The Egalitarian Tilt of Classical Liberalism

Melkevik, Åsbjørn

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-37908-7_1

Åsbjørn Melkevik⁴

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism ((PASTCL))

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Abstract

The liberal tradition has come a long way since it regarded the poor as a mere inconvenience for the rich, such that practices of poor relief were set to avoid a certain discomfort for the well-off rather than to help the worst-off. One exception remains, or so it is commonly believed, namely the classical liberal tradition. This tradition, for example defended by Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman, is generally thought to be hostile to social justice. The introduction to this book undoes this incorrect yet far too common reading of classical liberalism. There is an egalitarian tilt to classical liberalism that is unfortunately too often ignored or misunderstood. Inasmuch as one is a classical liberal, one should also be an egalitarian of a certain kind.

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Notes

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Sir Matthew Hale, A Discourse Touching Provision for the Poor, London, H. Hills, 1683, pp. 5, 7.
2.
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3.
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4.
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5.
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6.
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7.
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8.
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12.
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21.
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22.
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23.
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31.
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32.
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38.
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39.
Milton Friedman once used the term to refer to classical liberals of the Chicago school, like Henry Simons, who argue for some social justice beyond private charity. Milton Friedman, “Neoliberalism and Its Prospect”, originally published in Norwegian, “Nyliberalismen og dens Muligheter”, Farmand: Norsk Forretningsblad, Vol. 57, No. 7, 1951, pp. 89–93.
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42.
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43.
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44.
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46.
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47.
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48.
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49.
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50.
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51.
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52.
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53.
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56.
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58.
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59.
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60.
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61.
“We live together,” said Buchanan, “because social organization provides the efficient means of achieving our individual objectives and not because society offers us a means of arriving at some transcendental common bliss.” James Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 2000, p. 3.
62.
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63.
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64.
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65.
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66.
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67.
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68.
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69.
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70.
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71.
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73.
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74.
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75.
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77.
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78.
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79.
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80.
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 6.
81.
Friedrich Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism”, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1949, p. 428.
82.
H. Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 51.
83.
Voltaire, “Loi”, in Œuvres philosophiques, quoted in Friedrich Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, p. 5.
84.
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Melkevik, Å. (2020). The Egalitarian Tilt of Classical Liberalism. In: If You’re a Classical Liberal, How Come You’re Also an Egalitarian?. Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37908-7_1

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