Abstract
Israel has been confronted with irregular armed groups and terrorism for more than the past 60 years of its existence. This is one of the longest experiences of counterinsurgency struggle in recent history. Still today it faces Hamas (partial acronym for Harakat al-muqâwama al-‘islâmiya [Islamic Resistance Movement]) in the Gaza Strip. How has its army handled this war among civilian populations? What strategy has it adopted? It seems clear from the outset that it did not choose the strategy of terror, a strategy of mass destruction and atrocity, contrary to the many accusations that have been leveled at it. But nor has it chosen the strategy of minimal force.
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Cohen, S. (2010). The Roots of a Doctrine. In: Israel’s Asymmetric Wars. The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230112971_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230112971_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-28896-0
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-11297-1
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