

# 9

## Conclusion: Prospects for ACBF and African Human Development/Security

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*...trends signal a major tipping point in history. North-South relations have been dominant for some 200 years and current trends see the onset of an East-South turn.*

(Pieterse, 2011: 26)

### 9.1 Introduction

The world of 'development' at the turn of the decade is very different from the turn of the millennium (Desai and Potter, 2008) let alone in the immediate cold war period when the HDR was first generated (UNDP, 2010). Then, optimism surrounding political and economic liberalisation prevailed, characterized by the 'Washington Consensus'. Now, eroded by the continuing global crisis, optimism is in short supply. However, globalization has not been negative for all countries, communities and companies (Rudra, 2008). Rather, the traditional definition of geographical worlds of development – North, South, East and West (Hettne, 1995) – is being superseded by a tripartite differentiation into OECD, BRICs or 'emerging economies' or 'developmental states,' and fragile or failed states. As Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2011) suggests in the opening quotation, the new central axis may become South-East rather than North-South. In turn, the range, location and incidence of 'global' issues have evolved with special significance for the 'global South' (Reinert, 2007).

Hence any policy recommendations for state and non-state – private companies as well as civil societies – actors around the G20 especially the five BRICS need to be appropriate and innovative, not rehashes of the last six or more decades of 'development' desiderata. These increasingly revolve around novel formulae of 'global governance' for

development which bring myriad, heterogeneous actors together in extensive coalitions such as the Ottawa and Kimberley Processes, fisheries and forestry certification, etc (Cadman, 2011; Gale and Haward, 2011).

The preceding chapters provide snapshots of the several emerging 'worlds' of development at the end of the first decade of the new millennium, and policy responses to a set of new global issues and coalitions. They identify salient strands for policy development for state and inter-state organizations as well as non-state – corporate and civil society – concentrated around the G20 including the five BRICS. In turn, they highlight a set of relevant, revisionist, often overlapping analyses of both the global crisis and the elusiveness of global development.

Symptomatic of the new trio of worlds, in which the emerging 'second' (Khanna, 2009) is especially central, was the series of summits at the turn of the decade, ostensibly in response to the global financial crisis but in fact also in reaction to each other: from G20 in April 2009, though BRICs (and not yet BRICS) in mid-June to UN in late-June and regular G8 in July and onto another G20 in mid-September 2009 (Cooper and Subacchi, 2010) followed by the historic expansion of the four BRICs to include the Republic of South Africa as one of the BRICS. Attention to the majority of countries and communities in the South was minimal in all three, including the last at the General Assembly ([www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit](http://www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit)).

Arguably, part of the current international disarray reflects a crisis of confidence and reaction to the pressures of change. The global South was preoccupied in the post-war period with nationalist struggles followed by liberation wars. After a decade of *dependencia* and drought, neo-liberalism achieved hegemony, symbolized by ubiquitous structural adjustment programs (Amsden, 2007). But before the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, over-reliance on the market has been proven to be misplaced (Chang, 2008). Hence the rapid discovery of the G20 as a lifeline following the increasing institutionalisation of the 'Outreach 5' at successive G8s, most recently in the Heiligendamm Process (Cooper and Antkiewicz, 2008); but at the level of national leaders rather than its initial gathering of central bankers and finance ministers. Conspiracy theories tend to exaggerate, but we may yet seek to return to the halcyon days of the Trilateral Commission or G8 if the G20, augmented by the World Economic Forum ([www.weforum.org](http://www.weforum.org)), especially its GRI programme, fails to stabilise the global economy in the first half of the second decade of the present century at the levels of both prescriptions and relations.

## 9.2 'New' three worlds of development?

One reason for the apparent elusiveness of effective global governance for development is that the global economy is more diffuse than ever: the G8 even the OECD no longer monopolise (Lenderman, 2009). Rather, capital is increasingly located in the global South, especially the 'second world' (Khanna, 2009) epitomised by the BRICs. As Agtmael (2007) and Goldstein (2007) indicate, MNCs are increasingly from Mexico, Singapore and South Africa – by 2005, 34 corporations in the Fortune 500 were from the South, up from six a decade earlier – and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are concentrated in the Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and UAE, but also Azerbaijan, Botswana, Singapore and TandT as well as Alberta, Norway and Russia) (Xu and Bahgat, 2010). Hence the emergence of a debate about distinctions between emerging economies/markets/powers/societies (Pieterse and Rehbein, 2009)

Development studies and policies have increasingly come to recognise 'varieties of capitalisms', a trend which has accelerated with the profound difficulties confronting the established, trans-Atlantic 'Anglo-American' version in the continuing crisis. The notion of the BRICs as the centrepiece of the burgeoning 'emerging markets' is a creation of Jim O'Neill at Goldman Sachs ([www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/global](http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/global)).

Symptomatic of the changing global economy was the first BRIC summit of four heads of emerging powers as well as emerging markets/economies in Yekaterinburg, Russia in June 2009 complete with its own logo ([www.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/bric\\_1.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/bric_1.shtml)), between the first two G20 Summits of Heads in London in April and Pittsburgh in mid-September 2009 ([www.g20.org](http://www.g20.org)). But this has since been capped in early-2011 by the first five-power BRICS meeting in Southern China

And 'global civil society' is likewise increasingly located in as well as focused on the global South, symbolised by the World Social Forums in Porto Alegre, Brazil and elsewhere from the start of the new century ([www.forumsocialmundial.org](http://www.forumsocialmundial.org)). Among the larger INGOs are the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) and Civicus and the Bangladeshi 'twins,' BRAC and Grameen. One World Trust has undertaken a series of comparative analyses of the degree of accountability and transparency in major INGOs, MNCs and intergovernmental organizations. The '2008 Global Accountability Report' ([www.oneworldtrust.org](http://www.oneworldtrust.org)) reports on 90 organizations over three years – 30 of each category – since ranking began in 2006.

### 9.3 'New' global issues

The range of 'global' issues has proliferated since the end of the cold war in Africa as elsewhere with profound implications for development policy and practice (UNDP, 2010): from a preoccupation around fear of nuclear conflict to a shifting range of concerns, the ranking of which varies depending on analytic assumptions, regional location, policy priorities and preferred sequences:

- *climate change*, with implications not only for the longevity of some island states (Cooper and Shaw, 2009) but also for demand, price and supply of energy, food and water. Africa will remain particularly vulnerable to climate change because of its overdependence on rain-fed agriculture, compounded by factors such as widespread poverty and weak capacity to respond to shocks. The other longer-term impacts include: changing rainfall patterns affecting agriculture and reducing food security; decreasing fish resources in large lakes due to rising temperature; shifting vector-borne diseases; rising sea level affecting low-lying coastal areas with large populations; and rising water stress;
- *protracted conflicts* centred on the 50 or so failed or fragile states, not only around Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan but also regions like the Horn and Great Lakes in Africa, leading to endless debates about peace-building/-making, responsibility to protect (R2P), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). There have been increasing attempts to rethink security in Africa (Senghor and Poku, 2007). The effort to set up the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that embraces conflict prevention, management and resolution at continental and regional levels (AU and RECs) is a major development. It moves beyond the traditional approach that was obsessed with protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty. The adoption of the African Peer Review Mechanism and the debate on peer review has created new momentum and space for civil society organisations to determine parallel processes to hold African governments and leaders to account for stated commitments and decisions (Cilliers, 2004).
- *diasporas*, including cultural industries as aspects of the burgeoning global service sector, as well as dealing with the effects of growing migration;
- *the ubiquitous drug/gangs/guns nexus*, which is increasingly transnational with various 'mafias' and supply chains leading towards the 'privatization' of security as well as the securitization of development. Unfortunately most studies on the subject of terror have focussed on

the international dimension or manifestations, yet sub-national and state terror have for long been a feature of Africa's security landscape. Failed or collapsed states such as Somalia have become free-trade zones for the underworld, where black markets for arms, diamonds, human trafficking, passports and narcotics thrive, and local players are linked to the global underworld economy;

- *gender and 'global' civil society*, as features of popular responses to developmental deficits, both local to international NGOs, now including faith-based organizations (FBOs) and substantial novel private foundations like the Gates and Clinton Foundations (Rushton and Williams, 2011). There are greater efforts at fighting social exclusion, be it (a) individual and group-based; or (b) rights-based.
- *resources*, both renewable and otherwise, especially energy, food, and minerals, increasingly in demand from the BRICs, leading to prospects of resource wars as well as a creeping resource curse (to which EITI is intended as a pre-emptive response; see next section); and
- *viruses*, as unanticipated consequences of globalization, not just ebola, HIV/AIDS and SARS but also the growing danger of multiplication and mutation of zoonotic diseases from animals to humans.

#### 9.4 'New' global coalitions for development?

Just as global development has evolved quite significantly since the end of the cold war, so have international organizations. They have been transformed into 'global governance' involving a fluid, heterogeneous set of actors on an expanding range of issues from conflicts to viruses; what Brown (2011) calls heterogeneous 'transnational transfers'.

Dingwerth (2008) suggests that private transnational governance has paid insufficient attention to the South. His trio of case studies consists of the World Commission on Dams (WCD), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) (Cadman, 2011 and Gale and Haward, 2011), though he mentions many others like the Fair Labour Association (FLA), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) etc. The only World Commission based in the South – the WCD has incorporated non-state actors like MNCs and NGOs, with profound implications for its findings and proposals (Khagram, 2004).

Here in terms of global, particularly African, development we would highlight landmines and blood diamonds in the Ottawa and Kimberley Processes, along with the fisheries and forestry certification schemes.

But we would also note the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) ([www.eitransparency.org](http://www.eitransparency.org)) and Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) and now Diamond Development and International Cocoa Initiatives even if these are more recent and untested: how accountable, transparent, sustainable are they?

By way of transition to the last section, we would note the connection between EITI and the G8. This Initiative was formalised as part of Tony Blair's Commission for Africa – Our Common Interest (2005) ([www.commissionforafrica.org](http://www.commissionforafrica.org)) – at the 2005 Summit in Gleneagles and it has since been established with headquarters in Oslo ([www.eitransparency.org](http://www.eitransparency.org)), though its impact has yet to be truly assessed.

### 9.5 'New' policies for global development after 2010?

In conclusion, we reflect on the prospects for new policies and perspectives, which are inevitably interrelated. First, in terms of global development policies, aside from the desiderata of the Monterrey Consensus, more, better, harmonised ODA might be expected from the EU of 27 under its set of post-Lome EPAs as well as from the BRICs, with China being especially generous with its extra-DAC grants. New and very large private foundations like Gates and Clinton are especially involved in advancing health in Africa. Assistance increasingly comes from major INGOs including FBOs and investment is being secured from several SWFs (Xu and Bahgat, 2010), some of which are interested in food security, leading to extensive land purchases in the South. However, while some may favour a Beijing Consensus to supersede the discredited Washington one, the notion of a G2 between the US and China has already been dismissed (Economy and Segal, 2009).

In addition, in response to the Doha Round etc, as indicated in our Introduction, a set of innovative sources for financing development has been identified by the 'Leading Group' of states ([www.leadinggroup.org](http://www.leadinggroup.org)) and by African, Commonwealth and other NGOs:

The Leading Group (on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development) has...an expanding agenda which now includes, *inter alia*:

- The airline ticket levy and UNITAID;
- The International Financing Facility;
- The International Financing Facility for Immunisation;
- The issue of illicit flows, capital flight and tax evasion;
- The Currency Transaction Tax;
- Advanced market commitments for vaccine development;

A new issue of Special Drawing Rights;

Carbon taxes;

Migrants' remittances;

Digital solidarity

(Commonwealth 2008: 8)

And, finally, we suggest some novel perspectives which arise for a variety of disciplines and debates around African/global development (UNDP, 2010):

- *comparative politics: developmental versus fragile states* – how to progress from the latter to the former in a sustainable way without succumbing to the resource curse?
- *development studies* – proliferation of issues and actors, especially around 'Asian drivers' and Southern MNCs and their impacts in Africa, Caribbean and other regions;
- *international political economy* – recognition of MNCs located in the South, not just in the BRICs, along with ubiquitous drug/gang/guns nexus involving extensive money-laundering facilities;
- *international relations/multipolarity* – greater equality and decentralization among 200 states and myriad non-state actors or the emergence of new hegemonies such as the BRICs/BRICS and their MNCs and SWFs?
- *global governance/multilateralisms* – going beyond traditional inter-governmental law and organizations to recognise and advance emerging partnerships around corporate social responsibility as well as novel coalitions and processes such as Kimberley and Ottawa Processes, Forestry and Marine Stewardship Councils ([www.fsc.org](http://www.fsc.org); [www.msc.org](http://www.msc.org)) (Cadman, 2011 and Gale and Haward, 2011) while also lamenting minimal momentum in other areas like child soldiers of small arms;
- *global studies* – reaching beyond inter- and non-governmental relations to emerging transnational global structures, attention to which is increasingly reflected in academic programmes, publications, associations etc; and
- *security studies* – treating both 'old' and 'new' or 'critical' security along with diverse forms of privatization and 'civil-military relations'.

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