Abstract
In the world of China after Tiananmen, 1989, after that violent and, what is more, that un-necessary crackdown in response to a large, mostly peaceful and ‘loyal’ if disorganized protest and shutdown of Beijing, most Western observers still expected—perhaps still expect—an eventual return of mass protests and demands for ‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’ or political and ideological ‘liberalization.’ While I (2012) and many others have written at length on 1989, the best place to begin is with some of the collections of documents from the era, for example, Mok Chiu Yu et al., Eds., Voices from Tiananmen Square (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1990); Suzanne Ogden et al., Eds., China’s Search for Democracy: The Student and Mass Movement of 1989 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992); and Lu, Ping et al., Eds., A Moment of Truth: Workers’ Participation in China’s 1989 Democracy Movement, and the Emergence of Independent Unions. (Trans. Gus Mok et al. Hong Kong: HK Trade Union Education Centre, 1990). By ‘loyal’ here I mean that the sentiment of the student demands was largely patriotic and a demand for inclusion of—it must be said—their own class fraction. By unnecessary, I simply mean that the students and most protesters—even the striking workers who represented the greatest potential power and ‘threat’—were fully in retreat by June 3. The use of violence—death—was simply terror; even in its own terms of stability and so forth the state could well have resolved the ‘crisis’ by means other than that, and the later neo-liberalization of the economy. But it was Deng’s party at this point, and his politics. What was called the ‘cultural fever’ of the 1980s before that event was precisely such a ferment, the wide-ranging embrace of ‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy’ (as signifiers, as translated texts, in various fora) of seemingly all things ‘Western’ (from global capitalism to popular culture). (Three notable studies of the 1980s era and culture fever remain: Jing Wang, High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Zhang Xudong, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms: Cultural Fever, Avant-Garde Fiction, and the New Chinese Cinema (Durham: Duke UP, 1997); and Kalpana Mishra, From Post-Maoism to Post-Marxism: The Erosion of Official Ideology in Deng’s China (New York: Routledge, 1998). See also Chen Xiaomei, Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-discourse in Post-Mao China. 2nd ed. Foreword by Dai Jinhua. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002)). This was perhaps best represented, before the student protesters themselves (as opposed to the striking workers), by the controversial yet state-funded and thus state-sanctioned documentary series He Shang, a paean to ‘the rise of the West’ and the decline of ancient, ‘yellow,’ Confucian, ‘feudal’ China (also represented by Mao in the film). If it pathologized peasants for lacking entrepreneurial and modern spirit, and idealized the rise of the modern, capitalist West, it nonetheless expressed genuine, widely felt enthusiasm for the new era; in its concluding minutes, He Shang even trumpeted political reform (which led to its still-current ban after 1989). With the image of the murky Yellow River emptying into the Pacific, it offered a vision and ‘China dream’ of endless development, progress, and possibility, a new order of bright sunny days stemming from globalization and capitalist expansion. As if it were sublimating and not simply (not only) rejecting political, equalitarian, Maoist revolution. Clearly the China of the 1980s and the Western ‘end of history’ sentiment (Fukuyama) must have indexed something big happening. After the awful interruption of progress on the morning of June 4, 1989, surely the zeitgeist, China’s convergence with political normalcy and ‘modern’ democratic forms would return, alongside its burgeoning and increasingly privatized economy and all those millions lifted out of poverty. The velvet, or jasmine, or Tahir Square moment awaits.
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Notes
- 1.
While I (2012) and many others have written at length on 1989, the best place to begin is with some of the collections of documents from the era, for example: Mok Chiu Yu et al., Eds., Voices from Tiananmen Square (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1990); Suzanne Ogden et al., Eds., China’s Search for Democracy: The Student and Mass Movement of 1989 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992); and Lu, Ping et al., Eds., A Moment of Truth: Workers’ Participation in China’s 1989 Democracy Movement, and the Emergence of Independent Unions. (Trans. Gus Mok et al. Hong Kong: HK Trade Union Education Centre, 1990). By ‘loyal’ here I mean that the sentiments of the student demands were largely patriotic and a demand for inclusion of—it must be said—their own class fraction. By unnecessary I simply mean that the students and most protesters—even the striking workers who represented the greatest potential power and ‘threat’ were fully in retreat by June 3. The use of violence—death—was simply terror; even in its own terms of stability and so forth, the state could well have resolved the ‘crisis’ by means other than that, and the later neo-liberalization of the economy. But it was Deng’s Party at this point, and his politics.
- 2.
Three notable studies of the 1980s era and culture fever remain: Jing Wang, High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), Zhang Xudong, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms: Cultural Fever, Avant-Garde Fiction, and the New Chinese Cinema (Durham: Duke UP, 1997), and Kalpana Mishra, From Post-Maoism to Post-Marxism: The Erosion of Official Ideology in Deng’s China (New York: Routledge, 1998). See also Chen Xiaomei, Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-discourse in Post-Mao China. 2nd ed. Foreword by Dai Jinhua. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).
- 3.
This expectation of the PRC eventually becoming the same as the rest of the world—or that it should at any rate—is the essence of the ‘new’ if quintessentially ‘modernizationist’ orientalism, as I have argued elsewhere. (This is also a missionary logic.) But this assumption and discourse has also been noted by others of a decidedly different political and intellectual purview than my own, often to the tune of an argument for a harder line against China since it obstinately refuses to change. See, for instance, the journalist James Mann’s The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression (New York: Penguin Books, 2007).
- 4.
See as well on the new left—and indeed the entire landscape of intellectual politics—He Li’s excellent Political Thought and China’s Transformation: Ideas Shaping Reform in Post-Mao China (New York: Palgrave, 2015). See also Ban Wang and Lu Jie, Eds., China and New Left Visions (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012).
- 5.
Gan’s influential essay has been republished in various forms but can be found partly translated into English as ‘The Grand Three Traditions in the New Era’ in Mark Leonard, What Does China Think? (London: Fourth Estate, 2008). See as well the brief discussions of Gan’s position in Timothy Cheek, ed., A Critical Introduction to Mao (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and by Daniel Bell in China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008). Gan’s original version was published in Dushu (2007): 1–6.
- 6.
The most striking Mao-era example would of course have to be the later ‘Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius’ campaign after the former’s death by shot-down airplane. These veritably academic debates and propaganda screeds from the ultra-left were always aimed at their actual enemies and the struggle for control even as they attempted a Maoist analysis of ancient Chinese history.
- 7.
This is a common theme or phrasing in much of Wang Hui’s work from the 1990s onward, and the first part of this sentence gives my own gloss on it. See his most recent work China from Empire to Nation State (Trans. Michael Gibbs Hill. Harvard University Press, 2014).
- 8.
See the discussion of Gan and neo-Confucianism in He Li, op cit.
- 9.
On this phenomenon see especially the article by Xie Shaobo, ‘Guoxue Re and the Ambiguity of Chinese Modernity’ (China Perspectives 2011.1 39–45), as well as other pieces in that special issue on the topic. Of course not all ‘national learning’ projects are politically regressive or essentialist, as they depend on the contexts of the work and who reads them where.
- 10.
On Gan’s work, and this influential essay in particular, see the chapter by Zhou Lian, ‘The Debates in Contemporary Chinese Political Thought,’ in Fred Dallmayr and Zhao Tingyang, eds., Contemporary Chinese Political Thought: Debates and Perspectives (University Press of Kentucky, 2012).
- 11.
For discussion of Qiu Qiubai see Liu Kang, Aesthetics and Chinese Marxism (Durham: Duke UP, 2000). Classic pieces from Qiu are available at http://criticalasianstudies.org/assets/files/bcas/v08n01.pdf. Accessed Nov. 8, 2017.
- 12.
Wang Hui, Cui Zhiyuan, Dai Jinhua, and Wang Shaoguang (in Hong Kong) may be the most well-known abroad, in addition to outside scholars with deep roots in the mainland (often due to having been born and raised there), such as Lin Chun, Cao Tianyu, Li Minqi, and Gao Mobo. Other notable and widely read scholars include Gan Yang, Cai Xiang, Han Deqiang, Lu Xinyu, Han Yuhai, Luo Gang, Xi-Shu, Mao Jian, Hu Angang, and many more. In this chapter I cannot do justice to them all, since their range is co-extensive with that of the Chinese academy and intellectual sphere itself. The new left does not dominate, far from it, but it is ensconced; many of its scholars are also leading scholars in their disciplines and subfields. The next chapter will attend to liberalism. My intent is to characterize the movements as a whole, indicating their general logic and significances, rather than explicating or doing justice to individual thinkers.
- 13.
For the Wang Hui article in question as well as Fenby’s response, see ‘The Rumour Machine: Wang Hui on the dismissal of Bo Xilai’ (London Review of Books 34. May 9, 2012). https://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n09/-wanghui/the-rumour-machine. Accessed Nov. 3, 2017. Fenby is an investment consultant, journalist, author, former editor in colonial Hong Kong, and recipient of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire. This is indeed quite a resume and arguably only possible in the China field. But that field is defined by anti-communism and as such has certain limits on what can be thought or said while remaining in the fold. The reception of the new left is the case in point.
- 14.
See Wang Hui, China’s New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition, trans. Theodore Huters and Rebecca Karl (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).
- 15.
Barmé, ‘The Revolution of Resistance,’ in Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, ed. Mark Selden and Elizabeth Perry, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 304–305. The Han Yuhai piece in question was published as ‘Zai “Ziyouzhuyi” zitaide beihou,’ Tianya (1998).
- 16.
As cited in Chen Lichuan, para. 15, in the online edition, ‘The Debate Between Liberalism and Neo-Leftism at the Turn of the Century,’ China Perspectives 55 (2004), http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/417. (accessed Aug. 21, 2010). Han’s piece, ‘Ziben dengyu ziyouhua ma?’ (Does capital equal liberalization?), was published in Kexue shibao, January 3, 1999.
- 17.
I leave to one side here the anarchist, neo-Trotskyist or otherwise statistically irrelevant left self-positioning in China. It would be a mistake to imagine there will be some renaissance of such a ‘left’ in China. The Marxist humanism of the 1980s will be discussed in passing later, though it too seems to have been largely displaced by new left, liberal and neo-traditional ways of thinking.
- 18.
The Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 1, ‘Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society’ (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965). Michael Dutton notes that this line expresses the ‘quintessence of politics’: ‘If you want to understand the concept of the political, turn to the first line of the first page of the first volume of Mao Zedong’s Selected Works,’ Policing Chinese Politics: A History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 3.
- 19.
I refer here to sectarian Western leftist screeds, chiefly Internet and social media epiphenomena and familiar enough yet slight enough to obviate the need for full citations. The charge of nationalism is perhaps best answered generally by the work of the late, great Benedict Anderson, who once said that he had only ever met two or three non-nationalist cosmopolitans in his entire life.
- 20.
I must say that I have heard such views many times in teaching in Hong Kong, from mainland and even ‘local’ students. I would not say this is the dominant view, however. Perhaps the main point is simply that 1989 has not been forgotten or erased—it could not be—but a new ‘regime of truth’ surrounds it, or rather two regimes, very much reflecting an inside/outside dichotomy.
- 21.
See Han Yuhai, ‘Assessing China’s Reforms,’ in the June 3, 2006, Economic and Political Weekly of India (pp. 2206–2212) (Translated by Matthew Allen Hale.). http://www.epw.in/journal/2006/22/perspectives/assessing-chinas-reforms.html. Accessed Dec. 4, 2017. One should note that this point about the economic basis of 1989 (often elided by analysts and the students and liberal intellectuals themselves), and the clear if implicit defense of the right to protest, is also a theme in Wang Hui’s work.
- 22.
Han, Ibid., 2212.
- 23.
See the useful articles on Hu and others at The China Story website of Australia (various authors, not always signed). https://www.thechinastory.org/key-intellectual/hu-angang. Accessed Nov. 6, 2011.
- 24.
This interview with the mainland Foreign Theoretical Trends journal is included within Wang’s recent volume of essays China’s Twentieth Century: Revolution, Retreat and the Road to Equality (Saul Thomas, ed., Verso, 2016). Online at https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2555-contradiction-systemic-crisis-and-the-direction-for-change-an-interview-with-wang-hui. Accessed Nov. 6, 2011.
- 25.
See the interview with Wang done by En Liang Khong, ‘After the party: an interview with Wang Hui.’ January 13, 2014. https://www.opendemocracy.net/wang-hui-en-liang-khong/after-party-interview-with-wang-hui. Accessed Nov. 10, 2017. Wang is worth quoting at length to avoid confusion: ‘Nobody can defend the Cultural Revolution as a whole, and also you cannot simply say that any period in history was just completely wrong,’ Wang continues. ‘We talk about the Cultural Revolution mainly from the point of view of elites. But very few talk about it from the perspective of workers, peasants, and their different generations.’
- 26.
See the notes and discussion in Chap. 1.
- 27.
Josef Gregory Mahoney, ‘Changes in International Research Cooperation in China: Positive Perspectives’ (Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 43, 2, 47–64), 61.
- 28.
The China model has been argued for most forcibly by Pan Wei, a Beijing University professor and trenchant critic of liberalism though ambiguously situated in relation to new leftists and certainly not an old leftist in the Maoist sense. See his 2007 article ‘The Chinese Model of Development’ at http://www.ids-uva.nl/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/10_Pan.pdf. Accessed Nov. 6, 2017.
- 29.
See, for example, Sebastian Veg’s review essay in France’s think-tank journal based in Hong Kong, ‘Tibet, Nationalism, and the ‘West’: Questioning Economic and Political Modernity.’ (China Perspectives 2009.3) http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/4859. Accessed Nov. 7, 2017.
- 30.
For an excellent overview of Wang Hui’s work on this, see Zhang Yongle’s ‘The Future of the Past: On Wang Hui’s Rise of Modern Chinese Thought’ (New Left Review 62 March–April 2010). Wang’s case for China being modern so early has to do with ‘signs’ such as capitalist commodity exchange, a sense of ruptured time, and so on. I remain agnostic on this question, though it is clearly better than notions of oriental stagnation and despotism, stages of history, and so on. The twentieth-century context is the key one at any rate.
- 31.
Cai Xiang, Revolution and Its Narratives: China’s Socialist Literary and Cultural Imaginaries, 1949–1966 (Duke University Press, 2016). Translated by Zhong Xueping and Rebecca Karl.
- 32.
For the Li Yizhe writings on socialist democracy, including law, see the anthology, Wild Lily, Prairie Fire: China’s Road to Democracy, Yan’an to Tian’anmen, 1942–1989, edited by Gregor Benton and Alan Hunter (Princeton University Press, 1995).
- 33.
See Hall at his most Gramscian: ‘The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists,’ in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Lawrence Grossberg and Cary Nelson (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988).
- 34.
See Wang Shaoguang, Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan (Oxford University Press, 1995).
- 35.
Wang, Zheng. ‘Call Me Qingnian but Not Funu: A Maoist Youth in Retrospect’ (Some of Us: Chinese Women Growing Up in the Mao Era. Eds. Zhong Xueping, Wang Zheng, and Bai Di. 27–52).
- 36.
Wang Zheng, like many other participants or fellow travelers of the new left and intellectual politics in China (e.g. Gao Mobo), resides and works outside of China but also publishes and works in the mainland. The new left has to be understood as mainland-based but it—like other mainland Chinese intellectual ‘circles’—is also part of a global conversation, just an indirect one. My specific point in using Wang and Gao Mobo is that they provide excellent, clear, provocative descriptions of Maoist discourse.
- 37.
See Alain Badiou, The Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
- 38.
Tony Saich and David Apter, Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic (Harvard University Press, 1998).
- 39.
See Yu Liu, Maoist Discourse and the Mobilization of Emotions in Revolutionary China (Modern China 36.3 2010: 329–362).
- 40.
As I have written at length elsewhere on Maoist discourse as well as the critique of the Cold War notion of totalitarianism, I will not re-rehearse these arguments here. Again the essential point is that one does not see serious intellectual historians or cultural critics, let alone someone like Foucault or, say, Isaac Deutscher, assume and write about what is a Cold War-inspired notion of ‘brainwashing’ by any other name. Discourse does not stand outside of something called Truth. Maoist discourse, whether we like it or not, is by any definition opposed to and seeks to exclude liberalism, and even humanism. For more, see China and Orientalism. The pioneering essay on Maoist discourse is Gao Mobo’s ‘Maoist Discourse and a Critique of the Present Assessments of the Cultural Revolution’ Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, July (1994): 13–31.
- 41.
Kerry Brown and Simone Van Nieuwenhuizen, China and the New Maoists (London: Zed Books, 2016).
- 42.
See the November 18, 2013, report by Malcolm Moore in The Telegraph. Moore was the preeminent and most reliable reporter during the entire Bo/Chongqing affair. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10457357/China-pays-back-millions-of-pounds-to-Bo-Xilais-victims-but-keeps-them-in-jail.html. Accessed Nov. 8, 2017.
- 43.
See Rebecca Liao’s 2013 report in The Atlantic at http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/08/why-bo-xilais-trial-is-a-victory-for-the-rule-of-law-in-china/278448/ and lawyer Ben Self’s analysis in Global Studies Law Review, ‘The Bo Xilai Trial and China’s Struggle With the Rule of Law’ (14.1 2015) http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1520&context=law_globalstudies. Accessed Nov. 7, 2017.
- 44.
This seems to be the case as of 2016, according to no less an ‘anti-statist’ journal than Foreign Policy. See Dinny McMahon, ‘The Terrible Amusement Park That Explains Chongqing’s Economic Miracle.’ See also the praise for Mayor Huang for helping prevent any property bubble despite all the subsidized housing and development of farmland. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/29/chongqing-economic-miracle-locajoy-debt-sales-state-owned-enterprises/. Accessed Nov. 8, 2017.
- 45.
See for example a 2013 report by Zachary Keck, ‘With Bo Xilai on Trial, China Adopts Chongqing Model’ at The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/with-bo-xilai-on-trial-china-adopts-chongqing-model/?allpages=yes. Accessed Nov. 8, 2017. See also two (anonymous) reports more recently ‘Chongqing blazes economic trail as Bo scandal recedes’ (http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/chongqing-blazes-economic-trail-as-bo-scandal-recedes) and ‘As Beijing investigates his successor, support for jailed Bo Xilai endures in Chongqing’ (https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/31/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/beijing-investigates-successor-support-jailed-bo-xilai-endures-chongqing/). Accessed Nov. 8, 2011.
- 46.
See the report by Malcolm Moore: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10785505/Young-Chinese-Maoists-set-up-hippy-commune.html
- 47.
See Han, ‘The Social Costs of Neoliberalism in China: Interview with Stephen Philion,’ Dollars and Sense (July/August 2007): 22–34.
- 48.
As a general rule of thumb, it has long been the companies run by foreign capital—for example Taiwan’s infamous Foxconn—that abuse and exploit workers the most. Obviously this isn’t to say exploitation is rare in state-owned enterprises.
- 49.
See his ‘China’s Double-Movement in Health Care,’ Morbid Symptoms: Health Under Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009).
- 50.
This is a Polanyian argument that runs throughout several of Wang’s essays. See, for example, ‘The Changing Role of Government in China.’ In Xudong Zhang, ed., Whither China? (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).
- 51.
Zhiyuan Cui, Deng Yingtao, and Miao Zhuang, Nanjie Village (Beijing: Modern China Press, 1996). See also Cui’s ‘Liberal Socialism and the Future of China: A Petty Bourgeoisie Manifesto,’ in The Chinese Model of Modern Development, ed. Tian Yu Cao (New York: Routledge, 2005).
- 52.
See Shizheng Feng and Yang Su, ‘The making of Maoist model in post-Mao era: The myth of Nanjie village’ (Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46.1 2013: 39–51).
- 53.
This has been published in English as Maoist Economics and the Revolutionary Road to Communism, ed. Raymond Lotta (Chicago: Banner Press, 1994).
- 54.
There is a large literature on such organizations and the countermovement, small as it may be nationally speaking, toward a more social economy. See, for starters, Social Economy in China and the World, eds. Ngai Pun, Ben Hok-bun Ku, Hairong Yan, and Anita Koo (Oxon: Routledge, 2016).
- 55.
See Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning: Living Standards and Economic Development in Sichuan Since 1931 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). and Kueh, China’s New Industrialization Strategy: Was Chairman Mao Really Necessary? (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2008).
- 56.
On the Chinese economy, see also Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, rev. and expanded ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1986); Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1880s to 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and the sources discussed in Gao, The Battle for China’s Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution (London: Pluto Press, 2008). Current economic work on this period is closer to what was said by the US government and World Bank toward the end of the Mao period. See US Congress, The Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers, Joint Economic Committee, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978).
- 57.
The more popular or Internet debates around the famine can be found here, albeit from the leftist side: http://www.wyzxwk.com/s/sqwhy/. Accessed Aug. 21, 2010. See also the discussion in Gao Mobo, The Battle for China’s Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution (London: Pluto Press, 2008).
- 58.
See Sun Jingxian, ‘Population Change during China’s “Three Years of Hardship” (1959–1961)’ (Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2.1 2016: 453–500).
- 59.
See Simon Denyer, ‘Researchers may have ‘found’ many of China’s 30 million missing girls’ (November 30, 2016, The Washington Post). https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/30/researchers-may-have-found-many-of-chinas-30-million-missing-girls/?utm_term=.e002864366c2. Accessed Nov. 11, 2017.
- 60.
See the discussion of Sun and others in Gao Mobo’s forthcoming book, Constructing China: Clashing Views of the People’s Republic (London: Pluto Books, 2018).
- 61.
Sun Jingxian, Ibid., 495.
- 62.
Readers can judge for themselves since the journal is open access, though clearly background information about the PRC in the Mao era and about Chinese demography or the lack thereof would be helpful for the entire debate. http://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/ezfiles/122/1122/img/2375/CCPS2(1)-Sun.pdf. Accessed Dec. 4, 2017.
- 63.
I have attempted to address these issues in a chapter of my previous monograph. See Vukovich, China and Orientalism, Ibid.
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Vukovich, D.F. (2019). The New Left and the Old Politics of Knowledge: A Battle for Chinese Political Discourse. In: Illiberal China. China in Transformation. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0541-2_2
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