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Corporate Investigations, Corporate Justice and Public-Private Relations

Part of the book series: Crime Prevention and Security Management ((CPSM))

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Abstract

In this chapter, the day-to-day activities of corporate investigators are discussed. What are the investigative methods that are used by corporate investigators and how does the investigative process take shape? In this chapter, interview data, case study material and observation data are used to unravel the daily activities of corporate investigators. As becomes apparent, corporate investigators provide a comprehensive service. The investigations may, in this way, stay fully in the private legal sphere, without any criminal justice involvement. Within this private legal sphere, corporate investigators can move with considerable autonomy, providing a specialised and custom-made service to clients. Reasons for the popularity of corporate investigations are discussed in this chapter, as well as the full investigative process and corporate investigators’ relationship with their client.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, for example, the report of KRO Brandpunt, Bespied door de baas (1 June 2014) as an example of the public image of corporate investigations. Available on http://brandpunt.kro.nl/seizoenen/2014/afleveringen/01-06-2014.

  2. 2.

    See articles 141 and 142 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering—WvSv). Article 141 charges the prosecution, police officers, military police and special investigative agencies of the ministries with the investigation of criminal offences. Article 142 states that the Minister of Justice and security may define additional persons as ‘special investigating officer’.

  3. 3.

    Because the employee might not grant access willingly, this is sometimes contested in court as improper. However, case law supports the legality of the use of corporate investigation methods (see, e.g., ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2016:8313, in which the defendant claimed that the private investigations were illegal. The (criminal) court dismissed this argument).

  4. 4.

    This research also avoids ‘criminal law terminology’, as the use of these terms would be incorrect in the context of corporate investigations. An involved person for example is not a suspect in the sense of a criminal procedure (and as such does not enjoy the same rights). The adversarial principle could be interpreted as being a criminal justice term (as it is a leading principle of law in criminal proceedings); however, in the Dutch legal system, this is a term that is used in all legal proceedings, from administrative to civil to criminal, and it is thus not specifically linked to the criminal justice system.

  5. 5.

    See the previous Chapter 2 for a general overview of legal frameworks applicable to the different professional groups of investigators.

  6. 6.

    As distinct from broader investigations into the organisation, not focusing on an individual but on an issue.

  7. 7.

    Although this circumstance alone is not sufficient proof, as people tend to use each other’s key cards even when this is prohibited by the internal code of the organisation.

  8. 8.

    This does not necessarily mean that the blacklist does not comply. Many larger organisations have a privacy officer who is better informed on these issues than the respondents mentioned here.

  9. 9.

    For more information, see Chapter 2 of this book.

  10. 10.

    These are not necessarily corporate investigators. Training programmes are often provided by digital specialists.

  11. 11.

    See Chapter 5 for more on public-private relations and information sharing.

  12. 12.

    This is based on the former Privacy law (see articles 33, 34 and 43 WBP). Revisions have been made to the privacy code of conduct as a result of the new EU-wide privacy regulation. These revisions are currently under consideration by the Data Protection Authority. In the meantime, the privacy code of conduct ‘should be read in accordance with the GDPR’ (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, n.d.-c).

  13. 13.

    There are many (mostly USA) textbooks, e-learnings and other professional information available on different approaches and interview techniques (and on corporate investigations more generally; see, e.g., Brian, McNeil, & Demsky, 2017). In this section, the broader outlines of the interview as a source of information are described—the aforementioned very detailed instructions on how to interview are beyond the scope of this chapter. Additionally, the fieldwork reveals that many corporate investigators feel that interviewing can be taught but much importance is given to experience and following one’s own instincts. Although respondents state that there are no standard ways to interview, stressing the importance of flexibility, they seem to broadly follow the process as delineated in this section.

  14. 14.

    Unsurprisingly, an investigative interview follows some of the same basic rules followed by social scientists when interviewing respondents (Baarda, de Goede, & van der Meer-Middelburg, 1996).

  15. 15.

    This research has found no evidence of corporate investigators abusing their power by mistreating the interviewee. This does not mean, however, that such a situation never occurs.

  16. 16.

    Interestingly, in this sense the corporate investigations process follows civil law logic, rather than the logic of criminal investigations. In the civil law system, something is considered a fact when it is presented and not contested by either party (see also Chapter 4 of this book).

  17. 17.

    Not every investigation yields enough information to answer the questions asked in the assignment. When this is the case, a report is made about the findings and the lack of certainty is stated.

  18. 18.

    For example, because other norm violations are discovered within the organisation during the investigations that warrant their own separate investigations (often referred to as ‘by-catch’) or because business partners of the organisation want to have internal investigations as well to ensure they had nothing to do with the norm violation.

  19. 19.

    There are some standards provided for forensic accountants , but not all corporate investigators use them.

  20. 20.

    As we have seen in Chapter 2, investigative costs are also important for in-house departments; however, they are usually justified in more general terms (e.g. in a yearly report, calculated over a whole year) and not in every investigation.

  21. 21.

    See, for example, a 2012 report by Grant Thornton for the municipality of Eindhoven (https://eindhoven.raadsinformatie.nl/document/184307/1/Bijlage_5_Grant_Thornton_eindrapport_TA), a 2015 report by Hoffmann for the municipality of Urk (http://www.omroepflevoland.nl/SiteFiles/Doc/Rapport_onderzoek_naar_lek_E48A8C53F9EC9A01C1257DE400371DDF.pdf), a 2012 report by Deloitte for Avalex (http://www.politiekdelft.nl/avalex_rapport_deloitte_20120330.pdf) or (in a more limited way) the 2015 report of De Brauw for NS (https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-614489.pdf).

  22. 22.

    Neither can the police of course, although law enforcement authorities do have the power to summon documents, enter buildings without consent (when this is approved by a prosecutor or judge), or use other more or less coercive measures.

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  1. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, The Netherlands

    Clarissa A. Meerts

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Meerts, C.A. (2019). Corporate Investigations. In: Corporate Investigations, Corporate Justice and Public-Private Relations. Crime Prevention and Security Management. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26516-8_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26516-8_3

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