Abstract
Through the prism of the experience of air warfare, this chapter identifies key factors that have shaped targeting. These include technological developments, organizational structures, and processes and inter-service competition for scarce resources. Moreover, targeting is informed by perspectives on the nature of the political mandate and objectives, by the type of war, by intelligence on the nature of the opponent, and by assumptions that are derived from experience, doctrine, or strategic theory. It is, of course, shaped by societal norms. Targeting’s evolutionary process is one of solving technical and informational obstacles to finding and hitting targets. It is characterized by a trend in increased munitions accuracy and pinpoint attack capability against objects of an ever-decreasing physical signature in ever-shortening response times, and, if necessary, from ever-increasing distances from the target. The evolution is also a story of constant organizational learning, rediscovery, and theorizing about and experimenting with new targeting planning tools and processes. Moreover, there is a constantly swinging pendulum between the poles of centralized and decentralized control, with a strong tendency toward stringent political oversight. Finally, norms play an increasing role. As this chapter will argue, contemporary targeting challenges emanate from a paradox—as targeting accuracy has reached an unprecedented level, so too has the societal demand for risk-mitigation, precisely because of demonstrated targeting capabilities.
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Notes
- 1.
For a full definition, see Allied Joint Doctrine For Joint Targeting AJP-3.9, 2008, p. 1.
- 2.
As targeting doctrine in the West is heavily shaped by American experiences and capabilities, and as these are thoroughly documented, this chapter leans heavily on American case studies.
- 3.
- 4.
This very brief description does not do justice to the work of these theorists. For outstanding discussions of air power theory development during the interbellum see, for instance, McIsaac 1986; Meilinger 1997, in particular Chaps. 1–6; Biddle 2003b; Overy’s excellent 2013 tome The Bombing War, Europe 1939–1945 (Overy 2013), in particular Chap. 1; and Faber 2015.
- 5.
- 6.
See Overy 1998, pp. 11–17, 72–73.
- 7.
For an excellent concise overview of the development of norm in air warfare until 1945, see Biddle 1994, pp. 140–159.
- 8.
Reynolds 2005, p. 10.
- 9.
Thomas 2001, p. 125. This section merely touches upon the question whether norms influenced targeting. The debate on the morality of the bombing campaigns at the time, and the previous decades, merits greater attention than is possible in this chapter.
- 10.
For the development of the CBO, see Overy 2013, in particular Chap. 6.
- 11.
- 12.
Overy 2013, p. 611.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
Overy 2013, pp. 305–308.
- 16.
The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (European War) (Pacific War) 1987, pp. 39 and 117.
- 17.
See Thomas 2001, pp. 136–146.
- 18.
- 19.
On command problems, see in particular Winnefeld and Johnson 1993: The Renewed Clash of Service Air Command and Control Doctrines.
- 20.
- 21.
Meilinger 2007, p. 161. A total of 320,000 interdiction sorties were flown by the services combined, destroying or damaging a total of 5,087 bridges, 2,345 locomotives, 41,882 rail cars and 111,623 vehicles.
- 22.
Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, p. 53.
- 23.
Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, p. 53.
- 24.
Thomas 2001, pp. 150–151.
- 25.
In 1972, each offensive sortie during the Linebacker campaign required four EW sorties in protective support. Allocation and prioritization became acute issues.
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
Thomas 2001, p. 152.
- 29.
See Hone 1998, pp. 500–501.
- 30.
Thomas 2001, pp. 155–158.
- 31.
See, e.g., Citino 2004, Chaps. 7 and 8.
- 32.
- 33.
Hallion 1992, p. 205.
- 34.
Titus 1996, p. 19.
- 35.
Cohen 1996, p. 44.
- 36.
Hallion 1992, pp. 121–123.
- 37.
For a good discussion of this distinction, see Hosmer 1996, Chap. 10.
- 38.
- 39.
For a balanced account of the strategic air offensive against Iraq, see Davis 1998.
- 40.
Instant Thunder was designed to offer a strategic offensive retaliation option for the Joint Force Commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf , in the event Iraq decided to strike into Saudi Arabia while US troops were still in the build-up phase.
- 41.
- 42.
Source: Desert Storm Target Sets (030226-D-9085 M-006), at http://www.defense.gov/news/briefingslide.aspx?briefingslideid=110.
- 43.
For a concise focused discussion of the command arrangements, see in particular Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, Chap. 8.
- 44.
Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, p. 107.
- 45.
Davis 1998, p. 554.
- 46.
Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, p. 136.
- 47.
Davis 1998, pp. 556–557.
- 48.
Thomas 2001, p. 159.
- 49.
- 50.
- 51.
See, e.g., Mueller 1998, pp. 182–228.
- 52.
- 53.
- 54.
- 55.
See Owen 2010. A total of 293 aircraft flew 3,515 sorties in two weeks to deter Serb aggression. Compared to Desert Storm, the percentage of PGMs used was much greater, totaling 98 percent of US and 28 percent of non-US ordnance delivered.
- 56.
- 57.
McInnes 2002, p. 92. To appreciate this accomplishment, two decades earlier, the United States lost sixteen B-52 bombers in just 11 days during the Linebacker II campaign against North Vietnam.
- 58.
- 59.
- 60.
Lambeth 2001, p. 195.
- 61.
Lambeth 2001, pp. 133–134.
- 62.
U.S. Department of Defense 2000.
- 63.
Kometer 2007, pp. 160–164.
- 64.
Lambeth 2001, p. 212.
- 65.
Around 2,500 sorties were tasked with Scud hunting, with 1,500 strikes against Scud-related sites or production facilities. There was not one confirmed Scud destroyed.The time between target detection and that information reaching a pilot was up to fourteen hours.
- 66.
Lambeth 2001, p. 206.
- 67.
For an enlightening study of accidents in recent wars, see Larson and Savych 2006. See Chap. 3 for the key ‘misfortunes’ during Allied Force.
- 68.
See Posen 2000, pp. 39–84.
- 69.
See Larson and Savych 2006, pp. 43–57 for the Al Firdos incident during Desert Storm. The Al Firdos accident that killed two to three hundred civilians highlighted the increasing aversion for civilian casualties and the dramatically strengthened bombing norm. The target was a functioning C2 bunker in Baghdad, and thus a legitimate military target; however, unbeknownst to US planners, it was also used during nighttime as a bomb shelter for Ba’ath party family members. Precisely because it was located in an urban area, the planners had decided to attack it at night when the risk of civilians nearby was low. Exploited by Saddam Hussain in the media, it was a moral, political and strategic crisis because it threatened the stability of the coalition and international support. The result was that Chairman of the JCS, General Colin Powell, put Baghdad off limits for further strategic attacks.
- 70.
Thomas 2001, p. 164.
- 71.
- 72.
Ignatieff 2002.
- 73.
- 74.
- 75.
Gat 2001, p. 86.
- 76.
Eventually, these became a category of so called time-critical targets. The 2001 US Joint Pub 3–60 Joint Doctrine for Targeting defined time-sensitive targets as “air-, land- or sea-based targets of such high priority to the friendly force that the JFC designates them as requiring immediate response because they pose (or will pose) a danger to friendly forces or because they are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.”
- 77.
- 78.
- 79.
Lambeth 2005, pp. 247–252. This book is the most detailed open source study of the campaign.
- 80.
Lambeth 2005, p. 260.
- 81.
Fyfe 2005, p. 11.
- 82.
For this argument, see in particular Biddle 2003a, pp. 31–46.
- 83.
Kometer 2007, pp. 129–137.
- 84.
Lambeth 2005, p. 254. See 254–258 for a detailed description of the linking of various platforms.
- 85.
- 86.
- 87.
Kometer 2007, p. 203.
- 88.
US Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting, 22 March 2002.
- 89.
Fyfe 2005, pp. 18–19.
- 90.
Lambeth 2013, p. 33. This is the most detailed study as far as targeting and command and control is concerned.
- 91.
Lambeth 2013, p. 35. See the entire Chap. 1 for a detailed overview of the joint planning process.
- 92.
Kometer 2007, p. 204.
- 93.
Fyfe 2005, p. 21.
- 94.
Lambeth 2013, p. 203.
- 95.
See Lambeth 2013, Chap. 4 for key accomplishments.
- 96.
- 97.
- 98.
The literature on so called drone warfare is extensive. For a representative overview, see Osinga 2013.
- 99.
See in particular Rid and Hecker 2009, for a detailed account of the use of social media by insurgents groups.
- 100.
See Dunlap 2009, pp. 34–39.
- 101.
- 102.
- 103.
Hamas likewise has exploited the protected status of mosques, schools and civilians homes to hide weapons caches. See Erlanger 2009.
- 104.
- 105.
As quoted in Crawford 2013, p. 19.
- 106.
- 107.
- 108.
Miller 2011.
- 109.
U.N. Human Rights Council 2013a.
- 110.
- 111.
- 112.
U.N. Human Rights Council 2013c, p. 23.
- 113.
Statement in Kellenberger 2011.
- 114.
Baker 2013.
- 115.
Thomas 2001, pp. 162–164.
- 116.
Isscharoff and Pildest 2013, pp. 1522–1523.
- 117.
Coker 2002, pp. 2–5.
- 118.
Coker 2002, p. 13.
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Osinga, F.P.B., Roorda, M.P. (2016). From Douhet to Drones, Air Warfare, and the Evolution of Targeting. In: Ducheine, P., Schmitt, M., Osinga, F. (eds) Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-072-5_3
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