Conclusion: Philosophy and the Limits of Logic in Kant and Hegel

Abstract

In Kant, transcendental philosophy and general and pure logic are two distinct disciplines. They each have distinct modes of exposition, objects, and goals. General logic treats of the rules of cognition independent of any relation to an object — it consists of the rules of thought in general. Logic is composed of a set of determinations that correspond to the form of thinking. Transcendental logic, especially the Transcendental Analytic, concerns the conditions for the possibility of thinking an object. As such, the transcendental philosophy is concerned with the relation of thought to objects given in space and time. Transcendental logic is also formal, but it is the form of thought in relation to an object. If the transcendental logic takes as its task understanding the conditions for the possibility of thought thinking an object given in experience, then it seeks an understanding of the condition for truth itself. For without the possibility of the relation of thought to an object, the material conditions of truth could never be achieved. General and pure logic is considered by Immanuel Kant as laying out the negative conditions for the possibility of truth. Logical validity is a necessary condition for determinate truth, but is insufficient because it has no way to determine the material correspondence of an object to what is thought of it.