Abstract
Zeno’s position is that, though many absurdities follow if the Parmenidean One exists, still more impossibilities follow, if there is a plurality: things would be like and unlike, i.e. have contrary predicates. Socrates, in reply, brings in the doctrine of the separate Form (auto kath’ hauto eidos) to save phenomena from inconsistency. Two particulars may thus be both like and unlike, if they both participate in both Likeness and Unlikeness. Also, a person may be one and many in being one person with many parts. The real problem is whether the Forms, e.g. Likeness, Unity, Rest, etc. and their opposites can blend and be separated. If the same perplexity is involved (plekomenēn) in the Forms themselves there is ground for surprise (127e–130a).
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© 1982 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague
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Ostenfeld, E.N. (1982). Natural Kinds. In: Forms, Matter and Mind. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7681-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7681-8_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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