navigation. At most, one can speak of only a State Police at this time.

In the latter period, however, the police was a multi-faceted organization, which was thoroughly integrated into public and private life. Notwithstanding the validity of the debate on the use of alternative terms, the extensiveness and intensity of the impact of the new police, as expressed in its hierarchy, the wide variety of public and secret activities it undertook, and its broad powers in the field of the supreme police, justify calling the Occupation a Police State.²⁷

Moreover, the rebellion of 15 and 16 November 1813 in Amsterdam underlines an intensive use of police prisons, typical of a police state. As we have seen, at least 130 political prisoners were liberated. In this respect, it is important to observe that the masses were acting very purposefully and that they deliberately did not intend to free common criminals. The large number of police prisoners in Amsterdam is surprising and seems to show us that, if studied at a local level, the view of the Napoleonic police as relatively less repressive needs some modification, at least towards the end of Napoleon's reign.²⁸

Nevertheless, a reservation must be made regarding the significance of the police force, even during the time of the Occupation. The police certainly operated as a fearsome instrument of state in the Dutch departments of the Empire in the years 1810–13, but the practical constraints it faced meant that its repressive power should not be exaggerated. In the first place, there were few cities with a population of 5,000 in the north and east of the Netherlands and so there were fewer police officials in those parts of the country than in the west.

Also, police finances were often strained. Besides budgetary miscalculations, which were widespread, purposefully or not, police officials were underpaid. Their salaries were related to French prices, which were significantly below those in the Dutch departments. Many policemen were paid irregularly and, even if regularly, they were still confronted with a salary that was barely a subsistence wage.²⁹ This caused amusing as well as harrowing scenes. One such example is the case of the special commissioner of Hellevoetsluis, who had to run an office in a pub for a long while, because the local administration of his jurisdiction could not pay the rent for a more appropriate location.

By contrast, a harrowing example is the situation of the commissioner of police of Veendam, who, because he was constantly forgotten in the budget, fell into such terrible poverty that his wife died from hardship in the spring of 1812.³⁰

Predictably, these financial troubles had their implications for police work. Certain duties could not be carried out properly, partly because no money was available and partly because the underpaid policemen were not really committed to their jobs.

A final, telling, example of the distressed state of police officials in Dutch departments can be found in Lebrun's letter to the Minister of General Police, Savary, of 22 January 1813, in which the Governor-General recommends a special commissioner, Eymard, for a vacancy in France, because the general lot of a police officer in Holland was devoid of prospects and *bien misérable*.³¹

Epilogue

The police force was introduced into the Netherlands for the first time in the Napoleonic period. In both sub-periods, the Kingdom of Holland (1806–10) and the Occupation (1810–13), the police operated as an instrument of state. However there were fundamental differences between the two regimes. During the Kingdom of Holland, the police remit of the Minister of Justice and Police was, indeed, extensive but the true police force was very small and competent only in the specific field of navigation. Because of their organization and operational capabilities, most certainly one can speak of a State Police during this time.

During the Occupation, however, the police force was much larger than during the Kingdom of Holland and the intensity and impact of its actions also changed substantially. The local police commissioners were thoroughly integrated in the central police machinery and the police officials were now competent in a broad field of activities, above all overseeing public safety and public order. The permanent control of society, the spying of secret agents and the broad powers in the field of the supreme police justify the conclusion that there was a Police State in the last phase of the Napoleonic period in Holland.

After the Napoleonic period the police remained one of the instruments of the further evolution of the modern nation state. Nevertheless, the fearsome deployment of the police during the Occupation was not completely erased from the Dutch collective consciousness. The police became the subject of complex and intense political discussion during the decades after 1813, until the municipal police and the central police, both branches of the former Napoleonic police system, were moulded as separate police organs in 1851, in the wake of important legal and administrative reforms.³²

Notes

1. Louis Bonaparte, *Documents historiques et réflexions sur le gouvernement de la Hollande*, vol 3 (Amsterdam, 1820), 80.
2. Stadsarchief, Amsterdam (SAA) 5053, Nieuw Stedelijk Bestuur (NstB) 231, Wethouders, Bijlagen Notulen, 5 August 1806 (instruction).
3. For more detail see Johan Joor, *De Adelaar en het Lam. Onrust, opruiing en onwilligheid in Nederland ten tijde van het Koninkrijk Holland en de Inlijving bij het Franse Keizerrijk (1806–1813)* (Amsterdam, 2000), 418–20.
4. Ibid. and Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (NADH), Rijksarchief Zuid-Holland (RAZH), Hof van Justitie, 5636, Criminele Zaken, 1 (Van der Hoven) ([concept] instruction).
5. On the Continental System, see Joor, *De Adelaar en het Lam*, 413–444 and Simon Schama, *Patriots and Liberators. Revolution in the Netherlands 1780–1813* (New York, 1977), 561–577.
6. 'Empêchez donc le peau de transpirer!', Bonaparte, *Documents historiques*, vol. 1, 273.
7. See NADH, 2.01.10.04, Ministerie van Justitie en Politie (MvJP), 353, Index Verbaal, 'Commisen van Toezigt', 14 January 1809.
8. NADH, MvJP, 353, 'Maatregelen tot Zekerheid des Rijks', 6 June and 20 July 1808, and SAA, 5053, Burgemeester, 247, Bijlagen Verbaal, 23 July 1808.
9. M. Elisabeth Kluit, *Cornelis Felix van Maanen. Tot het herstel der onafhankelijkheid* (Groningen, 1954), 264–267. See also Matthijs Lok, *Windvanen. Napoleontische bestuurders in de Nederlandse en Franse Restauratie (1813–1820)* (Amsterdam, 2009), 247–292 and references to Van Maanen's vital role during early Dutch Restoration, 1813–1820.
10. Cyrille Fijnaut, *Opdat de macht een toevlucht zij? Een historische studie van het politieapparaat als een politieke instelling* (Antwerpen, 1979), 757–758.
11. *Réglement général à l'organisation de la police de L'Empire ... 25 Mars 1811*, in NADH, 2.01.12, Binnenlandse Zaken (BiZa), Intendance van Binnenlandse Zaken

- (IvBiZa), 1811–1813, Ingekomen Stukken, 986, Politie. See also Fijnaut, *Opdat de macht een toevlucht zij?*, 758 and 784–786. For more on police salaries, expenses etc. in Holland, see Archives Nationales, Paris (AN), F7, Police générale, 3224, 3225, comptabilité des commissaires généraux de police, An XII-1814, d'Amsterdam, 1811–1812; 1813. Idem, 3228, idem, ... 1813, Rotterdam and idem, 3232, idem, 1808–1814, Hardenberg, (le) Helder, Hellevoetsluis. In October 1811 a new regulation regarding the special commissioners in Holland was issued. Their salaries had to be financed out of the so-called '20° du revenue des communes' which until then were used to finance the 'compagnie de réserve', see NADH, BiZa, IvBiZa, 986, *Décret Impérial*, 23 October 1811.
12. *Règlement général*, 25 March 1811, art. 3 (selection higher police officials). Johanna W.A. Naber, *Overheersching en Vrijwording. Geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de Inlijving bij Frankrijk, juli 1810—november 1813* (Haarlem, 1913), 36 (Devilliers). BiZa, IvBiZa, 986, Decree of 23 January 1812 (personal information special commissioners). The other four special commissioners were stationed at Jever, Delfzijl, Dokkum and Hellevoetsluis.
 13. NADH, BiZa, IvBiZa, 986, *Etat Général des Commissaires de Police dans les Départements de la Hollande...*, 16 July 1812.
 14. AN, F7, 4217, [miscellaneous], *Instructiën voor den Dienst der Commissarissen van Politie*, 11 July 1811.
 15. AN, F7, 3224, *rapport Martignet à l'Empereur*, 1811 and idem, *Compte d'emploi des fonds mis à la disposition du Directeur General de la police en hollande*, 1er–4me trimestre, *fonds à la charge du Trésor Public* and *fonds à la charge de la ville d'Amsterdam*, 1811–1812.
 16. Idem, *Etat des agents secrets employés par le Directeur Général de la police en hollande pendant le courant de l'année 1812*.
 17. NADH, Collectie 077, Jorissen, 1777–1884, 89, Van der Chijs, *Mijne herinneringen uit de jaren 1810–1813*.
 18. Johan Joor, "'A very Rebellious Disposition": Dutch Experience and Popular Protest under the Napoleonic Regime (1806–1813)' in *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 1790–1820*, ed. Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall (Basingstoke, New York, 2009), 190. Spies in tow barges: Stads Archief Dordrecht, Dordrecht (SAD), Stadsarchieven, 1795–1813, Secretarie, II, Raad, Politie, 199c, Registers en dagrapporten, II, brieven commissaris van politie, (1811–1813), 23 April 1812.
 19. NADH, BiZa, IvBiZa, 986, *Arrêté SAS* [=Lebrun], 14 January 1811 (Amsterdam and Rotterdam). See also: AN, F7, 3308, [miscellaneous], [Zuiderzee], *Etat des individus de l'un et de l'autre sexe détenus par mesure de police administrative ou de sûreté dans les sept départements de la ci-devant hollande*, 15 March 1813.) (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Groningen and Emden, then part of the Dutch Departments).
 20. Joor, *De Adelaar en het Lam*, 571–674. See also Martijn van der Burg, 'Law Enforcement in Amsterdam: between Tradition and Modernization', in Manon van der Heijden et al., *Serving the Urban Community. The Rise of Public Services in the Low Countries* (Amsterdam, 2009), 217–241, www.lowcountries.nl/papers2009/papers2009_vanderburg.pdf ,(June 2009).
 21. Joor, *De Adelaar en het Lam*, 641–649.
 22. Joor, 'A very Rebellious Disposition', 187, 189–190.
 23. Joor, *De Adelaar en het Lam*, 620–622.
 24. NADH, 2.01.14.02, Ministerie van Oorlog (MvO), 1042, Verbaal, 23 August 1808 and idem, 1048, Relatieven Verbaal, 23 August 1808 and NADH, MvJP, 353, Index Verbaal, 160, 20 August 1808, 149.

25. Joor, *De Adelaar en het Lam*, 620–621. Idem, 'A very Rebellious Disposition', 189–90.
26. H. T. Colenbrander (ed.) 'Inlijving en Opstand', 1810–1813, in *Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840* ('s-Gravenhage, 1912), vol. VI, 1851, Letter from Provo Kluit to Van Maanen, 17 November 1813, 1,704–5. See for the November 1813 Revolt of Amsterdam also Joor, *De Adelaar en het Lam*, 211–212, 522–525.
27. Howard G. Brown, *Ending the French Revolution. Violence, Justice and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon* (Charlottesville and London, 2006), 343 ('Security State') and Michael Sibalis, 'The Napoleonic State', in *Napoleon and Europe*, ed. Philip G. Dwyer (Harlow, 2001), 79–80 ('Police State'). See also Jacques Godechot, *Les institutions de la France sous la Révolution et l'Empire* (Paris, 1985, 3rd edn), 624 and Thierry Lentz, 'La France et l'Europe de Napoléon 1804–1814', in idem, *Nouvelle histoire du Premier Empire* (Fayard, 2007), 313–31.
28. Michael Sibalis, 'Political Prisoners and State Prisons in Napoleonic France', in *Napoleon and His Empire. Europe 1804–1814*, ed. Philip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest (Basingstoke, New York, 2007), 96–113 and idem, 'The Napoleonic State', 93–94. Fijnaut gives a figure of 2,400 prisoners in all state prisons in France in 1814 in Fijnaut, *Opdat de macht een toevlucht zij?*, 788.
29. NADH, BiZa, IvBiZa, 986, *Copie d'une lettre écrite par le Ministre de l'intérieur à Mr. le Duc de Rovigo, Ministre de la police Générale*, Paris, 2 September 1813, attached to a note of Devilliers addressed to Lebrun, 14 September 1813 and idem, *Etat Général des Commissaires de Police dans les Departemens de la Hollande...*, 16 July 1812. Some examples of 'miscalculations' in the budget: idem, 6 July 1811 (Den Helder), 18 December 1811 (Monden van de Maas, Special Commissioner), 22 February 1812 (Amsterdam), 27 February 1812 (general note of Devilliers: the situation is alarming in many towns), 8 April 1812 (Hoorn).
30. NADH, BiZa, IvBiZa, 986, 8 April 1812 (Hellevoetsluis) and 31 March 1812 (Veendam).
31. AN, F7, 4291, Correspondance des ministres et des grand dignitaires, 1810–1814, Letter from Lebrun to Savary, Minister of General Police, 22 January 1813.
32. Cyrille Fijnaut, *De Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Politie. Een staatsinstelling in de maalstroom van de geschiedenis* (Amsterdam, 2007), 55.