Abstract
In this paper I will discuss some aspects of (1995) account of social institutions, especially features that are concerned with the role of collective intentionality in the creation and maintenance of social institutions. His account is interesting and rich. I find many of the basic ideas in his theory to be on the right track. However, I think that there are still non-trivial problems related to it. The theory seems too narrow on two counts. First, Searle’s theory is too narrow in that it leaves out a central class of social institutions. This is the class consisting of social institutions relying on expectation-based social norms or, as I have called them, “proper social norms” (cf. Tuomela, 1995, Chapter 1). Second, Searle’s emphasis on deontic status and status functions seems to be too demanding in general. While it works well for some cases (e.g. money), it does not apply to all those institutional cases where a new “conceptual and social status” in a sense to be explicated is involved, nor does it apply to institutional cases which only involve norm-governed social practices.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Miller, K., and R. Tuomela. “What are Collective Goals?” ms. 2001.
Searle, J. “Collective Intentions and Actions.” P. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. Pollack (eds.). Intentions in Communication. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990: 401–415.
Searle, J. The Construction of Social Reality. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1995.
Searle, J. “Responses to Critics of The Construction of Social Reality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LVII (1997): 449–458.
Tuomela, R. A Theory of Social Action. Dordrecht, and Boston: Reidel, 1984.
Tuomela, R. The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Tuomela, R. “Searle on Social Institutions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LVII (1997): 435–441.
Tuomela, R. “Private versus collective attitudes.” I. Nida-Ruemelin (ed.). Analyomen 3 (Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie). Berlin, and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1999: 317–321.
Tuomela, R. Cooperation: A Philosophical Study. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy. Dordrecht, and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers (in print), 2000a.
Tuomela, R. “Collective and Joint Intention.” Mind and Society 1 (2000b): 39–69.
Tuomela, R. Collective Intentionality: Social Practices and Institutions, book ms. 2001a.
Tuomela, R., 2001b, “Collective Acceptance, Social Institutions, and Social Reality.” Forthcoming in American Journal of Sociology and Economics (selected proceedings of the conference “Social Ontology”, held in Buffalo, NY, in 1998).
Tuomela, R., and W. Balzer. “Collective Acceptance and Collective Social Notions.” Synthese 117 (1999): 175–205.
Tuomela, R., and K. Miller. “We-Intentions.” Philosophical Studies 53 (1988): 115–137.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Tuomela, R. (2002). Searle, Collective Intentionality, and Social Institutions. In: Grewendorf, G., Meggle, G. (eds) Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, vol 79. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0589-0_20
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0589-0_20
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-0861-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0589-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive