

Chapter 9

Observations, Conclusions, Perspective



9.1 Four Observations

9.1.1 *Technical “Details”*

Uranium enrichment and plutonium production capabilities are treated under the NPT regime as legal activities if the country pursues them for peaceful purposes. Yet, this is considered to be the “Achilles’ heel” of the international non-proliferation regime, because the country that possesses these capabilities could use them to illegally and unexpectedly break-out of the regime and its obligations and pursue a military nuclear program, that means to build nuclear weapons.

Thirteen states maintain since 2006 one or both of the above capabilities [1]. In addition, according to competent estimates, thirty-five to forty states possess since long the knowledge for the construction of nuclear weapons [2].

9.1.2 *A Prelude to Worrying Nuclear Developments*

There are a number of facts which cannot be ruled out as a prelude of worrying nuclear developments in the broader Middle East region. These are:

- The failure of the NPT Review Conference in May 2015 in New York, which may be repeated in the upcoming conference in April–May 2020.¹
- The continuing non-universality of the NPT. The non-signatories to this global treaty are also nuclear weapon holders namely India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, the latter wider suspected to possess nuclear weapons.
- The withdrawal of the US from the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) with Iran.

¹The book was written before the planned conference dates; also, at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic measures which might cause the conference cancellation.

- The severe antagonisms in the Middle East for national predominance or for regime survival.
- The explosive geopolitical instability in the above mentioned region, and
- Serious public allegations on possible “nuclear suitors” or would-be proliferators (see Chap. 5).

9.1.3 Common Characteristics of Nuclear Weapon Holders

All countries that built nuclear weapons or attempted to acquire them had the following common characteristics:

- Powerful and/or authoritarian political leadership who took the decision and gave the order to acquire nuclear weapons and a great number of competent and ambitious scientists who willingly followed the orders to realize this political choice. Only exception was the first case, the United States, where the proposal originated from renowned scientists prompting the political leadership to the pertinent decision (see Sect. 1.1).
- Determination to achieving deterrence against an attack by a nuclear adversary—with exception of the US who had striven for primacy in world power, and most likely of Israel and South Africa who wanted to deter a broad alliance of adversaries. They all tried to balance a perceived severe external threat to their national security with the choice of an equally large threat, the possession of nuclear weapons.
- Common irony though: nuclear weapon holders after World War II lost a number of wars they entered, the UK at Suez (Egypt), France in Algeria, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the US in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. The UK and France could not hold on to their colonial possessions despite having nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union collapsed all while sitting on the world’s largest ever nuclear arsenal. One may notice that in the wars mentioned, nuclear capacity was on one side only. Luckily, or otherwise there would be probably no winner at all.

9.1.4 Mutual Assistance Between Nuclear Weapon Holders

The nine current nuclear weapon holders, that is, the five NPT nuclear powers and the four outside the treaty, including South Africa that possessed but later destroyed them, acquired their nuclear weapons through direct or indirect assistance of at least one of the other nuclear weapon holders. Exception is the first in the nuclear armament race, the US.

In the years that followed there was a kind of osmosis between these states. Usually a nuclear weapon possessor made the strategic decision to strengthen either a close

ally or “the enemy of my enemy”. Exception presents Pakistan’s assistance to North Korea, which was probably provided for purely economic reasons. I hope, the details given in previous parts of this book are highlighting adequately the links between the ten nuclear weapon holders regarding their mutual support in acquiring the nuclear bomb. In short:

- USA, the first link in the nuclear weapon holders’ chain, was directly assisted by the UK and Canada and by European scientists who had fled their homelands due to Nazism.
- Russia was indirectly aided by scientists in the US Manhattan project, through espionage.
- China was assisted directly by Russia, at least in the early phases.
- France was assisted directly by Jewish scientists in Europe.
- The United Kingdom had teamed up with the US from the very beginning.
- India was indirectly assisted by the US.
- Pakistan was directly assisted by China and indirectly by the US.
- North Korea was directly assisted by Pakistan and indirectly by China and the US.
- Israel was directly assisted by France and South Africa and indirectly by the US and the UK, and
- South Africa was assisted directly by Israel.

9.2 Three Conclusions

9.2.1 *Safeguards After the AP*

The concealed nuclear weapons programs in Iraq, Romania and North Korea have revealed the weaknesses in the Nuclear Safeguards regime regarding the detection of such programs.

The first Iraq war in 1990–1991 proved that comprehensive safeguards agreements did not adequately provide for the detection of a possible military dimension (PMD) concealed under a peaceful civilian nuclear program. Already before the Iraq war, in Romania after the fall of the Ceausescu regime in 1989, it was revealed that the country had maintained since 1978 a concealed nuclear weapons program which had achieved the production of a small amount of 100 mg plutonium.

This weakness was internationally recognized, leading the IAEA to begin in 1993 an effort to draft measures against the possibility of NPT member states acquiring nuclear weapons through hidden activities. In May 1997, the IAEA drafted the Additional Protocol as a complement to the comprehensive Nuclear Safeguards agreement. This protocol enabled the implementation of an additional strengthened control regime providing IAEA inspectors with the capability of pervasive monitoring, early

identification and confirmation of hidden nuclear technology, activities and material for military purposes.

However, there are still three weak points in the international nuclear safeguards regime after the creation of the AP:

1. The application of the Additional Protocol is optional to the IAEA member states.
2. Three states in the Middle East (Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia) have not signed the Additional Protocol; Egypt is applying it only as a commitment stemming from the JCPOA nuclear agreement with the P5 + 1.
3. Israel, being a member of the IAEA, has not signed the NPT; consequently, its nuclear installations and related materials are not subject to the international inspection regime.

Nonetheless, for any member of the IAEA, that is also an NPT signatory, and that has also signed the AP, it is practically almost impossible to develop a concealed nuclear weapon program without being detected by the Agency's inspectors through their stringent "state specific" monitoring and verification approach.

9.2.2 *Shaking NPT*

[The following chapter on the 2020 NPT Review Conference was written about 3 months before the conference due date. Even so, I dared to pursue this anachronism, firstly for facts remain and secondly, in order to challenge my written views on the anticipated outcome of this conference].

It is thought-provoking to anticipate the fate of the upcoming NPT Review Conference in April-May 2020 in New York. This international gathering taking place every five years in New York, is going, in my opinion, to be critical for the survival of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, thus, to world peace and security overall.

I can see a couple of bad omens for the outcome of this event:

To begin with, the previous record of the NPT Review Conference (NPT-RevCon) in May 2015 in New York was marked by an inglorious end; there was no common resolution mainly due to the dispute on an outstanding issue. The non-convening of the Helsinki Conference in 2012 on the issue of a *Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone*, as mandated by the preceding NPT-RevCon of 2010.

The heavy political climate, which has been created since the cancellation of the 2012 Helsinki Conference due to disagreement by the US, had clearly been demonstrated by the overwhelming majority of the 160 countries that participated in the *International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons* in December 2014 in Vienna [3]. It was made obvious there that a large number of States are linking the denuclearization of the Middle East to their own attitude towards the NPT. Turkey's statement at this Vienna Conference is typical of States' disappointment: "*If the Helsinki conference on establishing the Middle East NWFZ will not be convened the entire international NPT treaty is at risk.*"

Following the above developments, the UN General Assembly took a decision in December 2018, the so called UNGA Initiative for a Conference on the same issue to be held in November 2019 in Vienna [4]. This Conference was indeed held, although without the participation of Israel and the United States once more. It would be naive to expect that a final agreement on this issue, even more on a solution of this complicated multilateral challenge on establishing the Middle East NWFZ can be achieved without Israel or the United States.

The main areas of permanent conflict between the Arab States and Israel on this issue remained the same; they can be summarized as follows [5].

Israel takes the view that related regional security issues, cannot be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process. A process of confidence-building measures is firstly required whereby Israel holds the position that associated modalities, obligations or provisions should be solely addressed by the states concerned through direct negotiation, and after the international recognition of the state of Israel by its Arab neighbours who still refuse to do so. Of the states of the region only Egypt, Turkey and Jordan recognize Israel.

The other States in the region maintain that the application of IAEA comprehensive Safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East is sufficient for the conclusion of a peace settlement. In particular, the Arab States reiterate that all of them have acceded to the NPT, while Israel continues to ignore the international community by refusing to become a party to the international treaty or to place its installations under the IAEA's comprehensive Safeguards inspection regime. They claim that Israel's possession of nuclear weapons is likely to lead to a dangerous nuclear arms race in the region.

The basic conclusion from the Vienna November 2019 Conference is that as yet, there is no general agreement on the contours and details of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East.

Regarding the question on the role of this critical Middle East issue at the 2020 NPT RevCon in New York and consequently its possible outcome, some of the conclusion points of the recent Vienna conference are very indicative. They are:

(a) *the NPT review process remains the primary focus and the UNGA initiative is not an alternative to the NPT process but should be regarded as parallel and complementary;*

...

(h) *the Middle East zone issue remains within the NPT process and the 2020 review conference would have to reaffirm and recognize this;*

...

(j) *the Middle East zone now can be considered as the fourth pillar of the NPT;*
 (k) *it is regrettable that some States (Israel and the United States) had urged the IAEA (and other relevant international organizations) not to attend the November 2019 conference;*

(l) *the NPT States of the region believe in collective not selective security and this calls for the universalization of the NPT and the cessation of granting privileges to States not party to the Treaty (Israel);*

- (m) ... *the US ... has condemned the General Assembly decision of 2018 to convene the November (2019) conference as “illegitimate” and is boycotting the conference; and*
- (n) *Israel too has decided not to attend the November conference.*

The selected conclusion points of the Conference, illustrate:

1. The NPT members' agony regarding the fate of the treaty,
2. Their despair for non-universalization of the NPT, and
3. Their frustration about the stance of Israel and the US.

In this regard, the lack of compliance by all NWS with their NPT commitment on nuclear disarmament (NPT Article VI) expanded the gap between “haves” and “have-nots” more than ever before. Thus, in my judgment, the prospects for the upcoming NPT RevCon in 2020 are not promising, at all.

9.2.3 “Double Standards”

A large number of States, especially those of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), express at any opportunity they get their despair over the initially arbitrary criterion set by the nuclear weapon states on the legality of their nuclear weapons: Officially recognized NWS are those which had conducted a nuclear weapon test before 1 January 1967. These also happen to be the permanent members of the UNSC, holding the right of vetoing any political and diplomatic motion on issues related to international security. All other states are branded as NNWS.

Some states are pointing out additional discrimination: France and China conducted their first nuclear weapon test essentially before 1 January 1967; however, both of them signed the NPT in 1992, that is to say 22 years after the entry into force of the Treaty. Nevertheless, they are also recognised as NWS. The question is: does the arbitrary criterion of the first nuclear test date prevail over a 22-year delay in accepting the NPT? The absence of a fair answer to this question gives reason to their belief that the “have-nots” NNWS are vassals, or even hostages, of the NWS “haves”.

It is obvious that the perception on “double standards” has a historical origin in the creation of the NPT; however, this built-in cracking of the regime's architecture was progressively enlarged to a gap between “haves” and “have-nots” through the NPT's implementation shortcomings and the subsequent nuclear developments.

This gap between NWS and NNWS was more than ever evident during the NPT Review Conference in New York in May 2015. This gap continues to widen threatening to take apart the two basic pillars of this international treaty, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. Many NNWS states upon adhering to the NPT stated that they do so, and agree to take up the obligations of non-proliferation,

essentially giving up the option of going for nuclear weapons, upon the understanding that NWS will work in earnest towards nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.

Furthermore, a large number of states are linking the nuclear powers' response, mostly of the US and its close allies, to the nuclear crises of Iraq, Iran, North Korea and the pending nuclear issue of Syria to their failure to fulfill their individual NPT obligation to nuclear disarmament. The difference between the explicit commitment of NNWS "to accept Safeguards" control (NPT, Article III) and the vague obligation of NWS "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (NPT, Article VI), is perceived by many states as "the injustice" of NPT separating the "haves" from the "have-nots".

The NNWS, in accordance with Article III of the NPT, accept the international control of IAEA inspectors for the non-use of nuclear power for military purposes. In cases of non-compliance, the imposition of sanctions is imminent. Latest examples are the nuclear crises of Iran and North Korea.

The JCPOA agreement of the P5 + 1 with Iran for its nuclear program was considered by many countries as the exclusive result of tough international sanctions against Iran. This assumption brought along the feeling of forced humiliation of the underdog. A notion that was embraced by a large number of "have-nots".

This strong notion led to the creation of an informal but durable "nuclear alliance" between countries that make up the groups of NAM, G77, Arab League and the Latin Group. These groups have a very strong presence in all meetings of governing bodies of international organizations and in negotiations and review conferences and other *fora* through joint statements and common positions. Their benchmark is, apart from the need for the NPT's universality, the nonacceptance of double standards in the global nuclear control regime.

It is undeniable that the rate of reduction of nuclear weapons remains slow and non-transparent. Often a reduction in armaments goes hand in hand with an upgrading of their capabilities or, as their owners call it, their "modernization"; the aim always being to enhance nuclear weapons' effectiveness. As shown on the table of global nuclear arsenals of Annex V, the number of nuclear weapons of the nine nuclear weapon possessors was at the beginning of 2019 estimated at around 13,890. This figure, according to SIPRI, shows a reduction from the 14,465 nuclear weapons of the same countries in early 2018. Any reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons is mainly due to Russia and the US—these two still possess about 91% of all world's nuclear weapons—who reduced their strategic nuclear powers in line with the recent implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 2010 (New START).

The on-going "modernization" programs relate to the replacement and upgrading of nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles and their transport systems by aircraft, as well as to the improvement of installations and instrumentation for the production of nuclear weapons. The US Nuclear Posture Review (US-NPR) of February 2018 confirms this development justifying it by the increased nuclear threat from Russia, China and North Korea. The US-NPR further underscores the aim of strengthening

the nuclear option, the “*nuclear deterrence*” and, if necessary, the prevalence of both a nuclear and a “*non-nuclear strategic attack*” [6]!

Finally, the United States and Russia pursue the strengthening of their nuclear capabilities basically on an “*actio – reactio*” mode, through an endless competition spinning in a hopeless vicious circle. The remaining nuclear weapon holders are following in their footsteps. Although with substantially smaller arsenals, similar programs for the development of new nuclear weapons systems have been underway or their intent to do so has been announced. China continues to streamline nuclear weapons vehicles, increasing slowly but steadily the size of its nuclear arsenal. India and Pakistan are expanding their nuclear arsenals, also developing new nuclear weapon missile systems.

The newcomer in the nuclear club, North Korea is the country now engaged in the most rapid progress in the development of its military nuclear capabilities, including the testing of a thermonuclear, as it claimed, device in September 2017 and the development and testing of long-range ballistic missiles after a short-lived moratorium following President Kim’s last meeting with the US President Trump in Hanoi in February 2019. Pyongyang claimed to have carried out in December 2019 a “*very important test (that) will have an important impact on changing the strategic position of the DPRK*”, according to North Korea’s Central News Agency KCNA [7].

9.3 Gloomy Perspective—“Tetra-Polar” Balance

Nuclear weapons were considered by their possessors as the most effective lever to achieve strategic goal and the status of a world power or a regional leader. The geopolitical backdrop from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombing simply couldn’t be ignored. There are already a number of “nuclear suitors” or would-be proliferators (see Chap. 5) who are ready to play the same card in the on-going geopolitical game. This fact cannot and should not be ignored. Moreover, the existing “nuclear gap” in the international community could be a powerful catalyst for negative developments leading most likely in the long run to the collapse of the NPT regime.

Any change in the world’s dynamic and delicate emerging balance of a multipolar world, to a great extent built around the current nuclear weapon holders (5 NWS and 4 non-NPT nuclear powers), will have immense long-term impact on global security and peace, thus on peoples’ fates.

In the hypothetical case of a major nuclear conflict, the US due to NATO’s obligations will guarantee the security of its NATO allies through nuclear deterrence. Yet, the same does not apply to the US allies in Asia and the Middle East.

China’s growing nuclear power and the unknown outcome of the North Korean nuclear crisis are boosting the nuclear threat in East Asia for both Japan and South Korea, which would not hesitate to become nuclear powers. Under certain circumstances, and if they chose to do so, both are capable of acquiring nuclear weapons relatively fast.

In **South Asia**, the two non-NPT nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, ever since they achieved their independence in 1947, and due to the matters unresolved during the partition, mainly the issue of Kashmir, consider each other as the threat to their respective territorial integrity and stability. Their continued conflict over the disputed regime in Kashmir is a potential cause of a devastating nuclear adventure of global proportions. In the last days of February 2019, and while global attention was fixed on the nuclear meeting of Trump with Kim in Hanoi, violent and deadly hostilities on both sides led New Delhi and Islamabad very close to the use of military force, maybe closer than ever, and this inevitably means the potential of escalation into a nuclear war. Yet, the Pakistan-India crisis reached recently a new peak. On 27 September 2019 the prime minister of Pakistan *Imran Khan* referring to the Kashmir crisis addressed the UN General Assembly with a desperate, yet plain-spoken global warning: "... *two nuclear armed countries will come face to face ... and if a nuclear armed country fights to the end, it will have consequences far beyond the border; it will have consequences for all ...*".

The two sides seemingly concluded that they did not want to see the situation escalate, but in this continuous climate of hostility and violence the risk of a false calculation remains always present. If Imran Khan's warnings were to become reality it will be historically the first nuclear confrontation between countries holding both nuclear weapons. And maybe it will be the last on our planet.

This assessment is not exaggerated. Even a limited nuclear conflict can bring dramatic changes in the climate, a global economic collapse, and in particular a collapse in agricultural and food producing economy that could cause extended cases of famine, and of course lasting damage to life and health on a global scale. It is the scenario that experts call "*nuclear winter*" and that would signal the end of life on our planet [8].

In the **Middle East**, if **Iran** finally leaves the NPT, after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA nuclear agreement and the escalation of sanctions against the country, it is very likely that other countries will be pushed into military nuclear programs. Countries aspiring a leading role over the Middle East, or who see Iran as a threat, such as **Saudi Arabia**, **Turkey** and **Egypt** may then follow.

With regard to the **American** and **Russian** way of dealing with the ongoing nuclear crises of **North Korea** and **Iran**, as well as to their bilateral disagreements and competition on issues of nuclear armament, it is interesting to make a mention here to the non-mainstream but not baseless view of certain analysts that so far has not received broader attention [9].

According to this approach, the world is now experiencing the beginning of a thorough and carefully planned US policy with Russian consent, albeit somewhat clumsily applied by the American leadership. This new security architecture aims at dealing with the rise of China and the consequent fear of a slow demise of US hegemony [10]. Actually, it is perceived by the superpowers USA and Russia, that the steadily growing power of China becomes a common strategic threat to both of them.

Hence, a calculated reshuffling of strategic plans starts in the US. This implies targeted power shifting and restructuring of the old equilibrium creating new enemies

and friends in the rest of the world. Next goal for the US in their Holistic National Security Planning, under this approach, is the gradual replacement of Russia by China as the top antagonist in the list of major threats to the American global hegemony. A hegemony that if lost, it will have tragic consequences for the fate of mankind, or so American policy makers and top statesmen believe, such as the late Zbigniew Brzezinski who was among the first to point out this view [11]. Brzezinski also attached high priority on US security, including confronting the nuclear threat and global terrorism, as opposed to the European hierarchy of global threats that places as first threat for the planet the destruction of the environment and the gap between North and South [12].

Signs that the implementation of this shift in the US approach has started, to downplay Russia as a threat and upgrade China, are the following developments:

- The generally cautious and friendly attitude of the American President Trump towards his Russian counterpart Putin.
- The positive attitude towards Russia and negative one towards China shown in statements of key figures of the new American administration.
- The proposal of the American President at the meeting of the members of the G-7 in Canada on 8 June 2018 to add Russia to this group of world's most powerful economies, a proposal that wasn't met favorably by the other leaders [13].
- The statements made by the American President questioning NATO as "outdated" and promoting the reinforcement of bilateral agreements.
- His encouragement to the US allies in eastern Asia, Japan and South Korea, to acquire nuclear weapons [14].
- President Trump's statements at the UNSC on 26 September 2018 against China accusing it of attempting to meddle with the mid-term US elections in November 2018, without making any such reference to Russia's much-debated involvement in the 2016 USA election, when Donald Trump was elected President of the United States.
- The American President's unexpected decision on 20 December 2018 to withdraw US troops from Syria; an action that undeniably serves Russia's geopolitical interests.

As for the always relevant and ever turbulent region of the Middle East, time and global developments will reveal sooner or later the new equilibrium of power. In the meantime, collateral activities of countries in the broader Middle East, such as Israel, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, are evidently aiming to profit from the ongoing power-shifting, posturing and repositioning in the making of the new emergent status quo.

At the same time, the two superpowers continue to intensify their nuclear competition by both words and deeds, in order to maintain leadership on the routed developments. The impact of nuclear weapons on this violent and actually uncontrolled progression of geopolitical changes is latent but dominant. The nuclear capability, real or perceived, constitutes a prime source of power for the actual crises' managers, the two superpowers. However, this nuclear capability is simultaneously the

underlying threat. The threat that hides the risk of a devastating derailment of world peace and security. This risk is increasing day by day.

Intent, accident or miscalculation, in the end it will not matter. The potential victims know this. The potential executioners know this too. Nevertheless, the terrifying vicious cycle they believe they drive but are actually caught into accelerates steadily. Washington and Moscow believe the opponent will surrender first. There are many in Washington who believe that in the 1980s, it was President Reagan strategy that drove the Soviet Union to collapse through the US gigantic and extremely costly Star War program. They now believe that the US can today repeat this approach with China.

Also there are those in Washington and Moscow who would agree that their common interest lies in maintaining the status quo which can be challenged and topped by China. They are coming up carefully with relevant “ideas” on nuclear arms restrictions. Beijing, however, rejects any direct or indirect proposal on nuclear arms reductions. During a world gathering of high-level think-tanks and State representatives in December 2019 in Brussels, China responded categorically to a related direct American invitation on considering nuclear weapons reductions: “*Our nuclear arsenal is much smaller than the US equivalent; it is not fair to accept now negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Perhaps in the near future*” [15]. Obviously, a strategic response from an assertive China, will expand the perimeter of the aforementioned vicious cycle.

Despite the strong interest of the international community in nuclear disarmament, as it was clearly demonstrated in the conclusions of the UN-Conference on the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty of 7 July 2017, the nuclear weapons “modernization” programs launched by the nuclear powers show that real progress on nuclear disarmament will remain a distant goal [16].

A new world order rises around multipolar balances based on economic and military power, with nuclear weapons being an important part of the equation. In this slowly emerging and to some extent already visible rebalancing of the world, one can see the attempt of the two superpowers, the US and Russia, to engage China without losing their leadership.

At the same time, as already mentioned in Sect. 7.5 of this book, French President Emmanuel Macron on 7 February 2020 offered to open a “*strategic dialogue*” with willing European states advocating the central role of France, the European Union’s only nuclear power post-Brexit, calling for a “*surge*” in European defense spending and resolve [17]. He pointed out that “*Europe should reinforce its strategic autonomy in the face of growing global threats and stop relying solely on the United States and the transatlantic alliance for its defense*”.

Behind the smoke of existing regional armed conflicts, above the agony on the on-going nuclear crises and under the fear of reckless political decisions, some international analysts see the cementing of new foundations. New nuclear power alliances are being built on it, forming the new world order structure. A structure dominated by four strong core pillars, yet all nuclear, backed by peripheral states strategically selected by criteria of history, current pragmatism or future necessity. Four alliances, formally or informally formed, are in perspective:

1. USA and UK plus
2. Russia and India plus
3. China, Pakistan and the DPRK plus
4. France and Israel plus.

A “tetra-polar” balance of these nuclearcentric alliances would probably allow the temporary de-escalation of the current nuclear race and weapons’ “modernization”, making possible the creation of a global climate of stability and trust. A climate necessary to firstly mitigate the immense risks stemming from the currently uncontrollable nuclear threat and secondly eliminate the global nuclear threat through an agreed nuclear disarmament plan. This would be the solution of the nuclear *Nash equilibrium* [18], in which, once armed, neither side has any incentive to initiate a conflict nor to disarm. This famous equilibrium reflects in our days fully the reality of the MAD nuclear strategy, the *Mutually Assured Destruction*. The only possible solution of the *Nash equilibrium* would be lowering all armed raised hands before shutting at each other by necessity, absurdity or error. This is the bitter reality which should convince all nuclear weapon possessors on the imminent need to escape the dead-end MAD strategy by courageously solving the *Nash equilibrium*.

This is not my personal wishful thinking. It is rather the law of physics. It is the entropy of the universe, the global trend to move everything from order to disorder and then to new unpredictable equilibria. Mankind does not need to provoke disorder and uncertainty through its nuclear weapons but try to form stable and peaceful power balances. Rules of balance and power shifting are universal, applying to both microcosmic and macrocosmic processes; hence, to human geopolitical nuclear rearrangements too. Winners are leaders and people who respect the mighty and mysterious universe adapting quickly and smartly to its rules. Elseways, world’s perspective is gloomy. In my opinion, there are still clear minds around, close to unconventional, cynical or incompetent decision makers.

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