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## Introduction: The Great War and Veterans' Internationalism

*Julia Eichenberg and John Paul Newman*

The Great War created a new social group throughout Europe: ex-servicemen. Mass conscription and total warfare led to a vast number of combatants returning from the various battlefields. Unlike previous wars and times – and in what turned out to be a long-term legacy of the First World War – veterans emerged as a distinct group, defined by a construction of war commemoration and identity, as well as by their legal demands and rights.

The destructive capacity of the First World War and the divisive legacies the conflict left throughout Europe and the wider world are not in doubt. Quite rightly, historians have written at great length about the twentieth century's 'seminal catastrophe' (George F. Keenan) and the tense 'twenty year armistice' (Ferdinand Foch) left in its wake. But, in charting a course directly from the First World War to the Second World War, historians are at risk of neglecting equally important 'positive' legacies left by the conflict. Zara Steiner's ground-breaking history of Europe during the first decade after the First World War highlights the positive steps taken towards reconstruction and reconciliation across the continent after the war.<sup>1</sup> Steiner's work also takes into account the radical departures in international relations embodied in institutions such as the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization. Similarly, and often following her lead, other recent works have emphasized the contingency of the inter-war period, showing that there were many and various developments after the First World War, not all destructive, and not all leading to renewed conflict.<sup>2</sup> The international veterans' movement was one of them.

More specifically concerned with consequences of the war is, for example, the recently published biography of French activist and *ancien combattant* René Cassin by Antoine Prost and Jay Winter; a work which

eschews prevailing periodization to show how an influential individual was shaped by pre-war and wartime experiences, and in turn went on to shape inter-war and post-1945 history.<sup>3</sup> In this way, Prost and Winter are able to escape hermetically sealed time-frames and teleological conclusions about the inevitability of the Second World War.<sup>4</sup>

This volume aims to contribute to this growing body of research. It sheds light on the positive and constructive steps taken towards international co-operation and reconciliation. More specifically, it is concerned with analysing the important role played by veterans of the First World War in creating this long-lasting international culture of peace and reconciliation. One of the most important legacies of the war was the creation of a mass, transnational cohort of men bound by the fact that they had all served as soldiers during the war. With very few exceptions, veterans were a new phenomenon within their own nation states and on the international stage. As the first example of 'total war' (Chickering, Förster), the First World War involved the mass participation of populations across the continent; conscription, 'citizen armies' and the *Levée en Masse* meant that men from various backgrounds and of differing social status served together in uniform. Their status as veterans after 1918 raised a number of new questions about the presence of ex-soldiers in society, their entitlement in terms of welfare (pensions, disability benefits, etc.) and their role in politics and on the international stage. On this last point, once again, historians of fascism and the European right in the inter-war period have dwelt at length on the enduring camaraderie and the 'trenchocracy' (to use a term allegedly introduced by Mussolini himself) which led ex-servicemen – most notably in Italy and Germany – to duplicate the military forms and practices they had experienced during 1914–1918. But there is another, equally important, side to this story: the many men who returned from war committed not to its continuation but to its cessation, and not to a radical nationalist agenda but to one of internationalism. Whereas it could be argued that the 'dead-end' of right-wing veterans' militancy arrived with the end of the Second World War, this volume will show that the traditions of internationalism, of commitment to international institutions as the foundations of a peaceful community of nation states, and of a universalist welfare programme, were highly influential in the inter-war period and went on to survive into the post-1945 world.

So far, veterans have been examined primarily in a national framework. At first sight, veterans might seem like the paradigm of a national interest group. They volunteered – or were conscripted – to fight for their nation state, they experienced war within the lines of their national

armies. The experience of fighting and extreme violence could reinforce the demarcation of members of other nations, specifically those of the enemies. At the same time, the common experience of soldiers fighting for their home country enforced a sense of a specific national identity. Looking closer at the life of soldiers' and former soldiers, however, it is obvious that the phenomenon of the veterans' movement goes beyond national borders. Ute Frevert pointed out that the Great War constituted a powerful transnational experience, a period of multinational contacts and transfers.<sup>5</sup> This experience naturally influenced veterans' lives and mind-sets in the post-war period, and left them feeling a bond that distinguished them from 'civilians' – for better or for worse. This was especially true with regard to the many ex-servicemen, who, due to the massive changes to European political landscapes and borders after 1918, did not necessarily share their war experience with ex-servicemen of the same national citizenship.

War experiences were manifold, and they could not be separated according to the post-1918 national borders. By the same token, the interests of veterans were of transnational relevance. Ex-soldiers of all states struggled with problems of demobilization, that is to say, with problems of re-integration into the labour markets and claiming social benefits. Throughout the world, they were concerned with their medical, material and social needs, and also with their political lobbying power. Beyond national boundaries, veterans expanded their activities to an international level, seeking contacts and collaboration with their fellow ex-servicemen. Returning home to a civilian life and trying to re-adapt after the long absence pointed out to many of them that they had more in common with ex-servicemen of other states than with the broader civilian population; this was even more true in the case of disabled veterans. Just as being a soldier of the Great War was a transnational experience, so was being a veteran of the Great War. This transnational experience provided the basis for the emergence of an international veterans' movement, embodied not only, but predominantly by the inter-Allied veterans' organization FIDAC and the international veterans and war victims' organization CIAMAC.

Therefore, this volume will explore veterans and veterans' transnational activism at an international level. Veterans' internationalism distinguishes two different, sometimes intertwined, spheres. On the one hand, connections between the former Allied powers became highly influential, because they controlled international relations – this also shaped the emergence of veteran internationalism. This aspect of veteran internationalism focused on the former war alliances as the foundation for future collaboration

between states and between veterans. Accordingly, Allied veterans sought to maintain their links and were involved in an inter-Allied transnational network to promote a peaceful political international system, relying on the existing treaties. In societies that were victorious and helped make the peace, veterans are often considered less likely to engage in political violence. But veterans' internationalism could also transcend these war alliances. Many ex-soldiers from different countries all over the world believed that stable peace could only be achieved through reconciliation with former enemies. Thus, a significant number of veterans' organizations followed a more international approach to achieve a lasting peace and to promote a political international system which regulated non-armed state conflicts.<sup>6</sup>

In the reading and usage of transnationalism, the editors embrace the suggestion of Patricia Clavin to represent the transnational community as a honeycomb, in which the respective national group forms a larger unity with its own identity.<sup>7</sup> The coherence of this volume is structured accordingly: each chapter deals with an individual national case study, but follows the same key questions with regard to their respective engagement in international activities. While the veterans' meetings may be described as international encounters, the network and the identities formed are truly transnational, constructing their own aims and dynamics via communication processes and personal encounters. In this understanding, transnational history does not claim to compete, but to give a new perspective to the history of international relations.<sup>8</sup>

### **International veterans' associations – how they form and how they function**

A network of contacts developed from the collaboration of First World War veterans in international ex-servicemen's associations to form a new transnational infrastructure, in particular the *Fédération Interalliée des Anciens Combattants* (FIDAC) and the *Conférence Internationale des Associations de Mutilés et Anciens Combattants* (CIAMAC). Annual meetings, lively correspondence and personal contacts created a transnational community. Even ex-combatants who fought each other only a short time ago now cultivated a joint commemoration of the dead and engaged in pursuing common interests.

Initiated by the mostly pacifist French ex-servicemen, FIDAC was founded in 1920 as an assembly of veterans who had served the armed forces of the Allies. FIDAC wanted to provide a forum for an inter-Allied commemoration of war and the dead, to organize inter-Allied assemblies

and thereby conserve an inter-Allied comradeship of ex-servicemen.<sup>9</sup> Membership was restricted to veterans of the Allied forces. This, among other reasons, set the need for the foundation of a second organization.

CIAMAC aimed to unite all ex-servicemen and war invalids of the Great War, including the former enemies: Germany, Austria and Bulgaria. Again, the idea of founding the organization was initiated by French veterans' associations. Both the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the League of Nations supported the co-operation of ex-servicemen, intending to take advantage of its network, in awareness that the associations of invalids and ex-servicemen seem to provide an effective way to campaign the ideas of both organizations. 'They count more than 10 million members, are highly organized and hold a periodic press, which is read by all their members with the utmost attention.'<sup>10</sup>

Both FIDAC and CIAMAC stated as their principal aims 'the protection of material and moral interests of war victims and former combatants'. The material interests meant welfare and supply, the moral interest referred to an active engagement against war.<sup>11</sup> The majority of FIDAC members eventually decided to join CIAMAC (with the notable exception of the British Legion), but despite this and their frequent collaboration the two organizations remained fundamentally distinct in their world-view. While CIAMAC envisaged international reconciliation on a level that eventually would lead to appeasement, FIDAC was based on a belief in the continuity of wartime alliances into peacetime. To pursue their principal aims, to fight the case of First World War veterans, they were, however, ready to collaborate. Their shared past motivated the ex-servicemen to unite in transnational organizations to fight a common battle: against the threat of a new upcoming war. Not just in spite of, but in fact because of being ex-servicemen, they thought of themselves as morally able, responsible and justified to step up for peace. Not surprisingly, CIAMAC, with its programmatic reconciliation with former non-Allies and the proximity to the League of Nations, was the most pacifistic. But even FIDAC, with its continuity of wartime alliances, stated disarmament and arbitration in international and bi-national conflicts as one of its major policies. By supporting new international politics, based on conflict resolution, their activities for the League of Nations and their international collaboration, the veterans qualify as a 'proactive' peace movement.<sup>12</sup>

The aim of the transnational veterans' movement to support demands for disarmament, peaceful conflict solutions and pacifism provided a dilemma for most of the participating former combatants. Veterans chose a 'non-dogmatic concept of pacifism' that denied militarism and

supported any form of peace-building and peace-keeping policy, but allowed defence.<sup>13</sup> In doing so, ex-servicemen often found themselves in direct opposition to the more nationalized and militarized policies of their own national governments. The assembled veterans' organizations tried to use their moral capital as war victims and ex-servicemen. By taking a firm stand on the subject of war, the veterans opposed their respective national slants for the benefit of the common interest of a transnational ex-servicemen's community. Besides the actual reduction of weapons and arms, the former combatants demanded a demilitarization of thoughts and the elimination of prejudices and hate among nations, and the moral disarmament of European societies.<sup>14</sup>

In addition to their fight against a new war, veterans continued fighting to solve the tragic heritage of the previous one. International contacts provided an opportunity to bundle their interests and demands for pensions and medical care and to strengthen their position at home by exchanging knowledge and strategies with their peers. As early as 1921, invalids' organizations from France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Austria and Poland addressed the joint wish for international meetings and turned to the ILO for support.<sup>15</sup> They were trying to achieve international or, failing that, bi-lateral conventions on prostheses and pensions for war invalids. In a joint resolution they declared the setting up of international committees inquiring into questions of medical care and prostheses and the continuation of international meetings on a regular basis on the problems of war invalids.<sup>16</sup> They hoped the ILO could back up their demands for war invalids pensions, especially for those who lived beyond the borders of their native country. As their demands met the interests of the ILO, director Albert Thomas sponsored these beginnings of transnational exchange. Starting in 1922, the ILO issued a journal '*Mensuel d'information*' in French, English and German, dealing with central questions of invalids care. Furthermore, 1922 saw the first ILO-organized international conference on the topic. Among ten experts present, six had been commissioned by the veterans' organizations, among them René Cassin and Henri Pichot. A following conference, in 1923, featuring representatives of a vast number of veterans' organizations (including Australia, South Africa and Canada), focused on the re-integration of invalids into working life.<sup>17</sup> These conferences were the first step to the foundation of CIAMAC.

From the late 1920s on, both FIDAC and CIAMAC not only dedicated a large part of their journals to articles on pensions and welfare, but began to compare the living standards in the respective member countries systematically. This marks the change from passive comparison to

following a decisive strategy to use shared information as a capital to better promote demands on the national level. Articles and comparative tables show the retrieval and processing of information offered to be used in national contexts. Information and numbers were usually provided by the national veterans' movements, but also taken from official governmental statements and sometimes implemented by ILO and LoN statistics.<sup>18</sup> Over the years FIDAC and CIAMAC professionalized their comparisons, converted currencies, adapted the same criteria for welfare and included results of questionnaires collected from their members. Also, the retrieved data were more and more put into perspective and discussed as a core interest of the veterans' movement: as General Marco Nikiforov (Bulgaria) pointed out:

Our aim is to facilitate the understanding of legislation within the individual countries by comparison. This way countless organizations in different countries are able to combine their demands. Should these demands be granted, we will be able to achieve respective legislation in those countries. These are the means to achieve an pan-European legislation. War victims have repeatedly postulated their claims with reference to similar benefits in other countries. This method has proven to be successful.<sup>19</sup>

With regard to the material interests and the welfare debate, this volume wants to discuss the extent to which the social group of veterans was defined by their interaction with the state, legislation and welfare demands. With regard to their engagement at an international level, it asks how important material issues were compared to more ideological agendas. Finally, it will address the question of what impact the membership in FIDAC and CIAMAC had on the national veterans' movements.

### **Internationalism vs brutalization**

Until recently historiography of First World War veterans has been dominated by the 'brutalization thesis', based on the works of George Mosse. The impact of the experience of war and violence on the brutalization and radicalization of soldiers has perhaps been overemphasized, meaning that studies of the veteran movement have been more likely to stress the importance of the nation and to reject national and ethnic minorities and other nationalities more generally.<sup>20</sup> The experience of war, as much of the existing historiography would have it, led to a constant affirmation of wartime values, less peaceful and less

democratic than those of other people. But one need not presume that this was the only path taken by veterans after the First World War. This book wants to emphasize an alternative line, stating that it was exactly the experience of violence that led millions of men to engage in international collaboration and to promote peace.<sup>21</sup> The role played by veterans in the creation, promotion and support of international organizations after 1918 is just as important as the role they played in the rise of radical right and authoritarian movements. Through veteran organizations, many ex-servicemen made sincere attempts to maintain a peaceful internationalism in the inter-war period. Moreover, many veterans fully supported the work of international organizations such as the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization; organizations which they saw as instrumental in creating a peaceable system of international relations after 1918.

There is, however, an important caveat to this challenge of the 'brutalization' thesis in the study of the veteran's movement. The authors are aware of the extent to which Italian Fascism and German National Socialism used the legacy of the First World War and war veterans as a means of legitimizing their authority. This was especially true in the latter part of the 1930s, when the National Socialist regime in Germany presented itself as the champion of veterans' welfare. Adolf Hitler's vocal support for the veteran cause meant that many ex-soldiers, including those in inter-Allied countries, began to look kindly on the regime in Germany as a country that valued its former soldiers and made adequate provision for them. Several historians have pointed out that Hitler's concern for former soldiers was merely a ploy through which he could improve his own credentials as the rightful heir of Germany's wartime legacy. It was been argued that, in this sense at least, the grievances and peaceful aspirations of the veterans' movement in the inter-war period were hijacked by Hitler and his radical right supporters for their own ends. The contributions to this volume reflect on this important attempt to undermine the internationalist and pacifist aspirations of the majority of veterans in inter-war Europe. Whilst it seems clear, in hindsight, that many leaders of the veteran movement were naïve in their dealings with Hitler and National Socialism, it is also clear that, especially within the inter-Allied veterans' movement, many former soldiers were not responsive to radical right ideology. In fact, most were able to distinguish between Hitler's support for veteran welfare and the more central tenets of Nazi ideology, embracing the former whilst rejecting the latter. Others deeply believed that war had to be avoided at all costs, leading them not only



to appeasement, but to close collaboration with the fascist movement. Indeed, in many cases it was the adherence of veterans to a 'culture of victory' that prevented radical right movements gaining a successful foothold in formerly Allied countries.

In this respect, the well-known failures of French and British fascists to mobilize former soldiers can be in part attributed to an entrenched culture of internationalism and pacifism amongst ex-soldiers in these countries. It is also the case, as this volume will show, that minor strains of fascism in Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia were unable to displace veterans' commitment to internationalism and to the preservation of transnational inter-Allied networks.

There is another advantage to this approach. Mosse's brutalization thesis also encourages the notion of a hermetically sealed inter-war period that begins and ends with the world wars. We suggest that the ideas of social welfare, internationalism and pacifism, which informed the veterans' movement in the 1920s and 1930s reach beyond the historiographical watersheds of 1918, 1933 and 1939. The book will show that veterans' activism drew upon pre-1914 notions of socially progressive legislation and pacifism, both intellectually and through personal contacts. By the same token, the authors do not consider either 1933 or 1939 as evidence of the total failure of the veterans' causes. This transnational collaboration prepared the foundations for much of the post-1945 international order. Essentially, this volume calls for a shift in perspective, away from that of the inter-war period as one with a definite and clearly defined beginning – 1918 – and end – 1939.

The contributions stress the contingency of the inter-war period. It will show the importance both of activism and internationalism, which survived from the pre-1914 period into the inter-war period, and the traditions of veteran internationalism and activism, which survived the Second World War.

## **Generational and social impact**

A related concern of this work is the question of how far these men can be analysed as a single generational cohort, how far they defined themselves as such a cohort and how far they shared a common experience and perspective on internationalism and pacifism after 1918. Again, the generational approach serves to undermine the notion that the inter-war period is simply the story of how Europe went from one war directly into another. Many of the men who were at the vanguard of the veterans' movement during the inter-war period started to become

active in the pre-war period. In many cases, the attitudes and opinions of veterans were based on pre-war socialist and international circles. It is one of the questions of this volume to explore the extent to which the international veteran movement of the inter-war period in some ways was a re-iteration of these pre-war currents. Or did veterans instead pursue these ideas more vigorously due to their experiences during the First World War? Secondly, the volume discusses the dynamics of these attitudes during the inter-war period: did veterans become more conciliatory, more conservative or more radical as they aged? And, finally, what happened to these men after 1945?

We reject the notion that the outbreak of the Second World War should be seen as the ultimate failure of internationalism in the inter-war period, and also reject the idea that international relations in 1945 were a *tabula rasa*. Instead, the respective chapters explore the continuities between the internationalism of the inter-war period, the establishment of renewed veteran activism after 1945 and the expanding influence of international organization, such as the United Nations and the Human rights movement.

This edited volume, therefore, focuses on international collaboration between ex-servicemen of the First World War, the development of international networks and, eventually, of certain transnational identities emerging among the veterans. So far, the international activities of national veterans' movements have been mentioned within national case studies, but mostly in passing and from a national angle. However, the two biggest veterans associations of the inter-war period, FIDAC and CIAMAC, are well worth a closer look. At the same time, the national level provides an important balance for the international network. National case studies show the expectations and hopes the national movements projected on the collaboration – and discuss in how far the peaceful and international rhetoric was all words or the indication of a transnational civil movement. Within this volume, specialists of the respective national veterans' movements engage with the entanglement in international collaboration, thus contributing both to a better understanding of this important transnational movement and the national veterans' movements.

To analyse the movement it is important to consider scale and structure of national veteran movements and the extent of their involvement in international movements such as CIAMAC and FIDAC. Information on the relative sizes of veteran organizations throughout the world help determine in which parts of the world veteran activism was more prominent, and the contributors consider reasons for the appeal (or lack

thereof) of veteran activism and internationalism in their case study. In terms of numbers, obviously some veteran movements (especially in France) will dwarf others. Whilst these conclusions are not entirely novel, little is known about the size and support of veteran activism in other parts of the world, particularly in Eastern Europe. This volume draws out important comparative points between well-researched and documented movements and those that are less well-known, aiming to focus primarily on those active within the international movement, but also putting these into perspective within the broader national veterans' movements.

In addition to data on numbers of men involved during the inter-war period, the contributors were also encouraged to consider the extent to which the veteran movements, at both national and international levels, constitute merely collaboration between elite groups or whether they are examples of grass roots activism. The demands of total war called for governments to mobilize all sections of society, and mass participation in national armies was the norm. However, in many cases, veteran activism after 1918 was on a much smaller scale than this, and in many cases ex-servicemen returned to pre-war lives apparently unconcerned with the issues and agendas raised by their former comrades in FIDAC and CIAMAC. This work, then, considers the social structure of national and international veterans' organizations. It will explore the extent to which they enjoyed popular or mass support in some countries but not others. Furthermore, the contributions consider whether veteran activism rose and fell during the inter-war period, and, if so, when, and for what reasons.

## **Cultures of victory and defeat**

Veterans' internationalism offers an excellent opportunity to study the nature of cultures of victory and cultures of defeat, and the differences between them. Veterans in countries such as Germany, Austria, Hungary and Italy participated in, and helped form, 'cultures of defeat', a concept introduced by Wolfgang Schivelbusch that has been widely accepted as an analytical tool in recent discussions of the period.<sup>22</sup> By the same token, we argue, ex-servicemen on the Allied side felt connected by what John Horne has called 'cultures of victory'.<sup>23</sup> In veterans' organizations and associations throughout Europe in the inter-war period, ex-servicemen from formerly Allied countries sought meaning from their war-time sacrifice by celebrating their role in the Allied victory. Unlike the culture of defeat, which often went hand in hand with revisionism, this

culture of victory called for the preservation of the post-war order, and rather than seeking new battles and opponents, ex-servicemen from Allied countries often hoped that their transnational associations and organizations would prevent war from recurring. Although clearly led by larger veteran movements in France and Great Britain, this culture of victory was in fact a pan-European, even a global phenomenon. Veteran movements in Eastern Europe, for example, readily embraced notions of an inter-Allied culture of victory and of a lasting peace presided over by former soldiers. Ex-servicemen from Romania, Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia were enthusiastic participants in FIDAC and sent and received delegates from other inter-Allied countries throughout the inter-war period. The Little Entente, the diplomatic alliance comprising Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, also organized parades and festivities whose intention was to celebrate and commemorate the inter-Allied victory.

Allied veterans were intent on preserving a sense of the Allied victory and, in the successor states of Eastern Europe that were founded or confirmed by that victory (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia), with validating the veterans' role in nation building. In international terms, the 'culture of victory' favoured the transfer of the commemorative and monumental practices of Britain and France to the victorious successor states of Eastern Europe. In this sense, the Little Entente was a cultural as well as a political phenomenon. It also favoured the emergence of an inter-Allied veteran internationalism rooted in this victory culture and embodied by FIDAC.

A distinctive ideology of veteran pacifism and a common action to prevent future conflict was evident by the second half of the 1920s. It was accompanied by the elevation of ex-servicemen's moral and material claims on their own societies to a more universal plane and by the sharing of practical information on the pursuit of these pragmatic goals. This form of veteran internationalism was especially manifest in CIAMAC. This body became the unofficial ex-servicemen's organization of the League of Nations.

In addition to the decimation of the weapons and armies, the former combatants called for a social and moral demobilization, for the demilitarizing of thoughts and the demobilization of hatred against other nations. Everyday influences such as education and literature were considered as influential factors to this cultural demobilization and thereby to international relations in a broader sense. Invalid associations in particular questioned the dominant military enthusiasm. The belief that only social and moral demobilization could guarantee a lasting peace

prevailed all over Europe. Companies which produced arms should be shut down; the arms trade controlled by strict international juries. In addition, moral disarmament should include the suppression of all influences in public life, with a specific focus on schools and youth organizations.

Within a 'European Moment' (John Horne) of history, when European societies entered a calmer phase of cultural demobilization after the immediate and tense post-war period, veterans expanded their collaboration beyond national borders.<sup>24</sup> Following their two most important interests, peace and welfare, the ex-servicemen built up an international network to exchange knowledge and ideas. The 'culture of victory' was thus transformed by a process of cultural demobilization into one of attempted reconciliation and peace, in which it established an uncertain and contested juncture with ex-servicemen's organizations from the defeated powers. In this sense, the project departs from more traditional approaches to the study of inter-war Europe, which have separated the continent into categories of the 'defeated' and the 'victorious', or have divided the space into discrete geographical regions. One of the aims of the book is to show the way in which cultures of victory and reconciliation amongst ex-servicemen attempted to eschew these divisions. Certainly, in terms of geography, the project will show that these cultures did not exclude any part of formerly belligerent Europe, and that 'fraternal links' between veterans branched out across the continent. Reconciliation between former enemies was a more complicated and protracted process; nevertheless this volume will explore the ever more numerous examples of co-operation and collaboration between inter-Allied veterans and those formerly of the Central Powers. This volume will explore these transformations in the memory of war and the identity of veterans in the inter-war period throughout Europe and the wider world.

## Notes

1. Zara Steiner, *The Lights That Failed: European International History 1919–1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
2. See, e.g., Robert Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted Paths. Europe 1914–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
3. Antoine Prost and Jay Winter, *René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Universal Declaration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
4. Jay Winter, 'Veterans, Human rights, and the Transformation of European Democracy', in Elizabeth Kier and Ronald R. Krebs (eds.), *In War's Wake: International Conflict and the Fate of Liberal Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 121–138.

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5. Ute Frevert, 'Europeanizing German History', *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 36 (2005), pp. 9–31, esp. pp. 13–15.
6. Niall Barr, *The Lion and the Poppy. British Veterans, Politics, and Society, 1921–1939* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005); Antoine Prost, *Les anciens combattants et la société française, 1914–1939* (3 Vols.) (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1977); John Paul Newman, *Embattled Kingdom. South Slav Veterans in Yugoslavia, 1918–1945* (forthcoming) Julia Eichenberg, *Kämpfen für Frieden und Fürsorge. Polnische Veteranen des Ersten Weltkriegs und ihre internationalen Kontakte, 1918–1939* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011).
7. Patricia Clavin, 'Defining Transnationalism', in *Contemporary European History* 14/4 (2005), pp. 421–439.
8. Kiran Klaus Patel, 'Überlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte', in *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 52/7 (2004), pp. 626–645.
9. This identity of being an Allied veteran was central to FIDAC. To strengthen it, Colonel Fred Abbot, then FIDAC president, designed a flag in 1928, combining the flags of all member states around the inscription "FIDAC PAX" in the centre, as depicted on the cover of this volume. Additionally, a 'Journée inter-alliée' was introduced to commemorate the foundation of FIDAC.
10. Correspondence in the League of Nations Archives (LoN): Registry 40 / 23984 / 17591: Invalides de Guerre. Dossier concernant la collaboration du Secrétariat à une Conférence des Représentants des Associations de mutilés de Guerre et d'anciens combattants et avec les différentes associations d'anciens combattants. Letter October 7th 1922; from Albert Thomas to the General Secretary of the League of Nations (Eric Drummond). See Julia Eichenberg, *Kämpfen für Frieden und Fürsorge*, pp. 105–111.
11. For principal aims, see CIAMAC, Annual Assembly, September 9th to 12th, 1937. Report 3 'Pensions, Medical Care', General Marco Nikiforov (Bulgarien), 'Die Entwicklung der Renten für Kriegopfer im Jahre 1936–37', pp. 91–140, citation on p. 91. For material and moral interests, see Julia Eichenberg, 'Suspicious Pacifists', in Michael S. Neiberg and Jennifer D. Keene (eds.), *Finding Common Ground. New Directions in First World War Studies* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 113–138.
12. Robert D. Benford and Frank O. Taylor, 'Peace Movements', in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, Conflict* (vol. 2) (London: Academic Press, 1999), pp. 771–786, particularly p. 773.
13. Wolfram Wette, 'Einleitung: Probleme des Pazifismus in der Zwischenkriegszeit', in Karl Holl and Wolfram Wette, *Pazifismus in der Weimarer Republik: Beiträge zur historischen Friedensforschung* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1981), pp. 9–25, particularly pp. 13 and 15.
14. John Horne (ed.), 'Demobilisations culturelles après la Grande Guerre', in *Dossier de la revue 14–18 Aujourd'hui*, no. 5 (2002), pp. 43–53.
15. Leon Viala, *Les relations internationales entre les associations des mutilés de guerre et d'anciens combattants* (Paris: Cahiers de l'Union Fédérale des Associations françaises des victimes de la guerre et anciens combattants, 1930). p. 18; SdN, R. 1595 General 1919–1927; Registry 40 / 17591 / 17591: Pension de Guerre letter dated November 21st. 1921.
16. Viala, *Les relations internationales*, p. 20.

17. Viala, *Les relations internationales*, p. 21.
18. Relying on numbers taken from: Bulletin de l'Office National des Mutilés, April 1927, Chambre des Députés n. 624, Rapport Nogaro, p. 7; Reichsarbeitsblatt [mit Zahlen für 1928 aber ohne weitere Quellenangaben, J. E.]; 10th annual report of the Ministry of Pensions, 1927, Annual report of the Veterans Bureau for 1927. Ibid.
19. CIAMAC, Annual Assembly, 1937. Report 3, General Marco Nikiforov (Bulgarien), 'Die Entwicklung der Renten für Kriegopfer im Jahre 1936–37', pp. 91–140, pp. 92–93.
20. George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Emilio Gentile, *The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 1918–1925* (New York: Enigma, 2005).
21. Antoine Prost and Jay Winter, *The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
22. On 'cultures of defeat' see Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat: on National Trauma, Mourning and Recovery* (London: Granta, 2004); John Horne, 'Defeat and Memory in Modern History', in Jenny Macleod (ed.), *Defeat and Memory. Cultural Histories of Military Defeat in the Modern Era* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 11–29.
23. Leaning on Schivelbusch's concept, the term 'cultures of victory' was introduced by John Horne. It constituted a major point of reference of the workshop 'Veterans' Internationalism and the Cultures of Victory and Peace, 1918–1933', Trinity College Dublin, 23rd/24th October 2009. See conclusions.
24. John Horne, 'The European Moment Between the Two World Wars (1924–1933)', in Madelon de Keizer and Sophie Tates (eds.), *Moderniteit. Modernisme en massacultuur in Nederland 1914–1940* (Vijftiende jaarboek van het Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdokumentatie, Zutphen: Walburg Pers, cop., 2004), pp. 223–240.