Ramification of the Method: ‘Virtue is Knowledge’ Challenged (89c5–96c10)

Abstract

After painstakingly establishing that virtue is knowledge (86c7–89c4), Plato’s Socrates does an about-face by immediately putting its truth into question (89c5ff.). This about-face follows closely on the heels of Meno’s admission “… Clearly on our hypothesis that if virtue is knowledge, it must be teachable” (89c3–4) and is expressed in the form of the query, “But what if we were not correct in admitting that?” (89c5–6) As if to pinpoint what is at stake, Plato makes Socrates affirm the hypothetical statement, “If virtue is knowledge, it must be teachable,” and restricts his misgivings to the antecedent of that statement “Virtue is knowledge” (89d3–5). Prima facie, this is a surprising move for what Plato does here, in the final section of the Meno, is to make Socrates place in jeopardy one of his (Socrates’) own most revered doctrines, namely, to know the right is to do it.