Conflict of Interests

Abstract

A British dispute with Mussolini seemed unavoidable. A certain Raphael had predicted ten years before: “We may look for a resurrection of the mailed fist and blood and iron policies in the Mediterranean” for Mussolini’s “successes are likely to lead him on to folly and his crowning piece of egotism will be to cross the powers of England and of France, for his Saturn is” in conflict with “Britain’s star Aldebaron, while...” etc. ¹ A less celestial explanation can be found in the discongruity of British position and Italian aspirations. British interest in the Mediterranean was both strategic and commercial. Responsible for about twenty percent of all food and raw material imports, (almost entirely those of tin, rubber, and petroleum) the Mediterranean, as a way of transit, involved roughly three fourths of the population and half the land area of the Empire-Commonwealth. With defense resting on an assumption of unrestricted movement, British naval forces could serve a double utility: a means of exerting diplomatic pressure in times of peace and direct force during war. They additionally formed part of the outer defense perimeter for the Home Fleet. To guarantee supply and communication, Britain had established a series of well located naval bases — the most important at either end.