A Comparative Study of Risk Assessment Methods, MEHARI & CRAMM with a New Formal Model of Risk Assessment (FoMRA) in Information Systems

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Abstract. In this article, we present a comparative study of a developed new formal mathematical model of risk assessment (FoMRA) with expert methods of risk assessment in the information systems (IS). Proposed analysis verified the correctness of theoretical assumptions of developed model. In the paper, the examples of computations illustrating the application of FoMRA and known and accepted throughout the world methods of risk assessment: MEHARI and CRAMM were presented and related to a specific unit of the public administration operating in Poland.

Keywords: risk assessment in information systems, risk assessment methods, MEHARI, CRAMM, FoMRA, comparative analysis of risk assessment methods.

1 Introduction

Continuous technological innovations and competition among existing and entering into the market organizations (firms) enable customer's access to a wider range of services and products delivered by the ICT systems [1,2,3]. A rapid development of the IT systems and growing acceptance of the Internet as a medium (channel) of products and services distribution, carries both benefits and risks [4,5]. A particular risk arises from the possibility of unauthorized disclosure, modification or removal of a larger amount of a significant information without leaving traces of an unauthorized access [6,7,8]. A particular attention should be paid nowadays to ensure an appropriate, understandable as a secure, access to such a type of systems [9,10].

The choice of methods to ensure the security of the IT systems in a given organization should be relevant to the type of risk. A transparent and proactive approach to the analysis and risk management may not only minimize risk but also allows achieving a competitive supremacy of the organization [11,12].

Among the methods of risk assessment, a particular attention is paid to the methods, which can be represented by means of the mathematical models. One of such models has been developed by us and described in detail in [13]. The advantage of this formal mathematical model of risk assessment (FoMRA) on the background of existing models (shown below) is that, it enables the performing of risk assessment

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of the information system of the organization according to the ISO/IEC standards and OECD recommendations.

In this paper, a comparative analysis will be performed in order to demonstrate the correctness of the FoMRA theoretical assumptions on the background of the expert methods such as the CRAMM and MEHARI, accepted and applied by many professionals throughout the world.

2 Description of the Risk Evaluation Methods

Nowadays, amongst about 200 available methods of risk assessment and risk management [14], only few have found the acceptance of the market, including COBRA [15], COBIT [16], OCTAVE [17], CRAMM [18] and MEHARI [19]. The majority of these methods is based on know-how solutions developed by the independent or governmental organizations of different countries, and is assigned for the application in the governmental systems and public service organizations. These methods are not supported by proofs based on formal mathematical models, but they are only the collections of good practices within the IT Governance [20].

One of the first formalized methods of risk assessment for the information systems, approved as the government standard in the USA, is the Courtney method [21]. It considers the risk of information systems in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability.

The Courtney method, being a standard in the USA, was developed by Fisher and others [22,23], but Parker was the first one, who eliminated the weak points of this method [24]. These weak points, as reported recently in [25,13], are related to the "human factor" which influences the risk of the incident. Parker, who applied mathematical knowledge and the experience of the IT experts, has proposed the risk analysis model containing five phases as described in [24].

The model above is an improved model proposed by Courtney. Most of elaborated quantitative, qualitative methods (graph-based, static and dynamic, relational and Markov) uses some or the majority of the assumptions of a standard model proposed by Parker [26,27,28,29,30]. These methods differ, however, in the approaches to the identification and classification of the assets, vulnerabilities and risks, the risk value assessment, the choice of countermeasures, etc. This fact makes the most of the methods presented above to move in quite different directions, even if the final goal seems to be the same [14]. In most cases, it is thus impossible to directly compare results generated by two different methods, and an indirect comparison is hard and time-consuming, even if conversion mechanisms are obtainable. The important questions thus become whether these more or less widely used methods are competent? whether they can properly describe any IT system? and whether they effectively ensure declared compliance with standards?

Some answers to these questions were provided in the paper [13] we propose a formal model for risk assessment (FoMRA) based on the experience of experts who created the MEHARI method and it complies with the requirements and standards' guidelines for the security of the information systems [simplified model is presented in Section 2.1].

In this paper, the FoMRA model described in [13], will be a subject of the comparative analysis aiming, as mentioned above, to demonstrate the correctness of the theoretical assumptions of the model against the well-known and widely used methods of risk assessment. The experimental results of the risk analysis should confirm whether the FoMRA is meaningful, and if it truly describes any information system, and whether these results are comparable with the results obtained from other methods.

2.1 Simplified Formal Model of Risk Analysis (FoMRA)

The defined mathematical structures of the standard formal model of risk assessment (FoMRA), were used to precisely define a graph for calculating risk values [13], and to define an algorithm of its construction. Briefly, let A be a set of some assets[1]:

$$A = \{ a_i \ : \ i = 1, ..., n_A \} \tag{1}$$

Additionally, let us consider the following finite sets:

$$V = \{ v_j : j = 1, ..., n_V \} \text{ - a set of vulnerability classes,} \tag{2}$$

$$T = \{ t_k : k = 1, ..., n_T \} \text{ - a set of threat classes,} \tag{3}$$

$$S = \{ s_l : l = 1, ..., n_S \} \text{ - a set of risk scenarios,} \tag{4}$$

$$DP = \{ dp_s : s = 1, ..., n_{DP} \} \text{ - a set of measures reducing a potentiality,} \tag{5}$$

$$DI = \{ di_t : t = 1, ..., n_{DI} \} \text{ - a set of measures reducing an impact.} \tag{6}$$

The above sets define classes of system assets, vulnerabilities concerning threats, classes of threats for assets, risk scenarios and measures reducing potentialities and impacts of threats resulting from assets losses.

Let us assume that there is a given and ordered set $\Re$ of n-values for the arguments in *IS* system (according to [13]), corresponding to sets *A, V, T, DP, DI,* and *M, W,* where *M* and *W* are subsequent arrays and values reducing threats, risks and consequences of risk.

In this set $\Re = [r_{\min}, r_{\max}] \subset N$, where N is the set of natural numbers, additional auxiliary functions are defined:

- $value_A : A \to \Re^* \times \Re^* \times \Re^*$ - which assigns to a given asset $a \in A$ the values of three basic security parameters: *CIA* (*Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability*)
- $value_V : V \to \Re^* \times \Re^* \times \Re^*$ - which assigns the values of three parameters depending on *AEV* (*Accident, Error, Voluntary*) to a given natural vulnerability $v \in V$ (a so-called "natural exposure", independent from the security measures used)

[1] The numbers $n_A, n_V, n_S, n_T, n_{DP}, n_{DI}$ further used are some relevantly great natural numbers.

- For $value_A$, $value_V$ set $\Re^* = \Re + \{null\}$, where $null \in \Re^*$ is the neutral value, what means that such a function's argument value does not have the defined feature, and no value can therefore be assigned to it.

— $value_T : T \rightarrow \Re$ - assigning a given threat $t \in T$ to t value,

— $value_{DP} : DP \times S \times N \rightarrow \Re$ - assigning given measures reducing the threat potentiality $d_p \in DP$ to d_p value.

Additionally, in order to determine the risk values $W^{s,a}$ for any risk scenario s assigned to an asset a the following arrays are predefined:

— an array of potentiality reduction $M^s_{pot\ n \times n \times n}$, which makes a declared value of measure-reducing potentialities $W^s_{pot}[i, j, k] \in \Re$ dependent on $CM_{s,j}$ (for particular $j=dp_1, ..., dp_{n_{DP}}$) and vulnerability value $value_V(v)$,

— an array of impact $M^s_{imp\ n \times n \times n}$, which makes a declared value of measure-reducing impacts $W^s_{imp}[i, j, k] \in \Re$ dependent on $CM_{s,j}$ (for particular $j=di_1, ..., di_{n_{DI}}$),

— an array of impact reduction $M^{s,a}_{imp\ n \times n}$, which makes a declared value of measures-reducing impact $W^{s,a}_{imp}[i, j] \in \Re$ dependent on the value W^s_{imp} determined from the array $M^s_{imp\ n \times n \times n}$ and the value of an asset $value_A(a)$,

— an array of risk $M^{s,a}{}_{n \times n}$, which makes a declared value of risk $W^{s,a}[i, j] \in \Re$ dependent on the value W^s_{pot} determined from the array $M^s_{pot\ n \times n \times n}$ and value $W^{s,a}_{imp}$ determined from the array $M^{s,a}_{imp\ n \times n}$.

$CM_{s,j} \in \Re$ is a weighted value of the measure reducing the potentiality and impact of some threat. The following formula (7) shows how to calculate values for potentiality and impact actions:

$$CM_{s,j} = \left\lfloor (r_{\max} - r_{\min}) \cdot \frac{\sum R_i \times P_i}{\sum P_i} + r_{\min} + 0.5 \right\rfloor \tag{7}$$

where:

— $j \in DP \cup DI$ – represents implemented measure/countermeasure,

— $\lfloor x \rfloor$ - indicates the rounding down of the result x to the number belonging to the set $\Re$ (to the infimum of x in this set),

— R_i– is an answer to an audit question (the value 1 or 0),

— $P_i = value_X(j, s, no(R_i))$– is a value assigned to an i-th question, where X = DP or DI, which depends on the defined measure type j scenario s and a number of the question $no(R_i)$ associated with the answer R_i.

The values of defined arrays M^{s}_{pot}, M^{s}_{imp} $M^{s,a}_{imp}$ and $M^{s,a}$ should depend on the criticality of business processes in a given organization, and should not be "rigidly" taken, as proposed in most methods such as CRAMM and MEHARI. The criticality of the process depends on vulnerability values $value_V(v)$, assets $value_A(a)$ and the effectiveness of the implemented measures reducing potentialities $DP(dp_s : s = 1,...,n_{DP})$ and impacts $DI(dp_t : t = 1,...,n_{DI})$.

For these specific arrays, the following sets of arrays are also determined:

$$M_{pot} = \bigcup_{s\,:\,\exists_{dp\in DP}(s,dp)\in\overline{DP}} \{M^{s}_{pot}\} \tag{8}$$

$$M_{imp} = \bigcup_{s\,:\,\exists_{di\in DI}(s,di)\in\overline{DI}} \{M^{s}_{imp}\} \tag{9}$$

$$M^{a}_{imp} = \bigcup_{s\,:\,\exists_{di\in DI}(s,di)\in\overline{DI}} \{M^{s,a}_{imp}\} \tag{10}$$

$$M = \bigcup_{(a,s)\in\overline{A\times S}} \{M^{s,a}\} \tag{11}$$

The above brief description of the FoMRA complies with the fundamental requirements of the ISO standard: ISO/IEC 27005:2011 - Security techniques - Information security risk management. The FoMRA allows to conduct completely a comparative analysis with other methods, as shown below.

2.2 Description of Methods Used in Comparative Analysis

The choice of the CRAMM and MEHARI methods for comparative analysis has been made to demonstrate the correctness of the theoretical assumptions of the FoMRA [13]. These methods are widely accepted by the risk analysis and security management experts.

The risk value determined by the CRAMM method is dependent on assets value, threats and vulnerabilities of the system (Fig 1). By applying this method, a list of countermeasures aiming at reducing risks in information security is created.



Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the CRAMM risk assessment method

To determine risk value, CRAMM method applies heptavalent array of risk (Tab.1).
where:

- 1, 2 : negligible risk,
- 3, 4 : tolerable risk,
- 5,6 : inadmissible risk,
- 7 : intolerable risk.
- Depending on the risk value, CRAMM enables the selection of countermeasures from 70 groups for a given scenario, making it a dedicated method for large organizations and enterprises. In the case of the SME sector, the choice of countermeasures may not be optimal, since risk does not match the scale of the risk of failure due to the scale of the enterprise.

Table 1. The array of risk value according the CRAMM method

Threats		VL	VL	VL	L	L	L	M	M	M	H	H	H	VH	VH	VH
Vuln.		L	M	H	L	M	H	L	M	H	L	M	H	L	M	H
Assets/Value	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	3
	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	4
	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	3	4	4
	4	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	4	3	4	4	3	4	4
	5	2	3	3	3	3	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5
	6	3	3	4	3	4	4	4	4	5	4	5	5	5	5	6
	7	3	4	4	4	4	5	4	5	5	5	5	6	5	6	6
	8	4	4	5	4	5	5	5	5	6	5	6	6	6	6	7
	9	4	5	5	5	5	6	5	6	6	6	6	7	6	7	7
	10	5	5	6	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7

V.L – Very Low, L – Low, M –Medium, H – High, V.H – Very High.

According to various reviews [32,33], CRAMM as a commercial tool, should be used only by the experienced users, since it generates too much information, it is inflexible and slow. The full analysis can take months, instead of several days.

Unlike CRAMM, the MEHARI method is available as a Know-How knowledge base (in the Excel File) related to threats, vulnerabilities and threat scenarios assessment.

The MEHARI method is based on the knowledge of assets, vulnerabilities and threats identification and classification, and the assessment of risk levels (Fig. 2).



Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the MEHARI risk assessment method

To determine risk value, the MEHARI method applies tetravalent array of a risk (Tab. 2).

Table 2. The array of risk value according to the MEHARI method

Impact				
4	2	3	4	4
3	2	3	3	4
2	1	2	2	3
1	1	1	1	2
	1	2	3	4
		Potentiality		

where:

- 1 : negligible risk,
- 2 : tolerable risk,
- 3 : inadmissible risk,
- 4 : intolerable risk.

The risk value in the MEHARI method depends on the potentiality and impact values for each of the identified risk scenarios. According to various authors [32,33], the MEHARI method is flexible and dedicated to small and large organizations. The disadvantage of this method is the lack of data bases of countermeasures which are reducing risks in information security systems. Moreover, new upgrade issued in the year 2012, delivering new knowledge base of vulnerabilities, threats, etc., made this method even more complicated and a little more time-consuming.

Tables 1 and 2 determine the risk values estimation for each type of the organization for each of the methods mentioned above . They indicate the risk that a given organization takes into account as: (i)) intolerable (risk demanding the immediate implementation of countermeasures, despite of the organization budget and security plans), (ii) inadmissible (risk must be eliminated or minimized sooner or later, according to the established organization budget and security plans), or (iii) tolerable (low or insignificant risks - depending on the organization's security policy).

3 Conditions and Results of the Experiment

To perform a comparative analysis demonstrating the correctness of the theoretical assumptions of the FoMRA [12], we have to:

- establish an uniform scale of risk value array (CRAMM, MEHARI, FoMRA),
- use the same assets, vulnerabilities, threat/risk scenarios for various methods of risk analysis.

It was assumed for the analysis that the scale of risk value is in the range <1 - 4>. The assumed scale is not dictated by any requirements, only for ease operation of the quantitative records (for the MEHARI method and FoMRA), dissimilar to quantitative-qualitative as CRAMM.

It was also assumed that risk values (MEHARI and FoMRA *versus* CRAMM) should be interpreted after transformation as follows:

- for risk value: 1 = (1,2); 2 = (3,4); 3 = (5,6); 4 = 7 - and they correspond to the set of values given in (CRAMM and MEHARI). The scale of risk values according to the FoMRA is flexible [17] and can be matched to any of the above methods.

Additionally, the following classification system was used:

- for assets: 1 - less important, 2 - important 3 - very important, 4 - critical
- vulnerability/threat: 1 = Very Low/Low, 2 = Medium, 3 = High, 4 = Very High

The data derived from the analysis of the IT security of the administrative unit operating in Poland were used to perform the comparative analysis.

FoMRA was used to perform a pre-audit [13] which allowed to identify confidentiality (*C*), integrity (*I*), and availability (*A*). Table 3 shows an example of the identified *CIA* parameters.

Table 3. The results of the pre-audit of resources and vulnerabilities for a given organization

A	Assets	$Value_A(a)$			V	Vulnerability	$Value_V(v)$		
		C	I	A			A	E	V
a_1	Data files or data bases accessed by applications	4	4	3	v_1	Distorted data entry or fiddling of data	null	null	3
a_5	Written or printed information and data kept by users and personal archives	2	2	2	v_3	Intentional erasure (direct or indirect), theft or destruction of program or data containers	null	null	3
a_6	Main systems, servers hosting applications and their peripheral equipments, shared file servers	null	null	4	v_5	IT or telecom equipment breakdown	2	null	null
a_9	Application software, package or middleware (executable code)	null	null	2	v_{15}	Bug in application program	null	4	null
…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…

For each of the threat scenarios (s_1, s_2, ..., s_n) the risk value $W^{s,a}$ was calculated. To calculate the $W^{s,a}$ value, the results from the audit questionnaire were used. The audit concerned the implemented dissuasive measures, preventing from potential threats (measures defined in formula 5) and protective, preventive as well as palliative measures, depending on the threat type (measures reducing threat, formula 6). The questionnaire results taken from the MEHARI knowledge base [19] have been used to perform audit. Similar questionnaires are also available from the OCTAVE [17], EBIOS [34], CRAMM [18], etc. One should note that the content of the audit questionnaires may not perfectly match between the analyzed methods (certain audit questionnaires from the MEHARI contain more details and higher number of implemented countermeasures as compared to the CRAMM audit questionnaires and *vice versa*, for the same hazard risk scenarios).

The situation may happen when one or more of the audit questionnaires will be covered in one method, while not in the other one (e.g., audit questionnaires related to the recovery measures in the MEHARI method do not have the coverage in the CRAMM method, because such measures are not taken into account there). This situation can ultimately affect the outcome of risk assessment (e.g. risk values).

Table 4 shows a section of the questionnaire for the audit of dissuasive measures against theft of archives in an office for asset a_5 - written or printed information and data kept by users and personal archives, susceptibility v_3 - intentional erasure (direct or indirect), theft or destruction of a program or data containers and the threat t_2 - loss of data files or documents: theft of data media.

Table 4. Section of the audit questionnaire related to the dissuasive measures of the potential attackers against theft of archival documents

Monitoring of protected office areas	**Response (0/1)**	**Value$_{pi}$**
Is there a complementary video surveillance system, complete and coherent, for protected office areas, able to detect movement and abnormal behaviour?	1	4
In the case of an alarm, does the surveillance team have the possibility of sending out an intervention team without delay to verify the cause of the alarm and to take appropriate action?	1	2
Has the security team sufficient resources to cover the eventuality of multiple alarms set off intentionally?	0	4
Is video surveillance material recorded and kept for a long period?	1	1
Is the intrusion detection system itself under surveillance (alarm in the case of shutdown, video auto-surveillance etc.)?	1	2
Are procedures for surveillance and intervention in the case of abnormal behaviour audited regularly?	1	2

According to formula 7, we calculate the weighted value of measures $CM_{s,j}$ ($CM_{s,j}$=1 means that the measure is ineffective and $CM_{s,j}$ = 4 means that it is very effective) for each identified scenario *s*. The following example shows the calculation of $CM_{s,j} = dp_1$ for dissuasive measures taken from table 4 (scenario s_{15}-value in bold):

$$CM_{s_8,\, j=dp_1} = \left\lfloor (4-1) \times \frac{(1\cdot 4 + 1\cdot 2 + 0\cdot 4 + 1\cdot 1 + 1\cdot 2 + 1\cdot 2)}{15} + 1 \right\rfloor = 3$$

where:
1/0 - means Yes / No

Table 5 shows the calculation of the weighted values of the $CM_{s,j}$ for exemplary scenarios of threats. As can be seen from the table, some of $CM_{s,\,j}$ measures have value equal to 1. This value may be the result of calculation as above or can be taken arbitrarily in the absence of such measures (scenario s_4 - bold values). For example, in order to prevent copying the application data files (s_4) by a potential hacker, we can only use the protective measures against copying and/or measure-reducing impacts of copying. The use of effective dissuasive measures against potential hacker (to discourage him from performing an attack) is, however, minimal or impossible.

Table 5. An example of the calculated weighted values of $CM_{s,\,j}$ for exemplary threat scenarios

N^0	**Scenario -S**	**Parameters' & Value$_A$(a)**		**Parameters' & Value$_V$(v)**		$CM_{s,j=dp1}$= $value_{DP}(dp_1)$	$CM_{s,j=dp2}$= $value_{DP}(dp_2)$	$CM_{s,j=di1}$= $value_{DI}(di_1)$	$CM_{s,j=di2}$= $value_{DI}(di_2)$	$CM_{s,j=di3}$= $value_{DI}(di_3)$
		CIA	**value**	**AEV**	**value**					
S_4	Repeated copy of application data files, by a hacker connecting from outside to an open port for network remote maintenance	C	a_1=4	V	v_2=3	**1**	3	4	**1**	**1**
S_{15}	Loss of data files or documents: theft of archives in an office	A	a_5=2	V	v_3=3	**3**	2	1	2	3
…	…	…	…	…		…	…	…	…	…

Further procedure is the W^s_{pot}, W^s_{imp}, $W^{s,a}_{imp}$ calculation and $W^{s,a}$ mentioned above.

For this purpose, the standard values of the risk arrays M^s_{pot}, M^s_{imp}, $M^{s,a}_{imp}$ and $M^{s,a}$ described in detail in [13] were considered. Tables 6,7 and 8 illustrate all the necessary data to calculate the risk values for the selected threats in an exemplary administrative unit. Tables cover all the *CIA* safety parameters and types of actions using vulnerabilities *AEV* within FoMRA. The table also includes the results of analysis performed according to the MEHARI and CRAMM methods. During the risk

assessment with the use of CRAMM and MEHARI methods, the system of resources, vulnerabilities and risks classification was used. The scale of risk values was set according to the requirements of both methods. The audit questionnaires from each of the methods were used during the analysis in accordance to the requirements described above (with the same resources, vulnerabilities, and threat / risk scenarios).

The results obtained with the use of the FoMRA for 14 out of the 21 scenarios presented in Table 7, Table 8 and Figure 5 are comparable with those obtained using CRAMM (Fig. 3). In turn, 16 out of the 21 scenarios are comparable with those obtained using MEHARI (Fig. 4). Analyzing the results derived from the CRAMM and MEHARI and given in Table 8, we received comparable results, for which 14 out of the 21 scenarios overlaps.

As can be seen from Table 7 and Table 8, from the 21 scenarios representing approximately 10% of all threat scenarios [19], 12 overlap (they give the same results for the three methods). This result contradicts the statement made by the authors [14] that in most cases it is impossible to compare directly the results generated by two different methods.

Referring to the statement on audit questionnaires related to the recovery measures from the MEHARI method having no coverage in CRAMM method, we performed the analysis of the results from Table 7 for the weighted value, $CM_{s,j} = di_2$.

Table 6. The identified and classified resources and vulnerabilities for each threat scenario

S	Scenarios	Assets			vulnerability		
		CIA	a	$value_A(a)$	AEV	v	$value_V(v)$
s_1	Deliberate erroneous data input by a staff member usurping an authorized user's identity	I	a_1	4	M	v_1	3
s_2	Deliberate substitution of data media, by an unauthorized person	I	a_1	4	M	v_1	3
s_3	Theft of application data media during production, by a person authorized to handle the media	C	a_1	4	M	v_2	3
s_4	Repeated copy of application data files, by a hacker connecting from outside to an open port for network remote maintenance	C	a_1	4	M	v_2	3
s_5	Access to a system and copy of application data files, by a staff member using a security breach left open after a maintenance operation	C	a_1	4	M	v_2	3
s_6	Accident during data processing – Alteration of sensitive data	I	a_1	4	A	v_{11}	3
s_7	Accidental loss of business related data (sensitive data) due to obsolescence or pollution	D	a_1	3	A	v_{12}	2
s_8	Data integrity distortion during transmission on the WAN/LAN network, by a (remote) hacker	I	a_3	4	M	v_1	3
s_9	Erroneous message sent by a staff member usurping the identity of another person, with a forged signature	I	a_3	4	M	v_1	3
s_{10}	Diversion of sensitive information by a system administrator, using access to user data not erased after use	C	a_3	2	M	v_6	3
s_{11}	Interception of sensitive information transferred over the LAN by a network administrator modifying a network equipment	C	a_3	2	M	v_6	3
s_{12}	Interception of sensitive information transferred between a nomadic user and the internal network, by listening to the exchanges	C	a_3	2	M	v_6	3
s_{13}	Interception of sensitive information: eavesdropping electromagnetic emission	C	a_3	2	M	v_6	3
s_{14}	Short circuit resulting in a fire with important damages on WAN/LAN network equipment	D	a_4	4	A	v_{13}	2
s_{15}	Loss of data files or documents: theft of archives in an office	D	a_5	2	M	v_3	3
s_{16}	Malicious alteration of the expected functionalities of an application due to a logic bomb or back door laid by operation staff	I	a_9	2	M	v_7	3
s_{17}	Deliberate modification of an application by the maintenance	I	a_9	2	M	v_7	3
s_{18}	Unintentional degradation of performances for applications after software maintenance operation	D	a_9	3	E	v_{20}	2
s_{19}	Extended network configurations erased or polluted by a non operational staff member	D	a_{11}	3	M	v_9	2
s_{20}	Departure of strategic personnel	D	a_{13}	2	E	v_{16}	3
s_{21}	Remote attack of a third organization by internal personnel using authorized connections to the organization	D	a_{15}	2	M	v_{17}	3

The analysis showed that among the 13 scenarios examined by the FoMRA, where the value of the $CM_{s,\ j} = di_2 > 1$ (recovery measure - this means that the audited organization possesses the insurance covering some cost of property, assets, etc. damage), seven scenarios were identified (5 - Integrity, 2 - Availability) which do not match the results derived from CRAMM (Tab. 8).

Taking into account the method of $W^{s,a}$ evaluation, as described in details in [13], it was observed that changes in $CM_{s,\ j} = di_2$ for (s_1, s_2, s_6, s_7, s_8, s_{14}, s_{16}) scenarios from Table 7, impose values changes in assigned arrays (Table 9 - $CM_{s,\ j} = di_2 = 1$ dark gray color, $CM_{s,\ j} = di_2 > 1$ gray).

Table 7. Calculated risk values using FoMRA for selected scenarios on the example of administrative unit operating in Poland

S	*Risk value FoMRA*								
	$CM_{s,j=dp1}$	$CM_{s,j=dp2}$	W^s_{pot}	$CM_{s,j=di1}$	$CM_{s,j=di2}$	$CM_{s,j=di3}$	W^s_{imp}	$W^{s,a}_{imp}$	$W^{s,a}$
s_1	1	2	3	2	2	1	2	2	2
s_2	4	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
s_3	3	1	3	1	1	1	4	4	4
s_4	1	3	2	4	1	1	3	3	3
s_5	3	3	2	2	1	1	3	3	3
s_6	1	3	2	3	2	4	2	2	2
s_7	1	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	2
s_8	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2
s_9	1	2	3	1	2	1	4	4	4
s_{10}	2	3	2	2	1	1	3	2	2
s_{11}	2	2	3	3	1	1	3	2	2
s_{12}	1	3	2	1	1	1	4	2	2
s_{13}	1	2	3	1	1	1	4	2	2
s_{14}	1	3	2	3	3	3	2	2	2
s_{15}	3	2	2	1	2	3	3	2	2
s_{16}	2	4	1	2	2	1	2	2	1
s_{17}	3	3	2	1	2	1	4	2	2
s_{18}	1	2	2	1	2	3	3	3	3
s_{19}	1	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3
s_{20}	1	1	3	1	2	4	3	2	2
s_{21}	3	2	2	2	1	1	3	2	2

Table 8. Calculated risk values using CRAMM and MEHARI for selected scenarios on the example of administrative unit operating in Poland

S	*Risk value CRAMM*					*Risk value MEHARI*		
	$value_A(a)$	$value_V(v)$	$value_T(t)$	$W_{CRAMM\ <1,7>}$	$W_{CRAMM\ <1,4>}$	W_{pot}	W_{imp}	W_{MEHARI}
s_1	10	H	M	6	3	3	4	4
s_2	9	M	M	6	3	2	4	3
s_3	9	M	V.H	7	4	3	4	4
s_4	9	M	M	6	3	2	3	3
s_5	9	L	H	6	3	2	3	3
s_6	9	M	M	6	3	2	3	3
s_7	9	M	M	5	3	2	2	2
s_8	10	H	M	6	3	3	2	2
s_9	10	H	V.H	7	4	3	4	4
s_{10}	3	L	H	3	2	2	2	2
s_{11}	4	M	M	3	2	3	2	2
s_{12}	4	M	V.H	4	2	2	3	3
s_{13}	4	H	V.H	4	2	3	2	2
s_{14}	10	L	M	6	3	2	2	2
s_{15}	3	L	H	3	2	2	2	2
s_{16}	4	L	M	3	2	1	2	1
s_{17}	4	L	M	3	2	2	2	2
s_{18}	8	H	H	6	3	2	2	2
s_{19}	6	M	H	5	3	2	3	3
s_{20}	5	H	H	4	2	3	2	2
s_{21}	4	M	H	4	2	2	2	2



Fig. 3. Risk value assessed from CRAMM method



Fig. 4. Risk value assessed from MEHARI method



Fig. 5. Risk value assessed from FoMRA method

The values, W^{s}_{pot}, W^{s}_{imp}, $W^{s,a}_{imp}$ and $W^{s,a}$ are read from diagonals of M^{s}_{pot}, M^{s}_{imp}, $M^{s,a}_{imp}$, $M^{s,a}$ arrays.

Table 9. Impact Arrays M^{s}_{imp} in relation to *CIA* parameters

Integrity

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =4					
$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery	4	1	1	1	1
	3	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2
	1	3	3	3	3
		1	2	3	4
	$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =3					
$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery	4	1	1	1	1
	3	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2
	1	3	3	3	3
		1	2	3	4
	$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =2					
$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery	4	2	2	1	1
	3	2	2	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2
	1	3	3	3	3
		1	2	3	4
	$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =1					
$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery	4	4	3	2	1
	3	4	3	2	1
	2	4	3	2	2
	1	4	3	3	3
		1	2	3	4
	$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

Availability

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =4					
$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery	4	3	3	2	1
	3	3	3	2	1
	2	3	3	2	2
	1	3	3	3	3
		1	2	3	4
	$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =3					
$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery	4	3	3	2	1
	3	3	3	2	1
	2	3	3	2	2
	1	3	3	3	3
		1	2	3	4
	$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =2					
$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery	4	3	3	2	1
	3	3	3	2	1
	2	3	3	3	2
	1	3	3	3	3
		1	2	3	4
	$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =1					
$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery	4	4	3	2	2
	3	4	3	3	2
	2	4	3	3	3
	1	4	3	3	3
		1	2	3	4
	$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

Given the additional asset values (a_1, a_3, a_4, a_9) attributed to scenarios (s_1, s_2, s_6, s_7, s_8, s_{14}, s_{16}) from Table 6, it was noticed that for assets (a_1, a_3, a_4), classified as very important or critical, the change in the value W^{s}_{imp} (including $CM_{s,j} = di_2 > 1$, gray color, and $CM_{s,j} = di_2 = 1$ dark gray color) derived from M^{s}_{imp} array, affect the changes of values in Table 10. All other assets assigned to scenarios (in our case, $a_9 \rightarrow s_{16}$), classified as minor or major ones, do not affect value changes. This situation may be related to asset value (classified as significant), which is comparable to or lower than the security cost.

Finally, it can be concluded that by considering recovery measures for losses related to some assets revealed when determining the risk value, $W^{s,a}$ from Tab. 11, for 6 out of the 7 scenarios derived from the FoMRA, a significant effect on the resulting difference in risk values between this model and a CRAMM method was observed.

To unambiguously confirm the above statement, an explanation concerning the lack of changes in risk value reduction, $CM_{s,j} = di_2 > 1$ in 6 among 13 scenarios (s_9, $s_{15}s_{17}$, s_{18}, s_{19}, s_{20}), needs to be found.

Table 10. Array reducing impact

$Value_A(a)$				
4	1	2	3	4
3	1	2	3	3
2	1	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	2
	1	2	3	4

W^s_{imp}

Table 11. Array of risk value

$W^{s,a}_{imp}$				
4	2	3	4	4
3	2	3	3	4
2	1	2	2	3
1	1	1	1	2
	1	2	3	4

W^s_{pot}

For scenarios (s_9, s_{17}) associated with the Integrity parameter (Tab.12), at the absence of the protective measures, changes in the weighted value, $CM_{s,j} = di_2$ do not affect the obtained value, W^s_{imp} from M^s_{imp} array (dark gray color for the $CM_{s,j} = di_2 = 1$, gray color for $CM_{s,j} = di_2 > 1$).

Table 12. Impact Arrays M^s_{imp} in relation to the *CIA* parameters

Integrity

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =4

$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery				
4	1	1	1	1
3	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2
1	3	3	3	3
	1	2	3	4
$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =3

$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery				
4	1	1	1	1
3	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2
1	3	3	3	3
	1	2	3	4
$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =2

$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery				
4	2	2	1	1
3	2	2	1	1
2	2	2	2	2
1	3	3	3	3
	1	2	3	4
$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =1

$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery				
4	4	3	2	1
3	4	3	2	1
2	4	3	2	2
1	4	3	3	3
	1	2	3	4
$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

Availability

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =4

$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery				
4	3	3	2	1
3	3	3	2	1
2	3	3	2	2
1	3	3	3	3
	1	2	3	4
$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =3

$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery				
4	3	3	2	1
3	3	3	2	1
2	3	3	2	2
1	3	3	3	3
	1	2	3	4
$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =2

$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery				
4	3	3	2	1
3	3	3	2	1
2	3	3	3	2
1	3	3	3	3
	1	2	3	4
$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

$CM_{s,j=di1}$ - protective =1

$CM_{s,j=di2}$ – recovery				
4	4	3	2	2
3	4	3	3	2
2	4	3	3	3
1	4	3	3	3
	1	2	3	4
$CM_{s,j=di3}$ - palliative				

Other scenarios (s_{15}, s_{18}, s_{19}, s_{20}) associated with the Availability parameter (Table 12) show also no difference for derived values W^s_{imp} from the array ($CM_{s,j} = di_2 = 1$ dark gray, and $CM_{s,j} = di_2 = 2$ gray).

As can be seen from the Table 11, noticeable differences in values, W^s_{imp} appear for $CM_{s,j} = di_2 > 2$. In a situation where there are no differences in W^s_{imp} values for the weighted value, $CM_{s,j} = di_2 = 1$ and the calculated $CM_{s,j} = di_2 = 2$, the value $W^{s,a}_{imp}$ and $W^{s,a}$ determined from the $M^{s,a}_{imp}$ and $M^{s,a}$ arrays, will be the same for the identified and classified assets, etc.

Taking into account the derived results, it can be unambiguously stated that by considering the recovery measures of resulting losses from threats, an effect in differences of risk values between the FoMRA a CRAMM methods is noticed. The rationale for the resulting difference is coming out from a different structure of both methods. According to the literature [32], CRAMM and MEHARI methods are designed to analyze active risk (preventive measures are planned as a reaction to the possible risks before they occur). The proposed FoMRA, which is partially based on the

MEHARI method (with the same requirements for $W^{s,a}$ assessment [13]) includes recovery measures, which leads to statement that both, FoMRA and MEHARI method are dedicated for partial analysis of reactive risk (some preventive measures are applied "post factum", after the occurrence and identification of a risk and as a reaction to it).

4 Summary

A comparative analysis of a new model against the well-known and widely used methods of risk assessment was discussed. The obtained experimental results confirm the correctness of theoretical assumptions of the FoMRA model. Comparative analysis of the model gave almost identical results of risk values, assuming lack of the recovery measures in the FoMRA, oppositely to CRAMM methods. Considering CRAMM as the most well-known, accepted and used method for risk assessment in various IT systems (source materials for establishment ISO/IEC 27002 standard [31]), it can be concluded that the proposed FoMRA is meaningful, it is not difficult and laborious and can describe really well any information system, as it was shown on the example of an administrative unit operating in Poland. It can also be adapted to any organization. Further research is primarily focused on the FoMRA development towards its adaptation to any method, not only CRAMM or MEHARI. Another, equally important issue is the possibility of avoiding cost and time-consuming analyzes in the FoMRA, which must be performed after the introduction of any changes in the system.

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