



Africa–European Union Climate Change Partnership

Oluwole Olutola

Contents

Introduction	2
Liberal Institutionalism	3
Paris Agreement, UN Climate Action Summit, and COP 25	4
Africa–EU Climate Change Partnership: A Revisit	7
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations	10
References	11

Abstract

The need to heighten climate action momentum is a key outcome of the Climate Action Summit organized by the United Nations (UN) in September, 2019. The same concern reverberated in most of the presentations and discussions at the twenty-fifth Conference of Parties (COP 25) – the annual climate summit under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This chapter seeks to investigate the relevance of the call for more climate action in terms of what further climate priorities and strategies are required in the context of the existing climate change partnership between Africa and the European Union (EU). It relies on liberal institutionalism as its theoretical framework and data from a range of purposely selected secondary sources as reference points. Beyond arguing the case for more climate action to further strengthening the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES), particularly in the area of environmental partnership, this chapter emphasizes the need to align the required further climate action with the mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement and the UN transformative initiatives on

This chapter was previously published non-open access with exclusive rights reserved by the Publisher. It has been changed retrospectively to open access under a CC BY 4.0 license and the copyright holder is “The Author(s)”. For further details, please see the license information at the end of the chapter.

O. Olutola (✉)
University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

the global climate action. It concludes with an insight into some policy recommendations, including the need for a dedicated and regional-based approach in tackling Africa's climate change beyond the conventional worldwide UNFCCC (United Nations Convention on Climate Change) framework that has failed to deliver tangible results for some time past.

Keywords

Climate change · Liberal institutionalism · COP25 · Joint Africa–EU Strategy · Paris Agreement

Introduction

Addressing climate change as an existential threat to this generation (UNCC 2019a) and the future generation given its transgenerational implications is more urgent than ever. In recognizing this growing climate concern, the United Nations (UN) convened a global climate action held in New York on 23 September 2019. The primary objective was aimed at mobilizing wide-range support for the multilateral climate change process. In the end, the summit emphasized the need to increase mitigation ambition as well as accelerate climate action involving a range of stakeholders – state and nonstate alike, including multilateral entities (UN 2019). Less than 3 months after, similar concern reverberated in most of the speeches and statements given at the twenty-fifth Conference of Parties (COP 25) – the annual climate summit under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – which took place in Madrid from 2 to 13 December 2019. Generally described as the launchpad for significantly more climate ambition, COP 25 also ended with a call for improved climate action (CarbonBrief 2019).

This separate but joint call for more climate ambition and action could not have happened at a better time, considering the mounting threats of climate change to the global system, regional and subregional entities. Besides, the call is consistent with the mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement that was decided at COP 21 in December 2015 as the first-ever universally agreed climate deal after more than two decades of unduly prolonged negotiations that characterized the previous COP meetings (Amusan and Olutola 2016). Under the Paris Agreement, state entities commit to ensure that the global average temperature is pegged to 2 °C above preindustrial levels and, if possible, further down to 1.5 °C still above preindustrial levels (UNFCCC 2015). However, the collective efforts to meet the set mitigation target are currently insufficient (Boyd et al. 2015; Schleussner et al. 2016). Recent finding shows that there must be a cut in carbon emissions to about 45% and net zero by 2030 and 2050, respectively, to save this century from the irreversible and catastrophic impacts of climate change (IPCC 2018).

From the outcomes of the aforementioned summits and the IPCC carbon cut projection, it is deduced that both the past and current efforts – at all levels – to combat climate change remain inadequate and far less than what should be the case. The significant attention drawn to the mounting dangers of climate change and the

multistakeholder approach in dealing with the phenomenon as a common enemy and global emergency in particular points to establish the summits' acknowledgment of multilateral entities as important rallying points for the desired enhanced climate action.

This chapter presents the case of Africa and the European Union (EU) partnership focusing on climate change as one of the priorities in the relationship between the two continental partners. It seeks to examine the relevance or otherwise of the call for more climate ambition and action in this particular case, and what further climate priorities and strategies, if any, are required. The chapter is structured into five sections as follows: section one contains the above introduction; section two systematically examines the key constructs of liberal institutionalism as a theoretical basis for this study; section three gives an overview of the UN climate action summit and COP 25 in the context of the Paris Agreement; section four appraises Africa–EU climate change partnership in light of the call for more climate action; and section five closes with a conclusion including an insight into key policy recommendations.

Liberal Institutionalism

Liberal institutionalism represents one of the theoretical strands of the liberal school of thought. Generally, liberalism introduced new paradigm of debates to the body of international relations theories, as it underscores the relevance of nonmilitary (security) approach to handling issues and matters of common priority within the international system. Liberalists' main concern is to construct a model of international relations with capacity to mitigate the unchecked use of military force as a foreign policy instrument by state actors.

For most liberal institutionalists, cooperation between state and nonstate actors remains the most important and mutually beneficial ordering feature of the international system (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995). This interstate cooperation is facilitated through international institutions and regimes, defined as a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge regarding any aspect of international relations (Krasner 1983: 2). The implication is that international institutions and regimes are conceived as the primary means of limiting the power of states at both domestic and international levels, thereby mitigating anarchy in the international system (Burchill 2005: 65).

Besides, liberal institutionalism places emphasis on international institutions which have the ability to help overcome selfish state behavior by bringing them together in a cooperative manner in pursuit of shared foreign policy objectives otherwise unattainable in isolation. In other words, international institutions serve as entities for mobilization networks, within which transgovernmental policy coordination and coalition building could take place (Keohane and Nye 1987: 738). In addition to providing multilateral platforms through which states deal with collective action problems that threaten stable patterns of cooperation, international institutions also perform such roles as coordination and monitoring which together make them to become "valuable foundation" for international cooperation (Martin 2007: 111).

Another key assumption of liberal institutionalism is the existence of multiple channels of contact through which states and societies are interconnected (Keohane and Nye 1987: 731). This brings to focus the term complex interdependence and the argument that the ranking of global issues as high and low politics is uncalled for, particularly in a world of multiple issues imperfectly linked and characterized by transnational and transgovernmental coalitions (Grieco 1988: 490).

However, liberal institutionalists agree that interstate cooperation is constrained by cheating and noncompliance with international agreements given the self-enforcing and anarchic nature of the international system. The situation is further worsened by the lack of guarantee to ensure that state individual tendencies to maximize the gains of cooperation at the expense of other participating actors are regulated in such a way that benefits are shared equally.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, liberal institutionalists strongly believe that cooperation between states is still possible even though it is something that happens gradually. In their analysis, cooperation would first be achieved in technical areas where it was mutually convenient and, if successful, could be extended to other functional areas of mutual benefits (Burchill 2005: 64). Indeed, the emphasis on international institutions as an important rallying point for interstate cooperation and, also, a potentially effective mechanism for containing global emergencies brings to relevance the focus on Africa and the EU.

While the Africa–EU climate change partnership is not a standalone multilateral institution in itself, it represents a key element and one of the important thematic priorities under the Joint Africa–European Union Strategy (JAES) adopted at the second EU–Africa summit in Lisbon in 2007. Section four of this chapter provides more explanations on the JAES. However, it is important to stress that Africa and Europe as two key multilateral partners depend on the instrumentality of the African Union and the EU to provide the needed institutional framework for the implementation of JAES and, more specifically, the partnership on climate change and other related climate activities being discussed in this chapter.

Paris Agreement, UN Climate Action Summit, and COP 25

As a special creation of the UN, the UNFCCC is responsible for the global negotiations in response to climate change. Since its establishment in 1992, the global climate change process under the UNFCCC framework has experienced a back-and-forth approach to climate negotiations and, so, action. But after nearly two and half decades of interrupted negotiations, the Paris Agreement was agreed as a globally accepted climate action plan in 2015. By the agreement, state entities commit to ensure that the global average temperature is pegged to 2 °C above preindustrial levels and, if possible, to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels (UNFCCC 2015).

To attain this long-term mitigation ambition, each party to the UNFCCC is under an obligation to develop and commit to a nationally determined contribution (NDC), which should be communicated to the UNFCCC secretariat and progressively maintained. The provisions of the agreement include a ratchet-up mechanism to

periodically review and update the NDCs every 5 years effectively from 2018 upward. While the unanimity exists in terms of perception of NDCs as a collective response towards achieving the Paris climate goals, the common understanding of what exactly constitute the NDCs is still lacking among the UNFCCC parties. Besides, efforts to ensure its transparency, particularly in the context of national climate framework and objectives, are still quite challenging.

Besides, the current emission reduction pledges captured in the NDCs for the period up until 2030 though represent progress compared with “business as usual,” but insufficient to secure the achievement of the mitigation goal set by the Paris Agreement (Boyd et al. 2015; Schleussner et al. 2016; UN 2019). Nevertheless, it forms the basis of any serious global struggle against climate change, especially on the part of state actors. It also points to establish that collective efforts beyond the UNFCCC are, indeed, needed to effectively address climate change. Stabilizing the global climate at safe levels requires wider international cooperation to complement the global climate change process within the UNFCCC (Moncel and van Asselt 2012).

Unfortunately, not so much of the mitigation ambition proposed under the Paris Agreement has been achieved. The full implementation of the Paris Agreement is yet to be actualized, as efforts are still ongoing at the level of the annual Conference of Parties to finalize its operational guidelines. The latest in the series was COP25 held in 2019 as the Launchpad for significantly more climate ambition. It is important to note that the Trump-led US in mid-2017 formally disclosed the country’s intention to withdraw from further participating in the Paris Agreement (Lawrence and Wong 2017). While there is no consensus in research yet as to whether the US withdrawal represents an opportunity or a setback for the Paris Agreement in particular and the global climate action in general, some scholars have raised concerns around the potential damage that could result from the US nonparticipation in raising finance to support global climate action (Olutola 2020; Urpelainen and van de Graaf 2018).

Yet, the worsening impacts of climate variation are becoming increasingly evident in some parts of the world. Recent cases include the Hurricane Dorian that struck the Bahamas and Cyclone Idai landfall in Mozambique with their attendant unprecedented catastrophes. Obviously worried by this growing severity of climate change impacts, the UN as a universal body gathered together wide-ranging stakeholders – state and nonstate – in what was dubbed the global climate action summit held in December 2019. The intention was to provide support for the Paris Agreement and the UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. In particular, it offered state participants a unique opportunity to discuss how best to enhance their respective NDCs by 2020 (short-term) in keeping faith with 2030 (mid-term) mitigation goal of 45% emission reduction as well as the 2050 (long-term) mitigation objective of net zero relative to GHG emissions.

The summit focused on nine key areas where urgent climate action is required. These include energy transition; climate finance and carbon pricing; resilience and adaptation; nature-based solutions; mitigation strategy; among others (UN 2019: 3). Buried under 12 themes, the summit’s climate action objectives are expected to be achieved through transformative initiatives for which stakeholders would be held

responsible. These transformative initiatives include: the need for improved climate finance as a key element for the transition to net-zero emissions and climate resilient economies; pledges to decarbonize investment portfolios and systematically include environmental impacts in investment decision-making; setting limits for the use of coal, or phase it out altogether, including the development of a collective support system to help provide developing countries with the option of exiting coal; plans to eliminate deforestation, preserving biodiversity, and restoration of natural ecosystems particularly through planting of trees; integration of climate risks and resilience initiatives in decision-making systems and national development frameworks across the continent, including climate resilient development pathways for least developed countries (LCDs); and provision of insurance for the most vulnerable and support to prevent climate-related disasters, among others. More importantly, the summit succeeded in establishing an all-encompassing steering committee to provide strategic guidance and oversight of its planned action and activities as well as two advisory groups – science and ambition – to provide technical expertise.

Aside from stressing the need for the urgency of climate action in the identified areas, the summit called attention to the strategic importance of renewed leadership at all levels and across the board including collaboration between relevant stakeholders. Its multistakeholder transformative initiatives with commitments from 70 and 75 countries – mostly small and developing countries responsible for far below 15% of aggregate carbon emissions worldwide – to work towards more aggressive NDCs and net-zero emissions by 2020 and 2050 respectively, are nevertheless remarkable. Granted that the agreed initiatives are no doubt consistent with the Paris mitigation objectives, it is of concern that the summit could not secure concrete and immediate mitigation pledges from the world's leading GHG emitters – mostly the G20 countries (including the full EU) which together produce close to 30 kilotons of CO₂ annually, as of 2015, thereby responsible for about 81% of all global carbon emissions (Globalist 2018).

Unfortunately, the COP25 – which was to provide a critical platform for the operationalization of the Paris Agreement with the year 2020 set as the deadline – fell short of expectations. Despite the momentum ignited by the UN climate action summit, the once in a year climate meeting could not achieve much. The climate ambition alliance (UNCC 2019b) presented during the meeting is chiefly a recapitulation of the multistakeholder pledges made at the UN climate action summit. No consensus was reached regarding the planned increase in mitigation commitments, while virtually all other outstanding issues emanating from the Paris Agreement were also left unresolved. These issues range from failure to secure: increased NDCs pledges, especially from the world's biggest emitters; the final decision on the rulebook, regarded as the operating manual for the implementation of the Paris climate deal; specific operating guidelines for loss and damage; and new and enhanced climate finance goals, among others.

This lack of progress is worrisome and, certainly, not a good complementarity of the UN transformative initiatives concerning the global climate action. Besides, it exacerbates the concern raised in the emissions gap report that the existing NDCs, even if met, would not be enough to deliver the Paris mitigation goal. Based on the

report, emissions need to reduce to 2.7% each year from 2020 to 2030 and 7.6% each year on the average for the 2 °C and the 1.5 °C goals, respectively, to meet the Paris Agreement’s mitigation target (UNEP 2019: 26). Hence, the urge for increased ambition pledges is critical to closing the gap between the emission targets captured in the NDCs currently and the mitigation goal set by the Paris Agreement.

Just as COP25 was winding up, the EU signaled its resolve to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Encapsulated in what is known as the European Green Deal, the EU seeks to commit about 25% of its long-term budget to climate-related objectives. As a deliberate strategy to boost the EU’s NDC pledge for 2030, the deal contains a proposal to reduce the bloc’s carbon emissions from its current target of 40% to a higher target of at least 50% and towards 55% compared with 1990 levels (Claeys et al. 2019; EC 2019). If this deal is actualized, coupled with the fact that other key emitters – most especially the USA – are showing no indication to seriously commit to any increased mitigation plan, the EU would have once again reestablished its pivotal role in providing leadership to the global action against climate change. This self-assumed responsibility brings to focus the climate change partnership between the EU and Africa (another continent that is at the center of any discussions on the global climate action because of its high exposure to climate change impacts and little or no capacity in terms of adaptation).

Africa–EU Climate Change Partnership: A Revisit

The partnership between Africa and the EU was launched in 2000 – two decades ago – at the maiden edition of the Africa–EU meeting in Cairo. Seven years after, the two partners at the second edition in Lisbon adopted a Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES). The JAES represents the guiding instrument for the overarching long-term and political framework of the collaboration between the two continental entities (EU 2007). It outlines the basic principles (ownership, partnership, and solidarity) and general objectives of the partnership. These include a resolution on the part of the two partners to formalize the strategic partnership by moving away from the usual donor and recipient – give and take – approach; treat Africa as one entity; enhance their partnership at all levels on the basis of jointly identified mutual and complementary interests; and take their multilateral engagement to a new strategic level with reinforced policy dialogues and action plans, among other objectives (Bach 2010; EU 2013–2019).

Interestingly, climate change (and the environment) made the list as one of the thematic priorities of common concern in the Africa–EU partnership. Others include peace and insecurity; democratic governance and human rights; regional economic integration, trade, and infrastructure; millennium development goals; energy; mitigation, mobility, and employment; and science, information society, and space. Africa–EU climate change partnership can be viewed from at least two perspectives: the collaborative efforts of the two partners towards the global climate change process within the UNFCCC and the willingness on the part of the two partners to work together to combat climate change as a common enemy. Even though the

vision of a joint agenda/position on climate change could not be achieved as envisaged partly due to lack of clarity on their common interests and internal divisions, the JAES's climate change partnership perhaps succeeded in building a common understanding of various climate-related issues and of their respective positions in the UNFCCC multilateral negotiations (Tondel et al. 2015).

The partnership has produced some level of significant progress over the years, as manifested in the launch of several climate-linked initiatives and programs. These include TerrAfrica, the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI), and Climate for Development in Africa (ClimDev-Africa). While TerrAfrica was created in 2005 as a platform for better coordination of efforts geared towards the upscaling of finance and mainstreaming of effective and efficient country-driven sustainable land and water management (SLWM) across the continent (NEPAD 2019), the GGWSSI was launched in 2007 as a "bulwark against the encroaching desert" (Bilski 2018), thereby strengthening climate resilience in Africa. ClimDev-Africa was designed as a tripartite arrangement of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Union Commission (AUC), and the African Development Bank (AfDB) through ClimDev Special Fund in 2010. Essentially, it aims to provide a solid foundation for an appropriate regional climate change response (UNECA 2014).

In particular, TerrAfrica and GGWSSI contributed significantly to strengthening the collaboration between the two partners, especially in the areas of sustainable land management and fight against desert encroachment in sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. Similarly, the EU financial intervention of €8 million through the ClimDev-Africa initiative was instrumental to the establishment of the African Climate Policy Center (ACPC) in Addis Ababa in 2012 and, by extension, the development of climate-based knowledge in support of policy-making in Africa (EU 2014: 24–25). By 2013, a €28 million contribution to ClimDev-Africa was launched to provide support (financial and technical) to the African Union (AU) – as the continent's collective representative – and many of its member states to enhance their capacities to make climate-sensitive policies. In 2015, the EU introduced another funding package amounting to €80 million to build disaster resilience in sub-Saharan Africa (EC 2015). Since the rebirth of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as AU in 2002, Africa has received climate-related EU aid amounting to €3.7 billion (Khadiagala 2018: 440).

Many poor African countries with relatively high vulnerability to climate change (Chad, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sudan, and Uganda, among others) have particularly benefited one way or the other from the EU global ecological charity administered through the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA 2018). The GCCA was created in 2007 to support climate change projects and programs in the world's most climate-vulnerable countries of which many are found in Africa. It provides technical and financial support for national, multicountry, and regional climate change projects and programs using a set of eligibility criteria (Miola et al., 2015). The GCCA is focused on five priorities, namely: mainstreaming climate change into poverty reduction and development strategies; adaptation, building on the National Adaptation Programs

of Action (NAPAs) and other national plans; disaster risk reduction (DRR); reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD); and enhancing participation in the Global Carbon Market and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

Despite the progress recorded, climate change remains a challenging thematic priority for the EU–Africa partnership. For the most part, the partnership has been plagued by some issues ranging from cumbersome institutional structure; inefficient policy processes; mistrust; capacity differentials; lack of clarity on shared purpose and priorities; a deficit of political support on both sides; and the Brexit anxiety, among others. To address these issues and achieve common objectives in the important area of climate change, Africa and the EU must work more closely and commit to more climate action in line with the UN transformative initiatives.

The call for more climate action is therefore a wake-up opportunity for Africa and the EU to take deliberate action towards deepening the existing climate change collaboration between the two partners. Africa and the EU share affinities in the important aspects of their historical connections, geographical closeness, political vision, and interests, including the great potential for a common future. Up until this period, the two partners have played a pivotal role in the global fight against climate change. It is high time to consolidate their joint efforts and continue to take the lead in the global climate change struggle. One way to achieve this is by bringing the current approach in terms of climate action and strategies within the Africa–EU partnership into alignment with the agreed transformative initiatives on the global climate action. More specifically, it is high time that the Africa–EU climate change partnership complements the efforts of the UN steering committee on the global climate action, especially in providing strategic guidance and oversight of the implementation of the global transformative initiatives as they affect Africa.

In addition, Africa and the EU need to commit to a common climate change agenda and joint implementation framework that not only support the components of the UN transformative initiatives, but also consistent with the mitigation goal set by the Paris Agreement. Achieving this may face with the challenge of difference in priorities. As a marginal contributor to the global carbon emissions and, ironically, a core victim of climate change adverse impacts, Africa over the years has been consistent in its advocacy of adaptation bailout. The AU as the continent’s collective representative minced no words in stating this regional climate change position in its Agenda 2063 (AUC 2015). While the EU has no doubt demonstrated support for the continent’s adaptation priority, its primary focus like other developed parties to the UNFCCC is geared towards addressing mitigation in the form of emissions’ reduction. This priority gap needs to be addressed.

Narratives about Africa and Europe are changing in recent years. The African continent, for instance, have demonstrated remarkable progress in some aspects such as governance and democratic accountability, human development, and sustained domestic economic growth. A case in point regarding changes in Europe is no doubt the Brexit phenomenon. There is therefore the need to adjust the EU–Africa relations in the context of these new developments. Africa–EU climate change policies in particular should be driven by common interests and objectives, with clearly defined priorities and action plans that recognize differences regarding the strengths and

weaknesses of individual partners. More desirable is a balanced Africa–EU climate change relation. While it is important that financial and technical supports should be provided to African countries to enable them fulfill their climate action pledges, Africa cannot continue to depend entirely on bailout in its efforts to cope and adapt to climate change under the excuse of extreme vulnerability. A truly multilateral partnership entails collective action and shared responsibility in all aspects. With no prejudice to the fact that many African countries are relatively poor and faced with daunting challenges of sustainable development, it is time for Africa to stop paying lip service to the mantra “African solutions to African problems.”

Actions in terms of climate action and strategies within the Africa–EU partnership should not only be aligned with the transformation initiatives, but also and above all, be structured around a dedicated and regional approach. This should go beyond the conventional worldwide UNFCCC (United Nations Convention on Climate Change) framework that has failed to deliver tangible results for some time past. Incidentally, climate change is one of the few areas where a continental position has been agreed. Mobilizing African solidarity and unity on any issues has never been easy given the continent’s diverse national interests and agendas.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Climate change continues to threaten both the present and future generations. Its growing worsening impacts in recent years have drawn remarkable global attention. One of such was the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit that drew participant from across the world and ended with a call for more global climate action, particularly on the part of state-stakeholders. Though a yearly event but in recognizing the increasing dangers of climate change and the need for accelerated global intervention, the COP 25 held in December same year (2019) concluded with a resolution calling for more climate ambition and action in line with the mitigation goal of the Paris Agreement and the UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development.

On its part, the UN climate action summit succeeded in introducing a set of transformative initiatives for which state and nonstate stakeholders are responsible. But, it failed to secure concrete and immediate mitigation pledges from the world’s top greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters. In the case of COP25, not much progress was achieved beyond the presentation of the Climate Ambition Alliance (CAA). The CAA in its presentation succeeded in merely reemphasizing the multistakeholder pledges made at the UN climate action summit. This chapter argues that the lack of complementarity between the identified two summits is not only worrisome, but also exacerbates the concern raised in the emissions gap report that the existing mitigation pledges otherwise known as NDCs, even if met, would not be enough to deliver the Paris goal. The urge for increased ambition pledges and climate action is therefore critical to closing the gap between the current assemblage of NDCs and the mitigation goal set by the Paris Agreement.

Furthermore, it is argued that though the separate but joint call for more climate ambition and action is a global question, it provides Africa and the EU in particular a fresh opportunity to deepen their existing climate change partnership. This chapter

not only underscores the strategic positions and relevance of these two longstanding partners to the global fight against climate change, but it also highlights that the EU through the unveiling of the European Green Deal already set the pace for increased mitigation pledges involving world’s leading emitters. It is yet to be seen though how much of the proposed mitigation objectives would be realized ultimately.

Going forward, this chapter recommends that Africa–EU climate change policies be aligned with the UN transformative initiatives on the global climate action, particularly the African components. Besides, there is the need for a more assertive and balanced Africa–EU relation, particularly in the context of climate change. Such relation should be based on common climate agendas, with clearly defined priorities and action plans including a joint implementation framework that not only support the transformative initiatives but also consistent with the mitigation goal of the Paris Agreement. Africa–EU climate change partnership should be adjusted to complement the efforts of the UN steering committee on global climate action, especially in terms of providing strategic guidance and monitoring of the implementation of the global transformative initiatives in Africa. While the EU is encouraged to continue to provide both financial and technical supports to African countries to enable them fulfill their pledges relative to the global climate action, there is need for Africa to also look inward for solutions. More focus should be directed at unveiling regional-based solutions to the climate change challenges facing the African continent beyond the UNFCCC framework.

Lastly, as the mitigation ambition proposed in the framework of the Paris Agreement is far from being achieved and that the full implementation of the Paris Agreement has yet to be concretized, because efforts are always underway at the annual COP to finalize its operational guidelines; more plausible concepts such as a truly multilateral partnership which involve collective actions and shared responsibilities in all aspects should be considered to have a good Africa–EU partnership on climate change in light of the call for more climate action.

References

- Amusan L, Olutola O (2016) Addressing Climate Change in Southern Africa: Any Role for South Africa in the Post-Paris Agreement? *India Quarterly* 72(4):395–409. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928416671592>
- AUC (African Union Commission) (2015) *Agenda 2063: the Africa we want*. Popular version. AUC, Addis Ababa
- Bach D (2010) The EU’s ‘strategic partnership’ with Africa: Model or Placebo? GARNET Working Chapter No. 80/10, September
- Bilski A (2018) Africa’s great green wall: a work in progress. *Landscape News*, August
- Boyd R, Turner JC, Ward B (2015) Intended nationally determined contributions: what are the implications for greenhouse gas emissions in 2030? Policy Chapter, October. ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
- Burchill S (2005) Liberalism. In: Burchill S, Linklater A, Devetak R, Donnelly J, Paterson M, Reus-Smit C, True J (eds) *Theories of international relations*, 3rd edn. Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire and New York, pp 55–83

- CarbonBrief (2019) COP 25: key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Madrid. 15 December. Retrieved from <https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop25-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-madrid>
- Claeys G, Tagliapietra S, Zachmann G (2019) How to make the European green Deal work. Policy contribution issue no. 13, November. Bruegel, Brussels
- EC (European Commission) (2015) African Union Commission and European Commission meet to bring new impetus to the EU-Africa partnership. Press release, 21 April. EC, Brussels
- EC (European Commission) (2019) The European Green Deal. Communication from the Commission to The European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions. COM (2019) 640 final. EC, Brussels
- EU (European Union) (2007) The Africa-EU strategic partnership: a joint Africa-EU strategy. 16344/07 (Presse 291), 9 December. Council of the European Union, Brussels
- EU (European Union) (2013–2019) The partnership and joint Africa-EU strategy. Retrieved from <https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/partnership-and-joint-africa-eu-strategy>
- EU (European Union) (2014) The Africa-EU partnership: 2 unions, 1 vision. Summit edition. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg
- GCCA (Global Climate Change Alliance) (2018) Our programs. Retrieved from <http://www.gcca.eu/programmes>
- Globalist (2018) The scale of G20 Greenhouse Gas Emissions: can the G20 summit help advance international cooperation on the environment? 2 December. Retrieved from <https://www.theglobalist.com/the-scale-of-g20-greenhouse-gas-emissions/>
- Grieco JM (1988) Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. *International Organisation* 42(3):485–507
- IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2018) Global warming of 1.5°C: an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. IPCC, Switzerland
- Keohane RO (1984) *After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton
- Keohane RO, Martin LL (1995) The promise of institutionalist theory. *Int Secur* 20(1):39–51. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539214>
- Keohane RO, Nye JS Jr (1987) Power and interdependence revisited. *Int Organ* 41(4):725–753
- Khadiagala GM (2018) Europe-African relations in the era of uncertainty. In: Nagar D, Mutasa C (eds) *Africa and the world: bilateral and multilateral international diplomacy*. Palgrave Macmillan, Chaim, pp 433–453
- Krasner SD (1983) Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. In: Krasner SD (ed) *International regimes*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, pp 1–21
- Lawrence P, Wong D (2017) Soft law in the Paris climate agreement: strength or weakness? *Rev Eur Comparat Int Environ Law* 26(3):276–286. <https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12210>
- Martin L (2007) Neoliberalism. In: Dunne T, Kurki M, Smith S (eds) *International relations theories: discipline and diversity*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 109–126
- Miola A, Papadimitriou E, Mandrici A, McCormick N, Gobron N (2015) Index for the EU global climate change alliance plus flagship initiative. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg
- Moncel R, van Asselt H (2012) All hands on deck! Mobilising climate change action beyond the UNFCCC. *Rev Eur Comparat Int Environ Law* 21(3):163–176. <https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12011>
- NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) (2019) *TerrAfrica*. African Union Development Agency/NEPAD, Midrand. Retrieved from <https://www.nepad.org/programme/terrafrica>
- Olutola O (2020) U.S. withdrawal from the Paris agreement: implications for climate finance in Africa. *Africa Review* 12(1):18–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2019.1685334>
- Schleussner C, Rogelj J, Schaeffer M et al (2016) Science and policy characteristics of the Paris agreement temperature goal. *Nat Clim Chang* 6:827–835. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3096>

- Tondel F, Knaepen H, van Wyk L (2015) Africa and Europe combating climate change: towards a common agenda in 2015. Discussion chapter no. 177, May. European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht
- UN (United Nations) (2019) Report of the Secretary-General on the 2019 Climate Action Summit and the way forward in 2020. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/assets/pdf/cas_report_11_dec.pdf
- UNCC (United Nations Climate Change) (2019a) Climate action and support trends: based on national reports submitted to the UNFCCC secretariat under the current reporting framework. UNCC Secretariat, Bonn
- UNCC (United Nations Climate Change) (2019b) Climate ambition alliance: nations renew their push to upscale action by 2020 and achieve net zero CO₂ emissions by 2050. External Press Release, 11 December. Retrieved from <https://unfccc.int/news/climate-ambition-alliance-nations-renew-their-push-to-upscale-action-by-2020-and-achieve-net-zero>
- UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) (2014) ClimDev-Africa annual report. 1 January – 31 December. UNECA, Addis Ababa
- UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) (2019) Emissions gap report 2019. UNEP, Nairobi. Retrieved from <https://unepdtu.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/egr-2019.pdf>
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2015) Conference of the parties: report of the conference of the parties on its twenty-first session. Held in Paris from 30 November to 11 December. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1. Retrieved from <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf>
- Urpelainen J, van de Graaf T (2018) United States non-cooperation and the Paris agreement. *Clim Pol* 18(7):839–851. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2017.1406843>

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

