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The Universalisation of Western Values Since the Second World War

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The International Criminal Court at the Mercy of Powerful States

Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS,volume 13))

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Abstract

This chapter assesses whether the field of ICL, similarly to colonial legal systems, is also based on Western laws and values. The chapter specifically focuses on the system of international core crimes which is intimately related to the post-World War II Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo and which constitutes a linchpin of present-day international criminal law enforcement. Since these crimes have been enacted by the Allied Powers on a multilateral rather than a universal basis, it is examined whether they have coalesced into universal—as opposed to Western—values over the course of time. After briefly delineating what ICL essentially is (Sect. 6.1) a general picture on the universalisation-process of major crimes in ICL is provided (Sect. 6.2). Recourse to the concept of universal jurisdiction, which is a purely value-based approach to international criminal justice (Sect. 6.3) and an assessment of the ICC’s system of core crimes (Sect. 6.4) complement the universal value debate, ultimately confirming that international core crimes have now acquired a universal dimension. In terms of methodology, the question concerning the universal character of core crimes will be answered—considering the overall focus on the African cause—by assessing the African states’ commitments in this respect.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Before 1945, the term war criminals was typically used to describe individuals that were acting in breach of the law of war as covered, inter alia, by the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907. As of the Second World War , the term is interpreted more broadly covering also criminals guilty of other major crimes subject to contemporary international criminal law, such as crimes against humanity or genocide (see Minear 1971, pp. 6f.).

  2. 2.

    On the various understandings of the term ‘International Criminal Law’ see Cryer et al. 2014, pp. 3–8; and Kress 2012, pp. 717–32. On the foundations of ICL as a discipline, see Friedlander 1983, pp. 13–25; Schwarzenberger 1965, pp. 3–36; and Dinstein 1985, pp. 206–42.

  3. 3.

    Bassiouni 1980, p. 2.

  4. 4.

    Kress 2012, p. 717, para 2. See also, The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” ( France v. Turkey ), PCIJ Rep. Series A. No. 10, Judgment, 7 September 1927 [hereinafter The Lotus Case ] p. 19f., and Bassiouni 1980, p. 3.

  5. 5.

    The Lotus Case , supra note 4, p. 21.

  6. 6.

    Here, the author refers to international customary law (see Colangelo 2006, pp. 158f.).

  7. 7.

    Under the principle of territoriality, ‘States have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all events on their territory, this includes their airspace and territorial waters, and also includes ships and aeroplanes which are registered in those countries’. The nationality principle (sometimes referred to as ‘active personality’) devises that ‘States are entitled under international law to legislate with respect to the conduct of their nationals abroad’. The passive personality principle comprises the following situations: ‘Passive personality jurisdiction is jurisdiction exercised by a State over crimes committed against its nationals whilst they are abroad’. Under the protective principle , ‘[a] State is entitled to assert protective jurisdiction over extraterritorial activities that threaten the State security, such as the selling of a State’s secrets, spying or the counterfeiting of its currency or official seal’. On these principles, see Cryer et al. 2014, pp. 52–56. In addition, another, although controversial, type of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the so-called effects doctrine which applies to cases ‘where the [extraterritorial] offence is deemed to exert some deleterious effect within the territory of the prescribing state’ (O’Keefe 2004, p. 739). For an assessment of the principle of universal jurisdiction, see infra Sect. 6.3.

  8. 8.

    See Kress 2012, p. 718, paras 4/5; Bassiouni 1980, pp. 2f. On the international cooperation between states in criminal matters, Bantekas 2010, pp. 355–66.

  9. 9.

    Kress 2012, p. 718, para 5.

  10. 10.

    See Cryer et al. 2014, pp. 5f. An introduction to this topic is provided in Boister 2012.

  11. 11.

    Ibid., p. 13.

  12. 12.

    Bassiouni 1980, p. 3.

  13. 13.

    Cassese et al. 2013, p. 3.

  14. 14.

    See Kress 2012, p. 719, para 11.

  15. 15.

    Boister 2012, p. 18.

  16. 16.

    Kress 2012, p. 719, para 10.

  17. 17.

    Boister 2012, p. 18.

  18. 18.

    This obligation is commonly known as aut dedere aut judicare (see, in particular, infra Chap. 7, Sect. 7.1.3).

  19. 19.

    See Kress 2012, p. 721, para 17. On the various international criminal tribunals, see infra Sect. 6.2.

  20. 20.

    Cassese et al. 2013, p. 3.

  21. 21.

    Cryer et al. 2014, p. 49.

  22. 22.

    On these forms of jurisdiction, see ibid. at 49ff.; O’Keefe 2004, pp. 736ff.; and Colangelo 2006, pp. 157ff.

  23. 23.

    See Cryer et al. 2014, p. 49; and O’Keefe 2004, p. 736.

  24. 24.

    The Lotus Case , supra note 4, p. 19.

  25. 25.

    See ibid. pp. 19ff.

  26. 26.

    See Cryer et al. 2014, pp. 50f.; and O’Keefe 2004, p. 736.

  27. 27.

    It was noted in The Lotus Case : ‘Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention’ (The Lotus Case, supra note 4, p. 18). See also, O’Keefe 2004, p. 740.

  28. 28.

    See ibid., p. 740.

  29. 29.

    See ibid., p. 737.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., p. 737.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., p. 737.

  32. 32.

    The most prominent precedent dealing with war criminals on the basis of an international agreement prior to the Second World War and the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo was the Leipzig Trial in the wake of the First World War . In attempting to establish individual accountability for war crimes committed during the First World War, the 1919 treaty of Versailles devised that German war criminals, including Kaiser Wilhelm, should not go unpunished for the crimes committed during the war and be prosecuted by military tribunals. However, the intention to punish those responsible for war crimes during WWI was not carried out with utter vehemence by the Allied Powers and corresponding provisions in the Versailles Treaty by and large remained dead letters. An overview over the early initiatives in the field of ICL can be found in: United Nations Secretary-General . ‘Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction’ (1949) UN Doc A/CN.4/7/Rev.1; McCormack 1996, pp. 684–714; Bassiouni 1997, pp. 13–21; Bassiouni 1991, pp. 1ff.; and Segesser and Gessler 2005, pp. 453–68.

  33. 33.

    See, e.g., Friedlander 1983, pp. 20ff.; and Bassiouni 1997, pp. 21ff.

  34. 34.

    The British, for example, first plead for summary executions (see Bassiouni 1997, p. 23). For a detailed description of the events, see, among others, Taylor 1993, pp. 29–32; and Murphy 1990, pp. 62–67.

  35. 35.

    The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT ) commenced in November 1945 and lasted until October 1946. These proceedings resulted in nineteen convictions, ranging from 10 years imprisonment up to life imprisonment and death by hanging. Three of the accused defendants were acquitted (Jackson 1947, pp. viii, xii–xiii). A detailed overview over the indictment and the judgment is provided in Ferencz 1980, pp. 470–86. On the IMT in general, see Wright 1965, pp. 239–78; and Cryer 2005, pp. 36–42. On allegations of selectivity in the context of these tribunals see infra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.3.1

  36. 36.

    The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE ) took place in Tokyo and lasted from 29 April 1946 until 12 November 1948. It found 25 defendants guilty on one or more counts (for more information on the judgment at the IMTFE , Ferencz 1980, pp. 502–538; Horwitz 1950, pp. 542ff. and 578ff.; and Minear 1971, pp. 20–33; on the IMTFE in general, see Cryer 2005, pp. 42–48.).

  37. 37.

    On the most significant contributions of the IMT on modern-day international criminal justice, see Mettraux 2008, pp. 599–614.

  38. 38.

    For the IMT , see Bassiouni 1997, pp. 23ff. A description of the negotiations that took place at London, in the run-up to the IMT , is provided in Taylor 1993, pp. 56ff.; and Murphy 1990. For the IMTFE , Bassiouni 1997, pp. 31ff. For more information on the political environment these tribunals were embedded into, see infra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.3.1.

  39. 39.

    R. H. Jackson . ‘International Conference on Military Trials: London, 1945 (Minutes of the Conference Session of July 23, 1945)’ The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy (1945). http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack44.asp. Accessed 12 November 2016.

  40. 40.

    On the early initiatives in the field of ICL, see supra note 32.

  41. 41.

    See Mettraux 2008, p. 601.

  42. 42.

    The ‘Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal’ were adopted by the International Law Commission in 1950 (see ILC. ‘Text of the Nürnberg Principles Adopted by the International Law Commission’ (1950) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.2).

    • Principle I: Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.

    • Principle II: The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law.

    • Principle III: The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.

    • Principle IV: The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.

    • Principle V: Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law.

    • Principle VI: The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law:

      1. (a)

        Crimes against peace:

        1. (i)

          Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;

        2. (ii)

          Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).

      2. (b)

        War crimes:

        Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, illtreatment or deportation to slave-labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.

      3. (c)

        Crimes against humanity:

        Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime.

    • Principle VII: Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law.

  43. 43.

    On 11 December 1946, the GA of the United Nations ‘[affirmed] the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal’ (GA Res 95 (I) (11 December 1946) UN Doc A/RES/1/95). On 21 November 1947, the GA assigned the newly created International Law Commission (ILC) the task to formulate the Principles and prepare a draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind (GA Res 177 (II) (21 November 1947)). In 1950, the ILC adopted an elaborated version of the Nuremberg Principles (ILC. ‘Text of the Nürnberg Principles Adopted by the International Law Commission’ (1950) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.2). The universality of the Nuremberg principles has subsequently been confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia (ECHR No. 23052/04 and 24018/04), Decision as to the Admissibility, 17 January 2006. On the recognition of the Nuremberg Principles by states and international criminal tribunals, see A. Cassese. ‘Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal’ United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law (2009). http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_95-I/ga_95-I.html. Accessed 12 November 2016; Komarow 1980, pp. 21–37; and Sadat Wexler 1994, pp. 289–380.

  44. 44.

    See Cassese, supra note 43, para 4B; and Mettraux 2008, p. 600.

  45. 45.

    Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, Entry into Force 21 October 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85, Entry into Force 21 October 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, Entry into Force 21 October 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, Entry into Force 21 October 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (09 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277, Entry into Force 12 January 1951 [hereinafter Genocide Convention ]; Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (26 November 1968, 754 UNTS 73, Entry into Force 11 November 1970); International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (30 November 1973, 1015 UNTS 243, Entry into Force 18 July 1976) [hereinafter Apartheid Convention ]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, Entry into Force 7 December 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, Entry into Force 7 December 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II]. In addition, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in 1973 (GA Res 3074 (XXVIII) (3 December 1973)).

  46. 46.

    One of the early promoters of the vision to establish a permanent enforcement mechanism in the field of ICL was the International Association of Penal Law. This body proposed in 1926 that the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) should be given the power to deal with criminal matters. In 1937, a draft convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and for the establishment of an International Criminal Court was elaborated, but not put into practice. On early initiatives to establish a permanent international criminal tribunal, see, among others, Friedlander 1983, pp. 18f.; Hudson 1938, pp. 549–54; Mc Goldrick 2004, pp. 40f.; Gianaris 1992, pp. 88–119; and Bassiouni and Blakesley 1992, pp. 151–82.

  47. 47.

    See supra note 45.

  48. 48.

    See Dinstein 1985, pp. 226ff. For more information on this matter, Klein and Wilkes 1965, pp. 526ff.; and Gianaris 1992, pp. 93ff.

  49. 49.

    See supra note 45.

  50. 50.

    See Struett 2008, pp. 53–65; and Maogoto 2004, p. 6.

  51. 51.

    On possible problems of ICL enforcement, Bassiouni 2000, pp. 221ff.

  52. 52.

    Sadat Wexler 1994, p. 315. In the same vein, Komarow 1980; and Cassese, supra note 43.

  53. 53.

    SC Res 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827.

  54. 54.

    SC Res 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/955.

  55. 55.

    On these tribunals, see infra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.3.2.

  56. 56.

    Cassese, supra note 43, para 4A. See also Mettraux 2008, p. 600.

  57. 57.

    On the negotiations of the Rome Statute, see infra Sect. 6.4.1.

  58. 58.

    Article 5 RS. See also infra Sect. 6.4.2.

  59. 59.

    On the ICC, see infra Sect. 6.4.1.; on the ICTY and ICTR , see infra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.3.2.

  60. 60.

    Nouwen 2006, p. 190.

  61. 61.

    Some also refer to the Crimes Chamber in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For an introduction on these ‘hybrid’ courts, see ibid.

  62. 62.

    The crimes subject to universal jurisdiction are discussed below in this section.

  63. 63.

    Cryer et al. 2014, pp. 56f.

  64. 64.

    On these types of jurisdiction, see supra note 7.

  65. 65.

    Bassiouni 2001, p. 96.

  66. 66.

    M. Cherif Bassiouni has therefore concluded that ‘it [universal jurisdiction] is not as well established in conventional and customary international law as its ardent proponents, including major human rights organizations, profess it to be’ (Bassiouni 2004, p. 40). For a critique of the principle of universal jurisdiction, Fletcher 2003, pp. 580–84; and Kissinger 2001, pp. 86–96.

  67. 67.

    See Cordero 2008, pp. 59–100; and Expert Report, infra note 77, paras 15ff.

  68. 68.

    The Council of the European Union , in its decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003, has affirmed that ‘genocide , crimes against humanity and war crimes, must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at national level and by enhancing international cooperation’ (Council of the European Union. ‘Decision on the Investigation and Prosecution of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes’ (8 May 2003) 2003/335/JHA Official Journal L 118, 14/05/2003 pp. 0012–0014, preambular para 2; this duty is reiterated in preambular paras 4, 7).

  69. 69.

    See Decision on the Report I, infra note 97, para 3. A detailed assessment of the AU position on the principle of universal jurisdiction is provided in infra Sect. 6.3.2.

  70. 70.

    The preamble of the Rome Statute ‘[recalls] that it is the duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’. In addition, it is noted that states parties to the Statute are ‘[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes’.

  71. 71.

    The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a ‘Dule’  (IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 para 62; and The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-T), Judgment, 10 December 1998 para 156.

  72. 72.

    The Prosecutor v. Bernard Ntuyuhaga (ICTR -98-40-T), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw the Indictment, 18 March, 1999.

  73. 73.

    The Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and Brima Bazzy Kamara (SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) and SCSL -2004-16-AR72(E)), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, 13 March 2004 paras 67–71.

  74. 74.

    Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium ), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2002, p.3 [hereinafter Arrest Warrant Case], Dissenting Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, para 44.

  75. 75.

    The most prominent among them—the Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction—adopted the Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction. ‘Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction’ Program in Law and Public Affairs (2001). https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf. Accessed 12 November 2016). More recently, and as a direct consequence of the political frictions between European and African states which were caused by the alleged misuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction by European states, a joint ad hoc expert group between the EU and the AU (EU/AU Expert Group ) convened in 2008 ‘to clarify the respective understanding on the African and EU side on the principle of universal jurisdiction’ (see Expert Report, infra note 77, para 2 (emphasis in the original)).

  76. 76.

    As a consequence of this lack of a normative framework dealing with the principle of universal jurisdiction, a legislative diversity has emerged between different national judicial systems resorting to this type of jurisdiction. A prominent example illustrating such legislative diversity at a domestic level concerns the issue of trials in absentia. In light of the fact that there is no rule of international law proscribing the issuance of an arrest warrant or a trial in case the defendant is not present on the territory concerned, it can be argued in accordance with the lotus paradigm that the decision about the admissibility of proceedings in absentia falls within the competence of domestic legislators (see Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 74, Dissenting Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, paras 44/54 and Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, para 56). On the differences in the implementation of the principle of universal jurisdiction in European countries, Cordero 2008.

  77. 77.

    This expert group was constituted by the AU and EU, in order to discuss the principle of universal jurisdiction after political tensions materialised between those institutions following the exercise of universal jurisdiction by a number of European states against African personalities (Council of the European Union . ‘The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ (16 April 2009) 8627/1/09 REV 1 [hereinafter Expert Report]).

  78. 78.

    Ibid., para 9. On the customary law status of these crimes, SC. ‘Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to para 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)’ (3 May 1993) S/25704 paras 33–35.

  79. 79.

    The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, for example, also listed slavery and crimes against peace as crimes subject to the principle of universal jurisdiction (Principle 2 Princeton Principles, supra note 75).

  80. 80.

    An overview over national legal systems is provided in Cordero 2008, pp. 59–100; and Amnesty International . ‘Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation around the World’ (2012). https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior53/019/2012/en/. Accessed 12 November 2016, Annex I (pp. 16ff.).

  81. 81.

    See, e.g., Geneuss 2009, p. 951; Bassiouni 2001, pp. 81–162; Cryer et al. 2014, p. 57; and Randall 1987, pp. 785–841.

  82. 82.

    Notably the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were ratified by virtually all states of the world (see supra note 45).

  83. 83.

    Article 105 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, Entry into Force 16 November 1994) reads as follows: ‘On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the person and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.’ See also, Bassiouni 2004, pp. 47ff.

  84. 84.

    Geneva Conventions I–IV, supra note 45.

  85. 85.

    Protocol I, supra note 45.

  86. 86.

    Genocide Convention , supra note 45.

  87. 87.

    Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, Entry into Force 26 June 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention ].

  88. 88.

    This obligation is commonly referred to as aut dedere aut judicare (see infra Chap. 7, Sect. 7.1.3.).

  89. 89.

    The ‘grave breaches ’ are specified in Article 50 Geneva Convention I; Article 51 Geneva Convention II; Article 130 Geneva Convention III; Article 147 Geneva Convention IV.

  90. 90.

    See Article 49 Geneva Convention I; Article 50 Geneva Convention II; Article 129 Geneva Convention III; Article 146 Geneva Convention IV. The provision is worded identical in all four conventions: ‘Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches , and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.’

  91. 91.

    Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Entry into Force 27 January 1980) [hereinafter 1969 Vienna Convention].

  92. 92.

    On the relationship between the concept of universal jurisdiction and the treaty-based aut dedere aut judicare principle, Colangelo 2006, pp. 166ff.; and Expert Report, supra note 77, para 11.

  93. 93.

    See Expert Report, supra note 77, paras 9, 13.

  94. 94.

    See infra Chap. 7, Sect. 7.1.3.

  95. 95.

    Expert Report, supra note 77, para 11.

  96. 96.

    An overview over proceedings initiated on the basis on universal jurisdiction over the past two decades can be found in: Rikhof 2009, pp. 26–33; and Langer 2011, see tables pp. 42–44. Langer , in particular, links the selective application of the principle of universal jurisdiction to the potential (international-relations) costs a defendant would impose on the prosecuting state if a prosecution and trial takes place (see ibid, p. 2).

  97. 97.

    See Assembly of the AU . ‘Decision on the Abuse of the Principe of Universal Jurisdiction’ (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15–16 July 2012) Doc EX.CL/731(XXI) [hereinafter Decision on the Abuse V]; Assembly of the AU . ‘Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30–31 January 2011) Doc EX.CL/640(XVIII) [hereinafter Decision on the Abuse IV]; Assembly of the AU . ‘Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ (Kampala , Uganda , 25–27 July 2010) Doc EX.CL/606(XVII) [hereinafter Decision on the Abuse III]; Assembly of the AU . ‘Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 31 January–February 2010) Doc EX.CL/540(XVI) [hereinafter Decision on the Abuse II]; Assembly of the AU . ‘Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ (Sirte, Libya , 1–3 July 2009) Doc Assembly/AU/11(XIII) [hereinafter Decision on the Abuse I]; Assembly of the AU . ‘Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1–3 February 2009) Doc Assembly/AU/3(XII) [hereinafter Decision on the Implementation I]; Assembly of the AU . ‘Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ (Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, 30 June–1 July 2008) Doc Assembly/AU/14(XI) [hereinafter Decision on the Report I].

  98. 98.

    See, among others, Langer 2011, pp. 1–49.; T. Maluwa. ‘The Principle of Universal Jurisdiction and its Application in Africa: Reconciling Conceptual Logic with Political Reality’ (10th EAMJA Conference, Rwanda , 23–24 May, 2012) at 8f. http://www.eamja.org/10th%20EAMJA%20Conference.html. Accessed 12 November 2016; van der Wilt 2011, pp. 1043–66; and Zemach 2011, pp. 152f.

  99. 99.

    See Decision on the Report I, supra note 97, para 3.

  100. 100.

    Constitutive Act of the African Union (11 July 2000, Entry into Force 26 May 2001).

  101. 101.

    Decision on the Abuse V, supra note 97, para 5.

  102. 102.

    Executive Council of the AU. ‘Decision on the African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes’ (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9–13 July 2012) Doc EX.CL/731(XXI)c [hereinafter AU Model National Law].

  103. 103.

    Ibid., para 4. This request was reiterated by the AU Assembly in its July 2012 decision on the International Criminal Court (Assembly of the AU . ‘Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC)’ (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15–16 July 2012) Doc EX.CL/731(XXI) [hereinafter Decision on the Implementation IV], para 11). In regard to this decision, D. Akande rightly observes that it is at bit odd that the AU has located this request in the decision on the ICC instead of the decision on the abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction (see D. Akande. ‘The African Union , the ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: Some Recent Developments’ (29 August 2012). http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-african-union-the-icc-and-universal-jurisdiction-some-recent-developments/. Accessed 12 November 2016).

  104. 104.

    AU Model National Law, supra note 102, p. 6, n. 8. However, as Akande notes with regard to the inclusion of the treaty-based crimes of drug trafficking and terrorism: ‘Since African States have been complaining about the abuse of universal jurisdiction, it is a bit strange to see them pushing, through this Model Law, the boundaries of the crimes covered by that principle’ (Akande, supra note 103).

  105. 105.

    In a similar vein, Akande, supra note 103.

  106. 106.

    An unofficial summary by Human Rights Watch from notes taken in the court is available at: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1eAbEEaP_V_-R4u9ekEikONq_eEEPJ6VE_DrD1hB737Y/edit. Accessed 12 November 2016. For more information on this trial, see https://www.hrw.org/tag/hissene-habre, accessed 12 November 2016.

  107. 107.

    In South Africa , the Constitutional Court, on 30 October 2014, paved the way for the prosecution of Zimbabwean state officials for torture on the basis of the principle of universal jurisdiction (see National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another (CCT 02/14), ZACC 30, Judgment, 30 October 2014).

  108. 108.

    Assembly of the AU . ‘Decision on the Draft Legal Instruments’ (Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, 26–27 June 2014) Doc Assembly/AU/8(XXIII) para 2(e).

  109. 109.

    A short introduction to this topic is provided in Du Plessis et al. 2013, pp. 8ff.

  110. 110.

    On the performance of African jurisdictions, see van der Wilt 2011, pp. 1051ff.; Rikhof 2009, pp. 23ff. For an overview over national legislations in the context of international core crimes , Amnesty International , supra note 80, Annex I (pp. 16ff.).

  111. 111.

    GA Res 52/160 (15 December 1997) UN Doc A/RES/52/160 para 3.

  112. 112.

    A list with the participating states and organisations can be found in Annexes II–IV, ‘United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Official Records’ (Rome, 15 June–17 July 1998) Vol. I, UN Doc A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I) at 74–79.

  113. 113.

    See Kirsch and Holmes 1999, p. 4; and Arsanjani 1999, p. 23.

  114. 114.

    On the negotiations of Articles 13(b) and 16 RS, see infra Chap. 10, Sect. 10.2.; and infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.2.

  115. 115.

    Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium , Benin, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia , Germany , Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lesotho, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines , Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Senegal , Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa , Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Zambia (see Schabas 2011, p. 18, n. 63; and Glasius 2006, pp. 22–26).

  116. 116.

    See Benedetti and Washburn 1999, p. 20; Glasius 2006, pp. 26–28. On the discursive role that NGOs played in the establishment of a permanent international criminal tribunal, Struett 2008. On the role of NGO’s in the preparation of Articles 13(b) and 16 RS, see also infra Chap. 10, Sect. 10.2.3.; and infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.2.2.

  117. 117.

    See Glasius 2006, pp. 24f.

  118. 118.

    See Benedetti and Washburn 1999, pp. 31, 33; and Glasius 2006, p. 24.

  119. 119.

    See Benedetti and Washburn 1999, p. 31. On the role of the SADC , Maqungo 2000, pp. 42–53.

  120. 120.

    On the role of the SC during the negotiations, see also, infra Chap. 10, Sect. 10.2.; and infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.2.

  121. 121.

    See, in particular, infra Chap. 11, Sects. 11.2.2 and 11.2.3. See also, Benedetti and Washburn 1999, p. 21; and Glasius 2006, pp. 25f.

  122. 122.

    Glasius 2006, p. 24.

  123. 123.

    Ibid., p. 24.

  124. 124.

    ‘Summary Record of the 9th Plenary Meeting’ (17 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/SR.9 para 10.

  125. 125.

    See Benedetti and Washburn 1999, p. 27.

  126. 126.

    In a similar vein, Cryer 2005, p. 236.

  127. 127.

    See Preamble of the RS, paras 4/9 and Articles 1 and 5 RS.

  128. 128.

    The crime of aggression, of which a definition was adopted at the 2010 Review Conference at Kampala (Article 8bis RS), only enters into force when: (a) at least thirty States Parties have ratified or accepted the amendments (Articles 15bis (2) and 15ter (2) RS) and (b) two-thirds of the States Parties have taken a decision to activate the crime of aggression at any time after 1 January 2017 (Articles 15bis (3) and 15ter (3) RS).

  129. 129.

    Jouannet 2007, p. 397. On the methodology adopted in this section, see also introduction to Part II.

  130. 130.

    Jouannet 2007, p. 397.

  131. 131.

    Ibid., p. 397.

  132. 132.

    Ibid., pp. 397f.

  133. 133.

    Preamble of the RS, para 1.

  134. 134.

    See GA. ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ (1995) UN Doc A/50/22, paras 54–85.

  135. 135.

    See, e.g., Hall 1997, p. 179; Hall 1998, p. 129; and Zimmermann 2016, p. 113.

  136. 136.

    For an assessment on the reasons whether treaty crimes should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the ICC, see GA. ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court ’ (1996) Vol. I, UN Doc A/51/22, paras 103ff.; Boister 1998, pp. 27–43.

  137. 137.

    GA. ‘Statement by U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson Regarding the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ (New York, 23 October 1997). http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65828.pdf. Accessed 12 November 2016 (emphasis added).

  138. 138.

    See supra Sect. 6.3.1.

  139. 139.

    Nevertheless, a small number of categories of crimes within the Article 5 catalogue are considered to be in advance of customary international law. Antonio Cassese, for example, considers the inclusion of the categories ‘forced pregnancy’ (Article 7(1)(g) RS), ‘enforced disappearance of persons’ (Article 7(1)(i) RS) and ‘the crimes of apartheid’ (Article 7(1)(j) RS) to be in advance of customary international law. He also argues that the open-ended nature of the crime of ‘persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity’ (Article 7(1)(h) RS), by adding in particular ‘cultural, […] gender as defined in para 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law’, extends beyond established law (Cassese 2002, pp. 376–7) In a similar vein, Schabas 2010, p. 177). In addition, it is doubtful whether the prohibition of ‘conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities’ (Article 8(2)(e)(vii) RS) is covered by customary international law (see Cryer 2005, p. 283).

  140. 140.

    Cryer 2005, p. 287.

  141. 141.

    Benedetti and Washburn 1999, p. 33.

  142. 142.

    See The Nuremberg Judgment, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings 22, 30 September 1946. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/09-30-46.asp. Accessed 12 November 2016.

  143. 143.

    On the requirements for the crime of aggression to become operational, see supra note 128.

  144. 144.

    See infra Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.3.1.

  145. 145.

    See AU-Decisions on universal jurisdiction, supra note 97.

  146. 146.

    On these claims, see, in particular, infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.5.

  147. 147.

    Morocco rejoined the African Union on 30 January 2017 after more than 30 years, after having left the institution in 1984.

  148. 148.

    At the time of writing, 124 states have ratified the RS (on the status of ratification, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, Entry into Force 1 July 2002)).

  149. 149.

    Tladi 2009, p. 65.

  150. 150.

    See ibid., p. 65.

  151. 151.

    Other states that have voted against the adoption of the RS were: the U.S.; Israel, China , Iraq , Yemen and Qatar (see Benedetti and Washburn 1999, p. 27).

  152. 152.

    Du Plessis 2010, p. 6.

  153. 153.

    Ibid., p. 6.

  154. 154.

    See ibid., pp. 6ff.; and Maqungo 2000, pp. 42–53.

  155. 155.

    Maqungo 2000, p. 47.

  156. 156.

    On the role of a universal international law in the context of colonial expansion, see Jouannet 2007.

  157. 157.

    See supra Sect. 6.2. On the selectivity claim in relation to these tribunals, see infra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.3.1.

  158. 158.

    See ILC. ‘Text of the Nürnberg Principles Adopted by the International Law Commission ’ (1950) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.2.

  159. 159.

    The principles can be found in supra Sect. 6.2, note 42.

  160. 160.

    See Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia (ECHR No. 23052/04 and 24018/04), Decision as to the Admissibility, 17 January 2006. On the use of these principles in national fora, see Cassese, supra note 43, Komarow 1980, and Sadat Wexler 1994.

  161. 161.

    Geneva Conventions I-IV and Protocol I and II; Genocide Convention ; Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, supra note 45.

  162. 162.

    See supra Sect. 6.3.

  163. 163.

    See, in particular, Decision on the Report I, supra note 97, para 3.

  164. 164.

    Executive Council of the AU. ‘Decision on the African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes’ (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9–13 July 2012) Doc EX.CL/731(XXI)c.

  165. 165.

    See AU-Decisions, supra note 97.

  166. 166.

    Constitutive Act of the African Union (11 July 2000, Entry into Force 26 May 2001).

  167. 167.

    See supra note 106.

  168. 168.

    See supra Sect. 6.4.3.

  169. 169.

    See supra Sect. 6.4.2.

  170. 170.

    Having evaluated the AU’s objections in the context of the Al-Bashir indictment, Tladi also confirms that the value-based imperialism claim does not apply the context of the ICC: ‘[W]hatever their origins, the values under consideration have been (re)appropriated by African culture so that the imperialist potential […], whatever its validity, is not applicable to ICC action consistent with its mandate, ie these values reflect genuine universality’ (Tladi 2009, p. 66).

  171. 171.

    Anonymous. ‘African leaders denounce international court’ Gulf News (5 July 2009). http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/libya/african-leaders-denounce-international-court-1.500076. Accessed 12 November 2016.

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Schuerch, R. (2017). The Universalisation of Western Values Since the Second World War . In: The International Criminal Court at the Mercy of Powerful States. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 13. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-192-0_6

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