Abstract
Peter Singer has recently reaffirmed his belief that, in response to poverty, individuals have obligations to ‘do the most good they can’ by donating to those organizations that demonstrate the greatest amount of benefit per dollar donated (Singer, The most good you can do. Yale University Press, Yale, 2015a). Singer’s charitable giving based approach to extreme poverty has been criticized for failing to understand poverty as a form of injustice and for not acknowledging that it requires institutional change. This chapter investigates how Singer’s response to this criticism has been inadequate by exploring the ways in which Singer’s utilitarian understanding of morality and his account of the duties individuals have with regards to poverty can be rejected.
Singer’s analysis implies that all those who recognize a common-sense duty to assist others in difficulty must address poverty by donating large amounts of their income to the most effective poverty reducing charities (Singer, The most good you can do. Yale University Press, Yale, 2015a; Philosophy and public affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, pp 229–243, 1972). His work suggests that rationality requires that all those motivated by a genuine concern for others must adopt the action he recommends. Thus his approach suggests that a common-sense approach to moral duties requires agents to donate to the most effective charities. However, Singer’s up front appeal to common-sense duties, concern for others and basic rationality hides a commitment to a controversial utilitarian approach to moral obligation. The analysis here will argue that a common-sense approach that identifies multiple duties to others and recognizes the fact that genuine moral action must be rational and grounded in concern for others can in fact make different recommendations from those supported by Singer. In doing so the chapter will articulate an alternative account of the duties individuals have with regards to extreme poverty. It will suggest that, given that poverty is a form of social injustice, individuals have collectivization duties that require that they act responsively with a view to establishing a collective of a particular kind. The collective they work toward forming must be willing and able to establish and maintain procedurally just governing institutions that end poverty by ensuring no agent is placed in a position where they are vulnerable to deprivation or domination. It will be proposed that this duty operates in addition to the duties to assist Singer recognizes.
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Notes
- 1.
Leif Wenar has criticised this approach to judging consequences (Wenar 2011). Wenar argues that the complexities of the situation make the results of any intervention unpredictable. Using randomized trials (the method used by a website Singer recommends – Give Well) to measure effectiveness has been criticized by Emily Clough for taking a short term approach to impact (Clough 2015). Clough notes that NGOs often end up providing services for the ‘middle poor’. She notes that this can lead to their abandoning state services. This means state services are only used by the very poorest who are unlikely to monitor these services effectively and demand quality. As a result, she notes, NGO interventions that are effective for those who use them (the middle poor) can make the very poorest worse off. Such effects would not show up in a randomized trial that concentrated on whether an intervention improved the lives of those targeted.
- 2.
Young identifies systematic vulnerability to deprivation and domination that result from practices and structures, some of which are global in scope. She suggests overcoming them requires coordinated action between individuals in multiple states (Young 2011).
- 3.
Singer’s approach does not rule out the possibility that political action will provide the best expected benefit (Singer 2015c). However the reasoning of the movement Singer supports, coupled with the methodology it employs for comparing the good done by different approaches, makes it more likely to favour donation to charities that provide direct and immediate improvement to welfare over contributing to political movements that seek to fundamentally alter social and political relations through governing institutions.
- 4.
A utilitarian could respond that we should seek to maximize fairness alongside other social goods in order to make things as good as possible, all things considered. This suggests that fairness is quantifiable and can be maximized alongside other goods. However, translating all concerns of justice in to a quantifiable measure that can be maximized may distort the concepts in order to fit it into the consequentialist framework.
- 5.
It is interesting to note that Pettit himself is a consequentialist. How far this is compatible with his political views is a matter of debate.
- 6.
If those living in poverty are reliant on the charity of the affluent in order to avoid deprivation, despite no longer being deprived, they will still be subject to the arbitrary will of the charitable. In order for the injustice of their situation to be overcome they must not have to rely on the good will of others to avoid poverty. For the situation to be justly resolved they must be freed from poverty without being subject to the arbitrary power of donors or Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
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Kahn, E. (2016). Poverty, Injustice and Obligations to Take Political Action. In: Gaisbauer, H., Schweiger, G., Sedmak, C. (eds) Ethical Issues in Poverty Alleviation. Studies in Global Justice, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41430-0_12
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