Skip to main content

An optimised linear attack on pseudorandom generators using a non-linear combiner

  • Cryptanalysis
  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Information Security (ISW 1997)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1396))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 302 Accesses

Abstract

We propose an optimised linear attack on pseudorandom generators using a nonlinear combiner. The generators consist of a number of Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) and a non linear function f (·). We derive an attacking equation (AEQ) using a linear approximation of f(·) and the, generator polynomials of LFSRs. In the AEQ we focus on the initial value of one LFSR in the generator by eliminating the initial values of the other LFSRs using the elimination polynomial. The performance of the attack depends on the number of terms in the polynomial. We propose an optimised algorithm for an ellicient elimination polynomial. Using this attack we can determine the initial value of the LFSR from the tapped bits whose number is much smaller than the period of the pseudorandom generator.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Ding: “The Differential Cryptanalysis and Design of Natural Stream Ciphers”, LNCS vol.809, pp.101–115, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1991

    Google Scholar 

  2. Golić: “Linear Cryptanalysis of Stream Ciphers”, LNCS vol.1008, pp.154–169, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1995

    Google Scholar 

  3. Matsuzaki, Ohmori, Tatebayashi: “A Study on Stream Ciphers suitable for Conditional Access to Digital Broadcasting System”, ISEC95-6

    Google Scholar 

  4. Mohri,Morii: “A Probabilistic Algorithm for Minimum Distance of Cyclic Codes”,SITA96

    Google Scholar 

  5. Matsui: “Linear Cryptanalysis of DES Cipher (I)”, SCIS93-3C

    Google Scholar 

  6. Moriyasu, Morii, Kasahara: “Nonlinear Pseudo-Random Sequence Generator with Dynamic Structure and Its Properties”, ISEC93-7

    Google Scholar 

  7. Ruppel: “Correlation Immunity and the Summation Generator”, LNCS vol.218, Springer Verlag

    Google Scholar 

  8. Rueppel: “Design and Analysis of Stream Ciphers”, Springer Verlag

    Google Scholar 

  9. Shiraishi, Morii: “Some notes on the Non-linear Combiner Generator and that against a Linear Attack”, ISEC96-3

    Google Scholar 

  10. Siegenthaler: “Decrypting a Class of Ciphers using Ciphertext only”, IEEE C-34, pp.81–85, Jan.1985

    Google Scholar 

  11. Schneiner: “APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY”, WILEY

    Google Scholar 

  12. Tanaka, Kaneko: “A Linear Attack to the Random Generator by Non Linear Combiner”, The Transaction of the Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers, vol.J79, A, No.8, pp.1360–1368, 1996

    Google Scholar 

  13. Tanaka, Kaneko: “A Linear Attack to the Random Generator by Non Linear Combiner”, ISITA96

    Google Scholar 

  14. Tanaka, Kaneko: “A Study on a Quadratic Approximation Attack to the Reformed Dynamic Random Generator”, ISEC96-44

    Google Scholar 

  15. Zeng, Huang: “On the Linear Syndrome Method in Cryptanalysis”, LNCS vol.403, pp.469–478, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1988

    Google Scholar 

  16. Zeng, Yang, Rao: “On the linear consistency test in cryptanalysis and its applications”, LNCS vol.435, pp.164–174, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1989

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Eiji Okamoto George Davida Masahiro Mambo

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1998 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Tanaka, H., Ohishi, T., Kaneko, T. (1998). An optimised linear attack on pseudorandom generators using a non-linear combiner. In: Okamoto, E., Davida, G., Mambo, M. (eds) Information Security. ISW 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1396. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0030407

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0030407

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-64382-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69767-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics