Abstract
Thomas Nagel calls for philosophy to acknowledge an ‘ambition of transcendence’. It is necessary, he says, ‘to combine the recognition of our contingency, our finitude, and our containment in the world with an ambition of transcendence, however limited may be our success in attaining it. The right attitude in philosophy is to accept aims that we can achieve only fractionally and imperfectly, and cannot be sure of achieving even to that extent.’ We are called to rise above the particular, historical, cultural, and physical, ‘to reach a position as independent as possible of who we are and where we started’. The whole idea of philosophy, as Nagel understands it, is the pure desire for objectivity, the desire to transcend every ‘particular point of view and to conceive of the world as a whole’, bringing ‘one’s beliefs, one’s actions, and one’s values more under the influence of an impersonal standpoint’. Nagel evokes a Neoplatonic image of the soul ascending through celestial spheres toward the Absolute — toward a god’s-eye view from nowhere. ‘We may think of reality as a set of concentric spheres, progressively revealed as we detach gradually from the contingencies of the self.’ ‘What really happens’, Nagel thinks, ‘in the pursuit of objectivity is that a certain element of the self, the impersonal or objective self, which can escape from the specific contingencies of one’s creaturelv point of view, is allowed to predominate.
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Notes
Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 3, 5, 6, 9, 74.
Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), pp. 64, 66.
See also Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 138–40
and Nagel’s review, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), 351–60.
Parmenides, fragment 1, in K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 42.
A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956), p. 25.
For instance, Gilbert Harman, Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 114–15.
Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Pelican Freud Library, vol. 2 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 213.
See ‘Clothing the Naked Truth’, in H. Lawson and L. Appignanesi (eds), Dismantling Truth: Reality in the Post-Modern World (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989). My agreement with Rorty on this point does not, however, extend to wider agreement with his conception of knowledge; see my ‘What was Epistemology?’, in Robert Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming).
See Gilbert Ryle, ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, Collected Papers, vol. 2 (London: Hutchinson, 1971), esp. pp. 224–5
Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1962), p. 9.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 261
and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. A. Hofstadter (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 215.
On alchemy and the corpuscular philosophy of nature, see W. R. Neuman, ‘Boyle’s Debt to Corpuscular Alchemy’, in M. Hunter (ed.), Robert Boyle Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
On Newton’s alchemy, see R. S. Westfall, ‘Newton and Alchemy’, in B. Vickers (ed.), Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
‘As he [Plato] never tires of repeating, really to be is to be “its own self according to itself: auto kath auto” … there is no difference whatsoever between being and self-identity … to be is “to be the same”’ (E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952, 2nd ed.), pp. 10–15, 21). For examples, see Phaedo 78d, 100b; Parmenides 128e–129a; Timaeus 51d. I discuss this ontological conception of identity, especially as it bears on the classical Greek idea of truth, in Truth in Philosophy, Chapter 1.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), §374. I discuss Nietzsche’s philosophy of knowledge in ‘All the Daring of the Lover of Knowledge is Permitted Again’, in B. E. Babich and R. S. Cohen (eds), Nietzsche’s Epistemological Writings and the Philosophy of Science, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer, forthcoming).
Nagel, Nowhere, p. 11. On the artifactual quality of environments, see R. C. Lewontin, Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA (Toronto: Anansi, 1991), pp. 83–92.
Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 125
and Representation and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 2, 89, 93, 118–19.
Putnam, Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 246–7, 302.
Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 144; and Nowhere, p. 9.
‘The essence of truth is freedom’ (Heidegger, ‘On the Essence of Truth’, in Basic Writings, ed. D. F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 125). I elaborate on this argument about the relation between knowledge and freedom in ‘Forbidding Knowledge’, The Monist (forthcoming).
Johann Fichte, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy, ed. and trans. D. Breazeale (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 472.
Lynn White, Jr, ‘The Act of Invention’, in Machina Ex Deo: Essays in the Dynamism of Western Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968), p. 130.
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Allen, B. (1997). The Ambition of Transcendence. In: Phillips, D.Z., Tessin, T. (eds) Religion without Transcendence?. Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25915-1_2
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