EDITED BY
GUILLAUME D. JOHNSON
KEVIN D. THOMAS
ANTHONY KWAME HARRISON
SONYA A. GRIER

RACE IN THE MARKETPLACE

CROSSING CRITICAL BOUNDARIES

Foreword by
ARLENE DÁVILA
Afterword by
ROKHAYA DIALLO

Race in the Marketplace

"The Race in the Marketplace group are undertaking some truly important work on a subject that has been for too long sidelined in our discipline. This book should be on every scholars' reading list and discussed widely. I cannot recommend it enough."

—Mark Tadajewski, *Professor of Marketing, University of York and Editor of the Journal of Marketing Management*

"This book is absolutely necessary because it alerts the world to the reason why race still matters in contemporary market societies. Even though most formal forms of racism (notably apartheid and colonialism) ended years ago, market still seems to work in one direction, thus negating all the gains attained through freedom, and perpetuating the abuse of human rights. This book is a must read."

—Muzi Kuzwayo, *former CEO of TBWA / Hunt / Lascaris South Africa and Author of Through Mud and Dust: Marketing to Black South Africans*

Guillaume D. Johnson · Kevin D. Thomas
Anthony Kwame Harrison · Sonya A. Grier
Editors

Race in the Marketplace

Crossing Critical Boundaries

Foreword by Arlene Dávila
Afterword by Rokhaya Diallo

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Guillaume D. Johnson
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Université Paris-Dauphine
Paris, France

Kevin D. Thomas
Diederich College of Communication
Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI, USA

Anthony Kwame Harrison
Department of Sociology
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, VA, USA

Sonya A. Grier
Kogod School of Business
American University
Washington, DC, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-11710-8 ISBN 978-3-030-11711-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018968343

Cover illustration: Inspired by the work of Melchior Abeille

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Today, no one can deny that to think about markets is to think about race. Never before have we gotten so much evidence on the interplay of race and markets as reports about retail racism crowd everyone's newsfeed. We have ample evidence that people of color have unequal access to goods and services—from food and education to mortgages—and that they are regularly regarded as "suspects" when shopping, browsing, or simply for being non-white. The significant issue is understanding why. Despite all the overwhelming evidence showing that markets are raced, we remain so invested, tied, and committed to the existence of an actually occurring "free" and "fair" market. How did the idea that markets are or should be unencumbered by race, and other irksome "identities" such as those of class, gender, sexuality, age, and more come to be? Even more worrisome, we must ask why is this mythical market seen as the most reliable recourse for human salvation and flourishing?

This groundbreaking volume tackles these questions by centering the conversation on race, the issue that is most present and most ignored in the field of marketing research. In particular, the authors summon marketing researchers, classical economists, and practitioners (brand makers and advertisers) to stop ignoring decades of empirical, scholarly, and journalistic evidence showing that race and markets are intrinsically connected. Not only has race been central to capital accumulation from the very origins of world capitalism—as the variable around which labor was organized and value exploited and extracted; Race and racial logics also encode our institutions and laws—they fuel every marketing campaign, even every attempt to find new algorithms to reach "today's marketplace."

This timely and innovative volume makes amply clear that to deny this fact is to trade in myths at the cost of reality. In so doing, the volume provides an urgent reckoning and a necessary reality check about the interplay of markets and race. In particular, the authors urge us to stop celebrating the "discovery" of race, and diverse audiences and markets in naïve and simplistic ways by highlighting how people of color are neither a "new force" nor a "secret for growth," but the very fabric of the US population and popular culture. They summon brand marketers to stop seeking ways to maximize profit from ethnic and multicultural marketing campaigns and challenge their academic peers to stop coding for race without fully understanding how it works and operates in markets and in society at large. Moreover, they show that it is time scholars, marketing professionals, and the public reflect on how dominant ideas and practices around markets contribute to inequality. It is both necessary and possible to find ways to develop liberatory public policies and actions that contribute to greater access, equity and more equitable markets. The authors in this volume provide pathways, methods, and ways to do just that.

Even more powerfully, this volume serves as a testament of the growing community of RIM interdisciplinary scholars who are inserting conversations of race into their very fields and into the larger conversation around marketing and business. The RIM network provides a community of scholars who share this politicized vision of marketing and are ready to share their networks and insights through publicly open convening and the publication of this landmark volume.

The result is a book providing current and sophisticated concepts and methods to develop anti-racist approaches to marketplace research. Mining insights from an encompassing transdisciplinary community, the authors represent fields as varied as public health, anthropology, sociology, geography, communications, and more. The authors' goal is to open up the conversation and question taken for granted ideas about race and the wording of markets while promoting interdisciplinary and collaborative approaches to their study. Most significantly, they urge us to move past coded words such as multiculturalism, in-culture marketing, diversity and more to examine the multiple ways race impacts all type of markets, and people's experiences navigating them. The diversity of case studies is an enormous contribution on its own by showing the different spaces, fields, institutions that must be accounted to fully understand the contemporary interplay of markets and race. They trouble easy assumptions about ethnic and racial groupings and culture, by reminding us that there is a multiverse of identities in each

"identity" and challenging stereotypes that surround marketing's impulse to construct racially rational "bounded" markets.

Twenty years ago when I was a young assistant professor researching "Hispanic marketing," I remember browsing through business and marketing departments looking for anyone studying race or "ethnic marketing." Historically, many anthropologists have been hired in marketing, business, and advertising industries yet I was surprised to learn that few anthropologists were actually hired in marketing departments. Much less were there people of color in this predominantly white-dominated field. I must confess that while I teach courses on media and race and culture and consumption where I regularly touch on issues of marketing and advertising, I never consulted marketing departments again, or have kept up with that field, though I hear that my book *Latinos Inc.: Marketing and the Making of a People* is still taught in many marketing courses to discuss the topic of "Latino/a/x/s." However, as I write this Foreword I repeated the same exercise I did twenty years ago by browsing the marketing department at my own institution, which housed at NYU Stern Business School is a well-recognized leader in the field. Sadly, though unsurprisingly, I realized that if I were a young professor delving into examining marketing research, I would have come to the same conclusions. Black and Latinxs are nowhere to be found in the tenured and tenure track professors, with the exception of a recently hired assistant professor. The rapid growth of RIM makes it impossible for business and marketing to remain blinded and at the margins of all the advances in critical race theory, ethnic studies, and emerging from all disciplinary fields that are currently examining dynamics of race and markets. Unlike the early 2000, this time there is the RIM network ready to welcome new generations of researchers and scholars, and ready to change the conversation around marketing research and its practices. It could not come at a more timely moment.

Greenwich Village, New York, USA

Arlene Dávila
Anthropology and American Studies
New York University

Arlene Dávila is Professor of Anthropology and American Studies. She studies the political economy of culture and media, consumption, immigration, and geographies of inequality and race. She has authored six books examining these issues and is the founding director of NYU's Latinx Project.

Contents

Notes on Contributors

Susan Ainsworth is an Associate Professor in Organizational Studies at the University of Melbourne (Australia). She is an expert in discourse analysis, qualitative methods, and gender within organizations. She is on the editorial boards of *Organization Studies* and *Journal of Management Studies* and is an Associate Editor for *Gender, Work and Organization* and *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management*.

Ranam Alkayyali is a Lecturer of Marketing and Economy at ISEG Digital Marketing and Communication School Toulouse (France). She holds a Ph.D. in Marketing from Paris-Est Créteil University and ESCP Europe. Her research focuses on immigrants' acculturation and identity negotiation through consumption.

Patricia A. Banks is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Mount Holyoke College (USA) whose research program lies at the intersection of culture, patronage, and markets. In 2018–2019, Banks will be at Stanford University as a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. She is author of the book *Represent: Art and Identity Among the Black Upper-Middle Class* (Routledge, 2010).

Samuel Kwaku Bonsu is Professor of Marketing at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) and Visiting Researcher at the University of Southern Denmark, Odense. He maintains research interests in African consumer cultures and subjectivities in contemporary markets. He has earned the moral and scholarly authority to comment on matters of African development as a tyrannical process. You may disagree, if you wish!

Komal K. Dhillon-Jamerson is a race and women's and gender studies scholar, whose research primarily focuses on pigmentocracy in the context of India, with a focus on postcolonialism as it relates to cultural imperialism. Other works include *Can the Global Transmit the Local for Diaspora?* and *European-Americans Favoring People of Color: White Colorism and Social Inequality*. Dhillon-Jamerson teaches courses related to Asian cultures, multicultural communication, and women's and gender studies at Virginia Tech (USA).

Sonya A. Grier is a Professor of Marketing at the Kogod School of Business, American University (USA). Dr. Grier conducts interdisciplinary research on topics related to race in the marketplace using a diversity of methodological approaches. She has published her research in leading marketing, public health, health policy, and psychology journals and also created two award-winning documentary films.

Anthony Kwame Harrison is the Gloria D. Smith Professor of Africana Studies and Associate Professor of Sociology at Virginia Tech (USA). His scholarship examines the impacts of racial identification on arenas of popular culture and leisure. He is author of *Hip Hop Underground: The Integrity and Ethics of Racial Identification* (Temple University Press, 2009) and *Ethnography: Understanding Qualitative Research* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

Cassi Pittman Claytor is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Case Western Reserve University (USA) whose research examines the intersection of race and class and how race structures racial minorities' consumption and economic behavior. More specifically, her research examines the attitudes, experiences, and consumption preferences and practices of middle-class Blacks.

Miles Tycho Hugh is a research and teaching assistant at the University of Sydney (Australia), having recently completed Honours in Marketing. He is interested in research on the history and anthropology of identity construction and Asia, shaped primarily by ethnographic fieldwork he conducted in Jakarta and Singapore.

W. Trevor Jamerson's research focuses on the relationships between physical and digital communities, most prominently relationships between Harlem and TripAdvisor. He has previously published in areas of digital sociology, race studies, and critical tourism studies. He is currently teaching courses on sociology and racial inequality at Virginia Tech (USA).

Guillaume D. Johnson is a marketing scholar at the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) based at the University Paris-Dauphine (France). His research focuses on the sociopolitical dynamics of multicultural marketing with a special emphasis on race. He has explored these issues in France, South Africa, and the USA, and his work has been published in management, marketing, and advertising journals. Prior to joining the CNRS, he held academic positions in South Africa and China.

Naya Jones is a critical health geographer, activist scholar, and holistic practitioner. Through community- and arts-based methods, she broadly focuses on issues of historical and racial trauma, healing, sovereignty, and place. Her work especially centers the experiences and knowledge of Black Diaspora populations in North and South America. She is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Primary Care Research at the Medical College of Wisconsin (USA) and a Culture of Health Leader (2017–2020), a program supported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.

Vanessa Gail Perry is a Professor of Marketing, Strategic Management, and Public Policy at the George Washington University School of Business (USA). Her research focuses on consumer and regulatory issues in financial and housing markets.

Dorothée Prud'homme is Head of Research at Association Française des Managers de la Diversité (AFMD) and Associate Fellow at Centre Emile Durkheim, Sciences Po Bordeaux (France). She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Sciences Po Bordeaux and over the last ten years conducted several research projects dedicated to the process of racialization in public and private organizations in France.

Lauren Rhue is an Assistant Professor of Information Systems and Analytics at the Wake Forest School of Business (USA). Her research examines the economic implications of technology. Dr. Rhue is an alumna of the Stern School of Business and Stanford University.

Marcel Rosa-Salas is a born and raised Brooklynite and a doctoral candidate in cultural anthropology at New York University (USA). Her research examines how American marketing professionals produce knowledge about race and American national identity. She holds a B.A. in Africana Studies from the University of Pennsylvania (USA). She is a Ford Foundation Predoctoral Fellow and a Wenner-Gren Dissertation Grant Awardee.

Francesca Sobande is a Digital Media Studies Lecturer at Cardiff University (UK). Her research focuses on race, gender, media, and the marketplace. She is author of *The Digital Lives of Black Women in Britain* (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2020).

Kevin D. Thomas is an educator, analyst, and activist scholar. He currently serves as the Assistant Professor of Multicultural Branding at Marquette University (USA). He specializes in using policy-relevant and community participatory action research methods to critically examine the relationship between marketing, consumption practices, and notions of self and community. Dr. Thomas is a co-founder of Food for Black Thought and the Black Media Council. He remains grounded through his mindfulness meditation practice.

Jess Vega-Centeno is a doctoral candidate at the University of Texas at Austin (USA) with a B.A. in Psychology and M.B.A. in Marketing Management. She spent 15 years in advertising and marketing, developing and managing campaigns and strategic communication plans for various products and services ranging from educational to financial services. Her research interests include marketplace inequities, consumer culture, and identity politics.

Ramya M. Vijaya is a Professor of Economics at Stockton University, New Jersey (USA), where she teaches courses in economics and global studies. Her research focuses on race and gender inequalities in the global political economy.

Jeaney Yip is Lecturer in Marketing at the University of Sydney (Australia). Her research is multidisciplinary and involves the study of discourse and identity in religion, gender, and consumer culture. She has published in *Social Compass*, *Pacific Affairs*, *South East Asia Research*, and *Journal of Macromarketing*.

List of Figures

List of Tables

1

Introduction

Guillaume D. Johnson, Kevin D. Thomas, Anthony Kwame Harrison and Sonya A. Grier

In his fable "The Racial Preference Licensing Act," the late Harvard law professor Derrick Bell (1992) imagines a license which authorizes businesses to exclude people on the basis of their race. Similar to pollution permits giving firms the legal right to pollute, this license legalizes racial discrimination for a fee ("expensive though not prohibitively so," p. 48). Once obtained, a business must display their license prominently within their premises and operate their activity in accordance with their official racial preference. Only licensed facilities are allowed to discriminate. Others, if found

G. D. Johnson (✉)
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS),
Université Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France
e-mail: guillaume.johnson@dauphine.fr

K. D. Thomas
Race, Ethnic and Indigenous Studies Program, Diederich College of Communication, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI, USA
e-mail: kevin.thomas@marquette.edu

A. K. Harrison
Department of Sociology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA
e-mail: kwame@vt.edu

S. A. Grier
Marketing Department, Kogod School of Business, American University, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: sonya.grier@american.edu

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_1

guilty, are fined. The Act also stipulates that license holders must regularly pay a tax to an "equality fund" that supports discriminated communities through investments in business development, home ownership, and education. Accordingly, the fictional president of Bell's fable presents The Racial Preference Licensing Act as a way of maximizing freedom of racial choice while guaranteeing racial equality, either directly from equal access or indirectly from the "fruits of the license taxes" (p. 52). Drawing on the idea that the purpose of integration laws is "not to punish lawbreakers but to diminish their numbers," the president further claims that the license and associated taxes are the best ways to de-incentivize racist behaviors (p. 51). Rather than policing morality, he calls for a paradigm shift which realistically uses the "working of a marketplace" to achieve racial justice:

> Racial realism is the key to understanding this new law. It does not assume a nonexistent racial tolerance, but boldly proclaims its commitment to racial justice through the working of a marketplace […]. (p. 47)

Subtitled "a fable about the politics of hate," Bell's essay highlights some of the key questions that inform *Race in the Marketplace* (RIM) as an emerging field of interdisciplinary scholarship. Namely what is the relationship between markets and racial justice? Is racial injustice an indelible feature of a market society? Or can market practices, incentives, and/or policies be liberatory, enabling all individuals to experience just treatment, access, and opportunity?

Market(ization): The Road to Racial Justice?

Historically, scholars have considered the State as the key site of racial oppression (Omi and Winant 2015). Racist systems like Jim Crow, Nuremberg, and apartheid laws which directly impacted markets were all put in place by national governments. The marketplace, on the other hand, has been conceived as a potential space for the liberatory emancipation of dominated classes. Because the possibilities for commerce offered by markets extended beyond the scope of localized power structures (for instance trading with outside partners or in new unregulated commodities), subordinated groups could engage the market as a means to advancing their marginalized and/or ascribed status (Hann and Hart 2009). The power of Jewish merchants in medieval Europe (430 AD–1453 AD), for example, often challenged the racist arrangement of local authorities, which excluded Jews from many occupations and places of residence, and forced them to

wear distinctive, identifying clothing (Friedman 1962; see also Levy 2005). Similarly, the disproportionate contribution of "immigrants" to entrepreneurship and national growth contradicts racist anti-immigration rhetoric and policies that view them as social burdens (Kerr and Kerr 2016). Thus, prominent scholars across disciplines have theorized that a market unfettered by the political grip of government would eventually correct racial injustice and make it obsolete (Becker 1957; Friedman 1962; Posner 1987). In the words of US economist Milton Friedman in his seminal *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962, p. 109):

> [a] free market separates economic efficiency from irrelevant characteristics. […], the purchaser of bread does not know whether it was made from wheat grown by a white man or a Negro, by a Christian or a Jew. In consequence, the producer of wheat is in a position to use resources as effectively as he can, regardless of what the attitudes of the community may be toward the color, the religion, or other characteristics of the people he hires.

Such theorizing relies on the idea that marketplace participants are free, independent, and self-interested individuals who cooperate through various economic mechanisms to exchange goods and services. The argument continues: If a business uses racial preference in its activities, the self-imposed burden of excluding potential customers, clients, and/or partners on the basis of race would place it at a disadvantage relative to its non-discriminating competitors (Friedman 1962). The costs associated with such an obligation would act as a tax on the discriminating company and inevitably, so the logic goes, drive it out of business.

Supporters of this view agree nonetheless that a store may still discriminate within a free-market framework. Yet they contend that, if it does so, it is as a response to the racial preferences of its community of customers or employees. According to this third-party argument, racist patrons and staff can introduce "competitive pressures" forcing businesses to behave in discriminatory ways (Sunstein 1991, p. 25). Legally enforcing non-discrimination policies would then be counterproductive as they would not directly impact the real racists (that is the community) but rather the store, which is only trying to satisfy the preferences of its (racist) clientele and staff (Friedman 1962). In this view, also espoused by Derrick Bell's fictitious president, governments should not coerce firms to practice racial equity but should instead prevent coercion by ensuring freedom of choice. In other words, individual freedom should prevail over other values as it will guarantee mutual benefit, global stability, and put an end to discrimination.

History, however, has refuted this assumption time and again. First, local authorities have consistently controlled the potential racial subversiveness of markets by restricting the mercantile activities of racialized groups. An infamous example of this was the pariah status of Jews in medieval Europe, which controlled how they could run their business and public life; ensuring that they had limited access to money and almost no political power (Hann and Hart 2009). During the twentieth century, race riots against "Black Wall Street" in Tulsa, Oklahoma (USA) and against thousands of Jewish-owned businesses during the *Kristallnacht* ("Crystal Night") in Nazi Germany confirmed the ineffectiveness of market-logic in thwarting racial violence. More recently, beliefs that "neutral" market-driven technological advances will eliminate racial injustice were further challenged when the United Nations and several NGOs accused Facebook and its supposedly dispassionate algorithms of stoking the flames of racial hatred against minority-status Muslim groups in Myanmar and Sri Lanka (Fisher and Taub 2018; see also Müller and Schwarz 2018). One could argue that in all these examples (Oklahoma, Germany, and Myanmar), the governments were more or less directly involved and, thus, the market was never totally free to run effectively. Nevertheless, the worldwide marketization of fundamental social institutions like education, health care, criminal justice, politics, and the arts through privatization and deregulation—think students as consumers, monetized sickness, and for-profit prisons[1]—confirm that free markets have not led to racial justice.

From Racial Capitalism to Raced Markets

What free-market proponents may have overlooked is that "race" is not just an "irrelevant characteristic" of market capitalism (Friedman 1962, p. 109) but rather is infused into its core (Tilley and Shilliam 2018). Indeed, as political theorist Cedric Robinson (2000 [1983]) argues, capitalism and racism have always evolved together to produce a modern world system, which he labeled "racial capitalism" (see also Kelley 2017; Melamed 2015; Thomas 2013). His thesis takes issue with several conventions widely accepted in the study of racism and capitalism, respectively.

First, Robinson doesn't limit his understanding of race to perceived physical characteristics but rather focuses on the *sociopolitical processes* which create racial subjects (see also Schaub 2019). These processes include the often contradictory laws and ideologies that have been used to justify racial categories and hierarchies. Thus, Robinson challenges the idea that the concept

of "race" began with Europe's modern encounter with Africans, Asians, and/or indigenous peoples of the New World (Robinson 2000 [1983]). Instead he argues that racialism, the legitimation and corroboration of a social order by way of its racial categories, has its genesis *within* Europe where *racialized* subjects (such as Slavs, Tartars, Irish, Jews) were victims of dispossession, colonialism, and slavery (Kelley 2017).

As a result, Robinson's position also casts doubt upon the aforementioned view that capitalism was the revolutionary antithesis of the political and economical arrangements of medieval Europe (Kelley 2017). Instead, he argues that capitalism originated from a European civilization already thoroughly infused with racialism. He states: "The tendency of European civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but to differentiate—to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical differences into 'racial' ones" (Robinson 2000 [1983], p. 26). Simply put, he contends that as much as racialism cannot be dissociated from the European project, race cannot be dissociated from capitalism… within a free-market paradigm or not.

Robinson seems therefore to provide a definitive "Yes" to our opening question regarding whether racial injustice is an indelible feature of a market society. Indeed, race has clearly played a central role in the conception and growth of modern global markets including banking, housing and textile, and the inequities they engender (Grier et al. 2019). Furthermore, scholars demonstrate how through rhetoric and practices market initiatives have been legitimized in opposition to a welfare-state racialized as Black and inferior (Hohle 2012). Racialized representations, moreover, have always served as key linchpins through which products are commodified, which, in turn, impacts evolving understandings of race (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009; Crockett 2008; McClintock 1995). Thus, the process is intertwined: race influencing market constructions and markets (re)defining race. In particular, by masking power dynamics, the free-market approach contributes to a "colorblind" ideology, which reduces racism to an individual level; further mystifying connections between race and the economy, particularly as they relate to "the racialized division of labour, wealth accumulation, property ownership, environmental degradation and global debt" (Tilley and Shilliam 2018, p. 5).

Can We Escape Raced Markets?

So, is there a way out? To answer this challenging question, we draw parallels between the works of two monumental scholars of market and race, namely anthropologist Karl Polanyi and sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva. Both

argue that market and racial domination do not happen without some form of resistance. According to Polanyi (2001, p. 138), the dynamics of modern society are characterized by a *double movement* where the push for the free market is immediately met by a counterpush for social protection aiming to support those most affected by the damaging consequences of the market. Similarly, Bonilla-Silva (1997) contends that because racial classifications organize and limit people's lives, the meanings and the positions assigned to races within a social order are always contested. Race, then, far from being an inborn and fixed characteristic should be understood as contingent, negotiable, and transmutable over time and space.[2] As such, Bonilla-Silva defines *racial contestation* as the struggle of racial groups for systematic changes regarding their position within a given social organization (1997, p. 473). Both scholars argue that although such a resistance can be expressed at the individual level, it sometimes becomes collective, general, and can potentially affect a market/society's overall organization.[3]

It is this spirit of contestation against racial and market oppression that motivates the origins of Race in the Marketplace (RIM). As a nascent field of study, RIM coalesces around developing networks of dedicated scholars and practicing professionals who recognize and, accordingly, have responded to the shortage of critically oriented scholarship related to race in the fields of marketing and consumer studies (see Pittman Claytor 2019, in this volume Chapter 10). Scholars point out that research in these disciplines generally lacks a critical approach that explicitly engages with the realities of power, privilege, and oppression (Burton 2009; Davis 2018; Grier et al. 2019; Williams et al. 2008). On the other hand, a more complex approach can often be found outside these fields, including in scholarship stemming from the social sciences, communications, humanities, management, and health sciences. Still very little cross-pollination between disciplines occurs. Indeed, while researchers working in the social sciences and humanities grapple with race in contexts of economic, social, and political transaction, many have yet to fully appreciate or utilize relevant marketing frameworks. At a time when fundamental social institutions are increasingly governed by marketplace logics, all scholars committed to dismantling race and its pernicious role in defining conditions of social inequality and personal injustices could benefit from building with and upon each others' insights, models, and perspectives. As such, the RIM network was developed to promote cross-disciplinary research and dialogue that advances knowledge and understanding about the significant impacts of race on marketplaces across the globe.

Race in the Marketplace: Crossing Critical Boundaries represents the leading edge of ongoing efforts to establish RIM as a cohesive field of critical,

transdisciplinary inquiry, and research dissemination. The vision for this first-of-its-kind volume arose out of a spring 2017 gathering of international, cross-disciplinary scholars in Washington, DC. At the inaugural RIM Research Forum, nearly fifty scholars working in and around fields related to race and marketplaces congregated to share our collective experiences working in these frontier arenas. The conversations we had were vibrant, evocative, and ultimately instructive in solidifying our conviction that RIM represents a fruitful area of scholarship, collaboration, engagement, and activism. Out of this gathering, we created working groups to draft a collective mission, value statement, and framework for RIM as an inclusive, critical, and interconnected research domain. Through this partnering of marketing, social sciences, arts, and humanities scholarship—combining the rigor of empirical research with the vigor of invested advocacy—we established working definitions of *race* and *marketplace* and affirmed our commitment to transformative scholarship and accessible modes for communicating our findings. When, as editors, we invited colleagues to contribute to this volume, we did so under these auspices.

RIM represents a broadly defined arena for spotlighting, discussing, disseminating, and recommending policy. It is informed by a fundamental understanding that, just as markets impact the creation and maintenance of racial difference, racial differences impact the creation and maintenance of market practice.

Defining Race, Marketplace, and Other Key Concepts

Race, in the context of RIM, cannot be separated from power. We define it as a mode of sociopolitical classification that creates *enduring* hierarchies based on physical appearance, cultural practices, and ancestry. Race is generally thought to comprise specific inherent qualities ascribed to biological differences, including skin tone, blood, and other physical/physiological characteristics. In contrast, ethnicity encompasses cultural qualities achieved through socialization, such as language and religious practices. Under most circumstances, society will not accept a person changing their race. Although race divides humanity into several distinct subsets, its original and continued impact is to privilege White classified people as a group relative to non-whites through "the exploitation of their bodies, land, and resources, and the denial of [equitable] economic opportunities" (Mills 1997, p. 11).

Racial hierarchies manifest as both *ideologies* that get applied to racially differentiated identities and *practices*, which facilitate, perpetuate, and magnify race-based inequalities (Golash-Boza 2016). As such, our definition of race includes social and ethnic groups who experience *racialization* under its overarching classificatory design (Silverstein 2005).

Although regarded as a totalizing force—meaning that race consistently ranks among the most salient factors in determining people's identities, outlooks, and life chances—a vital dimension of RIM scholarship involves addressing the intersections between race and other socially consequential categories including gender, class, age, sexuality, ability, and religion as they concertedly relate to marketplace thought and practice. Indeed, such intersectional frameworks are essential to grasping lived experiences of race. For instance, sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (2000, p. 47) engages the importance of intersectionality in US consumer society in these terms:

> Patterns of consumer racism that fall more heavily on Black women affect the purchasing power of their income. Because African American women usually are responsible for families, they do much of the shopping for housing, food, clothing, health care, transportation, recreation, and other consumer goods. Consumer racism in all of these areas means that Black women's depressed incomes simply do not have the same purchasing power as those of White men or women.

On the other hand, we understand markets to be socially constructed fields of social interaction and systems/networks of exchange featuring a wide range of valued assets and resources. We often think of markets in economic terms and tend to characterize them as involving exchanges of commerce and money. Marketplace, in our formulation, includes sites of cultural interchange, exchanges of service, as well as brokering in political power, ideology, and persuasion. Accordingly, marketplaces are envisioned as broad and inclusive formulations that incorporate arenas of retail, finance, housing, health care, politics, education, advertising, employment, media, religion, and the like.

In forwarding RIM and its goal of inclusive, fair, and just marketplaces, our objective is not to promote some sort of "black capitalism" as one scholar may have erroneously believed (Micheals 2018); nor do we have a visceral hatred of markets. We do not conceptualize markets as antisocial enclaves or as mere synonyms of capitalism and neoliberalism. On the contrary, as many scholars have demonstrated, markets play a critical role in the social life of any modern society and are meaningfully connected to ways of

expressing love and care (Bandelj et al. 2017; Graeber 2004; Zelizer 2005). As such, they are valued mechanisms of social integration, coordination, and distribution (Ferguson 2015). To paraphrase anthropologist James Ferguson (2015, p. 128), our aim is not necessarily to replace markets with something else (racism also holds a key place in the development of welfare states, see Bhambra and Holmwood 2018) but to use them to do socially useful things that would be impossible to do without them.

Having outlined RIM's conceptions of *race* and *marketplace*, a handful of other concepts, appearing throughout the volume, also warrant preliminary definitions[4]:

- *Capitalism*: An economic system that centers on the private ownership of resources. In a capitalist society, the means of trade are primarily owned and controlled by private entities, rather than cooperatively or by the state. Typically, the process of generating goods and/or providing services produces significant tension between the private owners' desire to maximize monetary profits, steward the environment, and support social welfare.
- *Colonialism*: The extension of political and economic control, typically by European powers (colonial states), over new territories and their inhabitants via the procurement of lands, exploitation of ecological resources, racialization of native peoples, and imposition of sovereign authority through commissioned (such as colonial officials and military) and non-commissioned (such as missionaries, traders, and settlers) agents of the colonial state.
- *Commodification*: The process or act of transforming a person or thing (tangible or intangible) into a commodity—that is, an object intended for trade.
- *Dialectical*: The dynamic, interconnected, and often contradictory relationship between social structures, cultural practices, and each individual's ability to act independently.
- *Discrimination*: Unjust treatment of individuals or categories of people, generally, as a result of conscious or implicit bias associated with one or more identity coordinates, such as race, gender, age, sexuality, and social class. Discrimination can be experienced at the interpersonal level as well as through systems, structures, and institutions.
- *Identification*: The process whereby individuals recognize themselves (self-identification) and/or are recognized by others as belonging to collectively identified social group (such as race, gender, sexuality, religion). Such recognitions typically involve some ascription to (in the case of self-identifications) or expectation of adherence to the norms associated with the collective group. We emphasize *processes-of-identification* ahead of

any notion of set *identity*, as the former draws attention to the fact that what we consider "identities" are, in everyday practice, fluid, negotiated, and materialize through social interaction.

- *Ideologies*: Tacit (taken for granted) perceptions of the world and how it works, which advance the interests of particular groups, justifying and normalizing their position within the existing social structure.
- *Legitimation*: The manner with which a person, place, or thing gains justification and normalcy by their/its perceived or actual association with the values and norms upheld by a given society.
- *Marketization*: The process of transforming a public-sector enterprise or communal aspect of society (such as air or water) into one that is privately operated, controlled, and sold for consumption. This process typically requires making changes to the legal structure of the enterprise itself and/or the environment where it operates.
- *Neoliberalism*: An economic ideology that advocates for free-market enterprise. Rather than perceiving the government as a provider of public welfare, the state's primary function is to promote markets and foster competition, mainly through cutting or completely removing business-related regulations, restrictions, and oversight, and enacting pro-business trade practices, such as developing low or no taxation trade zones—think North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
- *Racialization*: The process or act of designating a social group and/or their cultural practices to a particular racial identity, regardless of how individual members of the social group self-identify, in such a way that this classification is assumed to be essential, inherent, prevailing, and hierarchical relative to other racial groups.
- *Racism*: (1) The ideology and practice of designating social groups according to race (racialization) and recognizing such designations as a basis for hierarchical ranking and differential treatment. (2) A prevailing (global) structuring force that grants privileges and access to resources on the basis of perceived proximity to Whiteness and imposes social and material disadvantages based on proximity to Blackness.

Overview of Chapters

The book is divided into four thematic parts.

The first part features a series of temporal and spatial studies, establishing a context for understanding the interactive nature of race and markets. In Chapter 2, cultural anthropologist Marcel Rosa-Salas uses an historical

analysis of marketing discourses and practices to demonstrate how the nondescript US consumer segment termed the "general market" is inextricably linked to Whiteness. Chapter 3 finds sociologist W. Trevor Jamerson offering historical and conceptual frameworks for understanding the interactions of and intersections between racial difference and digital technologies. Through a critical analysis of currently popular digital platforms, Jamerson illustrates their role maintaining racial hierarchies and contributing to the commodification of racial differences. In Chapter 4, geographer Naya Jones complicates nutritionally focused food activism and policy work by highlighting spatial and relational factors that impact food access for Black youth. Utilizing a case study of a gentrifying neighborhood in Austin, TX, Jones articulates the complexities that must be considered when undertaking food-focused research, policymaking, and activism from a food sovereignty perspective. Part I concludes with marketing and organization researchers Jeaney Yip, Susan Ainsworth, and Miles Tycho Hugh canvassing the Pan-Asian beauty ideal and its nuanced blending of Asian and European aesthetics. Through a contextualized analysis of beauty, race, and the "Pan-Asian look," the authors trouble how Whiteness is perceived in Asian culture.

The second part focuses on the interconnected nature of race and other identity coordinates within specific arenas of exchange. In Chapter 6, marketing scholar Ranam Alkayyali discusses the everyday racialized shopping experiences of veiled Muslim women in France. Through a series of in-depth interviews with Muslim women who wear headscarves, Alkayyali shows how veiled consumers experience and cope with intersectional oppression in French retail settings. The chapter that follows, written by digital studies researcher Francesca Sobande, illuminates how race, gender, and sexuality are intimately interconnected in the contemporary marketplace of interracial couple video blogging (vloggers). Responding to the current fashionableness of these self-produced vlogs, Sobande demonstrates how they uphold remarkably conservative notions of colorism and heteronormative couplepdom. In Chapter 8, interdisciplinary scholar Komal Dhillon-Jamerson investigates the intersection of race, gender, and class through one of life's most enduring rites of passage: matrimony. Focusing on matrimonial ads in India, Dhillon-Jamerson examines the role of colorism in relation to social class and caste during the process of matchmaking, thus demonstrating the intersectional ways in which the lives of women are impacted. In the final chapter of Part II, marketing and advertising scholar Jess Vega-Centeno explores the intersections of race, gender, hair, and the marketplace in post-Hurricane Maria Puerto Rico. Through a historized analysis of popular

press articles, Vega-Centeno draws attention to how the silencing of race relations and the power dynamics they encompass on the island are being disrupted as a result of marketplace failures resulting from the monumental storm.

The third part of the book highlights innovative research perspectives and techniques that promise to foster new insights and understandings of the relationship between race and markets. It begins with sociologist Cassi Pittman Claytor's chapter which calls attention to the dearth of research related to Black consumers in leading marketing journals and proposes a detailed framework for enhancing the depth of race-related consumption research. Drawing on research emerging from sociology, Pittman Claytor provides specific suggestions for the development of a more expansive consumption research agenda that focuses on Black consumers and their marketplace experiences. In Chapter 11, marketing researcher Vanessa Perry illustrates how issues of race and racism permeate the mortgage lending process. Specifically, Perry emphasizes the value of incorporating the sociological construct of cumulative (dis)advantage when analyzing the impact of race and racism by interrogating the relationship between race, generational wealth, and mortgage credit. Part III closes with information systems scholar Lauren Rhue unsettling the perceived neutrality of crowd-based marketplace technologies. Rhue provides explicit examples of how the logic undergirding crowd-based markets is inherently oppressive to non-white consumers and offers recommendations for addressing these issues.

The final part of the book explores the role of race in specific market domains including arts, beauty, health care, and the development industry. Part IV opens with sociologist Patricia Banks examining how political and aesthetic values shape the consumption behavior of African-American art collectors. Although focused on the market for African-American fine art, this chapter also offers insight on activism in cultural markets more broadly by troubling the assumption that appeals to racial politics alone will mobilize changes in consumer behavior. The subsequent chapter by economist Ramya Vijaya investigates the booming market of skin lightening products in India and Nigeria. Vijaya historicizes the product sector's substantial growth, discusses mobilization against it, and outlines a path forward to more effectively counter the evolving marketing strategies executed by the multinational-led industry. The penultimate chapter finds political scientist Dorothée Prud'homme examining how race serves as a currency in the French healthcare system. Utilizing ethnographic techniques and focusing on health care patients categorized as Roma, Prud'homme demonstrates how France's

promise of equal healthcare access is thwarted through the enactment of new public management policies that encourage healthcare professionals to select and treat patients based on their "medical value," which is intricately tied to their perceived race. The part ends with marketing researcher Sammy Bonsu's essay on the enduring relationship between colonial practices, racism, and development across the African continent. In addition to exposing how racist ideology permeates previous and current forms of development in Africa, Bonsu provides a post-colonial vision of development work on the continent that is rooted in collective well-being and emancipation.

Finally, the volume also includes a foreword and an afterword which provide broader views on the importance of RIM-related research. In the foreword, cultural anthropologist Arlene Dávila situates the historical place of RIM scholarship in academia. In the afterword, journalist and activist Rokhaya Diallo highlights the importance of RIM from a consumer standpoint.

Conclusion

The power of this book is that it directly brings to light the myriad ways race and markets impact each other. Race is not treated as one variable among many that must be controlled, nor are markets limited to places of monetary exchange. Here, the nuances and complexities of race are brought to the fore, and markets are demonstrated as essential to nearly every aspect of our lives. Each chapter illuminates particular ways that race and marketplaces feed on one another, and when taken as a whole a new vision for understanding and transforming the relationship between race and markets emerges. In this vision, multiple disciplines are engaged, commonalities and particularities across geographic regions are integrated, and the intersecting experience of race with other coordinates of one's identity, such as gender, social class, and religion are examined collectively. Indeed, the way forward is through crossing critical boundaries.

Acknowledgements As noted above, the volume has developed from the inaugural RIM research forum which we convened in May–June 2017 at the Kogod School of Business, American University, Washington, DC. We want to (alphabetically) thank the funders of this meeting, namely the American University Kogod Business School, the Association for Consumer Research, the Marketing Science Institute, Rutgers University-Newark, the Université Paris-Dauphine, the University of Texas at Austin.

Notes

1. Regarding students as consumers see Brown (2015) and Vally (2019); monetized sickness see Caldwell (2017), Merz and Williams (2018), and Prud'homme (2019, in this volume Chapter 15); and for-profit prisons see Davis (1998), Petrella and Begley (2013), and Smith (2018).
2. There is a vast body of literature on the sociopolitical construction of racial classifications. See for example, Karen Brodkin's (1998), *How jews became white folks and what that says about race in America*. Newark, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Livio Sansone's (2013), *Blackness without ethnicity: Constructing Race in Brazil*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Paul Schor's (2017), *Counting Americans: How the US census classified the nation*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, and Jean Francois Schaub's (2019), *Race is about politics: Lessons from history*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
3. For examples of mobilizations, see *La Vía Campesina* (discussed in Jones 2019, in this volume Chapter 4), or cultural boycotts and buycotts (discussed in Banks 2019, in this volume Chapter 13) and the "*Dark is beautiful*" campaign (discussed in Vijaya 2019, in this volume Chapter 14).
4. The following explanations are not comprehensive. They should be considered good working definitions, intended to establish common understandings of how terms are conceived of and operationalized throughout the book. We realize that each term can be (and have been) additionally complicated.

References

Bandelj, N., Wherry, F. F., & Zelizer, V. A. (2017). *Money talks: Explaining how money really works*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Banks, P. (2019). Cultural justice and collecting: Challenging the underrecognition of African American artists. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 213–226). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Becker, G. S. (1957). *The economics of discrimination*. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Bell, D. (1992). *Faces at the bottom of the well: The permanence of racism*. New York: Basic Books.

Bhambra, G. K., & Holmwood, J. (2018). Colonialism, postcolonialism and the liberal welfare state. *New Political Economy, 23*(5), 574–587.

Bonilla-Silva, E. (1997). Rethinking racism: Toward a structural interpretation. *American Sociological Review, 62*(3), 465–480.

Brodkin, K. (1998). *How Jews became white folk and what that says about race in America*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Brown, A. (2015). *A good investment? Philanthropy and the marketing of race in an urban public school*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Burton, D. (2009). Reading whiteness in consumer research. *Consumption, Markets & Culture, 12*(2), 171–201.

Caldwell, K. L. (2017). *Health equity in Brazil: Intersections of gender, race, and policy*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

Collins, P. H. (2000). Gender, black feminism, and black political economy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 568*(1), 41–53.

Comaroff, J. L., & Comaroff, J. (2009). *Ethnicity, Inc*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Crockett, D. (2008). Marketing blackness: How advertisers use race to sell products. *Journal of Consumer Culture, 8*(2), 245–268.

Davis, A. (1998). Masked racism: Reflections on the prison industrial complex. *ColorLines*, pp. 54–59. Available at https://www.colorlines.com/articles/masked-racism-reflections-prison-industrial-complex.

Davis, J. F. (2018). Selling whiteness? A critical review of the literature on marketing and racism. *Journal of Marketing Management, 34*(1–2), 134–177.

Ferguson, J. (2015). The social life of cash payments: Money, markets, and the mutualities of poverty. In J. Ferguson (Ed.), *Give a man a fish: Reflections on the new politics of distribution*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Fisher, M., & Taub, A. (2018, April 25). How everyday social media users become real-world extremists. *The New York Times*. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/world/asia/facebook-extremism.html.

Friedman, M. (1962). *Capitalism and freedom*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Golash-Boza, T. (2016). A critical and comprehensive sociological theory of race and racism. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 2*(2), 129–141.

Graeber, D. (2004). *Fragments of an anarchist anthropology*. Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm Press.

Grier, S. A., Thomas, K. D., & Johnson, G. D. (2019). Re-imagining the marketplace: Addressing race in academic marketing research. *Consumption Markets & Culture, 22*(1), 99–100.

Hann, C., & Hart, K. (2009). Introduction: Learning from Polanyi 1. In C. Hann & K. Hart (Eds.), *Market and society: The great transformation today* (pp. 1–16). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Hohle, R. (2012). The color of neoliberalism: The "modern southern businessman" and postwar Alabama's challenge to racial desegregation. *Sociological Forum, 27*(1), 142–162).

Jones, N. (2019). (Re)Visiting the corner store: Black youth, gentrification, and a sense of place. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace*: *Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 55–72). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kelley, R. D. (2017). What did Cedric Robinson mean by racial capitalism? *Boston Review*. Available at http://bostonreview.net/race/robin-d-g-kelley-what-did-cedric-robinson-mean-racial-capitalism.

Kerr, S. P., & Kerr, W. R. (2016). *Immigrant entrepreneurship* (No. w22385). National Bureau of Economic Research. Available https://www.nber.org/papers/w22385.pdf.

Levy, R. S. (2005). *Antisemitism: A historical encyclopedia of prejudice and persecution*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

McClintock, A. (1995). *Imperial leather: Race, gender and sexuality in the colonial contest*. New York: Routledge.

Melamed, J. (2015). Racial capitalism. *Critical Ethnic Studies, 1*(1), 76–85.

Merz, S., & Williams, R. (2018). 'We all have a responsibility to each other': Valuing racialised bodies in the neoliberal bioeconomy. *New Political Economy*, 1–14.

Micheals, W. B. (2018). The political economy of anti-racism. *Nonesite.org*, 23. Available at https://nonsite.org/article/the-political-economy-of-anti-racism.

Mills, C. W. (1997). *The racial contract*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Müller, K., & Schwarz, C. (2018). *Fanning the flames of hate: Social media and hate crime* (CAGE Online Working Paper Series 373). Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE). Available at https://ideas.repec.org/p/cge/wacage/373.html.

Omi, M., & Winant, H. (2015). *Racial formation in the United States*. New York: Routledge.

Petrella, C., & Begley, J. (2013). The color of corporate corrections: The over-representation of people of color in the for-profit corrections industry. *Radical Criminology, 2,* 139–148.

Pittman Claytor, C. (2019). Are black consumers a bellwether for the nation? How research on blacks can foreground our understanding of race in the marketplace. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 153–172). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Polanyi, K. (2001). *The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time* (Vol. 45). Boston, MA: Beacon press.

Posner, R. A. (1987). The efficiency and the efficacy of title VII. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 136*(2), 513–521.

Prud'homme, D. (2019). Race as a currency? Profitability and racialization in French healthcare institutions. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 245–258). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Robinson, C. (2000). *Black Marxism: The making of the black radical tradition*. London: University of North Carolina Press (Original work published in 1983).

Schaub, J. F. (2019). *Race is about politics: Lessons from history*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Schor, P. (2017). *Counting Americans: How the US census classified the nation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Silverstein, P. A. (2005). Immigrant racialization and the new savage slot: Race migration and immigration in the new Europe. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 34,* 363–384.

Smith, C. (2018). 'Authoritarian neoliberalism' and the Australian border-industrial complex. *Competition & Change*. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529418807074.

Sunstein, C. R. (1991). Why markets don't stop discrimination. *Social Philosophy and Policy, 8*(2), 22–37.

Thomas, D. C. (2013). Cedric Robinson and racial capitalism. *African Identities, 11,* 133–147.

Tilley, L., & Shilliam, R. (2018). Raced markets: An introduction. *New Political Economy, 23*(5), 534–543. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2017.1417366.

Vally, S. (2019). The bait-and-swith and echo chamber of school privatization in South Africa. In K. J. Saltman & A. J. Means (Eds.), *The Wiley handbook of global educational reform*. Medford, MA: Wiley.

Vijaya, R. (2019). The new economics of colorism in the skin whitening industry: Case of India and Nigeria. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 227–244). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Williams, J. D., Lee, W. N., & Henderson, G. R. (2008). Diversity issues in consumer psychology. In C. Haugtvedt, P. Herr, & F. Kardes (Eds.), *Handbook of consumer psychology*. New York: Psychology Press.

Zelizer, V. A. (2005). *The purchase of intimacy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Part I

Space and Time

2

Making the Mass White: How Racial Segregation Shaped Consumer Segmentation

Marcel Rosa-Salas

Chapter Overview

- Racial thinking is essential to how American marketing professionals have imagined the "mass" market.
- By creating all-white survey samples, twentieth-century market researchers' knowledge production has mirrored the public and private practices of racial segregation.
- In doing so, market research knowledge linked consumer-citizenship and Whiteness with the societal notion of the "average" American.
- Multicultural marketing has sought to remedy decades of systemic exclusion and discrimination experienced by people of color in the media and communications industry.
- However, multicultural marketing has had no choice but to leave the segregated Whiteness of the mass market intact in order to sustain its existence as a business sector.

M. Rosa-Salas (✉)
New York University, New York, NY, USA
e-mail: mas1480@nyu.edu

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_2

Introduction

"There is no Caucasian market," recently remarked Mark Turner, chief strategy officer at the American advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi (Maheshwari 2017). The prevailing wisdom in many US marketing circles is that Whites do not comprise a discrete consumer segment. However, just because Whiteness is not explicitly named in marketing discourse does not mean that advertisers have never targeted a White market. Over the course of the twentieth century, Whiteness has been rendered synonymous with the marketing industry's unmarked category for the average American consumer. First known in industry terminology as the "mass market" but currently termed the "general market," the historical development of these concepts is inextricably tied to the long-standing practice of racial segregation in the USA. By centering Whiteness and separating people of color as distinct from the mass, American market research studies and segmentation practices serve as key sites of knowledge production through which the politics of racial segregation are both mirrored and maintained.

This chapter offers a historical survey and analysis of the racialized invention of the mass market in American marketing discourse. The first section establishes the foundational role that racism has played in American marketing practices, and describes how racial segregation as legal doctrine shaped the social relations of mass consumer society at the turn of the twentieth century. The second section illustrates how early twentieth-century marketing research efforts on the mass market were part of broader social scientific preoccupations with measuring the "average" American. In their survey research design, marketing researchers excluded African-Americans (and other non-white populations) and replicated residential racial segregation, which in turn set the foundation for the rise of race-based market segmentation that remains today. The final section illustrates how the rise of multicultural marketing in the latter part of the twentieth century was not able to integrate the mass market concept in industry discourse but reinforced its segregated status, further normalizing Whiteness as interchangeable with American national identity.

Marketing Racial Capitalism

As one of the prime engines powering consumer capitalism, the marketing industry has long been ensnared in crafting racial ideas about American identity. To be sure, some of the earliest American advertisements were

targeted toward a White planter class seeking to purchase or capture enslaved human beings (Foxworth 1994). The USA's first[1] full-service advertising agency—N. W. Ayer and Son—was founded in Philadelphia in 1869, just three years after the Thirteenth Amendment nominally abolished slavery. Assuming an audience of Whites only, early advertisers embraced a visual culture shaped by racism, with brands tapping into denigrating racial stereotypes to sell everything from syrup to soap (McClintock 1995; Fu 2014). The commodification of racism was starkly evident in the marketing of one of the very first mass-distributed American goods, Aunt Jemima Pancake Mix. The brand's early advertising processed and packaged White nostalgia for a slaveholding past into every facet of the product's promotion (Manring 1998). Nineteenth-century era trading cards for goods like cigarettes and laundry detergent frequently promoted stereotypical imagery of African-Americans, Chinese, Mexican, and Native American peoples as mocked, exotic curiosities (O'Barr 1994). From blackface minstrelsy (Lott 1995) to the World's Fair (Rydell 1984), the bedrock of the American mass "media world" (Ginsburg et al. 2002) is predicated on the commodification and consumption of race and racism.

In addition to the abolition of slavery, among one of the most pivotal societal transformations to occur in the USA at the turn of the twentieth century was the emergence of the mass consumption economy. With the development of industrial manufacturing and cross-country transportation networks, along with innovations in media production and distribution, the seeds were sown for product promotion on a national scale. Keen on sustaining demand, product manufacturers and media companies soon came to view the American public first and foremost as a nation of consumers (Ewen 2001). Mass media and flow production connected disparate Americans in an "imagined community" (Anderson 1983). New national brands invoked patriotic themes to socialize Americans to connect consumption with modernity (Marchand 1985). "Advertisers sought to create national tastes, not only because potential profits were vast, but also because they were fascinated by the prospect of a national American culture characterized by consumption" (McGovern 2006, p. 106). In the minds of business leaders, a unified national market was the holy grail to unparalleled growth and prosperity.

However, the late nineteenth-century emergence of mass consumer culture threatened to blur long-standing distinctions between social classes and races (Hale 1998). The question of how government and business interests within a racial capitalist system were to adapt to these societal shifts became all the more critical. Racial capitalism, notably theorized by political theorist

Cedric Robinson (1983), refers to the inherent linkages between racial classification and capital accumulation (see also Kelley 2017; Leong 2013). Robinson argues that the rise of capitalism did not create racism per se, but that racialism existed within Europe during feudal period. "Capitalism is racial capitalism," further explains theorist Jodi Melamed, because "capital can only be capital when it is accumulating, and it can only accumulate by producing and moving through relations of severe inequality among human groups" (2015, p. 77). Racial capitalism has shaped social relations by simultaneously "partitioning" (or separating) as well as connecting people and geographies in order to buttress capital accrual (Wang 2018). Indeed, branding—in both a literal and figurative sense—was a key to the construction of racial capitalism in the Americas. The violent act of burning an enslaved person's skin with the initials of their owner marked and marketed the racialized Black body as a commodity, a key tool used to enforce the social, cultural, and political divisions between the free and the enslaved (Browne 2015).

Wholly barring the formerly enslaved Black population from participating in the mass market would counter the growth imperatives of capital accumulation. Racial segregation, as the practice of social differentiation and exclusion, became the political tool through which racial division was maintained in a mass consumption society (Wilson 2005). The US Supreme Court's 1896 *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision, which legally upheld the constitutionality of racially separate public accommodations, was a landmark moment for the organization of social relations in American society. Homer Adolph Plessy, a free mixed-race man from Louisiana, sought to challenge an existing state law called the Separate Car Act, which required Black and White riders to sit in separate coaches. Plessy, who was White passing, attempted to board a "whites only" train car to challenge the arbitrariness of enforcing the law. But after being discovered and refusing to relocate to the Black coach, Plessy was arrested. Plessy argued that his removal from the White coach was a violation of the 14th Amendment, which states that all American citizens are entitled to equal protection under the law. The Supreme Court refuted Plessy's claim and concurred that Louisiana could enforce the Separate Car Act, so long as it provided equal accommodations for both races. By supporting separate but equal doctrine, the highest court of the land decreed that political equality was not compromised by the practice of racial segregation.

The *Plessy* decision set the foundation for a racially segregated mass consumption economy into the twentieth century by "provid[ing] for the right amount of inclusion and exclusion in the commodity circuit, reducing just enough of the racial obstacle to expand the sphere of consumption to

include the former slaves" (Wilson 2005, p. 587). This ideology held that Black Americans could participate in consumer society but had to do so on the terms of White elites—in separate locales and often subjected to goods and services of diminished quality. Segregation inscribed racial distinction onto consumption spaces, which in turn produced structural racial hierarchies between White and Black customers (Lipsitz 2006).

The logic supporting segregation shaped the spatial experience of mass consumption and informed how twentieth-century marketing and advertising professionals imagined the mass market as a national consumer audience. While on the surface race-neutral and nationally representative, the mass market was anything but those things. Influenced by the widespread practice of racial segregation in housing, commerce, and recreation, early mass marketing efforts were a form of racially targeted advertising to White Americans of economic means.

Commercially Constructing Whiteness

How the Mass Was Made

The mass market was made as the result of several converging social, political, and economic shifts at the turn of the twentieth century. With the manufacturing output of American businesses increasing at a quick and steady pace, product manufacturers had to develop strategies to "mass produce customers in the same way that factories mass produced the merchandise" (Turow 1997, p. 21; see also Strasser 1989). Market research on the masses conducted via social surveying of "nationally representative" samples became an important endeavor for marketers seeking to anticipate and drive sales. Studies of human behavior in disciplines ranging from applied behavioral psychology to sociology fielded questionnaires to gain generalizable insight into national opinion. In 1915, advertising agencies like J. Walter Thompson began conducting their own proprietary research on the mass market. By the 1930s, investigations into the mass market became an institutionalized component of American marketing industry activities (Webster and Phalen 1997).

By making the nation knowable to itself through facts and figures, the drive to produce statistical thinking on mass society also came coupled with social critics' fascination with understanding lifeways of the "averaged American" (Igo 2007). Increased urbanization, immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, and domestic migration within the USA unsettled

long-standing cultural ideas about American identity. Mass consumption offered a viable means of generating national cohesion. As 1920s advertising executive Albert Lasker put it, "We are making a homogenous people out of a nation of immigrants" (Turow 1997, p. 23). In the process, the mass market became representative of the nation as a whole. But if a homogenous population is defined by its shared attributes, what attributes characterized the American mass market?

"There are in fact no masses; there are only ways of seeing people as masses," remarked cultural studies theorist Raymond Williams (1963, p. 289). In other words, the creation of the mass audience was the product of a specific way of imagining American society. The mass market, like any media audience, is first and foremost a social construction—a commodity invented by and through the knowledge practices of media industry professionals invested in understanding people *as* consumers (Smythe 1981; Ang 1991). Mass marketing imagined a public characterized by a certain quality of sameness. But as anthropologist Mary Douglas (1986) notes, "sameness is not a quality that can be recognized in things themselves; it is conferred… To recognize a class of things is to polarize and to exclude. It involves drawing boundaries" (pp. 59–60). Despite the rhetoric of freedom and democracy woven into twentieth-century marketing discourse and imagery, the early project of making the mass a market was replete with exclusionary practices. Socioeconomic status and, in particular, above-average income were long deemed a necessary qualifier for mass market consumer-citizenship (Marchand 1985). Race was another defining feature of how the mass was made. As historian Charles Zunz notes, "[if] mass consumption did not bring about the bland middlebrow homogenizing culture its critics saw invading American society, its claim of making society more democratic was unwarranted when it came to minorities who suffered from discrimination. Marketing strategies left inequality, segregation and prejudices largely untouched" (1998, p. 111).

Many early twentieth-century mass market research explicitly reproduced racial segregation by excluding populations of color from survey samples altogether. The Curtis Publishing Company, which pioneered one of the first market research divisions in modern American business, excluded Black people from their market studies. Echoing the eugenicist racial science of the day, the market researchers relayed to their advertising clients that "its readers were not 'Negroes' or members of other 'subnormal consumer groups'" (Ward 2009, p. 210). A late 1920s advertising campaign for Johnson and Johnson baby powder, targeting "young, White, upwardly mobile middle-class Americans and the millions who wanted to be like

them," was based on survey research that intentionally excluded Black communities from its population count (Zunz 1998, p. 60). It was clear that the industry's earliest configurations of the mass market relied upon positioning White middle-class Americans as the aspirational identity norm from which African-Americans were deemed inherently unlike and inferior. Nevertheless, the *Middletown* studies were perhaps the most foundational social survey to inform the making of the US mass market (1929, 1937).

The Average American

Conducted by a husband and wife research team by the name of Robert and Helen Lynd, the *Middletown* studies aimed to be a sociological investigation of everyday life in a "typical" American town. Their research culminated into two book-length longitudinal studies about how residents of Muncie, Indiana, maintained their traditions amidst the shifting tides of twentieth-century industrial capitalism.

As soon as the Lynds' first study was published, Muncie residents became almost immediately synonymous with the mass market that advertisers coveted. Market researchers, publishers, and advertising professionals from across the nation descended upon the town to get their finger on the pulse of the average American consumer's mind-set. *Life* Magazine sent photographer Margaret Bourke-White to document "the average 1937 American as he really is." Representatives from the monthly women's publication *McCall*'s journeyed to Muncie to investigate how "average" residents used products. Advertising historian Charles McGovern (2006) observes that Muncie "proved so appealing as a 'typical' American community for business spokesmen because the nation as a whole was much more complex. The portrait of Muncie fulfilled business leaders' fantasies of an America without class conflict or consciousness" (p. 273). Marketers' focus on searching for the American "middle"—geographically, socioeconomically, and culturally—reflected a desire to both simplify and commodify national identity into attributes that could be leveraged for driving consumption.

Middletown's seeming ordinariness, however, was also reflective of already-existing residential segregation in Muncie. When designing their survey sample, the Lynd's intentionally chose to exclude Muncie's African-American population from the research because they were deemed "in social scientific terms, 'complicating factors,' not constitutive components of the typical community" (Igo 2007, p. 57). By cordoning off Black Americans as deviant from the average in their survey design, the Lynd's forwarded

a vision of mass society created by and through the spatial topography of racial segregation. According to historian Richard Wightman Fox, Robert Lynd's choice to conduct the study in Muncie was due to "the product of his belief that the hope for social progress lay uniquely in the spirit and vision of the 'substantial type' of American, the native-born Protestant of the middle west" (1983, p. 119). In keeping with the assimilation discourse of the age, Lynd theorized, rather nostalgically, that White Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture was the most truly representative of the nation's core identity (Gordon 1964; Elias and Feagin 2016). At a time where racial pseudo-science wielded statistics to criminalize Blackness (Muhammad 2010; Zuberi 2001), mass marketing research could conversely be viewed as a form of racial statistics used to valorize Whiteness as wholesome and quintessentially American.

Segregated Consumer-Citizenship

Some might argue that American market research represented the mass as racially White for business efficiency reasons and that since Whites represented the nation's demographic majority, they would be representative of the average consumer. But that reasoning is only part of the story. Mass marketing's standard Whiteness was actually a continuation of centuries-old racial ideas. Scholars of race have shown how over the course of American history Whiteness is socially constructed both as a requirement and a standard for citizenship and national belonging (Du Bois 1899; Frankenburg 1993; Haney Lopez 2006; Harris 1993). Indeed, the idea of Whiteness as the norm is not self-evidently objective but is a construction of ongoing social practices and forms of knowledge produced by influential institutions (Foucault 1979).

Certainly, what it means to be "white" has changed over time and continues to according to geographic and social context (Hartigan 2005; Garner 2007). Over the years, the boundaries of membership into American Whiteness in particular have been fiercely guarded, retracting to deny membership for people of Japanese and South Asian descent, while expanding to incorporate groups like the Irish, Jewish, and Italians who were once deemed not *quite* White (Painter 2010; Roediger 1991; Brodkin 1999; Ignatiev 2009). Nevertheless, through concerted political and cultural practices, White racial identity is configured as the unmarked universalized norm from which racial difference—and deviance—is defined and measured in the USA (Lorde 1984; Wynter 1995; Dyer 1997). Twentieth-century commercial knowledge production was another "technique" (Hansen and Netherland 2017),

or set of social practices, used to perpetuate racial hierarchy by ideologically linking together White racial identity and the notion of generic, standard Americanness.

Over the decades, US state policies further perpetuated the segregated Whiteness of the mass market well into the twentieth century. As historian Lizabeth Cohen explains, the post-World War II solidification of the USA as a "consumer's republic" was set into motion by way of joint public and private interests. Increasing suburban homeownership was one of the key initiatives created to drive the growth of the postwar economy. Armed with benefits from the Veterans Administration's (VA) low-interest government mortgage programs, as well as the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) subsidies to private housing developers, former soldiers returned home in the prime position to purchase their own homes. Expansions in access to consumer credit also made it possible for homeowners to outfit their residences with new goods. The single-family suburban household became the political, economic, and cultural basis of the middle-class American lifestyle. For mid-twentieth-century advertisers, this population *was* the mass market target.

But the state initiatives that supported suburbanization as the bedrock of a mass consumption society were also shaped by racial segregation (Coates 2014; Rothstein 2017). Both the FHA and VA "adopted and elaborated the discriminatory practice of private lenders by considering the presence of racial groups other than whites the greatest obstacle to assigning neighborhoods a favorable rating; a stable community promising minimal defaults on mortgage loans was assumed to be a segregated, white one" (Cohen 2003, p. 214). A "stable community," more often than not, was defined as racially homogenous. As a result of these systemic redlining practices, Whiteness was deemed a financial and cultural value, and in many places a requirement, for suburban home ownership, whereas Blackness was viewed as a detriment and risk to property value (Perry 2019, in this volume Chapter 11).

The Rise of the Black Consumer Market

Racial segregation in residential and commercial life indelibly influenced the business infrastructure of mass media more broadly. Rampant anti-blackness in the mass marketing and communications industry provided little to no opportunities for African-Americans to be part of the white-dominated field. Because African-Americans were simultaneously rendered invisible and denigrated in mass media, separate newspapers, radio stations, and advertising

firms arose by a necessity to meet Black consumers' media needs (Weems 1998). As a result, "between the 1920s and mid-1940s, efforts by White and Black salespeople representing black-oriented media were instrumental in establishing the idea of a legitimate black consumer market" as distinct from the mass market (Foster Davis 2013, p. 474).

For example, the white-owned William B. Ziff company, which was an ad sales network for Black newspapers, published a report for potential advertisers in 1932 entitled *The Negro Market*. The pamphlet showcased "blacks as a separate and distinct market…[and] illustrated the separate banks, churches, fraternal organizations and newspapers that blacks maintained" (Chambers 2008, p. 32). The migration of millions of Black Americans from the south to segregated northern urban centers led to some mass advertisers taking notice of a distinct Black consumer audience. By the 1930s, brands like Chevrolet, Pepsi, and Camel cigarettes started to place mass advertisements in the pages of the Black press and over the Black radio airwaves (Capparell 2007; Foster Davis 2013). Entrepreneurs like David Sullivan in New York City and Vince Cullers in Chicago started advertising firms specializing in reaching the Black consumer market. By the 1950s, White advertising agencies, notably BBDO and Young and Rubicam, established separate "special markets" divisions specialized in producing marketing campaigns for Black consumers.

John H. Johnson, founder and publisher of the African-American-targeted *Ebony* and *Jet* magazines, also played a role in commodifying the Black market's racial distinctiveness from the White mass. Beginning in the mid-1940s, his writings about Black consumer preferences showcased to major advertisers that there existed a vibrant but woefully overlooked Black middle-class consumer audience. In a 1964 opinion piece in the trade magazine *Advertising Age* Johnson declared, "The Negro market… is not a special market within the White market-- it is, on the contrary, a general market defined, precisely by its exclusion from the white market" (Cohen 2003, p. 325). As communication studies scholar Oscar Gandy (2000) importantly demonstrates, "the consequences that flow within a media system governed by a capitalist logic is that not all audiences are valued equally in the market" (p. 6). Given the devaluation of Black life in American society as a whole, Black media and marketing professionals had to contend with systemic exclusion in the media industry by presenting to advertisers a narrative about Black audiences as essentially different, and valuable because of it.

The social realities of racial segregation across class lines set the foundation for the race-based consumer segmentation model that crystallized in the 1960s. Yet as media outlets and marketing firms arose to directly address African-American, and then later Latinx and Asian consumers, the business

which became known as multicultural marketing left the segregated White space of the mass market firmly intact.

Multicultural Marketing and the Maintenance of the "Invisible Center"

Just as the battle over the constitutionality of racial segregation waged over the 1950s and 1960s, consumer segmentation exploded as American marketers' latest technique for capital accumulation. Product manufacturers, retailers, and media companies sought alternatives to sustain demand outside of standard broad appeals. In addition, the 1960s and 1970s civil rights and desegregation movements, coupled with shifts in the nation's demographic makeup, resulted in new racial discourses about American identity. Immigration waves of Latinx and Asian populations into the USA from the 1960s through to the 1990s transformed the complexion of the country. With the dawning of multiculturalism ideology, what became increasingly important to many people of color was asserting that "being American was a thousand narratives, not just one" (Chang 2014, p. 110). The presumed Whiteness of American identity was being contested.

Technological shifts in mass media transformed in tandem with demographic change. The arrival of cable television in the 1970s transformed the nation's media infrastructure by offering countless more channels for brands to send out targeted messages to specific slices of the population. Multiculturalism rhetoric and new media together disrupted business as usual. A new business sector known as multicultural marketing was thus well suited to thrive in this new commercial culture (Halter 2000). This industry of advertising firms, media agencies, and consultancies were all grounded in the theory that African-American, Latinx, and Asian peoples' racial and ethnic identities were a defining factor in how they behave and should be marketed to by brands. African-American ad agencies had their "golden age" on the heels of the civil rights movement (Chambers 2008). These firms leveraged the elevated economic standing of some African-Americans, coupled with the expressions of racial pride from by younger generations, to sell their expertise to brand clients. "Hispanic" ad agencies came to the fore by the 1960s, as Puerto Rican and Cuban immigration to urban centers created new opportunities for Latin American elites to revive their advertising and public relation careers in the USA, and target a growing market of Spanish speakers with in-language marketing messages (Dávila 2012; Mora 2014). Advertising agencies targeting Asian consumers in the USA emerged in the

1990s, driven by immigration waves, as well as by a telecom industry keen on cashing in on the long-distance phone call market (Shankar 2015).

Yet, multiculturalism discourse that swept the nation ironically coexists in tension with the persistence of racial segregation in American residential and social life. According to a recent National Fair Housing Alliance report, nearly half of all African-Americans and Latinx people residing in the USA still live in communities without White neighbors, resulting in most White Americans living in neighborhoods that over 80% White (Williams 2018). Despite governmental as well as NAACP investigations of workplace racial discrimination in the marketing and advertising industry, the industry remains an overwhelmingly white-dominated enterprise (Bendick and Egan 2009). In this social context, multicultural marketing has not been capable of fully integrating nor disrupting the standard Whiteness of the mass market imaginary, but rather has had to reinforce its separateness in order to exist as a business.

Cultural studies theorist Stuart Hall (2000) contends that commercial multiculturalism erroneously equates marketplace recognition with social justice, and fails to attend to the most pressing issue, which is "the redistribution of power and resources. Corporate multiculturalism (public or private) seeks to 'manage' minority cultural differences in the interests of the center" (p. 210). That "center," formerly known as the mass market, has since been rebranded with a new name: the "general market." Marketing executives David Burgos and Ola Mobalde (2011) explain, "'general market'… has become a shorthand for any communications not specifically targeted to ethnic consumers…Once multicultural marketing was an established cottage industry, a new term was needed for marketing geared toward everyone else. Hence the emergence of 'general market = white' code used today." Hispanic media executive Chiqui Cartagena (2013) adds that in US marketing practice, "the reality is that the so-called 'general market' really became a euphemism for 'whites.'" Like the mass market of decades prior, the general market remains the US marketing industry's imagined "invisible center," a representation of the American national identity norm that at once "claims universality without ever defining itself" but at the same time remains tacitly understood as White (Ferguson 1990, p. 11).

A recent study from the multicultural market research firm Collage Group (2018) encourages potential brand clients to craft racially targeted marketing based on "clear areas of 'cultural divergence' where your target consumer differs from general market." A corresponding visualization of this strategy labels the general market as being "non-Hispanic White." This slippage between a racially unmarked general market and White Americans remains ordinary within marketing discourse. As such, the US marketing and

communications business infrastructure has grown to support the political economy of the multicultural/general market consumer segregation strategy. Advertisers doing business in the USA can contract advertising agencies, as well as buy and plan media, for either the general market audience or multicultural audiences. Brand's marketing budgets are often segmented accordingly. As a result, racial segregation and ethnic consumer segregation are commonplace to the US marketing industry knowledge infrastructure of consumer research and audience measurement. Anthropological studies provide further insight into how the segregated audience imaginary between the multicultural market and the general market manifests in current industry practices. Arlene Dávila's (2012) ethnographic research with US Hispanic marketing professionals illustrates how an Anglo/Latinx racial dichotomy forms the basis from which they define, evaluate, and sell their business expertise to corporate brands (see also Shankar 2015).

The commercialization of multiculturalism in the American marketing industry has required multicultural marketers to commodify racial difference from Whiteness as the foregrounding premise of their industry. But as a result, this industry has had to be complicit in the social relations of racial capitalism that rest on segregation and the normative power of Whiteness in American society. That such practices have become so ingrained into consumer segmentation and research practices is a testament to the vast scope of racial segregation as a cultural and political reality in contemporary American life.

Conclusion

Mass marketing was not made White by happenstance, but by the habitual and concerted knowledge production practices of marketing professionals, whose social theories have been influenced by the ongoing existence of racial segregation in countless domains of American society. The practice of consumer segmentation and the history of racial segregation are fundamentally intertwined, and as a result, the free market has never really been free. In a nation where consumer-citizenship and social belonging have been so closely tethered to Whiteness and anti-blackness, marketing industry practices provide a lens through which racial ideas about American identity are constantly being created, bought, and sold. Yet, at a time currently where the US Census has projected that people of color are collectively set to become the nation's demographic majority by 2042 (Frey 2014), the general market's assumed Whiteness has begun to be called into question. A new and highly contested category has emerged known as "total market," which

claims to racially integrate marketing communications by taking consumer insights about people of color into account from the very inception of a marketing strategy (Bowman 2015). Such shifts are also animated by marketing's seismic technological transformation in the age of big data, which promises to forever fragment the mass by targeting consumers with personalized advertising based on analysis of one's online behavior alone. The question of how racial consumer segmentation will be remade in a digital advertising ecosystem where White Americans are soon to be the demographic minority is yet to be seen (Jamerson 2019, in this volume Chapter 3). But what is certain is that race remains key to how American life is structured offline. The institutional memory of racial segregation in American marketing practices might not be so swiftly done away with.

Note

1. Historians have agreed that while the USA' first advertising agent was a man by the name of Volney Palmer, who started selling advertising space for Philadelphia newspapers in 1843, Francis W. Ayer of N. W. Ayer and Son is recognized as establishing the business norms of the American advertising business (Fox 1997).

Further Reading

Chang, J. (2014). *Who we be: A cultural history of race in post-civil rights America*. New York: Picador.

Dávila, A. (2012). *Latinos Inc.: The marketing and making of a people*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Flower, I., & Rosa-Salas, M. (2017). Say my name: Nameplate jewelry and the politics of taste. *QED: A Journal in GLBTQ Worldmaking, 4*(3), 109–126.

Roth, L. (2009). Looking for Shirley, the ultimate norm. *Canadian Journal of Communication, 34*(1), 111–136.

References

Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. New York: Verso.

Ang, I. (1991). *Desperately seeking the audience*. London: Routledge.

Bendick, M., & Egan, M. L. (2009). *Research perspectives on race and employment in the advertising industry*. Retrieved from http://bendickegan.com/pdf/2009/Bendick%20Egan%20Advertising%20Industry%20Report%20Jan%2009.pdf.

Bowman, J. (2015). *Reframe the brand: The total market approach to reaching the new majority*. Hoboken: Wiley.

Brodkin, K. (1999). *How Jews became white folks and what it says about race in America*. Rutgers: Rutgers University Press.

Browne, S. (2015). *Dark matters: On the surveillance of blackness*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Burgos, D., & Mobalade, O. (2011). *Marketing to the new majority: Strategies for a diverse world* [Kindle Version]. Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved from Amazon.com.

Capparell, S. (2007). *The real Pepsi challenge: The inspirational story of breaking the color barrier in American business*. New York: Wall Street Journal Books.

Cartagena, C. (2013). Excerpt from Chapter 8 of *Latino Boom II*. Retrieved from http://www.latinoboom.com/total-market-strategy/.

Chambers, J. (2008). *Madison avenue and the color line: African Americans in the advertising industry*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Chang, J. (2014). *Who we be: The colorization of America*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Coates, T. (2014). The case for reparations. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/.

Cohen, L. (2003). *A consumers' republic: The politics of mass consumption in postwar America*. New York: Vintage.

Collage Group. (2018). *Consumer journey: Understanding the points of divergence in multicultural consumers' path purchase*. Retrieved from https://collagegroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Collage-Consumer-Journey-Approach-Overview-Sept-2018.pdf.

Dávila, A. (2012). *Latinos Inc.: The marketing and making of a people*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Douglas, M. (1986). *How institutions think*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Du Bois, W. E. B. (1899). *The Philadelphia Negro*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Dyer, R. (1997). *White*. London: Routledge.

Elias, S., & Feagin, J. R. (2016). *Racial theories in social science: A systemic racism critique*. New York: Routledge.

Ewen, S. (2001). *Captains of consciousness: Advertising and the social roots of the consumer culture*. New York: Basic Books.

Ferguson, R. (1990). Introduction: Invisible center. In R. Ferguson, M. Gever, T. T. Minh-ha, & C. West (Eds.), *Out there: Marginalization and contemporary cultures* (pp. 9–19). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Foster Davis, J. (2013). Realizing marketplace opportunity: How research on the black consumer market influenced mainstream marketers, 1920–1970. *Journal of Historical Research in Marketing, 5*(4), 471–493.

Foucault, M. (1979). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. New York: Vintage.

Fox, R. W. (1983). Epitaph for middletown: Robert S. Lynd and the analysis of consumer culture. In R. W. Fox & T. J. Lears (Eds.), *The culture of consumption: Critical essays in American history 1880–1980*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Fox, S. (1997). *The mirror makers: A history of American advertising and its creators*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Foxworth, M. K. (1994). *Aunt Jemima, Uncle Ben, and Rastus: Blacks in advertising, yesterday, today, and tomorrow*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Frankenburg, R. (1993). *White women, race matters*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Frey, W. (2014). *Diversity explosion: How new racial demographics are remaking America*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Fu, L. C. L. (2014). *Advertising and race: Global phenomenon, historical challenges, and visual strategies*. New York: Peter Lang.

Gandy, O. (2000, May). *Audience construction: Race, ethnicity, and segmentation in popular media*. Presented at 50th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association.

Garner, S. (2007). *Whiteness: An introduction*. New York: Routledge.

Ginsburg, F., Abu-Lughod, L., & Larkin, B. (Eds.). (2002). Introduction. In *Media worlds: Anthropology on new terrain*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Gordon, M. (1964). *Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion and national origins*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hale, G. E. (1998). *Making whiteness: The culture of segregation in the South, 1890–1940*. New York: Vintage.

Hall, S. (2000). Conclusion: The multi-cultural question. In *Un/settled multiculturalisms: Diasporas, entanglements, transruptions*. New York: Zed Books.

Halter, M. (2000). *Shopping for identity: The marketing of ethnicity*. New York: Random House.

Haney Lopez, I. (2006). *White by law: The legal construction of race*. New York: New York University Press.

Hansen, H., & Netherland, J. (2017). White opioids: Pharmaceutical race and the war on drugs that wasn't. *Biosocieties, 12*(2), 217–238.

Harris, C. (1993). Whiteness as property. In *Critical race theory: The key writings that formed the movement*. New York: The New Press.

Hartigan, J. (2005). *Odd tribes: Toward a cultural analysis of white people*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Ignatiev, N. (2009). *How the Irish became white*. New York: Routledge.

Igo, S. (2007). *The averaged American: Surveys, citizens, and the making of a mass public*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Jamerson, T. (2019). Race, markets, and digital technologies: Historical and conceptual frameworks. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, &

S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 39–54). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kelly, R. D. G. (2017, January 12). What did Cedric Robinson mean by racial capitalism? *Boston Review*. Retrieved from http://bostonreview.net/race/robin-d-g-kelley-what-did-cedric-robinson-mean-racial-capitalism.
Leong, N. (2013). Racial capitalism. *Harvard Law Review, 126,* 2152.
Lorde, A. (1984). Age, race, class and sex: Women redefining difference. In *Sister outsider: Essays and speeches*. Freedom, CA: Crossing Press.
Lott, E. (1995). *Love and theft: Blackface minstrelsy and the American working class*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lipsitz, G. (2006). *The possessive investment in whiteness: How white people profit from identity politics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Lynd, R., & Lynd, H. M. (1929). *Middletown: A study in modern American culture*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Lynd, R., & Lynd, H. M. (1937). *Middletown in transition: A study in cultural conflicts*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Maheshwari, S. (2017, October 12). Different ads, different ethnicities, same car. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/12/business/media/toyota-camry-ads-different-ethnicities.html?_r=0.
Manring, M. (1998). *Slave in a box: The strange career of Aunt Jemima*. Richmond: University of Virginia Press.
Marchand, R. (1985). *Advertising the American dream: Making way for modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
McClintock, A. (1995). Soft-soaping empire: Commodity racism and imperial advertising. In *Imperial leather: Race, gender and sexuality in the colonial contest.* London: Routledge.
McGovern, C. (2006). *Sold American: Consumption and citizenship, 1890–1945*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Melamed, J. (2015). Racial capitalism. *Critical Ethnic Studies, 1*(1), 76–85.
Mora, G. C. (2014). *Making hispanics: How activists, bureaucrats, and media constructed a new American*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Muhammad, K. G. (2010). *The condemnation of blackness: Race, crime, and the making of modern urban America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
O'Barr, W. (1994). *Culture and the ad: Exploring otherness in the world of advertising*. Boulder: Westview Press.
Painter, N. I. (2010). *The history of white people*. New York: W. W. Norton.
Perry, V. (2019). A loan at last? Race and racism in mortgage lending. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 173–192). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Robinson, C. (1983). *Black marxism: The making of the black radical tradition*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Roediger, D. (1991). *The wages of whiteness: Race and the making of the American working class*. New York: Verso.
Rothstein, R. (2017). *The color of law: A forgotten history of how our government segregated America*. New York: Liveright Publishing.
Rydell, R. W. (1984). *All the world's a fair*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Shankar, S. (2015). *Advertising diversity: Ad agencies and the creation of Asian American consumers*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Smythe, D. ([1981] 2001). On the audience commodity and its work. In M. G. Durham & D. Kellner (Eds.), *Media and cultural studies: Keyworks* (pp. 230–256). Malden: Blackwell.
Snyder, R. (n.d.). European Americans and advertising: Race & ethnicity in advertising. *Race & Ethnicity in Advertising America: 1890-Today*. Retrieved from https://www.raceandethnicity.org/essays/european-americans-advertising.
Strasser, S. (1989). *Satisfaction guaranteed: The making of the American mass market*. New York: Pantheon.
Turow, J. (1997). *Breaking up America: Advertisers and the new media world*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wang, J. (2018). *Carceral capitalism*. South Pasadena: Semiotext(e).
Ward, D. (2009). Capitalism, early market research, and the creation of the American consumer. *Journal of Historical Research in Marketing, 1*(2), 200–223.
Webster, J. G., & Phalen, P. F. (1997). *The mass audience: Rediscovering the dominant model*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Weems, R. E. (1998). *Desegregating the dollar: African American consumerism in the twentieth century*. New York: New York University Press.
Williams, R. (1963). *Culture and society*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Williams, J. P. (2018, April 20). *Segregation's legacy*. Retrieved from https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2018–04-20/us-is-still-segregated-even-after-fair-housing-act.
Wilson, B. (2005). Race in commodity exchange and consumption: Separate but equal. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 95*(3), 587–606.
Wynter, S. (1995). 1492: A new world view. In Hyatt, Vera Lawrence & Rex Nettleford (Eds.), *Race, discourse and the origin of the Americas: A new world view*. Washington, DC and London: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Zuberi, T. (2001). *Thicker than blood: How racial statistics lie*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Zunz, C. (1998). *Why the American century?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

3

Race, Markets, and Digital Technologies: Historical and Conceptual Frameworks

W. Trevor Jamerson

Chapter Overview

- Racial stereotypes regarding economic and technological achievement are distinct yet overlap in important ways.
- The emergence and increasing ubiquity of digital technologies have not changed these core narratives.
- Digital technologies help to enforce racial hierarchies and distribute resources accordingly.
- Digital technologies are racialized through user capabilities and product design.
- Digital technologies play an increasing role in managing market-based ideas of racial difference.

Introduction

A central task in any consideration of digital technologies' effect on society is deciphering what is new about those effects and what is not. In other words, have digital technologies fundamentally changed the way we interact, or to what extent is social interaction in digital spaces merely a reflection of what happens offline? The answer is—usually—a little of both. I argue

W. T. Jamerson (✉)
Global Politics and Societies, Hollins University, Roanoke, VA, USA
e-mail: JamersonWT@hollins.edu

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_3

that today's relationships between digital technologies, markets, and race are influenced by older narratives surrounding racial difference and technological achievement and that digital technologies often serve as amplifiers for those narratives. Digital technologies play a key role in the proliferation of a globalized economy where racially marginalized groups are clearly and systematically disadvantaged (Pieterse 2010; Goldberg 2009; Harvey 2005). Such technologies have also created a myriad of new marketplaces existing in exclusively online settings and measured in terms of *follows*, *likes*, *clicks,* and *retweets*. These newer digital marketplaces have a tendency to mirror existing racial inequality (Boyd 2012; McPherson 2012).

This chapter provides historical and conceptual frameworks for understanding how racial difference and market forces interact with—and intersect within—digital technologies. To start, I review earlier efforts to analyze intersections of race and technology emphasizing the role of market forces in these perspectives. The first section emphasizes historical relationships between technology and race, while the second is more concerned with race and capitalism. There are significant overlaps, however, regarding histories of technology and capitalism as they relate to racial inequality. The second part of the chapter moves to a discussion of what is relatively new regarding the effect of digital technologies on race and markets. These sections show how prominent social media platforms Facebook and TripAdvisor help maintain racial hierarchies, participate in the formation of racial categories, and contribute to the commodification of racial difference, respectively.

Historical Framework: Race, Markets, and Technology

Theoretical Background

The idea of "race" has not always existed, and racial identities today are constructed differently in Brazil (Williams 2013), for example, than they are in Israel (Goldberg 2009) or the USA (Omi and Winant 2015). The fact that race changes in definition and form across time and space is the best evidence that it is the product of social interaction, and not produced from inherent biological or cultural difference. Nevertheless, global patterns of racial organization appear, including, for example, their emphasis on physical appearances and cultural traits, as well as the fact that Whiteness is generally the dominant racial setting, while Blackness is generally subordinate.

Some of the primary reasons for these global similarities include colonialism, the transatlantic slave trade, and the growth of global capitalism, as these were primary motivators in Euro-American (i.e., White) expansions, conquests, and resource extraction. Racial hierarchies grew over time to justify these practices (Williams 1944; Hirschman 2004; Omi and Winant 2015).

As capitalism and technological achievement are two primary markers of "civilization," any efforts to question a group's connection to them also questions their humanity. The rise of digital technologies has not dramatically altered this basic justification for racial hierarchy, rather given it new space to flourish. This does not mean digital technologies are passive receptors for existing stereotypes. As digital technologies open up new spaces for interaction and exchange, they also lead to new ways of managing and defining race. Digital technologies are a crucial part of today's globalized capitalist economy and in part dissolve the boundary between space and time—the major arbiters of racial definitions—through what geographer David Harvey calls "space-time compression" (1989). They are able to connect people, information, or ideas instantly, with virtually no regard for the geographic distance between them. As these technologies become more embedded in our social worlds, they play an increasing role in the continuing process of racial identity formation (Omi and Winant 2015; Nakamura and Chow-White 2012) through patterns of inclusion and exclusion, or the way racial boundaries are maintained and crossed (Goldberg 2009; McPherson 2012). These processes are further illuminated by discussing the development of stereotypes and inequalities regarding racial marginalization and technology.

Race and Technology: Tensions of Access and Representation

Dominant groups enforce racial hierarchies through twin processes of, first, negative representation—for example in literature, song, film, etc—and, second, controlling access to resources—such as education, legal protection, and money (Omi and Winant 2015; Hodkinson 2011). In terms of technology, racially marginalized groups tend to be stereotyped along a spectrum regarding its access, production, and use. Either they are characterized as non-technological, or primitive; or they are characterized as hyper-technological, more robot than human.

The former is the case especially for people of African or Indigenous descent and gets broadly applied to Global South societies (Smith 2012; Pieterse 2010). Indigenous people, in particular, have been affected by this

stereotype, which was tied to Darwinist beliefs that their supposed technological deficiencies were proof that they had not "evolved" as had Europeans, and were therefore inferior and deserving of their genocide (Hirschman 2004). Today these stereotypes are present in initiatives designed to "modernize" or "develop" non-white societies (Pieterse 2010; see also Bonsu 2019, in this volume Chapter 16), or in the case of social media, as a tool to spread "democracy" or "freedom" (Morozov 2011).

Hyper-technological stereotypes get applied to East Asian societies and people of Asian descent more generally (Morley and Robbins 1995; Nakamura 2002). Japan presents the most potent and longest running example of what media scholars David Morley and Kevin Robins call 'techno-orientalism', or representations of racial Otherness emphasizing relationships with technology. Japan was the first non-white nation to industrialize on a large scale, and the first to defeat a Western nation—Russia in 1905—using mechanized war machines. In this sense, it is no coincidence that the Japanese Empire—by geographic area one of the largest the world had ever seen—ended with world's first and only nuclear attacks (Dower 1986, 1999). W. E. B. Du Bois was prophetic in 1915 when suggesting that at some point Japan would be dealt with because it came to rival Euro-American military-industrial dominance.

In the postwar years, Japan reinvented itself as a major economic power through its car and electronics industries (Dower 1999). These newfound sources of wealth allowed it to pass the USA by 1985 as the world's largest creditor nation, once again stirring up fears of a "yellow peril," only this time the imagined invading armies were made of cheaper, more fuel-efficient cars, and Sony Walkmans (Morley and Robins 1995). This reinforced dehumanizing—and racist—narratives surrounding Japanese identity, and other Asian identities by proxy. As Morley and Robins put it:

> Within the political and cultural unconscious of the West, Japan has come to exist as the figure of empty and dehumanized technological power. It represents the alienated and dystopian image of capitalist progress. This provokes both resentment and envy. The Japanese are unfeeling aliens; they are cyborgs and replicants. But there is also the sense that these mutants are now better adapted to survive in the future…There is something profoundly disturbing in this techno-orientalism. (1995, p. 170)

Both of these stereotypes mirror actual global patterns of racial inequality surrounding access and use of modern technologies. In 2016, the nations with the highest rates of Internet use in the world include the UK (92.6%),

followed by Japan (91.1%), the USA and Canada (85.5% each), and South Korea (85.7%). While the Western countries on this list are regarded as among the more advanced and forward thinking nations, the high rates of Internet use among the Asian countries listed here are often viewed as a social problem, and as evidence that Asians use technology "too much" (Nakamura 2002; Morozov 2011). At the bottom of the list are countries like Chad (2.7%), Guinea (1.8%), East Timor (1.2%), and Eritrea (1.1%). Even larger Global South nations with high numbers of Internet users—but even higher populations—like India (34.8%) and Indonesia (20.4%) are severely affected by racially organized disparities in global Internet use.[1] Inequalities in access to digital technologies lead in part to inequalities in representations and discourses within digital spaces, with negative imagery more common than positive imagery. Thus digital technologies create a feedback loop where lack of access to the technology leads to negative representations within digital spaces which then reinforce the realities of unequal access and its consequences. This feedback loop also works at the other end of the spectrum, where high rates of Internet use reinforce hyper-technological stereotypes in non-white peoples (Nakamura 2002).

Race and Markets: To Be, or Not to Be … Civilized

Markets can generally be defined as systems of exchange within and between social groups. It is important to note that not all markets—now, and especially not in the past—are capitalistic, where the goal of exchange is to generate profit. But for the purposes of this chapter, it is equally important to realize that the idea of race—both its historical origins and the inequalities it generates—is intimately tied to the historical trajectory of global capitalism and the current patterns of global inequality it engenders. For example, the industrial revolution in Great Britain does not happen without the cotton produced by enslaved Africans in America (Williams 1944) and today the richest countries in the world are racially the "whitest" ones (Western Europe and North America), while the poorest—African nations located south of the Sahara—are the "blackest" (Dicken 2011). In this sense, we might think of both capitalism and race as fundamental organizing principles of the modern age that are distinct, yet also overlap in important ways.

Market dynamics also play a key role in the formation of racial stereotypes, and there are significant parallels between stereotypes associated with the use of technology and those associated with economic development.

"Non-technological" societies, for example, are also more likely to be characterized as "communal" and not capitalist market oriented. They are thus relegated to the status of market object, rather than market subject. Once again, these stereotypes are typically applied to those of African or Indigenous descent (and a lesser extent to Middle Eastern and Hispanic societies). These groups have historically been viewed—their bodies and homelands—as *sources of wealth* in colonial contexts (Rodney 1972; Smith 2012). Today, this tradition continues in the global economy through the monetary value placed on concepts such as "diversity" and "multiculturalism" (Werry 2011). "Hyper-technological" societies, on the other hand, are thought to be motivated only by profit—as *producers of wealth*—at the expense of sacrificing their "human side." These non-Western societies are seen as a threat to Western economic dominance. Japan has set the historical precedent for this narrative, but the West has since applied it to other East Asian nations like South Korea and especially China (Fan 2015). This narrative has also been applied to post-Cold War Eastern European societies—ones whose Whiteness (and European-ness) has traditionally been questionable—such as Estonia and Russia (Morozov 2011; Marchart 1998). Two of the main markers of Western definitions of "civilization" include capitalist market practice and technological innovation. All of the peoples and groups listed here have been found by Western observers at some point in their histories to be either lacking—or overcompensating for—these traits.

These racist narratives persist despite increases in global connectivity where national borders in many cases do not mean as much as they used to—especially in terms of material goods and information crossing them. And they continue to endure despite the still predominant mentality in the age of color blindness that race somehow does not exist in a meaningful way. The result of these interrelated narratives is that only Euro-American Whiteness exists in the "Goldilocks zone" regarding its relationship with technology. White is the only racial designator attached to "acceptable" uses and levels of technological achievement. The same seems to be true regarding economic practice as well (see also Rosa-Salas 2019, in this volume Chapter 2). And as some of the above examples illustrate, the real-life consequences of these narratives can be devastating. The emergence of digital technologies has not changed the structure of these core narratives, but it has changed their content, the way they are produced, the speed of their production, and the size of their audiences—resulting in greater exposure and influence.

Conceptual Framework: Digitizing Race and the Marketplace

In this section, I provide a conceptual framework for navigating intersections of race and the marketplace within digital spaces focusing on three main points. First, digital technologies may be considered a *racial project* (Omi and Winant 2015) due to the material consequences of their use—or non-use. Second, digital technologies are *racialized* through their affordances—or what technology allows one to do—and their technical organization. Third, digital technologies—and social media in particular—play a key role in the marketization and commodification of racial difference through their ability to convert experience into information. To provide further context, this section will incorporate discussions of TripAdvisor and Facebook as examples of digital technologies altering existing markets—and ideas of race—and creating new ones, respectively.

Digital Technologies as a Racial Project

For Michael Omi and Howard Winant racial identities and inequalities are formed over time through complex "sociohistorical processes," such as slavery or colonial conquest. They define these processes as "racial projects," or "an effort to organize and distribute resources (economic, political, cultural) along particular racial lines" (2015, p. 125). The key idea in this definition is that patterns of racial representation—both negative and positive—have significant material consequences. Digital technologies may be considered a racial project because of their role managing older systems of racial inequality, as with TripAdvisor and the influence of online review writing in the tourism industry. They also provide new spaces for racial inequality to emerge, specifically in the case of Facebook and personal-profile-driven social media. Each of these prominent Web sites traffick in racial representations carrying significant economic impact.

Facebook won the social media wars against Myspace in the late 2000s partly because of its associations with wealth and Whiteness (Boyd 2012). At the time these were competing social media platforms and both were designed for users to create personalized profiles and use those profiles to connect to like-minded people. In 2006, Myspace was the dominant social media platform for teens—and mostly associated with "20-something urban cultural practices and values" (Boyd 2012, p. 206)—while Facebook was at first only open to "elite" college students. The difference in initial user

bases helps explain why Facebook came to be known as a White and upper-class digital space while Myspace came to be associated with lower class, non-white signifiers, a "digital ghetto" (Boyd 2012). Technology and media scholar Danah Boyd links the shift in preference from Myspace to Facebook among teens and parents to stark material reality by naming it "digital white flight"—drawing parallels to White departures in urban housing sectors in the mid-twentieth century. As she explains:

> White and more affluent individuals were more likely to choose and move to Facebook…In essence, many of the same underlying factors that shaped white city dwellers' exodus to the suburbs—institutional incentives and restrictions, fear and anxiety, social networks, and racism—contribute to why some teens were likely to depart [Myspace] than others.

Today, Facebook is one of the world's most influential companies with a current market value of 446 billion dollars[2] and over 2.2 billion users globally.[3] On the other hand, Myspace was last seen being mined for Twitter's Throwback Thursday hashtag (#tbt), where celebrities would post older and presumably embarrassing pictures of themselves from their long-neglected, but still accessible, Myspace pages (Kleinman 2015).

While Facebook represents digital technologies creating new market environments, TripAdvisor shows how digital technologies are integrated into established market practices. As the world's largest travel-related online review site, TripAdvisor is the major digital space for the writing and reading of a very old narrative form, the traveler's tale. And as many have pointed out, traveler's tales—or simply stories about away-from-home experiences—have been important tools in the creation of racial categories, as they serve as a kind of "first impression" for readers regarding unfamiliar peoples and places (Smith 2012; Behdad 1994). Moreover online reviews have direct material consequences because of their ability to influence consumer decisions (Jamerson 2016; Leung et al. 2013). In the case of TripAdvisor—as with many online review services—users post comments in addition to a general score (1–5) of the hotel, restaurant, or attraction being reviewed. These comments and scores contribute to a seemingly impartial rankings system that has widespread economic impacts throughout the global tourism industry. In other words, TripAdvisor has become a major tastemaker in the tourism industry—one known more generally for cultural appropriation and racism—through the way it controls and manages traveler's tale narratives, which are also important tools in the creation of racial categories.

Racialization of Digital Technologies

Where racial projects refer to systematic patterns of social inequality resulting from racial hierarchies, racialization refers to the way racial categories are formed and come to be associated with various social phenomena. In the case of Facebook, for example, the racial and economic demographics of its initial user base—White and upper class—partially allowed it to take over the social media landscape in accordance with long running patterns of social inequality (*racial project*), but this dominance is also partially the result of the aesthetics and organizational structure of the Web site itself—which are also White and upper class (*racialization*). Racial categories evolve over time through a process of selection, or "imparting social and symbolic meaning to perceived phenotypical differences" (Omi and Winant 2015, p. 111). In other words, racial categories are created when values and judgments about an individual's or group's behavior or morals become associated with what they look like. When these meanings become attached to concepts, activities, and things not previously associated with phenotypical differences—this happens commonly with food and music, for example—they become *racialized.* Omi and Winant define racialization as, "the extension of racial meaning to a previously (un-racially) classified relationship, social practice, or group" (2015, p. 125).

In terms of digital technologies, we need to consider two areas where racialization occurs. The first concerns affordances, which Microsoft researcher Nancy Baym defines as "the social capabilities technological qualities enable" (2010, p. 44). In other words, affordances are what users are able to accomplish with a particular service or device. The second area deals with technical organization, or the way data is put together, disseminated, and emphasized within a given digital space. Where affordances are more user driven, technical organization is more designer driven and a reflection of producer intent. Racial meaning extends into digital technologies through both paths.

Boyd describes how the affordances of Myspace and Facebook—in this case users' abilities to alter digital space—became associated with racial difference:

> …Myspace enabled users to radically shape the look and feel of their profiles while Facebook enforced a strict minimalism…While Facebook's minimalism is not inherently better, conscientious restraint has been one marker of bourgeois fashion (Arnold 2001). On the contrary, the flashy style that is popular on Myspace is often marked in relation to "bling-bling" a style of conspicuous consumption that is often associated with urban black culture and hip-hop. (2012, p. 216)

Boyd's description of digital White flight is partly rooted in the ways that each Web site came to embody racially marked aesthetic practices through a difference in their affordances to users. It is also connected to how these aesthetics then became the basis of judgments and opinions of the site's users themselves. Boyd describes, for example, how Myspace came to be viewed as home to "sexual predators and other 'creepy' people" (2012, p. 217). As a result, parents came to view Facebook as safer than Myspace, primarily because user profiles were more guarded. Here again, we see the affordances of a particular Web site—in this case the ability for others to see one's profile—was tied to issues of safety, both real and perceived. Racialization in this case occurs when issues of digital safety—fear of "creepy people"—become linked to the already established racial aesthetics and imagined user base of the Web site in question.

Through its control and manipulation of traveler's tales, TripAdvisor acts as a provider and repository of racialized narratives. It allows users to evaluate attractions through narrative content and individual rating. Each of these affordances has underlying racial consequences. Review content has been found, in the case of cultural tourism in Harlem, for example, to glorify Blackness at the same time it ignores racial inequality; in effect trivializing the community's marginality (Jamerson 2016). This paradoxical arrangement—one that simultaneously praises and ignores racial difference—is also present in the entertainment and fashion industries which, like tourism, are geared toward personal enjoyment, leisure, and consumption (hooks 1992). TripAdvisor encourages the production of more traveler's tales through incentives such as the badge system, which reward site users with higher status and visibility on the Web site for posting more reviews. Individual ratings are algorithmically aggregated to create a crowdsourced and seemingly objective rankings system but are actually based on multitudes of individual opinions. The result is that traveler's tales—and the racial categories they help create—assume a more potent form of legitimacy in the digital age.

Technical organization refers to the way designers integrate hardware (computer consoles, smartphones, wireless routers, etc) with software (programming based in digital code) to create a desired outcome for users. For example, both Facebook and TripAdvisor use algorithms—the formulas of which change constantly and are not shared publicly—to create affordances for users, and profit for the company. But rather than delve further into the specifics of each Web site's technical organization—and for brevity's sake—I want to make a general point here about how the actual design and development of digital technologies does not exist in a racial vacuum: The digital technology industry itself has been dominated by White men from its very

beginning, and this racial dynamic has affected their technical organization. As race scholar Tara McPherson points out, it would be foolish to consider the design and structure of digital technologies without considering how they may be at least partially designed with the management of racial difference in mind:

> The emergence of covert racism and its rhetoric of color-blindness are not so much intentional as systemic. Computation is a primary delivery method of these new systems, and it seems at best naïve to imagine that cultural and computational operating systems don't mutually infect one another…we must understand and theorize the deep imbrications of race and digital technology even when our objects of analysis seem not to "be about" race at all. (2012, pp. 31, 34)

Marketization of Race in Digital Environments

Philosopher David Theo Goldberg argues that market forces—rather than the state—increasingly regulate ideas of racial difference (2009). This means that the role of national governments in defining racial categories is decreasing while the global capitalist market's role increases in that function. He suggests that race is viewed from the standpoint of capitalism through two perspectives. The first is that racial difference, and the conflict resulting from it, is a threat to an efficient and smooth market system. The second is the idea that racial difference is itself a space for capitalist expansion, especially in an era when information is a valuable commodity. Digital technologies participate in the market-driven regulation of racial difference because of their ability to convert experience into information, which is the lifeblood of data-driven online economies. On the other hand, they can also be used to great effect in stoking the flames of racial resentment and spreading racial conflict for political and economic gain in countries such as the USA (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018), South Africa (Ceasar 2018) and—most tragically—in Myanmar (Stecklow 2018).

Facebook has built its entire business model on the sharing of experiences. It is profitable because it converts those experiences into information, which it then sells to outside companies for advertising purposes. It does not include a space on personal profiles for users to identify their racial or ethnic background, a reflection of its "assumed whiteness" (Kolko 2000), and a choice completely in sync with color-blind logic. Media and communication scholar Angela M. Cirucci (2017) points out that although Facebook does not publicly gather data on racial identity it has engaged for years in

its collection through surreptitiously using software such as DeepFace—3D facial modeling—and Multicultural Affinity Targeting—to identify users, "who are interested in and likely to respond well to multicultural content" (Fussel 2016). Each of these techniques contributes to how understandings of racial difference are dictated by markets based on information.

TripAdvisor represents an example of an old narrative form shifting from being told in oral and literary spaces to digital ones. Review sites like TripAdvisor and Yelp act as digital brokers for the tourism industry, connecting producers and consumers in online spaces (Leung et al. 2013; Jamerson 2016). As a result, digital technologies play a major role in the operation of the global tourism industry as they connect different nodes of the tourism production process together. Tourism is an industry concerned with producing valuable experiences, the more exotic the better, and it has long specialized in using representations and brushes with racial difference to accomplish that task (Werry 2011; Behdad 1994). Today TripAdvisor is situated prominently within it and allowing it to operate more efficiently. TripAdvisor for many potential tourists becomes their first source of information, their point of contact with the Otherness about to be experienced. As a result, the market-oriented—and digitized—representations of race found on TripAdvisor play a potentially significant role in shaping racial categories based on market principles.

Conclusion

This chapter first outlined some of the broader historical intersections surrounding race, markets, and digital technology. Racially marginalized groups are characterized along a spectrum where non-technological equates with not being market oriented, and hyper-technological equates with a predatory market orientation, seemingly disqualifying each category from being able to attain "real" civilization. The chapter then proposes a conceptual framework for thinking about how digital technologies influence racial difference and market practices, and vice versa. Both markets and digital technologies may be considered racial projects due to their roles in defining the boundaries of racial difference and the way resources are distributed along those lines. Digital technologies, typically thought of as market instruments or social connectors, are also important sites of racialization. They have become a new site of racial contestation, even though they are not overtly designed with racial difference in mind. Finally, digital technologies play a key role in both contemporary market practice and racial commodification through their ability to convert experience into information.

As experiences and acknowledgments of racial difference move online, they may be more efficiently regulated and managed by dominant racial groups. But it is important to remember that racial inequality within and around digital spaces often mirrors economically based racial inequality as well as racial stereotypes regarding technology in general formed over the last century—and longer. Those roots run deep, and history's weight must be considered when thinking how digital technologies intersect with race and markets. In this sense, the frameworks developed here may be used to help predict the forms racial inequality regarding digital technologies may take in the future. For example, in this volume Lauren Rhue (2019, in this volume Chapter 12) discusses affordances and technical organization in her proposal that newer crowd-based markets play an increasing role in maintaining racial inequality. She argues that companies such as Uber, AirBnB, Prosper, and Kickstarter accomplish this through a combination of laissez-faire attitudes toward racial discrimination on the part of Web site designers and the built-in prejudicial attitudes of their user bases.

But despite—and because of—the many barriers described above, racially marginalized groups have developed a diverse set of responses. Indigenous groups have repurposed digital technologies to fit their unique worldviews (Salazar 2009; McMahon et al. 2015). African-Americans have collectively become one of Twitter's most influential demographics (Brock 2012) and have been central in the creation of a popular aesthetic tradition, Afrofuturism, countering non-technological stereotypes (Samatar 2017). Japanese culture, for its part, has accepted the stereotypes of techno-orientalism as part of its relationship with the West—for better or worse (Paulk 2011). From these perspectives, the significance of the frameworks developed here is that they help us understand where racial inequality regarding digital technologies comes from, and how it works; with the hope of identifying new ways of resisting racism and claiming space in digital and market environments.

Notes

1. All Internet use statistics sourced from www.internetlivestats.com. Accessed October 12, 2018.
2. Source www.ycharts.com, October 11, 2018.
3. Source www.statista.com, October 11, 2018.

Further Reading

Jamerson, W. T. (2016). Digital orientalism: TripAdvisor and online tourist reviews. In J. Daniels, K. Gregory, & T. M. Cottom (Eds.), *Digital sociologies* (pp. 119–135). Bristol: Bristol University Press.

Nakamura, L., & Chow-White, P. (Eds.). (2012). *Race after the Internet*. New York and London: Routledge.

Omi, M., & Winant, H. (2015). *Racial formation in the United States* (3rd ed.). New York: Routledge.

Werry, M. (2011). *The tourist state: Performing leisure, liberalism, and race in New Zealand*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

References

Arnold, R. (2001). *Fashion, desire, and anxiety: Image and morality in the 20th century*. Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Baym, N. K. (2010). *Personal connections in the digital age.* Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Behdad, A. (1994). *Belated travelers: Orientalism in the age of colonial dissolution*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Bonsu, S. (2019). Development by markets: An essay on the continuities of colonial development and racism in Africa. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 259–272). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Boyd, D. (2012). White flight in networked publics: How race and class shaped American teen engagement with Myspace and Facebook. In L. Nakamura & P. Chow-White (Eds.), *Race after the Internet* (pp. 203–221). New York: Routledge.

Brock, A. (2012). From the blackhand side: Twitter as a cultural conversation. *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 56*(4), 529–549.

Cadwalladr, C., & Graham-Harrison, E. (2018, March 17). Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data breach. *The Guardian*.

Ceasar, E. (2018, June). The reputation-laundering firm that ruined it's own reputation. *The New Yorker*.

Cirucci, A. M. (2017). Normative interfaces: Affordances, gender, and race in Facebook. *Social Media+ Society, 3*, 1–10.

Coe, N. M., Dicken, P., & Hess, M. (2008). Global production networks: Realizing the potential. *Journal of Economic Geography, 8,* 271–295.

Dicken, P. (2011). *Global shift: Mapping the changing contours of the world economy* (6th ed.). London and New York: Guilford Press.

Dower, J. W. (1986). *War without Mercy: Race and power in the Pacific*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.

Dower, J. W. (1999). *Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Du Bois, W. E. B. (1915). The African roots of the war. *The Atlantic Monthly, 114*(5), 707–714.

Fan, C. T. (2015). Techno-orientalism with Chinese characteristics: Maureen F. Mchugh's China Mountain Zhang. *Journal of Transnational American Studies, 6*(1). Retrieved from https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8n70b1b6.

Fussel, S. (2016, October 28). Facebook might be assigning you an "ethnic affinity" you can't change. *Fusion.* Retrieved from http://fusion.net/facebook-might-be-assigning-you-an-ethnic-affinity-you-1793863259.

Goldberg, D. T. (2009). *The threat of race: Reflections on racial neoliberalism*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Harvey, D. (1989). *The condition of postmodernity*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Hirschman, C. (2004). The origins and demise of the concept of race. *The Population and Development Review, 30*(3), 385–415.

Hodkinson, P. (2011). *Media, culture and society: An introduction*. Washington, DC: Sage.

hooks, B. (1992). *Black looks: Race and representation.* Boston, MA: South End Press.

Jamerson, W. T. (2016). Digital orientalism: TripAdvisor and online tourist reviews. In J. Daniels, K. Gregory, & T. M. Cottom (Eds.), *Digital sociologies* (pp. 119–135). Bristol: Bristol University Press.

Kleinman, A. (2015). Sad But True: People are actually going on Myspace in search of #TBT pics. *Huffington Post.* Posted 1-14-15. Accessed March 20, 2017.

Kolko, B. E. (2000). Erasing @race: Going white in the (inter)face. In B. Kolko, L. Nakamura, G. B. Rodman (Eds.), *Race in cyberspace* (pp. 213–232). New York, NY: Routledge.

Leung, D., Law, R., van Hoof, H., & Buhalis, D. (2013). Social media in tourism and hospitality: A literature review. *Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 30,* 3–22.

MacCannell, D. (2011). *The ethics of sightseeing*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Marchart, O. (1998). The east, the west, and the rest: Central and Eastern Europe between techno-orientalism and the new electronic frontier. *Convergence, 4,* 2.

McMahon, R., LaHache, T., & Whiteduck, T. (2015). Digital data management as indigenous resurgence in Kahnawa:ke. *The International Indigenous Policy Journal 6*(3), Article 6.

McPherson, T. (2012). U.S operating systems at mid-century: The intertwining of race and UNIX. In L. Nakamura & P. A. Chow-White (Eds.), *Race after the Internet* (pp. 21–37). New York and London: Routledge.

Morley, D., & Robins, K. (1995). Techno-orientalism: Japan panic. Chapter 8 from Morley and Robins. In *Spaces of identity: Global media, electronic landscapes, and cultural boundaries* (pp. 147–173). New York: Routledge.

Morozov, E. (2011). *The net delusion: The dark side of Internet freedom*. New York, NY: Public Affairs.

Nakamura, L. (2002). *Cybertypes: Race, ethnicity, and identity on the Internet*. New York: Routledge.

Omi, M., & Winant, H. (2015). *Racial formation in the United States* (3rd ed.). New York: Routledge.

Paulk, C. (2011). Post-national cool: William Gibson's Japan. *Science Fiction Studies, 38*(3), 478–500.

Pieterse, J. N. (2010). *Development theory* (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Sage.

Rhue, M. (2019). Crowd-based markets: Technical progress, civil and social regression. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 193–210). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rodney, W. (1972). *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*. Baltimore: Black Classic Press.

Rosa-Salas, M. (2019). Making the mass white: How racial segregation shaped consumer segmentation. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 21–38). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Salazar, J. F. (2009). Self-determination in practice: The critical making of Indigenous media. *Development in Practice, 19*(4/5), 504–513.

Samatar, S. (2017). Toward a planetary history of Afrofuturism. *Research in African Literatures, 48*(4), 175–191.

Smith, L. T. (2012). *Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous people*. London: Zed Books.

Stecklow, S. (2018, August 15). Why Facebook is losing the war on hate speech in Myanmar. *Reuters*.

Werry, M. (2011). *The tourist state: Performing leisure, liberalism, and race in New Zealand*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Williams, E. (1944). *Slavery and capitalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Williams, E. L. (2013). *Sex tourism in Bahia: Ambiguous entanglements*. Urbana, Chicago and Springfield: University of Illinois Press.

4

(Re)Visiting the Corner Store: Black Youth, Gentrification, and Food Sovereignty

Naya Jones

Chapter Overview

- Healthy food access continues to be the focus of food research and policy on a global scale.
- In the USA, corner store initiatives often target areas where African-American and Latinx youth reside.
- Emphasis on nutrition alone can deflect attention away from structural concerns like gentrification, race and racism, and food sovereignty.
- Based on arts-based research in Austin, Texas, this chapter contextualizes corner stores within power relations and everyday relationships.
- A Black geographies and food sovereignty frame brings attention to community-led, transformative marketplace practices already taking place.
- Throughout, I consider the possibilities for corner store research that promotes food sovereignty.

Introduction

Healthy food access continues to be the focus of food research and policy on a global scale. Studies consider "food deserts" and lack of "healthy" food retail in the Global South (Leatherman and Goodman 2005; Gartin 2012) as well

N. Jones (✉)
Medical College of Wisconsin, Wauwatosa, WI, USA
e-mail: njones@mcw.edu

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_4

as in overdeveloped countries such as the UK and Canada (e.g., Whelan et al. 2002). In US context, initiatives throughout the country seek to improve food access and health outcomes by transforming local corner stores. Both research and policy primarily focus on corner stores, in low-income neighborhoods where predominantly African-American and Latinx populations motivated in part by persistent health disparities. However, a nutritional perspective alone deflects attention from systemic issues that can also affect health and spur displacement. Furthermore, emphasis on healthy food options does not account for the meaning and function of corner stores for local residents. How do corner stores *matter* in everyday relationships and social networks? Here, I consider corner stores critically and relationally. I turn to Black geographies and food sovereignty to contextualize corner stores within broader power dynamics and everyday connections. Black geographies scholarship brings attention to "a Black sense of place," or to how Black diaspora populations have (re) made place through relationships (McKittrick 2011). Beyond promoting food access, the global food sovereignty movement emphasizes local ownership and management of food resources. In this chapter, I visit three corner stores with African-American and Afro-Latinx youth in a gentrifying neighborhood.[1] Their experiences (re)frame corner stores as sites of Black place-making, while underscoring the effects of local gentrification. They also disrupt monolithic representations of Blackness in the food marketplace. In the USA, food research and policy often treat "Black" as synonymous with African-American. Below, "Black" refers to diverse experiences with Blackness—African-American, Afro-Latinx, and "mixed". In closing, I consider how a critical and relational lens (1) brings attention to transformative marketplace practices and (2) opens up possibilities for corner store research and practice beyond food access.

Beyond Nutrition

Current corner store research focused on Black American communities overwhelmingly emphasizes access to "healthy" food. Corner stores, also called convenience stores, figure prominently in research on "food deserts." While definitions of "food deserts" vary widely, the concept generally describes areas with little or no retail access to "nutritious, affordable" food within a given distance from where Black youth live or go to school (e.g., USDA 2018). Still other definitions emphasize access to "culturally-appropriate" food choices. By diversifying foods at corner stores, research and health interventions seek to change food behaviors. Health disparities motivate research in this vein, specifically the "childhood obesity epidemic" and high

rates of diabetes among African-Americans. Prevailing scholarship, policy, and practice often trace these disparities to Black lack of "healthy" food access and to lack of food knowledge.

However, critics of the "obesity epidemic" question how obesity is measured as well as the value judgments placed on fatness (Guthman 2011). Obesity rhetoric links fatness to unproductivity and even climate change; given that African-American young women and adults claim the highest rates of "overweight" and "obesity" in the USA, these judgments are profoundly racialized and gendered (Kirkland 2011). Sociologist Anthony Ryan Hatch (2016) further critiques how metabolic syndromes like diabetes become biologically racialized as "Black" and non-white, without addressing structural and environmental factors. Furthermore, emphasis on food options or behaviors does not address urban disinvestment and displacement. More pointedly, will a renovated corner store that carries "healthier" options benefit long-established, lower-income residents? Or, will that corner store cater to an incoming, more affluent customer base?

Race and racism are central to these questions. In Austin, Texas long-established residents are primarily historically marginalized people of color, while incoming residents tend to be wealthier and White. Transforming Black food geographies, then, requires attention to intertwined legacies of race and racism, capitalism, and other social structures. Together, these legacies inform a Black sense of place.

A Black Sense of Place

Black geographies scholarship acknowledges legacies of oppression and survival. As Geographers McKittrick and Woods (2007) note, "The history of black subjects in the diaspora is a geographic story that is, at last in part, a story of material and conceptual placements and displacements, segregations and integrations, margins and center, and migrations and settlements" (p. xiv). In this chapter, the City of Austin's "geographic story" reflects these broader (dis)placements. A Black geographies frame lifts up how Black populations continue to (re)imagine place. McKittrick (2011) describes "a black sense of place" as "not a steady, focused, and homogenous way of seeing and being in place, but rather a set of changing and differential perspectives" that illustrate "legacies of racial violence" (p. 950). Though written in the singular—*a* Black sense of place—this singularity does not communicate a single experience. McKittrick uses this singularity to underscore shared coordinates of structural oppression, migration, and resistance across diasporic contexts.

This Black sense of place is deeply relational. A Black sense of place exists in relationship with dominant geographies. Because Black geographies are often invisibilized or concealed, engaging with them requires "reading the dark" (Baker 2016), or applying ways of knowing beyond conventional mapping or archives to understand how Black diaspora populations have created or (re)claimed place for themselves. A Black sense of place is further constituted by historical and everyday relationships: relationships with colonizers and the colonized, self and community, global and local phenomena. These relationships make a Black sense of place dynamic, again countering narratives about Black death and stasis. By highlighting "the many ways in which Afro-descendant communities seek to create their own sense of place" (Bledsoe 2017), Black geographies bring attention to how a Black sense of place has served Black thriving.

Studies of Black place-making are wide-ranging, including but not limited to Canada (McKittrick 2006), Brazil (Bledsoe 2017), Mexico (Weltman-Cisneros 2013), and the UK (Brown 2005). Scholarship increasingly focuses on the US South where Austin is located. Building on participatory planning with Black communities throughout Texas, Critical Urban Planner Andrea R. Roberts (2018) mobilizes Black collective memory and cultural expression to (re)claim Black lands and historical communities. Geographer Latoya Eaves (2017) considers how Black queer women in the South create place and a sense of belonging through the Black church. Deep attention to personal experiences, Eaves argues, can disrupt monolithic representations of Blackness while deepening an understanding of how a Black sense of place is lived. With a focus on Austin, Anthropologist Shaka McGlotten (2014) engages public sex among queer Black community, noting "the movement of desires, affects, discourses, politics, places, dreams, and bodies" (p. 471). McGlotten's emphasis on interiority, or the inner life, highlights the role of affect—or emotions, imagination, and memory—in place-making.

These works outline a Black sense of place that is shaped by external and internal dynamics: by the built environment and ongoing displacement(s), as well as by feelings and memory. From the perspective of food geographies, African-Americans face displacement in urban cores along with barriers to retail and land ownership, all of which may affect community food networks and access. Meanwhile, affect can inform how people engage with food, not only as a commodity, but as a medium for expressing personal or collective memory, Blackness, and other identities (Hayes-Conroy and Hayes-Conroy 2010). Navigating the external and the internal, Black communities continue to create a sense of place. One way they have done so is by harnessing community relationships to practice food sovereignty.

On Food Sovereignty

The theory and practice of food sovereignty centers marginalized lived experiences. La Vía Campesina (LVC), an international peasant-run organization, created the term "food sovereignty" in 1996. Today LVC connects and mobilizes organizations from various regions of the world, with the strongest representation in North America and the Caribbean, West and South-Central Africa, Western Europe, and Southwest Asia. With an emphasis on "organizing food production and consumption according to the needs of local communities (in Sbicca 2016), giving priority to production for local consumption," food sovereignty holds salience for historically oppressed populations who bear the brunt of land grabbing, displacement, among other consequences of capitalist food production (LVC 2018). As Sociologist Joshua Sbicca (2016) points out, "human rights, self-determination, social equity, healthy ago-ecosystems, counterhegemonic narratives, and new subjectivities underlie the [food sovereignty's] discourses and organizing tactics" (p. 318). Echoing a Black sense of place, food sovereignty requires *external* and *internal* transformation: (1) external restructuring of food systems, and (2) internal work-around (re)claiming of oppressed identities, decolonizing foodways, and, in the case of allies, addressing privilege.

Food sovereignty situates Black food geographies within the global marketplace while highlighting a history of self-determination among marginalized populations in the USA. Black Americans claim a tradition of cooperative practice through which community members collectively own and manage resources. Historically to the present, African-American-led food sovereignty efforts have included farm mutual aid societies (Roberts 2017), food entrepreneurship (Williams-Forson 2006), urban farming and gardening (Ramírez 2015; Reese 2018). Among organizations, the Detroit Food Security Network, the Southeastern African-American Farmers' Organic Network, Soul Fire Farm, and Black Urban Farmers and Gardeners (BUGS) grow sovereignty by fostering knowledge- and resource-sharing among Black food producers.

Among small market and corner stores grounded in food sovereignty, those located in historically marginalized and low-income neighborhoods share an emphasis on capacity building in a multifaceted sense of the word. The Renaissance Co-Op (Greensboro, North Carolina) exemplifies a cooperatively owned, full-scale grocer mutually owned by African-American neighbors. The Mandela MarketPlace (Oakland, CA) partners with community members and organizations to build wealth and assets through food enterprise. The MarketPlace's Mandela Foods Cooperative provides food access

in a historically disinvested community while creating opportunities for neighbors to be co-owners who invest in and manage the store together. Go Austin/Vamos Austin (GAVA) has harnessed the longtime activism of predominantly Latinx community members in Southeast Austin for healthy corner store and farm stand initiatives. Local residents manage relationships with the stores and run stands throughout the community. Though neighbors do not own the retailers in this case, their deep engagement reflects collective involvement in local food systems.

A fuller account of food sovereignty is beyond the scope of this chapter, and scholar-activists discuss Black-led and alternative food economies in greater depth elsewhere (Gordon-Nembhard 2014; Alkon and Guthman 2017). What concerns me here is how these examples underscore relationships. Whether informal (e.g., food sharing) or formal (e.g., businesses or organizations), they create relationships and build upon them. They have done so, in part, by recognizing knowledge among community members. Significantly, most of the efforts above contend with gentrification and displacement, from Detroit to Austin. Some explicitly acknowledge their efforts as anti-gentrification work, while others foster the ability to stay in place by supporting connections and by reimagining wealth (see examples throughout the USA on community-wealth.org). Together, a Black sense of place and food sovereignty shift the focus from how corner store food options impact Black youth, to how Black youth create relationships and place through convenience retailers.

Methodology

The corner store visits below took place as part of a broader participatory and public research project from 2012 to 2016 in Austin, Texas. Grounded in critical participatory action research methodology (CPAR), the East Austin Food Project (EAFP) unfolded in three phases. In the context of academia, participation action research or PAR engages in research with community members to address social or environmental injustice. As a mode of inquiry and methodology, PAR builds on a range of theory and practice, including but not limited to Paulo Freire's articulations of critical pedagogy, feminist theory, and social justice movements (Kindon et al. 2007; Cahill 2018). The "critical" stressed in CPAR emphasizes explicit, reflexive analysis of power throughout the research process as well as the co-creation of knowledge. CPAR methods seek to both harness and grow knowledge

regarding (in)justice for social change (PSP 2018). Related CPAR projects with young people focus on gentrification (Cahill 2006), racial profiling and "loitering" (Yes! Loitering Project 2018), and environmental injustice (Ramirez et al. 2015).

During Phase 1 of EAFP, I conducted a series of workshops at a local non-profit that employs farming to cultivate youth leadership. On the farm, the workshops (or "research camps") included mostly youth who identified as Black and/or Latinx, ages 15–19. The majority resided in the East Austin area. Given the intense focus on Black youth in food scholarship, and given Black displacement from the urban core, I ultimately focused on the food geographies of Black youth during gentrification. For Phase 2, three youth participated in a week-long research camp that culminated in participatory filmmaking and "go along" interviews. During this phase, the youth and I visited the boutique grocer discussed below along with their favorite corner stores. As co-directors, they presented the film at a community symposium (Food for Black Thought) that stemmed, in part, from EAFP. The final phase of the project included follow-up food oral history interviews with the youth as well as key community stakeholders.

"Participation" is, admittedly, a wide term. Youth participation in this project involved cooperation (they were paid for taking part) and co-direction (their interests shaped project activities and direction) (Kindon et al. 2007). Throughout, I participated as a facilitator and co-researcher; I actively shared my lived experiences with food as a Black woman and Blaxicana (African-American and Mexican descent) from a low-income background in the spirit of co-analysis. Because of its emphasis on relationship-building between scholar-practitioners and community members, CPAR is a relational methodology that invites attention to how, where, and why people (re)connect in their everyday lives. The approach allows for in-depth engagement with place as relational, as well as a close reading of personal experiences.

(Re)Making East Austin

> Film Scene: We, youth co-researchers and I, sit at tables outside a newly-opened boutique grocer in East Austin. During the fieldtrip, each of the coresearchers received $10 to purchase whatever they desired in the store. They purchased donuts, apple pie, and organic soda. As we debriefed, I asked if they thought their family members would go to the store. They responded no. They explained,

> "They'll try it, but then they'll take a look at the prices and just . . . [does not continue, and shrugs]".—Chris[2]

> "Yeah, like, my mom wouldn't have paid $6 for that".—Kristina

> [Turning toward the shopping center across the street, which houses a laundromat and corner store] "Like, we used to come here all the time with my family. Like wash us clothes there and eat tacos and stuff. And it used to be Latinos and Black people. And since we moved and as the years, like, moved on we saw it like decreasing. And, like, you used to see people walking up and down this [pointing to the street] right there. It used to be cars filled up over there, walking up and down, in and out of stores. Now it's just like, every place you walk in and it's a white person. And it's just like, it's really dying down over here".—Eric

Austin is one of the fastest growing cities in the country and, increasingly, a global food destination. Unlike corner stores discussed below, this new grocer was not part of the youth's food geographies. I included a visit to the store, so we could co-analyze the city's changing demographics. Each youth received $10 to experience the store as paying customers. The store's original mission and news media upon its grand opening emphasized its accessibility in a "food desert," and advertisements presented the small grocer as a fresher, fuller service option amid high-priced corner stores. As in cities throughout the USA, this incoming development does not necessarily serve the needs of long-established and lower-income residents. For Kristina and Chris, the prices are prohibitive for their families. When Eric describes "every place you walk in . . . it's a white person," he suggests the store caters to White customers. Memories of another corner store (across the street) lead him to observe demographic shifts as a longtime resident. His observations reflect the segregated past and present of Austin.

In 1928, the first master plan for Austin created what would become a predominantly Black, Latinx, and low-income area. At the time, African-Americans lived throughout the area. To promote segregation, the city government provided municipal services such as sewage, trash pickup, and public education for Black populations if they lived East of the main local thoroughfare (then called East Avenue). Subsequent city plans fostered local disinvestment for decades, and industrial zoning rendered property less desirable or profitable for development. Because the zoning was mixed with residential use populations of color lived near industrial pollution harmful to health and detrimental to local air, water, and soil resources. Private covenants, or land-use restrictions employed by developers, further cultivated disinvestment in East Austin. By the 1980s, the local population declined,

and corner stores played a major role in local retail food access. By 1995, the area claimed only two supermarkets and 38 convenience stores. Both major stores were smaller than those located elsewhere in the city, and one was more expensive, while low-income residents primarily depended on more expensive convenience stores with limited options (SFC 1995).

Since the 1990s, East Austin has shifted from being a historically "undesirable" area for development into a coveted one. This shift requires some further geographic context. Food has been at the forefront of both government and private enterprise in the area, especially as the City of Austin fashions itself into a global food destination. The original home of Whole Foods Market, city policies and marketing especially encourage sustainable and artisanal food-related development. Several factors render East Austin a prime site for this development, including affordable real estate, proximity to the urban core, and soil quality for food production. One effect of East Austin's (re)making is the emergence of food places with prices, "tastes," and values that do not necessarily meet the needs or desires of long-established residents. In Austin, as in other American cities, new stores cater to new White and/or wealthier residents (Anguelovski 2015). Proximity does not necessarily lead to access. This tension between accessible location and accessible price urges a nuanced understanding of access, one that takes price, stock, and how places *feel* into account (Jones 2018).

Another effect of East Austin's (re)making is Black displacement and out-migration due to rising property taxes among other factors, especially from Central East Austin where the youth in this study reside. Among cities with a double-digit growth rate, Austin is the only one with a declining African-American population. Many African-Americans have moved or been forcibly displaced to the suburban and rural periphery, a migration reflective of similar dynamics in Houston, Dallas, Washington DC, Atlanta, Detroit, and Chicago (Tang and Ren 2014). These displacements reflect global patterns of urban gentrification; as the cost of living in cities escalates in Europe, Latin America, and beyond, poorer and historically marginalized populations are most immediately affected (Lees et al. 2014).

As I write this, I am mindful of "static" notions of place and of food geographies beyond retail. Geographer Doreen Massey (1994) critiques how anti-gentrification causes often treat place as static. Assumptions of place as stable or fixed can foster reactionary claims, nationalist or ethnocentric claims to place that run counter to social justice. East Austin has always been dynamic. At issue are power relations that drive gentrification and their implications for the youth and their families. Furthermore, approaching the

City of Austin's geographic story through the lens of retail alone excludes other local Black food geographies. Food sharing, "under the table" entrepreneurship, and cultural institutions such as churches, barbershops, and Masonic lodges have long promoted food access as well as agency in Black American communities. Indeed, current practices in East Austin suggest long-standing food sovereignty. For instance, Kristina's mother sold plates of food to local barbershops for added income. Her story is an example of building on existing cultural and social networks.

Eric underscores this counter geography. Above, he characterizes the newly revitalized (and whiter) area as "dying down," while recalling the predominantly Black and Brown presence as vibrant: filled parking lots and "walking in and out of stores." His description counters dominant narratives about East Austin and other places where Black populations reside. Metaphors deployed to describe predominantly Black neighborhoods in the USA frequently evoke death or dying: "decaying urban cores," "revitalization" projects that "bring new life," "dead space." Black populations and places where they live are rendered as if they cannot "have a new lease on life" (McKittrick 2011, p. 955). Rather than recalling a *lack* of resources so often attributed to East Austin, Eric remembers a vibrant place made meaningful by eating, errands, and time with family. He describes an area that was very much alive *before* renewal. In the next two sections, visits to corner stores further highlight a Black sense of place and transformative possibilities.

Eric's Store

> "This is about the best store here. I mean, come to it all the time. I get everything I need here. I would take this place over a grocery store, me p personally. Because I can come get milk here, I can come get eggs here. I come and get a lot of things here, actually. I mostly come here for my grandma, though. My grandma plays her lottery and she tells me to go get stuff for her."—Eric, 19 years old

Chicken nuggets, wings, barbeque, burritos, egg rolls, breakfast tacos, *pan dulce* (Mexican sweet bread). Bright signs on Eric's favorite corner store advertise an eclectic selection of prepared foods. Options include the "staples" Eric describes above (milk, eggs), as well as quick meals. Eric knows the store well from living in the neighborhood ten years. The store's proximity to his house, along with its items sold, makes it convenient. At the same time, the corner store is a site of relationships, through which Eric sustains and cultivates multiple interconnections. As we walked into the store,

Eric and the store owner exchanged a warm greeting. He described walking or biking there, alone and with friends. He lives with his grandmother, and he often goes to the store for her in part because of her limited physical mobility. Engaging with a Black sense of place considers how these relationships *matter* while situating Eric's food geographies in broader context.

When Eric visits the store for his grandmother, he facilitates her access to entertainment (the lottery) or to food for the family as well as her creative cultural work. Reflecting scholarship about Black women's food labor, his grandmother prepares meals for her immediate household—Eric, his sister, and his mother—along with extended family (e.g., Williams-Forson 2006). Occasionally, Ms. Easley also cooks "pots of beans" for local homeless shelters. By extending beyond immediate family, her kitchen becomes a hub for family and community food networks. As Critical Food Studies Scholar Nettles-Barcelón et al. (2015) point out, Black women's food work is fraught with social stereotypes and expectations. Black women are "often represented in American culture as 'natural' good cooks" (p. 34), expected to nourish not only their own families but also those of others. These racialized and gendered stereotypes reflect African-American women's historic enslavement and servitude in kitchens, as well as representations of Black women and food in the marketplace. American food ads have long situated Black woman as smiling and accommodating "mammy" figures who cook food for the masses, from Aunt Jemima to the "Popeye's Lady."

Yet food also presents a creative medium for Black women. Eric's grandmother described enjoying cooking as a creative outlet because of her limited physical mobility. On the youth film, she made a point to share her favorite cookbook, *Paula Dean's Southern Cooking Bible* as a source of culinary inspiration. Aside from everyday sustenance, Eric's trips to the corner store make cultural and culinary practice possible. He participates in shopping and preparation, learning family recipes in the process. Cultural and subjugated food knowledge, an important aspect of food sovereignty, emerges here. Eric's experience reframes the corner store as a cultural institution, a reminder that consumption and cooking also involve the sharing and (re)creation of food knowledge.

Through its interactions, Eric's corner store also reflected feelings of safety and interracial relationships between residents of color. Along with other food retailers, corner stores continue to be sites of heightened racial surveillance, with racial profiling of Black and other non-white shoppers by personnel, authorities, and/or customers (Onwuachi-Willig 2017). Eric's ease suggests a sense of safety, and perhaps belonging, at the establishment. During a personal visit to the store, I witnessed this comfort from other

customers as well. As I checked out, a young Black man entered and greeted the store owner with, "Hello kinfolk." His greeting suggested a close relationship and shared language. I want to suggest, too, that "kinfolk" gestures toward *social* kinship: spoken from one man of color to another in this case, the expression acknowledges solidarity. The owner demonstrated familiarity with diverse people of color. When he asked if I wanted a bag, I responded in Spanish. My code-switching was not intentional, but my speaking a language other than English did not take him by surprise.

Eric's corner store fosters social and cultural relationships. At the same time, nearby gentrification of the built environment may foreshadow changes to the establishment as well. Eric noted that since "white people started moving in," "they rebuilt [houses], and then at the end of the street they're fixin' to put like a whole new street right there." Currently, his preferred and nearest corner store offers accessible prices for his family, along with a social network. Unless corner store initiatives address gentrification, any marketplace transformation stands to benefit new residents while possibly perpetuating displacement. From the perspective of food sovereignty, Eric's corner store experience brings attention to local relationships while reframing the corner store as a cultural institution.

Kristina's Store

> "Like people would think I eat Mexican food because I'm Mexican. I do, but that's not the only food I was raised upon – like soul foods, Southern foods, and fried chicken. So, I was raised around variety of foods, not just one particular type of food."—Kristina, 17 years old.

Inside Kristina's preferred corner store, a Chicken Stop serves fried chicken, liver, gizzards, burritos, and fish. Many of the items noted on the menu were among foods described as African-American, "Southern," or "soul foods" by youth and their family members during the broader project. The store also vends household cleansers and personal care items, as well as non-perishable food items, milk, energy drinks, and liquor. While Eric's experience emphasized place-making through relationships at the corner store as a friend, community member, and grandson, Kristina's experience emphasized her racial and cultural self-making as a multiracial young woman. Kristina was identified as Black and Mexican, with an African-American father and African-American and Mexican mother. She attributed her consumption of "a variety of foods" to her multiracial family. Her visits

to the corner store revealed how she conceptualized racial and cultural identities as bounded and distinct. She especially expressed this through her discussion of fried chicken.

Kristina recommended the corner store for its fresh fried chicken, sharing that the chicken was "pretty good but lacked seasoning." She speculated this lack of seasoning was due to the racial/ethnic background of the preparer, an older Latina woman. Kristina suggested the fried chicken would be more flavorful if cooked by an African-American woman. For her, fried chicken was symbolic of African-American or "soul food" cuisine. Her understanding of fried chicken as "Black" reflects historical and social geographies, as well as pervasive (re)presentations of African-American foodways. Historically to the present, denigrating representations of African-Americans and chicken have circulated to sell goods ranging from postcards to stoves (Williams-Forson 2006). Black women have prepared fried chicken for families, community, and customers, a role (re)presented in advertising, movies, and other media. During this project, other youth similarly described fried chicken as expressive of their racialized and cultural identities, and Eric's dislike of chicken became a recurring joke for Kristina and Chris. Fried chicken remains central to how Blackness is racially and culturally constructed in the USA.

For Kristina, a non-Black Latina woman preparing chicken unsettles these constructions. Her comment relates to other discussions of authenticity and food, such that *who* cooks, shops, or seasons the food, influences its flavor and if the meal is "properly prepared" (e.g., Williams-Forson 2011). Kristina further implies that making fried chicken involves more than a recipe, it also requires intimate and embodied cultural knowledge: The cook at the Chicken Stop may follow the recipe but lacks the requisite Blackness to make the chicken flavorful. Blackness is, in a sense, an essential ingredient. In making these claims, Kristina importantly draws distinctions between African-American and Latina identities. She understands the foodways of these racialized populations as bounded rather than connected. Indeed, even as she describes the various foods she consumes above, she defines them as African-American or Mexican. Kristina understands herself as moving between identities, rather than occupying them simultaneously.

Whereas Eric evokes interpersonal relationships in his corner store description, Kristina highlights other, internal dimensions of place-making. In her case, she *de*legitimizes her corner store. Her ambivalence toward the fried chicken influences not only what she consumes but also what she suggests to others by word of mouth. Marketing scholar Robert L. Harrison et al. (2015) find that even as Black and White, multiracial women form a "distinctive internal identity," "they are fully aware of external pressures to

conform to familial, societal, and marketplace expectations of what their identity should be and resultant retailer assumptions of their consumption practices" (p. 315).

Similarly, Kristina works through her personal "social location" by visiting the corner store. When she eats (and judges) the store's fried chicken, she applies her personal understanding of African-American and Mexican cuisines. She makes claim to both Blackness and Mexicanness when she determines the inauthenticity of the dish. She can do so, after all, because she *knows* fried chicken is best prepared by a Black woman. Her experience nuances studies of Black youth and corner stores, which tend to focus on African-Americans alone or do not indicate if Black youth identify as multiracial.

From the perspective of food sovereignty, Kristina describes the corner store as a place through which identities are (re)produced, here at the intersection of race, ethnicity, gender, class, and age. She brings attention to the "new subjectivities" that might be cultivated through food sovereignty (Sbicca 2016). Her self-making underscores broader tensions between how African-Americans and Latinx populations are racialized in the United States, cultural practices, and representations in the marketplace. How can corner stores empower subjugated identities? How can these subjectivities drive transformative marketplace practice? In addition to making culturally appropriate foods available, how do corner stores affirm subjugated identities and lift up marginalized food knowledge?

Conclusion

In this chapter, I revisited the corner store through lived experiences of Black American teenagers. Kristina and Eric cultivate relationships with themselves, family, and broader community through local convenience retailers. At the same time, our visit to the new boutique grocer contextualizes their food geographies within local displacement and gentrification. Their experiences push for a critical and relational understanding of corner stores beyond nutritional food access. By theorizing a Black sense of place, Black geographies scholarship (re)frames corner stores as sites of agency and potential systemic change, while examples of past and present food sovereignty suggest possibilities for corner store transformation that address issues of race and racism in the marketplace. Whereas I center Austin and Black American youth here, the gentrification and food injustices described impact marginalized youth worldwide. Scholarship can

further support transformative corner store practice by tending to relationships and by approaching Black and other historically marginalized populations as place-makers in their own right. As Agroecology Consultant Maryam Rahmanian and Sociologist Michel Pimbert (2014) assert, "To develop knowledge for food sovereignty we need to be humble and respectful of other [marginalized] voices and perspectives" (1). We need to believe, as scholars, practitioners, and community members, that (Black) communities have resources and relationships to build upon.

Notes

1. In this chapter, "Afro-Latinx" refers to youth who had African-American and Latinx (aka Latino) parents. They also identified as Black and "mixed". The food experiences of Afro-Latinx and "mixed" youth remain underrepresented in research and policy. Additionally, populations are not yet fully included in health or other data. In part due to these gaps, most references in this chapter involve African-Americans. As I discuss elsewhere, understanding Black food geographies as diverse is necessary in terms of access, cultural and social practices, and how young people are racialized in the marketplace (Jones 2018). Also see Williams-Forson (2011).
2. All names of interviewees are pseudonyms.

Further Reading

Grier, S., & Perry, V. (2018). Dog parks and coffeeshops: Faux diversity and consumption in gentrifying neighborhoods. *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 37*(1), 23–38.

Holt-Gimenez, E., & Harper, B. (2016). *Backgrounder: Dismantling racism in the food system, 1: Winter-Spring* (Report for Food First: Institute for Food Development and Policy). www.foodfirst.org/publication/backgrounder-dismantling-racism-in-the-food-system/.

Jones, N. (2018). "It tastes like heaven": Critical and embodied food pedagogy with Black youth in the Anthropocene. *Policy Futures in Education*.

La Vía Campesina: International Peasants Movement (LVC). https://viacampesina.org/en/.

References

Alkon, A., & Guthman, J. (2017). *The new food activism: Opposition, cooperation, and collective action*. Oakland: University of California Press.

Anguelovski, I. (2015). Healthy food stores, greenlining and food gentrification: Contesting new forms of privilege, displacement and locally unwanted land uses in racially mixed neighborhoods. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 39*(6), 1209–1230.

Baker, H., Jr. (2016). Intuiting archive: Notes for a post-trauma poetics. *African American Review, 49*(1), 1–4.

Bledsoe, A. (2017). Maroonage as past and present geography in the Americas. *Southeastern Geographer, 57*(1), 30–50.

Brown, J. (2005). *Dropping anchor, setting sail: Geographies of race in Black Liverpool*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Cahill, C. (2006). "At Risk"? The Fed Up Honeys Re-Present the Gentrification of the Lower East Side. *Women's Studies Quarterly, 34*(1/2), 334–363.

Cahill, C. (2018). Participatory action research. In J. J. Gieseking & W. Mangold (Eds.), *The people, place, and space reader*. www.peopleplacespace.org/frr/participatory-action-research-and-design/.

Eaves, L. (2017). Black geographic possibilities: On a queer Black South. *Southeastern Geographer, 57*(1), 80–95.

Gartin, M. (2012). Food deserts and nutritional risks in Paraguay. *American Journal of Human Biology, 24*(3), 296–301.

Gordon-Nembhard, J. (2014). *Collective courage: A history of African-American cooperative economic thought and practice*. Philadelphia: Penn State University Press.

Guthman, J. (2011). *Weighing in: Obesity, food justice, and the limits of capitalism*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Harrison, R. L., Thomas, K. D., & Cross, S. N. N. (2015). Negotiating cultural ambiguity: The role of markets and consumption in multiracial identity development. *Consumption Markets & Culture, 18*(4), 301–332.

Hatch, A. R. (2016). *Blood sugar: Racial pharmacology and food justice in Black America*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hayes-Conroy, J., & Hayes-Conroy, A. (2010). Visceral geographies: Mattering, relating, and defying. *Geography Compass, 4*(9), 1273–1283.

Jones, N. (2018). "It tastes like heaven": Critical and embodied food pedagogy with Black youth in the Anthropocene. *Policy Futures in Education*.

Kindon, S., Pain, R., & Kesby, M. (2007). Participatory action research: Origins, approaches, and methods. In S. Kindon, R. Pain, & M. Kesby (Eds.), *Participatory action research approaches and methods: Connecting people, participation, and place*. New York: Routledge.

Kirkland, A. (2011). The environmental account of obesity: The feminist case for skepticism. *Signs, 36*(2), 463–485.

Leatherman, T. L., & Goodman, A. (2005). Coca-colonization of diets in the Yucatan. *Social Science and Medicine, 61*(4), 833–846.

Lees, L., Shin, H. B., & López-Morales, E. (2014). *Global gentrifications: Uneven development and displacement*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Massey, D. (1994). *Space, place, and gender*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

McGlotten, S. (2014). A brief and improper geography of queerspaces and sexpublics in Austin, Texas. *Gender, Place & Culture, 21*(4), 471–488.

McKittrick, K. (2006). *Demonic grounds: Black women and the cartographies of struggle*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

McKittrick, K. (2011). On plantations, prisons, and a black sense of place. *Social & Cultural Geography, 12*(8), 947–963.

McKittrick, K., & Woods, C. A. (2007). *Black geographies and the politics of place*. Toronto and Cambridge: Between the Lines.

Nettles-Barcelón, K. D., Clark, G., Thorsson, C., Walker, J. K., & Williams-Forson, P., et al. (2015). Black women's food work as critical space. *Gastronomical: The Journal of Critical Food Studies, 15*(4), 34–49.

Onwuachi-Willig, A. (2017). Policing the boundaries of whiteness: The tragedy of being "out of place" from Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin. *Iowa Law Review, 102*(3), 1113–1185.

Public Science Project (PSP). (2018). *Participatory action research as public science*. http://publicscienceproject.org/.

Rahmanian, M., & Pimbert, M. (2014). Creating knowledge of food sovereignty. *Nyéléni Newsletter, 18.* www.nyeleni.org.

Ramirez, J., Heredia, A., Cardoso, E., & Nolan, J. (2015). *CHAMACOS youth council: Latino youth investigating environmental chemical exposures in the Salinas Valley*. http://yparhub.berkeley.edu/in-action/salinas-chamacos-youth-council/.

Ramírez, M. M. (2015). The elusive inclusive: Black food geographies and racialized food spaces. *Antipode, 47*(3), 748–769.

Reese, A. M. (2018). "We will not perish; we're going to keep flourishing": Race, food access, and geographies of self-reliance. *Antipode, 50*(2), 407–424.

Roberts, A. R. (2017). The farmer's improvement society and the Women's Barnyard Auxiliary of Texas: African American community-building in the Progressive Era. *Journal of Planning History, 16*(3), 222–245.

Roberts, A. R. (2018). Interpretations & imaginaries: Toward an instrumental black planning history. *Planning Theory & Practice, 19*(2), 254–288.

Sbicca, J. (2016). Food sovereignty or bust: Transforming the agrifood system is a must. In P. Godfrey & D. Torres (Eds.), *Emergent possibilities for global sustainability* (pp. 317–328). New York: Routledge.

Scott, T. (2016). *Liberatory sustainability: Food sovereignty, survival, and sustainability at the intersections, a guide for visionaries and warrior allies*. Ann Arbor, MI: Pioneers Press.

Sustainable Food Center (SFC). (1995). *Access denied: An analysis of problems facing East Austin residents in their attempts to obtain affordable, nutritious food.* www.sustainablefoodcenter.org/about/reports.

Tang, E., & Ren, C. (2014). *Outlier: The case of Austin's declining African American population* (Report prepared for The Institute for Urban Research and Policy Analysis). University of Texas at Austin.

United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). (2018). *Food Access Research Atlas.* https://www.ers.usda.gov/data/fooddesert/.

Weltman-Cisneros, T. (2013). Cimarronaje cultural: Towards of counter-cartography of blackness and belonging in Mexico. *Journal of Pan African Studies, 6*(1), 125–139.

Whelan, A., Wrigley, N., & Warm, D. (2002). Life in a food desert. *Urban Studies, 39*(11), 2083–2100.

Williams-Forson, P. A. (2006). *Building houses out of chicken legs: Black women, food, and power.* Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Williams-Forson, P. A. (2011). Other women cooked for my husband: Negotiating gender, food, and identities in an African American/Ghanian household. *Feminist Studies, 36*(2), 435–461.

Yes! Loitering Project. (2018). https://www.theyesloiteringproject.com/.

5

Beyond Whiteness: Perspectives on the Rise of the Pan-Asian Beauty Ideal

Jeaney Yip, Susan Ainsworth and Miles Tycho Hugh

Chapter Overview

- A "Pan-Asian" beauty ideal is increasingly used to represent the "face of Asia" and incorporates Asian and Western characteristics.
- Fairer skin is preferred in many Asian countries through the use of products that seek to enhance a uniquely Asian form of White skin that is Northeast Asian influenced.
- Pursuit of the Pan-Asian beauty ideal has driven growth in cosmetic surgery specializing in modifying distinctly Asian facial features.
- Pan-Asian beauty ideals are not imitation of Western norms but reflect economic and political development, Asian modernity, and transnational relations within the region.
- While the Pan-Asian beauty ideal promotes a distinctly "Asian" look, it also acts to homogenize racial difference within the region.

J. Yip (✉) · M. T. Hugh
University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: jeaney.yip@sydney.edu.au

M. T. Hugh
e-mail: tycho.hugh@sydney.edu.au

S. Ainsworth
University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
e-mail: susanaa@unimelb.edu.au

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_5

Introduction

Constructions of beauty are inherently racialized and also reflect the values of their particular contexts. In this chapter, we explore the racial basis and implications of the Pan-Asian beauty ideal. This ideal refers to a look that places particular emphasis on the face (rather than the body) and a distinctly "Asian" White skin tone with characteristic blending of Asian and European/Western features[1] (Frith et al. 2005). Reflecting shifting responses to Western influence as well as power relationships among countries in Asia, the Pan-Asian ideal serves as a marker of global integration and cosmopolitanism. Pursuit of this ideal and its promotion by fashion magazines, modeling agencies, and advertising have given rise to a significant market for beauty products and services ranging from skin whitening to cosmetic surgery.

We explore this phenomenon by tracing its origins, its changing symbolic capital, and its effects on the racial representations of beauty. We begin by outlining the intersection between beauty, race, and the Pan-Asian look. We then discuss the scale of the beauty industry in Asia, particularly relating to skin whitening. We explain how preference for fair skin shifted over time—reflecting economic and political developments as well as contact with the West. We then discuss the significance of the cosmetic surgery industry, which is targeted toward modifying characteristically Asian facial features in line with the Pan-Asian look. We conclude by contending that the Pan-Asian beauty ideal promotes a distinctly "Asian" look, which engages with global economic and information flows but also acts to homogenize racial difference within the region and reinforces superiority of Northeast Asia over Southeast Asia.

Beauty, Race, and Rise of the Pan-Asian Look

US sociologist Maxine Craig (2006) contends that beauty is inherently organized around racial hierarchies which categorize groups of individuals as more or less "beautiful" depending on their distance with the norm. Drawing upon this perspective, we view beauty standards as an expression of racial power relations in a given cultural context. In Asia, where "race" in bound up with migration, indigeneity, diaspora, (post-)colonialism, and nation-building (Rocha et al. 2018), we further argue that beauty standards must be appreciated in light of economic developments and transnational flows happening in the region. In other words, exploring ideals of beauty in

Asia enhances our ability to understand racial dynamics between Asia and the West as well as within the Asian region.

Much of the literature on beauty and race emphasizes how marketing representations of beauty privilege Western ideals of youth, slimness, and Whiteness embodied in fair skin, eye color, and hair texture (Hunter 2005). The historical domination of European and American brands in the globalized beauty industry explains part of this phenomenon (Jones 2011). Increasingly, however, the economic power of Asian nations spearheaded through the advanced economies of Japan, South Korea, and China (geographically referred to as Northeast Asia) has not only influenced the structure of the industry but also the way beauty ideals are marketed and visually represented.

In particular, much attention has been paid recently to people identified as mixed-race. Referred to as the "Pan-Asian look," this trend values individuals who exhibit European features mixed with an Asian appearance:

> It's called the pan-Asian face, and it usually means olive skin, Black hair – and probably a Caucasian parent. (Asian Sentinel 2007)

> Pan-Asian means Eurasian – models with a White ancestor in their family tree. (The Straits Times 2012)

> The whole allure of pan-Asian faces has been the cross-over appeal. They have the Asian flavor with an international touch. (China Daily 2007)

Transnational "Amerasian" actor and model Daniel Henney exemplifies this look (Ahn 2015). Born to an Irish American father and Korean American mother, Henney was featured on the cover of the Singapore publication *AugustMan* (March 2012) with the headline "*Daniel Henney Transcends Transnational Eastern and Western Boundaries and Roles.*" For media critics, his "exotic yet oriental look" embodies cosmopolitanism, elegance, and high class for Asian audiences (cited in Ahn 2015, p. 940). Similarly, the organizers of 2012 Miss Singapore World prioritized the selection of Pan-Asian contestants. When asked about this decision, a spokesperson responded that this strategy aimed to increase their chance to find "*a girl who can win the international finals*" (The New Paper 2012). Such a preference is also found among many brands, advertising and modeling agencies across the region. As stated by the head of a leading Singaporean modeling agency: "*if [my clients] want to appear global then they use the Pan-Asian look*" (private interview). However, while she notes that this representation of cosmopolitanism undeniably incorporates European elements ("*sharper nose,*

slightly larger eyes"), she insists on the fact that Pan-Asianism is not a mere imitation of Western ideals as her agency's Pan-Asian models are "*distinctly more Asian than Western.*"

Thus, over the past decade businesses and national institutions who participate in the economy of image production have reified and normalized the Pan-Asian look. What is less immediately discussed, however, is how this trend functions to conceal histories of marginalization and how it may in fact reproduce current inequalities among racial groups and countries within Asia (Matthews 2007). One of the Pan-Asian definitions above suggests a characteristic of "olive skin" which we note as a possibility of an acceptance of darker skin. However, it is noteworthy that this occurs against a dominant skin whitening ideal rampant in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. While an olive skin suggests a yellow undertone, there is possibly also more than one meaning of olive depending on the cultural context similar to how "white" is perceived in Asia. In the following sections, we discuss the valorization of fair or White skin and the minimization of distinctly "Asian" facial features such as eyes and nose.

White Skin in Asia

> Reduce brown spots, reveal more brightness. Michelle Reis.[2] (L'Oréal White Perfect Deep Whitening Double Essence 2011)

Skin is the "alpha and omega of racial difference" (Dixon Gottschild 2003, p. 190) and the most visible racial feature that signifies both ancestry and environment (Jablonski 2006). Modifications of the skin, then, seek to overtly or unconsciously alter racial elements. In formerly colonized Asian countries, skin has become an important classifier of status and White skin, a marker of beauty (Hunter 2005; Mire 2001). This preference for lighter skin, also known as colorism, situates people along a social hierarchy organized around skin tone (Glenn 2008). White skin, accordingly, serves as a form of symbolic or racial capital that enhances a person's life chances (see Dhillon-Jamerson 2019, in this volume Chapter 8; Vijaya 2019, in this volume Chapter 14).

While beauty brands have capitalized on the high value placed on fair skin in most if not *all* Asian markets, skin whitening has become a "normal" feature of many products ranging from facial washes to deodorants to body lotions. These products target the desire to preserve or enhance naturally fair skin as well as lightening darker or uneven skin tones. The skin whitening

market is a multibillion-dollar industry with the largest size and growth in Asia (Tan 2012), especially Japan and China. It is the single largest product category within skincare and includes cleansers, toners, moisturizers, makeup foundations, sunscreens, body lotions, and even deodorants. The key players in this global market include Beiersdorf (Nivea), Unilever (Dove, Rexona, Vaseline, Ponds, Fair and Lovely), Shiseido, Procter & Gamble (Olay, SK-II), L'Oréal (L'Oréal, Garnier, Vichy, Lancôme, Skinceuticals), and Kao Corporation (Kanebo, Sensai). While these global players operate and market skin whitening products throughout Asia, local brands such as Wardah (Indonesia's first halal skincare brand), Snowz (manufactured by a Thai company called Seoul Secret), and Laneige (owned by the South Korean AmorePacific Group) are gaining ground in various markets across the region. Simply put, almost *every* single brand of skincare operating in Asia regardless of region has a skin whitening range.

Nevertheless, there are multiple versions or tones of Whiteness and its meaning varies greatly depending on context. More specifically, we argue that in Asia, the promotion of a particular White skin tone as part of the Pan-Asian ideal privileges some racial subgroups (people of Northeast Asian origin encompassing Japan, South Korea, and China) over others (people from South East Asia). In other words, while this trend signifies racial distinctiveness from a European White person, it also homogenizes and represses racial difference within Asia.

Although the current popularity of "white skin" is certainly influenced by market and cultural flows between Asia and the West, it is important to note that the White skin beauty ideal was present in Asia prior to Western colonization (Wagatsuma 1967). For example, in pre-modern Japan (prior to the 1860s) the nobility of both genders would use White lead powder on their faces. From the Meiji Restoration[3] onwards (Ravina 2017), Japanese men and women started to imitate Western styles of dress and hairstyles (Wagatsuma 1967) so that by the early twentieth century, the White face (still produced by White lead powder) and traditional attire became associated with special occasions, rather than everyday wear (Ashikari 2003, 2005; Li et al. 2008). Urban middle-class women started wearing lighter more translucent makeup, but there were limits on the extent to which they could copy Western styles of dress, hairstyle, and makeup and still convey a gendered Japanese respectability. For instance, Japanese magazines contained advice aimed at helping women make fashion choices that clearly communicated their virtue and conformity to gender ideals in order to differentiate them from women of "dubious moral character" who worked in bars or clubs (Ashikari 2003). Thus, while Western trends certainly influenced

Japanese beauty ideals, it was far from straightforward imitation—rather Western ideals were adapted in such a way to express Japanese middle-class respectability, particularly for women.

The Japanese ideal of Whiteness has long been "ivory-like skin that is 'like a boiled egg' – soft, White and smooth on the surface" (market research firm Intage cited in Glenn 2008, p. 293). Social Anthropologist Mikiko Ashikari (2003, 2005) shows how this version of Whiteness expresses gendered and cultural values as well as racial identity. Studying the meanings that Japanese women attribute to skin tone, their skincare, and makeup practices, Ashikari's results illustrate the marked preference for lighter, whiter skin, associated with northern Japan's higher economic and social status. Those born with naturally lighter skin were seen as very fortunate. Yet whatever the shade, the objective is to preserve and enhance lightness through clothing (to protect the skin from the sun) and skincare. In particular, she notes that the wearing of foundation has a particular cultural significance. Foundation is not necessarily matching the natural skin tone of the individual. Rather it is applied to make the skin's appearance reflect the right shade of Japanese Whiteness and display "respect" for others, including men. Furthermore, Ashikari demonstrates that the ideal of Japanese Whiteness is clearly differentiated from both Southeast Asian darker skin tones and Western "whiteness." Japanese light skin is seen as far superior in both color and quality: It is fine, smooth, and unwrinkled, as opposed to European blotchiness, coarseness, and hairiness. As such, she argues that this ideal skin tone expresses a distinctly Japanese racial identity.

As a result, Japanese brands, notably Shiseido, have been at the forefront of the development of the skin whitening industry in Asia from the early 1990s. Later, European and American skincare companies such as Estee Lauder and L'Oréal entered the market. However, Japanese brands had a number of advantages in Asia. First, they could claim that their products were targeted at the "unique" needs of Asian skin. Second, their products were associated with sophistication, success, and scientific legitimacy due to Japan's historical economical domination in the region. Third, Japanese women's centrality within the ideal Asian beauty fostered phenomenal growth and demand for Japanese products, especially among former Japanese colonies (e.g. China and South Korea) which had adopted similar beauty ideals to Japan. Nevertheless, the growing influence of South Korea has slightly shifted the power dynamics related to beauty standards, and this is particularly evident in the second aspect of the Pan-Asian beauty ideal—the modification of racialized facial features.

The Pan-Asian Ideal and Facial Surgery

> …there is a Pan [Southeast] Asian beauty standard, which is white skin, big nose and non-oriental eyes even though almost no naturally born [Southeast] Asian that I know of would possess all of these without some sort of plastic surgery. (Comment posted on Quora 2017)

The focus of the Pan-Asian look on the face extends to facial features. This idealization has stimulated growth in cosmetic surgery all over Asia, especially in South Korea. South Korea is often claimed to be the world's leading country with regard to body and face modifications—although the largest market by consumption is still the USA (Holliday and Elfving-Hwang 2012). Korean popular culture has been increasingly influential throughout Southeast Asia since the early 2000s. This began with the spread of Korean dramas, music, and associated celebrities through what is labeled as the "Korean wave" or Hallyu (Shim 2006). The nascent boom of Korean cultural products from this period—in particular Korean drama series and later on K-pop music—made enormous inroads in both Northeast Asia (especially China) and Southeast Asia's media outlets. Always featuring highly "attractive" actors and actresses, this wave diffused to all parts of Asia where the transnational influences can be observed in makeup trends, skincare practices, and cosmetic facial surgeries.

Cosmetic surgery is not unique to any part of Asia. However, the marketing of these surgical procedures is directed toward both highlighting and rectifying particular facial features that are commonly connected to Asian racial phenotypes. Beauty work that involves surgical procedures correcting "racial features" includes blepharoplasty (double eyelid surgery) and rhinoplasty (nose surgery).

Pioneered in Japan, blepharoplasty has since spread to other Asian countries including China where it is now extremely common. Northeast Asian people do not typically have very "big eyes" and surgeons in China claim the so-called European style, characterized by a wide fold on the eyelid, was popular when the procedure first became known in China in the 1990s. It was later overtaken by the Korean style—"a natural-looking thin crease that is less noticeable" (Zhou 2017). Such a transition reflects the expanding influence of the Korean beauty industry on other markets.

In Southeast Asia though, European faces and bodies are often featured in the Web sites advertising plastic surgery practices. For example, a cosmetic

surgery clinic in Indonesia refers to the noses of "white people" as the standard to emulate in relation to rhinoplasty:

> According to experts in aesthetic surgery, the size of the ideal nose is proportional and in harmony with the shape and structure of each person's face. Therefore, the desired nose of each person is not the same. Many want to enlarge or shrink it. But in general, until now a prominent nose common to white people is still used as a reference nose, so the races of Asia and Africa want more sharp nose surgery. ("Cosmetic Plastic Surgery" n.d.—emphasis added)

Another surgical advertisement in Singapore highlights the specific needs of Asian customers/patients:

> The most common complaints in Asian patients are a flat nasal bridge, a round and bulbous tip, and a short, wide nose. Dr Huang uses advanced open rhinoplasty techniques involving the use of cartilage grafts for the nasal tip and silicone or Medpor implants of the nasal bridge to create enhanced but natural looking noses. (Asian Rhinoplasty, n.d.)

In these contexts, certain typically Asian facial features (such as small eyes and a flat nose) are constructed as a racial deficit which can be corrected through surgery. As with skin whitening, the claim that Asian needs are unique creates the need for brands and experts that specialize in understanding and meeting these needs. While this can be interpreted as catering to an "ethnic market" with specific needs, it can also be read as a form of racial engineering where facial features are corrected according to a seemingly Western and increasingly "Korean" beauty ideal. This correction creates a new Pan-Asian norm that incorporates both European facial features and northeastern Asian ideals of White skin.

This resonates with sociologist Kimberley Kay Hoang's (2014) study on the beauty practices of Vietnam's sex workers. These women, who are significant consumers in the beauty economy, engage in cosmetic surgery and other techniques of bodily alteration to achieve the Pan-Asian appearance. While the Pan-Asian face refers to the blend of European and Asian features, the focus and flavor always lie in "a specific East Asian ideal – round face, thinness and even, un-tanned skin tone." In the words of one of Hoang's (2014, p. 522) informants: "In the past, everyone wanted to look Western, but that is old. Now, the new modern is Asian."

This modern Asian face seems to be increasingly defined by a Korean beauty standard, with Vietnamese women looking toward Korea for the

latest and most advanced beauty products, many sharing Anh Minh's (one of the plastic surgeons cited in Hoang 2014, p. 525) opinion that South Korea "has become the new France." In Singapore too, the head of one leading modeling agency commented that the "Korean look," with its "big round eyes" and "high bridged noses" are emulated by Singaporean women as a beauty ideal. This aspiration toward a Korean aesthetic incorporates surgical modifications that reduce distinctly Asian features. A Pan-Asian face thus is a "distinct but indeterminate Asian look with some Caucasian-looking features, but the Asian heritage is more distinct than Caucasian" (Frith et al. 2005, p. 13). In summary, the Pan-Asian face which selectively mixes European traits and specific Northeast Asian features acts as a means by which a hegemonic beauty ideal is asserted that homogenizes racial differences within Asia.

Conclusion

Asia is neither homogenous geographically nor culturally. Asia's development intersects with European and British colonialism as well as with Japanese occupation, modernity, and cultural flows. The diverse settings and races that make up "Asia" are therefore complex with uneven economic, political, and cultural developments. Discussing "Asian beauty" is therefore equally complex—as this singular designation undermines the diverse racial, ethnic, cultural, and geographical contexts that vary between, for example, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. What is consistent in these contexts is the centralization and idolatry of White skin. This fascination with White skin, we argue, is not so much an emulation of the Whiteness associated with European skin but rather a Pan-Asian ideal achieved and facilitated through skin whitening products. This formulation normalizes and privileges some Asian "races" (namely Northeast Asians) who are fairer than, for example, counterparts in Southeast Asia such as Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. This implies an inferiority of those Southeast Asian "races" with darker skin and entrenches a long-standing tradition of "developmental racism" in Asia (Yue 2006), whereby the aesthetics of the Pan-Asian image are used and consumed at the expense (via occlusion) of the subaltern (darker) Asians in the region. Indeed, the aforementioned use of the Pan-Asian look acts to reinforce an entrenched racial hierarchy that places Northeast Asia at the top and Southeast Asia at the bottom. This complexity leads us to argue that Pan-Asian beauty ideals are increasingly used to deracialize differences among regions and diverse Asian ethnicities, which has both a

homogenizing and a privileging effect on racial representations that circulate in the marketplace.

Our review of the literature shows the complex cultural background of the fair-skinned Pan-Asian ideal and how it encapsulates aspirations for modernization and upward mobility among less developed countries in the region. The evolution of a Pan-Asian beauty ideal has been influenced by Western norms yet is a distinct and preferred aesthetic that denotes a modern, globally focused Asia. While previous authors have argued that Western beauty norms have created a homogenized look that colonizes other cultures, here we have shown how the influence of the West is more nuanced and contested. Asian White skin is considered far superior to that of Europeans, and a Pan-Asian look is the desired ideal. It is not that Western norms are entirely absent but rather that they have been interpreted and incorporated into a new aesthetic that reflects the Asian region. By tracing the evolution of the Pan-Asian look, and how preferences for skin tone and physical features have shifted over time, we have been able to shed light on some of the dynamics inherent in the relationships between race and beauty. There are many methods by which individuals, businesses, and nations can signal to others that they are globally integrated. One of them is through the types of faces and bodies used in visual representations. The Pan-Asian look is used by certain institutions as a living marker of global integration—emphasizing beauty ideals anchored in certain racial phenotypes. The sense of cosmopolitanism visually represented by the Pan-Asian look, however, is not solely via association with the West but rather via the strategic incorporation of European elements with a predominantly Asian look for the sake of appearing worldly—in other words, as a flexible citizen (Ong 1999).

Notes

1. Terms such as Asia, Europe, the West, or the East are admittedly inadequate notions—especially when referring to a unitary racial feature or identity. We do not claim that there are homogeneous contexts or racial categories. Using these terms, our aim is to designate imaginary racialized and gendered constructs in formation.
2. Michelle Reis is a Hong Kong actress of a Portuguese and Shanghainese descent, with a distinctively Pan-Asian look.
3. The Meiji Restoration refers to a period when military rule was ended by restoring Emperors to the throne. This occurred in response to Japan's first contact with the West after many centuries of being closed-off to foreigners.

Further Reading

Glenn, N. E. (2009). *Shades of difference: Why skin color matters*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Hunter, M. (2005). *Race, gender, and the politics of skin tone*. New York: Routledge.
Jablonski, N. G. (2012). *Living color: The biological and social meaning of skin color*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Turner, B. S., & Zheng, Y. (2009). *The body in Asia*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.

References

Ahn, J. H. (2015). Desiring biracial whites: Cultural consumption of white-mixed race celebrities in South Korean popular media. *Media, Culture and Society, 37*(6), 937–947.
Ashikari, M. (2003). Urban middle-class Japanese women and their white faces: Gender, ideology, and representation. *Ethos, 31*(1), 3–37.
Ashikari, M. (2005). Cultivating Japanese whiteness: The 'whitening' cosmetics boom and the Japanese identity. *Journal of Material Culture, 10*(1), 73–91.
Asian Rhinoplasty. (n.d.). *MH plastic surgery*. Retrieved from http://www.mhplasticsurgery.com.sg/services/asian-rhinoplasty-nose-surgery/. Accessed July 18, 2018.
Asian Sentinel. (2007, March 9). Pan-Asian beauty battle. *Asian Sentinel*. Retrieved from https://www.asiasentinel.com/society/pan-asian-beauty-battle/.
China Daily. (2007, February 9). Malaysian ads move triggers industry row. *China Daily*. Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-02/09/content_805345.htm.
Cosmetic plastic surgery. (n.d.). *Perfect beauty: Aesthetics and anti-aging clinic*. Retrieved from http://www.perfectbeautyclinic.com/cosmetic_plastic.htm. Accessed July 13, 2018.
Craig, M. L. (2006). Race, beauty, and the tangled knot of a guilty pleasure. *Feminist Theory, 7*(2), 159–177.
Dhillon-Jamerson, K. K. (2019). Marketing marriage and colorism in India. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 121–136). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dixon Gottschild, B. (2003). *The Black dancing body*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Frith, K., Shaw, P., & Cheng, H. (2005). The construction of beauty: A cross-cultural analysis of women's magazine advertising. *Journal of Communication, 55*(1), 56–70.

Glenn, E. N. (2008). Yearning for lightness: Transnational circuits in the marketing and consumption of skin lighteners. *Gender & Society, 22*(3), 281–302.
Hoang, K. K. (2014). Competing technologies of embodiment: Pan-Asian modernity and third world depending in Vietnam's contemporary sex industry. *Gender & Society, 28*(4), 513–536.
Holliday, R., & Elfving-Hwang, J. (2012). Gender, globalization and aesthetic surgery in South Korea. *Body & Society, 18*(2), 58–81.
Hunter, M. (2005). *Race, gender, and the politics of skin tone*. New York: Routledge.
Jablonski, N. G. (2006). *Skin: A natural history*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Jones, G. (2011). Globalization and beauty: A historical and firm perspective. *EurAmerica, 41*(4), 885–916.
Li, E. P. H., Min, H. J., Belk, R. W., Kimura, J., & Bahl, S. (2008). Skin lightening and beauty in four Asian cultures. *Advances in Consumer Research, 35,* 444–449.
L'Oreal. (2011, June). Advertisement for L'Oreal white perfect deep whitening double essence. *Herworld*, unknown page.
Matthews, J. (2007). Eurasian persuasions: Mixed race, performativity and cosmopolitanism. *Journal of Intercultural Studies, 28*(1), 41–54.
Mire, A. (2001). Skin-bleaching: Poison, beauty, power and the politics of the colour line. *Resources for Feminist Research, 28*(3–4), 13–38.
Ong, A. (1999). *Flexible citizenship: The cultural logics of transnationality*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Quora. (2017). *Can Southeast Asia create a Pan-southeast Asian pop culture like east Asia?* Retrieved from https://www.quora.com/Can-Southeast-Asia-create-a-Pan-Southeast-Asian-pop-culture-like-East-Asia. Accessed October 2, 2018.
Ravina, M. (2017). *To stand with the nations of the world: Japan's Meiji Restoration in world history*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rocha, Z. L., Fozdar, F., Acedera, K. A., & Yeoh, B. S. A. (2018). Mixing race, nation, and ethnicity in Asia and Australasia. *Social Identities*. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2018.1500162.
Shim, D. (2006). Hybridity and the rise of popular Korean culture in Asia. *Media, Culture and Society, 28*(1), 25–44.
Tan, D. (2012, September 18). Who's the fairest of them all? *Asian Scientist*. Retrieved from https://www.asianscientist.com/2012/09/features/skin-whitening-products-asia-2012/. Accessed July 10, 2018.
The New Paper. (2012, May 9). *Forget brains…we want the Pan-Asian look*. Retrieved from http://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Showbiz/Story/A1Story20120508-344646.html. Accessed July 15, 2018.
The Straits Times. (2012, May 17). The ugly side of 'Pan-Asian'. *The Straits Times*.
Vijaya, R. (2019). The new economics of colorism in the skin whitening industry: Case of India and Nigeria. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 227–244). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wagatsuma, H. (1967). The social perception of skin color in Japan. *Daedalus, 96*(2), 407–443.

Yue, A. (2006). Cultural governance and creative industries in Singapore. *International Journal of Cultural Policy, 12*(1), 17–33.

Zhou, V. (2017, June 12). Why double eyelid surgery is on the rise in Asia: Rising incomes and acceptance, and star power of Fan Bingbing, Angelababy. *South China Morning Post*. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/health-beauty/article/2093921/why-double-eyelid-surgery-rise-asia-rising-incomes-and. Accessed July 18, 2018.

Part II

Racialization and Intersectionality

6

Shopping While Veiled: An Exploration of the Experiences of Veiled Muslim Consumers in France

Ranam Alkayyali

Chapter Overview

- The French "culture wars" (Zerofsky 2016) over Muslim women veiling have migrated from public schools and public spaces into the marketplace;
- As a result of the veil's visibility, French Muslim women who wear headscarves are racialized, objectified, and at times discriminated against while shopping;
- Such treatment results from intersectional oppression, weaving aspects of gender, class, religion, and national background into the fabric of and meanings associated with veiling;
- Self-directed and situationally directed coping strategies embody veiled women's victim blaming ideology in French dominant-dominated marketplace contexts;
- Veiling should not be idealized or demonized but understood from multiple women's perspectives.

R. Alkayyali (✉)
ISEG Digital Marketing and Communication School
in Toulouse, Toulouse, France

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_6

Introduction

> Of course there are women who choose to wear the veil, there were also American Negroes who were for slavery. (Laurence Rossignol, France's Minister for Women's Rights)

On March 31, 2016, Laurence Rossignol, then France's Minister for Women's Rights, was interviewed on French National TV on the launch by several fashion retailers (i.e., Uniqlo, H&M, Marks and Spencer and Dolce & Gabbana) of products designed specifically for Muslim women, such as hijabs and the "burkini." She virulently condemned these brands as "irresponsible" and guilty of "promoting the confinement of women's bodies." She explained: "We cannot accept that it's trivial and innocuous that big brands are investing in this market and putting Muslim women in the position of having to wear that." When her interviewer pointed out that many Muslim women freely choose to wear such clothes, Rossignol responded with the infamous opening quote comparing "veiling" and slavery. If she later expressed remorse for the use of the word "Negroes,"[1] she stood by her observation about Islamic dressing (Jenkins 2016).

And so the Minister sparked yet another international controversy surrounding the "French culture wars" against veiling (Zerofsky 2016). However, while France's decade-long "wars" had historically focused on Muslim girls attending public schools and later on public spaces, this particular debate signaled a significant move to the marketplace. Since then, the recurring calls for the boycott of brands which target Muslim consumers (see Timsit 2018) frame the marketplace not only as a public space which should be religiously neutral (Johnson et al. 2017), but also as a space where Muslim women should be freed from the religious oppression that obliges them to cover their body. In this chapter, I question how such a framing may have an impact on the everyday shopping experience of Muslim consumers who wear headscarves. I examine veiled consumers' perceptions of discrimination and racism in French retail settings and how they cope with it.

First, this chapter briefly reviews the literature on consumer racial profiling and provides a short overview of France's historical "obsession" with veiling. It then presents the results of 20 in-depth interviews with veiled Muslim women living in Paris and its surroundings. These results highlight racialization, objectification, intersectional oppression, and various coping strategies. The conclusion discusses the implications of the study for consumer racial profiling.

Consumer Racial Profiling and Coping Strategies

Retail stores are not merely places for economic exchanges, but they are also sites of micro-interactional relations that allow abundant opportunities for customers, sales staff, and security personnel to engage in discrimination and racism (Pittman 2017). Existing research on consumer racial profiling mostly focuses on the experiences of African-American consumers and reveals how they receive different treatment than their White counterparts in stores (e.g., Bennett et al. 2015; Henderson et al. 2017; Pittman 2017). Many of these studies examine how some consumers feel discriminated against. For example, US criminologists Shaun L. Gabiddon and George E. Higgins (2007) show that Black consumers are ten times more likely than non-black consumers to report discriminatory treatment in stores. Other studies are more directly interested in discriminatory practices via testing methods. For instance, US social psychologists George E. Schreer et al. (2009) show that salespersons are more suspicious toward Black clients (versus White clients) when they ask them to remove an alarm on a pair of glasses in order to try them on.

This "Shopping While Black" literature also highlights the coping strategies that Black consumers mobilize in order to deal with the discriminatory treatment they receive in retail settings (Crockett et al. 2003). Most coping strategies draw on the *Exit-Voice-Loyalty* triad developed by the US economist Albert O. Hirschman (1970) and so involve both confrontational and non-confrontational strategies. Confrontational strategies include lashing out at clerks or asking to talk to the store's manager (Johnson et al. 2013; Pittman 2017). Non-confrontational strategies include but are not limited to: wearing clothes that demonstrate a certain income level, avoiding establishments reputed for treating Black consumers with suspicion, refusing to make a purchase and exiting the store, cultivating social ties with salespersons, and purchasing things they did not want just to disprove negative racial associations (Lee 2000; Pittman 2017).

Little research has examined how Muslim consumers, in particular veiled women, are racially profiled in the retail environment and how they cope with it. Existing research tends to focus on store-hiring practices that may discriminate against Muslim candidates who wear headscarves (Ghumman and Ryan 2013; Weichsebaumer 2016). On the other hand, research has examined how women (in non-retail environments) transform their veiling practice to escape the stigma associated with the veil (e.g., Jafari and

Goulding 2008; Sandicki and Ger 2010). Thus, they may remove their veil in some social settings where they fear being categorized as fanatical Muslims (Jafari and Goulding 2008), or they may try to turn the veil into something fashionable and aesthetic (Sandicki and Ger 2010). This chapter seeks to extend these studies by questioning how wearing a headscarf influences Muslim women shopping experiences in France.

Racialization, France and the Veil

US anthropologist Paul A. Silverstein (2005, p. 364) defines racialization as the process through which any element of social personhood (e.g., class, ethnicity, generation, and kinship/affinity) comes to be *essentialized* (associated with characteristics thought to be fundamental to the essence of the social group), *naturalized* (such characteristics are thought to inborn rather than learned), and/or *biologized* (distinct characteristics manifest through physical differences in bodies). For example, people of African descent might be essentialized as less intelligent (or more intelligent) as a result of biological differences determined at birth. Silverstein notes that immigrants are often racialized as a result of how the fluidity and particularities of individual migration processes get transformed into a fixed otherness, further constructed as a national problem. More specifically, he argues that Muslim immigrants and their descendants occupy a racialized slot in contemporary Europe because they are perceived as potential "enemies within" whose ultimate loyalties are located elsewhere (Silverstein 2005). In France, the "veil" as a distinct marker of otherness occupies a central place within the racialization process (Al-Saji 2010; Galonnier 2015).

Indeed, France has a long and tumultuous history with the "Islamic veil." Although veiling[2] started long before Islam and is still practiced within many religious groups, contemporary "battles" over veiling have specifically focused on Islam. Already in colonial time, French psychiatrist and activist Frantz Fanon (1965) noted that controversies surrounding the Islamic veil were at the core of the French civilizing agenda. He argued that the resourceful denunciation of the "sadistic and vampirish" attitude of the Algerian men toward women was an alibi to "destroy" the structure of Algerian society by "conquering the women" (Fanon 1965, p. 38). After many French colonies gained independence, the controversies migrated to mainland France.

Historically, France expects its immigrants to assimilate into the French secular Republic. This assimilationist perspective, also called the *Republican model*, is touted as the best way to protect French unity from the "tyranny of minorities" (Bowen 2007). As a result, a series of controversies have emerged focusing mostly on the clothing style which makes religious difference visible in the public space (Alkayyali 2015; Johnson et al. 2017; Alkayyali and Silhouette-Dercourt 2018). The first national incident sparked in 1989, when a middle school administrator banned young Muslim girls from attending school because of their refusal to remove their hijabs. This led to the first legal statement by the highest administrative Supreme Court, the Conseil d'Etat, authorizing wearing headscarves in public schools. Yet following the September 11 attacks in the USA, Muslim women in France were more likely to be harassed and assaulted than their male counterparts, largely owing to the visibility of their veils (Scott 2010). In 2004, the national assembly banned "signs and clothing that draw attention to the religious affiliations of pupils" in the public schools. Then, in 2011, another law criminalized the public display of any garment designed to hide the face. While no specific reference was made to religion or the niqab (Laborde 2012), quite tellingly the law was commonly referred to as the "burqa ban." The Islamic terrorist attacks in France further fueled Islamophobia as attacks against Muslims (both women and men) increased by two-hundred and twenty-three percent (Glasser 2016). Most recently, in 2016, a number of French municipalities banned the use of "burkini"—a swimsuit which covers the whole body except the face, the hands, and the feet.

Canadian Philosopher Alia Al-Saji (2010) contends that such laws and regulations have contributed to the racialization of veiling. She notes that such controversies have constructed veiling as a singular, homogeneous, and unchanging practice across historical periods and contexts (Al-Saji 2010, p. 890). As a result, she argues that, rather than just representing Muslim women, such naturalization of veiled bodies serves to reinforce the representation of Islam as closed and backward as well as to provide a positive and dynamic reflection of "western" constructions of identity and gender (Al-Saji 2010). Just as skin color is seen as the site of racial difference and biological determinism, the veil appears as both a marker of Muslim culture and an explanation of its inferiority (Al-Saji 2010, p. 890). Here, I explore how this racialization of veiling translates within the marketplace through the everyday shopping experiences of veiled consumers.

Methodology

This research is based on twenty qualitative in-depth interviews with veiled Muslim women living in Paris or its suburb.[3] Eight of these women immigrated to France between 1960 and 1980. They are first-generation immigrants (G1) between fifty and sixty-one years old. The other younger twelve women were born in France. They are second-generation immigrants (G2) between nineteen and forty-three years old. Some of these women are members of the same family (mothers and daughters). Each G1 woman has a secondary school degree, yet G2 women tend to be more educated with some of them studying at universities, pursuing master's degrees, and/or working for private companies.

I recruited the participants through two techniques. First, I subscribed to a mailing list (Les Dérouilleurs) aimed at the Muslim community living in France, which allowed me to send a call for participation to all its members. Second, members who responded to the initial email were asked to recommend other participants (i.e., the snowball technique). Recruitment, however, was not without its problems, especially with G1 women who were more reluctant to participate than G2 women. Nevertheless, identifying myself as a Middle Eastern woman, living in France, helped to ease participants' tensions surrounding cultural differences. Furthermore, in the context of some interviews I did wear a Hijab.

Interviews took place from January 2010 to August 2014 at the houses of some participants or in coffee shops or fast food outlets in the Paris area. They roughly lasted between a half-hour and two hours. Participants shared their (family) migration stories and details about their lives in their country of origin as well as in France. From these topics, we progressed to discussions surrounding perceived discrimination in French retail outlets. Women described their experiences with racism during shopping journeys in retail outlets; while waiting in the queue to pay for their products; through contact with security men, salespersons, and other clients; and when asking for after-sale services. They finally talked about their strategies for dealing with these experiences while shopping.

Findings

The Racial Profiling of Veiled Consumers

My informants reported different discriminatory treatment when shopping. These included feelings of objectification and dehumanization due to overlapping gender, race, and religious identities, and veil profiling.

Racialization

As defined above, racialization is the process through which any element of social personhood comes to be essentialized, naturalized, and/or biologized (Silverstein 2005). Existing consumer racial profiling literature focuses merely on phenotype and so tends to report the experience of consumers who may have been racialized and discriminated through their entire marketplace lives. In contrast, my informants have not worn their veil their entire lives or do not always wear it. As a result, they can more precisely pinpoint when racialization and discrimination occur. The following excerpt from Tasneem's (24-year-old salesperson, hijab) interview highlights this phenomenon:

> Yeah it is always the hijab that causes the problem. They will not say bonjour or bonsoir or merci. This is really pffff… I feel it in stores in front of other clients, I would do anything to get a smile or a hello… but no! What is funny is that when [I] go to buy a product and [I am] dressed in some ways, for example veil, long skirt, etc. the cashier ignores me. But when I come back unveiled and well-dressed everything changes…. She respects me more….

Tasneem's experience reveals the extent to which racialization occurs through the object of the veil. US writer Ralph Ellison (1952) famously wrote about the invisibility that cloaks racialized bodies. Commenting specifically on the experience of being Black, Ellison explained, "I am invisible . . . simply because people refuse to see me" (Ellison 1952, p. 3). For Tasneem, removing the hijab transforms her shopping experience from a racialized position of invisibility to a respected one. As a result of what Ellison describes as "a peculiar disposition of the eyes of those with whom [they] come in contact," Muslim shoppers receive second-class treatment and are denied the everyday courtesies and respect that other shoppers take for granted. For example, Fatiha (30-year-old PhD student, abaya) describes an experience she had while shopping in a Parisian hypermarket:

> Fatiha: Once I saw a big rat in [a store], I saw it twice, I swear, twice. It was running between the shelves… Ghhh… The first time I told the salesperson, she completely ignored me. She did nothing, she pretended that she did not hear about it. The second time I saw it, I did nothing, I understood that she would not answer to me.
>
> Interviewer: Why?
>
> Fatiha: Because I am an Arab woman in a black Abaya so I am a third degree citizen hhhhh my opinion is not important you know it well hhhhhh.

Here, Fatiha attributes her invisibilization not only to her veil but also to her gender and her racial background. Such an awareness indexes the notion of "intersectionality" which describes how various forms of social stratification (e.g., gender, race, class, sexual orientation, and disability) do not exist separately from each other but are interwoven together (Crenshaw 1989). Accordingly, Fathia and many informants declare multiple sources of oppression within the marketplace due to their overlapping gender, racial, class, and religious identities. Next, I discuss how Muslim shoppers are objectified as a consequence of their racialization.

Objectification

Objectification occurs when (women's) bodies are reduced to objects for the pleasure of others (Bartky 1990). This often takes place through normative (male) gazes or discursive acts of making comments about women's bodies (Gardner 1980). As a result, women experience shame and anxiety and suffer from various psychological disorders impacting their sense of self-worth (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997). My informants report many instances in which they feel objectified and dehumanized while shopping. They mention being bullied and harassed by other clients, salespersons, or security personnel:

> It is not comfortable for us to hang around in malls and supermarkets. People do not understand our clothing style, especially our veil. Sometimes they spit, other times they insult us, they call us the UFOs or the Ninja women. They compare us to everything which is scary. (Wafa, 21 years-old, student, abaya)

> People always make blessing comments about my clothing style […] Once I was doing my shopping in the supermarket which is right in front [of my place], and one salesperson said: "Madame the Black-Garbage-Bag drop your products here". It hurts my heart. That's why I avoid shopping there. It's unbearable. (Asma, 33 years-old, housewife, burqa)

Such experiences seem to contradict the consensus within most contemporary studies on consumer racial profiling which report that these practices tend to be subtle rather than overt (see Brewster et al. 2014). Nevertheless, some discrimination may be more subtle, as reported by Nadia (33-year-old PhD student, al-amira):

> Nadia: I went with my family to hang around and buy some games for my kids. There, there is a place for children to play with Lego. There was

another family when we arrived: a lady with her child and her husband. They were playing. When I approached, The French woman stood up, she got upset, she wanted to leave the place, I told her: "Thank you Madame" as if she left the place for us, but she looked at me strangely, and she did not reply…I repeated aloud: "Thank you Madam" and again nothing… she pretended to not hear me, she ignored me. She left her child with her husband and she left, she was really angry.

Interviewer: and what happened next?

N: She went to another part of the store and left her child and her husband playing with us

I: what did you do?

N: I left my husband with my child and I went to the other part of the store where she was. I wanted to see if she got angry because of me. And then she mumbled something. She went back to her husband and child and they left the store

I: Why did she do that?

N: I do not know. These people are very arrogant. They cannot stand to see us playing with them in the same store it happened to me several times. Once I was [at a restaurant] with my children and again a lady with her husband put their trays on a table next to us and then when they noticed that I am veiled, they changed their seats. I felt really humiliated.

Rarely mentioned in the consumer racial profiling literature, Nadia's accounts highlight the role of fellow consumers in the shopping experiences of veiled woman (see also Johnson and Grier 2013). Nadia's choice to confront the angry lady in the toy store and to remain silent and humiliated in the restaurant illustrates a range of coping strategies that I will discuss in further details below.

Coping While Veiled

When negative prejudices and stereotypes are salient and veiled women are faced with discriminatory treatment, they adapt different coping strategies to adjust their marketplace experience. These coping strategies differ according to women's age, generation, social class, and personality characteristics. Below, I distinguish two main types of coping strategies: self-directed (or internal) coping versus situationally directed (or external) coping strategies.

Self-Directed Coping Strategies

Self-directed coping strategies involve the women adapting themselves to cope with their shopping experiences. One strategy includes changing the

dress style. For example, some informants might wear colorful veils instead of sober ones and select scarves sold in stores and advertised in mainstream magazines, as reported by Houria (60-year-old housewife, hijab):

> When I go to supermarkets I wear my colorful clothes, elegant shoes. I chose a colorful veil. I wear it in the same way as French women in ELLE magazine. You know there you meet French shoppers, they look, criticize, and judge us. I like to show them that we, too, Arab women know how to dress.

Such a transformation of stigma into fashion consciousness is understood as important to avoiding veil profiling in stores (see also Sandicki and Ger 2010). In other examples, temporarily unveiling becomes the solution, as described by Mona (43-year-old teacher, hijab):

> I am not veiled all the time […] When I work, I do not put it on. […] When I [leave work] it is rare that I put it on and here I have the bag just to put my veil in it like a baby. . . hehehehe. It is in the bag. I'm like a mom carrying her baby in a bag… I am sensitive. In fact I cannot stand people's criticism towards my veil especially in [my work] neighborhood where the majority is French, the shops are French… And so I say to God: God forgive me I cannot put it on but it's there with me.

By carrying her veil in a bag instead of wearing it on her head, Mona transforms her veil into a fetish object that helps balance her two competing tensions: her feeling of weakness in the face of discrimination and her feelings of remorse for not being able to accomplish her religious duty. Finally, a last self-directed strategy involves regulating stressful emotions—or what US psychologists Susan Folkman and Richard S. Lazarus (1980) describe as an *emotion-focused coping* strategy—which allows veiled women to ignore the discriminatory treatment, as described by Halima (58-year-old housewife, hijab):

> They welcomed us in their home in France. And they serve us Halal meat despite the endless media debate. It's up to us to adapt to their cultures not the other way around! I wear my little veil and I don't bother anyone… if ever there is a criticism or a misplaced comment in a store, I ignore and I leave. It is up to us to adapt not the opposite.

Emotion-focused coping responses permit veiled women to trivialize or minimize the psychological and emotional stress of perceived discrimination. Ignoring discriminatory treatment is thus a preventive strategy utilized to avoid further unpleasant encounters and setbacks. The choice to respond this way stems from these women's status as older people who identified less

as "French" and are not eager to engage in confrontations. It also issues from their identity as foreign immigrants who believe they should respect the rules of their host country.

Situationally Directed Strategies

Situationally directed coping strategies involve women changing the situations and circumstances in which they shop as a response to their negative shopping experiences. As opposed to self-directed coping, which involves an internal focus on changing attributes of oneself, situationally directed coping emphasizes changing characteristics of the shopping environment one encounters. One strategy is to modifying the times at which one shops, as reported by Yousra (60-year-old volunteer, abaya):

> I go in the morning very early when there is no one. I don't do window-shopping. I don't take any pleasure. I know where I can find my products, I take them and then go directly to the checkout counter. I only go there before 12:00 pm. This way I am sure there are not a lot of people around. I don't go on Saturdays, for example, because there will be a lot of people and I prefer to avoid them.

Some women intentionally avoid peak shopping hours when they might potentially (or eventually) clash with hostile consumers, which, again, underscores the under-explored phenomenon enmity from fellow shoppers (see Nadia's above account). Another strategy is to avoid shopping in retail outlets altogether. To steer clear of physical demeaning and insulting interactions, many informants reported shopping online or exclusively patronizing "Muslims" stores and markets, as:

> Sometimes I go into stores, I do 5 steps and then I leave right away because I do not want it anymore… because I cannot stand the crowd and the contempt of people. So I prefer to avoid contact and I do [my shopping] online. For my clothes, there are websites like La Redoute, Les 3 Suisses, ASOS […] I also buy my make-up online, even for food I always use Carrefour Drive. (Warda, 31 years-old, pharmacist, hijab)

> We always prefer to go to Muslim shops where there are no strange gazes. Because I noticed when I'm with [my friend] people become very curious. Everyone turns around. Everyone is watching. Some people even insult us or spit. But she doesn't care. She feels good in her burqa. Especially in places where there are Muslims there are no gazes, there are no remarks, there is no police… (Wafa, 21 years-old, student, abaya)

These options involve considerable inconveniences surrounding the availability of products, shipping cost, and the time it takes for either mail-ordered items to arrive or to make a special trip to particular merchants. Yet in the last example of shopping at "Muslim shops," these women's withdrawal into their own community may reflect what French political circles lambaste as "*communitarianism,*" i.e., the insidious tendency for minority groups to organize along specific cultural identities (Mohammed and Talpin 2018). However, it appears here that the "community" is one of the last safe spaces left to avoid stigmatization and violence. In certain cases, shopping with the French Muslim community may serve as a form of political consumerism reminiscent of enduring efforts to "buy black" practiced by African-Americans (see Banks 2019, in this volume Chapter 13). That is, whether wittingly or unwittingly, veiled Muslim women are using their spending power to support fellow Muslim merchants.

Finally, a last situationally directed strategy involves developing a co-shopping tactic, namely always going shopping accompanied by friends or spouses, as Amina (35-year-old gynecologist, abaya) points out:

> I feel discriminated against at the checkout counter. Sometimes the cashier does not reply to my hello. Sometimes she passes the products nervously. She makes me feel that I am not desirable in the store due to my veil…..I try to be indifferent or I leave it to my husband. He becomes agitated and fights back. He shouts at her and asks "why do you treat us this way? Because we are Muslims? He always fights back and therefore gives her a lesson for life.

Here, Amina positions her husband as a protective force in conflicts with racist cashiers. In the earlier co-shopping example of Nadia with her family in the toy store, the presence of another person presumably empowered her to take a more confrontational stance and follow the angry woman. Indeed, the consumer racial profiling literature shows that there is a long-standing tradition of engaging in leisure activities as collectives rather than individuals as a means of avoiding the vulnerability and potential discrimination that comes with being isolated (see also Harrison 2013). In this regard, co-shopping among veiled Muslim women might be seen as an attempt to re-inert some degree of agency and pleasure into shopping experiences. Countering Yousra's aforementioned comments about taking no pleasure in shopping, through companionship co-shopping provides a level of empowerment, safety in numbers, and at least gestures toward reinscribing shopping as a leisure activity.

Discussion

The findings of this study highlight the experiences of veiled women in France. Consistent with extent studies on consumer racial profiling, my study describes how veiled consumers are racialized within the shopping environment and are treated differently than non-veiled consumers. This discrimination seems to emanate from the service providers (e.g., cashiers) as well as fellow consumers. However, my results also put a unique emphasis on the blatanteness/overteness of marketplace racism. Indeed, extant consumer racial profiling studies tend to show that instead of taking formal forms of exclusion (refusal of sale or access), discriminatory practices in stores tend to be more subtle/informal (Brewster et al. 2014). For example, in the study by Schreer et al. (2009) mentioned earlier, the request to withdraw the alarm on a pair of glasses was generally granted and it was only in the suspicious behavior of the sellers (including the tracking of Black customers in the store) that the discriminatory treatment appeared. Similarly, French marketing scholars Guillaume D. Johnson and Valerie Guillard (2017) revealed a parallel phenomenon in an experimental study testing discrimination among French B&B's. They showed that consumers named Amira and Mohammed had an approximately similar chance to obtain a room as other consumers named Marie and Nicolas. Nevertheless, they pointed out that discrimination took place in more subtle ways: The B&B's took longer to respond to Amira and Mohammed (vs. Marie and Nicolas), and they used fewer words in the mailings intended for Amira and Mohammed (vs. Marie and Nicolas). They concluded that marketplace discrimination should be rather understood in its subtleties versus its overtness.

My present study demonstrates the importance of understanding the significance of blatant racism as part of the experience of shopping. Indeed, "the veil" gives the opportunity for salespersons and fellow consumers to unleash their hatred on Muslim women consumers. In a world where blatant racism seems to rise with the support of neo-fascists (from Trump's USA to Bolsonaro's Brazil via Salvinis' Italy and the Philippines of Duterte, to cite just a few), the study of experiences of veiled consumers is critical as such treatment may sadly re-become the norm for many racialized groups. This research highlights the need to move away from an over-emphasis on "discrimination" in practice and to re-focus on marketplace racism as a vicious and incendiary ideology. This is particularly important when it comes to coping strategies.

Quite notably, the vast majority of the coping strategies practiced by women in this study do little (or nothing) to address the systemic issue of

racism in French society. Changing one's appearance, ignoring racist comments, and shopping online versus in-stores may be perfectly fine ways for individuals to deal with uncomfortable interactions. However, to the extent that these women are putting the onus on themselves to change, such strategies exemplify a blaming the victim ideology (e.g., "It is up to us to adapt not the opposite"; "I like to show them that we, too, Arab women know how to dress"). One way that I advocate for moving from the particulars of individual discrimination to the structural racism that underlies it is through considering both impact and intent. Rather than existing as sites where veiled Muslim women may be liberated from religious oppression, French marketplaces, as reflected in the everyday experiences of veiled shoppers, are saturated with tangible racial intolerances. The findings of this study suggest that, although women utilize different strategies in dealing with the impacts of this racism, few if any intentional efforts are put toward disrupting the racializing social structure. Outside of the retail environment, some interviewees are doing other actions that may lead to institutional/systemic change. But based on their actions, it would appear that in the direct retail setting, more times than not, they blame themselves.

Finally, as recommended by Al-Saji (2010), we must resist the tendency to make "the veil" a singular and homogeneous object. It should not be idealized as much as it should not be demonized. What is important is to recognize that Muslim women may wear a veil for many reasons—and with different understandings of the consequences—ranging from oppression to agency. As scholars, we must refrain from talking for them *à la* Rossignol. Instead, we must listen carefully to what they have to say, understand the complexity of their life, and possibly identify ways forward.

Notes

1. The translation of the French word "Nègre" is at the author's discretion.
2. The veil is a headcover that has different names and manifestations depending on time and place of origin and can be thought of as a continuum from least to most covering: **The Turban** is a headwear based on clothwending, it was very common among Sikh, but now it is also common among Muslim women. **The Shayla** is worn as a loose-fitting head scarf set in place at the shoulder, leaving the neck visible. **The Al-Amira** is a two-piece head scarf leaving the neck covered and only the face showing. **The Hijab** is a headwear that covers the head and the chest. **The Niqab** covers the entire body, leaving only the eyes visible. **The Burqa** covers the entire body including the eyes (Tolaymat and Moradi 2011).
3. All names of interviewees are pseudonyms.

Further Reading

Alkayyali, R. (2015). Religiosity and negotiating inter-generational acculturation tensions: The case of French Maghreb Muslim women's consumption. *International Journal of Islamic Marketing and Branding, 1*(1), 16–35.

Johnson, G. D., Thomas, K., & Grier, S. A. (2017). When the burger becomes halal: A critical discourse analysis of privilege and marketplace inclusion. *Journal Consumption Markets & Culture, 20*(6), 497–522.

Pittman, C. (2017). "Shopping while Black": Black consumers' management of racial stigma and racial profiling in retail settings. *Journal of Consumer Culture, 17*(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/1469540517717777.

Sandicki, Ö., & Ger, G. (2010). Veiling in style: How does a stigmatized practice become fashionable? *Journal of Consumer Research, 37*(1), 15–36.

References

Alkayyali, R. (2015). Religiosity and negotiating inter-generational acculturation tensions: The case of French Maghreb Muslim women's consumption. *International Journal of Islamic Marketing and Branding, 1*(1), 16–35.

Alkayyali, R., & Silhouette-Dercourt, V. (2018). Générations de femmes franco-maghrébines: La consommation comme marqueur des dynamiques intergénérationnelles. *Hommes & migrations, 1320,* 21–28.

Al-Saji, A. (2010). The racialization of Muslim veils: A philosophical analysis. *Journal of Philosophy & Social Criticism, 36*(8), 875–902.

Banks, P. (2019). Cultural justice and collecting: Challenging the underrecognition of African American artists. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 213–226). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bartky, S. L. (1990). *Femininity and domination: Studies in the phenomenology of oppression*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Bennett, A. M., Hill, R. P., & Daddario, K. (2015). Shopping while nonwhite: Racial discrimination among minority consumers. *Journal of Consumer Affairs, 49*(2), 328–355.

Bowen, J. (2007). *Why the French do not like the headscarves: Islam, the state, and the public space*. New York: Princeton University Press.

Brewster, Z. W., Lynn, M., & Cocroft, S. (2014). Consumer racial profiling in U.S. restaurants: Exploring subtle forms of service discrimination against Black diners. *Sociological Forum, 29*(2), 476–495.

Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A Black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. *University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1989*(8), 139–167.

Crockett, D., Grier, S., & Williams, J. (2003). Coping with marketplace discrimination: An exploration of the experiences of Black men. *Academy of Marketing Science Review*, *7*(4), 21.

Ellison, R. (1952). *Invisible man*. New York, NY: The Modern Library.

Fanon, F. (1965). *A dying colonialism*. New York, NY: Grove Press.

Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1980). An analysis of coping in a middle-aged community sample. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 21*, 219–239.

Fredrickson, B., & Roberts, T. A. (1997). Objectification theory: Toward understanding women's lived experiences and mental health risks. *Psychology of Women Quarterly, 21*(2), 173–206.

Gabiddon, S. L., & Higgins, G. E. (2007). Consumer racial profiling and perceived victimization: A phone survey of Philadelphia area residents. *American Journal of Criminal Justice, 32*(1–2), 1–11.

Galonnier, J. (2015). The racialization of Muslims in France and the United States: Some insights from white converts to Islam. *Social Compass, 62*(4), 570–583.

Gardner, C. B. (1980). Passing by: Street remarks, address rights, and the urban female. *Sociological Inquiry, 50,* 328–356.

Ghumman, S., & Ryan, A. M. (2013). Not welcome here: Discrimination towards women who wear the Muslim headscarf. *Human Relations, 66*(5), 671–698.

Glasser, A. (2016). *New French report shows rise in attacks on Muslims, sustained targeting of Jews*. New York: Humans Rights First. https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/new-french-report-shows-rise-attacks-muslims-sustained-targeting-jews.

Harrison, A. K. (2013). Black skiing, everyday racism, and the racial spatiality of whiteness. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 37*(4), 315–339.

Henderson, G. R., Haskian, A. N., & Williams, J. D. (2017). *Consumer equality: Race and the American marketplace* (Racism in American Institutions) (194 p.). Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.

Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, voice, and loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Jafari, A., & Goulding, C. (2008). "We are not terrorists!" UK based Iranians, consumption, and the "torn self". *Consumption, Markets, and Culture, 11*(2), 73–93.

Jenkins, N. (2016). A French minister has compared Muslim women to 'American Negroes'. A press article in the *TIME*. http://time.com/4277377/laurence-rossignol-muslim-women-hijab-negroes-slaves/. Visited in November 20, 2018.

Johnson, G. D., & Grier, S. A. (2013). Understanding the influence of cross-cultural consumer-to-consumer interaction on consumer service satisfaction. *Journal of Business Research, 66*(3), 306–313.

Johnson, G. D., & Guillard, V. (2017). Discriminations dans les services marchands : le cas des chambres d'hôtes en France. In Dauphine Recherches en Management éd., *L'état des entreprises* (pp. 31–42). Paris: La Découverte.

Johnson, G. D., Meyer, Y. J., & Williams, J. D. (2013). Immigrants versus nationals: When an intercultural service encounter failure turns to verbal confrontation. *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 32*(Special Issue), 38–47.

Johnson, G. D., Thomas, K., & Grier, S. A. (2017). When the burger becomes halal: A critical discourse analysis of privilege and marketplace inclusion. *Consumption Markets & Culture, 20*(6), 497–522.

Laborde, C. (2012). State paternalism and religious dress code. *International Journal of Constitutional Law, 10*(2), 398–410.

Lee, J. (2000). The salience of race in everyday life Black customers' shopping experiences in Black and White neighborhoods. *Work and Occupations, 27*(3), 353–376.

Mohammed, M., & Talpin, J. (2018). *Communautarisme?* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Pittman, C. (2017). "Shopping while Black": Black consumers' management of racial stigma and racial profiling in retail settings. *Journal of Consumer Culture, 17*(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/1469540517717777.

Sandicki, Ö., & Ger, G. (2010). Veiling in style: How does a stigmatized practice become fashionable? *Journal of Consumer Research, 37*(1), 15–36.

Schreer, G. E., Smith, S., & Thomas, K. (2009). "Shopping while Black": Examining racial discrimination in a retail setting. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 39*(6), 1432–1444.

Scott, J. W. (2010). *The politics of the veil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Silverstein, P. A. (2005). Immigrant racialization and the new savage slot: Race migration and immigration in the new Europe. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 34,* 363–384.

Timsit, A. (2018). A gap ad with a girl in a hijab shows how differently the US and France view personal liberty. A press article in *QUARTZ.* https://qz.com/1354629/a-gap-ad-showing-a-girl-in-a-hijab-is-infuriating-french-politicians/. Consulted in November 20, 2018.

Tolaymat, L. D., & Moradi, B. (2011). U.S. Muslim women and body image: Links among objectification theory and constructs of the hijab. *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 58,* 383–392.

Weichsebaumer, D. (2016). Discrimination against migrant job applicants in Austria: An experimental study. *German Economic Review, 18*(2), 237–265.

Zerofsky, E. (2016). The French cultural wars continue. *The New Yorker*. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-french-culture-wars-continue. Consulted in September 1, 2018.

7

Constructing and Critiquing Interracial Couples on YouTube

Francesca Sobande

Chapter Overview

- Components of interracial couple video blogs (vlogs) and what these suggest about issues regarding race and the marketplace.
- How interracial couple vlogs reflect racial privilege and colorism.
- What interracial couple vlogs indicate about the marketability of interracial relationships and mixed-race children.
- How and why interracial couple vlogs are connected to ideas regarding race, gender, sexuality, and cultural differences.
- How ideas about racialized identities and relationships are communicated via interracial couple vlogs.

Introduction

In 2015, one-in-six newlyweds (17%) in the USA had a spouse of a different race or ethnicity, which represents a significant increase from 3% in 1967 (Bialik 2017). As the number of interracial couples and mixed-race people steadily rises, there is a need to understand how their identities and experiences are communicated, and even commercialized, including online. In 2013, a *Cheerios* television advert depicted an interracial family; resulting

F. Sobande (✉)
Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
e-mail: sobandef@cardiff.ac.uk

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_7

in racist responses on YouTube, which eventually led to the temporary closing of the video's comments section. Such an example reflects how interracial relationships continue to cause controversy amidst consumer culture. Furthermore, digital media is readily available, produced and consumed by many, and is entangled with race-related issues. Hence, it is important to pay attention to the racial politics of online platforms such as YouTube, which offer arguably more democratic spaces for self-representation than traditional mass media outlets.

Since launching in 2005, YouTube has become a popular online video-sharing service where people upload and watch videos from around the world. YouTube content includes vlogs, through which people document their lives by directly addressing a camera. This can involve more than one person, as is the case with "couple" vlogs that focus on people intimately involved. YouTube opened up self-representation opportunities for marginalized groups, including ethnic minorities in predominantly White societies. Nevertheless, YouTube is not free from problematic issues of racial privilege and capitalism.

This chapter analyzes high-profile interracial couple vlogs, which depict individuals with a partner of a different racial background. Such vlogs have been created by couples living in societies that are primarily White (USA and Europe). Therefore, the vlogs studied stem from settings where Whiteness is commonly privileged. This work explores how intersectional issues related to race, gender, sexuality, and capitalism are implicated in interracial couple vlogs. It considers how the marketability of such vlogs frequently depends on idealized images of heterosexual relationships, as well as the presence of, or the prospect of there being, (often light-skinned) mixed-race children.

Literature Review

Race, Gender, Sexuality, Media, and the Marketplace

My research is grounded in critical examinations of race and inequality in market settings. Distinct influences include marketing and business scholars Geraldine Rosa Henderson et al. (2016) and their analysis of consumer equality, as well as marketing studies of ethnicity in virtual spaces, such as the work of Andrew Lindridge et al. (2015). Similarly, this chapter draws on the research of cultural anthropologist Anthony Kwame Harrison (2013, p. 315), which examines "how structural and symbolic forces combine to produce racialized discourses"; existing marketing scholarship, such as that of Judy Foster Davis (2017), which acknowledges how the normative nature

of Whiteness impacts media and marketplace dynamics; as well as communications studies yielded by Safiya Umoja Noble (2018), concerning how Internet activity represents and reinforces racial disparities. My work also involves recognizing the influence of heteronormativity, which relates to the dominance of heterosexual relations in public life, and their portrayal as being "normal," in contrast to other sexual identities.

Stereotypes and Social Perceptions of Racial Groups

As sociologist Trevor Jamerson (2019, in this volume Chapter 3) argues, digital technologies are racial projects entangled with issues of representation, power, and materiality. To put it briefly, as is argued in the media and technology scholarship of Alice Marwick (2016), online environments are connected to tangible offline entities, including people and material wealth. Further still, as marketing and advertising scholars Sonya Grier et al. (2019, p. 2) recognize, "race still looms large within the physical and virtual rooms of marketplaces." One of these virtual spaces is YouTube, which is a do it yourself (DIY) digital platform, where individuals produce and respond to online video content. Although it is not representative of all online video-sharing services and social media platforms, YouTube's popularity means that its content can have a vast and global reach, with over 1.8 billion users each month (Solsman 2018).

While YouTube vloggers have garnered the interest of academics, little attention has been paid to interracial couple vlogs. Couple vloggers' interracial relationships do not always involve a Black spouse; they can furthermore involve individuals with distinctly different cultural *and* racial backgrounds. Thus, my work examines different ideas and images related to race and culture as communicated in interracial couple vlogs. While this chapter focuses on YouTube content, there is also analysis of how such vlogs are influenced by racial and gender relations that predate the Internet, including the legacy of colonialism (Bonsu 2009).

The hangover of colonialism continues to facilitate stereotypical images of Black women in media and the marketplace, which fetishize and exoticize them in degrading ways, symbolizing an overlap in sexism and racism. Relatedly, as cultural sociologist Shirley-Anne Tate (2017) recognizes, light-skinned Black people (particularly women) are commonly more positively perceived in society than dark-skinned individuals, which is a manifestation of colorism—the social privileging of those who most closely resemble a White person. When reflecting on interracial couple vlogs, there is a need to account for the influence of long-standing racial and colorist inequalities.

Privileging Whiteness, Lightness, and Mixed-ness

As is illustrated by the work of community-based researcher and educator Naya Jones (2019, in this volume Chapter 4), racial identity is affected by geographical locations, where individuals forge a sense of self in connection with places and people they encounter. While there is no universal perception of racial identities (see Jamerson 2019), White supremacy, which refers to the dominance of political perspectives and attempts to oppress people of color, spans much of the globe. As sociologist Jessie Daniels (1997) elucidates, this results in White people often receiving preferential treatment in society; where they tend to be regarded as the norm against which people of color are defined as different, and even deviant.

Earlier in this volume, cultural anthropologist Marcel Rosa-Salas (2019, Chapter 2) scrutinizes how efforts to attract a "general market" in "Western" contexts such as the USA is often based on marketers' intentions to appeal to predominantly White consumer groups; even if this is not explicitly stated. Further still, the work of Grier and marketing research specialist Anne Brumbaugh (1999) unearths different ways that marketers attempt to attract racially and culturally specific target audiences. Just as advertisers use racially and culturally coded symbols to target certain groups (Crockett 2008), so too do YouTube vloggers. In considering how interracial vlogging is a form of marketing, it is beneficial to acknowledge that its potential mass appeal may depend on vloggers' abilities to attract a White audience, as well as more racially diverse ones.

There are important links between interracial YouTube vlogs and the different treatment of racial groups in society. This includes "ethnically ambiguous" mixed-race people, whose identities have increasingly been represented in media and marketing (Elam 2011). Marketing and advertising scholars Robert Harrison et al. (2017, p. 3) "suggest that marketers use mixed-race representations as cultural currency by mythologizing mixed-race bodies as the new beauty standard and as representing a racial bridge, physically and culturally tailored to ameliorate perceived racial divides." Comparably, images and ideas of interracial romance can involve insinuations that such relationships represent a racially tolerant society. This awareness underpins my analysis of interracial couple vlogs.

Overall, my work is approached from an intersectional perspective rooted in the transformational efforts of critical race legal theorists and Black feminists, such as Kimberlé Crenshaw (2017). An intersectional approach involves recognizing the interlocking nature of structural oppression, such as how racism, sexism, and capitalism combine in ways that result in the

particularities of discrimination faced by Black women. Aligned with the critical agenda of this book, intersectional research highlights the experiences of people who are among the most societally oppressed. Consequently, this chapter includes discussion of the perspectives of Black women on the topic of interracial vlogs.

Methodology

My work analyzes the activities of 10 interracial couple vloggers, all which are in heterosexual relationships. Of the 10 studied, five relationships are between a Black woman (BW) and a White man (WM). This reflects the popularity of interracial couple vlogs featuring such a pairing, which is often referred to as "BWWM" content. The relationships of other vloggers include those of Black and Asian (Blasian) couples, and of the 10 couple vloggers six involve a White spouse. The vlogs studied consist of the 10 most popular videos and 10 most viewed ones of each of the top 10 interracial couple vloggers on a Feedspot list. Feedspot is an RSS social feed reader, which compiles news feeds that can be customized and shared. It also has more than 100,000 "Influential Blogger" databases that enable marketers to connect with influencers. Although the criteria used to determine the Feedspot list are unknown, the top 10 couple vloggers each have a total video view count of over 10 million, with the highest nearing 200 million. They also each have over 140,000 subscribers, with one pair nearing 1.7 million. Additionally, all their top videos have a minimum of 100,000 views. Tubular Insights, which provides video marketing analytics information, suggests that the average number of views for YouTube videos about "People and Blogs" is 2354 (Marshall 2015). Therefore, the vlogs analyzed can be regarded as high-performing and included each of the couple vloggers' top 10 most "popular" videos, as well as their top 10 "most viewed" ones as indicated through YouTube's filter system.

The vlogs analyzed appear to originate from predominantly White societies, where marketers often attempt to primarily appeal to White people (see Rosa-Salas 2019). Analysis of vlogs was influenced by cultural theorist Stuart Hall's (1993) pivotal approach to encoding and decoding media messages, as well as literature on intersectionality and critical race theory (CRT, Crenshaw 2017). This involves examining how racist ideas are upheld and challenged in media, while recognizing the influence of dominant societal ideas, including the unquestioned state of Whiteness in the USA and Europe (Daniels 1997; Harrison 2013). Consequently, analysis

involved interpretively identifying potential meanings conveyed via the vlogs, by reflecting on their connection to social relations and inequalities (Noble 2018).

My analysis of vlogs also involved scrutinizing indicators of the vloggers' framing on YouTube. For example, the tagged words on the most popular vlogs were noted. Analyzing the intentional descriptions accompanying each vlog helped me to identify common themes. The top "search predictions" were also observed for each of the 10 interracial couple vloggers. This process involved acknowledging prompted words following vloggers' names as part of YouTube search predictions (e.g., "[YouTube couple vlogger name] wedding"). The search predictions provided insight into topics that are associated with interracial couple vloggers.

Table 7.1 summarizes key themes that emerged from my analysis, pertaining to parenthood, marriage, and family life. There is overlap between them (e.g., "Pregnancy" and "Children"). Still, distinguishing between these themes is pertinent given their differences, including the fact that not all content depicting children focuses on issues regarding pregnancy, nor do all vlogs related to dating involve discussions of marriage.

Table 7.2 highlights words that feature in the titles of the couple vloggers' most popular videos, as well as related search predictions. In addition to evidencing the strong link between interracial couple vlogs and content concerning parenthood, this table illustrates explicitly racialized language used to label and promote such vlogs (e.g., "Black"). This reflects Crockett's (2008) observations of how advertisers (in this case, vloggers) use racial discourses as marketing tools. The table also indicates the use of references to ethnic identities and geographical locations (e.g., "Korean," "China," "African," "Thailand") as part of interracial couple vlog marketing. Both tables shed light on foundational information regarding the content and labeling of the vlogs analyzed.

Table 7.1 Most popular videos—themes

Most popular videos—themes	Description
Dating and home	History of meeting and dating, cultural differences, pranks, home tours
Wedding	Bridegroom sending a gift to bride before the wedding, fairy-tale references, and racially diverse family, friends, and their children
Pregnancy	The video documentation of going into labor, being in the hospital, and beginning to raise a child
Children	Birthday celebrations, school, the physical appearance of mixed children

Table 7.2 Sample of words in most popular video titles and search prediction topics

Vlogger couple	Words in most popular video titles	Search prediction topics
1	First birthday, birth vlog, pregnancy announcement, proposal, parenthood	Wedding, pregnancy announcement, house tour, birth vlog, gender reveal, how we met
2	Pregnancy announcement, home, Asian baby, blue eyes, pregnancy test, unseen moments	Gender reveal, miscarriage, pregnancy announcement, birth vlog, name reveal
3	School, prank, birthday, baby, kids, girlfriend	Prank, prank wedding, pregnancy, gender reveal, wedding, kids
4	School, dating, proposal, wedding, Pampers, interracial	Pregnant, how we met, wedding, DNA, IVF, podcast
5	Black, wife, Korean, baby, married, prank	Pregnant, prank, wedding, how we met, Korea, China
6	Dad, kids, haircut, how we met, barbershop, Black	Wedding, dance, hair, kids, family, how we met
7	How we met, wife, first night, virginity, accent, body image	Snacks, prank, wedding, questions, how we met, Ramadan
8	Wedding, birth, traditional African, baby, how did we meet	Dancing, wedding, traditional, wedding, pregnancy, birth
9	Labor, birth, pregnant, romance, family, baby	Vlog, cooking, Thailand, house, wedding, birth
10	Vlogs, prank, breakup, cheating, kiss, ignoring	Vlogs, prank, break up, cheating, kiss, ignoring

Lastly, this analysis draws on interviews with Black women in Britain aged 19–47 years old, which included discussion of their YouTube usage. These interviews were part of a broader study on the media experiences of Black women in Britain (Sobande 2017, 2018). As such, only excerpts related to interracial vlogs are included in this chapter. Pseudonym is used to protect the anonymity of research participants.

Discussion

The online activities of popular YouTube vloggers involve strategic marketing efforts that can result in (micro-)celebrity status, for some (Marwick 2016). Recognizing vlogs as a form of marketing and branding is essential when exploring how they are shaped by issues of race, gender, sexuality, and capitalism. It is reasonable to describe the digital presence of the vloggers

under analysis as co-constructed self-brands that involve strategic staging and the pursuit of monetization opportunities, but which can also result in critiques of vloggers' alleged authenticity. The following subsections outline associated key themes stemming from my analysis of interracial couple vlogs and responses to them.

Fetishizing Mixed-Race Children

An emphasis on birth, children, and family life is an undeniable part of the interracial couple vlog genre, which is often anchored in commentary to do with: "Dating and Home," "Wedding," "Pregnancy," and "Children" (see Table 7.1). The vlogs studied present images and ideas regarding interracial relationships that are deemed to be marketable, such as those to do with mixed-race (children's) identities (Elam 2011; Harrison et al. 2017). Examples of this include the fact that all the vloggers feature words such as "birth," "baby," "pregnancy," and "nursery" in titles of some of their most viewed videos. Although the word "mixed-race" does not appear, such vlog content includes clear cues (e.g., emphasis on eye color, skin color, and hair texture) that indicate consumer culture fascination with the mixed-race identities of children—who frequently play a role in interracial couple vlogs.

In one case, a mixed-race child's first trip to a Black barbershop is the subject of the video. In a different vlog, it is a child preparing for language classes linked to the cultural identity of a parent. In both vlogs, the potential interest generated by them concerns documenting interracial and intercultural relations, as embodied by mixed-race children. Markers of racial and cultural difference seem to be strategically stressed as part of vlog content based on interracial and intercultural discourses of self-branding, representing strong links between issues of race and the marketplace (Grier et al. 2019). Another example is a vlog that focuses own an Asian child with blue eyes, which speaks to the fetishization of mixed-race children, particularly when their physical appearance indicates their partly White racial identity (see also Yip et al. 2019, in this volume Chapter 5).

Given that mixed-race individuals are often referred to in public commentary as exemplifying the perceived post-racial nature of society (Harrison et al. 2017), the focus on mixed-race children in popular interracial couple vlogs may be interpreted in similar ways. Despite this, these couples and their children are not solely celebrated as symbols of alleged progressive interracial relations, as is suggested by an interview participant named Annie:

> I just find it very telling that the most popular Black girls on YouTube have white spouses. I feel that part of their popularity has got to do with the fact that they are in mixed relationships […] I see a few Black women that kind of idealize their situation and I find that very awkward to watch. […] I guess get money where you can but I started seeing some sort of things that would come up on "recommended", like, "how to get a white guy" and it was just very cringe-worthy to watch and it would annoy me.

Annie's comments point to awareness of racialized discourses of branding at play in interracial couple vlogs. As she suggests, BWWM pairings are common among interracial couple vloggers. Her critique of these vlogs is based on a perception of them as perpetuating the idealization of interracial relationships, specifically involving a Black woman and a White man. Annie also alludes to the raced and gendered fetishization of "pretty female mixed kids," as she put it. Her reference to people's intrigue with the light-skinned children of interracial couples hints at how these vlogs and their potential marketability can be shaped by colorist beauty ideals influenced by colonialist racial hierarchies (Bonsu 2009; Tate 2017). Such a perception signals how issues concerning race, media, and the virtual marketplace are entwined with those related to ethnicity and culture (Jamerson 2019; Lindridge et al. 2015; Noble 2018).

Interracial and Intercultural Self-Branding Discourses

Annie's perspective was echoed by the words of an interview participant named Sasha-Barrow, who spoke of her awareness of Black friends who romanticize interracial love with a White partner:

> When it comes to love, they kind of think that white people's love is like a Fairytale, which is why I think so many women are drawn to relationships with white men in particular, because they view that as the only way of having romantic love. I'm really interested in Black love and how that's experienced. I'm really interested in that.

Sasha-Barrow's point of view mirrors elements of Annie's, who insinuates that it is the proximity to Whiteness of many Black women in interracial vlogs, which is part of their market appeal. More specifically, it is their relationship with White men, who due to the intersections of racism and sexism, are significantly more socially privileged than Black women (Crenshaw 2017), including amidst consumer culture contexts (Henderson et al. 2016).

In contrast to Annie, other interview participants such as Poppy enjoy interracial couple vlogs, but ones which specifically document the experiences of individuals bringing up children in intercultural and multilingual households. For Poppy, these vlogs provide a useful digital tool to turn to as part of her own navigation of a culturally blended family (Sobande 2018). Her interest in these vlogs was less about the fact that they focus on interracial relationships, and more to do with the ways that they emphasize "the culture clash" in intercultural families. Poppy spoke of following the vlogs of a Blasian couple, as well as a German and Nigerian couple, both of which are relatable to her because "I am from a different part of the country from where my husband is from."

The intercultural nature of certain interracial couple vlogs contributes to their appeal to audiences, who may infrequently encounter such images in mainstream media. Nevertheless, for people such as Miss Africa, this content can come across as condescending, commercializing, and disingenuous:

> They really annoy me because I find them quite degrading really. I feel that in 2016 we should not be celebrating interracial relationships. If it was 20 years ago, fair enough but not now […] It's almost like we don't appreciate ourselves [as Black women] so that when we become involved with someone of a different culture, it then becomes "aw, wow!" The media plays on it because now people are getting YouTube channels I believe, just for the sake of that now. They are dating people from different cultures, just so they can have a channel on YouTube [laughs].

Miss Africa's remarks reflect the perspective that interracial couple vlogs can, at times, even falsely represent relationships that have been orchestrated to tap into market demand. Comparable to Annie, Miss Africa also expresses frustration concerning how representations of Black women on YouTube acquire certain forms of capital when they are paired with an individual of a different racial and cultural background, and in notably heteronormative relationships. Although race is often the visible mark of difference between the individuals involved in interracial couple vlogs, it is commonly their attempts to blend cultural differences that are the focus and appeal of much of their content. This was demonstrated by words used in the titles of some of the most viewed vlogs analyzed, including: "cultural differences," "cultural identity," and "English memory." Moreover, a humorous video of a Black man speaking Korean while he attempts to convince a shocked Korean woman of his Korean heritage is further evidence of the interdependency of issues of race and culture in interracial couple vlogs; as well as those connected to the relationship between Black identity and geographical location (see Jones 2019).

Heteronormativity and Re-presenting Conventional (Globalized) Family Life

Of course, not all interracial couple vloggers are heterosexual, however, those who are, appear to consistently attract the most media interest and popular public following. When looking at the key themes and words associated with the vlogs analyzed, what is particularly striking is the relative dearth of explicitly racialized language. This is in contrast to words closely related to issues regarding gender, marriage, and childbirth, which can result in the vlogs universalizing conventional heterosexual dynamics. This is not to suggest that racialized language was completely absent (see Table 7.1). Rather, vloggers' emphasis on conventional and heteronormative gender relations (e.g., marriage between a man and woman) contribute to the prospect of these vlogs appealing to a general market (see Salas, this volume), instead of a more racially targeted one (Grier and Brumbaugh 1999). A case in point is the commonality of interracial wedding vlogs which depict a Bride-to-be getting ready beforehand, and receiving a gift from her future husband, before walking down the aisle in a White dress.

When explicitly racialized language is featured as part of the vlogs studied it is often paired with gendered words: "Black woman," "white man," "Black guy," "Black man," "Asian girls," "Korean wife." This illuminates that interest in the identities depicted in interracial vlogs is linked to the intersections of race, ethnicity, *and* gender. This is encompassed by vlogs often based on the explanations of non-Black people, discussing why they decided to date and/or marry a person of the opposite sex who is also from a different racial and cultural background (e.g., "Why I decided to marry a Black woman" or "Why I decided to marry an African wife"). To some extent, such interracial couple vlogs reflect the globalized nature of the world, including portraying the experiences of people from different racial and cultural backgrounds. The vlogs analyzed are all primarily in English and mainly focus on the perspectives of people in the USA and Europe. This arguably represents the dominance of media created by and for such primarily English-speaking audiences—even when such content depicts individuals with cultural backgrounds from elsewhere. This can be regarded as a function of the platform of YouTube, which despite having a global appeal, has significantly more active users in the USA (167.4 million per month) than from anywhere else (Statista 2016).

Conclusion

The tensions that exist at the nexus of racial and cultural differences make interracial couple vlogs seem novel. Yet, they often uphold conventional conceptualizations of heteronormative coupledom and family life, while fetishizing interracial relations and mixed-race children. This suggests that although media industry gatekeepers and producers may perpetuate racist stereotypes, the pervasiveness of the racial objectification of people can also be influenced by audience demand which is shaped by structural oppression and the internalized effects of White supremacy. As such, while there are ample opportunities for interracial couples to turn their everyday lives into marketized media, they come at the risk of fetishizing racial identities and relations.

Fascination surrounding interracial couple vlogs still frequently relates to the presence of, or prospect of them featuring (often light-skinned) mixed-race babies; whose physical appearance is spectacularized. This suggests that part of the appeal of such vlogs is their potential representation of Whiteness, lightness, and mixed-ness, even when darker-skinned people are also depicted—and under the guise of presenting more diverse images of couples and families than in mainstream media. Consequently, interracial couple vlogs reflect a combination of issues related to race, gender, ethnicity, culture, sexuality, and the marketplace. These are symbolized by the distinctly heteronormative nature and common inclusion of a White spouse and/or light-skinned child(ren) in the content of many high-profile vloggers. Future research would benefit from exploring how depictions of interracial couples in other digital spaces compare to those on YouTube, particularly platforms that may be less commercial in nature and which were created outside of the USA and Europe.

Further reading

Crockett, D. (2008). Marketing blackness: How advertisers use race to sell products. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, *8*(2), 245–268.

Grier, S. A., Thomas, K. D., & Johnson, G. D. (2019). Re-imagining the marketplace: Addressing race in academic marketing research. *Consumption Markets & Culture, 22*(1), 99–100.

Harrison, A. K. (2013). Black skiing, everyday racism, and the racial spatiality of whiteness. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 37*(4), 315–339.

Sobande, F. (2017). Watching me watching you: Black women in Britain on YouTube. *European Journal of Cultural Studies, 20*(6), 655–671.

References

Bialik, K. (2017, June 12). Key facts about race and marriage, 50 years after Loving v. Virginia. *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/12/key-facts-about-race-and-marriage-50-years-after-loving-v-virginia/.

Bonsu, S. (2009). Colonial images in global times: Consumer interpretations of Africa and Africans in advertising. *Consumption Markets and Culture, 12*(1), 1–25.

Crenshaw, K. (2017). *On intersectionality: The essential writings of Kimberlé Crenshaw*. New York: New Press.

Crockett, D. (2008). Marketing blackness: How advertisers use race to sell products. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, *8*(2), 245–268.

Daniels, J. (1997). *White lies: Race, class, gender and sexuality in white supremacist Discourse*. New York: Routledge.

Davis, J. F. (2017). Selling whiteness?—A critical review of the literature on marketing and racism. *Journal of Marketing Management, 34*(1–2), 137–177.

Elam, M. (2011). *The souls of mixed folk: Race, politics and aesthetics in the new millennium*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Grier, S. A., & Brumbaugh, A. M. (1999). Noticing cultural differences: Ad meanings created by target and non-target markets. *Journal of Advertising, 28*(1), 79–93.

Grier, S. A., Thomas, K. D., & Johnson, G. D. (2019). Re-imagining the marketplace: Addressing race in academic marketing research. *Consumption Markets & Culture, 22*(1), 99–100.

Hall, S. (1993). Encoding/decoding. In S. During (Ed.), *The cultural studies reader* (pp. 507–517). London: Routledge.

Harrison, A. K. (2013). Black skiing, everyday racism, and the racial spatiality of whiteness. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 37*(4), 315–339.

Harrison, R. L., Thomas, K. D., & Cross, S. N. N. (2017). Restricted visions of multiracial identity in advertising. *Journal of Advertising, 46*(4), 503–520.

Henderson, G. R., Hakstian, A. M., & Williams, J. D. (2016). *Consumer equality: Race and the American marketplace (racism in American institutions)*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.

Jamerson, T. (2019). Race, markets, and digital technologies: Historical and conceptual frameworks. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 39–54). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jones, N. (2019). (Re)Visiting the corner store: Black youth, gentrification, and a sense of place. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace*: *Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 55–72). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lindridge, A., Henderson, G. R., & Ekpo, A. E. (2015). (Virtual) ethnicity, the internet, and well-being. *Marketing Theory, 15*(2), 279–285.

Marshall, C. (2015, February 2) *How many views does a YouTube video get? Average views by category*. Retrieved from https://tubularinsights.com/average-youtube-views/.

Marwick, A. E. (2016). You may know me from YouTube: (Micro-)celebrity in social media. In P. D. Marshall & S. Redmond (Eds.), *A companion to celebrity* (pp. 333–350). West Sussex, UK: Wiley.

Noble, S. U. (2018). *Algorithms of oppression: How search engines reinforce racism*. New York: New York University Press.

Rosa-Salas, M. (2019). Making the mass White: How racial segregation shaped consumer segmentation. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 21–38). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sobande, F. (2017). Watching me watching you: Black women in Britain on YouTube. *European Journal of Cultural Studies, 20*(6), 655–671.

Sobande, F. (2018). Managing media as parental race-work: (Re)mediating children's black identities. In S. N. N. Cross, C. Ruvalcaba, A. Venkatesh & R. W. Belk (Eds.), *Consumer culture theory* (Vol. 19, pp. 37–53). Emerald Publishing: Bingley, UK.

Solsman, J. E. (2018, May 3). YouTube has 1.8 billion users logged in and watching every month. *CNET*. Retrieved from https://www.cnet.com/news/youtube-has-1-8-billion-users-logged-in-and-watching-every-month/.

Statista. (2016). *Leading countries based on number of monthly active YouTube users as of 1st quarter 2016 (in millions)*. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/280685/number-of-monthly-unique-youtube-users/.

Tate, S. A. (2017). *The governmentality of Black beauty shame: Discourse, iconicity and resistance*. London: Palgrave.

Yip, J., Ainsworth, S., & Hugh, M. T. (2019). Beyond whiteness: Perspectives on the rise of the Pan-Asian beauty ideal. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 73–85). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

8

Marketing Marriage and Colorism in India

Komal K. Dhillon-Jamerson

Chapter Overview

- How history informs the intersection of class, caste, and skin color in India.
- The gendered role of skin color in matchmaking negotiations.
- The influence of Bollywood and skin lightening advertisements on targeted marriageable age groups.
- How users navigate colorism in online matrimonial sites.
- Recognizing categories of difference and making the invisible visible.

Introduction to Colorism in India

Pigmentocracy or colorism refers to *intra*racial discrimination based on skin color and is transmitted through Western imperialistic values associated with Whiteness. In India, colonialism largely contributed to the perpetuation of Whiteness and masculinity as superior not only through direct domination, but also through the deepening of three key forms of social stratification—caste, class, and skin color. As a result, the colonial experience left lasting impressions on Indian culture in regard to perceived advantages

K. K. Dhillon-Jamerson (✉)
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA
e-mail: kdhillon@vt.edu

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_8

of lighter skin and patriarchy. The caste system in India functions as a hierarchical arrangement in which one is born into a sect that impacts life chances and societal treatment. In addition to caste, patriarchal cultures are also divided along gender lines with males holding more power in social and political spheres.

In postcolonial, patriarchal societies, the lives of women are deeply affected by pigmentocratic implications and the subsequent manifestations of prejudice. In this chapter, I consider how pigmentocracy in India disproportionately affects women in the context of marital arrangements, specifically illustrating how lighter and darker skin color can extend certain advantages or disadvantages, respectively, in the marriage market.

Women with darker skin often experience limited marital options across castes because their skin is frequently perceived as less valuable. As linguist Anita Pandey (2004, p. 413) explains:

> Darker individuals – particularly girls – usually have a harder time attracting "suitable proposals" and are often discriminated against…In fact, families sometimes demand a higher dowry[1] if the girl is "kali" (the Hindi term for a "black" or dark female).

This is in part a function of how standards of beauty can affect society's measurement of female value. Though colorism is closely linked to beauty standards, it also extends beyond the realm of perceived attractiveness and includes symbolic interactions relating to socioeconomic exploitation, caste status, being deserving of material comforts, and the skin-bleaching market. In essence, pigmentocracy is a project of racialization that involves characteristics that take on racial meaning—starting with skin color and extending to a range of social constructs—representing degrees of power that result from a seemingly natural order (Silverstein 2005).

In India, these complex nuances manifest through the value that light skin women impart to their husbands in signaling their ability to outcompete other men. That is, such women are symbols of men's success not only in the marriage market, but more importantly as a reflection of life achievements in general. Fair-skinned wives symbolize value in Indian culture and are often sought after in marital arrangements for their ability to elevate the status of their husbands. Radhika Mohanram (2007), a researcher in critical and cultural theory, advances our understanding of how women continue to be viewed as symbolic currency. She posits that in postcolonial India, gender serves as a marker for class and race and thus perpetuates British imperialism.

Social exchange theorists refer to this negotiation as men's socioeconomic value for women's attractiveness, which implies the exchanging of socially valuable commodities for other rewards (Ramasubramanian and Jain 2009). To illustrate how this exchange works in practice, I analyze several grooms-seeking-brides' online matrimonial advertisements from vivaah.com, one of the most popular South Asian matchmaking Web sites. Prior to considering how colorism operates in practice in the marriage market, I provide a brief discussion of the history of India as it relates to colorism. This is done to illuminate how pigmentocracy, in the context of India, interweaves unique aspects of Indian culture. Using a combination of conceptual and empirical research grounded in social science—specifically sociology, cultural studies, and feminist studies—I examine the intersections of caste, class, and color, while considering gender at the sites of marriage markets.

Finally, I address how colorism leads to the targeting of women in specific contexts, such as beauty salons, advertisements, and pre-wedding traditions. Though matrimonial ads in India are the primary focus of this chapter, the pervasiveness of colorism in matchmaking is not unique to South Asia and its global application is also discussed.

Historical Context: Caste, Class, and Color

The prevalence of social hierarchies in India, including the aforementioned trifecta of caste, class, and color, distinctly affects women in the marriage market. Though each individual factor impacts women of a marriageable age, at their intersections, these stratifications also have a compounding effect in regard to how they operate in women's lives. As such, skin color is intricately connected with caste designations or *varnas* (i.e., color). How color became associated with caste grouping has been theorized in various ways. One view holds that one of the *Rigveda* (ancient sacred hymns) is the source of caste and color designations (Sharma 1990). Another theory credits Aryan settlement of northern India with establishing the caste system based on color and occupation in 1500 BCE (Shevde 2008). According to anthropologist Nina Jablonski (2012, pp. 107–108), Aryans imparted social categories based on religious devotion and color as a dividing strategy:

> The highest class of priests was associated with white (and purity), warriors with red, peasants with yellow, and serfs with black. The classification also came to have some association with skin color (especially of the face) because many serfs were descended from the darkly pigmented Harappans.[2]

Lastly, though a caste system was in place prior to British colonization, many scholars such as Mohanram (2007) and anthropologist Diane Mines (2009) credit colonists for the oversimplification of the system. As a result, complexities of the system were lost to an organizational model based on occupation, skin color, and class as practiced during British colonialism. Colonialism imparted hierarchical beliefs related to race and skin color, with Europeans positioned as the most superior. Though India is no longer formally occupied by the British, the harmful effects of (re)colonialism remain and are reinforced by the production and circulation of racialized images, values, and organizing principles emanating from the West through channels such as mass media and the beauty industry. India has been reduced to stereotypes by Western imperial whites through historical representations and imagery that arrange the East according to Western standards. Doing so fortifies positive virtues (Whiteness, modernism, innovation, wealth, etc.) positioned as innate to the West, while simultaneously juxtaposing the East as dispossessing these characteristics.

I argue that the association of caste and skin color is not mutually exclusive from the association between caste and religion. According to modes of thinking oriented around racial difference and symbolism, forwarded by colonialism and other forms of empire building, White and Black are often representative of the religious morals of good and evil, respectively. Those with an interest in preserving caste distinctions and/or perceived racial purity still subscribe to the tenets of this system.

In modern India, dark skin as well as low caste membership are often associated with impurity and immorality. Due to how women are held to higher standards relating to both appearances and virtue (particularly of the sexual nature), it is not surprising that they are more likely than men to be viewed as commodities in the marriage market. These social forces can devalue a woman's worth and thus increase a family's financial burdens. Ancient and medieval historian, Ram Sharan Sharma, expands on this negotiation process in writing "the value of the dowry, a function of the bride's 'marketability,' correlates with factors such as her virginity, physical appearance, domestic skills, and education (i.e. the less marketable the potential bride, the greater the value the dowry must be to attract a suitable spouse)" (as cited in Ramasubramanian and Jain 2009, p. 259).

The remainder of this chapter addresses how caste, class, and color operate on the ground. Specifically, I expand on marriage as a crosscutting site of Indian patriarchal culture where casteism, classism, and colorism are discernable by examining matrimonial advertisements.

Caste, Skin Color, and Symbolic Currency in the Marriage Market

In patriarchal societies like India, women's value is largely articulated through appearances, which are complexly intertwined with colorism. Light-skinned (or *goreh/chitti* [fair/white]) domestic Indian women have become the desired choice for wives, while poorer, darker, lower caste, and/or Dalit women often experience less options in the marriage market. The former represents purity, which is associated with religious devotion and chastity. Light skin also denotes femininity, which encompasses the notion of being well kept by a father, husband, or son and not having to do hard labor. While recognizing that some forms of oppressions are shared, Indian women are positioned in very specific ways depending on their placement relative to caste, class, and color standards. These factors contribute to diversity among Indian women that differs from pigmentocracy found in other cultural contexts.

Marriages in India are often endogamous (occurring within similar social groups) and correspond with sociocultural categories such as caste, religion, class, age, education, geography, and increasingly, skin color. This system has traditionally allowed for the preservation of the caste system. Though caste is often an important factor in the matchmaking process, it is not entirely immutable. Both skin color and class status can supersede caste during marriage decisions. Skin color can also be used to negotiate marital arrangements—for example, light skin can compensate for lower caste and class. Conversely, to be better positioned, dark skin is often expected to be counterbalanced through other means, such as higher degrees of education and higher caste. Not surprisingly, men are not held to the same pigmentocratic standards as women, as their worth is more often determined by accomplishments such as education, employment, and wealth. Men who seek to marry women with light skin often possess competitive qualities related to caste and/or class status and can therefore afford to exchange their value for the symbolic currency of a light-skinned wife. Sociologists Korie Edwards et al. (2004, p. 69) summarize Ronald Hall's view on intercaste marriage:

> Hall (1995) explains that among Indian Hindus there exists a prejudice against darker skinned Indians. Light skinned spouses are preferred. For instance, light skinned wives are so preferred that Hindus from upper levels within a caste system will marry women from lower caste levels, exchanging

> her skin tone for his caste position. This preference is not as strong for Hindu men. Dark skinned Hindu men, who are of high status, can exchange their wealth for a light skinned wife. This is not as probable for dark skinned women.

Inevitably, there are circumstances in which such transactions are more viable than others. For example, a Brahmin family concerned with maintaining caste and "racial" purity may not be open to intercaste marriage, even if all other factors are favorable (including skin color). On the other hand, a higher caste family with little capital may be more amenable to an arrangement between lower caste and/or darker individuals with money.

The Commodification of Brides

The shift toward a free-market system in India's economy profoundly affected consumerism and bolstered women's financial independence. As a result, women experience an increase in buying power that purposely aligns with an increase in international companies targeting South Asian markets—most notably cosmetic industries. The manner in which dowries function in Indian culture is also altered due to women's socioeconomic and class progress, which further complicates theories of social exchange. As psychology and women's and gender studies professor, Jyotsna Vaid (2009, pp. 151–152) summarizes:

> A lighter skin color … can be used to compensate for status inconsistencies in cross-caste marriages, for an inadequate dowry, lack of education, or unemployment. By contrast, larger dowries may be demanded from women without education or employment, or from women considered dark or unattractive.

In addition, online matrimonial ads gained prominence as a result of increased mobility and the desire to broaden searches of the marriage market beyond known family networks (Vaid 2009).

Due to the weight placed on skin color and its intricate association with beauty, women of a marriageable age often experience societal and media pressure to have light skin. Taking into account the globalization of India in the 1990s, I consider the macro-level contexts in which this occurs, including media and cosmetics industries.

Bollywood (i.e., the Indian film industry) serves as one site in which stereotypical characteristics associated with skin color are showcased through the bodies of actors/actresses. For example, those actors/actresses who portray heroes/heroines and members of upper classes and castes are often fairer

than those who fill other roles. Conversely, villains, antagonists, and those of lower classes and castes often have darker complexions.

In this way, Indian movies can exploit negative associations with darkness, while the cosmetics industry provides the seemingly ideal solution. This has in part driven the increasing demand for skin-bleaching products in India. This heightened focus on colorism has been fueled further by both Bollywood's embracement of Whiteness and India's shift toward neoliberalism.

Bollywood actors and models often appear in advertisements promoting skin lightening products manufactured and marketed by Western companies such as L'Oreal, Vaseline, the Body Shop, and Garnier to name a few. Pharmacologists Ravi P. Shankar and Palaian Subish (2007, p. 102) attest that "certain advertisements had tried to project a notion that a fair skin is a necessary prerequisite for success in both the professional and the personal sphere." As a result, "the natural anxiety of men and women regarding skin colour has been heightened" (Shankar and Subish 2007, p. 102).

In the context of marriage, many prospective brides (and increasingly grooms) turn to skin-bleaching products in hopes of securing a better match. Cosmetic companies often target this consumer group with advertisements that utilize narratives relating to arranged marriages and the marketing of beauty and women's bodies. Additionally, beauty salons also promote skin lightening treatments that appeal to women seeking marriage or who are getting married. Hence, the connotation of "fairness and femininity in advertisements for skin lightening products … intersects with the cultural politics of beauty and skin color in a larger system of representations in India's popular domain" (Parameswaran and Cardoza 2009, p. 217). These advertisements reinforce beliefs that beauty (and thus value) can only be achieved through skin Whiteness, which is most evident in the company name *Fair & Lovely*. That is to say, advertisements present attractiveness and Whiteness as qualities that cannot occur independently. Conversely, they insinuate that darkness and beauty are mutually exclusive. These brands also focus on the economic advantages/disadvantages of lighter/darker skin.

The effects of colonialism and contemporary imperialism are embedded in Indian culture and further cultivated through forces such as globalization and capitalism. Subsequently, both racist ideologies and commodities influence social life. In this way, skin-bleaching companies, often using Bollywood celebrities, sell the belief that Whiteness is fundamentally superior, while relying on socioeconomic and aesthetic benefits as validation of these claims. In reality, lighter skin does yield material advantages. However, companies are circulating and intensifying preexisting stereotypes and socioeconomic realities through the exploitation (and devaluing of) dark skin.

Analysis of Online Matrimonial Ads

The following analysis of online matrimonial advertisements reveals how higher caste and class (correlated with education and profession) male-marriage candidates prefer lighter partners because this form of colorism symbolizes other social currencies for the couple collectively (i.e., wealth, modernism, achievement, etc.). For women, personal ads are more likely to include the word "fair" to increase perceived value on the marriage market; correspondingly, ads by potential grooms are more likely to list "fair" as a sought-after characteristic than vice versa (Pandey 2004). Pandey expands on this gender divide by arguing that matrimonial ads for grooms seeking brides have more specific requirements such as "fair, beautiful, god-fearing, quiet, respectful, innocent, humble, cultured, homely, dedicated, and finally educated" women (Pandey 2004, p. 417). In the marriage market, men are more often the subjects of negotiations, whereas women are relegated to the role of consumable objects. That is not to say that men are completely exempt from the societal pressures relating to physical appearances and skin color. In a study conducted by Edwards et al. (2004), the researchers found that in the USA, husbands' appearances are important to educated women seeking upward mobility. However, the authors note that among Asian-Americans, light-skinned women are the most likely to be married, whereas men with medium skin tones are the most likely.

The Role of Skin Color in Online Matrimonials

To illustrate how the trifecta of caste, class, and color often operate in tandem in Indian society, below I provide real-world examples of matrimonial advertisements. As Vaid (2009, p. 148) writes:

> Aside from birth, caste, and class considerations, other factors considered important in mate section are the prospective partner's education, age, and appearance. A crucial aspect of physical appearance, and one that is highly prized as a marker of beauty for South Asians, is a light complexion.

Using the online matrimonial site, Vivaah.com, profiles of prospective grooms in search of brides are reviewed below. Vivaah.com is widely used among South Asians and the South Asian Diaspora as the profiles are viewable to the public without a paid account (with additional benefits available

for purchase) or any mandatory user information. Additionally, the site has required fields relating to skin complexion for both the profile holder and the desired partner profile.

I accessed the site in 2017 and performed a "search for profiles" in which the following were selected:

Seeking: Groom
Age: 20–35 (default setting)
Country: India (default setting)
Religion: Hindu
Community: Any ("Any" is also the default, but available options included Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, etc.)

Users can further narrow results by selecting a link for "more search options," in which eight fields are displayed: religion, caste, community, key words, profession, photo club, profile ID, and advanced search. Of note, within the *advanced search* field, complexion was listed as a characteristic for narrowing one's search—complexion options include the following descriptors: "doesn't matter/any; very fair; fair; wheatish; wheatish medium; wheatish brown; wheatish dark; dark." The search yielded over 1000 matches, but only the first 100 are viewable for non-registered users.

I viewed the first one hundred ads for grooms seeking brides and the first one hundred ads for brides seeking grooms, the default of "any" was used for all fields. As Table 8.1 shows, I found that 21 out of 100 men indicated a preference for "very fair" or "fair" complexion in desired partner profile, whereas only 13 women specified the same preference. In this sample, none of the men showed a preference for wheatish dark or dark skin in their

Table 8.1 Skin color preferences and self description in matrimonial advertisements

	Men seeking brides[a]	Women seeking grooms[a]
Desire very fair/fair skin	21	13
Desire dark skin	0	0
Desire wheatish dark skin	0	4
Desire wheatish brown skin	3	7
Dark self-description	1	0
Wheatish dark self-description	0	0
Wheatish brown self-description	3	5
Very fair/fair self-description	65	60
Preference not indicated	7	11

[a] $n = 100$

desire partner, with three preferring the color rating of wheatish brown. For women, none preferred dark skin, but four indicated wheatish dark as a desired partner preference. For men seeking women, only one post included a self-description as dark and none as wheatish dark; no women seeking men described themselves as dark or wheatish dark. These figures likely reflect the stigmas associated with dark skin. Recognizing that dark skin is often viewed socially as a flaw, marriage candidates may intentionally attempt to minimize prejudgment by rating themselves lighter on the color scale. Even wheatish brown postings were nominal with three males and five females. The lack of dark, wheatish dark, and wheatish brown self-descriptions speaks to the invisibility of darkness, both as a reflection of how society views darker individuals as well as the lack of individuals willing to associate themselves with it.

Surprisingly, 65 out of 100 men in this sample stated having "very fair" or "fair" complexion, whereas women were slightly less at 60. In Pandey's 2004 study, she found that men were more likely to mention having darker complexions than women. Though the difference is only five candidates, this could be due to a relatively smaller sample size. Another possibility for the variation in findings could be the effects of increased color consciousness in India in general, in which men are also experiencing the perceived and real consequences of pigmentocracy—especially by women of higher statuses (in terms of caste and class [education/occupation]). As women become more empowered, the dynamics of pigmentocracy may shift and potentially disrupt the patriarchal nature of matchmaking. In other words, the effects of colorism may increasingly manifest in the groom selection process as women gain status. This would not be surprising as both potential brides and grooms may find themselves concerned with a partner's skin color—due, in part, to the widely recognized desire to have lighter children. In an effort to improve one's chances in the selection process, self-disclosed color labels may be purposely slanted in order to present oneself as ideally as possible. Moreover, these qualities could also be exaggerated by family members in situations where the matrimonial posting is created on behalf of someone else.

The Role of Caste and Color in Online Matrimonial Ads

To determine if caste is as significant a factor as skin color for grooms seeking brides, I focused on the most oppressed (out)caste, the Scheduled or Dalit castes, for the second part of the analysis. This entailed an in-depth look at two profiles seeking brides and identifying as Scheduled caste.

In the interest of randomness, all other fields, with the exception of "religion" (Hindu), were left as either default or "any." Ten profiles were listed on the first page of results and I examined the first ten pages available on the site for a total of one hundred profiles. These were viewed in the order in which they appeared with no intentionality behind the selection other than skin color preferences. I ultimately selected the first two profiles that indicated a "complexion" preference for "fair" in the "desired partner profile." These two profiles are representative of the sample yet contain telling differences. On average, 2–3 advertisements per page listed a preference for "fair" skin color, for a total of 27. I refer to the two compared profiles (the third and fifth listed on the first page) as Profiles A and B. Table 8.2 shows several similarities between Profile A and Profile B including: "marital status: never married; posted by: self; complexion: fair; body type: average; education: master's in arts." The similarities between A and B also extend to desired partner profiles: "marital status: never married; personal values: any; complexion: fair; body type: any; drink: no; smoke: no; religion: Hindu; and profession: any."

In regard to skin color, both users describe themselves as having fair complexion and list fair complexion as a characteristic in a desired partner. Indeed, skin color often operates in a unidirectional manner where wives are not expected to be darker than husbands, but the inverse is more acceptable. Furthermore, the fact that both users have advanced degrees can serve as a mitigating factor in how skin color is used in symbolic exchange. Higher levels of education and the correlation with higher income serve as "bargaining chips" (Vaid 2009) in leveraging one's socioeconomic assets in exchange for fair complexion in wives. Without masters' degrees and corresponding incomes, the users' preferences for fair complexion in desired partners may not be as justified, even with the condition of having fair skin themselves.

Interestingly, the desired partner profiles for both A and B do not indicate strong preferences in other areas beyond complexion and height. For example, the fields of personal values, body type, and profession are more flexible and allow for "any." Diet is also more open (though Profile A prefers "non vegetarian, vegetarian," which essentially encompasses all diets). Expectedly, profession is not accentuated in either desired partner profile. This may be partially due to the fact that in patriarchal societies, men are expected to be the primary breadwinners and women's careers are not as emphasized. That is to say, light skin color is an asset in and of itself and a fair woman typically does not need to rely as heavily on additional compensators that a darker woman may need to in order to offset a perceived deficiency.

Table 8.2 Comparison of male scheduled caste/dalit matrimonial advertisements

Profile A	**Profile B**
Age: 24 Years	Age: 30 Years
Height: 5ft 7in–170 cm	Height: 5ft 5in–165 cm
Marital Status: Never Married	Marital Status: Never Married
Posted by: Self	Posted by: Self
Religion: Hindu	Religion: Hindu
Caste: Scheduled Caste	Caste: Scheduled Caste
Community: Hindi	Community: Bengali
Complexion: Fair	Complexion: Fair
Body type: Average	Body type: Average
Profession: Teacher	Profession: Banking/Investment Services
Education: Masters in Arts	Education: Masters in Arts
Country, State: India, Uttar Pradesh	Country, State: India, West Bengal
City: Kanpur Nagar	City: Kolkata
Profile A's Desired Partner Profile	**Profile B's Desired Partner Profile**
Basics and Lifestyle	**Basics and Lifestyle**
Age: 19–26	Age: 21–25
Height: 5ft–152 cm–5ft 5in–165 cm	Height: 5ft–152 cm–5ft 4in–162 cm
Marital Status: Never Married	Marital Status: Never Married
Country: India	Country: India
Personal values: Any	Personal values: Any
Complexion: Fair	Complexion: Fair
Body type: Any	Body type: Any
Diet: Non Vegetarian, Vegetarian	Diet: Any
Drink: No	Drink: No
Smoke: No	Smoke: No
Religious and Social Background	**Religious and Social Background**
Religion: Hindu	Religion: Hindu
Mother Tongue: Hindi	Mother Tongue: Any
Manglik: No	Manglik: Any
Education and Career	**Education and Career**
Study Level: Bachelors	Study Level: Any
Profession: Any	Profession: Any

The areas in which the profiles differ pertain to age (24 vs. 30), occupation (teacher vs. banking/investment services), and geography (Uttar Pradesh vs. West Bengal[3]). Yet these do not seem to greatly affect the desired partner profiles, thus contributing to the view that pigmentocracy seeps into diverse facets of society, including age, profession, and place—in addition to various castes, classes, and religions. In short, the differences in the two profiles demonstrate the pervasiveness of skin color in Indian culture. Moreover, finding two profiles with a preference for fair skin in desirable partners was quick and effortless as they were quite common throughout the sample of 100.

Conclusion: The Fair Fare Best

For Indians, lighter skin transmits privilege, status, and attractiveness that promotes claims of racial, class, and/or caste superiority. Regardless of whether one is actually affluent/impoverished or high/low caste, skin color is intricately associated with class and caste. Though the manner in which caste operates in the context of matrimonial selections is unique to India, light skin as symbolic capital is not.

The desire for lighter skin brides extends beyond India. In the USA, in regard to online dating among African-Americans, skin color plays a role in decision making (Russell-Cole et al. 2013). Sociologist Christina Sue suggests that intermarriage in the USA and Brazil should be seen as deliberate incidences of "status exchange, [which] sometimes occurs when an individual marries someone with lighter skin or from a higher-status racial group by offering other valued attributes such as economic status, education, or power" (Sue 2009, p. 120). Similarly, in Veracruz, marrying a darker individual is generally only acceptable if the spouse is of a higher class (Sue 2009). Furthermore, skin lightening industries that target women are thriving around the Global South, including East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America (see Yip et al. 2019 [Chapter 5 in this volume]; Vijaya 2019 [Chapter 14 in this volume]).

Despite the complexities of marriage negotiations, women who embody the trifecta of idealness—including high caste, class, and light skin—often fare the best in matchmaking agreements in India and in cultures where pigmentocracy is prevalent. Moreover, Indian culture emphasizes marriage as a combining of families. As such, familial preferences must be taken into consideration during these social exchanges. In addition, the prominence of a bride or groom's family can reflect on the spouse's family, thereby further accentuating symbols of status, such as skin color, wealth, education, and caste.

In the marriage market in India, color consciousness and discrimination are fluid and cannot be defined according to set parameters; rather they must be examined in conjunction with the relevant beliefs, practices, and norms of Indian society—particularly caste, class, and pigmentocracy. Though love marriages are increasing, arranged marriages remain the predominant channel in the coupling process as the practice serves "to prevent alliances between individuals from differing classes, castes, or subcastes" (Vaid 2009, p. 148). As demonstrated, colorism complicates this notion as it is a factor in both love and arranged unions that can disrupt or enhance these categories of difference.

Outsiders often view Indians collectively as a homogenous ethnic and racial group—that is, a people with shared history, ancestry, culture, geography, traditions, and heritage. Darker and/or lower caste/outcaste Indians are thought to share the same history as elite Indians, and "thus their identity is supplanted by those in power" (Pandey 2013, pp. 63–65). Therefore, the unique interests and lived experiences of darker women and/or Dalits are often excluded from political and social narratives. As such, discourses related to pigmentocracy and casteism are not widely considered as sociopolitical and socioeconomic issues. In this way, darkness is rendered invisible, while fairness becomes the ideal. Generalizations regarding caste and colorism cannot effectively address the many factors affecting women in India. This can only emerge through undertaking more nuanced investigations of the values governing skin color in India.

Notes

1. Dowries refer to the practice of the bride's family providing money, gifts, and other valuable commodities to the groom and his family. The function and intention of dowries varies and ranges from setting up the couple's household to providing for the wife and children in the event of her husband's passing.
2. Serfs excluded from the caste system are the Dalits (broken people), also known as Untouchables (pejorative), Scheduled Castes (government designation) or Harijans (people of God) who are signified by the color Black.
3. Geographical differences can contribute to perceptions of skin color, especially given the north/south divide in which northern Indians are more often described as light or White, and southern Indians are viewed as darker. As Jablonski notes, "skin color varies from generally dark in the south to moderate or light (but able to tan) in the northern states" (Jablonski 2012, p. 165). In southern India, the highest class may be darker than the lowest class in northern India (Jablonski 2012).

Further Reading

Ayyar, V., & Khandare, L. (2013). Mapping color and caste discrimination in Indian society. In R. E. Hall (Ed.), *The melanin millennium* (pp. 71–96). New York, NY: Springer.

Jain, P., & Ramasubramanian, S. (2009, September). Gender stereotypes and normative heterosexuality in matrimonial ads from globalizing India. *Asian Journal of Communication, 19*(3), 253–269.

Telles, E., & PERLA. (2014). *Pigmentocracies: Ethnicity, race, and color in Latin America.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Vaid, J. (2009). Fair enough? Color and commodification of self in Indian matrimonials. In E. Nakano Glenn (Ed.), *Shades of difference: Why skin color matters.* Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

References

Edwards, K., Carter-Tellison, K. M., & Herring, C. (2004). For richer, for poorer, whether dark or light: Skin tone, marital status, and spouse's earnings. In C. Herring, V. M. Keith, & H. D. Horton (Eds.), *Skin deep: How race and complexion matter in the "color-blind" era* (pp. 65–81). Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago.

Jablonski, N. G. (2012). *Living color: The biological and social meaning of skin color.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Mines, D. P. (2009). *Caste in India*. Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Asian Studies.

Mohanram, R. (2007). *Imperial white: Race, diaspora and the British empire*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Pandey, A. (2004). Culture, gender, and identity in cross-cultural personals and matrimonials. *World Englishes, 23*(3), 403–427.

Pandey, Gyanendra. (2013). *A history of prejudice: Race, caste and difference in India and the United States*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Parameswaran, R., & Cardoza, K. (2009). Melanin on the margins: Advertising and the cultural politics of fair/light/white beauty in India. *Journalism & Communication Monographs, 11*(3), 213–274.

Ramasubramanian, S., & Jain, P. (2009). Gender stereotypes and normative heterosexuality in matrimonial ads from globalizing India. *Asian Journal of Communication, 19*(3), 253–269.

Russell-Cole, K., Wilson, M., & Hall, R. E. (2013). *The color complex: The politics of skin color in a new millennium*. New York, NY: Anchor Books.

Shankar, R. P., & Subish, P. (2007). Fair skin in South Asia: An obsession? *Journal of Pakistan Association of Dermatologists, 17,* 100–104.

Sharma, R. S. (1990). *Śūdras in ancient India: A social history of the lower order down to circa A.D. 600*. New Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.

Shevde, N. (2008). All's fair in love and cream: A cultural case study of fair & lovely in India. *Advertising & Society Review, 9*(2). https://doi.org/10.1353/asr.0.0003.

Silverstein, P. A. (2005). Immigrant racialization and the new savage slot: Race, migration, and immigration in the new Europe. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 34,* 363–384.

Sue, C. (2009). The dynamic of color: Mestizaje, racism, and blackness in Veracruz, Mexico. In E. Nakano Glenn (Ed.), *Shades of difference: Why skin color matters.* Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Vaid, J. (2009). Fair enough? Color and commodification of self in Indian matrimonials. In E. Nakano Glenn (Ed.), *Shades of difference: Why skin color matters.* Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Vijaya, R. (2019). The new economics of colorism in the skin whitening industry: Case of India and Nigeria. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 227–244). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Yip, J., Ainsworth, S., & Hugh, M. T. (2019). Beyond whiteness: Perspectives on the rise of the Pan-Asian beauty ideal. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 73–85). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

9

"Dirty Braids": How Hair Is Disrupting Dominant Racial Narratives in Puerto Rico Post-Hurricane Maria

Jess Vega-Centeno

Chapter Overview

- How race is defined in Puerto Rico versus stateside.
- The formation of racial identities on the island.
- Deconstruction of hair as a racial signifier.
- How stateside media perpetuates the dominant racial narrative on the island.
- Employing Critical Race Theory to disrupt the dominant racial narrative.

Race in Puerto Rico

The notion of race on the island of Puerto Rico has been silenced over centuries. Dating back to the 1500s, the genocide of the indigenous *Taino* Indians by Spanish colonists was preceded by a rampant *mestizaje* (the process of race mixing partly due to the enslavement of indigenous women and the African slave trade). This racial and cultural mixing has, ironically, served to preserve the Taino and African culture on the island, resulting in a range of skin colors, hair textures, multiple language dialects, and nuanced cultural practices that permeate the inhabitants of Puerto Rico today. However,

J. Vega-Centeno (✉)
University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
e-mail: jessmatias@utexas.edu

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_9

according to Communications scholar, Dr. Maritza Quiñones Rivera (2006, p. 163), "the ideology of *mestizaje* tends to omit African or indigenous ethnicity" by creating an identity that does not coincide with the Black/White racial dichotomy that exists in the US mainland. To be a *mestizo/a* means that you are neither Black nor White, denying Blackness yet allowing for Eurocentrism and *blanqueamiento* (an ideology that refers to whitening and Whiteness). *Mestizo/a* should not be misconstrued as a neutral racial identity because, ultimately, the closer a person is to White, the better they tend to fare in society. The acquisition of Puerto Rico by the USA after the Spanish American War created a tumultuous racial climate on the island, resulting in a silencing of Black and Taino racial identities.

This chapter aims to illustrate how Puerto Ricans disrupt the dominant racial narrative on the island; turning up the silence of race by exploring the context of hair (grooming and styling practices) post-Hurricane Maria. I interrogate Sociologist Ginetta Candelario's (2000) notion of *hair* systems (a term used to describe the organization and availability of hair services and products), arguing how these systems act more like *hair regimes* that exert a certain level of power that must be adhered to (Vickers and Isaac 2012), rather than a system that presumes a general level of neutrality.

Left with minimal resources, if any at all, the lack of electricity and clean running water following the hurricane, forced women to become innovative in a time of need. The lack of electricity disabled various styling tools such as flat irons and hair dryers and the lack of running water limited women's ability to wash and style their hair. Both circumstances have serious implications for racial identities. Using a critical perspective and examples from the media, I demonstrate how dominant racial narratives on the island of Puerto Rico (and the US mainland) are being disrupted, highlighting some of the various elements and ideologies that perpetuate and contribute to how racial identities are formed.

In Puerto Rico, social acceptance comes from adhering to cultural norms and beauty standards that have been imposed on women since Spanish colonization. The aforementioned genocide of the indigenous Taino Indians by Spanish colonists was meant to *eradicate* Blackness from the Puerto Rican cultural fabric while the enslavement of African people served as a means to *contain* Blackness on the island. Blackness in this context refers to a person's physical attributes which include—but are not limited to—skin color, hair textures, and other physical characteristics such as facial features (Weekes 1997). The Taino Indians were of darker-skin color with an array of physical attributes that deemed them *Black*—inferior, animalistic, wild, and most importantly—not White.

Conversely, the European beauty aesthetic became highly coveted. Puerto Rican women have learned since a very early age that curly, course or kinky hair is to be straightened, tamed, and essentially hidden. Anything outside of the straightened, lightened, and chemically processed hinders your social and cultural acceptance—an acceptance that women are constantly pressured into attaining because no matter how much a person changes, other physical characteristics will always be read as *Black*. A person can have lighter skin, lighter hair, and still be read as Black. Whether on the island or stateside, wearing natural hair demonstrates an acceptance of one's Blackness which also snowballs into recognizing one's oppression and exploitation (Badillo 2001). Anthropologist Casandra Badillo (2001) argues that hair straightening is a form of self-denial, denying one's self of the violent history during which indigenous ancestors were obliterated. Therefore, it is "natural" to straighten (Badillo 2001) and lighten your hair for not doing so may shed light on the Blackness that still permeates the Puerto Rican culture. The distinction between "good" and "bad" hair speaks to a tumultuous past, but also elucidates how racism continues to be reproduced in society (Candelario 2000; Badillo 2001).

Hair as a Racial Signifier

To understand the messages about hair and their relevance to racial narratives, it is important to address the politics of hair within the context of Puerto Rico and the US mainland. Communications scholar, Cynthia L. Robinson (2011, p. 372) states that "[c]oncepts of good and bad hair expose the internalization of White supremacy on Black identity." The course, curly, kinky, and dark, is considered "bad," whereas the straight, silky, long, and blonde is deemed "good." History and the media have taught us about "good" and "bad" hair. Documentaries, movies, music, books, and advertisements (to name a few) inform us about what it means to have "good" or "bad" hair. In addition to hair, other physical features such as the eyes, skin, nose, and lips are culturally encoded with racial meaning (Candelario 2000; Badillo 2001).

However, hair is the most malleable, it is common to, for example, see print and television advertisements for hair color products such as L'Oreal Feria and Clairol Nice "n" Easy for women to lighten/darken their hair and cover gray hair. Similarly, there are advertisements for hair straightening products ranging from hair relaxers to tools such as flat irons, and even wigs and hair extensions that help the establishment and adherence to social and

cultural norms. Both on the island and stateside, many women adhere to norms that favor straighter and lighter hair which is typically associated with professionalism, beauty, and manageability. On the island, there is a direct link between straightened/lightened hair, socioeconomic status, and racial identity—with straight/light hair typically denoting a higher socioeconomic position in society and a racial association with Whiteness.

Whether stateside or on the island, there are costs associated with "proper management" of one's hair, most notably the accessibility and affordability of required products and services must be considered. For instance, shopping for Black hair products is not an equable experience. In the USA, stores in predominantly Black and Latinx neighborhoods tend to have extended selections of hair products targeted to these groups. However, these stores are typically not as well maintained as stores in predominantly White areas, so people of color often must sacrifice selection for atmosphere or vice versa.

Dominant Racial Narratives

Despite there being no consensus on the exact nature of racial identification or categorization, a few key factors distinguish how race is perceived in Latin America (including the Caribbean) versus the USA. According to Sociologist Tanya Golash-Boza and Economist William Darity Jr. (2008), there are five key factors to be considered when trying to understand systems of racial identification and categorization.

First, the terms "Latino" and "Hispanic" are typically not used as racial or ethnic descriptors in Latin America (Golash-Boza and Darity 2008). However, these are common terms used stateside to describe anyone from a Spanish-speaking country despite their geographical, cultural, or racial background. To be clear, these terms are often misused as they are commonly used interchangeably. Latino refers to someone from Latin America, whereas Hispanic refers to someone of Spanish (Spain) descent. You can be both, but many are not. These terms were essentially created to lump all Spanish-speaking Americans into one group for "census purposes," however, there is much controversy over the generalization of these terms, and ultimately, the stereotyping that results from their use. These terms have rendered invisible the various nationalities and cultures that comprise this group. Second, in Latin America, people of African or indigenous descent are more likely to self-identify as White than their Latinx counterparts in the USA (Wade 1993) where some have adopted racial ideologies that would classify them as Black given their African and/or indigenous backgrounds according to the

one-drop rule (which states that having at least one ancestor of African ancestry provides the one-drop of Black blood needed to be classified as Black). In the USA, there are "binaries" that serve as frameworks for how we classify, identify, and categorize: race (Black/White), social relations (segregation/integration), and language (English/Spanish) (Rivera 2006). But, in practice, these categories function on a *spectrum*, whereas a binary implies definitive parameters such as Black and White. The African slave trade impacted both geographical locations thereby impacting how racial identities are formed. In Puerto Rico specifically, the *mestizaje* (racial mixing) has created what Rivera (2006) refers to as the "veil of cultural hybridity" alluding to the "myth of a racial utopia."

Third, the notion of mixed-racial categories is more prominent in Latin America (Skidmore 1993; Duany 2005). Terms such as *mestizo* (refers to White/Indian mix) and *mulatto* (refers to White/Black mix) illustrate how "[i]dentity is not static; instead, it is a fluid process negotiated through cultural and social relations" (Rivera 2006, p. 176). However, these terms are not free of negative and derogatory connotations that have been socially encoded. Rivera (2006, p. 162) defines *mestizaje* as "an ideology that purports a state of harmonious race relations in which discrimination supposedly does not exist"—a type of euphemism to soften the raging blow of racial discrimination, denying Blackness while silencing the oppression. Despite gestures toward a color-blind post-racial society, racism in the USA has undergone a discursive change as opposed to a behavioral change. This shift does not ameliorate racism, but gives way for other covert forms of racism such as inappropriate costumes during Halloween that are offensive toward various cultural groups, yet justified simply because it was not *intended* to be racist in nature, and systemic forms of racism that tend to challenge the notion of equality and equity such as various aspects of the education system where resources are limited or inaccessible to certain groups.

Fourth, unlike in the USA where people of African descent are more likely to identify as Black, Latin Americans (including Puerto Ricans) avoid this label (Cruz-Jansen 2001; Darity et al. 2005; Wade 1993). As previously mentioned, there is terminology in place to disguise Blackness (despite physical characteristics), such as *mestizo*.

And lastly, unlike in the USA where physical characteristics are a predominant racial signifier, Golash-Boza and Darity (2008) claim that racial status in Latin America is heavily determined by one's social class. The higher you are socioeconomically (class, income, education, etc.), the "Whiter" you can claim to be when compared to individuals with lower status. However,

because of the relationship between race and class, non-whites are far less likely to come from a higher socioeconomic status or experience social mobility–systems and institutions are situated as such that people of color are more likely to be born poor and remain that way. In the previous chapter, Komal Dhillon-Jamerson (2019, in this volume Chapter 8) describes a similar phenomenon in South Asia, among Indian men particularly in the context of marriage. This is not to say that this correlation between race and class does not apply on the "mainland," rather it operates and manifest differently stateside. Therefore, when Puerto Ricans migrate to the USA, they are confronted with racial classification systems that are familiar, yet foreign. In addition to their physical characteristics, income, education, and occupations are read racially from the distinct but related historical context of the USA.

Racial Silence and Assimilation

Rivera (2006, p. 163) refers to "racial silence" as the notion that "…Afro-Puerto Ricans have to negotiate their Blackness silently, while protecting their Puerto Ricanness…". This silence is comprised of the use of language (Candelario 2000) or lack thereof to describe Black racial identity (Quiros and Dawson 2013) and color-blind ideologies (Bonilla-Silva 2004). The silence does not ameliorate racism, or more specifically, the *experience* of being Black stateside and the island. In both contexts, the experience of being Black brings with it an array of hostility, cynicism, and denigration (Rivera 2006, p. 175); however, I argue that the silence is amplified on the island given the denial of racial oppression, the lack of racial binaries (more commonly found on the stateside), the "euphemistic" terminology used to label individuals of color anything but Black (mestizo, mulatto, etc.), and lastly, the term "Afro-Puerto Rican" itself further alienates Blackness as the term Puerto Rican already implies *Afro*.

Puerto Ricans who migrate to the stateside experience a kind of "culture shock" when confronted with the US racial hierarchy. Upon arrival, they find themselves essentially forced to learn the intricacies of race relations and its impact. Golash-Boza and Darity (2008, p. 929) refers to this as a type of "racial assimilation," which "takes into account the overwhelming importance that skin color has in shaping our interactions with others." Part of this learning process is coming to terms with a less fluid racial categorization system, and learning that you are not considered American. This gets particularly complicated for Puerto Ricans who are US citizens by birthright; however, their lived experience tells another story.

Innovation Out of Necessity: Grooming Practices Post-Hurricane Maria

The dominant racial narrative in Puerto Rico speaks to silenced, denied, and "covert" race relations overall. In an effort to examine the disruption in this narrative and turn up the volume on racial silence, let's examine some of the aftermaths of Hurricane Maria and its impact on the Puerto Rican people. This context provides a rich backdrop to explore the various socio-political implications that plague these narratives. On September 20, 2017, Hurricane Maria made landfall on the island of Puerto Rico, decimating the island to catastrophic proportions. Despite the debates surrounding relief efforts for the island, Puerto Ricans were left with limited recourse, forcing its citizens to adapt to a new way of life. Almost a year later, power was not fully restored, over 60,000 homes were without roofs, and over 2 million people (representing over half of the island's population) were living in areas at risk of water contamination. Yet citizens managed to meet certain basic needs despite the lack of resources, establishing a "new normal"—a new way of life that involved a great level of creativity and innovation.

Throughout the island, residents have adjusted to new ways of: *collecting water* by using pipes to funnel water from natural springs into towns where community members can collect water in buckets and empty soda bottles; *filtering water* by attaching portable filters to buckets of water providing clean water for drinking and cooking; *showering* by hanging buckets above bathtubs and connecting them to showerheads; and, *washing clothes* by constructing manual washing machines made out of barrels, buckets, and hand ringers (Reichard 2017). With no electricity and Internet, residents have also found ways of *entertaining the children*; a group has come together to provide movie nights via a traveling movie rig called Cine Solar—an outdoor movie night for kids powered by solar panels (Reichard 2017). However, just months after Hurricane Maria struck, headline news stateside fixated on new grooming practices—how women were doing their hair without electricity and clean running water. A rather peculiar focus given the prolonged lack of basic needs such as food and clean drinking water.

The "New" Normal Post-Hurricane Maria

Mainstream media shed light on how Puerto Ricans are adapting to their "new" lives—a "new normal." For example, how they are tackling basic needs such as grooming given the lack of power and in some cases, clean water.

Women are either cutting their hair shorter so that haircuts last longer or wearing different hairstyles that do not require hairdryers or flat irons—not merely by choice, as there are social implications to this change in appearance, but also out of necessity. Hairstyles such as "braids" and "buns" serve as an alternative for women to maintain a sense of beauty, self-esteem, and pride. For Puerto Rican women, the act of styling one's hair goes beyond having a convenient way to "keep one's hair out of the way"; styling one's hair is an expression of their femininity, beauty, and expresses an adherence to cultural and social norms that require women to *properly groom* themselves. Therefore, despite the lack of resources, styling and grooming practices are absolutely prioritized. However, there is a level of vulnerability that comes with this change. While Puerto Rican women have found new ways of maintaining their hair, these new styling and grooming practices are exposing natural hair colors and textures deemed unacceptable via patriarchy—a term that refers to the power dynamic that exists between men and women (Sultana 2011), a social system that supports the oppression and subordination of women. Hence, standards of beauty and femininity established and upheld by men—determining how successfully a woman navigates rites of passage such as marriage and motherhood. For example, a woman's beauty aesthetic is a barometer for how likely she will be courted for marriage as the expectation is that she maintain long, straight, and at times, even lightened hair.

This is further problematized when the media uses derogatory language to describe "the newly adopted" hairstyles as "messy buns" or "dirty braids." Media outlets such as *The Guardian*, *The Root*, Yahoo News, *The NY Daily News*, and NPR absurdly sensationalized this "new normal." Below are a few representative headlines and quotes from select articles:

How Hurricane Maria Forced Puerto Ricans to Change Their Hair—*The Guardian*

> I think I just saw everyone's real hair for the first time in my life…
>
> The constant heat and high humidity—*coupled with months without power and clean water— means that long, blown-straight hair no longer dominates the island…*
>
> …performance art theater company in San Juan…poked fun at *Puerto Rico*'s new normal, including the island's newest hairstyles. They include the "messy bun", the "dirty braid", and "el moja'ito" (the wet one) – in which women use an excessive amount of gel to make it seem they had just come out of the shower.

Hurricane Maria Changed Puerto Ricans' Lives—But in Stranger Ways Than You Would Expect—*The New York Daily News*

> Puerto Ricans are adjusting to a new way of life—and are implementing new and unusual routines…
>
> Women are ditching long, blown-straight hair in favor of styles requiring less upkeep…
>
> They [women] are beginning to show their undyed roots and natural curls, which are sometimes obscured by a cap.

Interestingly enough, approximately six months after these articles were originally published (January 2018), the tone changed. The headlines were no longer using words like *strange* and *forced*. Now, on a much more positive note, words like *embrace* and reference to the *natural hair movement* were stressed.

After Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rican Women Embrace Their Natural, Curly Hair—www.npr.org

> After the storm, many Puerto Ricans didn't have electricity to blow dry their hair…A lot of people decided, I'm not gonna deal with that anymore.
>
> Many have embraced the change.
>
> Om says straightened hair is a cultural norm that has been reinforced on the island for a long time…When they [women] came to her salon after Hurricane Maria…they didn't even know what their natural hair looked like.

Puerto Rican Women Are Embracing Their Natural Hair More Than Ever After Hurricane Maria—Yahoo Lifestyle

> Maybe only about 10 percent of women in *Puerto Rico* wear their hair curly,
>
> Now it's changing a lot. A lot more people are wearing their hair curly. It's a movement worldwide, but in Puerto Rico, because of the humid weather, and because of what just happened, many are still left without power, so they had to change the way they wear their hair.

When reading the articles in their entirety, there is clearly a taboo associated with natural curly hair; however, there was no discussion about the origin of the stigma. Rather than highlighting how Puerto Rico's present moment connects to its tumultuous relationship with Eurocentrism, current discourse

regularly erases (or silences) this part of the island's history. The way in which Puerto Rican women are doing their hair after Hurricane Maria made *national headline news* stateside. However, it is to no surprise that when local island media outlets were scoured for similar stories—none were found.

These headlines are a clear indication of how deeply rooted racial silence sits in the cultural fabric of the island. They support the racial silence on the island by simply not addressing race in the articles, and they are clearly in line with the blatant Othering of the *different* and *exotic* that is found stateside. These articles are not simply referring to hair; however, what hair represents here is the natural, the curly, the dark, the Black, the forbidden, and ultimately the taboo.

Disruption of the Racial Narrative in Puerto Rico

Hair "Regimes" in the Marketplace

The marketplace is a breeding ground for social inequities. For example, when a person walks into a drugstore or hair salon in the USA, the hair aisle or display is a space of division and segregation. It is commonplace to see a stark divide between White and Black hair products. There is also a disparity in the use of space where White hair products occupy a significantly larger space when compared to Black (or specialty) hair products.

Candelario (2000) introduces the notion of *hair systems* in reference to the organization and availability of hair services and products. She states that "African Americans,… have developed their own unique system of hair care and hair care products" (2000, p. 152) that may or may not comply with White beauty standards. In contrast, Latin American women's goals are to adopt White hair products—chemically processing their hair so that they *can* use these White hair products. It is important to recognize that these *hair systems* have a greater impact than just segregation or the availability of hair products in the marketplace. These systems in practice act more like *hair regimes* that must be adhered to for social and cultural acceptance. Not achieving acceptance comes with consequence.

Hair is complex. It is rich with history, meaning, symbolism, and various cultural codes that serve as somewhat of a governing body. The concept of *hair regime* highlights the stakes surrounding hair by foregrounding power. When referring to a system, there is a sense of neutrality that does not exist within a regime. A regime is charged with authority, dictatorship, control, oppression, and consequences (Vickers and Isaac 2012). For example, the ideas behind good and bad hair are substantiated given the mere placement

of hair products on the shelves. Whereas the notion of *hair systems* assumes access to all hair products, the *hair regime* controls accessibility to Black hair products which is typically limited. These *hair regimes* dictate what is socially and culturally acceptable, aiding in the reproduction of racism on a daily basis. They perpetuate valuations of hair and beauty particularly for Black/Afro Latinas. You are deemed inferior, unattractive, untamed, and wild. But most importantly, in the Puerto Rican context, you are contradicting the dominant racial narrative and unveiling what has been *hidden* and suppressed for so long.

Hurricane Maria tousled the *hair system* and angered the *hair regime*. The decimation of the island has impacted the availability of hair products, thereby forcing women to get creative with styling their hair. However, it is critical to point out that these changes in grooming practices are a result of survival, a matter of sustenance—a disruption—as opposed to a "new normal," not necessarily indicative of a new social code regarding the racialization of hair. For example, there is a movement in support of wearing natural hair, of owning one's Blackness in direct opposition to the hair regime, but it comes with consequence—job opportunities may be slim because natural hair is not considered *professional*, social acceptance is negatively impacted due to the *wild* appearance of your hair, or assumptions are made about your class or education level. Similar to other regimes, it will take time and great sacrifice to reach a point of compromise, but not impossible.

Turning Up the Volume on Racial Silence

The articles appearing in *The Guardian*, *The Root*, and *The NY Daily News* further silence the topic of race. They only address *hair systems*, not the *regimes* behind these systems. They point out new grooming practices that helped compensate for the lack of resources such as electricity and running water—even called it "strange,"—however, they do not speak to what it meant for Puerto Rican women to not be able to straighten and lighten their hair. They did not address what it means for natural hair textures and colors to now be exposed. Discussing these issues would be a direct challenge to the dominant racial narrative on the island.

Although space does not allow for it here, it is worth considering the post-Hurricane Maria experience of men with longer hair—that may have textures and styles indigenous to the island—along with transgender and gay bodies that may exist in a liminal space. What does the *new normal* look like for this portion of the population and why did they not make breaking news?

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a critical examination of the dominant racial narrative in Puerto Rico through US media characterizations of hair grooming practices post-Hurricane Maria. More importantly, it has provided a theoretical analysis of how *hair systems* available in the marketplace function more as *hair regimes* that infiltrate the formation of racial identities and perpetuate dominant racial narratives on the island. The notion of *hair regimes* helps to further understand the complexities that exist at the intersection of race, hair, and the marketplace. Lastly, this chapter highlights how mere product placement, availability, and accessibility perpetuate racial hierarchies, narratives, and reinforce social systems such as patriarchy.

Further Reading

Frank, R., Akresh, I. R., & Lu, B. (2010). Latino immigrants and the U.S. racial order how and where do they fit in? *American Sociological Review, 75*(3), 378–401.

Lugo-Lugo, C. R. (2012). "Ricky Martin ain't no Dixie Chick": Or, how we can learn a few things about citizenship and invisibility from popular culture. *Centro Journal, 24*(1), 68.

Landale, N. S., & Oropesa, R. S. (2002). White, black, or Puerto Rican? Racial self-identification among mainland and island Puerto Ricans. *Social Forces, 81*(1), 231–254.

Stayman, D. M., & Deshpande, R. (1989). Situational ethnicity and consumer behavior. *Journal of Consumer Research, 16*(3), 361–371.

References

Badillo, C. (2001). "Only my hairdresser knows for sure": Stories of race, hair and gender. *NACLA Report on the Americas, 34*(6), 35–37.

Bonilla-Silva, E. (2004). From bi-racial to tri-racial: Towards a new system of racial stratification in the USA. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 27*(6), 931–950.

Candelario, G. (2000). Hair race-ing: Dominican beauty culture and identity production. *Meridians, 1*(1), 128–156.

Cruz-Janzen, M. I. (2001). Latinegras: Desired women—Undesirable mothers. *Daughters, Sisters, and Wives, Frontiers, 22,* 168–183.

Darity, W., Dietrich, J., & Hamilton, D. (2005). Bleach in the rainbow: Latin ethnicity and preference for whiteness. *Transforming Anthropology, 13*(2), 103–109.

Dhillon-Jamerson, K. K. (2019). Marketing marriage and colorism in India. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 121–136). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Duany, J. (2005). Neither white nor black: The representation of racial identity among Puerto Ricans on the island and in the US mainland. In A. Dzidzienyo & S. Oboler (Eds.), *Neither enemies nor friends: Latinos, Blacks, Afro-Latinos* (pp. 173–188). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Golash-Boza, T., & Darity, W., Jr. (2008). Latino racial choices: The effects of skin colour and discrimination on Latinos' and Latinas' racial self-identifications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31*(5), 899–934.

Quiros, L., & Dawson, B. A. (2013). The color paradigm: The impact of colorism on the racial identity and identification of Latinas. *Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment, 23*(3), 287–297.

Reichard, R. (2017). *5 Creative ways the people of Puerto Rico are persevering*. Retrieved from https://wearemitu.com.

Rivera, M. Q. (2006). From Trigueñita to Afro-Puerto Rican: Intersections of the racialized, gendered, and sexualized body in Puerto Rico and the U.S. mainland. *Meridians*, *7*(1), 162–182.

Robinson, C. L. (2011). Hair as race: Why "good hair" may be bad for black females. *Howard Journal of Communications, 22*(4), 358–376.

Rodriguez, E. P. (2018, June 3). *After Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rican women embrace their natural, curly hair.* Retrieved from http://www.npr.org.

Skidmore, T. (1993). Bi-racial USA vs multi-racial Brazil: Is the contrast still valid? *Journal of Latin American Studies, 25,* 373–386.

Sultana, A. (2011). Patriarchy and women's subordination: A theoretical analysis. *Arts Faculty Journal, 4,* 1–18.

Vargas-Ramos, C. (2016). Some social differences on the basis of race among Puerto Ricans. *Center for Puerto Rican Studies, Research Brief, December Issue 2016.*

Vickers, J., & Isaac, A. (2012). *The politics of race: Canada, the United States, and Australia*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Wade, P. (1993). *Blackness and race mixture: The dynamics of race mixture in Colombia.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Weekes, D. (1997). Shades of blackness. In *Black British feminism: A reader* (pp. 113–127). London: Rouledge.

Part III

Voices and Modes of Understanding

10

Are Black Consumers a Bellwether for the Nation? How Research on Blacks Can Foreground Our Understanding of Race in the Marketplace

Cassi Pittman Claytor

Chapter Overview

- A review of marketing discipline's leading journals indicates that research on Black consumers is marginalized.
- Sociological research on racial minorities' engagement in the market indicates that markets provide opportunities for inclusion, but can also be sites of social exclusion.
- Economic sociology offers insight as to how Black consumers may interact in the market and are affected by cognition, social networks, and social institutions.

Introduction

Black Americans represent a valuable segment of the consumer market, not just for their purchasing power, estimated at 1.2 trillion US dollars (Mcgirt 2018), but also for their ability to set trends and to influence other consumers through their consumption practices and cultural displays. As the USA moves toward becoming a majority minority country (Frey 2014), research on Black Americans' experiences and engagement in the market has

C. Pittman Claytor (✉)
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, USA
e-mail: Clp77@case.edu

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_10

the potential to serve as a bellwether for patterns of future market change. Yet a review of top marketing journals indicates a long-standing pattern in which Blacks are peripheral subjects in the disciplines' leading peer-reviewed research outlets. This has important implications for what we know about Black consumers, but also it reflects racial hierarchies and power relations within the discipline. This chapter begins with the presentation of a content analysis study of five top marketing and consumer behavior journals, focusing on published research on the marketplace experiences of Blacks. The review demonstrates a considerable absence of research on Blacks in these journals, but it also draws attention to areas where the literature can be improved. For example, much of the existing literature on Blacks published in the top journals relies on antiquated or oversimplified notions of racial difference. This is an area where more research is needed to advance a nuanced account of Black consumers' marketplace experiences. Another flaw of the few articles published in these top journals is that they often evidence "hegemonic Whiteness" (Lewis 2004). That is, they promote claims built on an assumption of neutrality, all the while upholding the status quo where Whiteness is deemed normal and is privileged. To address these limitations, marketing researchers must employ a more robust conceptualization of race and address how Blacks' racial identity and societal racism impact their experiences in the market. Conceptualizations of race, racism, and the market advanced in sociology offer useful tools when examining the ways the market is both liberating and constraining for racial minorities. With the goal of advancing an analysis that illuminates the diverse drivers and determinants of Black consumers' experiences in the market, this chapter also calls attention to the concepts of cognition, social networks, and social institutions, emerging out of economic sociology.

Black Consumers on the Margin

To begin, this chapter reviews the results of a content analysis study of five top marketing and consumer behavior journals—*Journal of Marketing (JM)*, *Journal of Marketing Research (JMR)*, *Journal of Consumer Research (JCR)*, *Journal of Consumer Psychology (JCP)*, and *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science (JAMS)*[1]—focusing on research that examines the marketplace experiences of Blacks. The sample analyzed consists of all articles appearing in the abovementioned journals since their first issue, with at least one of the following aims: (1) to account for the behavior of Black consumers, (2) to analyze Black consumers' experiences in the market, and (3) to

provide marketing strategies that focus on marketing to Black consumers. A limitation of the analysis presented here is that it does not include all written work on the subject, for example, it does not include conference proceedings, books, or book chapters. However, the selected journals examined are critical sources of knowledge in the discipline.

The content analysis reveals that less than one percent of all articles published focus on Black consumers and their experience in the marketplace, indicating the marginal status of research on Blacks in marketing's top journals. A closer analysis of the articles in the sample raises two critical questions. First, given that the majority of the articles analyzed for this review were written nearly 50 years ago, how have theories about race and racism as well as the nature and character of race and racism changed in a post-civil rights era? For instance, how might modern forms of racism impact Black consumers? Second, the subject matter addressed in the sample highlights a paradox in which research on Black consumers either represents them as an unexploited, but coveted market segment, or reveals how Blacks are outright excluded when navigating the market or encounter inferior experiences in comparison with similar Whites.

To begin, I will first address issues of timing. There was an uptick in the amount of scholarship published that focuses on Black consumers during the 1970s, however, the nature and character of race relations, racial inequality, and racism has changed dramatically since the 1970s. During the late 1960s and 1970s, a period characterized by social unrest and change, questions of race and racism were pronounced at the societal level, and this was reflected in the marketing scholarship at the time. Milton Pressley compiled a bibliography of an assortment of research on "*Marketing to Black Americans*" in 1974, and he found that research focusing on Black consumers exploded, going from fewer than 100 articles and books prior to 1960 to nearly 700 by the early 1970s. At the time, empirical research on Blacks was seen as necessary to better understand race relations and to determine if and how Black consumers' preferences were distinct from Whites. This pattern was evident in the sample of articles analyzed for the content analysis reviewed here, as most of the articles analyzed were also published during this period. Since the 1970s, there has been a notable decline in research published in these top journals that examines the Black consumers' marketplace experiences. Additionally, in the few recent articles, race and its impact on Black consumers is discussed less explicitly, instead the authors tend to draw on broader conceptualizations of group difference, for example, by discussing cultural differences that may occur along racial lines or practices that might be racialized.

Examining the sample of articles published in the top journals focused on Black consumers brought to light an interesting paradox in relation to the articles' content, themes, and arguments. Many articles either drive home the message that Blacks constitute a potentially viable and valuable segment of the consumer market, or highlight external factors that condition Blacks' experiences—largely marketplace exclusion (instances in which consumers face obstacles or challenges when engaging in the market). Additionally, a limited number of articles addressed the presence or absence of Blacks in advertisements and the effectiveness of Black models in reaching "mainstream" audiences.

While research on Blacks does not appear often in the five journals reviewed here (notable exceptions include Crockett and Wallendorf 2004; Bone et al. 2014; Crockett 2017), research focusing on the Black consumer experience is evident in other journals and formats (books, conference proceedings, etc.). Many Race in the Marketplace (RIM) scholars—for example Crockett (2008), Grier and Kumanyika (2008), and Henderson et al. (2016) to name a few—have taken the lead in developing and publishing research on Black consumers, their experiences in the marketplace, and how firms might best reach them. This research has made use of dynamic conceptualizations of race and racism, and integrated perspectives from diverse disciplines including sociology and psychology. More research in this vein is sorely needed.

Why, then, might we focus attention on the absence of research on Black consumers in the top journals? Well, whether research on Black consumers is published in the top journals matters for at least two reasons. First, publishing in these prestige-awarding journals bestows symbolic advantages for marketing scholars. By only limitedly publishing scholarship on Blacks, these journals contribute to the sidelining of scholars who study Blacks and promote the perception that there is a real risk to conducting research on Black consumers. Furthermore, if a significant share of the scholarship is produced by Black scholars, then an unforeseen consequence of this marginalization will be the reproduction of racial advantage and inequality within the discipline, as career advancement is affected by publishing in the disciplines' highest ranked journals.

Second, excluding research that documents and analyzes the consumer experience of racial minorities contributes to the idea that Whites are the default subject of marketing research (Burton 2009; Davis 2018). Marcel Rosa-Salas (2019, in this volume Chapter 2) documents the historical processes resulting in a "White middle-class identity" that serves as the advertising industry's "unmarked signifier for the average American consumer"

(p. 21). The results of the content analysis indicate that the exclusion of scholarship on Blacks in the discipline's leading journals also promotes "Whiteness" as the norm or unspoken standard within the academic discourse. This is particularly problematic considering the impending demographic shifts that will result in the White population no longer being in the majority.

This begs the question of why journals heralded as leaders in the field have been so silent in researching an entire segment of the market, undeniably undervaluing research that explores Blacks' marketplace experiences? The limited space allotted for this chapter does not allow an in-depth discussion of antiblack bias and the root of such marginalization in the publication process, still highlighting the gravity of its absence is a first and important step in addressing it.

A second and necessary step is to begin to develop a theoretical framework that empirically investigates Blacks, as well as other racial minorities, experiences as market agents and actors. While the failure of the top marketing journals to seriously investigate the Black consumer experience is the key takeaway of the content analysis conducted for this study. The review also highlights areas where the literature can be improved. In addressing the limitations made evident by the content analysis review, in the section that follows I outline how sociological perspectives on race, racial distinctions, and racism may help advance our understanding of Black consumers.

Conceptualizing Race, Racial Distinctions, and Racism

Grounding research on Blacks in the marketplace with a robust definition of race will help clarify the ways that race is relevant to Blacks engagement in the market, both in terms of how racial categories are utilized by market actors and the ways racial categories are reproduced in the market. Race is a socially constructed category of human difference historically conditioned and used by people to categorize others and also to classify themselves (Golash-Boza 2016). Race and racial categories are not stagnant or fixed, rather they evolve over time and are contextually determined. During different epochs, various racial orders and regimes have existed (Omi and Winant 2013). The leading marketing journals should contain more research on Blacks that address the impact of past racial projects and also the contemporary racial order on consumers' engagements with the market.

Given that perceptions of differences in physical features, such as skin color, can affect important individual and group-level outcomes (Monk 2014), one direction more marketing researchers could take is to highlight the complex ways that racial hierarchies are manifested, by examining how variation in complexion, or physical determinants impact the effectiveness and reception of advertisements. Throughout US history phenotypic markers have been used to categorize a person's racial category. Marketing research should make clearer what symbolic attributions are made, and what is conveyed when a "Black" model appears in an advertisement. For example, research indicates that Black hairstyles maintain symbolic and cultural weight (Craig 2006). Hairstyles can serve as racial markers, embodying racial differences; they can also indicate conformity to dominant aesthetic preferences or used to contest dominant norms. Given the symbolic nature of Blacks' hairstyles, the meaning conveyed by an advertisement may be conditioned by how a Black model's hair is styled. More thoroughly investigating significance of race and the meaning attached to physical differences displayed in advertisements means documenting and discussing the impact of a wide variety of physical differences and markers of race, like hair. Contrarily, ignoring these differences may reproduce racialized standards of beauty that perpetuate antiblack biases and promote racially insensitive messages. In addition to research that documents whether Black bodies appear in advertisements or not, and what role Blacks play, more marketing researchers should aim to account for how race is embodied in advertisements and marketing efforts. Such efforts would further contribute to our understanding of the complex ways that race is made known through the body.

Beyond the physicality of how race is read, and more specifically how "Blackness" is constructed, it is important to note the social function that racial categories perform. Racial categories help establish and maintain social hierarchies used to justify the distribution of valued resources. One way that sociologists examine the persistence of social hierarchies is by promoting the idea of social and symbolic boundaries and highlighting the importance of boundary work when examining the unequal distribution of resources along racial lines (see Lamont and Molnár 2002). Boundary work consists of the efforts and behavior people and groups engage into demarcate social, morals, and cultural lines and to forge symbolic community, while also justifying the division of resources. Boundaries allow people to make distinctions pertaining to who is like them and who is not. Racial boundaries, which help to establish and reinforce perceived racial distinctions, may be porous and flexible, or rigid and impenetrable.

Research on Black consumers in leading marketing journals can build on boundaries and boundary work scholarship by incorporating analysis of racialized cultural practices. Specifically, such analysis can reveal the degree that Blacks maintain cultural knowledge, skills, and system of tastes and preferences that are: (1) disproportionately engaged in by Blacks, and (2) seen as symbolic devices that bind members of the racial group together. For example, when it comes to music, cultural sociologists Paul DiMaggio and Francie Ostrower (1990) find that Blacks are significantly more likely than Whites to report listening to jazz, soul, blues, and rhythm-and-blues. Examining and documenting cultural differences, particularly symbolic differences that are racialized and used to draw racial boundaries, may be key to determining the ways that Black consumers' preferences and practices are both similar to and divergent from other racial groups.

Marketing researchers can further enrich our understanding of Black consumers by determining the nature and cultural content, as well as racial markers that are key in forging symbolic and social boundaries, as well as how demographic indicators, like age or class, might create intra-racial divisions and points of tension. Heterogeneity among Blacks, as a consequence of nativity, region, mixed-race, and class status, researchers must be careful not to project Blacks as a uniform group. Another finding indicated by the content analysis study was that the marketing research in the top journals rarely focuses on the experiences of Black youth. Given the pronounced influence of Black youth cultures—as cultural and historical sociologist Orlando Patterson (2015) writes, Black youth "are among the most vibrant creators of popular culture in the nation and the world" (p. 1)—more research is needed that systematically examines and compares the experiences and cultural tastes of specific market segments among Blacks, such as Black youth. Advancing research on Black consumers means recognizing intra-racial differences exist but also acknowledging the way cultural practices are instrumental tools used to draw racial boundaries. Though tastes and cultural sensibilities may be shared among Blacks, Black consumers experiences are not identical.

Conceptualizing the impact of modern forms of racism on Black consumers is another avenue of advancing the research agenda on Black and their market engagement. Studies of race that do not advance or investigate claims of racial hierarchies only limitedly address the question of why race matters. Sociologist Amanda Lewis (2004) argues that race constitutes "a set of identities, discursive practices, cultural forms, and ideological manifestations" which "would not exist without racism" (p. 625). Similarly, sociologist Tanya Golash-Boza (2016) notes, "We cannot separate the construction

of race from the reproduction of racism." Given the critical role of racism, both historically and contemporarily, and its impact on the Black consumer experience (Henderson et al. 2016; Weems 1998), research on Black consumers must examine past manifestations of racism in the market, along with the processes and mechanisms through which it is perpetuated today. Racial prejudice and discriminatory treatment directly impact Black consumers, as evidenced by the pervasiveness of retail racism (Crockett et al. 2003; Gabbidon and Higgins 2007; Schreer et al. 2009; Pittman 2017); but racism also affects the operation of the market and Blacks' experiences in indirect ways.

Throughout the twentieth century explicit forms of racism prevailed, however, since the civil rights movement scholars point to a shift in Whites' racial attitudes, and the nature of racist ideologies. Racism appears in new ways, yet it functions to perpetuate and affirm existing racial hierarchies and exclusionary power structures. Given this shift, it is important to examine Black consumers' engagement in the market in an era of "Colorblind racism" (Bonilla-Silva 2003), or what others have called "Laissez Faire racism" (Bobo et al. 1997). Both concepts suggest that racism operates covertly and often on a symbolic level. According to sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2003) a color-blind racist ideology allows Whites to justify racial inequality and the resultant unequal treatment of Blacks, characterizing it as natural and nonracial. This means, for example, that Blacks aim to gain recognition and to be treated as equals in a market where actors might assert a "color-blind ideology," proclaiming all customers deserve to be treated equally, while simultaneously seeing it as perfectly normal to bestow advantages to Whites. Even without discriminating against Blacks, inequality in the market is perpetuated by consistently favoring Whites, for example, giving them preferential treatment.

Laissez-faire racism asserts that Whites embrace merit-based ideals and explain racial inequality as a consequence of Blacks inadequate efforts, in addition to their cultural and moral failings. Thus whites can justify their lack of support for government policies or interventions aimed at reducing racial inequality. Rather than the involvement of the state, laissez-faire racism promotes the idea that the market will correct any inequality and should operate unfettered. However, this assumes that racial biases are not reproduced in the market. Sociologist Frederick Wherry (2008) argues, however, that even "price" is not a "neutral, scientifically objective instrument," rather price is a product of social values and assignments (p. 364). While he does not explicitly address laissez-faire racism or racial discrimination in the market, Wherry (2008) suggests that low-status people often

encounter "negative assessments" in the market. In this light, one might argue that racial minorities, due to their perceived low-status, are more likely to be viewed unfavorably, irrespective of the price they pay or how they view themselves as consumers. For example, Blacks may assess a purchase as a way of rewarding themselves for their hard work. However, a store salesperson may view them as buying something that they cannot afford and consider their purchase inappropriate given their low social rank. Marketplaces are often sites where hierarchies are maintained, and more research is needed to examine how Blacks' marketplace experiences are constrained or altered given "new" forms of racism that characterize the market as race-neutral.

Understanding how Blacks respond to modern racism, how it alters their marketplace experiences and consumer behavior, is particularly important for firms. When discrimination occurs both buycotts and boycotts have been implemented to leverage Black consumer buying power to address Black consumers' discontent over inferior treatment. Once flagged as discriminatory, retailers, brands, and national chains can face long and costly struggles to win back Black customers, especially if immediate and effective action is not taken (Henderson et al. 2016). Social media platforms have become powerful tools for Black consumers to draw attention to mistreatment in the market. Research examining how modern racism works and ways to minimize it should have a captive audience of firms that desire to reduce the likelihood of discriminatory events, or to reduce the financial loss such occasions of discrimination impose.

Conceptualizing the Market and Blacks' Economic Behavior

Sociological research can also help us to expand our understanding of the market as Blacks experience it. It is important to examine how markets are deeply embedded in society and can function to *reproduce* racism and racial hierarchies or, contrarily, markets can be critical sites that function to *reduce* racial inequality. A key lesson from economic sociology relates to markets social embeddedness and social construction. Beyond sites of exchange that bring together patron and producers, markets maintain a multitude of social and symbolic functions.

Historical conditions and social interactions determine how, when, and with whom exchange takes place. Blacks, both historically and today, have sought recognition and treatment as equals in the market. While research

in the leading marketing journals has addressed questions of discrimination, the ways that Blacks positively experience the market and use it for their own ends—even contesting existing power structures or stereotypes, have been limited. Focusing on the inclusive nature of the market allows researchers to also highlight Black consumers' agency, that is, their ability to take independent action and demonstrate free will.

Marketplace Inclusion

In the USA, markets are assumed to be a part of a democratic process that considers participation a right belonging to all consumers as citizens. Historian Charles McGovern (1998) notes, the "advent of the consumer society" means the American people "equate the consumer with the citizen, a consumer standard of living with democracy, and the full participation in such an economy of spending and accumulation with being an American" (p. 37). Consumption constitutes a key part of what it means to be included in US society and the equation of social equality with a person's ability to spend money without restriction is a widely shared American value (McGovern 1998). Beyond bestowing citizenship, scholars argue that engaging in consumption is one means by which people construct and express their racial and ethnic identities (Banks 2010b; Lamont and Molnár 2001). The use of goods and the acquisition of services can constitute meaningful acts that help Blacks to express beliefs about their racial identities, and the racial group to which they belong.

Others argue that Blacks' engagement in the market helps to solidify social and collective identities. For example, sociologist Patricia Banks' (2010a, p. 4) study on upper-middle-class Blacks' consumption of Black art demonstrates Blacks "assert and nourish cultural connections" with other Blacks through their consumption, thus, Banks (2010a) argues, well-to-do Blacks engage in "Black cultivated consumption." That is, their acquisitions facilitate the assertion of their membership in the Black community and allow them to display racial pride, racialized tastes, and cultural competences. Encoded in their consumption are sentiments of racial solidarity. Hence, Blacks' racial identity can affect their attraction to products that affirm their identity and allow them to forge bonds with other group members. Alternatively, Black consumers' racial identity can lead to an aversion to products or brands they view as exclusionary or incongruent with their racial identity.

The market is inclusive to the extent that goods and services are widely available for racial minorities to construct social identities and define boundaries. In this way, should they have proper access and possess the resources to freely engage with markets, markets can allow people to express who they are and to construct authentic identities. Markets can be spheres with liberating qualities where creativity and individuality flourish. Marketing research would be enriched by further attending to Blacks creative and expressive use of goods and their agency, recognizing the transformative power of an inclusive marketplace.

Marketplace Exclusion

Processes and practices of pronounced racial exclusion often take place in the market. Research documents racial discrimination and racial stigma evident both in the past and at present, as Black consumers are often subject to poor treatment or encounter service failure (Crockett et al. 2003; Gabbidon and Higgins 2007; Schreer et al. 2009; Pittman 2017). In contrast, White consumers, particularly upper-class White women, tend to receive preferential treatment (Williams 2006). If White consumers benefit from opportunity and resource hoarding, often manifested in favorable or preferential treatment, then their advantaged and privileged position is preserved without directly promoting discriminatory treatment toward Blacks. This broadly occurring phenomenon has been characterized as "racial inequality without racism" (DiTomaso 2013, p. 1). Drawing attention to White advantages, as well as the many ways that Black people are ignored and excluded, and seen as less desirable than White customers, is just as important as documenting and analyzing instances of outright discrimination.

Considering the emergence of subtler forms of racial discrimination, where Blacks are not prevented from gaining access or entry, but still marginalized and mistreated, more scholarship examining Blacks' experiences of discrimination in the market needs to attend to questions of "social closure, power and status, and the interactional foundations of inequality" (Roscigno et al. 2009, p. 50). That means examining how the racial order and racial disparities are produced due to both "minority vulnerability and gatekeeper discretion" (Roscigno et al. 2009, p. 49). For example, W. Trevor Jamerson (2019, in this volume Chapter 3) demonstrates how racial consumer hierarchies are maintained even in digital spaces; Myspace a digital platform used in greater numbers by Blacks was ghettoized and subsequently met its

demise, while in contrast Facebook prevailed in part due to its association with "wealth and Whiteness" (Jamerson 2019, p. 39). Black consumers, in this case, were defenseless against the privileging of Whiteness in the market.

Beyond discrimination, attention to the question of how marketers' messages explicitly and implicitly reproduce racial stereotypes and cultural racism must also be expanded. Cultural racism, a key frame of color-blind racism, suggests that cultural differences cause inequality along racial lines, resting on claims that racial minorities are culturally inferior (Bonilla-Silva 2003). Advertisements may draw on negative racial cues, promote one-dimensional portrayal of Blacks, and exclude Blacks from prominent positions. Alternatively, marketers might promote images contesting racial stereotypes and offer alternative messages that disrupt pervasive racist ideologies and cultural frames. More marketing research is needed therefore to determine which type of advertisement is most salient under a given set of conditions and why.

There are many parallels between how race is exhibited in political messaging and marketing. An important and relevant takeaway from research on political messaging is the suggestion that even if Black bodies are made visible or when Blacks are the central subjects, messages may still project images of Blacks that are stereotypical and/or draw upon color-blind racist ideology, thereby contributing to racial inequity in representation and recognition. Research on political messaging demonstrates that the expression of anti-black attitudes may resonate with potential voters and function as an effective political tool (Stephens-Dougan 2018). For example, when politicians call for Blacks to "work hard" and to "take responsibility for their actions," these messages, while not explicitly racist, reference stereotypes that Blacks are lazy, unmotivated, and irresponsible. While problematic, these racially coded messages may resonate with the public at large and even with middle-class Blacks. Research indicates that middle-class Blacks often perceive economic mobility as possible despite discrimination if Blacks work hard to overcome unfair treatment (Welburn and Pittman 2012). Advertisements may similarly be effective and even appeal to some Blacks, while projecting stereotypes of Blacks. Certainly, marketers can capitalize on the widespread acceptance of racist ideological views or the practices that reinforce them considering that antiblack bias is widespread. Yet this does not absolve them from the resultant reproduction of inequality and disadvantage embodied in the marketing of their products. This idea, that racist ideological frames may positively impact the effectiveness of messaging and even resonate with racial minority audiences, deserves greater attention, and reveals the nuanced ways that marketplace exclusion may take place.

Borrowing from Economic Sociology—Critical Directions and Levels of Analysis

By applying key concepts and outlining distinct levels of analysis, economic sociology offers scholars interested in the study of race and the marketplace several avenues to explore. Much of the work in economic sociology focuses on cultural cognition, social networks, and institutions (Dobbin 2004), which, in turn, offers useful direction for understanding Blacks' experience in the market.

Cognition

Cognition refers to how people make sense of the world. It includes the cognitive frames existing at the individual (micro) and societal (macro) level. Cognitive frames constitute widely available cultural scripts and norms that shape peoples' commonsense understandings. Such intuitive understandings guide people's everyday routines, habits, and the performance of traditions. Cognitive frames can be racially specific—that is, shared sets of meanings and beliefs common among particular racial groups. For example, there are widely held beliefs about Blacks that reflect racial stereotypes and anti-black bias. But there are also cognitive frames that are widely shared among Blacks, which may separate and distinguish them as a group. Analyzing the varied cognitive frames Blacks draw upon may be key to determining how Blacks have adapted to racialized exclusion in the marketplace. For instance, Naya Jones (2019, in this volume Chapter 4) finds that Black and Latinx youth residing in a gentrifying neighborhood make sense of place in ways that empower them to contest and resist the transformation of neighborhood spaces. In this way cognitive frames, how people see their neighborhood, become useful tools that facilitate resistance to market forces that might otherwise disempower them.

Ideologies are a type of cognitive frame that constitute collectively held and "explicit, articulated, highly organized meaning systems," endorsing certain "styles or strategies of action" (Swidler 1986, p. 278). Ideological belief systems are often characteristics of a particular group and shared among its members. One of the most prolific ideologies among Blacks during the twentieth century and now into the twenty-first century is Black Nationalism (Dawson 2001). Black Nationalism provides explicit directions concerning Black spending, making it particularly relevant to discussions of Blacks' engagement with the market. Specifically, it aims to realize economic

empowerment through racial solidarity in spending. The idea of "Buying Black" or patronizing Black-owned businesses is one of Black Nationalism's most widely agreed upon tenants, even among those who only limitedly support Black Nationalist ideals (Pittman Claytor, forthcoming). In the case of buying Black, Blacks' collective orientation and desire for economic advancement can arguably factor into their decision making. Marketing scholars David Crockett and Melanie Wallendorf (2004) provide another account of how ideologies impact Black consumers. Their research reveals that racialized political ideologies shape how Black consumers respond to living in a neighborhood offering limited grocery store options. Examining the implications of Black Nationalism represents just one of a myriad of ways that cognitive frames and ideologies shape Blacks' engagement in the market.

Networks

Social networks are sets of regular contacts or social connections among individuals or groups. They constitute ongoing systems of social relations that function as an important source of information and capital, and they are also a means through which information is diffused and resources shared. Social networks and social capital, the benefits and resources available as a consequence of social relationships, impact a wide assortment of outcomes. Social ties can both facilitate and restrict action. Member of social networks tends to be of the same race and social network size and the strength of available social ties differs along racial lines (McPherson et al. 2001). How might social capital manifest in Blacks' engagement in the market? In my research on the mortgage market, I found that Black borrowers were often steered into sub-prime products when they did not discuss or seek advice from others or had few if any financial experts in their social circles. In contrast, those who listened to advice of a trusted advisor often received counseling, which helped to direct them to low-cost and less risky products (Pittman 2008). This research shows social connections supply people with information that can shape critical consumer decisions, including how to finance the purchase of a home.

Research also shows Blacks often maintain high levels of financial obligations to family members and friends. Some argue this reduces Blacks' capacity to build wealth, but it also impacts the amount of resources they can dedicate to discretionary spending and consumption (O'Brien 2012). Thus, social networks may not only inform Blacks' spending, but they might also work in nuanced ways to constrain it.

Institutions

Market actors are not only socially embedded, connected, and conditioned by cognitive frames and social ties, but also affected by structural conditions and the organization of the market. Institutions are key to structuring and ordering the market. Institutions constitute particular conventions, defined by law or tradition, ranging in complexity from simple customs to elaborate legal schemas, which provide actors with behavioral scripts. Racial residential and economic segregation, for example, are the products of institutional conditions, and segregation on multiple levels impacts Black consumers' marketplace experiences. The prevalence of retail and food deserts in Black neighborhoods is one way in which racial residential segregation creates inequality in access to healthy foods and results in additional hurdles for Blacks in the acquisition of goods and services. Institutions shape the perpetuation of racism and antiblack bias in the market, as Blacks are often disadvantaged due to the systemic institutionalization of discriminatory policies and practices. Future research could examine how institutional policies and practices develop and promote unequal access in the market. In addition to scholarship that investigates how institutional policies perpetuate racial disparities in the market, research should also examine how institutionalized racism can be dismantled. That is, what conditions facilitate and sustain institutions and institutional actors that promote equity and are anti-racist?

Conclusion

The dismal number of articles on Black consumers appearing in five of the most prestigious marketing journals indicates that policies, practices, and institutionalized procedures within the discipline have not encouraged, recognized, and rewarded scholarship on Black consumers. The RIM network performs a critical role of making accessible scholarship examining the experiences of racial minorities as consumers. In fact, this book serves as a model of what inclusive scholarship should encompass. As the nation becomes increasingly racially diverse, the experiences of many consumers will mirror Blacks, in that they will operate in a market seeking to capitalize on their spending, but will find the perpetuation of racial hierarchies and inequality. One way marketing researchers can prepare for this upcoming demographic and cultural shift is to deepen their examination of the Black consumer experience.

In this chapter, I argue that examination of sociological research which explores race, racial distinctions, and racism, as well as cognition, social networks, and institutions may help develop a more robust discussion of Blacks' experience in the market. Yet even beyond bettering our understanding of the Black consumer experience, research exploring racial differences in cognitive frames, ideological commitments, and social ties may prove useful in targeting Black consumers, as well as other racial minorities, more effectively. For example, creating messages culturally aligned to the values and belief systems prevalent among large numbers of Blacks is key to firms developing sustained relationships with Black consumers.

Blacks, both historically and today, face markets that are simultaneously racially inclusive and exclusive. More research is needed to address Blacks' agency and acknowledge their role as cultural producers, as well as consumers. Future scholarship should incorporate discussions of cognitive frames, social networks and social institutions, particularly as each helps to create either liberating or constraining market conditions for Blacks. Research examining the exclusionary processes in the market, both historically and contemporarily, is important to understand the experiences of Blacks as consumers. This can only be done by increasing the amount of research that examines the systemic nature of discrimination and highlights institutional and ideological roots of racial disparities, as well as Blacks' responses to racial stigma and stereotypes in the market. Additionally, the marketing field requires more research that examines the underlying causes and processes that not only create and perpetuate marketplace exclusion, but also the practices and policies required to promote a more equitable market.

At present, however, research that recognizes and makes sense of Blacks' experience in the marketplace within marketing is more the exception, than the rule. In many ways the creation of the RIM research network, established with the goal of promoting "inclusive, fair and just marketplaces," performs a critical function in rectifying the enduring exclusion of research on Blacks in marketing's top journals (Pennamon 2018; Grier et al. 2019). The RIM network of scholars is ahead of the curve, and it is time for the top marketing journals to take note and to begin to address existing gaps by expanding their focus to include research on Black consumers specifically, but also more diverse consumers more broadly.

Note

1. All of the journals included were listed by the *Financial Times* as one of the top 50 business journals.

Further Reading

Banks, P. (2010). Black cultural advancement: Racial identity and participation in the arts among the black middle-class. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33*(2), 272–289.

Bonilla-Silva, E. (2003). *Racism without racists: Color-blind racism and the persistence of racial inequality in America* (1st ed.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Crockett, D. (2017). Paths to respectability: Consumption and stigma management in the contemporary black middle class. *Journal of Consumer Research, 44*(3), 554–581.

Dobbin, F. (2004). The sociological view of the economy. In F. Dobbin (Ed.), *The new economic sociology: A reader*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

References

Banks, P. (2010a). *Represent: Art and identity among the black upper-middle class*. New York: Routledge.

Banks, P. (2010b). Black cultural advancement: Racial identity and participation in the arts among the black middle class. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33*(2), 272–289.

Bobo, L., Kluegel, J. R., & Smith, R. A. (1997). Laissez-faire racism: The crystallization of a kinder, gentler antiblack ideology. In S. A. Tuch & J. K. Martin (Eds.), *Racial attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and change* (pp. 15–42). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Bone, S. A., Christensen, G. L., & Williams, J. D. (2014). Rejected, shackled, and alone: The impact of systemic restricted choice on minority consumers' construction of self. *Journal of Consumer Research, 41*(2), 451–474.

Bonilla-Silva, E. (2003). *Racism without Racists: Color-blind racism and the persistence of racial inequality in America* (1st ed.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Burton, D. (2009). "Reading" whiteness in consumer research. *Consumption Markets and Culture, 12*(2), 171–201.

Craig, M. L. (2006). *Ain't I a beauty queen? Black women, beauty, and the politics of race*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Crockett, D. (2008). Marketing blackness. *Journal of Consumer Culture, 8*(2), 245–268.

Crockett, D. (2017). Paths to respectability: Consumption and stigma management in the contemporary black middle class. *Journal of Consumer Research, 44*(3), 554–581.

Crockett, D., & Wallendorf, M. (2004). The role of normative political ideology in consumer behavior. *The Journal of Consumer Research, 31*(3), 511–528.

Crockett, D., Grier, S. A., & Williams, J. A. (2003). Coping with marketplace discrimination: An exploration of the experiences of black men. *Academy of Marketing Science Review, 4*(7), 1–21.

Davis, J. (2018). Selling whiteness? A critical review of the literature on marketing and racism. *Journal of Marketing Management, 34*(1–2), 134–177.

Dawson, M. (2001). *Black visions: The roots of contemporary African-American ideologies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

DiMaggio, P., & Ostrower, F. (1990). Participation in the arts by black and white Americans. *Social Forces, 68*(3), 753–778.

DiTomaso, N. (2013). *The American non-dilemma racial inequality without racism*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Dobbin, F. (2004). The sociological view of the economy. In F. Dobbin (Ed.), *The new economic sociology: A reader*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Frey, W. (2014). *The U.S. will become "minority white" in 2045, census projects*. Brookings. Available online https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/14/the-us-will-become-minority-white-in-2045-census-projects/.

Gabbidon, S. L., & Higgins, G. E. (2007). Consumer racial profiling and perceived victimization: A phone survey of Philadelphia area residents. *American Journal of Criminal Justice, 32*(1), 1–11.

Golash-Boza, T. (2016). A critical and comprehensive sociological theory of race and racism. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 2*(2), 129–141.

Grier, S., & Kumanyika, S. (2008). The context for choice: Health implications of targeted food and beverage marketing to African Americans. *American Journal of Public Health, 98*(9), 1616–1629.

Grier, S. A., Thomas, K. D., & Johnson, G. D. (2019). Re-imagining the marketplace: Addressing race in academic marketing research. *Consumption Markets & Culture, 22*(1), 99–100.

Henderson, G., Hakstian, A., & Williams, J. (2016). *Consumer equality: Race and the American marketplace*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.

Jamerson, T. (2019). Race, markets, and digital technologies: Historical and conceptual frameworks. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 39–54). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jones, N. (2019). (Re)Visiting the corner store: Black youth, gentrification, and a sense of place. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 55–72). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lamont, M., & Molnár, V. (2001). How blacks use consumption to shape their collective identity: Evidence from marketing specialists. *Journal of Consumer Culture, 1*(1), 31–45.

Lamont, M., & Molnár, V. (2002). The study of boundaries in the social sciences. *Annual Review of Sociology, 28*(1), 167–195.

Lewis, A. (2004). "What group?" Studying whites and whiteness in the era of "Colorblindness". *Sociological Theory, 22*(4), 625–646.

Mcgirt, E. (2018). Race ahead: A new Nielsen report puts black buying power at $1.2 trillion. *Fortune*. Available online http://fortune.com/2018/02/28/raceahead-nielsen-report-black-buying-power/.

McGovern, C. (1998). Consumption and citizenship in the United States, 1900–1940. In S. Strasser & M. Judt (Eds.), *Getting and spending: European and American consumer societies in the twentieth century* (pp. 37–58). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. *Annual Review of Sociology, 27*(1), 415–444.

Monk, E. P. (2014). Skin tone stratification among black Americans, 2001–2003. *Social Forces, 92*(4), 1313–1337.

O'Brien, R. (2012). Depleting capital? Race, wealth and informal financial assistance. *Social Forces, 91*(2), 375–396.

Omi, M., & Winant, H. (2013). *Racial formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*. London: Routledge.

Patterson, O., & Fosse, E. (2015). *The cultural matrix: Understanding Black youth*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pennamon, T. (2018). Race, power, privilege in the marketplace are focus of interdisciplinary network's research. *Diverse Issues in Higher Education.* Available online https://diverseeducation.com/article/109427/.

Pittman, C. (2008). *Use of social capital in borrower decision-making*. Cambridge, MA: Joint Center For Housing Studies, Harvard University.

Pittman Claytor, C. (2017, July). "Shopping while black": Black consumers' management of racial stigma and racial profiling in retail settings. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/1469540517717777.

Pittman Claytor, C. (Forthcoming). *Black privilege: Middle-class black consumers managing race and class.*

Pressley, M. (1974). *A selected bibliography of readings and references regarding marketing to black Americans*. Monticello, IL: Council of Planning Librarians.

Rosa-Salas, M. (2019). Making the mass white: How racial segregation shaped consumer segmentation. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 21–38). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Roscigno, V., Karafin, D., & Tester, G. (2009). The complexities and processes of racial housing discrimination. *Social Problems, 56*(1), 49–69.

Schreer, G., Smith, S., & Thomas, K. (2009). 'Shopping while Black': Examining racial discrimination in a retail setting. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 39*(6), 1432–1444.

Stephens-Dougan, L. (2018, March 7). *The race for votes: How candidates use negative racial appeals about Blacks to win White votes*. Cambridge, MA: Hutchins Center Spring Colloquia, Harvard University, Lecture.

Swidler, A. (1986). "Culture in action: Symbols and strategies." *American Sociological Review, 51*(2): 273–286.

Weems, R. (1998). *Desegregating the dollar: African American consumerism in the twentieth century*. New York: New York University Press.

Welburn, J., & Pittman, C. (2012). Stop 'blaming the man': Perceptions of inequality and opportunities for success in the Obama era among middle-class African Americans. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 35*(3), 523–540.

Wherry, F. (2008). The social characterizations of price: The fool, the faithful, the frivolous, and the frugal. *SOTH Sociological Theory, 26*(4), 363–379.

Williams, C. (2006). *Inside Toyland: Working, shopping, and social inequality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

11

A Loan at Last? Race and Racism in Mortgage Lending

Vanessa Gail Perry

Chapter Overview

- Homeownership is the primary source of wealth accumulation in the USA.
- Homeownership rates for Blacks and Latinx households remain significantly lower than those of White Americans.
- Due to cumulative disadvantage, mortgage underwriting models that rely on traditional measures of credit reputation, capacity, and collateral value are a function of past racism and discrimination.
- Accordingly, these models have a negative and disparate impact on Black and Latinx consumers.
- Inequities in access to mortgage credit and ultimately to homeownership will persist until more inclusive mortgage lending models are implemented.

Introduction

John and Debra Carter, a young African-American couple, are planning to buy their first house, to build wealth and to establish a strong foothold in their community. Both are college graduates and working professionals

V. G. Perry (✉)
Department of Strategic Management and Public Policy,
George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: vperry@gwu.edu

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_11

and combined, earn $120,000 a year (the median income for the area is $112,000). After a great deal of planning and research, they selected a house valued at $550,000 located near friends, family, and their church. According to their mortgage broker, to qualify for a mortgage loan, they need a 3% initial down payment ($16,500), and total outstanding debts that are less than 50% of their monthly income (debt less than $4500 per month). Due to redlining and discriminatory lending practices in the 1960s, the Carters' parents never became homeowners, and thus, did not have equity upon which to draw to fund their children's college educations. For John and Debra, the $3000 estimated mortgage payment combined with monthly student loan payments ($600/month each) would exceed the maximum debt allowable. Thus, due to racism in banking and real estate markets that occurred 5 decades ago, homeownership remains out of reach.

Homeownership is often considered the lynchpin of the "American Dream." The largest asset in the portfolio of the typical American household is a house, which is often financed through a residential mortgage contract. According to the most recent decennial Census, approximately seventy percent of US owner-occupied households were purchased with a mortgage loan. Accordingly, homeownership via the mortgage market has significant implications for wealth-generation and other long-term benefits, including improved educational and health outcomes, safer communities, and tax advantages. For these reasons, homeownership is subsidized by the government and supported by a complex housing finance system supported by domestic and international investors. Due to racism, discrimination, historical inequality, and the disparate impact of certain public policies over time, Black and Latinx households have had far fewer opportunities to accrue the benefits of homeownership than their White counterparts, and homeownership rates for Blacks (43%) and Latinx (46.4%) households in the USA remain significantly lower than those of White Americans (72.7%) (National Association for Home Builders 2017).

These patterns have had implications for the global economy, as seen in the aftermath of the 2008 mortgage market crisis, which began in the "subprime" mortgage market. Subprime loans were designed to avail borrowers who could not meet traditional lending standards of mortgage credit, such as borrowers with no traditional credit history, those with a record of late payments, judgments or liens, and self-employed individuals without traditional income documentation. Because these loans carried a higher risk of default, investors were attracted to their higher rates of return. As evidenced by many scholars and policymakers, Black and Latinx borrowers were often targeted for subprime loan products (Hanson et al. 2016; Hartman and Squires 2013;

Engel and McCoy 2012), and allegations of discriminatory subprime lending practices have led to some of the largest legal settlements in history—$335 million in damages paid by Countrywide and $175 million paid by Wells Fargo (Mock 2015). The crisis in the subprime mortgage market occurred because investment models failed to fully account for the risk of default; in addition, investors underestimated the extent of the fraudulent, irresponsible, and predatory lending practices in this market. These loans began to default in massive quantities, setting in motion a global economic recession. The US housing market has still yet to fully recover from the effects of the subprime mortgage meltdown, and minority communities have been the hardest hit in terms of lost wealth and access to mortgage credit.

This chapter focuses on race and racism in mortgage lending requirements and the ways in which these impediments undergird a persistent wealth gap that can only be offset by substantial changes to the market system.

Theoretical Framework

Many scholars and public policymakers have argued that mortgage lending criteria are applied uniformly regardless of the race of the borrower (Gates et al. 2002). However, because the factors used to qualify prospective homebuyers for mortgage loans reflect higher social and economic costs faced by racial and ethnic minorities (e.g., lower incomes and wealth, differential access to financial services, as well as higher costs for certain goods and services), uneven outcomes result. To the extent that these higher social and economic costs persist, disparities in lending and in homeownership will continue.

Our approach is based in part on prior theoretical and empirical work in sociology on the effects of cumulative advantage, or in this case, cumulative disadvantage. According to sociologists Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan's (1967) conceptualization of cumulative disadvantage, a variable that measures status, such as race, can have a direct and interactional effect on an outcome, such as wealth, career, or health, or in the present case, mortgage lending criteria (DiPrete and Eirich 2006). For example, models of household net worth that include race have found that Blacks and Latinxs have lower levels of net worth than similarly situated Whites, accounting for income, level of education, and homeownership differences. According to cumulative disadvantage theory, Blacks and Latinxs accrue fewer benefits of higher earnings, education,

and homeownership than Whites, implying statistically significant interactional effects of race with these variables. This disadvantage occurs for Black and Latinx consumers across multiple intersecting housing and financial markets and involves multiple institutional and independent actors, including, for example, landlords, real estate agents, banks, and mortgage companies (Roscigno et al. 2009). Furthermore, the disadvantage can grow over time, and the rate of growth can change over time. For example, race can affect earnings due to discrimination over the course of a person's career; similarly, race can affect not just wealth levels but changes in wealth over time due to differences in house price appreciation in predominately minority neighborhoods (Diprete and Eirich 2006).

This chapter is based on a model of race and racism in mortgage lending presented in Fig. 11.1. Mortgage lenders and investors use multivariate statistical techniques to model the probability of default[1] based on multiple indicators of the "3 C's of mortgage lending," which refer to Credit, Capacity and Collateral (Freddie Mac 2016). According to this model, each of these components of underwriting requirements are affected by race, and as a result, the effects of these factors on the likelihood of default differs for Black prospective homebuyers.

The following sections include a review of prior evidence of the direct and indirect effects of race and racism on each of the 3 C's of mortgage underwriting, followed by implications for the mortgage industry and for public policy.

Credit History

Due to a few late credit card payments incurred after John Carter was laid off a few years back, the Carters have some blemishes on their credit report. Their mortgage broker has warned them that due to their imperfect credit rating they will probably have to pay a higher interest rate on a mortgage loan.



Fig. 11.1 Indirect effects of race and racism on mortgage lending criteria

A consumer's credit history, also known as credit reputation or credit profile, is one of the key factors used by lenders to determine whether to approve a mortgage loan and how much to lend. Credit reputation is based on a borrower's history of overdue payments, credit delinquencies, collections, repossessions, and charge-offs. Legal actions related to past credit activity, such as foreclosures, bankruptcies, liens and/or judgments are also captured. In addition, a credit file contains information on current and past credit accounts, such as the type of account (auto loan, credit card, etc.), the age of the loan, the credit limit, usage patterns and the status of revolving accounts, and recent applications for new credit. This information is collected, stored, and reported to lending institutions by three credit repository companies (Equifax, Trans Union, and Experian). These data are sold to FICO (or other credit score provider), a company which develops proprietary algorithms for credit scores, upon which lenders and investors rely as an indicator of credit risk. FICO scores range from 400 to 900, with 650 being a widely relied upon minimum score for mortgage eligibility.

Direct Effects of Race on Credit History

Prior research has found that Blacks and Latinxs have lower credit scores and are more likely to have no credit score due to *non-existent credit* accounts or thin payment histories (Federal Reserve 2007; Brevoort et al. 2015). Access to credit has historically been a challenge for consumers in minority and low-income communities due to wealth effects, differential access to financial services and higher costs for these services. Despite gains in credit access and homeownership in the early to the mid-2000s, minority households have been slow to recover from significant losses in home value and higher foreclosure rates experienced during the 2008 mortgage crisis. These patterns, resulting in lost savings and asset values, are undoubtedly reflected in credit data and, by extension, existing credit scoring models (National Consumer Law Center 2016).

There is also evidence from previous studies of a direct effect of race/ethnicity on the propensity to pay higher interest rates and fees for mortgage credit (Hanson et al. 2016; Ghent et al. 2014). Patterns of *predatory lending*, deception, fraud as well as absent and inaccurate consumer information in the subprime mortgage market were key contributors to the 2008 mortgage crisis. Subprime mortgages were developed for borrowers with high credit risk profiles, or who otherwise could not meet the traditional underwriting standards required for traditional, prime mortgages.

Subprime borrowers tend to have a poor credit history and/or cannot meet income verification requirements. During the heyday of subprime mortgage lending, mortgages were often approved for borrowers with scores below 650 and even 600. Because these loans carry a higher default risk, rates and fees for subprime loans are higher than charges for prime loans, and critics argue that these charges are often unjustified, excessive, and predatory. Predatory tactics include targeting less financially-sophisticated and lower-income borrowers, providing misinformation, withholding information or using advertising techniques that evoke fear and uncertainty (Perry and Motley 2009). Predatory lenders also engage in practices that reduce the borrower's home equity, subject them to exorbitant interest rates and fees, or disregard the borrower's ability to repay—increasing the risk of default and foreclosure. Studies have found that subprime and predatory lending are concentrated in minority and low-income neighborhoods, even after controlling for a variety of borrower and neighborhood characteristics, including the share of households in the neighborhood with poor credit histories (Hanson et al. 2016; Hartman and Squires 2013; Engel and McCoy 2012). Evidence suggests that Black and Latinx borrowers pay higher interest rates, even after controlling for differences in credit quality, to traditional lending institutions and, to a lesser extent, newer, more digitally oriented "FinTech" lenders (Bartlett et al. 2017; Nothaft and Perry 2002).

Indirect Effects of Race on Credit History

According to our proposed framework, in addition to the direct effects of race/ethnicity, the higher costs of mortgage credit faced by Black and Latinx borrowers have important indirect effects on credit reputation as well. These borrowers pay higher costs for credit and higher transaction costs than similarly situated Whites. Coupled with *lower, less stable incomes* and lower levels of home equity available to offset income shocks, Black and Latinx borrowers will have fewer resources for mortgage payments, and therefore will be more likely to make delinquent payments. As addressed later in the discussion of collateral values, predominately minority neighborhoods are more likely to face negative house price appreciation and as such will have a higher incidence of mortgage delinquencies, judgments, liens, foreclosures, and bankruptcies.

These indirect effects also occur due to *differential access to other financial services*. Evidence suggests that disadvantaged minorities are subjected

to higher rates due to risk-based pricing in some cases and discrimination in others. For example, Black and Latinx consumers pay significantly higher credit card interest rates than Whites (Federal Reserve 2013; Ruetschlin and Asante-Muhammad 2013). Several studies have concluded that Black and Latinx consumers are charged higher interest rates for auto loans (Charles et al. 2008).

In addition, a study of the peer-to-peer lending market revealed that Blacks were less likely to be approved and were charged higher average interest rates. What is perhaps most noteworthy about this study was that the borrowers' race was revealed to prospective lenders by online photos, so the researchers could make comparisons across racial groups while holding other characteristics constant (Pope and Sydnor 2011).

Since Black and Latinx consumers face *higher payments*, all else equal, members of these groups will be more likely to incur delinquent payments. It follows that credit scores will be lower on average for minorities relative to similarly situated Whites. In sum, existing measures of credit reputation reflect latent disparities in access to credit and financial markets.

Capacity to Repay

Monthly payments made by the Carters for student loans, credit cards, and their auto loan, when combined with the expected mortgage payment for their desired new home, would account for over 50% of their monthly income. Many mortgage lenders will not approve loans that exceed this 50% ratio. Because they spend much of their disposable income on debt payments, they have very little savings.

In the context of mortgage loan underwriting, capacity measures are used to capture the financial resources that are available to borrowers. Lenders rely on the following measures of capacity to repay: debt ratios, which include the monthly housing expense-to-income ratio and monthly debt payment-to-income ratio; the nature of employment (e.g., self-employed), cash reserves, such as amounts in depository accounts; and the number of borrowers. Because the terms of the loan often affect the size and frequency of payments, capacity also depends upon the duration (e.g., 15, 20, and 30 year), whether the interest rate is fixed versus adjustable (the interest rate on adjustable rate loans varies according to an agreed upon external market benchmark, such as the prime rate) and the whether the loan is for a home purchase, refinance of an existing loan, or to finance a rental property.

Due to historical inequalities in income, homeownership, educational attainment, and other opportunities to build wealth, any requirement that relies directly or indirectly on capacity will have a negative and disparate impact on Black and Latinx mortgage applicants.

Direct Effects of Race on Capacity to Repay

Income and wealth disparities between disadvantaged minorities and Whites in the USA are well-documented (Fryer et al. 2013; Charles and Guryan 2008). Differences in median income and wealth for Black, Latinx, and White households are shown in Fig. 11.2. Prior research on the income gap has found that while differences in education, returns to education, skill levels, and search behavior underlie these disparities, there is considerable evidence of racial discrimination in the labor market. For example, the use of credit scores as a hiring criterion has been found to have a significant adverse impact on Black job applicants (Volpone 2015). According to the empirical estimates of economist Roland G. Fryer et al. (2013), after accounting for differences in education, ability, search behavior, and other legitimate factors, racial discrimination accounts for approximately one-third of the wage



Fig. 11.2 Selected financial characteristics by household race/ethnicity[3]

gap between Whites and Blacks. Similarly, economists Kerwin Kofi Charles and Jonathan Guryan (2008) estimate that 25% of the wage gap is due to racial animus.

The consensus among mortgage market scholars is that the persistent gap in wealth for Blacks and Latinxs relative to Whites results from *differences in homeownership, education, and labor market outcomes* (Sullivan et al. 2016). Cumulative disadvantage and historical racial discrimination affect each of these factors. Black and Latinx families tend to have fewer assets to transfer to children and future generations. A recent study found that while upward income mobility is likely for White children and, to a lesser extent, Latinx children, Black children are more likely to experience downward mobility, regardless of parents' income or level of education (Chetty et al. 2018).

Several studies have found that wealth constraints, i.e., down payments, are the most significant impediment to homeownership for minority households (Di and Liu 2007; Quercia et al. 2003; Charles and Hurst 2002). For example, the median home value in the USA in 2017 was $216,000 and $232,000 in the top 100 metropolitan areas (Kiplinger 2018). The required down payment would be approximately $8,200.[2] As shown in Fig. 11.2, 19% of Black households have zero net worth, and another 31% have assets worth $11,000 or less. This simple analysis shows that approximately 50% of Black households could not afford to purchase a typical home, underscoring the extent of the impact of the wealth gap on homeownership affordability.

Indirect Effects of Race on Capacity to Repay

Mortgage lending criteria include debt-to-income (DTI) ratio requirements, which are limits on the proportion of a borrower's monthly income that is needed to cover payments to creditors. Due to Federal regulations and long-standing mortgage industry rules-of-thumb, mortgage lending standards typically require that household debt, including expected mortgage, auto loan, student loan, credit card, and other loan payments fall below 43% of monthly income (utility and rental payments are excluded). Research has shown that approximately one-third of African-American and Latinx borrowers have *debt-to-income ratios* that exceed 43%, which is approximately 50% higher than the share of White borrowers (Bhutta and Canner 2013). The business justification for applying this DTI restriction is questionable (Goodman 2017; Green 2016). The extent to which DTI, when used as part of a multivariate model, is predictive of default depends on the loan data

used for the analysis, because in some cases borrower equity or credit score, mitigate these effects (Agarwal et al. 2014; Agarwal 2007; Goodstein 2014; Ding, et al. 2011; Quercia et al. 2012; Foote et al. 2009).

Higher costs for products and services place additional cash burdens on Black and Latinx consumers; these patterns lead to higher debt levels and/or higher costs of credit. These consumers pay more for certain products and services, such as food, utilities, other contract-based payments, and out-of-pocket health-care expenses (Charron-Chénier et al. 2016). Although some of these additional costs are due to risk-based pricing, there is also evidence of discrimination and disparate treatment in these markets (Charron-Chénier et al. 2016; Spader 2010). Blacks tend to pay significantly more for automobiles (Ayres and Siegelman 1995; Ayres 2005); additionally, African Americans and Latinxs are more likely to be sold dealer "add-on" products such as warranty and insurance, often with significant price markups (Rice and Schwartz 2018).

"*Retail and service desertification*," is more common in minority neighborhoods, such that residents have less proximate access to banks, in addition to supermarkets, health-care providers, pharmacies, non-fast food restaurants, and movie theaters, among others (Rugh et al. 2015; Schuetz et al. 2012; Moore and Diez Roux 2006; Morrison et al. 2000). Residents of Black and Latinx neighborhoods have fewer supermarkets and superstores and tend to have more proximate access to smaller grocery stores and convenience stores (Lamichane et al. 2013; Chung and Myers 1999), resulting in prices that are as much as 20% higher (Broda et al. 2009).

Taken together, this evidence suggests that Black and Latinx prospective homebuyers face constraints on indicators of their capacity to repay loans due in part to cumulative disadvantage and racial discrimination, which, in turn, have a negative impact on mortgage market outcomes.

Collateral Value

> Negroes don't depress real estate values, *racism does.*—W. E. B. DuBois (1967 [1925])

The Carters chose a home in a predominately Black neighborhood which is a short distance from family, friends, and their church. Although in recent years, the neighborhood has begun to gentrify, and house prices have begun to rise, there are still many vacant and distressed properties due to the wave of foreclosures that occurred following the subprime crisis. Not only are homes in this neighborhood

worth less than homes in similarly situated, predominately White neighborhoods, these property values are likely to increase at a slower pace.

Collateral measures, as a component of lending criteria, relate to the value and characteristics of the property to be purchased, i.e., the kind of house and how much it is worth. Collateral indicators include: the amount of the borrower's total equity (or home value minus the down payment); the property type (e.g., a 1-unit or 2- to 4-unit detached property); the type of structure (e.g., a condominium or manufactured home); and whether the property is intended to be used as a primary residence, second home or as an investment (e.g., rental property). As with underlying measures of credit quality and capacity, race has both a direct and indirect impacts on collateral values and ultimately mortgage lending outcomes.

Direct Effects of Race on Home Values

Housing markets in the USA remain highly segregated by race and economic class (Fry and Taylor 2012; Frey 2010), and there is little question of the operation of racial discrimination in housing, enabled in some cases by US government policy (Rothstein 2017; Roscigno et al. 2009). As alluded to by sociologist W. E. B. DuBois in the quote at the start of this section, *property values* are lower in minority neighborhoods than in similarly situated predominately White areas, controlling for socioeconomic and housing stock characteristics (Krivo and Kaufman 2004). Compared to similarly situated Whites, Blacks, and Latinxs gained less home equity between 2000 and 2009 and were more likely to have negative equity (i.e., owe more than their home was worth) at the end of this period (Fabera and Ellen 2016). Research also suggests that neighborhood housing appreciation declines significantly as the share of minority residents increases (Blau and Graham 1990), and this pattern can be observed in neighborhoods where a mere two percent of the residents are Black (Flippen 2004).

Indirect Effects of Race on Home Values

Despite the prohibition of "Jim Crow era" redlining practices, and the overlapping regulation and enforcement efforts of Federal and State regulatory agencies, lenders find ways to engage in less overt forms of discrimination. In recent years, major lenders, including Wells Fargo, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, and Citigroup, have been charged with steering Black and Latinx

homebuyers into higher-cost *subprime mortgages*, while offering lower-rate "prime" loans to White borrowers with similar credit profiles (Mock 2015). In addition to subprime loans being more expensive in terms of interest rates and fees, they are more likely to result in negative equity (i.e., loan amount exceeds the value of the home), loan defaults and foreclosures, which in turn, lead to increased vacancy rates, property deterioration, increased crime, and the perpetuation of lower home values in neighborhoods with high concentrations of these loans.

Research suggests that homes in minority neighborhoods receive *inferior maintenance* by private investors as well as public services. For example, a series of studies found that banks and other investors in possession of homes in foreclosure (known as "real estate owned" or REO properties) are less likely to perform regular maintenance and upkeep on properties in predominately Black and Latinx neighborhoods than in White areas (Dane et al. 2015). Findings from a study of 29 metropolitan areas found that REO in predominantly White neighborhoods were more likely to have regular lawn care, secured doors, and professional real estate advertising materials, while the same owners were less likely to perform these maintenance activities for properties in Black and Latinx neighborhoods. REO properties in minority areas were more likely to have visible trash and debris, unsecured doors and windows, and untended lawns (National Fair Housing Alliance 2014). Research also suggests that property insurers' policies are based on *negative racial stereotypes*, resulting in fewer resources being made available for development and maintenance of properties in minority neighborhoods (Squires 2003). Paired testing studies reveal that real estate professionals show fewer homes and apartments to Blacks and Latinxs than to Whites (Turner et al. 2013). As discussed by legal scholar Lior Strahilevitz (2006), certain "exclusionary amenities" (e.g., golf courses) signal consumers about the racial composition of neighborhoods, can alienate minority residents, and foster racial segregation while complying with fair housing regulations.

Along with higher foreclosure rates faced by minority homeowners negatively impacting home values, race/ethnicity can also indirectly affect the costs of mortgage loans. For example, mortgage lenders often charge "adverse market loan-level price adjustments" (LLPAs), which are premiums added to the interest rate in areas which have declining home values (Rust 2015). This practice has a negative and disparate impact on mortgage outcomes for Black and Latinx homebuyers by increasing the amount of income needed to qualify for the mortgage as well as the monthly payment.

Thus, as with measures of credit reputation and capacity, collateral values are impacted directly and indirectly by cumulative disadvantage and the effects of redlining and racial segregation.

Conclusions

Due to cumulative, direct and indirect effects of race and racism passed down from prior generations, John and Debra Carter do not qualify for a mortgage loan, and as a result, will either postpone or forego homeownership altogether.

This chapter presented a conceptual model of the role of race and racism with respect to each of the 3 C's of mortgage lending. According to this framework, Black and Latinx consumers often face credit challenges due to limited access to traditional financial services over time, higher costs due to layering of risk-based pricing, and racial discrimination, resulting in cumulative disadvantage.

Additional evidence suggests that Black and Latinx homebuyers are at a disadvantage in terms of their capacity to repay a mortgage loan. Members of these groups on average have lower incomes and wealth than White homebuyers due to fewer opportunities in employment, education, and homeownership, driven in part by racial discrimination. Black and Latinx consumers may also face higher costs for goods and services, such as utilities, insurance, banking, and credit, due to risk-based pricing in these markets as well as racial discrimination. These added costs place an additional burden on current and future resources.

According to prior research, race and racism also affect home values both directly and indirectly. Public policies over time have enabled the perpetuation of neighborhood racial segregation, resulting in higher concentrations of poverty, inferior housing quality and public services, as well as lower home values and house price appreciation in Black and Latinx areas. Developers and investors invest fewer resources in upkeep and restoration in these neighborhoods. In addition, loan-level price adjustments, which charge higher prices in troubled areas, have a negative, disparate impact on predominately minority areas while making loans in these areas less affordable.

Taken together, prior research supports our conceptual framework of the indirect effects of racism on mortgage lending criteria. Due to cumulative disadvantage, mortgage underwriting models that rely on traditional measures of credit reputation, capacity, and collateral value are a function of racism and discrimination, and as such, have a negative and disparate impact on Black and Latinx consumers. One approach to solving these inequalities and to "even the playing field" is to offset the effects of historical disadvantage using public or private subsidies. While this sounds like a costly burden on taxpayers or investors, these stakeholders are already bearing high social, economic, and opportunity costs due to low homeownership rates in these

communities. Thus, economists Darrick Hamilton and William A. Darity (2010) have proposed that the Federal government provide a trust fund to all newborn children, which could be used after they reach adulthood to finance educational expenses, business startups, as well as homeownership and other investments.

The existing legal standard for assessing a negative disparate impact relies on whether a practice has a legitimate business justification, and that businesses rule out the existence of a less discriminatory alternative. Because of the complexities of assessing mortgage credit risk, lenders can easily provide legitimate business justifications for the data and models used to measure the 3 C's. What has yet to be fully explored, however, are potentially less discriminatory alternatives. These possibilities include using artificial intelligence to build new mortgage lending models based on sources of data that more accurately represent the economic realities of racial and ethnic minorities (see Rhue 2019, in this volume Chapter 12). Existing models, for example, do not include rental or utility payment history, payments to cell phone or Internet providers, data on remittances (i.e., regular transfers of funds outside of the USA), payments using mobile applications or non-traditional financial entities (e.g., PayPal). These rich data sources could potentially be used to model mortgage loan performance while relying less heavily upon factors that are known to amplify historical disadvantage, although these approaches have been scrutinized due to ethical and legal concerns.

Until public policymakers, regulators, mortgage lenders, and investors can develop models that account for these disparities, inequities in access to mortgage credit and ultimately to homeownership will persist due to accumulated and intergenerational social and economic costs of racism.

Notes

1. These models are also used to predict prepayment (e.g., mortgage terminates when borrowers refinance a mortgage loan), default losses, as well as to set prices and fees. Although some lenders use their own underwriting models, most lenders adopt systems provided by secondary mortgage market entities (e.g., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) who purchase and package mortgage loans for sale to the mortgage-backed securities market.
2. Most Black and Latinx mortgage borrowers obtain Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans, requiring a down payment of 3.5%. For other loans, the average down payment is 6% (National Association of Realtors 2018). Accepted down payment sources include borrowers' savings, gifts from family members, and grants from local government and non-profit sources.

3. Source of Income and Poverty Estimates: Bernadette D. Proctor, Jessica L. Semega, and Melissa A. Kollar *Income and poverty in the United States: 2015, P60-256(RV)*, September 2016, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.pdf. Source of Net Worth Estimates: Thompson, Jeffrey P. and Gustavo A. Suarez (2015). "*Exploring the racial wealth gap using the survey of consumer finances*," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-076. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2015.076. Source of Zero net worth estimates: Dettling, Lisa J., Joanne W. Hsu, Lindsay Jacobs, Kevin B. Moore, and Jeffrey P. Thompson (2017). "*Recent trends in wealth-holding by race and ethnicity: Evidence from the survey of consumer finances*," FEDS notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 27, 2017, https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2083.

Further Reading

DiPrete, T. A., & Eirich, G. M. (2006). Cumulative advantage as a mechanism for inequality: A review of theoretical and empirical developments. *Annual Review of Sociology, 32*(1), 271–297.

Perry, V. G., & Motley, C. M. (2009). Reading the fine print: Advertising and the subprime mortgage crisis. *California Management Review, 51*(1, Fall), 29–44.

Perry, V. G., & Motley, C. M. (2013). You live where? An investigation of public housing stereotypes. *Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 32,* 48–58.

Rugh, J. S., Albright, L., & Massey, D. S. (2015). Race, space, and cumulative disadvantage: A case study of the subprime lending collapse. *Social Problems, 62*(2), 186–218.

References

Agarwal, S. (2007). The impact of homeowners' housing wealth misestimation on consumption and saving decisions. *Real Estate Economics, 35,* 135–154.

Agarwal, S., Green, R., Rosenblatt, E., & Yao, V. (2014). Collateral pledge, sunk-cost fallacy and mortgage default. *Journal of Financial Intermediation, 24*(2), 636–652.

Ayres, I. (2005). Discrimination in consummated car purchases. In L. B. Nielsen & R. L. Nelson (Eds.), *Handbook of employment discrimination research* (pp. 137–148). Dordrecht: Springer.

Ayres, I., & Siegelman, P. (1995). Race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car. *The American Economic Review, 85*(3), 304–321.

Bartlett, R. P., Morse, A., Stanton, R., & Wallace, N. (2017). Consumer lending discrimination in the Fintech era. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3063448.

Bhutta, N., & Canner, G. (2013). Mortgage market conditions and borrower outcomes: Evidence from the 2012 HMDA data and matched HMDA–credit record data. *Federal Reserve Bulletin, 99*(4). https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2013/pdf/2012_HMDA.pdf. Downloaded November 19, 2018.

Blau, P. M., & Duncan, O. D. (1967). *The American occupational structure*. New York: Wiley.

Blau, F. D., & Graham, J. W. (1990). Black-white differences in wealth and asset composition. *Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105,* 321–333.

Brevoort, K. P., Grimm, P., & Kambara, M. (2015, May). *Data point: Credit invisibles*. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf. Downloaded July 5, 2018.

Broda, C., Leibtag, E., & Weinstein, D. E. (2009). The role of prices in measuring the poor's living standards. *Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23*(2), 77–97.

Charles, K. K., & Guryan, J. (2008). Prejudice and wages: An empirical assessment of Becker's the economics of discrimination. *Journal of Political Economy, 116,* 773–809.

Charles, K. K., & Hurst, E. (2002). The transition to home ownership and the black-white wealth gap. *Review of Economics and Statistics, 84*(2), 281–297.

Charles, K. K., Hurst, E., & Stephens, M., Jr. (2008). Rates for vehicle loans: Race and loan source. *American Economic Review*, *8*(2), 315–320.

Charron-Chénier, R., Fink, J. J., & Keister, L. A. (2016). Race and consumption: Black and white disparities in household spending. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 3*(1), 50–67.

Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Jones, M. R., & Porter, S. R. (2018, March). *Race and economic opportunity in the United States: An intergenerational perspective* (Equality of Opportunity Project, Working Paper). http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/assets/documents/race_paper.pdf. Downloaded July 5, 2018.

Chung, C., & Myers, S. L., Jr. (1999). Do the poor pay more for food? An analysis of grocery store availability and food price disparities. *Journal of Consumer Affairs, 33*(2), 276–296.

Dane, S. M., Tara, K., Ramchandani, T. K., & Bellows, A. P. (2015). Discriminatory maintenance of REO properties as a violation of the federal fair housing act. *CUNY Law Review, 17*, 383–397.

Di, Z. X., & Liu, X. (2007). The importance of wealth and income in the transition to homeownership. *Cityscape, 9*(2), 137–151.

Ding, L., Quercia, R. G., Li, W., & Ratcliffe, J. (2011). Risky borrowers or risky mortgages disaggregating effects using propensity score models. *Journal of Real Estate Research, 33*(2), 245–278.

DiPrete, T. A., & Eirich, G. M. (2006). Cumulative advantage as a mechanism for inequality: A review of theoretical and empirical developments. *Annual Review of Sociology, 32*(1), 271–297.

DuBois, W. E. B. (1967). What would you do? In M. Meltzer (Ed.), *Their own words* (pp. 62–67). New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company (Original work published in 1925).

Engel, K. C., & McCoy, P. A. (2012). A tale of three markets: The law and economics of predatory lending. *Texas Law Review, 80*(6), 1255–2002. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286649.

Fabera, J. W., & Ellen, I. G. (2016). Race and the housing cycle: Differences in home equity trends among long-term homeowners. *Housing Policy Debate, 26*(3), 456–473. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2015.1128959.

Federal Reserve Board of Governors. (2007, August). *Report to the congress on credit scoring and its effects on the availability and affordability of credit*. Submitted to the congress pursuant to section 215 of the fair and accurate Credit transactions act of 2003. https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf. Downloaded July 5, 2018.

Federal Reserve Board of Governors. (2013). *Report on the economic well-being of U.S. households in 2013*. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/2014-economic-well-being-of-us-households-in-2013-household-credit-behavior.htm#subsection-184-B14E9ACA. Downloaded July 5, 2018.

Flippen, C. (2004). Unequal returns to housing investments? A study of real housing appreciation among black, white, and hispanic households. *Social Forces, 82*(4), 1523–1551.

Foote, C. L., Gerardi, K., Goette, L., & Willen, P. S. (2009). *Reducing foreclosures*. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Public Policy Discussion Paper 09-2). https://www.fedinprint.org/items/fedbpp/09-2.html. Downloaded November 18, 2018.

Freddie Mac. (2016). *The single-family seller/servicer guide*. McLean, VA: Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/guide/. Downloaded July 7, 2018.

Frey, W. H. (2010). *Census data: Blacks and hispanics take different segregation paths*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/census-data-blacks-and-hispanics-take-different-segregation-paths/. Downloaded July 8, 2018.

Fry, R., & Taylor, P. (2012). *The rise of residential segregation by income*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/01/the-rise-of-residential-segregation-by-income/. Downloaded July 8, 2018.

Fryer, R. G., Jr., Pager, D., & Spenkuch, J. L. (2013). Racial disparities in job finding and offered wages. *Journal of Law and Economics, 56*(3), 633–689.

Gates, S. W., Perry, V. G., & Zorn, P. M. (2002). Automated underwriting systems and lending outcomes: Good news for the underserved? *Housing Policy Debate, 13*(2), 369–392.

Ghent, A. C., Hernández-Murillo, R., & Owyang, M. T. (2014). Differences in subprime loan pricing across races and neighborhoods. *Regional Science and Urban Economics, 48,* 199–215.

Goodman, L. S. (2017). Quantifying the tightness of mortgage credit and assessing policy actions. *Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice, 37*(2), 235. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/jlsj/vol37/iss2/3. Downloaded October 14, 2018.

Goodstein, R. (2014). Refinancing trends among lower income and minority homeowners during the housing boom and bust. *Real Estate Economics, 42,* 690–723.

Green, R. K. (2016, September 17). The trouble with DTI as an underwriting variable—And as an overlay. *Richard's real estate and urban economics Blog*. Downloaded October 14, 2018.

Hamilton, D., & Darity, W. (2010). Can 'baby bonds' eliminate the racial wealth gap in putative post-racial America? *The Review of Black Political Economy, 37*(3–4), 207–216.

Hanson, A., Hawley, Z., Martin, H., & Liu, B. (2016). Discrimination in mortgage lending: Evidence from a correspondence experiment. *Journal of Urban Economics, 92,* 48–65.

Hartman, C., & Squires, G. D. (2013). *From foreclosure to fair lending: Advocacy, organizing, occupy, and the pursuit of equitable credit*. New York: New Village Press.

Kiplinger. (2018). *Home prices in the 100 largest metro areas*. https://www.kiplinger.com/tool/real-estate/T010-S003-home-prices-in-100-top-u-s-metro-areas/index.php. Downloaded July 7, 2018.

Krivo, L. J., & Kaufman, R. L. (2004). Housing and wealth inequality: Racial-ethnic differences in home equity in the United States. *Demography, 41*(3), 585–605.

Lamichhane, A. P., Warren, J., Puett, R., Porter, D. E., Bottai, M., Mayer-Davis, E. J., et al. (2013). Spatial patterning of supermarkets and fast food outlets with respect to neighborhood characteristics. *Health & Place, 23,* 157–164.

Mock, B. (2015). Redlining is alive and well—And evolving. *CityLab*. https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/09/redlining-is-alive-and-welland-evolving/407497/. Downloaded July 7, 2018.

Moore, L. V., & Diez Roux, A. V. (2006). Associations of neighborhood characteristics with the location and type of food stores. *American Journal of Public Health, 96*(2), 325–331.

Morrison, R. S., Wallenstein, S., Natale, D. K., Senzel, R. S., & Huang, L. L. (2000). We don't carry that—Failure of pharmacies in predominantly non-white neighborhoods to stock opioid analgesics. *The New England Journal of Medicine, 342,* 1023–1026.

National Association of Home Builders. (2017). *Homeownership by race and ethnicity*. Eye on Housing. http://eyeonhousing.org/2017/12/homeownership-by-race-and-ethnicity/. Downloaded July 8, 2018.

National Consumer Law Center. (2016, May). *Past imperfect: How credit scores and other analytics "bake in" and perpetuate past discrimination*. Racial justice & equal economic opportunity project. http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_discrimination/Past_Imperfect050616.pdf. Downloaded July 7, 2018.

National Fair Housing Alliance. (2014, August 27). *Zip code inequality: Discrimination by banks in the maintenance of homes in neighborhoods of color*. http://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2014-08-27_NFHA_REO_report.pdf. Downloaded July 7, 2018.

Nothaft, F. E., & Perry, V. G. (2002). Do mortgage rates vary by neighborhood? Implications for loan pricing and redlining. *Journal of Housing Economics, 11,* 244–265.

Perry, V. G., & Motley, C. M. (2009). Reading the fine print: Advertising and the subprime mortgage crisis. *California Management Review, 51*(1), 29–44.

Pope, D., & Sydnor, J. R. (2011). What's in a picture? Evidence of discrimination from prosper.com. *Journal of Human Resources, 46,* 53–92.

Quercia, R. G., McCarthy, G. W., & Wachter, S. W. (2003). The impacts of affordable lending efforts on homeownership rates. *Journal of Housing Economics, 12*(1), 29–59.

Quercia, R. G., Ding, L., & Reid, C. K. (2012, January 18). *Balancing risk and access: Underwriting standards for qualified residential mortgages* (UNC Center for Community Capital Working Paper). https://ssrn.com/abstract=1991262 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.199126. Downloaded November 18, 2018.

Rhue, M. (2019). Crowd-based markets: Technical progress, civil and social regression. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 193–210). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rice, L., & Schwartz, E., Jr. (2018). *Discrimination when buying a car: How the color of your skin can affect your car-shopping experience*. Washington, DC: National Fair Housing Alliance. http://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Discrimination-When-Buying-a-Car-FINAL-1-11-2018.pdf. Downloaded July 7, 2018.

Roscigno, V. J., Karafin, D. L., & Tester, G. (2009). The complexities and processes of racial housing discrimination. *Social Problems, 56*(1), 49–69.

Rothstein, R. (2017). *The color of law: The forgotten history of how our government segregated America*. New York: Liveright.

Ruetschlin, C., & Asante-Muhammad, D. (2013, December). *The challenge of credit card debt for the African American middle class*. Research sponsored by Demos and the NAACP. http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/CreditCardDebt-Demos_NAACP_0.pdf. Downloaded July 7, 2018.

Rugh, J. S., Albright, L., & Massey, D. S. (2015). Race, space, and cumulative disadvantage: A case study of the subprime lending collapse. *Social Problems, 62*(2), 186–218.

Rust, A. (2015). *The new hurdle to homeownership: How loan level pricing changes the cost of and the access to mortgage credit.* The Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina. https://reinvestmentpartners.org/file_download/inline/8417c1a0-b313-48cb-a85a-5e3fe37051f1. Downloaded July 7, 2018.

Schuetz, J., Kolko, J., & Meltzer, R. (2012). Are poor neighborhoods "retail deserts"? *Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42*(1–2), 269–285.

Spader, J. S. (2010). Beyond disparate impact: Risk-based pricing and disparity in consumer credit history scores. *Review of Black Political Economy, 37*(2), 61–78.

Squires, G. (2003). Racial profiling, insurance style: Insurance redlining and the uneven development of metropolitan areas. *Journal of Urban Affairs, 25,* 391–410.

Strahilevitz, L. J. (2006). Exclusionary amenities in residential communities. *Virginia Law Review, 92*(3). http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/exclusionary-amenities-residential-communities. Downloaded October 14, 2018.

Sullivan, L., Meschede, T., Dietrich, L., & Shapiro, T. (2016). *The racial wealth gap: Why policy matters*. Institute for Assets & Social Policy, Brandeis University. http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/RacialWealthGap_1.pdf. Downloaded July 7, 2018.

Turner, M. A., Santos, R., Levy, D. K., Wissoker, D., Aranda, C., & Pitingolo, R. (2013). *Housing discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. Prepared for U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.huduser.gov/portal/Publications/pdf/HUD-514_HDS2012.pdf. Downloaded November 19, 2018.

Volpone, S. (2015). Exploring the use of credit scores in selection processes: Beware of adverse impact. *Journal of Business and Psychology, 30*(2), 357–372.

12

Crowd-Based Markets: Technical Progress, Civil and Social Regression

Lauren Rhue

Chapter Overview

- Crowd-based markets such as crowdfunding and sharing economy platforms facilitate peer-to-peer user transactions by generating trust among users.
- To promote trust, technological design of crowd-based markets encourages users to share information—be transparent and authentic—which introduces racial bias.
- Currently, some researchers recommend that people of color remove all indications of their race and that platforms automate decisions as ways to reduce bias.
- Because the influence of crowd-based markets extends beyond the user base, society should act to lower racial bias in these platforms.
- Governments and citizens should engage with crowd-based markets to adopt regulation and technological changes to support anti-discrimination solutions.

L. Rhue (✉)
School of Business, Wake Forest University,
Winston-Salem, NC, USA
e-mail: rhuela@wfu.edu

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_12

Introduction

Imagine this. Most weekdays, Emily wakes up in her house that she shares with an Airbnb guest to supplement her income. After a breakfast delivered from Uber Eats, she calls an Uber or Lyft driver to take her to her co-working WeWork office space. She chooses a desk and begins working on the freelancing gigs that she found on Upwork. In her downtime, she checks the fundraising progress on the Indiegogo campaign she launched to start her small business venture. On the weekends, she declutters her apartment and sells her extra goods on eBay (and buys a few nice things for herself). Emily's comfortable life allows her to balance her professional and personal goals.

Emily's life sounds futuristic, frictionless, and convenient. Emily uses the excess capacity in her biggest asset, her house, to generate income. Plus, by renting out her extra space on Airbnb, Emily can afford a nicer and larger house. Once Emily becomes reliant on ride-sharing, she does not need to own a car so she avoids maintenance costs. As a participant in the gig economy, Emily has the flexibility to choose her jobs and complete them from anywhere in the world. Emily is no longer tied to a single company or a single location. Emily could travel the world, visit friends and family, or spend weekends in the country—all without worrying about sufficient vacation time. The existence of these platforms removes the frictions and trade-offs associated with car ownership or corporate jobs. The world Emily inhabits appears to be a place in which all people are empowered to prosper through shared ownership and market-based transactions. Many are heralding this crowd-based digital economy as the future of our economic arrangements and a communal utopia.

Utopia or not, these types of crowd-based digital marketplaces are transforming the global economy. Airbnb operates in thousands of cities worldwide and is globally the largest provider of short-term accommodations (Sundararajan 2018). As of 2018, Uber is available in 83 countries and 674 cities globally. By 2020, LinkedIn predicts that 43% of the US market will participate in the "gig economy" as freelancers and contractors.[1] With their increasing prevalence, crowd-based digital markets are heralded as mechanisms of individual empowerment.

Given the expected global dominance of crowd-based platforms, it is imperative to analyze and examine the claims of a frictionless digital future. While crowd-based markets clearly benefit participants (e.g., workers profit as independent contractors, consumers purchase cheaper goods and services), the benefits are unevenly distributed.

This chapter contributes to the emerging literature on technology's inherent values and inconsistent impact by discussing racial disparities in crowd-based markets and the prevailing suggestions to reduce racial bias. The technical capabilities of crowd-based markets introduce racial identifiers into platforms, and the economic incentives limit the effectiveness of anti-discrimination and self-regulation measures at the platform level. As the global economy shifts toward more crowd-based solutions, the influence of crowd-based markets extends beyond their user base. Society must act to reduce bias and enshrine anti-discrimination protections in these crowd-based markets. As such, this chapter provides recommendations for a multi-faceted approach to lower racial bias in online platforms.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I analyze crowd-based markets to understand the participants and their economic incentives. I also describe the technical dimensions of these platforms and how those elements shape the user experience. Next, I discuss the evidence of racial discrimination and recommendations to reduce bias in these platforms. Lastly, I consider the societal implications of these platforms and why it is imperative to intervene and incorporate anti-discrimination principles.

Crowd-Based Marketplaces

Crowd-based marketplaces facilitate peer-to-peer economic transactions across a variety of industries. In 2018, these marketplaces encompass sharing economy platforms such as Airbnb, Uber, Lyft, or TaskRabbit; crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and GoFundMe; shopping platforms like eBay or Craigslist; and peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms such as Prosper.com and Kiva. Crowd-based marketplaces essentially produce microbusinesses—small-scale hoteliers (Airbnb), small-scale taxi providers (Uber and Lyft), etc.—by allowing users to easily connect and transact with each other.

The first step is to understand the common properties of crowd-based platforms. Who participates in these markets? What are the norms and values? I use three lenses to study crowd-based markets: (1) a conceptual lens to identify the participants in the marketplace, (2) an economic lens to examine the stakeholders' financial incentives, and (3) a technical lens to discuss technological capabilities and constraints (Friedman et al. 2006).

Participants

Crowd-based marketplaces have three direct participants: consumers, sellers, and the digital platform itself (Hagiu and Wright 2015).

Consumers purchase goods and/or services in crowd-based markets. In practice, consumers differ according to the platform: On Airbnb, consumers are the guests who search for a place to stay; on crowdfunding platforms like Kickstarter, consumers are the project backers who contribute money to the fundraisers often in exchange for future access to a product; on crowdsourcing platforms like TaskRabbit, consumers are the people seeking someone to hire. In all examples, consumers inject money into crowd-based markets.

Sellers provide the content, goods, or services on the platform. In practice, sellers also differ by the type of platform. On Airbnb, sellers are the hosts who contribute apartments or houses for short-term rent. On Kickstarter, sellers are project creators who provide fundraising campaigns. A single person on the platform can play dual roles of consumer and seller. For example, an Airbnb host (seller role) can also act as a guest (consumer role) for another apartment, and a freelance writer (seller role) on Upwork can also hire a copyeditor (consumer role).

Crowd-based marketplaces act as intermediaries to facilitate these market transactions among sellers and consumers. As businesses, these entities have their own culture and norms around the treatment of employees, consumers, sellers, and their commitment to society.

Economic Incentives

Platforms offer a simple economic proposition to consumers and sellers: value. *Consumers* want to receive the best value for their money, usually in the form of cheaper goods and services. *Sellers* want the highest profit for their goods and/or services, usually in the form of a higher sales price.

As businesses, *crowd-based markets* profit from high transaction volume; therefore, each platform's success relies on increasing the number of users and transactions (Reinhold and Dolnicar 2017). To retain consumers and sellers, crowd-based platforms like Airbnb must provide better value to consumers and sellers than other options such as hotels. In this way, the platforms espouse two primary economic objectives: retaining a large user base and growing transaction volume. The technical designs of crowd-based markets reflect these economic incentives.

Technical Capabilities and Constraints

By its nature, technology is designed with specific capabilities to enable and constrain user actions, and the design choices reflect the designer's priorities and assumptions. To facilitate transactions, the core of their business model, crowd-based platforms must create trust among transacting parties (Sundararajan 2016). Without trust, crowd-based markets deteriorate; potential guests will not stay at a stranger's house and riders will not get into a stranger's car. Thus, *trust* is a core value for platforms that informs their technical design decisions.

To create trust, crowd-based marketplaces include technical elements to encourage *transparency* and information sharing. All participants, both consumers and sellers, complete detailed user profiles with pictures and provide reputation scores (Ert et al. 2016) and social network information (Tomboc 2013). Sellers often have additional product-based profiles—containing pictures, description, reputation, and social network elements (number of shares, other contributors, ratings, etc.)—to describe the sellers' products or services. Users can learn more information about other users and available products in order to facilitate sufficient trust to generate a transaction (Sundararajan 2016).

Once sufficient trust is established via transparency, platforms must provide a pathway for users to exercise *agency*, or the freedom for humans to interact with technology (Boudreau and Robey 2005), and initiate transactions. The transaction pathways differ by crowd-based platforms; users can begin a transaction from another user's profile on a crowdsourcing platform, from a product profile on a sharing economy or crowdfunding platform, or as a service request on a ride-sharing platform.

Most crowd-based markets permit sellers and consumers to reject an initiated transaction, such as a rider rejecting a driver after requesting the service. Sellers and consumers can screen each other and refuse initiated transactions without accountability for their rejections, unlike more typical business-to-consumer markets. Offline businesses like hotels engage in thousands of consumer transactions, and, because of their size, anti-discrimination protections restrict their ability to spurn potential customers based on certain attributes such as race and/or national origin. These anti-discrimination protections do not extend to the de facto microbusinesses facilitated by crowd-based platforms (Ravenelle 2016) because individuals possess agency over whether to engage in transactions. Thus, the

collective decisions of the individual participants can lead to unevenly distributed benefits of these crowd-based platforms, as some individuals are viewed as more desirable transaction partners.

There is one important caveat to the comparison between crowd-based markets and their offline counterparts. In some offline industries, such as the taxi industry, individuals make the point-of-sale decision. Because individuals can reject or accept consumers in these industries, anti-discrimination protections are similarly difficult to enforce. In these industries, the digital traces left by crowd-based markets may actually produce better investigations and enforcement of anti-discriminatory practices. However, the majority of offline industries disrupted by crowd-based markets (e.g., hotel, freelancing, lending) follow the typical business-to-consumer relationship.

In the context of crowd-based markets, these technical choices embed values—trust, transparency, and individual agency—into the technology. However, technology and algorithms are not neutral (O'Neil 2016), and seemingly objective software can exacerbate existing power differences and lead to suboptimal and/or harmful outcomes (Barocas and Levy 2016; Jamerson 2019, in this volume Chapter 3). For example, Boston offered a smartphone app called Street Bump that would automatically detect and report potholes, so the city could repair them. Although this crowd-based innovative app was heralded by tech enthusiasts, Street Bump detected more potholes in affluent neighborhoods because lower-income constituents were less likely to own smartphones and download Street Bump (Crawford 2013). Thus, ostensibly impartial crowd-based technology can produce disparate outcomes, even with positive intentions of the technical designers. The following section examines how the technical elements of these crowd-based markets generates racial disparities.

A Color-Conscious Crowd

The technical capabilities encouraged by crowd-based platforms to facilitate transactions—user profiles and reputation—also introduce racial identity into the marketplace. As an example, Kickstarter advises creators to "to tell people [your] story: who you are, what you want to make, and why". In order to share their story, users must include personal details that often reveal their racial and ethnic identity (Rhue and Clark 2018). Some names are associated with racial and ethnic groups (Booth et al. 2012); user pictures and/or product pictures include racial characteristics such as skin color (Ayres et al. 2015); and some words like "anime" or "gospel" are closely associated with

particular racial groups (Rhue and Clark 2018). As long as people are sharing personal details, there are multi-dimensional ways to infer racial identity.

With the introduction of race into the crowd-based marketplace, racial bias arises with real economic consequences for people of color. Black loan applicants receive higher interest rates on Prosper, a peer-to-peer lending platform (Pope and Sydnor 2011). An eBay auction with a dark-skinned hand holding the product receives lower-priced bids than another auction with a White hand holding the same product (Ayres et al. 2015). On Kickstarter, contributors discount the value of products from Black entrepreneurs (Younkin and Kuppuswamy 2019) and Black entrepreneurs experience 50% lower success rates than other racial groups (Rhue and Clark 2018). On Airbnb, guests with Black names are 16% less likely to be accepted as guests (Edelman et al. 2017). Muslim candidates receive a 13% lower callback rate than Christian candidates in predominantly Christian areas (Acquisti and Fong 2016). In Europe, a driver with an Arab, Turkish, or Persian sounding name must offer a 23% lower price in order to attract a rider at the same rate as a driver with a German name (Tjaden et al. 2017). Numerous studies have confirmed the presence of racial and ethnic discrimination on crowd-based platforms across the world.

There is a dystopian corollary to the frictionless opportunities described in the Introduction. Imagine the same crowd-based digital future, but for Quirtina and not Emily. Quirtina is searching for someone on Airbnb to rent the extra room in her house, but no one responds to her rental listing. She tries to use Uber to get to her co-working space, but drivers cancel her requests so she is often late. Quirtina struggles in the gig economy as she applies to job listings and waits for responses. On weekends, she wants to make money selling her things on eBay, but her items receive lower bids than similar items sold by other users. Quirtina is frustrated with this digital future, filled with inconveniences, uncertainty, and unreliability.

As a Black woman, Quirtina may suspect racial bias for her lower success; however, she is limited in her opportunities for redress. No single individual is responsible for the *collective* crowd's decision not to rent her room, hire her, or bid market price for her goods. In crowd-based markets, the racial disparity for people of color stems from the individual choices of millions of users—offering lower prices to people of color; refusing to host people of color; discounting the contributions of entrepreneurs of color; and declining to hire people of color. Each individual who discriminates is acting within their rights and each individual discriminatory act has limited consequence. It is the collective effect of individual choices that harm people of color and reflect the racial bias in society.

Bias Reduction by Design

How can we address racial disparities in these crowd-based marketplaces? Researchers have consistently offered two types of recommendations to reduce bias: (1) Users or platforms can remove all racial identifiers to create racial anonymity or (2) platforms can automate reputations and decisions to remove unconscious bias.

Racial Anonymity

To achieve racial anonymity, some people advise eliminating all personal elements that could indicate race. For example, the peer-to-peer lending site Prosper removed all personal information about the borrowers and retained only the relevant financial information about the loan. Without names, pictures, or other personally identifying details, Prosper achieved racial anonymity for all its borrowers.

Few researchers suggest that other crowd-based platforms remove all personal information like Prosper did. Because of the importance of interpersonal trust, most crowd-based platforms are unlikely to remove personal information about users. In ride-sharing platforms, riders want to know their driver's name and face for security purposes. In freelance platforms, employers want to talk to their temporary employee using their name. On most crowd-based platforms, it is unfeasible to create a space without any indications of racial identity, and so actual racial anonymity is impractical if not impossible.

Instead of racial anonymity for all users, most researchers are actually suggesting assimilation. Younkin and Kuppuswamy (2017) recommend that people of color obscure their race on Kickstarter to improve their odds of success, and anecdotal evidence confirms the effectiveness of this strategy. The real Quirtina, Quirtina Crittenden, struggled to book a room on Airbnb until she shortened her name to "Tina" and changed her photo to a generic city skyline photo (Penman et al. 2016). By eliminating signs of her Black racial identity, she could book a room and engage in the crowd-based economy; with her entire identity—her full name and her picture—she was excluded from the crowd-based economy.

This situation highlights an inherent contradiction for people of color: Crowd-based marketplaces promote transparency and authenticity as a means to encourage user trust; however, people of color are viewed as less trustworthy (Smith 2010), so authenticity can penalize people of color (Rhue and Clark 2018). Since suggestions for "non-racial" identifiers often

signify Whiteness (Rosa-Salas 2019, in this volume Chapter 2), assimilation becomes a prerequisite for success.

If people of color cannot "tell their story" and simultaneously be successful, then they face a choice between authenticity and success. In this way, the recommendation of "racial anonymity" places an emotional and psychological burden on people of color to hide important aspects of their identity—their name and their face—in order to fully participate in the emerging digital future. Does society really benefit from crowd-based markets that are devoid of non-white faces?

Automation

To offset individual unconscious bias, some platforms turn toward automation to shape individual choices. For example, Airbnb promotes "Instant Book," a feature that automatically books any prospective guest who satisfies the host's pre-determined criteria, as a method to reduce discrimination (Murphy 2016; Edelman and Luca 2014). With this feature, Airbnb hopes to remove hosts' unconscious bias. Guests are booked based on pre-defined criteria, reducing the opportunities for hosts to discriminate based on guests' appearances and/or names.

In the case of Airbnb, Instant Book may reduce some discrimination, but it is not a panacea. First, the host must choose to adopt Instant Book since a mandatory platform-wide policy of automated acceptance conflicts with the platform's built-in individual agency over transactions. Second, hosts can still cancel the stay after the initial agreement, similar to how Uber drivers cancel the rides for Black riders after the automatic assignment (Ye et al. 2017). Lastly, hosts may identify elements such as neighborhood that correlate highly enough with race to act as a proxy, creating seemingly race-neutral criteria with discriminatory effects. The biggest benefits to automation are the potential to analyze the digital traces for evidence of disparate effects and the potential to use artificial intelligence to identify opportunities for traditionally marginalized groups (Perry 2019, in this volume Chapter 11).

Why Bias Matters

Some argue that crowd-based markets are limited in scope, so why should anyone care about discrimination in crowd-based markets? Society must grapple with these issues because the influence of these platforms extends beyond the users, as shown in the following three examples.

City Transformation

Globally, Airbnb changes landscapes of its cities by increasing housing prices, accelerating gentrification, and facilitating displacement (Gant 2016; Lee 2016). Accelerated gentrification affects the supply of affordable housing, an issue that disproportionately impacts communities of color. Crowd-based platforms often pay lower taxes than their offline counterparts, leading to a drop in tax revenue toward affordable housing and other social services. Furthermore, people of color cannot reap the same economic benefits of Airbnb because they experience discrimination as a host and as a guest (Edelman and Luca 2014). Thus, Airbnb's reach includes not only users but anyone who lives in a city with a strong Airbnb presence.

Ride-Sharing as Public Transit Infrastructure

Many local governments view ride-sharing platforms as a replacement for additional public transportation (Tabuchi 2018). Public transit infrastructure is expensive to build and potentially disruptive for residents, whereas reliance on ride-sharing could capitalize on the existing excess capacity in cars driven by a single person.

However, public transportation must be equally available to all residents, and ride-sharing does not meet this standard. People of color experience discrimination and bias on these platforms as drivers and riders, meaning that the public transportation infrastructure would exhibit racial differences. Plus, these apps are not cost effective for long-distance travels, leading to unaffordable commutes for lower-income residents. Anyone with a vested interest in public transit should care about the discrimination in crowd-based markets.

Gig Economy

As more hiring functions move into the digital sphere, people are forced to compete in the "gig economy" of the crowd-based labor markets. In the USA, racial biases exist in the job market (Bertrand et al. 2004) but independent contractors on crowd-based markets are not subject to the same anti-discrimination regulations as corporate employee hires. An Australian study showed that distinctly non-white ethnic names received fewer callbacks, and one woman had to *legally change her name* from Ragda Ali to Gabriella Hannah in order to receive callbacks for job interviews

(Booth et al. 2012). Without legal protections, the economic pressures of job-seeking in these crowd-based markets could be significant enough for people of color to assimilate, similar to how "Quirtina" became "Tina" on Airbnb.

These three examples demonstrate the potentially widespread consequences of crowd-based markets to communities and individuals. As these platforms influence economic systems outside their user base, in some cases replacing public services, society must address and reduce bias to ensure fairness and civil rights. Because of the platforms' relatively laissez-faire approach toward racial bias, government agencies, users, and concerned citizens should all engage with the platforms to lessen the racial discrimination in these crowd-based marketplaces.

A Call to Action

Crowd-Based Markets: Enforce Existing Policies

To what extent should digital platforms be responsible for discouraging discrimination? Platforms' seemingly neutral values of trust, transparency, and individual agency unwittingly stymie users of color in their participation in crowd-based markets. For users of color, their authentic selves are often viewed as less trustworthy so other users can exercise individual agency to discriminate. Any action taken by the platform to reduce racial bias is likely to violate one of these core values.

For example, crowd-based markets can intercede to lessen racial disparities through recommendation systems. Platforms can promote campaigns from underrepresented groups to potential backers (Younkin and Kuppuswamy 2017). Despite its potential effectiveness, this policy could lead to controversy, similar to the controversy over "affirmative action" in college admissions, because it reduces the perception of individual agency and transparency.

Indeed, most anti-discriminatory oversight fundamentally conflicts with the economic incentives and values of crowd-based platforms. If platforms intercede, then they would be setting prices for host and guests, requiring callbacks for job positions, creating penalties for canceled rides, etc. Despite insisting on self-regulation, crowd-based markets are reluctant to interfere with individual agency and possibly reduce transaction volume. They typically distance themselves from their users' behaviors, disavowing

accountability for the collective effect of individual choices (except in instances of overt racism and/or hate speech).

Anti-discrimination policies are ineffective without methods to identify and monitor discriminatory users, requiring data analysis (Murphy 2016) and other corporate resources. Platforms can commit to enforcing community standards and working with governments to ensure the dignity and opportunities of all participants.

International Governments: Hold Crowd-Based Markets Accountable

In addition to platforms' enforcement of non-discrimination policies, governments should enact protections to monitor and protect members of marginalized groups. In the USA, laws and regulations sought to prevent racial discrimination by businesses. However, the move toward crowd-based markets results in a regression toward unregulated and de facto bias by these microbusinesses.

Governments with more progressive ideals and stronger consumer protections can take the lead. Facebook was required to change its targeting policy in response to concerns from the European Union (Singer 2018), and those changes shaped its product for non-EU citizens as well. In the same vein, progressive governments have an opportunity to influence the direction of crowd-based markets and reduce the hands-off approach currently favored by platforms. As the economy moves into these crowd-based marketplaces and away from structured companies, there is a need for "super regulation" (Hadfield 2017) and global cooperation to regulate these markets.

California provides a model for this type of governmental leadership. In 2017, the California state government enacted legislation to apply fair housing tests on Airbnb (Welch 2017) for hosts with more than three listings. The California regulation, which separates casual users from "professional" hosts, could provide a blueprint for how the USA and other governments can oversee these platforms and reduce bias.

Ravenelle (2016) finds that Airbnb is reversing the civil rights housing protections in the USA, highlighting the pressing nature of this problem. The fate of Airbnb has worldwide implications, as international markets are often dominated by US companies with global operations (Stanoevska-Slabeva et al. 2017). Governments must cooperate to provide collective protections and ensure that our technological progress is matched with continued social and civil protections.

"The Crowd": Support Users of Color

People of color can also organize to support each other as a means to remedy structural inequality (Banks 2019, in this volume Chapter 13). People have suggested that increasing the population of users of color will increase the overall success measures (Ye et al. 2017). Although these markets are not necessarily completely segregated (Laouénan and Rathelot 2017), there is some evidence of a preference for same-race interactions on crowd-based platforms (Dahlin et al. 2018).

In practice, the technical aspects of crowd-based markets hinder community support. First, people cannot overtly associate with a race on their user profile, and second, people are not discoverable by race. Crowd-based markets should provide an option for users to associate with a racial or ethnic group. Currently, not a single crowd-based market allows users to specify their race, but such "color-blind" policies, intended to remove racial bias, only serve to foment it. Other users can perceive a user's race through their pictures, but that user loses the agency to affirmatively state their race. In addition to user self-identification, crowd-based markets could use artificial intelligence to identify people of color and provide others with the option to support their endeavors (e.g., renting rooms from other people of color, hiring freelancers who are people of color, etc.). Without a mechanism to identify and support other users of color, platforms inhibit community-based support for people of color.

This community-based solution has important drawbacks. First, if users can easily find users of color, then they could easily exclude users of colors. Crowd-based platforms would have to think carefully about how to allow for race-based support while preventing overt racial exclusions. Perhaps crowd-based markets could offer search results based on only inclusive criteria or require that search results include users from multiple racial/ethnic groups. Second, facial recognition is less successful with people of color, so crowd-based markets would have to examine the biases in their facial recognition systems if they chose that route (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018).

Still, platforms should examine options to enable community-based support for people of color. Community-based support adheres to their values of transparency, individual agency and trust while providing opportunities to reduce disparities for people of color.

Conclusion

Crowd-based marketplaces are poised to shape our future. Their influence extends into numerous arenas such as housing prices, public transportation, and labor markets. These platforms embrace a series of seemingly neutral values like transparency, trust, and agency; however, technology is never completely neutral. The technical capabilities designed to promote these values introduce racial identities, and eventually racial bias, into the market. Racial discrimination in crowd-based markets has significant economic impacts for people of color, and the current suggestions to reduce bias—racial anonymity and automation—are insufficient and serve to devalue people of color.

Because of their economic incentives, crowd-based markets typically take a laissez-faire approach to racial discrimination. Progressive governments must lead the way and enact legislation to protect users in these crowd-based markets. Because these markets are global phenomena, more progressive legislation in one country could improve the markets globally. As a complementary measure, people of color should support each other and crowd-based markets should enact technological changes to facilitate those practices.

The most common recommendation to reduce racial bias, "racial anonymity," should be retired. By suggesting that only people of color remove all indicators of their race, researchers communicate that White is the "norm" (Rosa-Salas 2019, in this volume Chapter 2) and that non-white racial identities should be hidden from the public sphere to achieve economic success. Yet, to paraphrase the artist Alisha B. Wormsley, there are Black people in the (digital) future.[2] We need to fight for protections for Black people, and other marginalized people of color, to ensure their complete participation in the growing sphere of crowd-based markets.

Notes

1. https://blog.linkedin.com/2017/february/21/how-the-freelance-generation-is-redefining-professional-norms-linkedin.
2. http://www.post-gazette.com/ae/art-architecture/2018/04/05/Landlord-removes-There-Are-Black-People-in-the-Future-billboard-in-East-Liberty/stories/201804040154.

Further Reading

O'Neil, C. (2016). *Weapons of math destruction: How big data increases inequality and threatens democracy*. New York, NY: Crown Publishing Group.

Ravenelle, A. (2016, March 13). *Belong anywhere? How Airbnb is dismantling generations of civil rights in the name of progress*. Available at SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=2838219 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2838219.

Rhue, L. (2018). *An overview of crowd-based markets and racial discrimination*. AMCIS 2018 Proceedings, New Orleans. Available at https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2018/SocialInclusion/Presentations/1/.

Rhue, L., & Clark, J. (2018). *The consequences of authenticity: Quantifying racial signals and their effects on crowdfunding success* (Working Paper). Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2837042.

References

Acquisti, A., & Fong, C. (2016). *An experiment in hiring discrimination via online social networks*. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031979.

Ayres, I., Banaji, M., & Jolls, C. (2015). Race effects on eBay. *The RAND Journal of Economics, 46*(4), 891–917.

Banks, P. (2019). Cultural justice and collecting: Challenging the underrecognition of African American artists. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 213–226). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Barocas, S., & Levy, K. (2016). What customer data collection could mean for workers. *Harvard Business Review.* Available at https://hbr.org/2016/08/the-unintended-consequence-of-customer-data-collection.

Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). Are Emily and Greg more employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A field experiment on labor market discrimination. *American Economic Review, 94*(4), 991–1013.

Booth, A. L., Leigh, A., & Varganova, E. (2012). Does ethnic discrimination vary across minority groups? Evidence from a field experiment. *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 74*(4), 547–573.

Boudreau, M. C., & Robey, D. (2005, January–February). Enacting integrated information technology: A human agency perspective. *Organization Science, 16*(1), 3–18.

Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). Gender shades: Intersectional accuracy disparities in commercial gender classification. In *Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency*.

Crawford, K. (2013). The hidden biases in big data. *Harvard Business Review*. Available at https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data.

Dahlin, L., Clark, J., & Rhue, L. (2018). *Crowdfunding community formation: Fundraiser race and gender homophily* (Working Paper).

Edelman, B. G., & Luca, M. (2014). Digital discrimination: The case of Airbnb.com (Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper [14-054]).

Edelman, B., Luca, M., & Svirsky, D. (2017). Racial discrimination in the sharing economy: Evidence from a field experiment. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 9*(2), 1–22.

Ert, E., Fleischer, A., & Magen, N. (2016). Trust and reputation in the sharing economy: The role of personal photos in Airbnb. *Tourism Management, 55,* 62–73.

Friedman, B., Kahn, P. H., Jr., & Borning, A. (2006). Value sensitive design and information systems. In P. Zhang & D. Galletta (Eds.), *Human–computer interaction in management information systems: Foundations* (pp. 348–372). Armonk, NY and London, UK: M.E. Sharpe.

Gant, A. C. (2016). Holiday rentals: The new gentrification battlefront. *Sociological Research Online, 21*(3), 1–9.

Hadfield, G. (2017, November 22). World needs 21st century regulation to police gig economy. *The Financial Times*. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/71a2dea6-a505-11e7-8d56-98a09be71849.

Hagiu, A., & Wright, J. (2015). Multi-sided platforms. *International Journal of Industrial Organization, 43,* 162–174.

Jamerson, T. (2019). Race, markets, and digital technologies: Historical and conceptual frameworks. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 39–54). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Laouénan, M., & Rathelot. R. (2017). *Ethnic discrimination on an online marketplace of vacation rental*. https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01514713/document.

Lee, D. (2016). How Airbnb short-term rentals exacerbate Los Angeles's affordable housing crisis: Analysis and policy recommendations. *Harvard Law and Policy Review, 10*, 229.

Murphy, L. W. (2016, September 8). *Airbnb's work to fight discrimination and build inclusion*. A Report Submitted to Airbnb. Available at https://blog.atairbnb.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/REPORT_Airbnbs-Work-to-Fight-Discrimination-and-Build-Inclusion.pdf?3c10be.

O'Neil, C. (2016). *Weapons of math destruction: How big data increases inequality and threatens democracy*. New York, NY: Crown Publishing Group.

Penman, M., Vedantam, V., & Nesterak, M. (2016). *#AirbnbWhileBlack: How hidden bias shapes the sharing economy*. NPR. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/04/26/475623339/-airbnbwhileblack-how-hidden-bias-shapes-the-sharing-economy.

Perry, V. (2019). A loan at last? Race and racism in mortgage lending. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 173–192). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pope, D. G., & Sydnor, J. R. (2011). What's in a picture? Evidence of discrimination from Prosper.com. *Journal of Human Resources, 46*(1), 53–92.

Ravenelle, A. (2016, March 13). *Belong anywhere? How Airbnb is dismantling generations of civil rights in the name of progress*. Available at SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=2838219 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2838219.

Reinhold, S., & Dolnicar, S. (2017). Chapter 2—The sharing economy. In S. Dolnicar (Ed.), *Peer-to-peer accommodation networks: Pushing the boundaries* (pp. 15–26). Oxford: Goodfellow Publishers. https://dx.doi.org/10.23912/9781911396512–3600.

Rhue, L., & Clark, J. (2018). *The consequences of authenticity: Quantifying racial signals and their effects on crowdfunding success* (Working Paper). Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2837042.

Rosa-Salas, M. (2019). Making the mass white: How racial segregation shaped consumer segmentation. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 21–38). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Singer, N. (2018, April 8). A tough task for Facebook: European-type privacy for all. *New York Times*. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/technology/a-tough-task-for-facebook-european-type-privacy-for-all.html.

Smith, S. S. (2010). Race and trust. *Annual Review of Sociology, 36,* 453–475.

Stanoevska-Slabeva, K., Lenz-Kesekamp, V., & Suter, V. (2017). *Platforms and the sharing economy: An analysis EU H2020 Research Project Ps2Share—Participation, privacy, and power in the sharing economy, 2017*. Available at https://www.bi.edu/globalassets/forskning/h2020/ps2share_platform-analysis-paper_final.pdf.

Sundararajan, A. (2016). *The sharing economy: The end of employment and the rise of crowd-based capitalism*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Sundararajan, A. (2018). Crowd-based capitalism, digital automation, and the future of work. *University of Chicago Legal Forum, 2017* (Article 19). Available at https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2017/iss1/19.

Tabuchi, H. (2018, June 19). How the Koch brothers are killing public transit projects around the country. *New York Times*. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/climate/koch-brothers-public-transit.html.

Tjaden, J. D., Schwemmer, C., & Khadjavi, M. (2017). *Ride with me: Ethnic discrimination in social markets* (Kiel Working Paper No. 2087). Available at https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/167311/1/89502831X.pdf.

Tomboc, G. (2013). The lemons problem in crowdfunding. *The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law, 30*(2), 253 (2013–2014).

Welch, C. (2017, April 28). Some Airbnb hosts will face racial discrimination tests in California. *The Verge*. Available at https://www.theverge.com/2017/4/28/15475982/airbnb-discrimination-tests-california.

Ye, T., Pierce, C., Alahmad, R., & Robert, L. P. (2017). *Race and rating on sharing economy platforms: The effect of race similarity and reputation on trust and booking intention in Airbnb*. Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2017) in Seoul, Korea. Available at http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2017/Peer-to-Peer/Presentations/4/.

Younkin, P., & Kuppuswamy, V. (2017). The colorblind crowd? Founder race and performance in crowdfunding. *Management Science, 64*(7), 3269–3287.

Younkin, P., & Kuppuswamy, V. (2019). Discounted: The effect of founder race on the price of new products. *Journal of Business Venturing, 34*(2), 389–412.

Part IV

Neoliberalism, Markets and Marketization

13

Cultural Justice and Collecting: Challenging the Underrecognition of African American Artists

Patricia A. Banks

Chapter Overview

- Activism and aesthetics shape the collection of African-American art by Black collectors.
- Although collectors take race into account when making art purchases, aesthetic criteria are foremost in their collecting decisions.
- While focused on the market for African-American fine art, this chapter also offers insight on race and activism in other cultural markets such as film.
- Buycotts and boycotts directed at addressing racial inequality in cultural markets may have limited effectiveness if they do not address aesthetic concerns.

P. A. Banks (✉)
CASBS, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
e-mail: pbanks@mtholyoke.edu
URL: http://www.patriciaannbanks.com

P. A. Banks
Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA, USA

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_13

Introduction

This chapter investigates how political and aesthetic values influence the collection of African-American art by Black patrons.[1,2] I draw on ethnographic and archival data, such as in-depth interviews with collectors and books about their collections, to empirically illustrate this process. I find that while collectors take race into account when making art purchases as a strategy to address the underrecognition of African American artists, aesthetic criteria are also foremost in their collecting decisions. Or, the race of artists sets a boundary for what collectors purchase but aesthetic factors, such as perceived quality and mode of representation, determine what specific works they choose. Although focused on the market for African-American fine art, this chapter also offers insight on activism in cultural markets more broadly. More specifically, this analysis troubles the assumption that appeals to racial politics are enough to mobilize consumers to buy products and services in cultural markets.

Politics and Cultural Consumption

To cast light on factors influencing the collection of African-American art by Black art collectors, I draw on theorizations of art and political consumptions. *Political consumption* is "… the act of selecting among products and producers based on social, political, or ethical considerations…" (Shah et al. 2007, p. 219). However, there is also a form of political consumption that is specifically linked to race—*racialized political consumerism* (Brown 2015). Racialized political consumerism concerns consumption directed at influencing the allocation of resources to a racial group. It can be organized around "boycotts"—for example, avoiding the consumption of particular goods and services—or "buycotts"—for example, seeking out certain goods and services—to impact racial resource allocation. One form of racialized political consumerism is "buy black" campaigns where consumers make purchases from Black sellers to address varying forms of inequality.

While theory on racialized political consumerism addresses consumption as a whole, I suggest that how it works varies within particular market sectors. Here, I am concerned with how racialized political consumerism is enacted within markets for cultural goods. I argue that within cultural markets aesthetic concerns are fundamental to the articulation of racialized political consumerism. Given recent efforts to mobilize Black consumers to boycott and buycott cultural products mainly on the basis of racial politics,

it is especially critical to develop an aesthetic-centered understanding of political consumerism in markets for creative goods. Next, I review key sociological theory in the field of fine art.

In his research on fields of cultural production, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1983) argues that art fields are organized around competitions for various form of capital. In the world of fine art, it is symbolic capital, or prestige, that is most prized. However, the valorization of artists is not dependent on talent alone. Instead, the legitimation of artists depends on collective action within the art world. Along with individuals such as gallerists, critics, art historians, and curators, collectors are central figures in the production of artists' reputations. By buying artists' works and advocating for them in other ways such as making donations to museums, collectors influence the distribution of symbolic capital in the art world.[3] I argue that some Black collectors focus their collecting on African-American artists partly as a strategy to address racial inequality in the distribution of recognition. Yet, while these collectors are concerned with redressing systematic racial inequalities in the distribution of symbolic capital,[4] they do this by focusing their acquisitions on works that align with a range of other criteria. To better understand the non-politically motivated dimensions of racialized political consumerism in the fine art field, it is instructive to turn to the sociological research on cultural consumption.

In researching cultural consumption, Bourdieu (1984) asserts that the middle and upper class are preoccupied by the formal properties of art. I suggest that aesthetic factors, such as perceived quality and mode of representation, shape what specific artworks by African-American artists Black collectors' purchase. Thus, aesthetic factors place a limit on what artworks get selected in activist-oriented collecting. Moreover, while the race of the artist is a fundamental criterion underlying what works are purchased, it is not the only dimension of artists' identities that matters. Within the category of African-American artists, patrons often commit to collecting specific individual artists in-depth and collecting specific groups of artists associated with a certain region of the USA. As such, while these collectors may be united in sharing a commitment to increasing the recognition of African-American artists, how this commitment manifests itself in their collecting takes different turns. For example, while one collector may direct her attention to gaining recognition for African-American artists who create abstract art another may place his focus on legitimating the work of African American artists who produce representational art. In this sense, while these collectors comprise a "taste public" (Gans 1999, p. 7) who make similar cultural choices—in this case collecting African-American art—they also represent a diverse group with individualized tastes.

Methods

There are varying understandings of who is considered a collector and what is considered a collection of African-American art. For the purposes of this chapter, I focus on Blacks who live in the USA and have an art collection with a primary, though not necessarily exclusive, focus on African-American art. I draw on a range of data including in-depth interviews with Black collectors from two ethnographic studies that I conducted on Black cultural patronage, in-depth interviews with Black art collectors who took part in the National Gallery of Art's (NGA) series "The Collecting of African American Art," all books that I could identify that describe and illustrate major collections of African-American art owned by Blacks, and articles in the *International Review of African American Art* that feature Black collectors.[5] The in-depth interviews were transcribed, and the art books and magazine articles were converted to digital documents. To content analyze these data, a coding key centering on collecting motivations and aesthetic concerns was developed inductively by examining a subset of documents and existing relevant literature. The coding scheme was subsequently applied to the whole set of documents using a qualitative data analysis program. My understanding of the meanings and motivations that shape these patrons' collecting is also informed by participant observation in places such as African-American art auctions and gallery exhibitions.

Social Justice and Art Patronage

Activism

For some Black patrons of African-American art, one motivation underlying their collecting is to help reduce racial marginalization in the art world. In this regard, the underrecognition of Black artists is a core concern. For example, describing the difference in name recognition between Black and White artists collector Darryl Atwell notes that while artists like Julie Mehretu and Theaster Gates "are doing tremendous … there's a lot of work to do to get them to become a common name, like Andy Warhol" (National Gallery of Art 2012). Some patrons first became conscious about inequality in the art canon before they started collecting. They remember experiences in their childhoods and young adult years such as learning about few if any African-American artists in school. For example, collectors Jacqueline and

Clarence Bradley recall how they were both moved and disappointed when they visited an exhibition on African-American prints when they were well into adulthood. "What surfaced was a range of emotions from joy to pride to anger," they explain. "We were angry because, despite liberal arts college educations (Yale University and Williams College) that were liberally sprinkled with art history classes we suddenly recognized our lack of exposure to African American artists" (McKinnon 2007, p. 10).

Once collectors start buying art and getting more involved in the art world, they often become even more keenly aware of the lack of recognition for African-American artists. Experiences such as visiting galleries and art fairs and seeing a dearth of Black artists' work and befriending artists and learning directly about their careers bring further confirmation of the outsider status of some Black artists. For example, collector Pamela Cooper Cafritz (2018, p. 37) recalls how a friendship with artist Jacob Lawrence made her more sensitive to the difficulties of Black artists. She notes that, "I learned so much from this generous iconic artist about the generations of artists who have yet to receive their full due in the American cultural lexicon."

While African-American artists may not have gotten their "full due," collectors know that they are part of the system that determines the reputational fates of artists. Even if they believe that a particular artist is highly talented or that a particular work is of high merit, they know that recognition for that artist and artwork will only come if they and others advocate for them. Or, they are aware that they must act as "reputational entrepreneurs" (Fine 1996) to ensure that the artists who they believe are talented, and the artworks that they see as high quality, are recognized accordingly.

Describing her family's commitment to equal cultural recognition collector Harriett Kelly says, "I think we're activists and informers. I think the beauty of it is that we have raised awareness of how great these African American artists were" (National Gallery of Art 2009). Similarly, Pamela Joyner describes how through their collecting she and her husband are "attempting to be activists" (Brooklyn Museum 2017). She explains that, "…[O]urs [The Joyner Giuffrida Collection] is a mission-driven collection with no taller ambition than to reframe art history and make certain to the extent of our capabilities and resources, that our artists are put in the full context of a diverse canon" (TEDx Talks 2016). Cafritz frames her efforts to use collecting as a mechanism to valorize African-American artists as part of a broader lifetime commitment to equity that began in her hometown in the segregated south:

> Having had the good fortune to travel to museums all over the globe, I recognize the weight of the world's great artists. Yet I was always struck by a haunting absence of us, artists of color. This then informed my life's work, not solely as a collector, but as an advocate for equity, beauty, and permanence, an advocacy that began in Mobile, Alabama. (2018, p. 22)

The first step in reputational advocacy is to purchase artists' work. The purchase, particularly if collectors themselves have gained a high level of legitimacy in the art world, signals to the public that the artist and work are worthy. As collector and former NBA player and coach Darrell Walker explains, "When you go to most museums, you're going to see Picasso, Renoir, Monet, but rarely do you see African American painters on display, and this is my way of paying homage to them, by putting them on display—at my house" (Harris 2003, p. 4). But the purchase is just one of many other activities that collectors engage in to advocate for their chosen artists. Given that museums are among the central legitimating institutions for art, one step in the advocacy process is to lend work for exhibitions while another is to donate works to collections. For example, Walter O. Evans donated a portion of his collection to the Savannah College of Art and Design (SCAD), while Paul Jones made a significant donation to the museum at the University of Delaware. Serving on museum boards and committees also allows collectors to institutionally advocate for their chosen artists. Describing why he agreed to serve as a trustee at the High Museum of Art, Jones recalls that, "I said I would serve, and I decided I'd do my fighting and my pushing by winning friends and influencing people on the inside, and pushing at the scene, rather than bouncing off of a steel wall or a brick wall from the outside and not making much of a dent in it" (National Gallery of Art 2011). Publishing books about their collections, such as Cafritz's (2018) *Fired Up! Ready to Go! Finding Beauty, Demanding Equity: African American Life in Art*, also serves to build artists' reputations.[6]

Aesthetics

While collectors may be motivated to purchase works by African-American artists to address racial inequality in the economy of prestige in the art world, their purchasing activities are not solely driven by racial consumerism. If they were, they would indiscriminately purchase works by any African-American artist. Instead, collectors focus their purchases on only a subset of works by these artists. They have distinct collecting strategies that result in collections with varying specialties. By focusing on specific areas,

artists and artworks can be understood more comprehensively and brought into context with one another.

One of the most important criteria that collectors consider is quality. The disjuncture between the talent and reputations of African-American artists often motivates collectors to champion them. Observing that African-American abstract artists were "mightily overlooked," Joyner wondered, "How could that happen to artists of such skill making work of such quality?" (TEDx Talks 2016). Thus, it is because they value artistic talent and quality so highly that collectors commit themselves to helping African-American artists receive recognition. However, while collectors may subscribe to the belief that talent alone will not vault an artist to the top of the cultural hierarchy, they do not subscribe to the belief that there are no real differences in quality among artworks or talent among artists. In their minds, objective differences do in fact exist and those African-American artists who produce what they perceive to be high-quality work should be recognized. Some collectors are so focused on artistic merit that they not only concentrate their purchases on a subset of African-American artists who they see as especially talented, but they also try to purchase only the best examples of their work—or at least the best examples of their work that they can afford. This is the approach of collector Elliot Perry who recalls that to accomplish their goal of building a "strong and vibrant collection" he and his family "proceeded to acquire the best available works by African American artists" (Perry 2014, p. 7).[7]

While perceived quality is one criterion that collectors use to decide what works by African-American artists they will purchase, mode of representation is another. Some collectors are particularly interested in figurative art or works that represent the world in a realistic fashion. For example, when the Kelly's began collecting, they "were only interested in portraits and landscapes [and] still lifes" (BlackVideoNetwork 2018). Within figurative art, collectors may also focus on particular types of content. For example, some collectors not only seek out work by African-American artists that depicts the human figure, but also work that depicts the human figure as Black. They want to "see themselves" in the art that they own. For instance, Evans recalls how in his early days of collecting he "would consider only works with Black subjects" (1999, p. 21).[8]

While some collectors begin their collections with figurative art, over time their taste may change and eventually they seek out abstract art. Some view abstract art as more challenging and requiring an eye honed by several years of exposure to fully appreciate (Halle 1993, pp. 119–121). In fact, one collector who I interviewed described his progression to collecting abstract

works by artists like Norman Lewis as akin to shifting from becoming a less to a more experienced wine drinker. "My tastes have grown and matured," he said. Walker, who now also collects abstract art by artists such as Norman Lewis, Beauford Delaney, and Sam Gilliam regrets how he once refused to buy a work by Lewis because of his then preference for figurative art:

> I'll never forget, I was at Camille Billops' [an artist and patron] house, she had a beautiful Norman Lewis on paper, and I was just like, 'nah,' because like most buyers that just started as early collectors, they want to see figurative stuff. I passed up on that Norman Lewis. (Harris 2003, p. 9)

On the other hand, collector and gallerist George N'Namdi describes how he has "always gravitated toward abstraction" (2008, p. 7). He collects artists like AI Loving and Jack Whitten who "abandoned the traditional use of the brush and began to make paintings as opposed to painting paintings" (2008, p. 8). Collectors, such as Joyner, are committed to collecting abstract art because of what they see as an especially heightened undervaluing of this work. They are sensitive to the reality that there has often been an expectation not only among collectors but also others in the art world that work by Black artists will contain obvious markers of Blackness (Martin 2016). In their view, this puts African-American abstractionists in an especially vulnerable position when it comes to gaining recognition.

Period is also a factor that collectors consider when purchasing art. Some have focused their collections on nineteenth-century work by painters such as Robert Scott Duncanson and Joshua Johnston or conversely on contemporary artists including Chakaia Booker and Radcliffe Bailey. To some, an advantage of the latter is that not only are works often more widely available and less expensive, but it is also sometimes possible to meet and develop friendships with the artists. Just as some collectors change the modes of representation that they collect, they also shift in the periods of focus. Describing this shift in his collection, Perry (2014, p. 7) notes that "after collecting these great nineteenth- and twentieth-century artists for many years, our collecting focus and method shifted. In 2004, we began to acquire contemporary art, which included emerging and mid-career artists of color."

Patrons' collections are also distinguished by their focus on other characteristics of art such as medium.[9] Some collectors focus on particular media such as works on paper, like prints or photographs, while others focus on media such as paintings. For instance, the Bradley's shifted to collecting photographs in 1998 with the purchase of a photograph by Lyle Ashton

Harris. An advantage of photographs and prints is that they are more accessible since they are typically produced in multiples and more affordable. Print collectors are often concerned with championing African-American printmakers along with artists. For example, the purchase of a silk-screen print by an artist such as Jacob Lawrence that is created with a "master" African-American printer like Lou Stovall is partly motivated by a desire to champion both cultural producers.

Finally, in addition to considering an artist's racial background, collectors also reflect on other aspects of their identity. For example, some patrons center their collections on specific individual artists and collect their work in-depth. Patron Grant Hill notes this about his collection of works by Romare Bearden saying that, "The thirteen Beardens in our collection span his career and give us a chance to appreciate the scope of his enormous talent" (Hill and Hill 2004, p. 10). Other collectors commit to African American artists based in a specific geographic region, such as their state of residence or artists of a particular gender. For example, a patron who I interviewed who collects art by Black women, such as Elizabeth Catlett, explains that she has a special "interest in feminist subject matter and women's artistic expressions."

To summarize, while it is not uncommon for Black art patrons to focus their collecting on African-American artists partly as a strategy to help address their underrecognition, this activism does not override the impulse to consider other criteria such as perceived quality, mode of representation, and other modes of identity politics.

Cultural Activism and Consumption More Broadly

By analyzing how racialized political consumption operates in the market for African-American art, this chapter offers insights on racialized political consumption in cultural markets more broadly and as well as insight on cultural uplift and racialization. Below, I discuss these terms, offer practical implications, and suggest directions for future research.

First, findings suggest that when it comes to markets for creative goods, politically motivated consumption directed at addressing racial inequality is circumscribed by aesthetic concerns. As I will discuss in more detail below, this has important implications for social movements directed at boycotts and buycotts in the cultural sector. Second, by documenting how Black

collectors use collecting to legitimate Black artists, findings also offer insight on racial uplift. Given that the unequal treatment of African Americans has been justified on the grounds of cultural inferiority, one tactic used by Blacks to assert their full humanity has been to promote the cultural accomplishments of the group. Describing this tendency in the field of literature during the Harlem Renaissance, David Levering Lewis (1997 [1981]) summarizes it as an ethos of "civil rights by copyright." The collecting practices described here have a degree of resonance with this long standing approach of using culture to remake the meanings assigned to the category Black. This is captured by a statement from a member of the Kinsey family. A central theme of the Kinsey African-American Art and History Collection is "The Myth of Absence." By collecting they seek to demonstrate the "contributions" that Blacks have made to American life. Describing the fine art in the collection, Kahlil Kinsey notes that "it shows our…creativity and our genius" (2010, p. 88).[10]

Next, it is important to note that within the field of fine art, African-American artists are not the only group of racial and ethnic minority artists who have been systematically underrecognized. This is also a fate that has befallen groups such as Latinx, Asian American, and Native American artists, as well as artists in other parts of the world such as Black artists in Great Britain (Chambers 2014).[11] Given this reality, comparative research on racialized political consumption in the markets for artists from various racial and ethnic minority groups—such as research comparing this practice in the markets for African-American and Latinx artists in the USA and the markets for Black artists in the USA and Great Britain—could be fruitful.

Practically, findings offer perspective on ongoing calls to mobilize Black consumers to engage in cultural boycotts and buycotts. For example, in 2018 Black consumers in the USA were asked to boycott Netflix to address charges of underpaying Black women comedians and to buy tickets for movies such as *Proud Mary* to ensure that films with Black directors and/or Black actors continue to be made (Bossip Staff 2018; Breakfast Club Power 105.1 FM 2018). By addressing these calls to all Black consumers regardless of their specific aesthetic interests, there is an underlying assumption that political values alone are enough to compel them to boycott and buycott. However, if Black consumers in these markets are similar to Black collectors in the fine art market who direct their concern for cultural equity to a particular subset of cultural producers and objects that resonate with their specific aesthetic concerns, then these broad calls for all Black consumers to engage in cultural boycotts and buycotts may have limited effectiveness.

Conclusion

This chapter applies theory on racialized political consumption to the market for African American art. I show how Black patrons focus their collecting on African-American artists as a strategy to address racial inequality in the allocation of symbolic capital in the art world. However, while a desire to redress racial marginalization motivates their collecting, so do other factors that are traditionally taken into account when purchasing art such as perceived quality and period of production. Given the marginalization of racial and ethnic minority cultural producers in other fields, and calls for consumer activism to ameliorate these inequities, it is important to develop more nuanced and empirically grounded insights on cultural justice and consumption.

Notes

1. Political values refer to conceptions of worth related to power, while aesthetic values refer to conceptions of worth related to beauty and taste.
2. I use the term "African American art" to refer to art that is by African American artists. While this is not an uncontroversial term, it is a term that is institutionalized in the art world—e.g., it is a category that organizes both the sale and collection of art by African-American artists with galleries and auction houses organizing sales of "African American art" and collectors identifying themselves as collectors of "African American art."
3. Given that collecting art requires discretionary income this is a form of influence that is disproportionately held by the middle and upper class.
4. For example, a recent study found that in the past decade only 2.4% of acquisitions and gifts at a sample of prominent art museums were by African American artists (Halpernin and Burns 2018).
5. As a group, they are best described as upper-middle and upper class. Most have graduate degrees and work in professional jobs. The majority are also married and are members of the civil rights generation who were born before 1965. They are about evenly split between men and women. Also, some have non-black partners who collect with them. Twenty-seven collecting books were analyzed and seventeen interviews from the NGA series and other sources were transcribed and analyzed.
6. Just as there is a hierarchy of artists, there is also a hierarchy of collectors (Braden 2016). A small number of Black collectors of African American art have been recognized as among the world's top collectors. Gaining membership on museum boards takes place via recruitment through elite social networks (Ostrower 2002).

7. In some cases, art consumers do not buy the best work. Instead, factors such as the decorative potential of works are more important to them. "Serious collectors" are distinguished from collectors more broadly by a particular concern with aesthetic quality.
8. By insisting on Black subjects, the content of work also takes on a political dimension.
9. Collectors also have particular interests in other aspects of art such as its color and level of conceptual depth.
10. Also see Fleming and Roses (2007) and Gaines (1996) for examples of Black cultural uplift by the Black middle and upper class.
11. There is also evidence of racial inequality among creators in other cultural fields such as literature (Corse and Griffin 1997) and film (Erigha 2016).

Further Reading

Banks, P. A. (2010a). *Represent: Art and identity among the black upper-middle class*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Banks, P. A. (2010b). Black cultural advancement: Racial identity and participation in the arts among the Black middle class. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33*(10), 272–289.

Becker, H. S. (1982). *Art worlds*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Brown, N. M. (2015). African Americans and consumption. In D. T. Cook & J. M. Ryan (Eds.), *The Wiley-Blackwell encyclopedia of consumption and consumer studies* (pp. 10–12). Malden, MA and Oxford: Wiley.

References

BlackVideoNetwork. (2018, March 11). *Conversation and brunch: Collecting African American art* [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKG124yFZvE.

Bossip Staff. (2018, January 10). *"Proud Mary" is barely being promoted but black people are STILL going to show up and show out*. Retrieved from https://bossip.com/1613721/sony-is-barely-promoting-proud-marybut-black-people-are-still-going-to-show-up-and-show-out/.

Bourdieu, P. (1983). The field of cultural production, or: The economic world reversed. *Poetics, 12,* 311–356.

Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Braden, L. E. A. (2016). Collectors and collections: Critical recognition of the world's top art collectors. *Social Forces, 94*(4), 1483–1507.

Breakfast Club Power 105.1 FM. (2018, February 23). *Mo'Nique speaks on racial and gender inequality in Hollywood + more* [Video File]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpvC3j9Qxus.

Brooklyn Museum. (2017, March 22). *Breaking the canon: Collecting African American art* [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bebSwMZcvbU.

Brown, N. M. (2015). Freedom's stock: Political consumerism, transnational blackness and the Black Star Line. *Critical Sociology, 41*(2), 237–248.

Cafritz, P. C. (2018). *Fired up! ready to go! Finding beauty, demanding equity: An African American life in art—The collections of Peggy Cooper Cafritz*. New York, NY: Rizzoli Electa.

Chambers, E. (2014). *Black artists in British art: A history since the 1970s*. New York, NY: I.B. Tauris.

Corse, S. M., & Griffin, M. D. (1997). Cultural valorization and African American literary history: Reconstructing the canon. *Sociological Forum, 12*(2), 173–203.

Erigha, M. (2016). Do African Americans direct science fiction or blockbuster franchise movies? Race, genre, and contemporary Hollywood. *Journal of Black Studies, 47*(6), 550–569.

Evans, W. O. (1999). Reflections on collecting. In A. D. Barnwell (Ed.), *The Walter O. Evans collection of African American art* (pp. 19–25). Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Fine, G. A. (1996). Reputational entrepreneurs and the memory of incompetence: Melting supporters, partisan warriors, and images of President Harding. *American Journal of Sociology, 101*(5), 1159–1193.

Fleming, C. M., & Roses, L. E. (2007). Black cultural capitalists: African-American elites and the organization of the arts in early twentieth century Boston. *Poetics, 35,* 368–387.

Gaines, K. K. (1996). *Uplifting the race: Black leadership, politics, and culture in the twentieth century*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Gans, H. J. (1999). *Popular culture and high culture: An analysis and evaluation of taste*. New York: Basic Books.

Halle, D. (1993). *Inside culture: Art and class in the American home*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Halperin, J., & Burns, C. (2018, September 20). *African American artists are more visible than ever: So why are museums giving them short shrift?* Retrieved from https://news.artnet.com/market/african-american-research-museums-1350362.

Harris, M. D. (2003). *Images of America: African American voices: Selections from the collection of Mr. and Mrs. Darrell Walker*. Fayetteville, AK: Walton Arts Center.

Hill, G., & Hill, C. (2004). Something all our own. In A. J. Wardlaw (Ed.), *Something all our own: The Grant Hill collection of African American art* (pp. 7–11). Durham: Duke University Press.

Kinsey, K. B. (2010). Translating inspiration. *The Kinsey collection: Shared treasures of Bernard and Shirley Kinsey* (pp. 87). Pacific Palisades, CA: The Bernard and Shirley Kinsey Foundation for Arts and Education.

Lewis, D. L. (1997 [1981]). *When Harlem was in vogue*. New York, NY: Penguin Books.

Martin, C. J. (Ed.). (2016). *Four generations: The Joyner Giuffrida collection of abstract art*. New York, NY: Gregory R. Miller & Company.

McKinnon, E. L. (Ed.). (2007). *Crossing the line: African American artists in the Jacqueline Bradley and Clarence Otis, jr. collection*. Winter Park, FD: The George D. and Harriet W. Cornell Fine Arts Museum.

N'Namdi, G. (2008). George N'Namdi on collecting. In D. Goody (Ed.), *Seminal works from the N'Namdi collection of African American art* (pp. 7–9). Rochester, MI: Oakland University Art Gallery.

National Gallery of Art. (2009, March 3). *The collecting of African American art VI: The art of collecting* [Video file]. Retrieved from https://soundcloud.com/nationalgalleryofart/the-collecting-of-african-3.

National Gallery of Art. (2011, May 3). *The collecting of African American Art III: A peculiar destiny—The mission of the Paul R. Jones collection* [Video file]. Retrieved from https://soundcloud.com/nationalgalleryofart/the-collecting-of-african.

National Gallery of Art. (2012, November 27). *The collecting of African American art IX: Collecting black: An anachronism* [Video file]. Retrieved from https://soundcloud.com/nationalgalleryofart/the-collecting-of-african-5.

Ostrower, F. (2002). *Trustees of culture: Power, wealth, and status on elite arts boards.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Perry, E. (2014). Basketball and art. In Charles H. Wright Museum of African American History, & Flint Institute of Arts (Eds.), *Point of view: African American art from the Elliot and Kimberly Perry collection* (pp. 6–9). Detroit, MI and Flint, MI: Charles H. Wright Museum of African American History and Flint Institute of Arts.

Shah, D. V., McLeod, D. M., Kim, E., Lee, S. Y., Gotlieb, M. R., Ho, S. S., & Breivik, H. (2007). Political consumerism: How consumption orientations drive 'lifestyle politics.' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 611*, 217–235.

TEDx Talks. (2016, November 18). *Reframing art history | Pamela Joyner TEDxJohannesburg Salon* [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vskpb-f6gTM.

14

The New Economics of Colorism in the Skin Whitening Industry: Case of India and Nigeria

Ramya M. Vijaya

Chapter Overview

- Neoliberalism, new globalized consumption model and its impact on colorism through skin whitening products,
- Case study of the expanding demand and supply for skin whitening in India and Nigeria,
- Mobilizing against skin whitening, lessons learned and how to sustain the conversation, and
- Complicity of global corporations in introducing new dynamics in the skin whitening industry.

Introduction

In the early 2000s, the Indian subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch multinational corporation Unilever began airing the "air hostess" advertisement for its iconic Fair and Lovely whitening cream on Indian television. A dark-skinned daughter hears her father's lament about the family's low economic status and lack of a son. She then begins to use Fair and Lovely whereupon her skin is shown becoming visibly lighter, she lands a higher paid job as an air hostess, the family circumstances improve, and her father is happier.

R. M. Vijaya (✉)
Stockton University, Galloway, NJ, USA
e-mail: Ramya.Vijaya@stockton.edu

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_14

This notorious commercial is symbolic of a more aggressive era in the commodification and marketing of Whiteness by the skincare industry. While in the past skin whitening products alluded vaguely to White as a beauty ideal, the newer marketing strategies directly underscored the economic and social mobility associated with Whiteness and explicitly linked darker skin to socioeconomic stagnation. This chapter explores these new economic forces that have led to the rapid expansion of the skin whitening industry in India and Nigeria and the potential for mobilizing against it. Public health campaigns against skin whitening in several countries have been unsuccessful in combatting this expansion. Here, I argue that to be effective public health campaigns have to be augmented with more direct mobilizations against colorism that make explicit the skin whitening industry's global complicity in sustaining colorism.

What Is at Stake: Whiteness as Economic Capital

Globally, colorism serves as an understudy to racism, where even among non-white majority populations, power, and privilege become associated with Whiteness (Norwood 2014). There is now a long-standing and widely recognized acceptance among social and physical scientists that race is a social construct rather than a biological reality. The scientific debunking of race, social awareness, and the evolution of legal structures in many countries has made inroads in reducing overt racial discrimination globally. Yet pockets of race-based politics, rhetoric, and quasi-scientific theory have continued to resurface in the USA and Europe (Beirich and Buchanan 2018). Moreover, covert and institutionalized forms of advantages and disadvantages based on skin color are deeply entrenched in many societies, elevating "whiteness" to a marker of social status.

This view of Whiteness as a social marker of privilege can be understood as a form of socioeconomic capital that can yield incremental benefits for those possessing it. Such benefits come from equating Whiteness with the "in-group," those who are seen as reliable and possessing the cultural knowledge deemed necessary to succeed. Members of the in-group receive preferential treatment in a whole range of economic interactions. For example, candidates who possess Whiteness may be perceived as more reliable in comparison with equally qualified darker-skinned candidates in hiring decisions (Vijaya et al. 2015). Similarly, lighter-skinned individuals may engender

greater trust among financial institutions leading to easier access to credit and other financial resources. US economists Arthur H. Goldsmith et al. (2006) found that in the USA, lighter-skinned African-American men tended to have higher wages, comparable to those of White men. In comparison, darker-skinned African-American men, even when controlling for education, skill, and experience levels, tended to have lower wages. Other studies have also found that lighter-skinned African-Americans, Asians, and Latin Americans in the USA are able to have greater access to education, employment, and wealth creation opportunities, in comparison with darker-skinned individuals from the same ethno-racial group (Monk 2014; Painter et al. 2016; Hersch 2008).

So strong is this association of Whiteness with privilege that colorism itself has expanded beyond merely preference for skin color and expanded into other aspects of looking "white" such as facial features and hair texture (Vega-Centeno 2019, in this volume Chapter 9). Changing eye color, eyelid surgery, and having smooth non-curly hair have all become part of an aspirational Whiteness industry in many non-white parts of the world as Yip et al. (2019) discuss in their chapter on beauty standards in Asia (see Chapter 5).

Even as class divisions and inequalities at the local and global level expand, having Whiteness still provides material advantages over non-whiteness. Whiteness therefore constitutes a form of capital or asset for those who have it and yet another layer of disadvantage for those who do not.

Colonialism, Colorism, and New Global Aspirations: The Rising Demand for Skin Whitening

The rapid growth in the skin whitening products industry globally is an extension of the pursuit of the "capital" embedded in Whiteness. A few different global market research reports indicate an even more rapid growth in the near future. For example, a recent market forecast indicates that the global market for such products is projected to reach about $24 billion (US) by 2027 (Future Market Insight 2017); another puts the figure at $ 31.2 billion (US) by the year 2024 (Global Industry Analysts 2018). New forces of globalization have combined with the historic elevation of Whiteness to expand the scope and size of this industry in many parts of Asia and Africa. Below I consider the history and the new growth factors in India and Nigeria.

The Market in India

The elevation of Whiteness and the aspiration for "fairness," as it is referred to in India, has a long and somewhat contested history. The complex heterogeneities of region, caste, and religion stemming from Ancient Indian history has many contentious interpretations. The caste hierarchy is sometimes interpreted as having originated as occupational categories. Since the literal meaning of the Sanskrit language word for caste classification—"*varna*," is color, this has led to discussions about the links between caste and skin color. The *varna* system itself, in some interpretations, is said to have been introduced by lighter-skinned Aryans tribes from central Asia who made incursions into the Indian subcontinent. However, there is considerable disagreement about the linkages between caste and skin color since the word *varna* can also be interpreted as simply implying categories. In fact, there is no clear consensus or evidence that skin color was the basis for caste divisions or even the discriminations based on these divisions in ancient India (Mishra 2015; Parameswaran and Cardoza 2009).

In the middle ages, prior to the arrival of the British colonialists, the Indian subcontinent faced yet more waves of incursions from Central Asian forces of Arabic and Persian origins. Most prominently, the last of this wave, the Mughals, made India their home and established a unified Indian empire. There is again no specific evidence of discrimination or prejudice based on skin color during this period (Mishra 2015). Though being from Central Asia, the Mughals rulers would have been lighter in skin tone than much of the local population. This might have initiated the association of lighter skin with the ruling classes. It is with the arrival of the British colonialists that we see specific codified color lines. Unlike the Mughals and the previous central Asian migration, the British, with their distinct Whiteness, specifically emphasized the separation between themselves and the Indians. A large body of historical and sociocultural literature has documented the British emphasis on Whiteness as a form of racial superiority and their justification of colonization as a mission to civilize the non-white Asian and African populations (Alatas 1977; Said 1994). Specific demarcation of access to educational institutions, private clubs and restaurants between whites and Indians, the labeling of British versus Indian living spaces as White and Black towns and the exclusion of Indians from the colonial power structure solidified the association of White with power, privilege, and overall social superiority. The elevation of Whiteness in India, whatever the pre-existing inclinations induced by central Asian invasions in the ancient and medieval

period, became overt and firmly established during the 200 years of British colonialism. In post-Independence India, this transformed into a more generalized aspiration for lighter skin tones.

The contemporary market for skin whitening products in India capitalized on this aspiration for Whiteness with various bleaching products. In 1975, Unilever introduced the "Fair and Lovely" fairness cream, touting its melanin blocking properties as a first of its kind safe alternative to bleaching.[1] Fair and Lovely quickly became a mainstay of the Indian cosmetic market. The initial marketing was primarily aimed at women and propagated "fairness" as the beauty ideal for women, particularly younger women on the cusp of entering the marriage market (Dhillon-Jamerson 2019, in this volume Chapter 8). More recently, new economic forces are driving explosive growth in the variety and range of skincare products. Following a deep economic slump in 1991, India embarked on a period of economic restructuring known as liberalization. It was broadly based on what became known globally as the neoliberal policy agenda (Ostry et al. 2016). Liberalization involved reductions in government controls and regulations in the economy, including the previous limits on foreign investments. It also marked a shift from the post-colonial, independence-era policies of domestic self-reliance to greater global economic engagement. This was followed by a period of high growth rates. In the early 2000s, India along with China attracted much attention as two of the fastest growing economies in the world (Gupta and Blum 2018). The new economic order brought a tremendous increase in economic inequality with a new class of wealthy urban elites. At the same time, it also generated a big increase in the number of people exiting poverty and entering if not a stable, at least an aspirational middle class. Between 2004 and 2011, poverty rates witnessed a sharp decline from about 38% to a little over 21% (Government of India Planning Commission 2013). The new Indian middle class and its consumption potential attracted considerable attention (Kharas 2011). At the same time, opening the economy to foreign investors expanded the exposure to Western brands and consumer products. The sharp rise in the market for skincare products in recent years should be viewed within this context. According to marketing reports the skincare products market as a whole grew by an annual rate of about 20% between 2012 and 2016, in China, the largest market in the region, the growth rate was nearly 40% (MarketLine Industry Profile 2017). Valued at close to $2 billion dollars (US) in 2016, the skincare market is dominated by facial care products and as the UN report indicates a majority of these products claim skin whitening benefits.

Skin Whitening in Nigeria

According to a 2011 World Health Organization report (WHO 2011), 77% of Nigerian women reported using skin whitening products on a regular basis, making them one of the highest usage segments for skin whitening in the world. The history of colorism and the gradual intensification of the quest for skin whitening in Nigeria is akin to the Indian experience. The Nigerian population is a combination of multiple ethnic groups that trace their origins broadly to the West African region. The three largest groups Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo, and the Yoruba have a long history of differences in terms of religion, social hierarchy, and political engagement. These differences have caused periodic power struggles among the groups, culminating in the civil war in the 1960s which pitted the Islamic Hausa-Fulani against the predominantly Christian Igbo and resulted in the marginalization of the latter and the political dominance of the former in modern-day Nigeria. Yet there is no specific evidence of skin color driving the antagonism among the groups. In fact, there are considerable skin tone variations within each of these groups. Similar to the Indian experience, it was the British colonial rule over West Africa that sparked and ingrained the association of Whiteness with power, privilege, and overall social superiority among the different ethnic groups in Nigeria (Bratlinger 1985). In Africa, even more than elsewhere, British colonialist propagated the myth of colonization as an obligation to civilize an inferior population with a special emphasis on racialized notions of inferiority. British incursions into West Africa coincided with the rise of the British abolitionist campaign against slavery in the Americas. The need to justify colonial rule even while acknowledging the inhumanity of slavery prompted the creation of the myth of Africa as a "dark" continent. The imagery of darkness deliberately combined perceived geographical remoteness of the continent with notions of racial inferiority and so-called savagery of dark-skinned people (Bonsu 2019, in this volume Chapter 16). By the time colonial rule ended in 1960, the long-imposed myth of racial superiority transformed into a firmly engrained generalized preference for lighter skin tones.

This preference led to an enduring market in skin-bleaching products in Nigeria. More recently, like India, new forces of economics and globalization have accelerated and expanded Nigeria's skincare market. The Nigerian economy experienced more than a decade of high growth rates beginning in the early 2000s with attempts to encourage private investments in manufacturing and diversify the predominantly oil-dependent economy (Corral

et al. 2015). From 2003 to 2016, Nigeria joined India and China as the fastest growing economies with an average annual growth rate of around 6% (World Bank 2017). Though the rapid growth led to increasing inequalities and was not accompanied by a substantial reduction in the number of people in poverty, it did expand the numbers of the middle class significantly. A few different studies estimated that the Nigerian middle class constituted about 20% of the population by 2016, a big increase from the 13% in 2003 (Corral et al. 2015; Standard Bank 2014). The African Development Bank produced the first report on the rising African middle class and its consumption potential in 2011 with Nigeria leading the numbers (African Development Bank 2011). At the same time, media reports highlighted the consumption aspirations and increasing brand consciousness of the Nigerian middle class indicated by the rising popularity of Western style shopping malls (Onishi 2016). Expected to become the third largest country in the world by 2050 with one of the largest youth populations, Nigeria's consumption potential is attracting attention among multinational corporations (United Nations 2015; United Nations Population Fund 2014). The German multinational skincare corporation Beiersdorf Global referenced this potential while announcing its new investments in opening direct manufacturing operations in Nigeria in 2017 (*This Day* 2017).

Commodification of Whiteness: The Supply Side Story

Though there are several small-scale local brands, Beiersdorf has the largest share of the skincare market in Nigeria with the ubiquity of its Nivea skincare brand. This is closely followed by Unilever. In India, Unilever dominates the overall skincare and skin whitening products market. The French multinational L'Oreal which entered the market in 1994 in the wake of the liberalization policies is now the second largest player in the worldwide skincare market. A few Indian companies like CavinKare and Emami Ltd., with its foray into men's skin whitening, have also had a consistent presence. However, the dominant players in the market are the large multinational corporations headquartered in "white" majority countries.

Selling an aspirational consumption model based on Western lifestyles, these large corporations have helped launch a new dynamic in the skin whitening market. Marketing strategies have evolved to evoke colorism and emphasize the socioeconomic capital embedded in Whiteness more

explicitly. Like Unilever's "air hostess," the contrasting imagery of light skin as upwardly mobile and socially successful and dark skin as failure serves as the representational default across multiple commercials for different brands. The transition to this more overt linking of Whiteness with social mobility coincided with the economic transition that awakened multinational corporations to the consumption potential of the global middle class. The concerted effort to sell Western style consumption to the new global consumer is reflected in the increasing use of Western imagery to depict the supposed success and mobility acquired due to lighter skin. In the air hostess commercial, the Indian clothes and styling in the unhappy darker-skinned phase give way to the shiny image of a Western style stewardess dress in the post-whitening socioeconomic success phase. Similarly, Unilever's 2008 five-part commercial for their Pond's White beauty cream is peppered with images of international airports with White travelers in the background. These images of a global consumer lifestyle also expanded the boundaries of colorist aspirations. No longer was it sufficient to be "fairer" or a few shades lighter than before. The new global aspiration sold by the corporate brands is Whiteness itself. The Pond's commercial emphasizes White beauty, not just a few shades lighter, as does L'Oreal Paris's "white" perfect line of creams. Similarly, a Beiersdorf commercial in Nigeria featured a scene where the Black skin of Omowunmi Akinnifesi, winner of the Miss Nigeria beauty pageant, turns practically White as she applies the Nivea Natural Fairness moisturizer.

The role of multinational corporations in the skin whitening market can be viewed as a form of neocolonialism; the perpetuation of the exploitative economic relationships between White colonial nations and their former colonies through covert corporate influences rather than direct colonial control (Langan 2017). Through their role in expanding the demand for skin whitening, multinational corporations are deepening the economic capital that became associated with Whiteness during the colonial era. The scale of recent expansions in the industry also highlights the need for a new urgency in mobilizing against skin whitening practices.

Mobilizing Against Skin Whitening

The Public Health Response and Its Limitations

The initial mobilizations against skin whitening products focused on the public health perspective. In 2011, the WHO raised concern about the widespread use of mercury as a skin-bleaching agent in whitening creams

and soaps. Along with dangerous harm to the kidneys, mercury can also cause rashes, scarring, and reduce the skin's resistance to bacterial and fungal infections. Similar concerns are associated with hydroquinone, another harsh agent used to reduce skin pigmentation. Several national food and drug administrations, particularly in West Africa, began to ban or restrict the use of mercury and hydroquinone in cosmetic skin whitening products. The Nigerian National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) banned the manufacture, sale, and import of cosmetics and soaps containing mercury. It has also periodically sought to reiterate the ban and spread awareness about the harmful effects of mercury (Ifijeh 2015; *PM News* 2017). NAFDAC has also limited the use of hydroquinone to less than 1% in cosmetic preparations, on par with the limits placed in Europe and the USA (NAFDAC 2018). Similarly, the food and drug administration in Ghana and the ministry of health in Ivory Coast have banned the sale of skin whitening products containing mercury or hydroquinone.

However, as regulatory scrutiny of the harmful effects of skin whitening began to gain momentum, larger corporate brands sought to distinguish themselves from the older products that included harsh and harmful skin-bleaching ingredients like mercury and hydroquinone.

Large corporate brands have responded to this medical regulatory scrutiny by creating a distinction between harmful bleaching and the so-called natural whitening products. Beiersdorf's Nivea natural fairness cream for example touts the use of natural berry extracts that supposedly reduce "overactive" melanin without the use of any bleaching agents. Unilever products Fair and Lovely and Pond's both claim the "scientific"[2] melanin reducing benefits of its patented version of Vitamin-B3 that works without bleaching. L'Oreal's White perfect range of products similarly claims to "unload excess melanin"[3] with a special ingredient called vanish. This segmenting of the market into the old bleaching products and the new "natural," "scientific" brands became an effective strategy to deflect the negative publicity from the public health campaigns against skin whitening that were gaining momentum globally. It also helped introduce a new dynamic in the industry.

The casting of melanin as a kind of abnormality that needs to be controlled only serves to accentuate the normalization of Whiteness and ingrains darkness as a deviation from the norm. Controlling this deviation takes on a more normalized connotation that is natural and expected for everyone to indulge in as opposed to the harshness of bleaching. This normalization of skin lightening in turn continues to perpetuate the bleaching segment of the market. While corporate branding has targeted the middle-class, low-income, working-class consumers who are priced out of the higher end

branded products continue to seek out the harsh bleaching products despite the ban. The propagation of the idea that lightening is normal and expected leaves poorer consumers with no choice but to participate in harmful forms of whitening (Tate 2016). In fact, by many accounts, the banning of harsh bleaching ingredients has only resulted in a thriving Black market in countries like Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria (*Guardian* 2015).

The easy limitation of the public health campaigns is perhaps to be expected since they do not fully engage with skin whitening as part of the systemic problem of colorism. Often people are aware of the negative health effects of bleaching. For example, in a survey of students in India, Mishra (2015) found that among those who admitted using bleaching products to lighten their skin, about 84% of women and 60% of men indicated awareness about the harmful effects of bleaching. The weight of the systemic prejudice against darker skin is clearly a stronger force than the fear of the potential harm from skin lightening. Focusing solely on medical concerns also shifts the burden to individuals themselves. Expecting individuals to become aware of the medical dangers and stop using the products underestimates the perceived and lived cost that skin color prejudice imposes on darker-skinned individuals. Meanwhile larger corporate brands can dodge responsibility for sustaining and deepening the entrenchment of colorism through their marketing of Whiteness by segmenting the market into the harmful bleaching and the supposedly benign non-bleaching categories.

Beyond Public Health: Providing Counter-Narratives to Colorism

It is becoming increasingly difficult for the industry to ignore the growing movement against the embedded colorism of the skincare market. The Fair and Lovely air hostess commercial sparked protests by women's groups in India. The All India Democratic Women's Association explicitly called the commercial racist for linking lighter skin to success and economic mobility. Unilever was forced to acknowledge such direct protest and curtailed the commercial (BBC, July 2003).

Eventually, prompted by the protests, the Indian National Information and Broadcast Ministry deemed it demeaning to Indian women and banned its further airing (Chandran 2003). However, this action was not successful in creating lasting change. Skincare commercials continued to portray socioeconomic mobility and success as a byproduct of achieving lighter skin. Still, this phase of overtly linking dark skin to images of failure in the marketing

of skin whitening did open up the space for a nascent movement to develop counter-narratives against colorism. In 2009, the advocacy group Worth of a Woman in India launched a "Dark is Beautiful" campaign to draw attention to skin color bias and raise awareness about media messages. The campaign featured positive images of people with a diversity of skin tones and started including male voices in its "Beauty Beyond Colors" extension. A sustained conversation around media messages also pushed the Advertising Standard Council of India, a self-regulatory industry organization to issue guidelines for skin whitening products (ASCI 2014). In its new guidelines issued in 2014, ASCI guidelines urged the industry to not communicate any discrimination based on skin color and specifically refrain from showing people with darker skin as unattractive or unhappy. These guidelines are self-regulatory and have no binding impact on the industry. Yet they do build awareness and help to sustain the conversation around colorism in a way that campaigns focused on purely public health messages do not.

Similarly, the blatant imagery of Black turning to White in the Nigerian Nivea natural fairness commercial sparked protests and conversations about colorism in West Africa and received wider international attention (Nwankwo 2017; BBC, October 2017). More sustained protest in Ghana forced Beiersdorf to withdraw the commercial in that country. Just at it attempted to deflect the public health scrutiny, the skin whitening industry is now developing new strategic responses to counter this emerging mobilization against colorism. Unilever and Beiersdorf both have responded to accusations of promoting colorism by resorting to the language of free markets and consumer choice. Unilever's Fair and Lovely is now marketed as the brand that champions "the ambitions and desires" of women and claims to empower women by giving them the confidence to "pursue their dreams and ambitions." In the wake of the criticism against the Nivea commercial in Nigeria, Beiersdorf now claims that it develops products according to the "cultural preferences" of consumers, which differ globally and likened demand for skin whitening products to the demand for tanning products in Europe.

New Responses and Counter-Narratives: Sustaining the Focus on Colorism

This portrayal of a benign provision of supply to match a demand is untenable in its omission of the historical and social context associated with preferences for whiter skin. There is no history of exclusion from power structures

and entry into spaces of everyday living like restaurants and clubs for untanned people. This lack of exclusion also means that untanned people were not shut out of economic opportunities in the way that led to systemic global material inequalities for non-white populations. They also do not continue to experience the impact of these systemic inequalities in everyday economic interactions the way darker-skinned people continue to do.

Neither do marketing images reinforce ideas of lower social and economic standing of those untanned, the way skin whitening commercials do.

One could also use the language of market systems to counter these spurious comparisons of consumer choice. As US strategy scholar Aneel Karnani (2007) argues, skin whitening represents a case of a market failure. Market failure is a commonly accepted occurrence within the free-market framework. Markets can fail due to information "asymmetries" where either the seller or the buyer is complicit in providing incorrect or insufficient information about the product. In such cases, there is a precedence for governments to correct the market distortions by requiring informational labeling requirements. In the case of cosmetic skin whitening products, there is no real evidence of consistent long-term efficacy. The chair of the dermatology department at the All Indian Institute of Medical Sciences in India debunked the possibility that any topical cream can entirely change skin color (Sinha 2000). Certainly, non-white skin cannot change into the White beauty or White perfect claims that are common in marketing materials. In fact, lack of consistent results often pushes people to transition to harsher creams with harmful steroids and mercury components (Hogade and Fatima 2017).

Given this misinformation, it is reasonable and within the parameters of the free-market framework, to push for more stringent and consistent global labeling requirements that clearly state the limited efficacy and dangers associated with skin whitening. Lack of such warning is creating market distorts where demand continues to grow based on incorrect information. While regulatory measures in a few countries have aimed to control the harsher substances in bleaching products, there should be a stronger push for regulations to control the false claims of the larger brands as well. In fact, a global regulatory framework should jointly address bleaching and the supposedly benign melanin blockers since the expansion of the latter segment of the market will inevitably sustain the former as well. Poorer consumers and those seeking more tangible results will be pushed toward the harsher bleaching products.

The connections between the newer whitening products and the harsher bleaching ingredients also highlight another aspect of market failure in the

industry—the externality effect. Markets also fail when the impact of one person's private consumption has a negative impact on others in society at large. For example, smoking is not just harmful to the individual who smokes but also has negative consequences for those who experience the harmful impact of secondhand smoke. By specifically linking whiter skin to positive outcomes in employment, marriage, and other areas of social success, the corporate brands have moved skin whitening outside the realm of a beauty ideal. Such marketing contributes to and accentuates the notion of economic capital attached to Whiteness and propagates the idea of dark skin as a liability. The marketing and use of skin whitening products therefore perpetuate a disempowering environment and foster a lack of confidence for everyone with darker skin tones. Individual consumption of skin whitening products is therefore causing great social harm.

The spillovers from this social harm are not limited to the specific countries where the skin whitening products are marketed. Large diaspora populations from countries like India and Nigeria feel the impact of such messaging globally (Davey 2016). The popular 2015 Unfair and Lovely social media campaign against colorism and bleaching in the USA began with an initial focus on South Asian women in the USA in 2015 (Acquaye 2018). It has now expanded to include positive images of all dark-skinned people of color. Similarly, the Beauty-Wellness Talk, a weekly show on a Somalian-American community radio station in Minnesota attempts to engage women in the Somali diaspora on a conversation about colorism and perceptions of beauty without stigmatizing the practice of bleaching (Rosenbaum 2018). In a similar vein, Black Barbie, an animated film by the British-Ghanaian artist Comfort Arthur explores individual experiences with skin bleaching to spark a discussion about skin color and self-esteem. These global, diasporic voices are countering skin whitening by moving beyond a public health focus on bleaching and directly engaging conversations around colorism.

The global resonance of the message also suggests the need to direct more attention to the complicity of multinational corporations in expanding the skin whitening market in recent years. Headquartered in predominantly "white" majority countries, these corporations are profiting from perpetuating a market for "whiteness." While Unilever apologized for a 2017 Dove commercial deemed racists in the USA for showing a Black woman transition into White, it continues to propagate such images elsewhere (Astor 2017). These images percolate and sustain colorism globally, making it harder for localized or even national campaigns to succeed in isolation.

Localized campaigns such as Dark is Beautiful or even the diasporic conversations initiated by the Unfair and Lovely campaign or the Beauty-Wellness Talk show can gain momentum from more direct engagement with the complicity of these global corporations.

Conclusion

New forces of neoliberal economic globalization have generated interest in the consumption potential of markets in the Global South and intensified the market for skin whitening products in countries like India and Nigeria. By explicitly referencing colorism and producing images that depict dark skin as an impediment to socioeconomic success, multinational corporations are redefining consumption and colorism for the new global age. While this brought about a rapid expansion of the market, it also opens up the space for more explicit conversations about colorism and the opportunity to develop anti-whitening campaigns that go beyond public health messages. Public health campaigns do draw needed attention to the harmful health consequences of skin whitening. At the same time, their effectiveness is limited given the perpetuation of the message that lighter skin brings significant socioeconomic benefits. The perceived cost of skin color prejudice on darker-skinned individuals tends to negate the messages from public health campaigns. Mobilizations against skin whitening therefore need to move beyond health concerns and directly engage in conversations about colorism and skin color bias. The recent local and diaspora campaigns to expand conversations about beauty and self-esteem beyond skin color are much needed supplements to public health campaigns. More such campaigns are required globally and can be supported by more research on the impact of colorism. While there is considerable documentation of the negative impact of colorism on employment, income and wealth prospects of darker-skinned individuals in the USA, there are few comparable studies in the global context. This makes it easier for corporations to argue that skin whitening is a personal choice rather the perpetuation of systemic bias with serious socioeconomic consequences.

Future research on measuring such biases in different countries can help sustain the momentum of anti-colorism campaigns. Additional research on the role of multinational corporations and the overall supply chain in the skin whitening industry globally is also needed. While there are many local suppliers of skin-bleaching products, multinational corporations are market share leaders in many countries. Local regulations on bleaching products

tend to be ineffective in the face of the power of multinational companies, often creating a dual or segmented market that is difficult for regulations to monitor. Consistent documentation of multinational domination in this market globally can also open up a conversation about global regulatory frameworks that might be adopted to more effectively curb the proliferation and marketing of skin whitening products.

Notes

1. Unilever's Fair and Lovely Web site, accessed June 1, 2018, https://www.fairandlovely.in/our-story.
2. Unilever's Fair and Lovely Web site, accessed July 16, 2018, https://www.fairandlovely.in/skin-science.
3. L'Oreal Paris India Web site, accessed July 16, 2018, https://www.lorealparis.co.in/products/skin-care/cream/white-perfect-magic-white-cream-spf19.

Further Reading

Glenn, E. N. (2008). Yearning for lightness: Transnational circuits in the marketing and consumption of skin lighteners. *Gender and Society, 22*(3), 281–302.

Halley, J., Eshleman, A., & Vijaya, R. (2011). *Seeing white: An introduction to white privilege and race*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Roediger, D. R. (2007). *The wages of whiteness*. New York: Verso.

Said, E. (1994). *Culture and imperialism*. New York: Vintage.

References

Acquaye, A. (2018, March 1). How unfair and lovely's relaunch will combat colorism. *Teen Vogue*. https://www.teenvogue.com/story/unfair-and-lovely-relaunch-combats-colorism. Accessed July 19, 2018.

African Development Bank. (2011). *The middle of the pyramid: Dynamics of the middle class in Africa* (M. Ncube, C. L. Lufumpa, & S. Kayizzi-Mugerwa Eds.). Abidjan: African Development Bank.

Alatas, S. H. (1977). *The myth of the lazy native*. London: Routledge.

ASCI. (2014). Advertising Standards Council of India Press Release. https://www.ascionline.org/download.php?f=images/pdf/press-release-on-asci-sets-up-new-guidelines-for-the-fairness-products-category-2-.pdf. Accessed June 6, 2018.

Astor, M. (2017, October 8). Dove drops an ad accused of racism. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/business/dove-ad-racist.html. Accessed November 10, 2018.

BBC. (2003, July 24). *India debates 'racist' skin cream ads*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3089495.stm. Accessed July 10, 2018. Accessed July 18, 2018.

BBC. (2017, October 19). *Nivea accused of racist advert showing product lightening skin*. http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/41683890/nivea-accused-of-racist-advert-after-showing-product-lightening-black-skin. Accessed July 19, 2018.

Beirich, H., & V. Buchanan. (2018, February 11). *2017: The year in hate and extremism*. The Intelligence Report, Southern Poverty Law Center. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2018/2017-year-hate-and-extremism.

Bonsu, S. (2019). Development by markets: An essay on the continuities of colonial development and racism in Africa. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 259–271). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brantlinger, P. (1985). Victorians and Africans: The genealogy of the myth of the dark continent. *Critical Inquiry, 12*(1), 166–203.

Chandran, R. (2003, April 24). All for self-control. *The Hindu Business Line*. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/catalyst/2003/04/24/stries/2003042400020100.htm. Accessed July 18, 2018.

Corral, P., Molini, V., & Oseni, G. (2015). *No condition is permanent: Middle class in Nigeria in the last decade* (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7241).

Davey. E. (2016, February). *Illegal skin lightening creams being sold in London*. BBC.

Dhillon-Jamerson, K. K. (2019). Marketing marriage and colorism in India. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 121–136). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Future Market Insights. (2017). https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/skin-lightening-products-market-growing-fascination-for-fair-skin-to-spur-the-growth-of-global-market—future-market-insights-665159303.html. Accessed May 30, 2018.

Global Industry Analyst Inc. (2018). https://www.strategyr.com/MarketResearch/Skin_Lighteners_Market_Trends.asp. Accessed May 30, 2018.

Goldsmith, A. H., Hamilton, D., & Darity, W., Jr. (2006). Shades of discrimination: Skin tone and wages. *American Economic Review, 96*(2), 242–245.

Government of India Planning Commissions. (2013). *Press note on poverty estimates, 2011–12*. http://planningcommission.nic.in/news/pre_pov2307.pdf. Accessed June 10, 2018.

The Guardian. (2015). Ivoreans ignore ban on skin lightening cream despite damage to skin. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/14/ivory-coast-skin-whitening-ban-effects. Accessed October 13, 2018.

Gupta, P., & Blum F. (2018). *India's remarkably robust and resilient growth story*. The World Bank End Poverty in South Asia Blog. http://blogs.worldbank.org/

endpovertyinsouthasia/india-s-remarkably-robust-and-resilient-growth-story. Accessed June 10, 2018.

Hersch, J. (2008). Profiling the new immigrant worker: The effects of skin color and height. *Journal of Labor Economics, 26*(2), 345–386.

Hogade, S. H., & Ismat H. (2017). Tropical steroids: Fairness fervour to fallout. *International Journal of Research in Dermatology, 3*(2), 234–238.

Ifijeh, M. (2015, October 9). NAFDAC raises alarm over unsafe bleaching devices. *This Day*.

Karnani, A. (2007). *Doing well by doing good case study: 'Fair & lovely' whitening cream* (Michigan School of Business Working Paper). https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/49327/1063-Karnani.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed July 10, 2018.

Kharas, H. (2011). The emerging middle class in developing economies. *Brookings Institution*. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABCDE/Resources/7455676-1292528456380/7626791-1303141641402/7878676-1306699356046/Parallel-Sesssion-6-Homi-Kharas.pdf.

Langan, M. (2017). Let's talk about neocolonialism in Africa. *Global Policy Journal*. https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/16/11/2017/let's-talk-about-neo-colonialism-africa. Accessed October 13, 2018.

MarketLine Industry Profile. (2017). *Skin care in India*.

Mishra, N. (2015). India and colorism: The finer nuances. *Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 4,* 725–750.

Monk, E. P. (2014). Skin tone stratification among black Americans, 2001–2003. *Social Forces, 92*(4), 1313–1337.

NAFDAC. (2018). *Cosmetic product (prohibition of bleaching agents) regulations 2018*. http://www.nafdac.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/Files/Resources/Regulations/COSMETIC_REGULATIONS/Cosmetics-Products-Prohibition-of-Bleaching-Agents-Regulations-2018.pdf. Accessed July 19, 2018.

Norwoord, K. J. (2014). *Color matters: Skin tone bias and the myth of a postracial America*. New York: Routledge.

Nwankwo, M. E. (2017, October 20). *Nivea ad for 'visibly fairer skin' sparks controversy in West Africa*. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/10/20/558875377/nivea-ad-for-visibly-fairer-skin-sparks-controversy-in-west-africa. Accessed July 18, 2018.

Onishi, N. (2016, January 5). Nigeria goes to the mall. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/world/africa/nigeria-goes-to-the-mall.html.

Ostry, J. D., Loungani, P., & Furceri, D. (2016). Neoliberalism: Oversold? *Finance & Development, 53*(2), 38–41.

Painter, M. A., Holmes, M. D., & Bateman, J. (2016). Skin tone, race/ethnicity, and wealth inequality among new immigrants. *Social Forces, 94*(3), 1153–1185.

Parameswaran, R., & Cardoza, K. (2009). Melanin on the margins: Advertising and the cultural politics of fair/light/white/beauty in India. *Journalism and Communication Monographs, 11*(3), 213–274. https://theshadeofbeauty.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/melanin-on-the-margins.pdf.

PM News. (2017, January 25). NAFDAC cautions against dangerous skin lightening creams. https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2017/01/25/nafdac-cautions-against-dangerous-skin-lightening-creams/. Accessed July 18, 2018.

Rosembaum, N. (2018). *You have dark skin and you are beautiful: The long fight against skin bleaching*. National Public Radio. https://www.npr.org/2018/02/25/588632658/you-have-dark-skin-and-you-are-beautiful-the-long-fight-against-skin-bleaching. Accessed October 13, 2018.

Said, E. (1994). *Culture and imperialism*. New York: Vintage.

Sinha, S. (2000, December 4). Skin care: Market for fairness products changes colour. *India Today*. https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/economy/story/20001204-skin-care-booming-sales-multiplying-brands-market-for-fairness-products-changes-colour-778754-2000-12-04.

Standard Bank. (2014). *Understanding Africa's middle class*. Insights and strategy, July.

Tate, S. A. (2016). *Skin bleaching in black Atlantic zones: Shade shifters*. London: Palgrave Pivot.

This Day. (2017, April 11). Beiersdorf, German multinational, injects N7bn in Nigerian economy. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/04/11/beiersdorf-german-multinational-injects-n7bn-in-nigerian-economy/. Accessed July 15, 2018.

United Nations. (2015, July). *World population projected to reach 9.7 billion by 2050*. https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2015-report.html. Accessed July 10, 2018.

United Nations Population Fund. (2014). The power of 1.8 billion. *The state of the world population 2014*. https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/EN-SWOP14-Report_FINAL-web.pdf. Accessed June 15, 2018.

Vega-Centeno, J. (2019). 'Dirty braids': How hair is disrupting dominant racial narratives in Puerto Rico Post-Hurricane Maria. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 137–150). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vijaya, R., Eshleman, A., & Halley, J. (2015). The cultural of class and its economic impact. *Review of Black Political Economy, 42*, 7–18.

World Bank. (2017). *Nigeria overview*. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview. Accessed July 10, 2018.

World Health Organization. (2011). *Mercury in skin lightening products*. http://www.who.int/ipcs/assessment/public_health/mercury_flyer.pdf. Accessed May 5, 2018.

Yip, J., Ainsworth, S., & Hugh, M. T. (2019). Beyond whiteness: Perspectives on the rise of the Pan-Asian beauty ideal. In G. D. Johnson, K. D. Thomas, A. K. Harrison, & S. G. Grier (Eds.), *Race in the marketplace: Crossing critical boundaries* (pp. 73–85). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

15

Race as a Currency? Profitability and Racialization in French Healthcare Institutions

Dorothée Prud'homme

Chapter Overview

- The equal access to health principle is not a reality in French hospitals.
- There is an incompatibility between new public management hospital reforms and welcoming disadvantaged patients in health institutions.
- Healthcare professionals racialize patients to assess their workload.
- The perceived race of patients is used as an indicator of their "medical value" and their "profitability."
- New public management hospital reforms encourage the selection/exclusion of racialized, non-profitable patients from hospitals.

Introduction

In the 1980s, the combination of a growing demography and high inflation provoked an increase in public health expenditure in France. The social security system was said to no longer be able to support public hospital costs. French public authorities looked for ways to control this expenditure, "modernize" hospitals' public service, and increase the financial profitability of healthcare institutions. As in many countries, French authorities

D. Prud'homme (✉)
Sciences Po Bordeaux, Bordeaux, France
e-mail: dprudhomme@afmd.fr

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_15

implemented reforms inspired by the new public management—this form of public action mostly focuses on increasing staff productivity by defining quantitative aims and financial rewards (Belorgey 2010; Bezes 2008).

During the 1980s, many public administrations began implementing new public management reforms (Baines and Cunningham 2015; Carter 2000; Robertson and Dale 2002). A body of research underlines how public management requirements, based on competition and market-based mechanisms, twist the public policies' value of equity and public service practices (Cunningham 2000; Simonet 2015; Stivers 2007). It analyzes the impact of these reforms on racialized healthcare professionals and on racialized patients (Carter 2000; James and James 2017). The French literature on these reforms underlines how healthcare institutions have been turned into marketplaces where patients are seen as potential sources of profit (Couty 2013; Palier 2010). Therefore, some patients, due to their socioeconomic situation, may be considered to be obstacles to the rationalization of health treatments and perceived as threats to a hospital's budget (Camus and Dodier 1997; Parizot 2003).

This chapter analyzes the role of racial categorization in the process of determining "good" and "bad" patients according to the new public management requirements. Studying the way healthcare professionals—physicians, paramedics, and administrative staff working in French hospitals—consider, categorize, and treat patients they perceive as Roma reveals how race is used as an indication of patients' profitability in French public hospitals (Prud'homme 2015). It demonstrates that the functioning of the French healthcare system reinforces unequal treatment based on race and provokes the erosion of fundamental principles of modern medicine, such as equal access to healthcare, hospitality, and solidarity in the name of performance and profitability.

Questioning the Principle of Equal Access to Health

The French public health code guarantees "equal access to health for all, and particularly for poor people" (articles L1110-1 and L1110-3). The Hospitalized Person's Charter (*Charte de la personne hospitalisée*) states that "every healthcare institution should contribute to guarantee equal access for each person to the treatments required by their health condition." Every healthcare professional interviewed during this research project referenced this fundamental principle. However, in 1973, French sociologists Claudine

Herzlich and Antoinette Chauvenet demonstrate how such a principle does not always translate into reality. Herzlich (1973, p. 49) shows how physicians treat "physician patients" from a privileged background differently than "hospital patients" "from an inferior social status." And Chauvenet reveals a "class medicine" based on three compartmentalized and hierarchized health sectors: (1) a "high technical skills prestige medicine" selecting patients on the scientific interest of their ailment and their social belonging; (2) a "mass medicine" treating middle-class patients with severe ailment; (3) and an "abandoning sector" treating elderly and poor people with low life expectancy and few perspectives of profit. She concludes that the healthcare system produces inequalities in terms of access to healthcare and contributes to "the production of a permanent social ordering of the population" (Chauvenet 1978, p. 237).

However, wealth or social class alone cannot encompass all social disparities. Starting from the 2000s, a growing body of research underlines the obstacles that migrants must overcome regarding access to healthcare and the inequality of treatments based on their nationality and their administrative status (Fassin 2000; Cognet et al. 2009). In 2001, French sociologist Didier Fassin draws on the concept of "racialized body" to describe the rise of discriminatory practices based on presumed racial differences in several fields, including health care, during the 1990s. Several research projects then investigate the process of racialization in French hospitals (Carde 2011; Fassin 2001; Kotobi 2000; Nacu 2011; Sargent and Larchanché 2007; Sauvegrain 2010). These studies examine the impact of the presumed race of patients on the quality of care they received. They demonstrate how, in a color-blind Republic reluctant to use the word "race" and refusing to consider the racial identity of individuals,[1] public agents treat patients unequally on the basis of their skin color or their presumed racial group—thereby questioning the French universalist perspective of ensuring equality for all (Avril et al. 2005; Siblot 2005).

So, as in many countries around the world (Hicken et al. 2018), the principle of equal treatment is not translated into reality in French hospitals. Poor, foreign, or racialized patients (even more so poor, foreign, and racialized patients) do not enjoy the same quality of health care as other patients. Hospitals do not treat them the same way; they do not provide them with the same information and with the same respect as other patients.

This chapter relies on the results of three years of fieldwork in five hospitals of the Paris region—four public hospitals and one private. Adopting an ethnographic approach, I analyzed the functioning of healthcare departments, the work of healthcare professionals and their relations to patients,

especially to patients perceived as Roma. I spent approximately one month in each healthcare department (more than 15 in total), mostly ER, but also Obstetrics and Gynecology, Intensive Care, Orthopedics, Oncology, Follow-up Care and Rehabilitation, etc., observing the day-to-day work and taking intensive notes. I also conducted 74 semi-directive in-depth interviews with physicians, paramedics, and administrative staff (from 45 minutes to 4 hours long). This approach gives the interviewees the opportunity to develop and orientate their answer, improving the contextualization of collected data. I asked them about their personal and professional trajectories, their perception of their occupation and their relations with patients, their specific experiences with patients they identify as Roma, the impact of the patient's presumed race on their professional practice, and finally their opinion of the moral dimension of their occupation. To respect their anonymity, I use pseudonyms for each interviewee.

New Stakes Leading to Patient' Selection

The new public management hospital reforms profoundly changed the functioning of French healthcare institutions. Until then, hospitals were "self-sufficient": once diagnosed, patients entering the institution through the ER were hospitalized in specialized departments (cardiology, orthopedics, pulmonology, etc.) for surgery and treatment. Patients stayed in healthcare departments according to their illness, and public hospitals were financed for their hospitalization based on a fixed price per day.

In the 1980s, administrative authorities, preoccupied by growing public health expenditures, judged this financing system too "inflationary." They opted for a new public management approach, already in place in several other countries (Klein 2006; Yoon et al. 2003). French authorities established a new system based on a global fixed grant per hospital and developed several indicators to assess each establishment's productivity. In 2002, the French state applied a financial system to public hospitals that was comparable to the one in effect in private hospitals: a pricing system based on acts (*la tarification à l'activité* also called *T2A*). In this system in which each medical and surgical act has a financial value, a gynecologist performing a cesarean is more profitable for the department than a natural delivery for example. This new system means that an increasing share of hospitals' financial resources depends on their productivity. It encourages healthcare institutions to increase their activity—but without exceeding the annual national objective of social security expenditure (*Objectif national des dépenses*

d'assurance maladie) at the risk of a decrease in the price of acts. According to health care management specialist Edouard Couty, "this mechanism constitutes a vicious circle 'decrease in prices / (artificial?) increase in activity / decrease in prices' from which it is difficult to escape, and which may not result in better access to healthcare, nor better quality of healthcare" (Couty 2013, p. 29).

In this context, one way to cut costs is to reduce the average length of patients' stays in hospital (Batifoulier 2012; Chanial 2010). The logic of profitability requires hospitalization departments to welcome a greater number of patients per day, but also patients' stays should be shorter in order to admit new patients as soon as possible. The reduction of the average length of patients' stay (*la durée moyenne de séjour—DMS*) has become a central objective for all hospitalization departments. To achieve this goal, hospitals' activity has to become more and more predictable. New public management reforms encourage specialized departments (cardiology, orthopedics, pulmonology, etc.) to schedule their activity (consultations, surgeries) rather than accepting transfers from the ER. However, patients addressing the ER are mostly in vulnerable socioeconomic situations. As sociologist Nicolas Belorgey puts it, vulnerable patients' health is often in a worse state when they come to a hospital than other patients (Belorgey 2010, p. 87). Therefore, when transferred to specialized departments, they constitute a risk for profitability: they may not be solvent, they may not have an accommodation to be sent back to for recovery, they may suffer from multiple ailments and, as a consequence, need to be hospitalized for a longer period, etc. All these possible characteristics of disadvantaged patients threaten the reduction of the average length of patients' stay, the efficiency of healthcare professionals, and the profitability of healthcare departments.

There is a major incompatibility between the reality of hospitals in which vulnerable patients represent the majority of an ER's patients, and the recommendations of new public management's reforms. Specialized departments are free to choose the patients they want to hospitalize. Therefore, budgetary imperatives encourage specialized departments to select patients to treat, in order to accept only the profitable ones. Sociologists Agnès Camus and Nicolas Dodier's concept of the "patient's mobilizing value" (*valeur mobilisatrice du patient*) specifies "all the factors making a patient more or less attractive" (Camus and Dodier 1997, p. 742). They argue that, in the negotiation between the ER and specialized departments for the admission of patients, healthcare professionals select their patients based on three criteria. The first one is the "care load" (*la charge de soin*), that is "all the resources mobilized in a department to treat the patient." The second

one is the "budgetary value" (*la valeur budgétaire*) which means "what the patient represents to healthcare professionals, in terms of the costs to include in budget calculations and requests." And thirdly, the "unseen potential" (*les potentialités d'inédit*) designates "the interest of the patients' problem with regards to the advancement of specialized medical knowledge." The authors remark that specialized departments that select their patients according to their mobilizing value pass management constraints imposed by administrative authorities onto Emergency departments. Healthcare professionals working in the ER therefore encounter great difficulties to "sell" their patients to specialized departments (Camus and Dodier 1997, pp. 752–755) and as a result are overcrowded. Although they are supposed to be short-term departments, ERs are increasingly forced to accommodate (disadvantaged) patients (with a weak mobilizing value), sometimes for several days.

Hospital reforms have increased the difficulties for Emergency department professionals to transfer patients, even within the same institution. Each department looks out for its own interests and tries to prevent the admission of non-profitable patients. However, hospitals, and in particular public hospitals, remain the main recourse for poor people with health problems.

Stereotyping and Racialization of "Roma Patients"

In the Paris region, the composition of hospital staff is a reflection of the diversity of the French population in general. Some hospitals claim to welcome more than 100 different nationalities, among patients but also among staff. Healthcare professionals often solicit many of them as informal translators. However, despite the great diversity of hospitals' staff in terms of nationalities, claimed origins or cultural and ethnic belonging, in three years of fieldwork none of the professionals I encountered defined either themselves or a colleague as "Roma." Moreover, while they underlined the great diversity of patients' origins (real or presumed), the vast majority of healthcare professionals interviewed declared they never—or very rarely—treat patients they identify as Roma.

In 1971, the World Romani Congress chose the term "Roma" to designate the "first ethnic minority in Europe" (according to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) composed of various groups such as Sinti, Kalé, and Gitans (Bordigoni 2013). Those concerned, as well as social scientists and institutional actors, refuse any cultural or biological

categorization of this group, while sustaining its political and institutional existence. During the last decade, "the Roma people" became, in Europe and in France, the face of a political discourse rather distant from the reality of this social group (Fassin et al. 2014).

This chapter does not deal with the reality experienced by members of the social group called "Roma" but more with the impact of the political discourse about "Roma people" on professional practices—for this reason, I did not interview anybody identifying themselves as Roma. I used the expression "Roma people" as a "label" in order to study the process by which healthcare professionals categorize some patients according to their presumed racial belonging and to collect representations about this category. Roma patients do not tick a "Roma" box when they arrive in a hospital. Healthcare professionals impose this racialized status on them. As sociologist Alexandra Nacu puts it: "the Roma are unknown but they are easily identified by most French people through stereotypes" (Nacu 2012, p. 1326).

Even if most of healthcare professionals declare they never or rarely treat Roma patients, they actually all have a very precise idea of the way Roma people behave in hospitals: they all describe Roma patients as transgressing legal, institutional, and moral rules in hospitals. The care relation is said to be difficult, or at least more complicated than with other patients, because of their cultural specificities. "Difficulties to communicate, to be understood, to accept illness or treatment are explained [by hospital professionals] by the patients' cultural origin, which is generally perceived as an obstacle" (Kotobi 2000, p. 65). The racialization of presumed Roma patients' behaviors in the institution legitimizes rationalizing "deviances" or slurs they would be guilty of, according to healthcare professionals. In addition, Roma people are considered to have an "inappropriate" relation to the healthcare system, and in particular to the ER. They are blamed for either "consuming" health care excessively or, on the other hand, neglecting it.

Some healthcare professionals I met explained that Roma patients take advantage of having their "camp" established near a hospital to check every member of their large family's health condition in the ER. Tristan a 43-year-old ER physician explains: "In general, one [Roma] person is ill and she is accompanied by ten others. […] So ten come together. One is really sick with a temperature, is really ill, and by her side, her husband says 'well, I also lost consciousness', so I open a new chart. The son says 'well…', the cousin, the uncle, the brother… And I open six charts for the same family!" On the other hand, some interviewees describe Roma people as very reluctant to come to hospitals. These professionals explain that Roma people are suspicious of French institutions and that they agree to come to the ER

only when they have no other choice. This would explain why they arrive with multiple ailments and in worse health than other patients. Djibril, a 32-year-old nurse in the ER, declares "[Roma populations] clearly escape from healthcare […]. Sometimes, it's only small things left without care for a while, benign things that worsen, teeth problems, muscle problems or a slight temperature. For us it's just inconceivable! I have a temperature, I feel sick, I go to my family doctor."

These two representations healthcare professionals have about Roma people's use of the ER, and the healthcare system in general, are justified by cultural differences: Roma's supposed nomadism, Roma's presumed traditions (e.g., the use of traditional medicine in camps), Roma's mistrust toward the majority society, etc. However, using the ER for benign ailments or letting health problems worsen is just representative of working-class patients' medical culture (Boltanski 1971). For healthcare professionals, the "cultural difference" of presumed Roma patients has an indirect impact on their professional practice. Their "typical" use of the ER makes these patients more difficult to treat, extends the duration of the consultation, increases the medical risks, etc. In the view of healthcare professionals, taking care of patients identified as Roma demands more time and effort than for all other patients. ER professionals therefore negatively assess the Roma patients' mobilizing value.

Excluding Racialized Patients from Hospital

To comply with the requirements of new public management reforms and increase hospital profitability, medical, paramedical, and administrative staff daily assess the patients' "care load" (*charge de soins*) and budgetary value. They use racialization (among other categorization processes, such as age for example) to assess the patient's mobilizing value. Patients categorized as Roma are perceived as non-profitable patients since they are said to be poor, nomadic, homeless, dirty, non-French-speaking, undocumented migrants, etc. (Bouvet and Floch 2012).

Research in the USA has long demonstrated the impact of healthcare professionals' racial/ethnic bias on healthcare disparities (James and James 2017; Maina et al. 2018). In his 2000 book, sociologist Jean Peneff already wondered if French ERs were to follow the USA's example and "clean the ER of poor people that take up too much space in it" (Peneff 2000, p. 78). The observation conducted in five Parisian hospitals confirms that patients perceived as non-profitable encounter great difficulties to access health care and that some of them are victims of patient selection conducted by hospitals based on their presumed race.

Several interviewees designated the closest private hospital as responsible for "unloading" less profitable patients on the public institution they are working for. Lucie, a 44-year-old nurse, testifies: "Frequently, you will see foreigners coming here – I think it's outrageous! – with a letter [from the private hospital nearby] saying the hospital does not have any room for these patients. But, when you ask the patient 'do you have a social security card?', 'no'. [The private hospital refuses them] because they don't have any money!" Private hospitals are allowed to select their patients and some interviewees, such as Eugénie a 46-year-old receptionist working in a private institution, confirmed the refusal of patients unable to afford treatment. She explains: "Here, with physicians, it's very complex: you will call [the physician] and tell him that [the patient] has no papers, no money, that he isn't able to pay, 'what should I do?', 'tell him to go to [the public hospital nearby]'." Here, the refusal of vulnerable patients is open and clear.

Theoretically, public hospitals cannot refuse patients, even if they may have to meet the cost of treatment. "Either we succeed in [obtaining the reimbursement by social security], or we don't, and it contributes to the hospital's losses," declares Dominique, a 48-year-old nurse manager working in a public hospital. However, I observed the refusal of such patients on several occasions during the fieldwork. Patients were denied access to a hospital (through the ER) under various pretexts. For example, an assistant nurse, Sylvie, explains that some patients are sent to the hospital where she is working, claiming they need to be hospitalized in a specialized institution: "They tell the ladies to come here because we are specialized in miscarriages. That is what patients tell us. But a miscarriage is a miscarriage. It can be treated anywhere." Healthcare professionals mislead these patients in order to make them go to another hospital. This practice disregards the principle of equal access and the ethics of the healthcare profession.

Healthcare professionals give two main justifications to explain these refusals: treatment costs and the length of patients' stay. The first justification is treatment costs. Zoë, an ER nurse manager, received a patient suffering from severe burns in the ER. She identified him as Roma, foreign, and undocumented. Undocumented migrants represent a financial risk for public hospitals. Law forbids public healthcare institutions to refuse to treat them when they arrive in the ER, but social security may not reimburse the cost of their treatment. Zoë was unable to find a service to hospitalize him, either in the institution she is working in, or in another: "Nobody wanted him because he is a patient without a social security card, so all costs have to be met by the hospital, by the service." Finally, the patient left, thereby endangering his health, and was admitted a few days later, in a worse condition, for an emergency skin transplant in a nearby hospital. Zoë concluded

"He had to be dying [to obtain an operation and a treatment]." For a 45-year-old physician, head of department in a public hospital, the selection of patients is clearly an institutional issue. He says, "some hospitals' boards organize the expulsion of migrant patients, in a very concrete way, towards other hospitals"—a consequence of competition between hospitals and cost reduction implemented by new public management reforms.

The second justification is (indirectly) the length of patients' stay. Several Obstetrics and Gynecology staff members denounced false pretexts under which some patients are refused by some public hospitals. An intern received a "Roma couple" that was referred by another public hospital for an ultrasound. He explains that nothing in the patient's condition was specific ("abdominal pain, mammary pain, classic pregnancy!") but "they didn't speak perfect French, far from it! And [she had] no [pregnancy] monitoring at all." For him, "[the public hospital nearby] got rid of them" so that the monitoring and the delivery, that can be complicated and expensive, would take place elsewhere. Since her pregnancy was not monitored, this woman represents a medical risk. Moreover, she constitutes a threat for the average length of patients' stay in the department. As "Roma," she might be nomadic or homeless and healthcare professionals would not be authorized to send her back home after treatment if she does not have one. Yet, keeping her hospitalized would decrease the department' profitability.

As these two examples demonstrate, healthcare professionals rely on their perception of the patients' "race" to decide if they represent a risk for healthcare institutions on the basis of profitability criteria. Excluding patients based on their presumed racial belonging from healthcare institutions, these professionals transgress equal access principle to health care and produce racial discrimination.

Conclusion

The principle of equal access to health care has never been a reality in French public hospitals: poor people have never enjoyed the same quality of care as the richest. However, new public management reforms have increased inequalities between patients. Some of them not only do not enjoy the same quality of health care but are (indirectly) denied access to public health care. Increasing productivity means treating more patients in less time. Decreasing hospital costs means reducing unpredictable medical activities, avoiding "unnecessary" expenditure. To face these profound changes and meet the new financial requirements, hospital staff select patients based on their presumed profitability.

The case of Roma patients demonstrates how race is used as an indicator of patients' profitability (or not). Healthcare professionals interviewed have a very negative perception of "Roma people," even though they hardly ever treated any patients claiming to be Roma. They perceive "Roma people" through their supposed deficiency (of money, home, understanding, etc.) and the risk they represent in terms of the reforms' requirements. Specialized departments therefore refuse to hospitalize some patients being transferred from the ER because of their weak mobilizing value. And overcrowded ERs refuse access to patients that "look" disadvantaged. To rule out these "threatening" patients—possibly foreigners, penniless, homeless, etc. healthcare professionals use racialization. Color of skin, phenotypic features, presumed way of life, linguistic competences guide the selection of patients to be treated in hospitals. Budgetary results trump the principle of access to health care.

In this way, health care has become a market in which race is a currency. Since the implementation of new public management reforms, healthcare institutions are supposed to financially benefit from treating patients. Therefore, hospital professionals satisfy healthcare demands according to the value they grant to patients, based on their presumed racial belonging. They do not grant racialized patients enough value to enter the healthcare market.

To conclude, two recommendations can be made to improve equal access to health care in French hospitals. At an individual level, healthcare professionals should be made aware of the stereotypes which guide their daily practices so they may be able to resist their influence. At a structural level, hospital reforms should include the monitoring of equal treatment and equal access to health care (Carter 2000). To ensure the respect of these fundamental principles, public hospitals should implement measures based on the valorization of diversity and the fight against discrimination.

Note

1. In the color-blind French Republic, all citizens are supposed to enjoy the same rights regardless of their individual characteristics. As a result of the racial categorization of Jewish people during World War II, acknowledging race is considered, in France, as a source of potential prejudice. Contrary to the UK or the USA, France does not conduct annual surveys about race and/or ethnicity, and data on this topic are very scarce (Beauchemin et al. 2010). Sadly, refusing to acknowledge race does not prevent racialization and racism.

Further Reading

Balsa, A. I., & McGuire, T. G. (2003). Prejudice, clinical uncertainty and stereotyping as sources of health disparities. *Journal of Health Economics, 22,* 89–116.

Prud'homme, D. (2015). *La racialisation en urgence. Représentations et pratiques des professionnels hospitaliers à l'égard des patients présumés roms (2009–2012)* (Thèse pour le Doctorat en Science politique, sous la direction de M. Yves Déloye). Sciences Po Bordeaux.

Prud'homme, D. (2016). Du "soin global" au traitement discriminatoire. La prise en charge de patientes identifiées comme roms dans un service de gynéco-obstétrique parisien. *Terrains & travaux*, *29*(2), 85–104.

Sargent Carolyn et Larchanché Stéphanie. (2007). The Muslim body and the politics of immigration in France: Popular and biomedical representations of Malian migrant women. *Body & Society, 13*(3), 79–102.

References

Avril, C., Cartier, M., & Siblot, Y. (2005). Les rapports aux services publics des usagers et agents de milieux populaires: quels effets des réformes de modernisation? *Sociétés contemporaines, 58*(2), 5–18.

Baines, D., & Cunningham, I. (2015). Care work in the context of austerity. *Competition & Change, 19*(3), 183–193. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529415580263.

Batifoulier, P. (2012). Le marché de la santé et la reconstruction de l'interaction patient-médecin. *Revue Française de Socio-Economie*, *10*(2), 155–174. https://doi.org/10.3917/rfse.010.0155.

Beauchemin, C., Hamel, C., & Simon, P. (2010). *Trajectoires et origines*. Paris: Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France (INED).

Belorgey, N. (2010). *L'hôpital sous pression. Enquête sur le « nouveau management public »*. Paris: La Découverte.

Bezes, P. (2008). Le tournant néomanagérial de l'administration française. In O. Borraz & V. Guiraudon, *Politiques publiques 1* (Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 215–254). Paris.

Boltanski, L. (1971). Les usages sociaux du corps. *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 26*(1), 205–233. https://doi.org/10.3406/ahess.1971.422470.

Bordigoni, M. (2013). *Gitans, tsiganes, roms…: idées reçues sur le monde du Voyage*. Paris: Le Cavalier bleu éditions.

Bouvet, O., & Floch, S. (2012). Manouches et Roms. Représentations sociales des personnels soignants: Stigmatisation, déviance, étiquetage, stratégies. *Spécificités*, *1*(5), 257–274.

Camus, A., & Dodier, N. (1997). L'admission des malades. Histoire et pragmatique de l'accueil à l'hôpital. *Annales. Histoires, Sciences Sociales*, *52*(4), 733–763.

Carde, E. (2011). De l'origine à la santé, quand l'ethnique et la race croisent la classe. *Revue européenne des migrations internationales, 27*(3), 31–55. https://doi.org/10.4000/remi.5611.

Carter, J. (2000). New public management and equal opportunities in the NHS. *Critical Social Policy, 20*(1), 61–83.

Chanial, P. (2010). Le New Public Management est-il bon pour la santé? *Revue du MAUSS*, *35*(1), 135–150. https://doi.org/10.3917/rdm.035.0135.

Chauvenet, A. (1978). *Médecines au choix, médecine de classes*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Cognet, M., Gabarro, C., & Adam-Vezina, E. (2009). Entre droit aux soins et qualité des soins. *Hommes & Migrations, 1282*. Consulté à l'adresse. http://www.hommes-et-migrations.fr/index.php?/numeros/sante-et-droits-des-etranger-realites-et-enjeux/5725-entre-droit-aux-soins-et-qualite-des-soins.

Couty, E. (2013). Financer l'hôpital, le professionnel ou le parcours du patient? *Les Tribunes de la santé, 40*(3), 23–35. https://doi.org/10.3917/seve.040.0023.

Cunningham, R. (2000). From great expectations to hard times? Managing equal opportunities under new public management. *Public Administration, 78*(3), 699–714.

Fassin, D. (2000). *Les inégalités sociales de santé*. Paris: La Découverte.

Fassin, D. (2001). Quand le corps fait loi. La raison humanitaire dans les procédures de régularisation des étrangers. *Sciences sociales et santé*, *19*(4), 5–34. https://doi.org/10.3406/sosan.2001.1533.

Fassin, E., Fouteau, C., Guichard, S., & Windels, A. (2014). *Roms & riverains: Une politique municipale de la race*. La Fabrique éditions.

Herzlich, Claudine. 1973. «Types de clientèle et fonctionnement de l'institution hospitalière». *Revue française de sociologie, 14*(1), 41–59.

Hicken, M. T., Kravitz-Wirtz, N., Durkee, M., & Jackson, J. S. (2018). Racial inequalities in health: Framing future research. *Social Science and Medicine, 199,* 11–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.12.027.

James, S. A., & James, S. A. (2017). The strangest of all encounters: Racial and ethnic discrimination in US health care. *Cadernos de Saúde Pública*, *33*. https://doi.org/10.1590/0102-311x00104416.

Klein, R. (2006). *The new politics of the NHS*. Oxford: Radcliff Publishing.

Kotobi, L. (2000). Le malade dans sa différence: les professionnels et les patients migrants africains à l'hôpital. *Hommes et Migrations*, *Santé*, le *traitement de la différence, 1225*, 62–72.

Maina, I. W., Belton, T. D., Ginzberg, S., Singh, A., & Johnson, T. J. (2018). A decade of studying implicit racial/ethnic bias in healthcare providers using the implicit association test. *Social Science and Medicine, 199,* 219–229. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.05.009.

Nacu, A. (2011). A quoi sert le culturalisme? Pratiques médicales et catégorisations des femmes « migrantes » dans trois maternités franciliennes. *Sociologie du travail, 53,* 109–130.

Nacu, A. (2012). From silent marginality to spotlight scapegoating? A brief case study of France's policy towards the Roma. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 38*(8), 1323–1328. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2012.689192.

Palier, B. (2010). *La réforme des systèmes de santé*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Parizot, I. (2003). *Soigner les exclus: identités et rapports sociaux dans les centres de soins gratuits*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Peneff, J. (2000). *Les malades des urgences. Une forme de consommation médicale*. Paris: Ed. Métailié.

Prud'homme, D. (2015). *La racialisation en urgence. Représentations et pratiques des professionnels hospitaliers à l'égard des patients présumés roms (2009–2012)* (Thèse pour le Doctorat en Science politique, sous la direction de M. Yves Déloye). Sciences Po Bordeaux.

Robertson, S., & Dale, R. (2002). Local states of emergency: Tha contradictions of neo-liberal governance in education in New Zealand. *British Journal of Sociology of Education, 23*(3), 463–482.

Sargent, C., & Larchanché, S. (2007). The muslim body and the politics of immigration in France: Popular and biomedical representations of Malian migrant women. *Body & Society, 13*(3), 79–102.

Sauvegrain, P. (2010). *Différence de traitement et traitements différentiels. Les trajectoires de soins des femmes « Africaines » en maternité publique* (Thèse de sociologie). Université Paris Diderot (Paris VII), Paris.

Siblot, Y. (2005). « Adapter » les services publics aux habitants des « quartiers difficiles. *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 159*(4), 70. https://doi.org/10.3917/arss.159.0070.

Simonet, D. (2015). The new public management theory in the British health care system: A critical review. *Administration & Society, 47*(7), 802–826.

Stivers, C. (2007). « So poor and so black » : Hurricane Katrina, Public Administration, and the Issue of Race. *Public Administration Review*, *67*(Special Issue on Administrative Failure in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina [December 2007]), 48–56.

Taguieff (Dir.), P.-A. (1997). *Le Racisme: un exposé pour comprendre, un essai pour réfléchir*. Paris: Flammarion.

Yoon, P., Reinhardt, G., & Steiner, I. (2003). Analysis of the factors influencing length of stay in emergency department. *Canadian Journal of Emergency Medicine, 5*(3), 155–161.

16

Development by Markets: An Essay on the Continuities of Colonial Development and Racism in Africa

Samuel Kwaku Bonsu

Chapter Overview

- Contemporary development harbors racist ideologies related to visions of African inferiority.
- The market has become a tool for perpetuating subjugation of the African through development.
- Development is more about racial power dynamics than it is about well-being of the marginalized.
- Africa is not condemned to mediocrity, as the racist development agenda would suggest.
- There is hope for a brighter future if development rhetoric and practice would rise above racism.

Introduction

The concept of development, defined as a conscious strategic effort to improve lives, has been part of humankind's long history. For many in the developing world, this history is littered with the troublesome biography of colonialism. Even though colonialism has been outlawed by the global

S. K. Bonsu (✉)
Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, Accra, Ghana
e-mail: sbonsu@gimpa.edu.gh

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5_16

fraternity of nations, it remains a primary source of inspiration for many present-day institutions, and its attendant racism has been carried over into contemporary development (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). Subtle racism continues to inhabit African development, grounded in the seeming superiority of Whiteness which, supposedly, has been elected to save the poor of the world (Bonsu 2009).

Racism in colonialism was steeped in the rhetoric of a "civilizing mission" that conveyed the need for sharing the benefits of European enlightenment with the colonized (Nkomazana and Setume 2016). The colonized needed to be forced into a particular level of understanding and practice of living that was alien to them before they could be "enlightened." Christian missionaries, scientists, merchants, and other seeming philanthropists relocated to "pagan" continents to save the heathen. That being the case, it would be expected that knowledge transfer and the building of infrastructure, as in Europe, would have been part of the development agenda in the colonies, but that was not the case.

The brutal colonial regimes around the world pursued a development agenda that was directed almost exclusively at subjugating indigenous peoples and ensuring that resources were removed from the colonies and easily exported to the colonial Centre. It was partly for this reason that, for example, the railway network in colonial Gold Coast (now Ghana) originated in gold- and cocoa-producing areas only and terminated at the port. Similar observations have been made where development strategies in African colonies were designed to facilitate exploitation and extraction of human, natural, and other resources in the interest of the colonizer (Rodney 1972).

Despite these observations, researchers have not explored adequately the dynamics of racism in colonial and contemporary development. Such is the object of this chapter: to interrogate the concept and practice of contemporary development in a manner that excavates its ideological dimensions in terms of colonial heritage and its attendant racism. Toward this end, the chapter takes a critical view of how development operated (and continues to operate) and how colonial ideologies of racism still dominate development practice. Colonialism relied on physical brutalities in furtherance of exploitation and Europeanization as the primary means to a better world for Europe (Fanon 2005); an ideology that has continued to this day, even if the obvious physical brutalities are absent.

Development has become yet another tool for perpetuating institutional racism. The focus of this chapter is on one form of development that embraces capitalist ideals as the only foundation for cultural and other structural changes toward improvement in the African existence. It is important

to note that any discussion of race grounded in the experiences of Black people alone would lack adequate analytical focus (Gabriel 1994, p. 4). However, the restricted focus on Blackness and Africans in this short essay was necessary as a means of understanding a small part of the African experience for placement within the broader conversation on race. I recognize the role that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have attempted to play in the development process over the years, with mixed results (e.g., Young 2018); but for purposes of this chapter, I focus on other agents of change and exploitation.

Colonialism, Racism, and Development

Development in Colonialism

A century or so before Columbus' famous journey in search of a new route to the East Indies, Portugal and Spain, among others, had been sponsoring voyages along the West Coast of Africa, hoping to locate direct sources of gold, spices, and silk whose supply were dominated by Arab traders and Jewish merchants of Venice and Genoa. With the support of the Pope, monarchs of these states assumed dominion over all that they could survey. One of the powers granted the voyagers by their sponsors was to "search out and conquer all pagans, enslave them and appropriate their lands and goods" (Nicholas 1455, p. 12). This was the foundation of colonialism. Parties to the June 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas were granted the opportunity to pursue colonial assets as a political, economic, and cultural right, within a "civilizing mission."

The European pursuit of power through control of natural and economic resources in Africa and other colonies was the foundation for many skirmishes among European nations. The "Scramble for Africa" came to a head at the Berlin Conference in 1884 when the rivalries ceased with the signing of an agreement that partitioned Africa for the European colonizers. The famed Guyanese historian and political activist, Professor Walter Rodney (1972), demonstrated how Europe exploited Africa through colonialism, sometimes in the name of development. Two researchers at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Leander Heldring and James Robinson (2012, p. 17) also identified different mechanisms by which colonialism reduced development, including indiscriminate looting of African resources. Together, these researchers suggest that while colonialists were different in their approaches to governance, they all adopted development strategies that favored their own ambitions.

Colonial development practice was informed primarily by preferences of the sponsoring nation-state, often at the expense of the colony (Rist 2014), always about what the colonizer perceived to be of importance. Consider the "*Office du Niger, Mali Project*." The goal of this "development" project, as determined by the French colonial authorities in 1932, was to irrigate 2.47 million acres of land for rice/cotton cultivation and develop hydropower in the Mali desert. This was the largest development project attempted by French colonial authorities, all without consultation with local communities. These communities were comfortable with their own practices and ignored attempts to change traditional agricultural practices. By 1982, only 6% of the region was developed and the infrastructure is falling apart ("Examples of Failed" 2007).

As part of colonial practice, racism against Africa and Africans was invented and refined over centuries of European (Ross 1982) and Arab (Lewis 1985) contacts. Imperialists often sought to establish themselves as superior through ideological framing that supported the colonizer's brutal disciplining techniques and expelled competing ideologies of African competence (Bonsu 2009). Feeling superior to their local hosts left the colonizers unable to convert stakeholder dissent, disinterest, and disenchantment into an adaptive development design that would have prevented failures of the kind experienced with the Office du Niger, Mali project.

Early anthropologists emphasized the inferiority of the Black race and the need for their "development" by way of colonialization because, by nature, the Africans were not equipped to take charge of their own destinies:

> England and France will rule Africa. Africans will dig the ditches and water the deserts. It will be hard work and the Africans will probably become extinct. We must learn to look at the result with composure. It illustrates the beneficent law of nature, that the weak must be devoured by the strong. (Winwood Reade, quoted in Andreasson 2005, p. 974)

> Modern science had shown that races develop in the course of centuries as individuals do in years, and that an underdeveloped race, which is incapable of self-government, is no more of a reflection on the Almighty than is an undeveloped child who is incapable of self-government. (Rev Josiah Strong, as reported by Gould 2007, pp. 218–219)

These comments present the White race as being biologically more advanced than the Black; they note the need for the superior race to subjugate the inferior. Helping the African to "develop" was an act of philanthropy grounded in a "saviour mentality" that placed whites at the top of

the human race. Even so, this was a risky venture as the Black race was not strong enough to withstand the vagaries of evolutionary processes.

All these point to the devastating colonialism legacy of racism. As the famed development economist William Easterly (2014) put it, these effects were aggregated and interpreted at the national level, pitching the State—an invisible entity—against the individual. Africans, for instance, are defined merely by economic poverty, not by their humanity, histories, or socioculture (Esteva 1992). The resulting essentialization, as the development economist Jeffrey Sachs (1992, p. 2) has noted, supported "arrogant interventionism from the North and pathetic self-pity in the South." Indeed, the effects of colonial power structures granted the colonizers immense opportunity to deepen the racial divide with people of African descent. It would seem then that political scientist Shiraz Dossa (2007) is correct in noting that colonial (and contemporary) development was NEVER intended to benefit Africa but to create and enhance economic and political opportunities for racist and rent-seeking sponsors.

Africa was not a lone victim in the colonial pillage that was disguised as development. In a debate at Oxford Union in 2016, Dr. Shashi Tharoor, a Member of the Indian Parliament noted the brutality of British racism and colonialism in India. India had about 24% of the world's trade of woven cloth when the British arrived. The British smashed thumbs and broke looms. They exported the raw muslin for processing in the UK and sold the finished cloth to the local Indians turning the locals into consumers and creating markets for "British" products. By the end of the nineteenth century, India's market share had been reduced to less than 2%. With a forced shift to cash-crop cultivation as opposed to food, 15–20 million people died from starvation while the British kept food as reserve stock. Indian lives did not matter then and now! Easterly (2014) reports on several such occurrences in China, Latin America, and Africa.

From Colonialism to NeoColonialism

Following World Wars I and II, and the emergence of the Cold War, another scramble for Africa began. In addition to the reallocation of German colonies to the allies, the USA and Soviet Union fought to extend their ideological territories across the world. African and Latin American pursuit of self-determination intensified, and the emerging new nations needed economic support. It was then that American President Harry Truman

specifically called for concerted efforts to support Latin American socioeconomic growth. Truman's call was part of an ostensible strategy for improving the livelihoods in target regions toward controlling the spread of communism (Easterly 2014). Development as practiced today was born.

Truman's strategy recognized equality of all races and the exile of physical brutalities, in principle. However, it noted the advanced development of the USA and the need for recipients of American support to be trained in advanced American technologies and ideologies. The strategy was embraced by Truman's successor, John F. Kennedy, and was extended to include Africa, South America, and parts of Asia. This "development" has since grown into an industry and has assumed ideological postures that define its current processes and practices (Escobar 1995). Each of the resulting "development" spaces maintains remnants of colonialism, including the not-so-subtle assumption of White superiority.

Development under the Truman doctrine was managed through technologies for improving GDP in target countries by way of state-led industrialization and control of the business sector (Reed and Reed 2008). Businesses' roles were merely to encourage government to provide supportive environments where industries could create employment for local populations, and hence boost the poor's economic migration from pre-modern conditions through "take-off" to advanced development (Rostow 1966). Strategic business discourses and practices, however, encouraged apathy toward establishing concrete infrastructure in poor regions, perceiving these areas only as extensions of sales outlets for established products (Ohmae 1985). Despised by global businesses and shut out of global markets by unfair trading practices (see Walker 2011)—along with several other factors—socioeconomic conditions in the poorer regions of the world continued to deteriorate, as global inequalities (Kiely 2007) were reproduced.

The abysmal failure of the Truman doctrine of development called for new approaches, especially as the nation-state underwent several iterations in her attempt to keep control, but ultimately lost most of her power to capitalist firms (Osterhammel and Petersson 2005). As in the colonial era, the imperial order commanded the African socioeconomic agenda in the 1980s and now (Sachs 1992; Easterly 2014), even if the agent of power is no longer the nation-state but the multinational corporation. The corporation is now the arbiter of justice, power, and control, embodying the strategies and technologies of sovereignty's endless and ubiquitous counter-historic reassertion of power.

Development by Markets

As capitalist firms have assumed more power in global affairs, "development" has shifted its primary dependency from the nation-state to the corporation (Davies 2018; May 2017). The resulting strategy for development, what is herein labeled "Development by Markets," perceives market-based solutions to the problem of global poverty. Development by Markets incorporates the Base of the Pyramid (BoP) strategy (Prahalad 2004). It references a market-based model of cooperation that affords profit-oriented private enterprises significant involvement in the business of development for the world's disenfranchised billions. However, Development by Markets extends beyond the BoP in that it recognizes development as a full extension of life well beyond business—including cultural, social, and political life, among other things. Whether by intention or ignorance, global leaders have turned a blind eye to the exploitative aspects of development by markets, reminiscent of the imperialist order and the neoliberal ideology that works to concentrate power and wealth among the elite (Harvey 2007).

The relics of colonial control served through development have led many, including Africans, to accept Western norms as the standard for all things, while the local is cast as inferior. Sponsors of development unconsciously employ racist assumptions to preserve jobs for expatriate development workers. Imagine a situation where all development officers around the world were recalled to their home countries; now imagine the unemployment situation this would create for the sponsors of development. It would seem that it is in the interest of sponsors to support racist ideals that preserve high paying development jobs for their citizens abroad who repatriate their incomes to support the home economies.

Development by Markets harbors colonial ideologies related to visions of African inferiority that have found residence in practice, employing racial power dynamics in activities which are often deemed part of a disinterested process of poverty alleviation. In other words, the strategy masks a global power play whereby the "developed" sponsors employ foreign-based historical experiences as a guide (Gubser 2012) and adopt colonial and other control strategies (Goldsmith 1997) to manage the affairs of the African. Perhaps it is partly for this racist reason that, in a case involving development support for the health sector in Ghana, the UK development agency preferred an inexperienced 26-year-old White British economist over an experienced UK-trained local economist who also understood local culture. The latter's grievous fault, it seemed, was being non-white.

In what seems like a genuine search for effective ways to facilitate development, the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID) is experimenting with what is described as CashAid. Deviating from its traditional way of giving fertilizers, food, and resources such as training to aid recipients, CashAid gives cash directly to aid recipients who are then free to decide on how they use the funds. Here, the recipient is "empowered" to define his/her own priorities for consumption, which may not necessarily align with societal objectives (Aizenman 2018). While CashAid may counter the colonial idea that development sponsors decide priorities for the aid recipients, it seems to tap into the neoliberal notion of freedom-of-choice and individual empowerment to mobilize the sheer weight of numbers in poorer markets for addressing the problem of dwindling markets for firms in the global North. Whichever way one looks at it, the circle loops back for the benefit of the sponsors of development and the well-being of their own constituents.

With this background of latent racism and presumed African inferiority, development planners often ignore the wealth of indigenous knowledge in favor of foreign experience that may be inappropriate for the target market. On the racist assumption that the colonized has no value to add to their own lives, it has become the "white man's burden" (see Easterly 2006) to rid the uncouth and undeveloped of their incivility, even if it causes harm to the undeveloped, which echoes the civilizing mission of colonialism. Development, thus, seeks merely to reconstitute the target persons in a colonial image and as markets for foreign goods and services. Both the globalization of markets and development's incorporation of market strategies appear to create an excellent opportunity to launch such an attack. This is the situation of the world now: Latent racism being spread in the name of development to perpetuate colonial processes of subjugation.

Concluding Remarks

The argument presented thus far is that practices and processes of contemporary development rely on market-situated solutions that employ emblems of racism, grounded in representations of Africa constructed as part of Europe's colonizing project. Colonialism supported the emergence of racial structures that allowed for domination and exploitation of those who were deemed racially inferior. Whiteness always manages to hide behind its negative constructions of otherness (Hall 1991, p. 21), successfully creating a continual legacy of racism that continues to afflict Africa, especially

in her dealings with "white" development partners. That is to say that "Development by Markets" is a continuity of colonialism where the market has become a veneer covering the spread of African inferiority and promoting Ameri-Eurocentrism.

The struggle continues because Ameri-Eurocentrism is still

> articulated as part of civilizing mission, emancipation and development. In reality, it is the foundation of the politics of alterity that produced … 'the West and the rest of us'….It exists as a condescending worldview that accords history to Europe, complete and sovereign being to Europeans, confer the right to judge others to Europeans as well as racial superiority to Europeans … Africans continue to suffer from alienation and dispossession that was imposed through a combination of colonial assimilation policies, indirect and direct rule, forced particularism and ghettoization, and even 'dilution in a nameless universalism' …..The proposed therapy …..is that of 'decolonising the African mind', which is proving to be very difficult in a context where coloniality is still actively working to hail Africans into embracing coloniality as a dominating worldview. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015, pp. 19, 30)

A professor of Political Science, Bruce Gilley (2017), has made a big push for a return to a revised colonialism for development whereby the colonized would consent to be so governed by the powers that be. He has received a lot of backlash from all corners of the globe, some noting his ignorance. While he may not have timed his arguments right, the professor is right in his assertion that colonialism has been good for development—the question is: Whose development? Gilley fails to fully appreciate the history of colonialism and why, in spite of his good visions of the concept and its practices, it is not good for the subjugated. He seems to subscribe to the view of an earlier British professor, Trevor-Roper (1965, p. 9), that African historical studies are "unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant parts of the globe" leading Gilley to ignore African history in favor of a very shallow perspective of colonialism. He and his ilk perceive a future of colonialism with no discontent. Utopian as this vision may be, it embodies a certain entrenched representation of the colonized that seems to serve the purposes of the colonizer: power and domination.

Power, as French sociologist and philosopher Michel Foucault observes, is most effective when applied indirectly. Throughout European history, the nation-state has sought to instill power, order, and control through instituted systems of discipline. Foucault (1975) observes further that disciplinary power vested in the state, operated through institutions as disparate as

prisons and normalized self-control. The State's system of organization and inherent power dynamics—for instance, through its hierarchical ordering of society—was essential for the success of the industrial revolution.

As part of this oppressive system of sovereign power over citizens, racism was employed as a means of enabling certain categories of life to be excluded in order to purify and strengthen society as a whole (Foucault 1998 [1976]). "Actual Racism," per Foucault (2003 [1975–1976], p. 80), references the deterministic and hierarchical categorization of human life according to biological criteria as a counter-historical means of defending and reasserting sovereign power. With this foundation, any state efforts at "development" would seek to develop and entrench structures that facilitate racial and other hierarchies such as was employed in the imperialist order.

Development, as practiced today, tortures Africans' existence and renders them powerless relative to their global counterparts. Indeed, contemporary development has reneged on its promises, providing instead an institutionalized violence of inequality, domination, and subordination of poor nations and peoples. But Africa is not condemned to mediocrity, as the racist development agenda would suggest, even though the future portends more of the horrible racial relations in development by markets. Does this mean that we must abandon any hope of achieving a better world for all? I do not think so. As "people of color"—forgive my seeming acceptance of a controversial and racist moniker—and all others, do we sit idly by to see the emergence of such a future? What future do we see for development?

For the present, I must agree with political scientist Nasar Meer (2018) that the term "post-colonial" is a misnomer in that continuities in colonial racism and other practices do not allow for the sharp distinction implied by the term. What are deemed "post-colonial" are not "solely anchored in what happened after political decolonization, but instead on the form and content of colonialism, and its subsequent (indeed contemporary) articulations" (Meer 2018, p. 5). Such is the history of the world, and we cannot build a future without connecting it to this history. Thus, I would propose that the African development of the future, one that is truly "post-colonial," would seek to build bridges across races to facilitate the well-being of all, including the marginalized, rather than entrench racism and other colonial attributes. It would generously incorporate the valid input of local communities. The target recipients of development aid would be humanized and not counted as mere statistics, as is currently the case. They would have equal rights under all international laws, and all dealings with them would be fair. Any development effort and related policy would be guided by the well-being of the poor. In essence, a truly post-colonial development would

not involve mis-education of the poor African masses a la Woodson (2005) but would avoid all colonial inclinations and seek total emancipation of the heart, body, and soul of all involved. That is not too much to ask, is it?

Further Reading

Davis, J. F. (2018). Selling whiteness?—A critical review of the literature on marketing and racism. *Journal Marketing Management, 34*(1–2).

Easterly, W. (2016). *The economics of international development: Foreign aid versus freedom for the world's poor*. London, UK: Institute of Economic Affairs.

Kothari, U. (2006). Critiquing 'race' and racism in development discourse and practice. *Progress in Development Studies, 6*(1), 1–7.

Wilson, K. (2012). *Race, racism and development: Interrogating history, discourse and practice*. London: Zed Books.

References

Aizenman, N. (2018). Which foreign aid programs work? The US runs a test—But won't talk about it. *All Things Considered*. Retrieved from www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/09/14/647212387/which-foreign-aid-programs-work-the-u-s-runs-a-test-but-wont-talk-about-it.

Andreasson, S. (2005). Orientalism and African Development Studies: The 'reductive repetition' motif in theories of African development. *Third World Quarterly, 26*(6), 971–986.

Bonsu, S. K. (2009). Colonial images in global times: Consumer interpretations of Africa and Africans in advertising. *Consumption Markets and Culture, 12*, 1–25.

Davies, J. E. (2018). Does the millennium challenge corporation reinforce capitalist power structures or empower citizens? *Third World Quarterly, 39*(4), 609–625.

Dossa, S. (2007). Slicing up 'development': Colonialism, political theory, ethics. *Third World Quarterly, 28*(5), 887–899.

Easterly, W. (2006). *The White man's burden: Why the west's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good*. New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Easterly, W. (2014). *The tyranny of experts economists, dictators, and the forgotten rights of the poor*. New York: Basic Books.

Escobar, A. (1995). *Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Esteva, G. (1992). Development. In W. Sachs (Ed.), *The development dictionary: A guide to knowledge and power*. London: Zed Books.

Examples of failed aid-funded projects in Africa. (2007, December 23). *Associated Press*. Retrieved from www.nbcnews.com/id/22380448/ns/world_news-africa/t/examples-failed-aid-funded-projects-africa/#.W789qfaxWhc.

Fanon, F. (2005 [1961]). *The wretched of the earth* (R. Philcox, Trans.). New York: Grove.

Foucault, M. (1995 [1975]). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison* (A. Sheridan, Trans.). New York: Vintage.

Foucault, M. (1998 [1976]). The order of things. In J. Faubion (Ed.), *Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, method, and epistemology*. New York: The New Press.

Foucault, M. (2003). *Society must be defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975–1976*. New York: Picador.

Gabriel, J. (1994). *Racism, culture, markets*. London: Routledge.

Gilley, B. (2017). The case for colonialism. *Third World Quarterly, 38*, 1–18.

Goldsmith, E. (1997). Development as colonialism. *The Ecologist, 27*(2), 69–76.

Gould, S. J. (2007 [1977]). *Ever since Darwin: Reflections in natural history*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Gubser, M. (2012). The presentist bias: Ahistoricism, equity, and international development in the 1970s. *The Journal of Development Studies, 48*(12), 1799–1812.

Hall, S. (1991). The local and the global: Globalization and ethnicity. In A. King (Ed.), *Culture, globalization and the world system*. London: Macmillan.

Harvey, D. (2007). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Heldring, L., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). *Colonialism and economic development in Africa* (Working Paper No. 18566). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Kiely, R. (2007). Poverty reduction through liberalisation? Neoliberalism and the myth of global convergence. *Review of International Studies, 33,* 415–434.

Lewis, Bernard. (1985). The crows of the Arabs. *Critical Inquiry, 12*(1), 88–97.

May, C. (2017). Multinational corporations in world development: 40 years on. *Third World Quarterly, 38*(10), 2223–2241.

Meer, N. (2018). "Race" and "post-colonialism": Should one come before the other? *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 41*(6), 1163–1181.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2013). *Empire, global coloniality and African subjectivity*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2015). Genealogies of coloniality and implications for Africa's development. *Africa Development/Afrique et Développement, 40*(3), 13–40.

Nicholas, V. (1455, January 8). The Bull Romanus Pontifex. *European Treaties* (n 11), 9–26.

Nkomazana, F., & Setume, S. D. (2016). Missionary colonial mentality and the expansion of Christianity in Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1800–1900. *Journal for the Study of Religion, 29*(2), 29–55.

Ohmae, K. (1985). *Triad power: The coming shape of global competition*. New York: Free Press.

Osterhammel, J., & Petersson, N. P. (2005). *Globalization: A short history*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Prahalad, C. K. (2004). *The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid: Eradicating poverty through profits*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing.

Reed, A. M., & Reed, D. (2008). Partnerships for development: Four models of business involvement. *Journal of Business Ethics*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-008-9913-y.

Rist, G. (2014). *The history of development: From western origins to global faith*. London: Zed Books.

Rodney, W. (1972). *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*. London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications.

Ross, R. J. (1982). *Racism and colonialism: Essays on ideology and social structure*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Rostow, W. W. (1966). National markets and economic growth. *The International Executive, 8*(1), 5–7.

Sachs, W. (Ed.). (1992). *The development dictionary: A guide to knowledge as power*. London: Zed Books.

Trevor-Roper, H. (1965). *The rise of Christian Europe* (pp. 9–11). London: Harcourt.

Walker, A. (2011). *The WTO has failed developing nations*. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/14/wto-fails-developing-countries.

Woodson, C. G. (2005 [1933]). *The miseducation of the Negro*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

Young, F. (2018). Unprotected. *Propublica*. https://features.propublica.org/liberia/unprotected-more-than-me-katie-meyler-liberia-sexual-exploitation.

Afterword

During a recent television appearance, I described how non-white people struggle when shopping for everyday consumer products: *"It's a constant battle, living in a country that makes us feel like we don't exist since nothing is produced with us in mind—not bandages, not hair products, not foundations. We cannot buy our cosmetics in supermarkets."*

The conversation continued on Twitter, with a lively debate about the color of bandages (light pink or beige), which are supposed to match the skin tone of White people but are highly visible on Black skin. Very quickly, the discussion became the subject of a national controversy, unleashing an incomprehensible fury among various political and media personalities.

Unsurprisingly, nearly all of the dissenting voices were White. Indeed, it is difficult to grasp the relevance of a problem that does not directly affect oneself—this is what we call a "blind spot."

Many reacted as though I had personally attacked them, although I only highlighted a discriminatory system, without pointing fingers at anyone.

The extent of the controversy sparked by my comments, the ferocity that followed, and the level of irrational violence in reaction to this legitimate question (concerning a feature of everyday life) reveal the total absence of empathy for the lived experiences of non-white people. Also brought to light is a kind of "fragility" on the part of one segment of the population which, having no personal experience with the consequences of racism, cannot tolerate a discussion about it.

The controversy further highlights the power and significance of this book, as it emphasizes a topic which may seem irrelevant to many, but

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5

which in fact sits at the core of our capitalist societies. Beyond the law of supply and demand, each chapter of this book vividly illustrates how markets, which occupy a vital role in our daily lives, are deeply saturated by racial dynamics.

In my country, France, there is a significant and growing percentage of non-white people, one of the largest in Europe. However, public spaces rarely allow for debates about the recognition of these people's specific needs. These questions are perceived as secondary, as taking the debate away from "real" problems—problems identified by people unaffected by the inherent racism of the marketplace.

This denial concerns not only cosmetic needs related to physical appearance; it also concerns needs related to cultural practices.

The diversity of cultures found amongst twenty-first-century French people is reflected in food practices, an area that easily offends those who fear the dilution of age-old traditions. While the 1980s saw the development of *kosher* food, in recent years there has been a rise in the consumption of *halal* food by Muslims, resulting in many controversies. For instance, when the fast food chain Quick decided in 2010 to offer only halal food at its restaurants located in majority-Muslim districts, the outcry was inevitable. The mayor of Roubaix, one of the affected cities, launched legal action against the company for "discriminating" against non-Muslims—as if halal meat contained germs that non-Muslims could not tolerate. Quick's inclusive approach allowed more people to frequent the same restaurants and have access to more menu items, and in some cities Quick's turnover increased by forty percent. However, the mayor's decision to bring legal action focused only on the fate of the majority of people, who already had access to all fast food in France.[1]

This relatively minor issue of halal food has become symbolic of the Muslim presence in France, and it was controversial to the point of taking a central place in the final debate of the 2012 presidential elections. It is paradoxical to constantly urge minorities, particularly Muslim women, to "integrate," while at the same time refusing their access to a fairly basic food request.

Yet this refusal is not limited to popular leisure activities.

In her chapter about the shopping experiences of Muslim women who wear veils in France,[2] Ranam Alkayyali opens by referencing an incident in 2016 where Laurence Rossignol, then Minister of women's rights, compared Muslim women who voluntarily wear headscarves with "*American Niggers who were for slavery.*"[3] The deliberate use of the n-word triggered a controversy, yet the minister stood by her statement, insisting that "*at the end of the*

60s, when women had access to more rights, skirts got shorter."[4] This particularly assimilationist and ethnocentric view also impacts non-Muslim women who are unwilling to show their legs.

The struggle for women's liberation is thus presented as if it can only be fought by women who wear clothing that matches certain Western norms. In line with this, the philosopher Elisabeth Badinter, who has long opposed veiled women in the name of feminism, called for a boycott of brands that designed clothing adapted to Islamic requirements.

Here, we see how the recognition of the preferences of Muslim women, as well as the response of the fashion industry in offering an adapted option, are strongly rejected, even though this concerns a private commercial initiative.

We are witnessing a paradox that places Muslims at the heart of a contradiction. Dominant political and popular culture figures urge them to blend into the national fabric and give up everything that might distinguish them. However, when brands propose products which would allow them to adopt practices similar to the majority with ease (such as by going to the same shops and restaurants), it is considered a threat to national unity.

A similar phenomenon is explored in Marcel Rosa-Salas' chapter on the construction of the US "mass market," where she demonstrates that this unity (which is never explicitly articulated) is in reality the reproduction of the historically dominant White Christian identity.[5] This "unity" or "mass market," presented as neutral, actually establishes White consumers as the implicit and immutable norm.

Hostile reactions therefore reveal a desire to preserve this centrality within the market.

In 2014, I undertook a photo-biographical work with photographer Brigitte Sombie, on Afro-descendant people in France who choose to wear their hair "natural," challenging (consciously or not) most beauty stereotypes. Indeed, as described in the chapter by Jessica Vega-Centeno, the hair of Afro-descendants, particularly women, has been an important site of racial hierarchy since the days of the transatlantic slave trade.[6] While carrying out my research, I realized that the Certificate of Professional Aptitude in Hairdressing, issued by the Department of National Education, did not train graduates in the care of hair thick in texture. Thus, this diploma, although issued by the State and supposed to respond to the needs of all, does not take into account the needs of a significant part of the population—as if these people do not exist at all.

This invisibilization forces people to resort to alternative strategies to obtain desired services. They must visit the few high-end salons reserved for

those who can afford them, or seek the services of hairdressers at home, or go to hair salons located in certain "majority-immigrant" neighborhoods (when they are lucky enough to live in big cities, such as Paris). Such small salons can play a central role in the maintenance of these communities and their traditions, similar to the function of food corner stores as described by Naya Jones in her chapter on urban gentrification in Austin, Texas.[7] Nevertheless, because the ability of these professionals (who are usually from minority-status groups themselves) to care for thicker-textured hair is not recognized, their businesses tend to be more vulnerable and less sustainable. Furthermore, such institutionalized non-recognition encourages clandestine activities that can give rise to many abuses, as seen through the exploitation of African hairdressers in Paris, who in 2014 organized a social movement in protest against deplorable working conditions.

The cosmetics market has made undeniable progress in supplying and adapting to various types of facial features. Nevertheless, the lack of options remains an issue, as does the accessibility of these products, which should be widely available in pharmacies or supermarkets.

Thus, the lives of non-white people are subjected daily to microaggressions resulting from the lack of consideration for the existence of their bodies. They also face indifference and even hostility—sometimes very aggressive—toward what they consider to be important needs.

This is a new paradox that manifests in the following way. Just mentioning ethno-racial groups is taboo in France, which makes it very difficult to articulate the desire to access aesthetic or cultural practices in conditions equivalent to those of the privileged majority. When expressed, these needs are often referred to as "communitarian,"[8] even though they are merely the expression of a desire for inclusion and sociopolitical recognition. Including and recognizing these needs within the marketplace would have the effect of reducing the visibility of their singularities, insofar as they would fit in with those of the majority.

We are faced with a great contradiction in a plural society, in which commercial interests tend to increasingly take plurality into account; whereas the idea of evoking the racial question and its consequences is severely shunned by the majority of intellectual and political classes.

Beyond capitalism and the economic interests that it implies, debates about the structure of the marketplace, including its accommodation of diverse needs, illustrate how a country perceives itself and its implicit norms. It is therefore an important mission for academics, practitioners, policy makers, and activists, to better understand the deeply intertwined dynamics between race and markets.

The present book is a first step in this direction. It engages diverse disciplines from a variety of countries, in order to demonstrate the reach and complexity shared between race and markets. It provides a vision of society that truly reflects the historical dynamics of oppression, highlighting the intersectional dimensions of the racial question, which is also determined by gender, class, and ability. The power of this book lies in its detailed analysis of the impact of industrial, economic, and marketing choices which affect all aspects of our lives: from beauty care, to housing mortgages, to Internet browsing. Unquestionably, the market is not neutral, as is revealed in this unprecedented volume.

Paris, France Rokhaya Diallo

Notes

1. In 2010, Quick had 22 halal restaurants out of the 358 existing in France. For further analysis of the Quick controversy see Johnson, G. D., Thomas, K., Grier, S. A. (2017), "When the burger becomes halal: A critical discourse analysis of privilege and marketplace inclusion", *Consumption Markets & Culture*, 20(6), 497–522.
2. See also Alkayyali in this volume Chapter 6.
3. The translation of the French word "Nègre" is at the author's discretion.
4. Laurence Rossignol et les «nègres qui étaient pour l'esclavage» Frantz Durupt, *Libération*, March 30, 2016, Available at: https://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/03/30/laurence-rossignol-et-les-negres-qui-etaient-pour-l-esclavage_1442820.
5. See Rosa-Salas in this volume Chapter 2.
6. See Vega-Centeno in this volume Chapter 9.
7. See Naya Jones in this volume Chapter 4.
8. See Alkayyali in this volume Chapter 6.

Rokhaya Diallo is a French journalist, author, filmmaker, and activist for racial and gender equality. She is a host on Black Entertainment Television-France and has directed several award-winning documentaries including Steps to Liberty and Networks of Hate. She has published Racism: a Guide, France Belongs to Us and How to Talk to Kids about Secularism, a graphic novel Pari(s) d'Amies, and a photo-biographical book Afro! featuring Afro-Parisians who choose natural hairstyles.

Index

G. D. Johnson et al. (eds.), *Race in the Marketplace*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11711-5