FFT-Hash-II is not yet Collision-free

Serge Vaudenay

LIENS *, 45 rue d'Ulm, 75230 Paris cedex 05, France

Abstract. In this paper, we show that the FFT-Hash function proposed by Schnorr [2] is not collision free. Finding a collision requires about 2^{24} computation of the basic function of FFT. This can be done in few hours on a SUN4-workstation. In fact, it is at most as strong as a one-way hash function which returns a 48 bits length value. Thus, we can invert the proposed *FFT* hash-function with 2^{40} basic computations. Some simple improvements of the FFT hash function are also proposed to try to get rid of the weaknesses of FFT.

History

The first version of FFT-Hashing was proposed by Schnorr during the rump session of Crypto'91 [1]. This function has been shown not to be collision free at Eurocrypt'92 [3]. An improvement of the function has been proposed the same day [2] without the weaknesses discovered. However, FFT-Hashing has still some other weaknesses as it is proved in this paper.

1 FFT-Hash-II, Notations

The FFT-hash function is built on a basic function $\langle . \rangle$ which takes one 128bits long hash block H and one 128-bits long message block M, and return a 128-bits long hash block $\langle H, M \rangle$. The hash value of n message blocks M_1, \ldots, M_n is $\langle \ldots \rangle \langle H_0, M_1 \rangle, M_2 \rangle, \ldots, M_n \rangle$ where H_0 is a constant given in hexadecimal by :

 $H_0 = 0123\ 4567\ 89ab\ cdef\ fedc\ ba98\ 7654\ 3210$

The basic function is defined by two one-to-one functions Rec and FT2 on the set $(GF_p)^{16}$ where $p = 2^{16}+1$. The concatenation HM defines 16 16-bits numbers which represents 16 numbers in GF_p between 0 and p-2. (RecoFT2oRec)(HM) defines 16 numbers of GF_p . The last 8 numbers taken modulo 2^{16} are the result < H, M >.

^{*} The Laboratoire d'Informatique de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure is a research group affiliated with the CNRS

E.F. Brickell (Ed.): Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '92, LNCS 740, pp. 587-593, 1993. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1993

We define the following notations :

$$A(M) = H_0M$$

$$B(M) = \operatorname{Rec}(A(M))$$

$$C(M) = \operatorname{FT2}(B(M))$$

$$D(M) = \operatorname{Rec}(C(M))$$

588

So, $\langle H_0, M \rangle$ is the last 8 numbers of D(M) taken modulo 2^{16} . We define X_i the *i*-th number of X (from 0 to 15), and X[i, j] the list of the *i*-th to the *j*-th number of X.

If $x_i \in GF_p$, i = 0, ..., 15, we define $y_{-3} = x_{13}$, $y_{-2} = x_{14}$, and $y_{-1} = x_{15}$. Then, following Schnorr :

$$y_i = x_i + y_{i-1}^* y_{i-2}^* + y_{i-3} + 2^i \tag{1}$$

where $y^* = 1$ if y = 0 and $y^* = y$ otherwise. Then, we let :

$$\operatorname{Rec}(x_0,\ldots,x_{15})=y_0,\ldots,y_{15}$$

If $x_i \in GF_p$, $i = 0, \ldots, 7$, we define :

$$y_j = \sum_{i=0}^7 \omega^{ij} x_i$$

where $\omega = 2^4$. Then, we define $FT(x_0, \ldots, x_7) = y_0, \ldots, y_7$.

If $x_i \in GF_p$, i = 0, ..., 15, we define $y_0, y_2, ..., y_{14} = FT(x_0, x_2, ..., x_{14})$ and $y_1, y_3, ..., y_{15} = FT(x_1, x_3, ..., x_{15})$. Then, we define $FT2(x_0, ..., x_{15}) = y_0, ..., y_{15}$.

2 Basic Remarks

If we want to find a collision to the hash function, we may look for a pair (x, x') of two 128-bits strings such that $\langle H_0, x \rangle = \langle H_0, x' \rangle$. In fact, we will look for x and x' such that D(x)[8, 15] = D(x')[8, 15].

First, we notice that we have necessarily C(x)[11, 15] = C(x')[11, 15]. In one direction, we show that $C(x)_i = C(x')_i$ for i = 11, ..., 15. This is due to the equation :

$$C_i = D_i - D_{i-1}^* D_{i-2}^* - D_{i-3} - 2^i$$

Conversely, if we have both C(x)[11, 15] = C(x')[11, 15] and D(x)[8, 10] = D(x')[8, 10], then we have D(x)[8, 15] = D(x')[8, 15].

Moreover, we notice on the equation 1 that B(x)[0,7] is a function of x[5,7] only. Let us denote :

$$B(x)[0,7] = g(x[5,7])$$

Finally, we notice that FT2 is a linear function.

3 Breaking FFT

3.1 Outlines

If we get a set of 3.2^{24} strings x such that C(x)[11, 15] is a particular string R chosen arbitrarily², we will have a collision on D(x)[8, 10] with probability 99% thanks to the birthday paradox. We will describe an algorithm which gives some x with the definitively chosen R for any x[5, 7] = abc.

Given abc = x[5,7], we can compute B(x)[0,7] = g(abc). If we denote y = B(x)[8,15], the following equation is a linear equation in y;

$$FT2(g(abc)y)[11, 15] = R$$
(2)

We can define a function ϕ_R and three vectors U_e , U_o , U'_e such that :

$$(2) \Longleftrightarrow \exists \lambda, \lambda', \mu \quad y = \phi_R(abc) + \lambda U_e + \lambda' U'_e + \mu U_o$$

(see section 3.2).

Finally, the system :

$$\begin{cases} x[5,7] = abc\\ C(x)[11,15] = R \end{cases}$$

is equivalent to the system :

 $\begin{cases} x[5,7] = abc \\ y = \phi_R(abc) + \lambda U_e + \lambda' U'_e + \mu U_o \\ H_0 x = \operatorname{Rec}^{-1}(g(abc)y) \end{cases}$

Which is equivalent to :

$$\begin{cases} y = \phi_R(abc) + \lambda U_e + \lambda' U'_e + \mu U_e \\ y_{13} = a + y_{12}^* y_{11}^* + y_{10} + 2^{13} \\ y_{14} = b + y_{13}^* y_{12}^* + y_{11} + 2^{14} \\ y_{15} = c + y_{14}^* y_{13}^* + y_{12} + 2^{15} \\ x[5,7] = abc \\ x[0,4] = \operatorname{Rec}^{-1}(g(abc)y)[8,12] \end{cases}$$
(3)

Is we substitute y by the expression of the first equation in the other equations, we obtain a system of three equations of three unknown λ , λ' , μ . This system can be shown linear in λ and λ' by a good choice of U_e , U_o and U'_e . Then, this system can have some solutions only if the determinant, which is a degree 2 polynomial in μ is 0. This can gives some μ . Then, the number of (λ, λ') is almost always unique. For more details, see section 3.3.

Finally, this gives 0 or 2 solutions x, with an average number of 1 for a given abc. If we try $1 \le a < p$, $1 \le b \le 768$ and c = 2, we have 3.2^{24} abc.

² For the collisions found in this paper, R is the image of my phone number by FT2.

3.2 Solving (2)

The function $X \mapsto FT2(X)[11, 15]$ is linear, and has a kernel of dimension 3. If we define :

$$U = (0, 0, 0, 0, 4081, 256, 1, 61681)$$

$$U' = (0, 0, 0, 0, 65521, 4352, 1, 0)$$

we notice that :

$$FT(U) = (482, 56863, 8160, 57887, 7682, 0, 0, 0)$$

$$FT(U') = (4337, 61202, 65503, 544, 61170, 3855, 0, 0)$$

Let us introduce the following notation :

$$(x_0,\ldots,x_7) \times (y_0,\ldots,y_7) = (x_0,y_0,\ldots,x_7,y_7)$$

We have $FT2(X \times Y) = FT(X) \times FT(Y)$. Thus, we can can define :

$$U_e = U \times 0$$
$$U_o = 0 \times U$$
$$U'_e = U' \times 0$$

So, we have :

$$U_{e} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4081, 0, 256, 0, 1, 0, 61681, 0)$$

$$U_{o} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4081, 0, 256, 0, 1, 0, 61681)$$

$$U'_{e} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 65521, 0, 4352, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0)$$

These vectors are a base of the kernel of $X \longrightarrow FT2(X)[11, 15]$.

If M denotes the matrix of FT, we can write it using four 4×4 blocks :

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} M_{11} & M_{12} \\ M_{21} & M_{22} \end{pmatrix}$$

If x and y are two vectors of 4 elements, we have :

$$FT(xy)[4,7] = 0 \iff y = -M_{22}^{-1}M_{21}x$$

Let us define :

$$N = -M_{22}^{-1}M_{21} = \begin{pmatrix} 65281 & 4335 & 289 & 61170 \\ 3823 & 8992 & 53012 & 65248 \\ 8447 & 61748 & 56545 & 4335 \\ 4369 & 57090 & 3823 & 256 \end{pmatrix}$$

Now, if x and y are two vectors of 8 elements, we have :

$$FT2(xy)[8,15] = 0 \iff y = Nx^0 \times Nx^1$$

Where $x = x^0 \times x^1$. Let us define :

$$\phi_R(abc) = 0(Nx^0 \times Nx^1 + y^0)$$

where $g(abc) = x^0 \times x^1$ and $R = FT2(0y^0)[11, 15]$ for an arbitrary y^0 (one's phone number for instance). Then, $\phi_R(abc)$ is a vector which begins by g(abc), and such that $FT2(\phi_R(abc))$ ends by a constant vector R.

So, we have :

(2)
$$\iff \exists \lambda, \lambda', \mu \quad y = \phi_R(abc) + \lambda U_e + \lambda' U'_e + \mu U_o$$

3.3 Solving (3)

If we hope that no y_i (i = 11, 12, 13, 14) is equal to 0 (we may ultimately test this condition, and forget the solutions y which do not pass this test, but this will be very rare), the system :

$$\begin{cases} y = \phi_R(abc) + \lambda U_e + \lambda' U'_e + \mu U_o \\ y_{13} = a + y_{12}^* y_{11}^* + y_{10} + 2^{13} \\ y_{14} = b + y_{13}^* y_{12}^* + y_{11} + 2^{14} \\ y_{15} = c + y_{14}^* y_{13}^* + y_{12} + 2^{15} \\ x[5,7] = abc \\ x[0,4] = \operatorname{Rec}^{-1}(g(abc)y)[8,12] \end{cases}$$

imply :

$$z_{13} + \mu = a + (z_{12} + \lambda + \lambda')(z_{11} + 256\mu) + z_{10} + 256\lambda + 4352\lambda' + 2^{13}$$

$$z_{14} + 61681\lambda = b + (z_{13} + \mu)(z_{12} + \lambda + \lambda') + (z_{11} + 256\mu) + 2^{14}$$

$$z_{15} + 61681\mu = c + (z_{14} + 61681\lambda)(z_{13} + \mu) + (z_{12} + \lambda + \lambda') + 2^{15}$$

where $z = \phi_R(abc)$. If we define :

$$a' = a + z_{12}z_{11} + z_{10} + 2^{13} - z_{13}$$

$$b' = b + z_{13}z_{12} + z_{11} + 2^{14} - z_{14}$$

$$c' = c + z_{14}z_{13} + z_{12} + 2^{15} - z_{15}$$

we have :

$$\begin{pmatrix} z_{11} + 256\mu + 256 & z_{11} + 256\mu + 4352 & a' - (1 - 256z_{12})\mu \\ z_{13} + \mu - 61681 & z_{13} + \mu & b' + (256 + z_{12})\mu \\ 61681 (z_{13} + \mu) + 1 & 1 & c' - (61681 - z_{14})\mu \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \lambda \\ \lambda' \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} = 0$$

This is a linear system of unknown λ and λ' . If this system has an equation, which determinant has to be 0.

3.4 Discussion

This condition may be sufficient in most of the cases. The determinant should be a degree 3 polynomial. However, the coefficient of μ^3 is the determinant of the following matrix :

$$\begin{pmatrix} 256 & 256 & (1-256z_{12}) \\ 1 & 1 & -(256+z_{12}) \\ 61681 & 0 & (61681-z_{14}) \end{pmatrix}$$

which is 0 since the first line is 256 time the second.

The coefficient of μ^2 is 0 with probability 1/p, this is rare. In this case, we have one solution if the equation has a degree one, and zero or p solutions in the other cases.

 μ has to satisfy a degree 2 equation. If the discriminant is different from 0, it has a square root with probability 50%. So, we have two different μ or no solution with probability 50%, and a single solution with probability 1/p.

For each μ , we are likely to have a uniq solution (λ, λ') . However, it is possible to have 0 or p solutions, but it is rare. So, for each solution (λ, λ', μ) , we can compute y in the system (3), then x. Finally, we have zero or two solutions x in almost all cases.

3.5 Reduction of the Function FFT

To sum up, we have a function f_R such that for a given abc:

$$f_R(abc) = \{D(x)[8, 10]; x[5, 7] = abc \land C(x)[11, 15] = R\}$$

 $f_R(abc)$ is a list of 0 or 2 D(x)[8, 10] for each x such that x[5, 7] = abc and C(x)[11, 15] = R. The average of number of x is 1, so f_R is almost a function.

The function f_R is a kind of reduction of FFT since a collision for f_R gives a collision for FFT. We can use the birthday paradox with f_R to get some collision. The expected complexity is $O(2^{24})$.

We can invert FFT with f_R to. If we are looking for x such that D(x)[8, 15] = z, we can compute $R = \text{Rec}^{-1}(z)[11, 15]$ and look for *abc* such that $f_R(abc) = z[0, 2]$. The complexity is 2^{48} . Then, we get the x required.

4 Finding Collisions with the Birthday Paradox

If we suppose that f_R is like a real random function, the probability that a set $\{f_R(x_i)\}$ for k different x_i have k elements is next to :

 $e^{-\frac{k^2}{2n}}$

where n is the cardinality of the image of f_R , when k is next to \sqrt{n} . So, with $n = 2^{48}$ and $k = 3.2^{24}$, the probability is 1%.

Two collisions have been found in 24 hours by a SUN4 workstation with $k = 3.2^{24}$ different x. With the choice :

 $R = 5726 \ 17 fc \ b115 \ c5c0 \ a631$

We got :

$$FFT(17b3\ 2755\ 4e52\ b915\ 2218\ 1948\ 00a8\ 0002) = \\FFT(9c70\ 504e\ 834c\ b15c\ f404\ 94e2\ 02a7\ 0002) = \\0851\ 393d\ 37c9\ 66e3\ d809\ d806\ 5e8c\ 05b8$$

and :

$$FFT(8ccc \ 23a4 \ 086d \ fbb9 \ 85f4 \ 70b2 \ 029e \ 0002) = FFT(9d53 \ 45ae \ 3286 \ ada7 \ 8c77 \ 9877 \ 02b4 \ 0002) = 10e5 \ 49f5 \ 9df0 \ d91b \ 0450 \ afcc \ fba4 \ 2063$$

Conclusion

The main weakness of FFT-Hash-II are described in section 2. First, the beginning of the computation depends on too few information of the input : B(x)[0,7]is a function of x[5,7]. Second, the output allows to compute too much information of the computations in FFT : D(x)[8,15] allows to compute C(x)[11,15]. The connection between B(x) and C(x) is linear, this makes our attack possible.

To get rid of the first weakness, we might mix H_0 and x in A(x) before applying Rec. Similarly, the result of $\langle H_0, x \rangle$ should be the set of $D(x)_{2i+1}$ instead of the right side.

Acknowledgment

I am happy to thank JEAN-MARC COUVEIGNES, ANTOINE JOUX, ADI SHAMIR and JACQUES STERN from the *Groupe de Recherche en Complexité et Cryptographie* for any advices. I owe a lot of time to JACQUES BEIGBEDER. RONAN KERYELL and all the *Service des Prestations Informatiques* for hardware and software advices. Finally, I should thank *France Telecom* to have given to me a phone number which hid so many collisions.

References

- 1. C. P. Schnorr. FFT-Hashing : An Efficient Cryptographic Hash Function. Presented at the rump session of the CRYPTO'91 Conference (unpublished)
- 2. C. P. Schnorr. FFT-Hash II, Efficient Cryptographic Hashing. Presented at the EUROCRYPT'92 Conference (unpublished)
- 3. T. Baritaud, H. Gilbert, M. Girault. FFT Hashing is not Collision-free. Presented at the EUROCRYPT'92 Conference (unpublished)