Abstract
The paper analyzes the interaction between the domestic and foreign capital allocation of a multinational firm, and market transparency in the foreign country. Foreign capital investment is risky because of uncertainties about the host country’s institutions and market conditions. We model transparency through a publicly observable signal that provides information about the quality of institutions and market conditions in the foreign country. Under higher transparency, the public signal conveys more precise information. It is shown that higher transparency leads to more dispersion of conditionally expected foreign country risks as they become more sensitive to the realization of the public signal. We characterize conditions under which more transparency encourages or discourages foreign investment. Regardless of the volume of capital flows, the ex-ante expected total cash flow of the firm always increases with more transparency .
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We would like to thank our referees for very helpfull comments and suggestions.
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In memory to Monika Medick- Krakau
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Broll, U., Eckwert, B. & Wong, K.K.P. Market transparency and international allocation of capital. Asia-Pac J Reg Sci 3, 421–429 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41685-018-0101-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41685-018-0101-5