Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Organisational Conflict

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya

  • 306 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter looks in depth at the relationships between the Malayan Security Service, Security Intelligence Far East, and the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) in the period between April 1946 and June 1948. Britain’s new post-war intelligence apparatus in the Far East appeared conceptually sound but required time to “bed-in”—for remits to be defined, working practices established and personal relations forged. This, however, never happened. From the outset, Security Intelligence Far East and its masters in London clashed with Malayan Security Service. Neither the Governor General or Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) were able to provide any moderating influence. As a result, on the eve of the declaration of Emergency in Malaya, Britain’s intelligence apparatus in the Far East was fractured and dysfunctional. The impact on forthcoming counterinsurgency campaign would be far-reaching.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    R. Arditti and P. Davies, “Rethinking the Rise and Fall of the Malayan Security Service, 1946–48”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 43: 2 (2015), pp. 292–316.

  2. 2.

    At the end of the War, the MPAJA reformed itself into the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army (MPABA). See L. Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police 1945–60—The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency (Singapore 2008), p. 48, fn. 23; D. Mackay, The Domino that Stood—The Malayan Emergency, 1948–60 (London 1997), p. 31; M. Shennan, Our Man in Malaya (London 2007), pp. 17, 27–28.

  3. 3.

    Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police, p. 31; Comber’s text actually reads “Dalley … who had considerate [sic] intelligence experience…”.

  4. 4.

    FCO 141/17012, Dalley to Gent, 21 March 1947.

  5. 5.

    MSS Ind. Ocn. S254, memorandum from Dalley to Ralph Hone, 13 July 1948.

  6. 6.

    Ibid., Dalley Quotes Figures for Actual vs. Approved Establishment for 1 May 1946. Comber provides similar figures for 1948, see Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police, p. 32.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., p. 34.

  8. 8.

    Ibid., See also C. Sanger, Malcolm MacDonald —Bringing an End to Empire (1995), pp. 293–294.

  9. 9.

    Ibid.

  10. 10.

    CO 537/1581, Minute by Mr. Morgan, 28 March 1946.

  11. 11.

    See ibid., CO 537/1582 and CO 537/2140 for the HQ Malaya Command Weekly Intelligence Reviews (February 1946–July 1946).

  12. 12.

    MSS Ind. Ocn. S254, memorandum from Dalley to Ralph Hone, 13 July 1948.

  13. 13.

    A. Stockwell, “Policing During the Malayan Emergency, 1948–60: Communism, Communalism and Decolonisation”, in D. Anderson and D. Killingray, eds., Policing and Decolonisation: Politics Nationalism, and the Police, 1917–65 (Manchester 1992), pp. 108–109.

  14. 14.

    L. Comber, “The Malayan Security Service (1945–48)”, Intelligence and National Security, 18: 3 (2003), p. 131.

  15. 15.

    A. Short, The Communist Insurrection (London 1975), p. 80. This problem was exacerbated by the use of at least four regional dialects amongst the various Chinese sub-ethnic groups in Southeast Asia including Southern Min or ‘Amoy’ Hokkienese, Cantonese, Teochew and, less commonly at the time, Guoyeu or Mandarin.

  16. 16.

    J. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife—Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago 2002), p. 60.

  17. 17.

    K. Hack, “Corpses, Prisoners of War and Captured Documents: British and Communist Narratives of the Malayan Emergency, and the Dynamics of Intelligence Transformation”, Intelligence and National Security, 14: 4 (2008), p. 213; see also Comber, “The Malayan Security Service”, Intelligence and National Security, 18: 3 (2003), p. 133.

  18. 18.

    KV 4/421, Dixon to Sillitoe, 29 July 1946.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., Sillitoe to Dixon, 12 August 1946.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., Dick White (MI5) to Bates (Colonial Office), 13 August 1946.

  21. 21.

    KV 4/421, SLO Singapore to DG, 17 February 1947.

  22. 22.

    Sillitoe also envisaged SIFE and the DSOs having a broader “intangible” but “essential function” of providing a means of inciting the local security authorities to do their job efficiently, akin to an inspectorate, KV 4/422, Assessment of the value of S.I.F.E and D.S.O Points in the Far East.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., SIFE to DSO Singapore, Malaya Union, Hong Kong, and SLO Burma, 25 November 1947.

  24. 24.

    KV 4/423, Kellar to MacDonald, 19 December 1948.

  25. 25.

    KV 4/421, Charter for Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE), 6 August 1946.

  26. 26.

    KV 4/422, Winterborn to DSO Hong King, Singapore, Malayan Union and Burma, 12 January 1948. Winterborn was Acting H/SIFE.

  27. 27.

    Ibid.

  28. 28.

    KV 4/421, Memorandum of Instruction for Colonel C.E. Dixon, Head of Security Intelligence Far East, 6 August 1946.

  29. 29.

    FCO 141/14360 Paskin to Gent, 11 July 1946.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., Gimson to MacDonald, 24 July 1946.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., Sec of State to Governor Malayan Union, 23 July 1946.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., Gent to MacDonald, 25 July 1947. Ibid., Extract from draft minutes of the Governors’ Conference held at Malacca on 1st and 2nd August 1946.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., Commissioner of Police, Singapore to Colonial Secretary, Singapore, 13 August 1946.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., Malayan Security Service Proposed Establishment, by L. Knight, A/Director MSS, 27 August 1946.

  35. 35.

    Liddell’s diary suggests that SIFE was already in place by January 1946, with the JIC (London) recommending the establishment of staff on 20 February 1946, See KV4/467.

  36. 36.

    KV 4/421, Charter for Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE), 6 August 1946.

  37. 37.

    FCO 141/14360, L. Knight, Commentary on Instructions to DSO Malayan Union, 27 August 1946.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., Commissioner of Police (Singapore) to Colonial Secretary, Singapore, 6 September 1946. It is possible that key actors thought that SIFE would be responsible to the Defence Committee and MSS to the governors, and thus be clearly separate organisations. See Extract from Minutes of Governors General’s conference held at Singapore on 25 September 1946.

  39. 39.

    MI5 representatives holding military status were designated Defence Security Officers and typically based with armed service commands; civilian representatives were Security Liaison Officers (SLOs). See, e.g. WO 208/4696, “Reorganisation of MO and MI,” DMO&I 307a.

  40. 40.

    Comber, a former Malayan Police Special Branch officer, states that SIFE did not run agents in Malaya. See Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police 1945–60, p. 96. This is contrary to the briefing note to MacDonald which clearly states that “there are Defence Security Officers under him [Major Winterborn] in Singapore and the Malayan Union.” There also appears a difference of terminology. Comber states that MSS state representatives were termed Local Security Officers, whereas Short uses the term Security Liaison Officer.

  41. 41.

    CO 537/2647, a note for discussion with Sir P. Sillitoe, undated, c. January 1948.

  42. 42.

    KV 4/421, Extract of a letter from Lt. Co. Young (SIFE), 19 August 1948.

  43. 43.

    FCO 141/17012, Dalley to Gent, 21 March 1947.

  44. 44.

    KV 4/470, Diary of Guy Liddell (D/DG MI5), November 1946.

  45. 45.

    CO 537/2647, Sillitoe to Lloyd, 17 December 1947.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., Sillitoe to Lloyd, 17 December 1947.

  47. 47.

    Grimson offers an interesting counterpoint. He welcomed Sillitoe’s visit to discuss the relations between the MSS and SIFE. He informed the Colonial Office that “I have too been worried about these relations, as I fear that there is a tendency on part of the U.K. Security Service stationed in Singapore to fail to appreciate the knowledge which our Security Service has of local conditions and the ability of this Service to view any data at their disposal against an oriental background.” See CO 537/2647, Gimson to Lloyd, 3 February 1948. For more about the relationship between Dalley and Sillitoe, see Arditti and Davies “Rethinking the Rise and Fall of the Malayan Security Service, 1946–48”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 43: 2 (2015), pp. 292–316.

  48. 48.

    FCO 141/ 15436, Notes of a meeting held at Government House on 20 March 1948.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., See also Dalley to Gent, 15 April 1948.

  50. 50.

    KV 4/470, Diary of Guy Liddell (D/DG MI5), 30 January 1948.

  51. 51.

    FCO 141/ 15436, Notes of a meeting held at Government House on 20 March 1948.

  52. 52.

    CO 537/2653, Sillitoe to Acheson, 7 May 1948.

  53. 53.

    KV 4/422, Kellar to Sillitoe, 18 August 1948.

  54. 54.

    CO 537/2653, Acheson to Sillitoe, 28 April 1948. The realisation that local issues might adversely impact Britain’s wide strategic interests in the region was not new. See WO 203/6236, Directive of the Central Intelligence Staff, Singapore, 26 October 1946.

  55. 55.

    Ibid., Sillitoe to Acheson, 7 May 1948.

  56. 56.

    Ibid., Seel to MacDonald, 19 May 1948.

  57. 57.

    Ibid, JIC (48) 49th Meeting, extract from minutes, dated 11 June 1948.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., COD (48)85, Intelligence Organisation in the Far East, Annex—JIC/FE, ‘Composition of Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)’, 12 June 1948.

  59. 59.

    R. Cormac, Confront the Colonies—British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency (London 2013), p. 30.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., p. 33.

  61. 61.

    Arditti and Davies “Rethinking the Rise and Fall of the Malayan Security Service, 1946–48”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 43: 2 (2015), pp. 292–316.

  62. 62.

    Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948–60, pp. 82–83.

  63. 63.

    KV 4/422, Assessment of the Value of SIFE and the DSO Points in the Far East, Undated, believed to be c. January 1948.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Independent Scholar, Wraysbury, UK

    Roger C. Arditti

Authors
  1. Roger C. Arditti
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Arditti, R.C. (2019). Organisational Conflict. In: Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya. Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16695-3_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16695-3_4

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-16694-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-16695-3

  • eBook Packages: HistoryHistory (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation