Abstract
In De Interpretatione Aristotle states a necessary condition for the application of the word ‘proposition’. He writes: “We call propositions those only that have truth or falsity in them. A prayer is, for instance, a sentence but neither has truth nor has falsity”.1
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References
Aristotle, Organon; On Interpretation, 17a (1–5), Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, and Heinemann, London, 1955, p. 121.
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A. Tarski, ‘The Semantic Concept of Truth’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4 (1944); repr. in H. Feigl and P. Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis, Appelton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1949, p. 63.
Davidson, Op. cit., p. 759.
W. V. O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, 1970, p. 38.
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© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Gochet, P. (1980). A Semantic Definition of Proposition in Terms of Truth and Falsity. In: Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions. Synthese Library, vol 98. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_4
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