‘A Cardinal Point of Our World Strategy’: The Foreign Office and the Normalisation of Relations with Japan, 1952–63

Abstract

One of the great ironies of the Cold War was that the new strategic paradigm created by the need to contain Soviet expansion meant that many members of the ‘free world’, including Britain, now found themselves ranged alongside their former enemies from the Second World War in the shape of West Germany, Italy and Japan. Indeed, the denial of all three of these countries to the Soviet bloc was one of the most important strategic goals in the post-war world. As Saki Dockrill demonstrated in her first book, this new reality meant that Britain had soon to contemplate and approve the rearmament of its recent German foe.¹ Moreover, in order to seal the security of Western Europe, it was necessary for Britain to encourage the development of a military alliance in the form of NATO that would see Italy join as a founder member in 1949, with West German entry coming in 1955.² These were undoubtedly tough decisions to take, for memories of the recent war naturally led many amongst the British elite and public to view these new allies with distaste and suspicion, but the exigencies of national security meant that sentiment could not be allowed to trump pragmatism.³