Reflections on Practical Reason

Abstract

Does the ideal of practical reason have a philosophic import or must we place it on a purely technical level, concerned with the ordering of means to an end? We call ‘prudence’ the virtue which guides us in the choice of the most efficacious and fruitful means, which teaches us to avoid the painfully surmountable obstacles and to reject enterprises that are too hazardous. Prudence, however, doesn’t allow us to appreciate the goal of our acts; at most we can claim that it presupposes a thoughtful egoism. If it is the individual’s interest which must implicitly provide the final criterion in matters of conduct, then prudence does not tell us if it is our concrete I, which is the judge of our interests, or if it is the reasonable I inspired by an ideal of wisdom or justice which has this responsibility. In the first case, reason is subordinated to sentiments, governed entirely by irrational, individual and social forces. Practical reason remains faithful to the ideal of Western philosophy when it proposes ends for our conduct, contributes a model of the sage and just man, and provides objective criteria to judge the value of our actions.

Le Champ de l’Argumentation (Bruxelles, 1970), pp. 171–182.