Abstract
This chapter examines the current targeting process. It begins by defining targeting as the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. The essential elements of targeting are highlighted: a process orientation, awareness of one’s own capabilities, and, perhaps most significantly, a linkage to a specific requirement. It then defines what the targeting process is not: arbitrary, fixated on the impossible or random. Next, this chapter lays out the targeting process by examining the US and NATO deliberate processes, along with their identical F2T2EA (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess) dynamic process. The author describes a targeting process that encompasses four steps: (1) objectives and guidance; (2) planning; (3) execution; and (4) assessment. This chapter identifies six dynamics that inform and influence the current targeting process: (1) tension between the art and science of targeting; (2) equal demands to both speed up and slow down the targeting cycle; (3) high demand for precision; (4) avoidance or at least mitigation of collateral damage; (5) non-lethal capabilities, increasingly relevant in today’s targeting; and (6) cognitive approach as the bedrock targeting principle. The author concludes by examining the future of the targeting process through the lens of robotics. As Artificial Intelligence increases, precision becomes more exact, the need for human beings in the loop lessen and greater isolation occurs from actual combat on the ground. These are unnerving possibilities that could impact targeting dynamics. For now, targeting remains focused on influence and coercion, leading one to the inescapable conclusion that targeting is a human activity. And this human activity, undertaken by humans and focused on other humans, drives the current targeting process.
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Notes
- 1.
JCS, Joint Pub 3-60 2013, p. I-1. NATO, AJP-3.9 2008, p. 1–1.
- 2.
JCS, Joint Pub 3-60 2013, p. II-1 and NATO, AJP-3.9 2008, pp. 1–2.
- 3.
JCS, Joint Pub 1-02 2013, p. 84 and NATO, AJP-3.9 2008, pp. 1–2.
- 4.
AJP-3.9 2008 describes this process as the “Time Sensitive Targeting” Process; for the sake of brevity, the author will refer to this as dynamic targeting. Within the US military and NATO, professionals often use the terms “Time Sensitive Targeting” and “Dynamic Targeting” interchangeably.
- 5.
JCS, Joint Pub 3-60 2013, pp. II-21–22, NATO, AJP-3.9 2008, p. A-5.
- 6.
Mann 1985, p. 87. Also, the author uses the dates of 17 January 1991–28 February 1991, specifically the time period of the Desert Strom operation to arrive at 42 days. Many consider the start date as 2 August 1990, the day Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the start of Operation Desert Shield. But targeting execution did not start in earnest until Desert Storm, so 17 January 1991, in the author’s estimation, is the most accurate way to measure the time dimension of this operation.
- 7.
Priest 2003, p. 54 and DoD 2000, p. 127. Although the Department of Defense presented a very favourable picture of the operation in this report, there are several areas where it identifies problems and challenges at the political-military strategic level.
- 8.
This comment is based on the author’s 17 years of targeting experience, including involvement in nine major contingency or deliberate targeting planning efforts and dozens of smaller efforts in seven different combatant commands. In every single effort, more time to plan was viewed by the author and other targeting professionals as highly desirable.
- 9.
Joffe 2003.
- 10.
Clark 2001, pp. 265, 406.
- 11.
The author was the Commander at the Air Force Targeting Center (AFTC) at the time. The AFTC had approximately 120 personnel involved, including several individuals deployed at Ramstein Air Base, the home of the Air and Space Operations Center which executed the air operation.
- 12.
Major General Margaret Woodward, the 17th Air Force Commander, in Fontaine 2011. Also, Woodward acknowledged the central targeting role of the AFTC to several of its members who were deployed to Ramstein Air Base, Germany, during Odyssey Dawn.
- 13.
Myers 2000.
- 14.
Observations from the author’s experience.
- 15.
This is a key element of “Karzai’s Twelve ,” the nickname given to a dozen restrictions on NATO operations in Afghanistan required by Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, as presented in Chivers 2011.
- 16.
Chivers 2011.
- 17.
This is based on the feedback received by the author as Commander of the Air Force Targeting Center from senior officers at 17th and 3rd Air Forces, along with the Joint Staff, after Odyssey Dawn concluded. The AFTC was extensively involved with the combat assessment effort (see note 11). In fact, one of its members actually wrote the Combat Assessment plan.
- 18.
These dynamics are derived from a combination of sources. Some sources are classified, the details of which cannot be identified or cited here. Other sources can be seen in the respective dynamic’s section which follows. The foremost source of these dynamics is the author himself, drawing on his experience and his professional discussions with other subject matter experts.
- 19.
JCS, JP 1-02 2013, p. 194.
- 20.
- 21.
Operation New Dawn was the name of the operation in Iraq starting on 1 September 2010. Operation Iraqi Freedom officially concluded on 31 August 2010.
- 22.
Not on the table (Fig. 4.2) is the use of PGMs in the continued operations of Enduring Freedom (after major combat operations concluded, 2002-present) and Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn (after major combat operations concluded, 2003–2011). The author was unable to obtain that number. However, based on his two deployments and service in United States Air Forces Central Command in which he either participated in the planning or was aware of literally hundreds of munition releases from 2004–2013, the author estimates a nearly 100 % use of PGMs. Indeed, he cannot recall a single use of a non-PGM.
- 23.
Circular Error Probable (CEP) is defined as the radius of a circle, centered about the mean, whose boundary is expected to include the landing points of 50 % of the rounds. It’s not exactly an average, but rather a predictive tool for military planners based on empirical evidence and testing of the weapon.
- 24.
JCS, JP 1-02 2013 p. 81.
- 25.
Clark 2001, pp. 296–297.
- 26.
Powers 2013.
- 27.
Doswald-Beck and Henckaerts 2005, p. 46 (rule 14).
- 28.
JCS, JP 3-0 2011, p. III-27. See Chap. 10, by Ducheine in this volume.
- 29.
Apps 2012.
- 30.
JCS, JP 3-0 2011 pp. III-26-27.
- 31.
JCS, JP 3-0 2011 p. III-26.
- 32.
JCS, JP 3-0 2011 p. III-27.
- 33.
JCS, JP 3-0 2011 p. III-27.
- 34.
Personal interview with J. Glock 8 November 2013.
- 35.
Oxford Dictionaries 2013.
- 36.
Singer 2009, p. 67.
- 37.
Blackmore 2005, p. 9.
- 38.
Singer 2009, p. 432.
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Pratzner, P.R. (2016). The Current Targeting Process. In: Ducheine, P., Schmitt, M., Osinga, F. (eds) Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-072-5_4
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