Abstract
This chapter defines behavioral economics as “the study of economics which does not rely on the assumption of the rational, selfish economic man.” It also gives some examples of experimental studies in behavioral economics.
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28 July 2019
The original version of the book was revised: Author’s belated corrections have been incorporated.
Notes
- 1.
In this book traditional economics includes neoclassical economics, new Keynesian economics, and traditional game theory. An example of studies that can be categorized both in behavioral and tradtional economics are those for outcome-based social preferences as explained in Chap. 8.
- 2.
For the principles and methodology behind both behavioral and traditional economic experiments, see Davis and Holt (1993).
- 3.
“Economic man” is a traditional technical term even though it is not politically correct.
- 4.
Stable preferences mean either preferences that do not change, or preferences whose preference shocks are stationary in the case that they do fluctuate. Stationarity means that their joint probability distributions do not change over time.
- 5.
see Chap. 10 for various concepts of subjective well-being and happiness.
- 6.
We call the goods “normal goods” when people’s income increases and so does consumption. Most of goods are normal goods.
- 7.
Chapter 4 will explain Plott and Zeiler’s experiments and experiments that were motivated by them, as well as a theoretical hypothesis that potentially explains these results.
- 8.
This test question is from Adams (2012).
- 9.
In this book, we do not consider mixed strategies.
References
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Appendix: Nash Equilibrium
Appendix: Nash Equilibrium
This Appendix gives a definition of Nash equilibrium for pure strategies (see, e.g., Tadelis 2013 for more details).Footnote 9 Consider a game in which there are n players, and let the set of players be \(N = \left\{ {1,2, \ldots ,n} \right\}\). Let Si denote the set of all possible strategies \(s_{i}\) of player \(i\) and \(u_{i} \left( {s_{i} ,s_{ - i} } \right)\) denote the utility function when player \(i\) chooses strategy \(s_{i}\), when the other players choose strategies \(s_{ - i} = \left( {s_{1} , \ldots ,{\text{s}}_{i} - 1,s_{i} + 1, \ldots ,s_{i} } \right)\) (here, \(j = 1, \ldots ,n\) and \(s_{j} \in S_{j}\) For a pair of pure strategies, \((s_{i} , s_{ - i} )\), if for other players’ strategies \(s_{ - i}\),
hold for all \(t \in S_{i}\), we call this strategy si a best response to \(s_{ - i}\).
Here, when the pair of strategies \(\left( {s_{i} , s_{ - i} } \right)\) satisfy (1.A1) for all t∊Si and i∊N, we call it a Nash equilibrium. In other words, Nash equilibrium is the strategy pair in which each player is choosing a best response to the strategies of all other players.
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Ogaki, M., Tanaka, S.C. (2017). What Is Behavioral Economics?. In: Behavioral Economics. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6439-5_1
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