Abstract
Can terrorism be justified? Nowadays, whoever seriously poses this question runs a good chance of being excommunicated from the so-called discourse community, and of not even being listened to in the first place. This explains why several pre-existing philosophical analyses of the phenomenon of terrorism, some of which well antedate September 11, 2001, are paid practically no attention at all in the current public debate. The reason they are ignored is this: these philosophical investigations have as their goal the critique and questioning of socially promoted modes of discussion and prejudices, not their docile acceptance.
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Notes
Compare Thomas Nagel, ‘War and Massacre,’ and Michael Walzer, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,’ in Marshall Cohen et al. (eds.), War and Moral Responsibility (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974); Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, third edition (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 225–32, 251–63, 323–7. See also the excellent article by Arthur Isak Applbaum, ‘Are Violations of Rights ever Right?’ Ethics 108 (1997/8).
James C. Scott, ‘Domination, Acting, and Fantasy,’ in Carolyn Nordstrom and Jo-Ann Martin (eds.), The Paths to Domination, Resistance, and Terror (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 67.
R. Hirschbein, ‘A World without Enemies (Bush’s Brush with Morality),’ in Deane C. Curtin and Robert Litke (eds.), Institutional Violence (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), p. 344.
Igor Primoratz, ‘The Morality of Terrorism,’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1997), p. 231.
Jeff McMahan, ‘Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War,’ Journal of Political Philosophy 2 (1994), pp. 202–3.
Cf. also Phillip Montague, ‘Self-Defense and Choosing among Lives,’ Philosophical Studies 40 (1981); and ‘The Morality of Self-Defense: A Reply to Wasserman,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 18 (1989).
See also Michael Walzer, ‘The Moral Standing of States,’ in Charles Beitz et al. (eds.), International Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). One must not forget that Walzer is a communitarian.
Andrew Valls, ‘Can Terrorism Be Justified?’, in Andrew Valls (ed.), Ethics and International Affairs (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 73.
Max Weber distinguishes between Verantwortungsethik (ethics of responsibility) and Gesinnungsethik (ethics of principled conviction). While in the former the consequences of one’s actions are to be carefully considered, the latter is concerned with purity of heart and absolutist moral norms. Its motto is ‘fiat justitia et pereat mundus.’ A notorious example of Gesinnungsethik is Kant’s insistence that lying is never allowed, not even when the life of an innocent person can only be saved by telling a lie. See Max Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics,’ Political Writings, trans. and ed. P. Lassman and R. Spiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 359ff.
A. Baier, ‘Violent Demonstrations,’ in R.G. Frey and C.W. Morris (eds.), Violence, Terrorism, and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 54.
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© 2004 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Steinhoff, U. (2004). How Can Terrorism Be Justified?. In: Primoratz, I. (eds) Terrorism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230204546_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230204546_8
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