Abstract
The last sentence of the first chapter2 as well as the last sentence of the first paragraph of the second chapter 3 show in unequivocal language that Aristotle spoke here as a philosopher to philosophers, and that he spoke in a ‘philosophical attitude’ about a ‘philosophical subject-matter’. He therefore did not speak in what, following modern parlance, we shall call a ‘natural attitude’ 4 about a ’natural subject-matter’. Aristotle was very careful to set the life and activities of the philosopher 5 apart from the life and activities of other men 6, although he emphasized that every man could become a lover of wisdom - a philo-sophos 7. Yet, while ‘all men strive to see and know’8, such striving does not by itself bring about the actuality (ενέργεια) of the ‘theoretical life’ 9. The actuality of the theoretical life is clearly differentiated both from that of the life of mere empeiria 10 and from that of techne and episteme11. The man of techne and episteme is already a great deal advanced over the man of mere empeiria. He already ‘sees the differences’ (διαφοράς) by virtue of logos (λόγος) and (εϊδος); he directs his attention to ‘universals’ (καθόλου) rather than to singulars 12, and knows the ‘causes’ (αίτιαι). However, the actuality of his life is still fundamentally different from that of the man who ‘loves wisdom’ (φιλό-σοφος)13.
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References
έξις
Meta., Book 1, 1003a, 30: therefore, it is of being as being that ‘we too’ must grasp the first causes.
Ibid., 1103b, 19: if, then, substance is the primary thing, it is of substance that ‘the philosopher’ must grasp the principles and causes.
e.g. as used by E. Husserl in Ideen zu einer reinen Phaenomenologie und Phaenomenologischen Philosophie, Bd. 1, S. 57. We do not want to use the designation ‘empirical’ because Aristotle attaches a particular meaning to empeiria. Nor do we want to create the impression that we denied that Aristotle’s method is an empirical one in the sense that he always starts from the concrete beings as they present themselves. P. 25ff.
Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a, 14.
cf. Meta., 982a, 5 ff; 982a, 20 ff; 982b, 27 ff; 1072b, 18 ff; 1074b, 15 ff. Nie. Eth., 1097b, 23 ff; 1141a, 9 ff.
cf. Ibid.; also De Anima, Book III, Ch. 4.
Meta., 980, 22. πάντες άνθρωποι του είδέαι ορέγονται. The translation must bring out the ‘seeing’ implied in the word είδέαι.
cf. Ibid., the description 981b, 26 ff and 982a, 16 ff and Nie. Eth., 1177a, 12 ff.
cf. Meta., 980b, 26 ff.
More correct: Ibid., 980b, 26: techne and logismos.
cf. Ibid., 980b, 29 ff.
Ibid., 981b, 26 ff, 982a, 16 ff.
Meta., 980a, 23.
cf. Ibid., 981b, 29 ff and De An., 429b, 21 ff.
cf. Ibid., 982b, 11 ff.
cf. Ibid., 982b, 19. See also, p. 64 infra.
Ibid., 982b, 17 ff.
De An., 430a, 14.
Meta., 981b, 29.
cf. Nic. Eth., 1094a, 1 ff.
Nie. Eth, 1139b, 18, 1141a, 3.
Ibid., 1139b, 24.
Ibid., 1139b, 24-25.
Ibid., 1139b, 25.
Ibid., 1141a, 1-3.
Ibid., 1141a, 3.
Ibid., 1140b, 33.
Ibid., 1141a, 9 ff.
cf. Plato, Parmenides, 130E ff.: μεταξύ.
Nie. Eth., 1141a, 9. λείπεται νουν είναι των άρχων.
Ibid., 1141a, 19.ή σοφία νους καΐ επιστήμη.
Ibid., 1141a, 17-20. άληθεύειν περί τάς αρχάς.
Ibid., 1141a, 19. κεφαλήν έχουσα επιστήμη των τιμιωτάτων.
cf. also Meta., 1072b, 23.
cf. H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Bd. I. Frag. 12: 18. Περί Φύσεως: πάντων νους κρατεί.
Ibid., Frag. 8: 34, Περί Φύσεως: ταύτον δ’εστί νοεϊν τε καί οΰνεκεν έ*στι νόημα.
cf. also C. G. Gadamer, Zur Vorgeschichte d. Metaphysik, p. 72.
De An., Book III, Ch. 4-8.
We need not discuss within the context of this paper whether ??υς is a ‘transcendental or an immanent power’, cf. De An., 430a, 18 ff together with Nie. Eth., 1178a, 1 and 1178a, 8.
cf. Nic. Eth., particularly 1178a, 12 ff.
Meta., 1072b, 15 ff.
Nic. Eth., 1177a, 11 ff.
Ibid., 1177?, 28.
Ibid., 1177?., 27 ff.
Meta., 1072b, 11 and 1072b, 15-1072b 23.
De An., 431a, I41 431b, 2; 432a, 9 ff.
cf. Meta., 1072b, 15 ff.
De An., 429a, 19.
Ibid., 430a, 15.
Loc. cit.
Op. cit., 418b, 9.
Ibid., 429a, 24 ff, but cf. 430a, 20 and 431a, 2.
hoc. cit.
Op. cit., 429b, 23.
Meta., 1074b, 37.
Ibid., 1075a, 1.
Ibid., 1075a, 2 ff.
Ibid., 1075a, 4.
De An., 430a, 4.
Meta., 1072b, 22.
Ibid., 1072b, 22.
Ibid., 1072b, 24.
cf. Ibid., 1074b, 15 ff.
Ibid., 1074b, 35.
cf. De An., 430a, 2 and Meta., 1075a, 3.
cf. Meta., 981b, 28 ff and 982b, 1 ff.
cf. Ibid., 983a, 5 ff.
Ibid., 1075a, 2 and De An., 430b, 26.
cf. also infra, p. 61 for the later discussion.
Meta., 1072b, 22.
Ibid., 1075a, 5 ff.
Ibid., 1072b, 14 ff, 1072b, 2.4.
Ibid., 1051b, 24.
Ibid., 1051b, 18.
De Int., 16A, 5.
Summa Theologica Qu. 16, Art. 12, Obj. 2, which refers to Isaac Israeli.
But the truth of the thing, in turn, was guaranteed through its own correspon. dentia with the ‘idea’, as conceived by God.
cf. I. Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, pp. 82, 83, 100, 350.
cf. A. Riezler, Parmenides, p. 15, on the subject of aletheia and the Presocratics particularly.
cf. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 226 ff., on the sense in which ‘Wahrheit ist vorausgesetzt’.
Plato, Meno, 8od, 8.
cf. De An., 430b, 4; Meta., 1051b, 34. (εν μέν έστιν).
De An., 430b, 4: ‘in each and every case that which unifies is ‘Χους’, cf. also 430a, 14 ff.
cf. Meta., 1051b, 3 ff; also De An., 430a, 26 ff.
Meta., 1051b, 7.
cf..M. Heidegger Logos Festschrift fuer H. Jantzen, regarding the original meaning of λέγειν.
De An., 430b, 5.
Meta., 1051b, 35.
cf. Ibid., 1051b, 32; 1052a, 3ff; De An., 430b, 27 ff.
De An., 430a, 26.
Ibid., 430b, 6-20.
Ibid., 432a, 10.
Ibid., 429b, 21.
Ibid., 432a, 14; also 431a, 14; 431b, 13.
Ibid., 429b, 15; Meta., 1051b, 29; 1051b, 33.
De An., 429b, 18 and 430b, 29; also Meta., 1075a, 3.
Meta., 1075a, 3; 1051b, 27.
De An., 429b, 15 ff.
Meta., 1051b, 35.
Ibid., 1051b, 18 ff.
Loc. cit.
cf. De An., 430a, 14, together with 430b, 5 and Meta., 1051b, 35.
Meta., 1051b, 32 and 1052a, 1.
Ibid., 1052a, 1.
De An., 429a, 28; however, as such, they are ‘actual’, cf. Meta., 1051b, 27.
cf. De An., 417b, 22; the episteme of the καδόλου are ‘in a sense within the soul’.
Ibid., 432a, 2 ff.
Ibid., 430a, 15.
Ibid., 430b, 5.
Meta., 1051b, 27
Ibid., 1051b, 35.
De An., 430b, 6 ff.
Ibid., 430, 16.
cf. Meta., 1052a, 5 ff.
Ibid., 1051b, 29.
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© 1954 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Holland
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Marx, W. (1954). The Keyterms. In: The Meaning of Aristotle’s ‘Ontology’. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9504-1_3
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