Abstract
A good retail enterprise must have the steady revenue growth and well-deserved reputation. It should offer high quality products with reasonable competitive price and respond immediately to uncertainly customer demands with good services. Therefore, the reputation and historical performance play the key role in forming long term steady customer relationship. When the cost that reduced by the establishment of reputation is greater than the maintenance cost for the catering supply chain, the game between the catering supply chain and customers will bring profit to both sides.
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Xinhua, A. (2011). The Study on Reputation Model of Retail Enterprises Supply Chain Based on Game Theory. In: Dai, M. (eds) Innovative Computing and Information. ICCIC 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 232. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23998-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23998-4_7
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