Structural Reasons in Rational Interaction

Abstract

Using the one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma as an example, I investigate the extent to which game theory in its orthodox interpretation can provide an adequate account of practical rationality applicable to situations of interaction. I argue that orthodox game theory cannot adequately account for the fact that rational agents often refer to what I call structural reasons for acting. These are reasons the content of which refers to the overall preference structure of the decision situation and which, as it is argued, cannot be represented in these very preferences. It is outlined how game theory under a non-orthodox interpretation can be embedded in a conceptually enriched framework capable of accounting for structural reasons.

Material included in this paper has been presented at the conference ‘Rationality and Structure’ at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies, Bielefeld (March 1998), at a workshop on practical reason at Munich University (July 1998) and to a colloquium at Leipzig University (July 1998). For helpful comments I am indebted to Robert Audi, John Broome, Christoph Fehige, Olaf Müller, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Martin Rechenauer, Stephan Schlothfeldt, Rudi Schüssler, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Jay Wallace, Nick White and Mark Young. This paper is part of a research project on ‘Structural Rationality’ funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.