Abstract
Where manners of givenness are concerned, there is not only that between clarity and obscurity, but also, to begin with, that between direct and indirect and indirect consciousness in which one object is intended “through” another. Seeing a photograph is direct but the consciousness of the depicted object is indirect. In perceiving, the object is there in person and in recollecting, which is also direct, the object is formerly there in person, non-original but still direct. In perceiving a box, one side is directly presented and the other sides are directly appresented. And there are fictive versions of these.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Cf. pp. 61ff.
- 3.
See p. 47ff.
- 4.
Criticism of rival theories does not fall within the limits of this essay. But the picture-theory of memory is so firm a habit with many people—is taken so unquestioningly as the presupposition for all further analysis of recollection—that it seems advisable to criticize it expressly, in order to contrast Husserl’s view. Only so will the latter be understandable.
- 5.
See Chap. 13.
- 6.
The present essay will avoid this usage.
- 7.
Cf. Chap. 8.
- 8.
P. 47.
- 9.
It is evidently a mistake to believe that a fictive object cannot also be real.
- 10.
There is a marginal note on the last two sentences of this paragraph: “Not Husserl (?)”—L.E.
- 11.
Pp. 48ff.
- 12.
Pp. 37ff.
- 13.
Pp. 22f.
- 14.
In the case of phantasy or imagination we must distinguish between fictive reproduction of the phantasied act (an imagined remembering of an imagined impressional act) and real reproduction of an act of phantasying. In our stock illustration, we must distinguish between the case where the fictive man (perhaps a fictive I) who once saw the castle, remembers that experience, and the case where the man at the desk remembers imaging the castle (as seen by the fictive man).
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Cairns, D., Embree, L. (2013). Direct and Indirect, Impressional and Reproductive, Consciousness. In: Embree, L. (eds) The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Phaenomenologica, vol 207. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5043-2_7
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