Abstract
Husserl had been thinking of the problem of what binds one when one undertakes a “free” variation. The variation of the given object is the traversing in phantasy of a range of possibilities. By virtue of habituality we have the object given, not only as it is but as standing under a genus, indirectly, as exemplification of one of several species, subordinate to the genus. There is thus a horizon of possibilities about each actuality. These given possibilities are, like the given actuality, essentially the deposits of Urstiftungen 〈primal institutions〉. As such they may be spoken of as “factual” possibilities and are to be distinguished then from the range of pure possibilities. Fink suggested that, since the pure possibilities are not the deposit (Sedimentierung) of Urstiftungen, we may speak of them as “innate”. Husserl then said there was nothing worse than a recourse to the innate.
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© 1976 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Cairns, D. (1976). Conversation with Husserl and Fink, 18/11/31. In: Conversations with Husserl and Fink. Phaenomenologica, vol 66. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-6890-6_26
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-6890-6_26
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