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Game Theory pp 263–271Cite as

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Non-Cooperative Games (Equilibrium Existence)

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Abstract

Nash equilibrium is the central notion of rational behaviour in non-cooperative game theory (see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, for a discussion of Nash equilibrium, including motivation and interpretation). Our purpose here is to discuss various conditions under which a strategic form game possesses at least one Nash equilibrium.

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Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (2010). Non-Cooperative Games (Equilibrium Existence). In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_27

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