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Transcendence and Truth — A Reply

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Religion without Transcendence?

Part of the book series: Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion ((CSPR))

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Abstract

I do not want to get sidetracked by the issue of elitism, but I think it is helpful to begin with Professor Hick’s remarks on this topic.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, D. Z. Phillips, From Fantasy to Faith (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 119, 198–9. For those who reject theodicy as itself misguided. Hick’s slogan ‘No theodicy without eschatology’ (p. 48) lacks any bite.

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  2. Religious non-realists such as Feuerbach are not non-realists about everything; they are realists about whatever it is that they think religion reduces to. Reductionists are therefore those who are non-realists about whatever is reduced, but realists about what does the reducing, as Putnam has pointed out (H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 56–7). Putnam remarks that ‘[a] truly non-realist view is non-realist all the way down’, which in context suggests that non-realists are those who reduce ad infinitum. But this view, if it is coherent, is not what Hick has in mind, for the proponents of religion without transcendence adopt the naturalistic viewpoint and this presumably means that assertions about the physical universe are not reducible to assertions of some other kind.

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  3. Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966), p. 71.

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© 1997 The Claremont Graduate School

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Grover, S. (1997). Transcendence and Truth — A Reply. In: Phillips, D.Z., Tessin, T. (eds) Religion without Transcendence?. Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25915-1_5

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