Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking

Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad
Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHENOMENOLOGY

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Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking

Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad
A dictionary can provide an indication for understanding a word but it is never a simple authority that would be binding a priori. The appeal to a dictionary is always an appeal to an interpretation of language which is often not grasped at all in its style and limits. Considered in view of the historical spirit of a language as a whole, no dictionary provides an immediate standard; and none is binding.

There is no translation at all in which the words of one language could or should cover the words of another language.

Translation is an awakening, clarifying, and unfolding of one’s own language by coming to grips with the foreign language.

—Martin Heidegger
Preface

We do not know goals
and are only a pathway


This volume of essays honors the many contributions of Parvis Emad throughout his life and career of four decades, both as an interpreter and a translator of Martin Heidegger’s writings. Though Emad has addressed various thinkers in his scholarly articles and books, his legacy primarily revolves around his impact in advancing the understanding and appropriation of Heidegger’s thought throughout the United States and the world. As we enter another decade, the interest in and influence of Heidegger’s thinking continues to grow at a remarkable rate. We would not be surprised, then, that there are many different avenues for approaching his philosophy. The central approach that this volume of essays will embody, taking its cue both from the example and spirit of Emad’s work, is that the task of translation provides a unique “gateway” to Heidegger’s thought.

One of the distinct advantages of this “Festschrift” is that the longevity of Parvis Emad’s career offers a perspective on how much has changed in the field of Heidegger studies during the past four decades. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the interest in Heidegger’s thinking was just beginning to blossom, and, with the exception of his magnum opus, *Being and Time* (1962), precious little of his writings had been translated into English. As interest in his thought would continue to grow, and, on the cusp of his death in 1976, the publication of the initial volumes of his *Gesamtausgabe* ushered in a new era in the field of Heidegger studies. The few translations of Heidegger’s works which appeared in the 1960s, provisional and incomplete as they were, nevertheless served to introduce an English-speaking audience to his philosophy. The translations that followed, particularly those which were

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based on the texts of the Gesamtausgabe, perhaps had an even greater impact insofar as they allowed the unity of Heidegger’s thinking to unfold (rather than in a “piecemeal” fashion).

While these translations sparked new interest in Heidegger’s thinking, and even promoted occasional reflection on the “strategies” of translation, the publication of one volume in particular, Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis) [1989] and its subsequent translation (by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly) under the title Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), would dramatically and irrevocably transform the landscape of Heidegger studies. Not only does Heidegger significantly radicalize his own philosophy as well as the language for its expression throughout this text, he also provides the keys to unravel various confusions surrounding the development of his thinking, most notably the so-called turning (die Kehre). Yet, there is also another factor that cannot be underestimated in terms of its “impact,” and which, because of his role as a co-translator as well as an interpreter of this text, placed Emad before a new threshold in the study of Heidegger’s thought. Specifically, the complex and original language of Beiträge zur Philosophie – equally in regard to its distinctive idioms and syntax – not only underscored the difficulty of translating this text into English, but self-reflexivity crystallized the parallel issue as to the hermeneutic methodology of translation itself. Now the question of translation, which had been considered only peripherally, had to be addressed seriously. Suddenly, the concern for translation as a task vaults into the forefront of the study of Heidegger’s thinking, in a way which had never occurred before. A new era in the study of Heidegger’s philosophy is born.

In retrospect, and in a way that is surely more evident today, Parvis Emad stood at the forefront of this new era, and, even at this juncture of his career, continues to do so. First, as the editor-in-chief of Heidegger Studies in 1985, he outlined the threefold mission of this journal: (1) as cultivating the “interpretive exploration of the new texts of the Gesamtausgabe,” (2) as fostering “international” interest in Heidegger’s writings by publishing articles in English, German, and French, and (3) as stated in the prelude to the inaugural issue of Heidegger Studies, as “taking seriously the distinction that Heidegger makes between merely scholarly research in philosophy and philosophy as thinking that is underway...” Instead of only translating Heidegger’s writings, as many have done, Emad developed his own insights into the hermeneutic methodology of translation in order to offer, in his most recent

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1 Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989). Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).


book, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, a highly original reinterpretation of the unity of Heidegger’s thinking as a whole. Even in the midst of this contribution, however, a further development of this insight unfolds, insofar as today Emad continues to demonstrate in his work that translation can no longer be viewed merely as an addendum to Heidegger’s philosophy, but must instead be considered as integral to the task of thinking itself.

By making the issue of translation a new “gateway” for accessing Heidegger’s thought, and creating an international forum within which scholars can broaden the understanding of his philosophy, Parvis Emad remains a leader in his field. Most significantly, in a climate that bends to the latest academic fashions, Emad continues to stay the course. His example instills a sense of calm in whose silence reverberates the echo of the first line of Rudyard Kipling’s epoch poem, “If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs...” The commitment to “keep to the path” may in the end be one of Parvis Emad’s greatest lessons (and his enduring legacy as well), even to those who never attended his classes. While it was not my good fortune to have this opportunity, as did other contributors to this volume, I nevertheless consider myself to be one of his students, for he has played a vital role in enhancing my understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy.

In this respect, the essays in this volume each gives thanks to Parvis Emad by shifting attention to the *work ahead*, that is, of continuing to explore, interpret, and appropriate the thought of Martin Heidegger. Appropriately, this *Festschrift* begins with the translation of an original essay by Heidegger entitled “Poverty” (“Die Armut”), which he composed in June of 1945. In the spirit of this beginning, the essays in this volume attempt to radiate the light of Heidegger’s thinking, according to the humility which comes by seeking guidance from the path, rather than only its destination.

New Orleans

Frank Schalow

References


Acknowledgments

This *Festschrift*, which pays tribute to the work of Parvis Emad, would not have been possible without the efforts of those who equally embrace the mission of cultivating Martin Heidegger’s thinking. The title of the opening essay, “Poverty,” which Heidegger composed in 1945, embodies the deepest humility of those who undertake the momentous task of interpreting and understanding his thought. In this spirit, I give thanks, first and foremost, to Herr Dr. Hermann Heidegger, executor of Martin Heidegger’s literary remains, for granting me permission to publish a translation of the original German text of “Die Armut.” I also wish to acknowledge the inestimable help of Prof. Dr. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann for his counsel and direction in helping to bring this *Festschrift* to fruition.

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Part I
Heidegger’s Pathway
Poverty*

Martin Heidegger†, Translated by Thomas Kalary and Frank Schalow

In the draft of an essay concerned with the historical periods of Europe, Hölderlin writes the following guiding dictum:

“For us everything is concentrated upon the spiritual, we have become poor in order to become rich.” (III, 621)

These words were written at a time when the eighteenth century was passing over into the nineteenth century. The opinion that Hölderlin makes this statement about his own time is so obvious that one would shy away from specifically taking note of it again. And yet, Hölderlin also says “for us everything is concentrated upon the spiritual.” Does this “for us” in the dictum refer only to the Germans and does the “us” here refer only to those who were then contemporaries of the European history in Hölderlin’s lifetime? This is an issue that cannot be immediately and easily decided. We know only this much: when Hölderlin speaks of history whereby he always has the Occident in mind, he thinks in terms of long stretches of time. When he calls us “us,” and says “now,” he does not mean the historically datable time of a

*The translators wish to express their deepest gratitude to Herr Dr. Hermann Heidegger for granting the copyright permissions to publish this English translation of Martin Heidegger’s essay, “Die Armut,” which first appeared in *Heidegger Studies*, 10 (1994): 5–11
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particular instant in time in which he writes down the sentence; with “us,” of course, he refers to himself but “himself” not as the historically ascertainable person, but “himself” as the poet, who by poetizing rises above “his own time” and who intimates “the years of the peoples” (An die Deutschen IV, 133) and who intimating in this manner is mindful of that which enows what is sheltered-hidden in Western history but can never be read off the historically ascertainable events. Accordingly, Hölderlin’s words could have not been indeed about and for the time in which it was written, and that is why the time in which these words were written is a different time than the time of historical dates and the time of differentiable junctures of a century that is chronologically familiar.

Hölderlin says: “For us everything is concentrated on the spiritual, we have become poor in order to become rich.” We can only understand the content and the implications of this statement when we know what Hölderlin thinks when he says “the spiritual.”

The “spiritual” is indeed that which is determined from out of the spirit “and” by the spirit. But what is “the spirit”?

A long tradition of thinking has various answers ready for this question. It is said: spirit is the opposite of matter. Contrasted with the material, the spiritual is the immaterial. But this determination of the spirit and the spiritual is stuck in a mere negation of matter and the material. The Greek word πνεῦμα, the Latin word spiritus, and the French word l’esprit definitely say more. The immaterial is the pneumatic and the spiritual. It means: spirit is the effective power of enlightenment and wisdom, what the Greeks call σοφία. In the Christian Church’s theological–philosophical speculation concerning the unitariness of God, this substance-akin essence of the spirit was carefully thought out. Consequently, Augustine’s work, De Trinitate became decisive for the Western Roman Church as a different development occurred in the Oriental Church and particularly in Russia where the doctrine of holy Sophia was unfolded. This doctrine is even today alive in the Russian mysticism in a manner that we can hardly imagine. The efficacy of the spirit as the all-pervading power of enlightenment and wisdom (Sophia) is “magical.” The ownmost of the magical is as inscrutable and opaque as the ownmost of the pneumatic. Yet, we know that Jacob Böhme, the theosophist and philosopher – the shoemaker from Görlitz, who from all the shoemakers was called the most quiet one – had recognized the magical in the light of the shoemaker’s globe and thought of it as the primal will. Böhme’s doctrine of the divine Sophia (theosophy) was known in Russia as early as the seventeenth century. In those days, the Russians referred to

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2 The lens-shaped tool was filled with water and used in earlier times for concentrating the light on the spot where repairs had to be done on shoes. Here, Heidegger does not use this word metaphorically, but in the strict sense of a tool used by the shoemakers. His point appears to be this: Jacob Böhme was spiritual enough to recognize the ownmost of the spiritual (das Magische) in the light cast by his own shoemaker’s globe.
Jacob Böhme as the holy father of the Church. In Russia, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a renewal of Jacob Böhme’s influence came about simultaneously with the strong influence of Hegel and Schelling involving Vladimir Solovyov. It is thus no exaggeration when I say that what one nowadays conceives shortsightedly and incompletely as merely “political” or even roughly “political” and calls Russian Communism comes from a spiritual world about which we know hardly anything, even if we totally overlook the fact that we already forget to think the manner in which even Materialism taken roughly as the forefront of Communism is not itself something material, but rather something spiritual coming from a spiritual world that can only be experienced in and out of the spirit if its truth and untruth are to be fulfilled.

However, spirit is not only the effective will as substance, it is thought at the same time, but especially since Descartes right through modernity, as self-consciousness, that is, as subject and is as intellect, reason, understanding of the soul superordinated to, equated with, or juxtaposed to the principle of life in the sense of what is merely alive and body-akin (Cf., interpretation of Nietzsche by Ludwig Klages in his Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele [Leipzig, 1929–1932]. Klages takes spirit as “understanding” and thereby forgets the pneumatic and the spiritual of which Nietzsche was very well aware). The ownmost of the spirit is the primal will, which wills itself, and this will is at times thought as substance, at times as subject, and at times as the unity of both. We had briefly to recall these more or less familiar and prevailing metaphysical representations of the ownmost of the spirit because we want to heed what it means that Hölderlin thinks the ownmost of the spirit totally differently.

What is a spirit for Hölderlin? In what does the spiritual rest for him? What does he mean when he says that “for us everything is concentrated upon the spiritual”? At about the same time as Hölderlin writes the dictum just mentioned, he writes a philosophical aperçu from which we quote the following sentences (Cf., Über die Religion, III, 263).4

Neither from out of himself alone, nor solely out of the objects that surround him, can man experience, that more than a mechanical course, there is a spirit, there is a god in the world, but of course he can experience it in a more lively relationship that is exalted above the pressing need, a relationship in which “he” stands together with that which surrounds him.

What is this exalted relationship wherein man stands together with that which surrounds him? By experiencing this relation, we experience the spirit and the spiritual. Hölderlin does not say anything more precise about this relationship reason enough for us to try to think this relationship more clearly by taking a step to meet Hölderlin. Hölderlin says that this relationship is not oriented to the objects; it is not the relation of a subject to the objects, a relation that for the most part is determined by the prevailing pressing needs, insofar as the objects are those that we process and use for various purposes and goals to satisfy the needs that the distress arouses in us.

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Man abides in a relation to that which surrounds him – a relation that is exalted above the relation of a subject to an object. Here, “exalted” does not just mean “hovering over” but rather reaching for the high, about which Hölderlin once said, man – especially the poet – could also “descend” into the high. Thus, the height of this apogee of the exalted is in itself at the same time the deep. The exalted relation refers to that which towers over all objects and man and at the same time sustains all these. And what is that? Hölderlin does not say it; therefore, we must specifically think it and that means append it via poetizing. What surrounds us normally, what individually stands over against us (= the objects), we also call a being that is. But this “is” on beings is itself not something that again is a being, but rather that which in the first place lets all beings be be-ings (Seyendes) and thus shelteringly encloses and surrounds them. We call it be-ing (das Seyn). The exalted relation wherein man abides is the relation of be-ing to man, namely so that be-ing itself is this relation that draws to itself the ownmost of man as the ownmost that abides in this relation and preserves and inhabits this relation by abiding within it. We experience “the spirit” in the openness of this relationship of be-ing to human beings – it is that which sways from out of be-ing and presumably for be-ing.

Hölderlin’s dictum reads: “for us everything is concentrated upon the spiritual.” Given the preceding, this means: a concentration, a gathering, is enowned as the gathering upon the relationship of be-ing to our ownmost, a relationship that is the center, the midpoint, that is everywhere as the midpoint of a circle whose periphery is nowhere.

The dictum “for us everything is concentrated upon the spiritual” is not a historical identification of a fact pertaining to the situation of that time, but a thinking poetizing invocation of an enowning that is hidden-sheltered in be-ing itself – an enowning reaching out into what is coming from afar and intimated by only a few, or perhaps only by the one who can say and think that enowning.

What follows the first part of the dictum, namely “we have become poor, in order to become rich,” has the same character of a poetic statement as the first part, namely “for us everything is concentrated upon the spiritual.” What does “poor” mean? In what does the ownmost of poverty consist? What does “rich” mean, if only in and through poverty we are to become rich? According to the ordinary meaning, “poor” and “rich” pertain to possession, to having wealth. Poverty means not having and being specifically deprived of what is needed. Wealth means not being deprived of what is needed; it means a having that surpasses what is needed. The ownmost of poverty, however, lies in the singular be-ing (beruht in einem Seyn). To be truly poor means to be so that one is deprived of nothing except what is not needed.

To be truly deprived means not being able to be without what is not needed and thus immediately and exclusively belonging to what is not needed.

But what is it that is not needed? What is it that is needed? What does needful (nötig) mean? Needful is that which arises out of and through need. And what is need? According to the fundamental meaning of the word, the ownmost of need is compulsion. What is need-akin, what is needful, what makes needy (das Nötigende) is what compels. It is that which in our life places the needs (Bedürfnisse) at the service of this life to sustain it and compels us exclusively to satisfy these needs.
What is not needed is what does not arise out of a need, that is, is what does not arise out of compulsion, but out of what is free and open (das Freie).

But what is free and open? According to the intimating saying of our oldest language, what is free and open is the un-violated, is the safeguarded, is that which cannot be put to use. Originally and actually to set free means to safeguard, to shelter by letting something rest in what is its singular ownmost. But to shelter means to ensconce (in der Hut behalten) the ownmost, wherein the ownmost remains only when it is allowed to return to itself and rest in itself. Sheltering means helping constantly with this resting and awaiting it. Only this is the enowing ownmost of safeguarding. In no way does it exhaust itself in the negativity of not concerning oneself with something and merely not using it.

Freeing rests in an owned safeguarding. The liberated is what is released unto its ownmost and protected from the compulsion of the need. What is liberating in freedom averts or circumvents in advance all need. Freedom means this averting and circumventing of the need. Turning unto need (Not-wendigkeit), necessity (Notwendigkeit), sway only in freedom and in its safeguarding liberation. If we think the ownmost of freedom and necessity in this way, then necessity is not at all the opposite of freedom, as metaphysics assumes, but freedom in itself is solely turning unto need (Not-wendigkeit) as the averting and circumventing of the need.

Metaphysics goes even so far as to teach through Kant that, necessity, namely the compelling of the ought and the empty constraint of duty for the sake of duty, is the true freedom. The metaphysical essence of freedom attains its completion at the juncture wherein freedom becomes an “expression” of necessity giving rise to a willing that wills the will to power as the will to actuality and as life itself. An example of this is Ernst Jünger. He thinks of the will to power when in Der Arbeiter he writes, “The certainty of being able to participate in the innermost nuclei of time is one of the distinguishing marks of freedom – a certainty, that amazingly exhilarates actions and thoughts all the while as the freedom of those who act recognizes itself in that certainty as a special expression of necessity (Notwendigkeit).”

But if we think deeply how to turn back, we realize that everything now turns around. Freedom means turning unto need (Not-wendigkeit), insofar as what liberates is not necessitated by a need and is thus what is not needed.

Be-ing poor (Armseyn) means being deprived of nothing except of what is not needed; it means being deprived of the liberating free and open.

However, what we are deprived of is not our own so that we are indeed concerned with owning what we are deprived of. What we are deprived of we do not have, but it has us. It can even have us in such a manner that our ownmost is exclusively pending on depravation because our ownmost belongs exclusively to depravation insofar as our ownmost is of old (formerly and futurely) owned over to it.

Be-ing poor means to be exclusively deprived of what is not needed; it means belonging of old to the unrestrained that liberates; it means residing in a relationship to that which liberates.

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Now, be-ing is that which lets each and every being be what it is and how it is, precisely because be-ing is the liberating that lets things rest in their ownmost; be-ing is what safeguards each and every being.

When the ownmost of man resides solely in the relationship of the liberating be-ing to man, that is, when human beings are deprived of what is not needed, then man has become in the strict sense of the word poor.

Hölderlin says: “For us everything is concentrated on the spiritual, we have become poor in order to become rich.” According to this saying, the concentration on the spiritual means being gathered in the relation of be-ing to man and as gathered residing in it.

We have become poor, in order to become rich. Becoming rich does not follow from be-ing poor like an effect following the cause. Rather, the genuinely being poor is in itself be-ing rich. As we are not deprived of anything because of poverty, we own beforehand everything; we reside in the overflowing be-ing, which overflows all needs that make us needy.

Just as freedom in its liberating ownmost is to everyone that which averts and circumvents the need, and is so a turning unto the need (Not-wendigkeit), be-ing poor as being deprived of nothing other than what is not needed is in itself already be-ing rich.

In that everything for us is concentrated on the spiritual, be-ing poor enowns itself. This will attune human beings. The overtone of the still hidden-sheltered ownmost of the Western people and their destiny is poverty.

Poverty is the mourning joyfulness of never be-ing sufficiently poor. In this reticent restiveness lies poverty’s releasement, which is used to overcoming everything need-akin.

The actual danger of need and of the times of need consists in the fact that the excess of need prevents the genuine experience of the ownmost of need and of taking from this ownmost the hint for overcoming the need.

Viewed from the entirety of, and the actual destiny of the West, the danger of famine for example and of the years of scarcity consists, not only in the fact that perhaps many human beings perish, but in the manner in which those who survive live only in order to eat so that they may live. “Life” rotates around its own peculiar void, which surrounds life in the form of the hardly noticed and admitted boredom. Man goes to ruin in this void. He goes astray on the way whereupon he learns the ownmost of poverty.

What is ahead of us as world-historical destiny and is inappropriately called “Communism” does not make us poor. We are poor, only when everything for us is concentrated on the spiritual.

Only when the European nations are attuned to the overtone of poverty do they become the richest peoples of the West – the West that does not and cannot go under because it has not yet risen at all. Rather, the beginning of the West’s rising lies in the fact that the people of the West alternately awaken themselves to their ownmost, learn to have a knowing awareness of the ownmost of poverty so that they can be poor.

By be-ing poor, we do not avoid and bypass Communism but supercede it in its ownmost. Only in this way will we be able to truly overcome it.
The way is long. But still greater than this long way is the inability to think truly and listen carefully to what is already thought and said, and to hear out what is of old and unique and to transform what is heard into a knowing awareness.

Wars do not have the capability to historically decide on destinies because wars already rest upon spiritual decisions upon which they solidify themselves. World Wars too are incapable historically to decide on destinies. But for the people, World Wars and their outcomes can become an occasion that gives rise to a mindfulness. But such a mindfulness itself arises from other sources, which must begin to flow out of the ownmost of the people. That is why a self-mindfulness is needed in the alternating dialogue of the people with one another.

Editorial Notes

Published for the first time from Martin Heidegger’s literary remains, the text entitled “Poverty” was presented on June 27th, 1945 by Heidegger to a small audience in Forsthaus von Burg Wildenstein in Hausen. Commenting on the guiding dictum he quotes from Hölderlin, Heidegger noted the following on the first page of the manuscript: “Why in this moment of world history do I chose for us this dictum to elucidate must become clear by the elucidation itself.”

The handwritten manuscript of this text consists of twelve pages in Din A 5-Format. It belongs to a manuscript that Heidegger himself put together under the title “Das Wesen der Frage. Eine Reihe von Manuskripten zum Ereignis (1943/1944).” This manuscript will appear along with a few others as Volume 73 of the Gesamtausgabe under the title “Zum Ereignis-Denken.”

Without further ado, I have corrected Heidegger’s occasional slips of the pen. I have also inserted into the printed text within square brackets three words missing in the handwritten text. By contrast, the addition to Hölderlin quotation also appearing in square brackets is Heidegger’s own. The spelling, punctuation, and division of paragraphs correspond to the handwritten text. Heidegger has taken both of the Hölderlin quotations from the third edition (1943) of Hellingrath’s Hölderlin-Ausgabe. My cordial thanks go to Herr Dr. Herrmann Heidegger, the executor of Martin Heidegger’s literary remains, for permission to print this text.

F.-W. v. Herrmann

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6Din A-5 Format is an acronym for “Deutsche Industrie Norm.” It refers to a standardized paper size used across Germany for preparing manuscripts, and was the paper size preferred by Heidegger.

7Norbert von Hellingrath (1888–1916), a German literary scholar who fell in Verdun, assembled the Complete Edition of Hölderlin’s work.
References

A Historical Perspective on Translation and the Study of Heidegger’s Thought

When Martin Heidegger passed away on May 26, 1976, both interest in and appreciation of his thought had spread to all corners of the globe. Implicit in this development was the simple fact that many of those who were devoted to studying his thought and writings were not native German speakers, and indeed, may have been fluent only in the language of their own nationality and upbringing. Within the English-speaking world, this “language gap” was probably most glaring in the United States, where the “melting pot” of diverse cultures had often occurred at the expense of cultivating fluency in other languages. Given this unique twist on the “Zeitgeist,” a growing audience of students and scholars alike not only depended upon existing translations, but, also discovered in each “new” translation of Heidegger’s writings the opportunity to gain greater access to his thinking and thereby achieve deeper insight into his philosophy.

To be sure, the limitations of this “intellectual climate” may have similarly impacted the broader appreciation of other literary figures and philosophers, including Friedrich Nietzsche, whose reception in post-World War II America hinged largely on new translations of his writings. In Heidegger’s case, however, the divergences may be more important than the parallels. For in construing his own philosophical mission as always “underway,” he also recognized that the translation of his writings constituted a key component in the understanding, interpretation, and appropriation of his thinking. Given that Heidegger’s thinking gravitates around a
perennial concern, namely, the question of being, its distinctive task of reaching its
destination from a distant shore can be pursued in languages other than the “mother
tongue.”

While the temptation might be great to compare Heidegger with other philoso-
phers in the Continental tradition, there are five differences that distinguish his
thinking, both as it simultaneously impacts and is impacted by the task of transla-
tion. First, for Heidegger, translating philosophical works from one language into
another is not simply a “literary” exercise that is external to a thinker’s philosophy,
but rather, at least for him, translation is inextricably woven with the task of thinking
itself. Second, by extension, translation is not confined to the exercise of trans-
ferring the meanings of a text from one language to another, but, on the contrary, more
decisively recovers what is stated in the text within the abode of language itself.
Third, the same “interpretive” or “hermeneutic” guidelines that govern Heidegger’s
philosophical inquiry can serve equally as a method to direct the translation of his
own writings. Fourth, his own understanding of language as a way of safeguarding
and caring for the word, and thinking as dependent thereon, implies also that trans-
lation is primarily a craft of eliciting the hidden meanings of words than a mecha-
nism for employing the standards of a dictionary. Fifth, because of its character
as a craft, and thereby its affinity with thinking, the translation of texts from one
language into another requires basic “decisions”; conversely, these decisions are not
arbitrary, but instead, because the mission of “safeguarding” language is essential
to them, display the greatest sense of responsibility. Taken in unison, these five
points outline the guiding thread of this volume: that from whichever direction we
approach Heidegger’s thinking, the concern for translation, and, more specifically,
its methodological elements, provide an important access way for understanding
and interpreting his thought.

Through the efforts of Parvis Emad and other leaders in the field, the insight into
“accessing” Heidegger’s thought through a more precise and definitive understand-
ing of translation has emerged comparatively late on the scene—despite the fact that
various translations of his writings have appeared over the course of at least half a
century. As is the case in Heidegger’s own thinking, translation occurs as a journey
whose importance we may come to appreciate only when we are already quite far
along. In the case of any journey, there are also crucial junctures and crossroads that
are reached which not only test the metal of the translator but also most decisively
redirect attention to what is already in play in Heidegger’s thinking per se, that is,
the limitations of language itself and the abruptness of our “thrownness” into it. And
yet, at the inception of this journey, the awareness of facing a challenge recedes in
favor of its undertaking, as is normally the case in traveling the first steps. For the
very presupposition which is evident today withdraws from the outset of the first
translations of Heidegger’s writings: namely, that these translations do not occur in

1Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, GA 54 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), p. 18.
Parmenides, trans André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University
isolation, any more than can the depth and scope of his thinking be contained in any single text or an assortment thereof.

Indeed, when the first translation of Heidegger’s *magnum opus* was published approximately a half century ago (1962), it became for the English reader almost the sole opening onto the entirety of his thought, not only because of the paucity of the translation of other key works; but, more importantly, because an important crossroads was still to be reached that could shift attention back to the origination of the works themselves and their place in the overall development of Heidegger’s thinking. Specifically, the interlude of Heidegger’s passing also marks the birth of the publication of his *Gesamtausgabe* or Complete Edition. With the cooperation of his son, Hermann Heidegger, and the guidance of his personal assistant, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (the managing editor of this edition up to now), Heidegger initiated this lengthy process of publishing his *Gesamtausgabe*. As the first of 102 volumes of his *Gesamtausgabe* began to appear, the unfolding, appropriation, and interpretation of Heidegger’s thinking thereby reached one of its most decisive junctures.

First, the wealth of lecture-course texts, treatises, essays, and other writings, which were published in German for the first time, for example, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1975b), called for their translation. Secondly, whether one could read these volumes in the original German or not, the plethora of these writings provided a wider perspective and helped to bridge the gaps in understanding Heidegger’s thought, which in many cases (particularly for the English speaker) occurred in a rather piecemeal if not fragmented way. The challenge posed by the publication of the *Gesamtausgabe* provides a concrete example of how the understanding and interpretation of Heidegger’s writings become interwoven with their translation, even if this hermeneutic synergy was completely evident at the outset and would only become fully appreciated much later. As if through a reciprocal interplay, the appearance and translation of these volumes not just lend greater opportunity to understand Heidegger’s thought; the gradual enhancement of this understanding opens the possibility to address the task of translation as a hermeneutic-phenomenological craft in its own right. The need to examine and evaluate these various translations, notwithstanding the rigors of Heidegger’s own thinking, paves the way for outlining the methodology of translation, not as an addendum to his philosophy, but in direct synergy with it.

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3 Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975b).
2 The Importance of “Beiträge” and the Controversy Surrounding Its English Translation

The *Gesamtausgabe* edition of Heidegger’s works includes both previously published and unpublished writings. Among the latter, undoubtedly the most anticipated was a manuscript from 1936 to 1938, which Heidegger deliberately “held back” and which subsequently was published in 1989 as volume 65 under the title *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. Not only was the publication of this volume a “high point” in the study of Heidegger’s thought, it also marked a turning point in how to approach the translation of his writings particularly within the English-speaking world. There are, of course, various reasons why this proved to be so, but the most basic include these. First, *Beiträge* stood alongside *Sein und Zeit* as among Heidegger’s most important works, and moreover, forged a new pathway for radicalizing and enacting the inquiry into the meaning of being, which he has first initiated through his *magnum opus* of 1927. Second, Heidegger’s deeper awakening to the importance of language, and thinking’s dependence upon it, posed an obstacle to any attempt to interpret much less translate his writings: that is, that language and its singular idioms held the key to thinking’s ability to address “being” and re-emerge within its expanse of openness and unconcealment. Given this singularity of the idiom, it became clear that the corresponding “meanings” intrinsic to being, that is, to its manifestation, interpretation, and expression in words, were not unilaterally transferrable like currency (or exchangeable as coins). Third, due to the complexity of his own thinking, and its unique mission of allowing being to manifest itself (rather than “represent” it), Heidegger employed a novel and ground-breaking syntax, which in its departure from conventional grammar eclipsed (in audacity) even that of *Being and Time*. Ultimately, when both the need and opportunity presented itself to translate *Beiträge*, that task would not only hinge on confronting the previously mentioned considerations and challenges. Indeed, the daunting task would call for a preliminary maneuver, a “step back” to ponder the guiding thread of each and every attempt at translation and the express synergy between this undertaking and Heidegger’s thinking as such. As a result, the entry point into the arena of translation would become problematic for the first time, in such a way as to raise a question concerning the hermeneutic elements for translating his writings.

As early as 1993, William J. Richardson, S.J., pointed to the “formidable challenge” that the publication of the *Beiträge* posed, not only for re-interpreting the basic thrust of Heidegger’s thought but also, by implication, for the possibility of translating such a highly singular and idiomatic text.4 The magnitude of the

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Introduction

challenge carries with it a double responsibility born of preserving the originality of his thought and negotiating the turbulent sea of its “formidable” syntax (including the wave of criticisms that would inevitably follow the appearance of this translation). But what is the origin of such criticisms, whence do they come? What we might glean (rather than dismissing them) is a reminder of a response that Heidegger made in addressing the charge of the “violence” of his radical reinterpretation of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. Specifically, the need to break with convention is an essential dynamic of thinking, for only by standing and abiding within the crucible of conflict can philosophy renounce its pretense of sovereignty and instead belong to what is “original.” In this originality resides the sheltering (Bergung) that welcomes the risk of error—for the translator as well as the thinker—and thereby prepares for a “leap” (Sprung) into what is singular and ownmost in our experience of language. There is, then, a doubling of the challenge of the Beiträge, such that the “leap” with which Heidegger reserves to thinking has its own mode of enactment, or “re-enactment,” as it were, in the endeavor to translate that formidable text. In a way, paralleling the “violence” of Heidegger’s Kant-interpretation, translation of this “first magnitude” is itself a venture, a “leap” into a crucible of conflict.

When Parvis Emad undertook the “Herculean task” of translating Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), he entered this crucible. In an analogous way to Heidegger’s “violent” encounter with the Western tradition, we might expect that the attempt to translate the key terms of his second most important text would unleash its own disruptive forces. We would also expect, conversely, that the more daring the venture, the more heated would be the criticism, which inevitably follows. Such has been the case with Contributions to Philosophy, which from its publication in 1999 has become a lightening rod of controversy among various critics. Indeed, some scholars have exaggerated their criticisms in an effort to parody the most radical aspects of this translation, including its effort to evoke the dynamism of being through such unusual expressions as “essential swaying” (Wesung) and “enquivering” (Erzittern). While the evaluation of any translation poses its own unique challenge, we must make a deliberate effort to access its impact as a whole, rather than considering it in a piecemeal fashion.

In this regard, the most vehement criticisms can also serve as “contrary indicators” to how the English translation of Beiträge remains uncompromising in its search for original meanings, as well as testing the limits of language. What in the eyes of Emad’s critics appears as creative license may portend a higher lawfulness and

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loyalty to the word (wortgetreu) in the sense that Heidegger emphasizes when he describes the singularity of the saying of being:

The manifold meanings of saying (die Mehrdeutigkeit der Sage) in no way consist in a mere accumulation of significations that arise arbitrarily. It resides in a play that, the richer it unfolds, remains all the more rigorously maintained in a concealed rule....This is why the saying remains bound to a supreme law. This law is the freedom that frees us for the ever playful jointure of never resting transformation.7

The enactment of this freedom governs all translation “decisions,” including other possible or alternative renderings of such key terms. For the sake of both underscoring the originality of Emad’s approach, as well as to alert the audience to other possibilities of translation, we need to consider briefly previous precedents for rendering Ereignis, on the one hand, and, on the other, the prospect of their resurfacing in future translations of Beiträge (as well as in other texts of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe). Past, present (and presumably future) uses of “appropriation” or “event of appropriation” as cognates for the German term “Ereignis” suggest an important benefit, albeit primarily a negative one: namely, of employing standard English terms without coining a new expression or neologism, as in the case of “enowning.” These “standard” (or dictionary-based) translations offer advantages of clarity and familiarity, particularly for philosophical schools where the convenience of “plugging in” conceptual formulas outweighs the difficulty of unveiling new idioms. Conversely, any future translations may follow suit in their efforts to reach a broader audience, in which the demand for greater accessibility (and hence “readability”) becomes paramount.8 In this case, perhaps the best adjudicator of these disagreements over translating Ereignis and other key terms may not lie in any present rebuttals, but rather in the calm and patient resolve of what history decides through future generations that study his thought. Ultimately, what will prevail or emerge as the decisive factor is the measure of faithfulness to Heidegger’s own hermeneutic methodology, rather than the voice that can be heard loudest over the clash of polemical viewpoints.

In considering two past precedents (as well as future alternatives) for translating the word “Ereignis,” namely “event of appropriation” or simply “appropriation,” the perspective of the novice might provide the best litmus test.9 The term “appropriate,”

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8 In the past decade, proposals for a new translation of Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), have surface, beginning with the brief excerpt, “Ereignis,” published in The Heidegger Reader, ed. Günter Figal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 177–188. The translation of this excerpt is by Jerome Veith (based on a draft by D. Schmidt, D. F. Krell, and R. Rojcewicz, see footnote, p. 177).

whose meaning is frequently gleaned from economic and fiscal discussions (e.g., budgetary matters in state and federal government), is not a familiar expression in everyday discourse. Put in Heidegger’s terms, its philosophical meaning can only be conveyed by appealing to a formal indicator, which highlights an activity in which each of us can participates, that is, the endeavor of “making one’s own.” For example, we tell our students that they have learned or understood the class material only when they can re-state it in their own words, that is, “appropriate” it. Put in the simplest way, to appropriate means to “make one’s own.” The more esoteric term “appropriate” still refers back to a simpler root in English of “owning,” “ownership,” and, most of all, of “coming into its own.” To take another example, we might advise a student to pursue a career path in which he/she can “appropriate” what he/she may have learned—a suggestion which, despite its vagueness, entails that the individual develops his/her “ownmost” talents, that is, what is uniquely one’s “own.” When the attempt is then made to translate “Ereignis” as “appropriation” or even as “event of appropriation,” we cannot deny that “owning” remains an important element in understanding that term. Conversely, we must also acknowledge that by rendering “Ereignis” through the neologism “enowning,” a new precedent is set, which allows the German idiom to speak from the simplest roots of our language (that is, from “en-owning”).

The controversy over how to translate “Ereignis,” as well as other key terms in Beiträge, should serve as a counterchallenge for the staunchest critics of Contributions to Philosophy, and, most of all, for future generations who herald the other onset of thinking. Indeed, we immediately confront this challenge upon pondering the enigma of how to translate the “essential heading” or parenthetical title, “Vom Ereignis.” Not only must we consider the meaning of the word “Ereignis,” but must also yield to the enactment of its thinking (by and from the gifting-refusal of being). To be sure, one alternative rendering of this subtitle as simply “of the Event” may resonate with some readers, even while the significance of the “of” (as conveying the nuance of the word “vom”) remains unquestioned in its role in the overall attempt to express the dynamic of “Ereignis.” As we will examine in a subsequent section of this “Introduction,” the substitution of “event” for “Ereignis” (and, by the same token, rendering of the subtitle as “of the Event”), which some readers may welcome due to its simplicity, illustrates both how immeasurably nuanced and extremely difficult these “translation decisions” are. As a result, the world of “academic reviews” may cross an entire spectrum of perspectives in evaluating the English translation of Beiträge. But the extremes may also tell us something, whether in characterizing this task as a “hard nut to crack” or as a “hermeneutic labor,” on the one hand, or, on the other, pointing to a kind of juggernaut in the attempt to translate

10For an example of this way of translation, the “Essential Heading” of Contributions to Philosophy, see Dennis J. Schmidt’s “Foreword” to Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), p. xvii.

11See Kovacs, op cit, pp. 320, 325.
key terms that appear so idiosyncratic as to seem almost “untranslatable.” Indeed, however one sorts out this debate (as will be the aim of one of the papers in this volume), the negativity of the “Angst” over it only reinforces the importance of the translation, and, reciprocally, how monumental the publication of Beiträge zur Philosophie has proven to be. In this regard, the ongoing controversy serves as a reminder of how profound the “impact” of the publication of Contributions to Philosophy has been. While a so-called “politician,” rather than a philosopher, might be tempted to tally votes “pro” and “con,” Heidegger cautions against such tactics: a so-called “consensus” may be as much a barometer of falsehood as of truth.

If we steer away from the caustic character of the academic climate today, and follow Heidegger’s lead of tempering the urge to “pass judgment,” then we can come to a clearer and calmer recognition that the importance of the English translation does not lie in its “finality” or even in a pretense of “perfection,” but, on the contrary, in the “provisional” attempt to proceed along the path of thinking and to reside in the singularity of its language. In this regard, we need to separate the polemics of the criticism, and even the “defense” of the English translation, from a hermeneutically mediated, self-reflexively formulated observation concerning the limitations of this translation. As Emad emphasizes in his book, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, the best we can ever strive for is an “approximate” translation.

In a parallel way to the task of thinking, translation remains an opened-ended challenge. When we begin from the simplicity of this insight, we can get beyond the impasse of contentiousness that not only contains its own pitfalls, but also blocks our access to Heidegger’s thought. After addressing the interface between translation and Heidegger’s understanding of language, we will outline his strategy for translating the key words of Beiträge (including Ereignis and Abgrund).

3 Heidegger’s Thinking and Its Kinship with Language

However we gauge the importance of the English translation of Beiträge zur Philosophie, we need to consider its impact within the larger context of Martin Heidegger’s thinking as a whole. Within the twentieth century, Heidegger emerges as the philosopher par excellence who took up the ultimate challenge of re-asking the most basic of all philosophical questions, namely the question of the “meaning” of being.

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13 See Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 37, 39.
Not merely as a philosophical concept, but as an enigma surrounding the origin and use of the word “being” itself, the concern for the “meaning of being” has implications both for the central role that language plays in Heidegger’s inquiry and for his methodology of investigation. In terms of his method, Heidegger developed “hermeneutic-phenomenology” as a way of addressing the “meaning of being” in light of the human power to understand it and develop new interpretations thereof throughout the course of the philosophical tradition. Yet hermeneutic-phenomenology is also uniquely suited for exploring the etymology and ancestry of the most basic philosophical terms, and then for providing guidelines to “interpret” the various meanings of these key idioms insofar as they enrich our understanding of being. The fact that the meanings pertaining to “being” are not self-evident, and may even be obscured in the words of the great philosophers, creates a twofold problem. First, the activity of philosophizing or thought can no longer be considered apart from the language by which it achieves expression; and, secondly, the words by which the great thinkers speak, including Heidegger, also require a hermeneutic-phenomenological explication of their roots and backgrounds, that is, they need an “intralingual translation.” For this endeavor is shaped by the ongoing struggle of thought to find new ways for expressing the most perennial philosophical motifs, which in Heidegger’s case occurs *eo ipso* through the native idioms of his own German language.

The fact that the concern for translation should become central to Heidegger’s enterprise is not accidental, but, on the contrary, is already prefigured in the design and methodology by which he formulates the question of the “meaning of being.” Indeed, the need to recover the meaning of the most basic philosophical idioms through an act of “intralingual” translation already implies that the language of thinking cannot be monopolized by a native tongue. By the same token, if thinking is to become truly “historical,” it must be able to render the most basic philosophical idioms into other possibilities of expression, that is, through an act of “interlingual translation.” As Emad describes in his book, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, any attempt to translate terms from one language into another, that is, to engage in “interlingual” translation (as we commonly refer to the task of translation), proceeds from and finds its direction through a prior “intralingual” translation. Put simply, *interlingual translation requires intralingual translation, and vice versa*. Moreover, this scenario is not just one aspect of Heidegger’s thinking, but instead constitutes the crowning message of his hermeneutic-phenomenological methodology and, in his own words, the task faced by what he calls “being-historical thinking.”

For many of us who have been following along the journey of Heidegger’s thought for years, if not decades, it is often difficult to put ourselves in the position of the “novice” who is faced with the daunting challenge of entering the labyrinth of Heidegger’s philosophy. Before much understanding can develop, the novice may frequently be struck by an experience so fundamental, as to suggest why the

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14 For a discussion of this important distinction, see Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, pp. 21–42.
issue of translation becomes inextricably tied to the challenge of understanding Heidegger’s thought. If there is any undeniable fact, it is that Heidegger’s philosophy depends upon terms whose meanings appear to be remarkably different than their customary use. For example, even his coinage of “Da-sein,” as the term for human existence as “standing out” toward possibilities, poses as great a challenge for its use in the original German, as does its attempted translation in English.15 But the appreciation of this simple example cuts two ways, insofar as the novel use of this key term in English hinges upon a parallel innovativeness of its “meaning” within the German language. Thus the English-speaking student will discover that in order to study Heidegger’s thought, it is necessary to gain at least some minimal appreciation for the German language. In other words, in taking his/her first step, the student has already experienced a “slippage,” a strange dissociation, and consequently their realization that his/her capacity to understand Heidegger hinges on a fragile relation to language, and, in some mysterious way, this frailty is linked to the problem of “translation.”

And yet, even with this simple revelation, there is no easy way to isolate this problem. Because given Heidegger’s unique way of re-asking the most perennial of all philosophical questions, namely the question of the “meaning” (Sinn) of being, even a concept that is as ostensibly straightforward as “translation” may become “worthy of questioning” in its own right. As we shall discover, a foremost example of the method Heidegger develops in order to guide his philosophical investigation is the distinctive way in which he intertwines the following two concerns as they mutually implicate each other: (a) the concern with “what is translation, insofar as it pertains to understanding and interpreting the key terms of his philosophy” and (b) the concern with the question of being. He calls this method “hermeneutics.” In order to address “being” in the precise manner in which it becomes manifest, or shows itself, that is, in order to enact “phenomenology,” Heidegger employs the term hermeneutics as the chief innovation to radicalize the approach that his mentor, Edmund Husserl, pioneered. As a result, Heidegger calls his distinctive methodology “hermeneutic phenomenology.” Unlike previous philosophical methods, the unfolding of hermeneutic phenomenology does not depend on the intellectual stance of the philosopher, but, as I shall show in the course of this introduction, begins from the “vague” and imprecise “pre-philosophical” level of understanding being, that is, the uncovering of the initial obscurity that serves as the “signpost” and the first lesson on the long and arduous path of thinking. Constituting a foremost example of what he calls the “hermeneutical situation,” this unfolding is also reflected in the vagueness concerning our initial understanding of the issue of translation and in the clues that this vagueness provides about the point of departure of Heidegger’s philosophy. The hermeneutical situation comprises the initial set of presuppositions that guide

any attempt to formulate the question of being, and to address being’s manifestation in light of the “intra- and interlingually” translated “key words” and central motifs of Heidegger’s thought. As we will discover throughout this volume, the hermeneutical situation also provides the translator with the provisional “foothold” and orientation to undertake the task of translating Heidegger’s writings. The more fully we understand the implications of Heidegger’s hermeneutic-phenomenology, the more can we also appreciate this initial “lesson” in understanding his philosophy. First, we distinguish that “thinking” in Heidegger’s unique enactment of it, always occurs by “dwelling” within and, indeed, in relation to the ownmost (Wesen) of language. Secondly, we realize that because Heidegger’s own language includes a unique range of idioms, which hark back to their German roots, and in a few cases to their Greek ancestry, the task of translation (no matter how vaguely conceived) leads to the heart of his enterprise. Thirdly, we realize that no matter how carefully we attempt to arrange the basic concepts of Heidegger’s philosophy into an elaborate system, this pursuit can never be substituted for the transformation that comes from embracing the first two points, that is, the interaction between Heidegger’s enactment of thinking and the unique range of his idioms. In this regard, while an introduction such as this seeks to sketch the interconnectedness of many of Heidegger’s central concepts, its unique approach proceeds from the example of his own hermeneutic situation within whose horizon each of us, as students, first become acquainted with his philosophy. I shall highlight this by pointing to specific instances of transformation that stem from Heidegger’s use of key words, insofar as they open up a distinctive “gateway” to his thinking.

As more and more volumes of Martin Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe have been published and translated, the questions as to precisely what the task of translation involves, as well as the role it plays in appropriating his thinking, have never been more important. Unlike his predecessors, Heidegger’s thinking bears upon, is intimately tied to, and ultimately illuminates, the task of translation itself. In this respect, the question of translation wields a double-edged sword. For the hermeneutic guidelines that direct his inquiry into the question of being are precisely those that govern any attempt to translate texts, including Heidegger’s own. This statement echoes a provocative remark that Heidegger makes in one of the lecture-courses he devoted to the great German poet, Friedrich Hölderlin: “Tell me what you think about translation, and I will tell you who you are.”16 In this regard, translation is not merely an addendum to thought, but, understood “intralingually” as well as “interlingually,” is intimately joined with the task of thinking. With this observation, the precise focus of this anthology comes to the forefront insofar as its title, Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking, captures the intricate relation between translation and thinking.

The “Being-Historical Perspective” of Heidegger’s Thought

The order of words in the title of this volume is not coincidental, but stems from a priority emerging in Heidegger’s own thinking and, ultimately, from the development of its “being-historical perspective.” We need to elaborate precisely how this being-historical perspective both governs and comes to light in the key terms of his thinking. Indeed, the advantage provided by this focus on translation is that, rather than simply “defining” the key terms of his philosophy as a pedagogical tool to help the reader, we are directly led into a discussion of the “meaning” of these terms and their point of origination from within the ownmost of language. By explicating the meaning of these key terms, we can gain a hermeneutic foothold within Heidegger’s inquiry into being and the language of his own thinking. In the process, we enter into a hermeneutic circle of understanding and interpretation, by which the meanings of the key terms of his philosophy come to be developed and amplified. This hermeneutic dimension, however, applies equally to Heidegger himself, insofar as he is already engaged in the “intralingual” translation of familiar German words, “Ereignis” and “Abgrund,” transforming these through his intralingual translation into “Er-eignis” and “Ab-grund,” that is, two key terms governing his philosophy. These terms, in particular, are “being-historical” words in the sense that they originate from the thinking of and by being and its endeavor to inhabit the ownmost of language as the “place” for the manifestation of being throughout the course of history as etched specifically in the philosophical tradition.

It is easy to overlook, however, the importance that the being-historical perspective has for understanding/interpreting/translating the key terms of Heidegger’s philosophy. The more we are drawn into the orbit of being-historical thinking, the more the power of the verbal form “to be,” and the corresponding syntax of its expression, dislodges our reliance upon the familiar, conventional styles of understanding, which are rooted in metaphysical concepts and substantialist grammar. Or, put another way, Contributions to Philosophy raises the bar in our understanding of Heidegger, in such a way as to give priority to its language, and thereby thrust into the foreground the concern for translating his key terms of his thinking (both as it applies intralingually to the development of his own distinctive German idioms and interlingually to the possibility of rendering their meanings in English). And here a distinctive philosophical problem arises. Because Heidegger’s being-historical words are themselves granted from this otherwise withdrawn (indeterminate) dimension, that is, from “Ereignis,” and hence unfold in the creative tension of this “in-between” (Zwischen)—whether through the hermeneutic figure of an intermediary or “intralingual” receiving of a gift—their meanings cannot simply be mapped upon corresponding terms in a dictionary. Rather, another application of the “hermeneutical circle” occurs, such that the thinking enacted in these being-historical words can alone “project open” their meanings, and, conversely, this manner of projecting-opening (“vom Ereignis”) allows for the understanding, interpretation, and appropriation of Heidegger’s philosophy. These hermeneutic guidelines, however,
can never be formalized into an explicit “theory of translation,” because they spring from a deeper lawfulness residing within the silent depths of language, that is, within its ownmost.

By virtue of this new projecting–opening (which we can figuratively describe as a “hermeneutic circle”), our understanding of Heidegger’s key philosophical terms are necessarily prefaced by his own “intralingual” translation of them (including most explicitly the “being-historical” words beginning with “Er-eignis”). Insofar as these key words originate from the dimension of “Er-eignis,” Heidegger’s enactment of their intralingual translation, first and foremost in the case of this word itself, pave the way for their rendering into English, or their interlingual translation. As a result, the directive (der Hinweis) of Heidegger’s own thought suggests the idiom for the proper English translation. As the foremost example, then, Er-eignis is translated as “en-owning,” rather than the “conventional” meanings of a dictionary via such presumably “equivalent” cognates as “appropriation,” “event of appropriation,” or simply “event.” No dictionary can come to rescue here (even for the German speaker). For a hermeneutic transformation has occurred in the saying and unfolding of language, which “raises the bar” higher than any dictionary can reach. This basic insight then has profound repercussions for carrying out the task of rendering Heidegger’s German terms into English (or their interlingual translation). Put simply, what we can characterize as “decisions” of translation stem from a care for and responsiveness to the word. As a result of safeguarding the word in this way, and returning into the sheltering stillness of its silent depths, a “hermeneutic responsibility” of translation governs the rendering of the key words of Heidegger’s philosophy into English. From the perspective of being-historical thinking, Ereignis points to a transformation that both grants being the possibility to appear, and allocates a reciprocal place (for its appearing) through the haven of language. Heidegger’s clarity on this point and against his various warnings have not detoured commentators, however, from erring on both sides: either falsely equating Ereignis with “being” (Sein), or giving some kind of quasi-mystical, “trans-historical” status as

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18 See Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 10–11. Emad points to the error of a “monological reductionism” at the basis of such renderings of Ereignis (enowning) as “event.” Also see p. 33. For a recent example of rendering “Ereignis” as “event,” see The Heidegger Reader, p. 177. The title of the excerpt from Beiträge, that is, “Ereignis,” is left untranslated.

19 For a discussion of the “responsibility” as it bears on the task of translation, see Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 21–42 (Chapter I).

20 As an example of this false equation, or view of Ereignis as another “name” for being, see Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 258–259.
an “event” outside of and beyond being’s manifestation in history. Though most of this confusion can simply be attributed to misconstruing Heidegger’s philosophy, we cannot underestimate the pivotal role that the early (mis)translations of the word “Ereignis” had in perpetrating these false understandings. For over three decades, such an imprecise rendering as “event” and “event of appropriation” has created a climate of misunderstanding, in which the tendency has been either to construe Ereignis as another kind of “happening” or “occurrence” (albeit a peculiar one), or to hypostatize Ereignis as a mystical force. Even more recently, with the emphasis on the so-called “early” phase of Heidegger’s development, commentators have invoked false linguistic constructions of the impersonal “it” that presumably parallels human facticity (while trying to connect this “it” with Heidegger’s early use of the word Ereignis). But no matter what forms these confusions take, they all reveal a common failure to follow Heidegger’s lead, and consider the clue provided by the hyphenated form of the word, that is, “Er-eignis.”

In this regard, two considerations immediately follow. First, by exploring the root of the term, we discover that any translation of Er-eignis must include the connotations of “eignis,” and their conservatorship, that is, in English, of “owning,” of coming into its own. Accordingly, if “being” is in some ways to be “granted,” in accord with “it gives” (es gibt) or “there are” beings, then the granting of this dynamic must already yield (in the sense of originating/belonging) its “own” preservation: hence the need to use the English prefix “en-” for indicating the “enabling” that comes with that “yielding” and “owning.” And this enabling–yielding, in the counter balance of preservation, is a more strained way of expressing what already speaks in the idiom “en-owning.” Secondly, the idiom speaks from Ereignis, and, correlatively, how the latter arises from within, engages, and transforms language itself, including how to “say” the most basic words of thinking. Because Ereignis is involved in the immanent transformation of “saying” (Sage), there is no warrant for employing the term “event,” or even “event of appropriation,” as hermeneutically responsible renditions of Er-eignis. An “event” implies something “external,” a “before” and “after,” a distance, a sequence and hence can never approximate an enabling–yielding transformation from within language—a transformation divested of all “before” and “after,” of all causality, and “sequentiality,” which requires no basis for its preservation than “its own.”

Given this dual emphasis on “enowning,” both in the structure of the word and the thinking thereof, we then discover why the parallel designation of “belonging” should assume the importance it does. Indeed, when a “relationship” implies a priority in the joining of one to another, that is, where a sense of “belonging” prevails, a guidance for “coming into its own” must already be entailed. Put simply, without

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22 For a critique of this error reifying of Ereignis by equating it with an “impersonal” it, see Thomas Kalary, “Towards Sketching the Genesis of Being and Time,” *Heidegger Studies*, 16 (2000): 200–205.
“enowning” there can be no intimacy of belonging. But what, then, in Heidegger’s terms, is said to “belong,” and thereby be joined in a reciprocity so fundamental as to preclude a separation? Of course, thinking becomes possible only by virtue of a relationship in which it belongs to being, and that belonging together also enables being to allocate a “place” for its appearing. And what in turn arises to shape the “in-between” (Zwischen) of this intersection, and thereby springs from the depths of “enowning”? And the answer in turn is language, whose example of “transformed saying” alone confirms why “enowning,” and not the other alternatives, can serve as an acceptable rendering of “Ereignis.”

Because of the long-standing precedent set by other renderings of Er-eignis, the acceptance of its translation as “enowning” has been somewhat gradual—and, as we have discussed, at times staunchly contested—throughout the field of Heidegger studies. Yet, while this may in part be due to the fact that “old habits die hard,” we must also recognize that only a decade has elapsed since the publication of Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning). There have been, however, noteworthy examples where commentators have adopted the terminology of this English translation and employed “enowning” as the pivotal term to express the subtleties, in Heidegger’s words, of “Ereignisdenken,” or “thinking enowning.” Certainly Daniela Vallega-Neu stands out among these commentators by making the term “enowning” the preferred translation in her commentary on Contributions to Philosophy, as well as in her recent book, The Bodily Dimension in Thinking.24 “Enowning” guides thinking in responding to being’s openness, and allowing this reciprocity to unfold in order that thought can be experienced as “enowned” through its devotion to the word. Through the conservatorship of enowning, language can then provide a place for being’s disclosure.

By the same token, only by following Heidegger’s example of his being-historical thinking, does it becomes possible to experience the transforming power of his “en-owned” intra-lingual translation of such words as “Wesen.” By recalling the root of Er-eignis, and recognizing that it echoes in “eigen” and in “eignis,” we discover the clue for translating a parallel term such as “Wesen”; this translation explicitly circumvents the metaphysical and substantialist overtones of “essentialism,” which occurs through the customary rendering of Wesen as “essence.” By following the hermeneutic guideline of translating Er-eignis as “en-owning,” we see that “eigen” echoing in “eignis” also harbors the connotation of what is most “its own,” and thereby suggests a more precise and felicitous way to translate Wesen, that is, as “ownmost” rather than “essence.” Yet without following this hermeneutic guideline,

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as the evidence of recent literature shows, even deconstructionists who most vehemently condemn “essentialism” can easily relapse into a language of “essences,” and hypostatize Ereignis as a transhistorical reality beyond history.\textsuperscript{25}

The fact that the dual errors of mistranslating and misinterpreting Heidegger’s writings are intertwined, rather than disparate occurrences, indicates in the converse a fundamental hermeneutic principle: namely that translation is integral to the task of thinking. If by thinking along with Heidegger we respond to and are duly transported into the unconcealment of being, then in the most humble way we become both beneficiaries and guardians of the truth. Yet, if there is indeed an intimacy between translation and the task of thinking, then it is by engaging in the concern “ownmost” to the former, that is, by safeguarding the word, that we also “belong” to truth as the disclosive power of language. Indeed, within the domain of “enowning,” this relation of “belonging” first becomes possible. Such is the decree, declaration, and testimony of Ereignis as “enowning.” By the same token, in translating Ereignis as “enowning,” the guidance that arises is not arbitrary, but instead prevails in the manner of a “gift,” that is, from “enowning,” and of its truth as a claim that governs the translation. Because of the gifting that gently guides the decision of how to translate the key words of Heidegger’s thinking, responsible translation is also an act of humility. As Emad emphasizes, the translator must ultimately “abdicate the throne he occupies when he conceives of himself as the master and the lord of language,” in order that the power (Kraft) of the most elemental words can prevail.\textsuperscript{26}

There are instances, of course, when the resiliency of the translator, in all his/her forbearance and humility, becomes severely tested: that is, at key junctures where the “thrownness” into the ownmost language, that is, into its Wesen is most emphatic and the stakes of translating the keywords of Heidegger’s philosophy are at their highest. Perhaps, the noteworthy example stems from the decision to translate “Abgrund,” not as either “abyss” or “abysmal ground,” as the all-too dubious “conventional wisdom” might have it, but instead through the singular, and thereby, thoughtful neologism, “ab-ground.” In contrast to the recently adopted alternative, abground, “abysmal ground” neglects the nuance of hesitation, refusal, and reservedness, which harbors the mystery inherent in the concealment of being. The term “abground” elicits the connotation of refusal that reverberates in the hyphenation of Ab-grund, allowing the prefix “ab” to play out the nuance of “staying away.”\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25}See Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit, pp. 212–213.
\textsuperscript{26}See Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 39. See GA 2, p. 262.
\textsuperscript{27}Heidegger, Besinnung, GA 66 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997b), p. 361. Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London: Continuum, 2006), p. 251. See Emad’s and Kalary’s “Translators’ Foreword,” pp. xix–xx. Also, see Emad’s and Maly’s “Translators’ Foreword to Contributions to Philosophy,” pp. xxii–xxiii. As Kenneth Maly explains the preference for abground over abyss: “Abgrund says the staying-away of ground that is part and parcel of Grund. Thus, not an ‘abyss,’ which ‘opens up’ and into which one might ‘fall’”—thus not something that thinking might even consider to avoid—but rather the staying-away of ground that inheres in the ground itself. Thus: not abyss, but ‘abground.’” Kenneth Maly, “Translating Heidegger’s Works into English: The History and the Possibility,” Heidegger Studies, 16 (2000): 136–137.
The English term “abground” is an example of a “neologism,” whose leap of innovation breaks the shackles of conventional usage and answers to a more primordial law of freedom. Such a response to freedom must ultimately “go against the grain” of what the language of the dictionary suggests as a suitable (English) cognate for the German term. Translating *Abgrund* in a way that heeds the relation to ground, rather than denies it altogether, averts the misunderstanding of the deconstructionists who claim that Heidegger’s later thought comes to fruition in the “groundless” play of *différence*. In this regard, we must pay special attention to the translation of such words as *Ereignis* and *Abgrund*. By hyphenating these words, Heidegger assigns independent status to the prefixes *er* and *ab,* He thereby leads us into the space of freedom, which remains inaccessible through the simple use of a dictionary. In its dynamic unfolding, this “free space” joins together the “gift” of language with the ownmost responsibility to it as inseparable in the open resolve (*Ent-schlossenheit*), which guides the translation. A responsible translation, then, proceeds from a prior attunement to the “‘gathered ringing of stillness’” (*das Geläut der Stille*) of language, which thereby revisits Heidegger’s own “intralingual” translation as the prelude for rendering the key words of his philosophy. There is, however, a critical counter focus we need to emphasize in order to unfold the hermeneutic elements of the task of translation. An important transformation occurs in light of: (1) Heidegger’s being-historical words, (2) their enactment in thinking, and (3) their rendering into English, changing our understanding, interpretation, and appropriation of Heidegger’s philosophy, and affecting how we look at the hitherto renderings of his key terms in the various English translations of the *Gesamtausgabe*. We witness another rotation of the hermeneutic circle in which the initial fore-having or pre-understanding, which guide these early translations, must be taken back into the wider orbit of the illumination/projecting opening of being-historical thinking. But with this observation, we come to another important crossroad; indeed, we come even to an uncomfortable moment of self-evaluation and self-criticism. For among the early translations of the *Gesamtausgabe*, we must also include Emad’s (and Maly’s) rendering of Heidegger’s lectures from 1930/31, or volume 30, *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.* Indeed, absent the insight into the language of *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, Emad (and his co-translator) skirted the question of how to translate the term *Wesen* throughout _Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (1988).

28 For a discussion of the keys to translating these terms, see Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, pp. 31–35, 38–40.


Here, the issue becomes, as mentioned above, whether the reverberation of the being-historical words exacts new distinctions surrounding the meaning of “Wesen,” which throws out of joint its isomorphism with the dictionary cognate (i.e., conventional, metaphysical term “essence”).

In this context, the so-called “rightness” or “wrongness” becomes secondary to the search for an alternative rendering, which could resonate with the meanings of the being-historical words, and thereby, based on Heidegger’s own intralingual translation and interpretation of Wesen as “eigneste,” that is, “ownmost,” exact a “new decision” in regard to translating Wesen as “ownmost” rather than as “essence.”31 By circumscribing “Wesen” in terms of “ownmost,” Heidegger offers one of his foremost examples of “intra-lingually” translating the key words of his thought. As soon as we acknowledge this alternative translation, we short circuit any attempt to correlate Heidegger’s thinking with a substantialist metaphysics of “essences,” and with the stance of “essentialism” to which some of his critics, particularly in the deconstructionist camp, mistakenly sought to reduce his philosophy. When viewed in retrospect, the importance of the decision to translate Wesen as “ownmost,” rather than “essence,” becomes quite clear: an “essence” is what is shared by all the member of a given class—that is, as such, “essence” does not stand for what is “ownmost” to each member of a given class.32 Conversely, we can readily see how the mistranslation of Wesen as “essence” gives rise to the inappropriate characterization of Heidegger’s philosophy as “essentialism,” and how easily this blatant misunderstanding would have been avoidable. Because false criticisms and misinterpretations can easily result due to these errors, the care by which we translate the key words of Heidegger’s thinking, far from being merely an academic exercise, proves to be integral to understanding his philosophy. Or, put in the terms

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31 See GA 9, p. 141.

32 Without the guidance of this hermeneutic precondition or strategic insight into the nature of translation, Emad encountered an initial obstacle in the form of a centuries old, metaphysical presumption that there is a simple identity holding between the key terms of Heidegger’s philosophy and their English cognates, most noteworthy, the patently obvious and yet for that reason questionable precedent of using “essence” as a dictionary equivalent for “Wesen.” Almost a decade later when Emad co-translated volume 25 of the Gesamtausgabe, the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, (1997) he began to establish a more solid “foothold” in the hermeneutic situation of translating Heidegger’s texts. See Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, GA 25 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977b). Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). Standing on the threshold of uncovering the hermeneutical basis of translation, Emad discovered clues, which had hitherto lay dormant in other of Heidegger’s works, specifically, in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, in which, as hindsight shows, Heidegger was already enacting an “intralingual” translation of the word “Wesen” and thereby suggesting how to translate it into English. In a key passage in this work, Heidegger observes that “To attribute being-in-the-world to Dasein as its basic constitution means to state something about its Wesen, i.e., its ownmost inner possibility (sein eigene innere Möglichkeit).” See Heidegger, “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” in Wegmarken, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976a, b, c), p. 141.
in which Emad came to crystallize his pioneering insight (despite the limitations of his initial hermeneutic foothold in his translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit), there is a hermeneutic synergy between “intralingual translation,” “interlingual translation,” and the “interpretation” of Heidegger’s writings.33

The implications that follow from unfolding the hermeneutical situation of translation are obvious, including the preliminary guideline for translating the key words of Heidegger’s philosophy. But the conflict that bears fruit is first and foremost the self-criticism, which Emad brought to this mission from his previous venture into translation and lengthy journey it embodies. As such, Emad’s unique path illustrates how his translations comprise a body of work in their own right; and how this work arises from a specific “hermeneutical situation,” or set of presuppositions, in which the translator resides and first undertakes his task. Given this hermeneutical situation, the keys to translating would not come easily or overnight. Instead, they would emerge as the result of the “backward–forward” dynamic of Emad’s lifelong encounter with Heidegger’s thought or, put another way, on the basis of the same temporality that projects open our human capacity to understand. In this regard, the first translation of his several translations of volumes of the Gesamtausgabe, the 1930/31 lecture-course text, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, illustrates how Emad was still on the way to a crucial insight, namely, that the key idioms in Heidegger’s writings were already “translations” in their own right. From this brief assessment of the “hermeneutic situation” of the translator, we should not conclude anything specifically about the problems inherent in any attempt at translating a text, but, on the contrary, acknowledge the unique parallel between translation and thinking: namely, that errancy is the repository of future lessons, just as being’s withdrawal thrusts thought into the lighting concealment (lichtende Verbergung).34

By the same token, whoever ventures to translate Heidegger’s writings must follow his example, insofar as that guidance serves as the “go-between,” the “Hermes” to which all translation, by virtue of its hermeneutical situation, is “owned.” Emad’s early venture into translation (a year before the publication of Beiträge zur Philosophie) proves to be instructive, not only because it provides a counter focus of criticism for our study, but also because it illustrates how we must be alert to the hermeneutic pre-understanding, which guides translation (i.e., whether it is in some way limited by our metaphysical pre-conceptions). In this regard, the primary lesson to be learned is that no translator can stand outside of the hermeneutical circle. In summation, through the guidance of Hermes, of this “emissary,” the intralingual act of translation transmits what is ownmost, in order to allow its “interlingual” counterpart to unfold (e.g., as the rendering of Heidegger’s German into English). Only because the transmission of what is “ownmost” already shapes interlingual translation can its adherence to the word direct us in translating the key terms of Heidegger’s philosophy and, by unfolding their deepest roots, also clear the way to address the methodology of translation.

33Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 31.
34GA 66, p. 259; tr. 229.
5 Errancy, Technicity, and the Turning

Heidegger’s enactment of being-historical thinking underscores the importance of the key terms or “grounding words” (Grundworte) that shape his attempt to re-ask the question of being and retrieve its implications throughout the history of philosophy. Indeed, we cannot underestimate the importance of the nuances of the words that sustain this question, insofar as they can easily be distorted in the translation of such pivotal notions as “Seinsvergessenheit” (forgottenness of being). For Heidegger, the emphasis on the “forgottenness” must be understood in its tension with the reciprocal possibility of “recollection” (Erinnerung) and vice versa. In directing the entire course of Western metaphysics, “enowning” as “gifting-refusal” equally preserves being in its mystery through the shelter of its concealment, thereby holding the promise of its “recollection” in its very “forgottenness.” As a result, the so-called “errancy” in the history of metaphysics is not just an “accident,” but instead displays a necessity because “enowning” shapes the tension of both possibilities simultaneously. In the sixth jointure of Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger appeals to the “last god” (der letzte Gott) to distinguish the tension of gifting-refusal, which transforms the concealment of being into a mystery, including the counter sway of the flight and return of the gods.\(^{35}\) The history of metaphysics, as the history of the “forgottenness of being,” is thereby not in vain, since it safeguards the “mystery” (Geheimnis) for its arrival in future possibilities of thinking.\(^{36}\)

Specifically, in re-examining the translation of “Vergessenheit,” we discover the inadequacies in such earlier renderings as “forgetting” (because of its accidental, as well as “subjectivistic” overtones), and “oblivion” as well. The rendering of Vergessenheit as “oblivion,” which became accepted decades ago with Joan Stambaugh’s translation of Identity and Difference,\(^{37}\) harbor the confusion of both missing the significance of the German root and creating the kind of false image of “decline,” “deterioration,” “demise,” and “dissolution” that Oswald Spengler popularized in his book (whose simplistic account of Western history Heidegger also severely criticized).\(^{38}\) In contrast to translating Vergessenheit as “forgottenness,” the


\(^{36}\)GA 65, pp. 411–412; tr. 289.

\(^{37}\)See Heidegger, Identität und Differenz, GA 11 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), p. 59 (die Vergessenheit der Differenz). Compare the German text with the English version (which is not based on the Gesamtausgabe edition), Identity and Difference, trans. J. Stambaugh, p. 50 (“the oblivion of the difference”).

latter (Stambaugh) translation blurs the counterpossibility of being’s historical recollection, and hence how “enowning” pervades refusal (whose dynamic remains lost in the English word “oblivion”). The following passage from Mindfulness reveals these nuances that are inherent in the being-historical word “Vergessenheit,” by specifically emphasizing that “forgottenness” is always prefaced by the “turning in enowning,” thereby preserving the possibility of being’s recollection: “The forgottenness of be-ing is the forgottenness that is held unto the ab-ground (that is, it is the forgottenness that is turned towards be-ing).”39

We now see how Er-eignis, both through Heidegger’s “intralingual” translation of the German prefix “er” into “eignis” and its “interlingual” rendering in English as “en-owning,” harbors the possibility of Seinsvergessenheit, not just as a negative, but as belonging to the dynamic of be-ing’s giving and refusal. While already implied in our discussion thus far, it is important to note Heidegger’s use of the old German word “Seyn” in both Contributions to Philosophy and Mindfulness. To differentiate this word from “Sein,” as Heidegger intends for it to speak directly from the domain of “enowning,” Emad employs the hyphenated form of the word “be-ing” to translate the old German term “Seyn.” This hyphenation, however, is not merely a linguistic marker, but instead evokes the transformation in our understanding of being to include the dynamic of giving and refusal. To quote from the “Translators’ Foreword” to Mindfulness:

> The singularity of the syntax of be-ing-historical thinking follows from the fact that this thinking is not a thinking about being but is one that is enowned by being. And insofar as this thinking itself is enowned by being, the translation of the syntax of this thinking must take its bearings from this enownment.40

By taking its “bearings” in this way, be-ing-historical thinking undertakes the task of “thinking enowning” (Ereignisdenken), in such a way that it first becomes possible to include the counter sway of errancy as the un-truth of concealment that is “en-owned” by be-ing and thereby “belongs” to truth as unconcealment. As Heidegger states in a crucial passage from Mindfulness:

> This errancy (Irre) itself is the clearing (openness-truth) of be-ing. Errancy does not set itself up against the truth, and is also not removed by truth and made to disappear. Rather, errancy is the appearing of the truth itself in its own sway. Errancy is that within which a particular interpretation of be-ing must err, which erring alone traverses the clearing of refusal—traverses in accord with the clearing of what is lighted up.41

Only because, as Er-eignis, the clearing of being also harbors the possibility of its opposite, can the history of metaphysics unfold as the history of an untruth, which culminates in the epoch of modern technicity. This untruth is not merely “nothing,” but instead provides the occasion to illuminate, through the onslaught of “machination,” the historical culmination of the philosophical

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39 GA 66, p. 217; tr. 191.
40 See “Translators’ Foreword” to Mindfulness, p. xxxix.
41 GA 66, p. 259; tr. 229.
Although a few thinkers within the twentieth century (including Ernst Jünger and John Dewey) recognized the dawn of the technological age, only Heidegger addressed “machination” as the clearing within which technology appears. By formulating the question of technicity as integral to the question of being, and as harboring a danger, which can only be confronted within the wider expanse of the clearing, he stands apart among all his contemporaries. Because technicity arises from the Western tradition’s tendency to subordinate being to beings, an historical confrontation with its metaphysical roots address the “forgottenness of being” as the source of the imminent danger pervading the final phase of metaphysics by raising the question concerning technicity. By the same token, being-historical thinking addresses the double-edged character of technicity as embodying both the culmination of modernity and as harboring an alternative possibility for being to manifest itself in a way that exposes technicity as the global danger it is. The forgottenness of being and its corollary “abandonment of being” (Seinsverlassenheit), leading to beings’ exclusively “instrumental” uses in technicity, however, is neither an “accident” nor a philosophical lapse of forgetting. Instead, this forgottenness occurs as a destiny, which shapes the entire course of Western history since its inception as belonging to the gifting-refusal of Ereignis. Enowning thereby reveals the internal necessity between the forgottenness of being and the history of metaphysics. For each stands in an intrinsic relation to the other’s essential correlate: forgottenness of being leads to the abandonment of beings (to their instrumental uses) and metaphysics as the “errancy” leads to the rise of modern technicity. By making these crucial connections, we discover (1) that “Seinsvergessenheit” has to be translated in a way that recognizes its necessary link to “Seinsverlassenheit,” that is, as “forgottenness” rather than as either “oblivion” or “forgetting”; and (2) that Ereignis, that is, “enowning,” as the giving within the refusal, shapes the destiny of Western metaphysics including its culmination in the modern epoch of technicity.

As it becomes more and more evident as we proceed, the careful interpretation of Heidegger’s thought can hinge, not only on rendering a single word (e.g., “Ereignis”) but also on the proper translation of such simple phrases as “das Seiende im Ganzen,” which is frequently mistranslated as “beings as a whole.” This simple phrase should be translated as “beings in a whole” where the seemingly innocuous preposition

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43 See GA 66, p. 369; tr. 327.
44 For the importance of this link, see Heidegger, “Seinsvergessenheit,” Heidegger Studies, 20 (2004): 9–14. Also, see GA 65, pp. 113–114; tr. 79.
“im” holds the key to this translation.\textsuperscript{45} The phrase, “being as a whole,” suggests an aggregate or collection of beings whose unity might be given through some kind of intuition about what all of them may have in common. One such example might be an intuition of a sphere called “nature.” As such, nature could be conceived either in

\textsuperscript{45}In translating Vergessenheit as “forgottenness,” rather than as “forgetting,” or “oblivion,” we discover an important example of how we can avert many crucial misunderstandings of Heidegger’s thought by practicing hermeneutically responsible translation. Yet there are even more subtle instances of errant translations that have prompted significant misunderstandings of Heidegger’s thought. Foremost among these is the errant decision to translate “das Seiende im Ganzen” sometimes as “beings as a whole,” and sometimes as “being as a whole,” while this technical phrase should have been translated as “beings in a whole.” The history of this error begins as early as the Krell/Capuzzi translation of Early Greek Thinking (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975a), reappearing in Krell’s translation of What Is Metaphysics? in Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), only to be preserved in the slightly modified version in the English edition of Pathmarks. See Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Here is an example of the initial error, which occurs in the Krell/Capuzzi translation of the essay “Moira,” in Early Greek Thinking: “One could certainly be justified in wondering further why Parmenides proceeds to give a special proof for this inclusion, particularly through the commonplace notion that aside from beings, and being in totality, there can be no other beings” (p. 80). We see this same error reemerge in the 1977 translation of “What Is Metaphysics?”: “In the inquiry concerning nothing such an inquiry beyond or over beings, as being as a whole, takes place.” See, Heidegger, “What Is Metaphysics?” in Basic Writings, p. 109. As the designation of the boldface in both instances suggests, of special note is the way in which Krell renders “das Seiende im Ganzen” as “being” not “beings” as a whole. First, we discover that by using the singular rather than the plural form “beings,” both translations fail to contrast das Seiende with das Sein, thereby obscuring the ontological difference. In the process, these translations ignore the uniqueness of being’s unconcealment, as a “singularity” to which no beings, even the “all-highest” or God, can compare. Secondly, we find that the two translations vacillate between using “totality” and “whole,” thereby disregarding the phenomenological fact that they are not the same. Thirdly, we see that the mistaken substitution of “as” for “in,” despite the fact that Heidegger’s word is “im” and not “als,” ignores that what is at stake in the phrase “das Seiende im Ganzen” is his concern for the situatedness of a being—any being—in a whole.

Yet when two decades later, the slightly modified version of the translation of “What Is Metaphysics?” is incorporated into the edition of Pathmarks, the identical error reappears in the same line. Let me quote the relevant passage from the 1998 English translation of “Was ist Metaphysik?”: “In the question concerning nothing such an inquiry beyond or over beings, being as a whole, takes place.” For examples, see Heidegger, “Was ist Metaphysik?”, Wegmarken, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976b), pp. 118–119. As different examples of how this line is translated, see “What Is Metaphysics?”, trans. D. F. Krell in Pathmarks, p. 93. In the “Notes” to Pathmarks, the editor points out that the “present edition is edited and revised by David Farrell Krell and William McNeill” (p. 366). This translation was based on the version that appeared in Basic Writings, p. 109. Although here “das Seiende” is properly translated as “beings” (rather than as “being”), the mistake of translating “im” as “as,” rather than as “in,” has not been corrected. The history of this error, however, does not end with the 1998 edition of Pathmarks. On the contrary, translating in 2003 one of Heidegger’s most crucial essays, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes perpetuate the same error made decades ago by Krell and Capuzzi when Young and Haynes use “beings as a whole,” instead of “beings in a whole.” To take a simple example, allow me to quote the following passage from “The Origin of the Work of Art”: “Now it is indeed possible that the idea of creation which is grounded in faith can lose its
modern terms as an aggregate of material objects, which are organized by the law of physics, or in ancient terms as the “natural” cycle of coming to be and passing away as an expression of φύσις. Yet even while the retrieval of this ancient perspective might appear to be the more desirable alternative, misinterpretations can still arise when the dynamic emergence of the beings themselves are privileged ahead of their manner of becoming present within the “clearing whole” as such. As a case in point, the contemporary version of “naturalism” is no different from pragmatism in its metaphysical presumptions, insofar as it succumbs to the illusion of “positing” “beings as a whole” as self-contained and independent. This positing detaches beings from the historical “clearing whole” in which they emerge, and ignores the gifting-refusal that yields different possibilities for their appearance in distinctive epochs.

By contrast, it is precisely by emphasizing how beings reside in the whole, and hence depend upon be-ing’s gifting-refusal, that we can also recognize how their manifestation occurs, not just accidentally or “willy-nilly,” but by belonging to a destiny. Indeed, it is only by virtue of this belongingness that beings in the whole emerge through a sheltering unconcealment, which abandons them to the exclusively instrumental uses of machination. Indeed, if it were not the case that the whole pervades the abandoning and the abandoning pervades the whole, there could never be a distinctive kind of uncovering within technicity’s “Gestell,” such that it could emerge as a global danger to both humanity and nature simultaneously. For what the “im” both “intra-lingually,” and “inter-lingually” as “beings in the whole” translates, is the significance of the double-genitive, that is, it is always the “being of beings” and the “beings of being.”46 Without the guidance of these “intralingual” and “interlingual” translations, however, multiple errors have arisen (e.g., as noted above, the naturalist misinterpretation of Heidegger and his pragmatist


46 As Emad points out, whether it be a “pair of shoes or Nietzsche’s new god,” a tool or a person, at stake in Heidegger’s emphasis on the situatedness of beings is the fact that any being, and the possibility of our knowledge thereof, always occurs “in” a whole. See Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 168. For his criticism of the translation of “das Seiende im Ganzen” as “being as a whole” see Emad, op cit, p. 188, and note number 93 on pp. 218–219. In their “Translators’ Foreword” to Mindfulness, Emad and Kalary address the importance of avoiding this mistranslation, by raising an important question: “Is it perhaps the epistemology of analytic philosophy that hinders other translators of Heidegger from “seeing” the situatedness of beings within a whole and blinds them to the insight that there are no beings in isolation from a whole? How else is one to understand and assess the mistranslation of the “im”—how else is one to grasp the fact that “beings as a whole” translates “das Seiende als Ganzen” and not Heidegger’s “Das Seiende im Ganzen”—other than look in the direction of that epistemology?” See Emad’s and Kalary’s “Translators’ Foreword” to Mindfulness, p. xxxiv.
misconstrual to name just a few), which have distorted the true message of hermeneutic phenomenology as a return to the clearing.

By appreciating the key words of Heidegger’s philosophy on the one hand, and avoiding the errors of their mistranslation on the other, we gain a hermeneutic foothold on the attempt to interpret the vast writings of his Gesamtausgabe. The basis of this hermeneutic foothold becomes never more important than when we revisit Heidegger’s allusion to the “turning,” and clarify its meaning in the course of undoing the many confusions surrounding it. As we will discover, the web of confusion can be traced back to a mistranslation of the term in question, “Kehre,” which subsequently has sparked so many contentious debates as to conceal the source of the initial misunderstanding. Although today it appears straightforward to translate “die Kehre” as “turning,” such was not the case when the seeds of this controversy erupted almost half a century ago.

As early as 1962, and in response to a query from William J. Richardson, S. J. whether “die Kehre” or “the turning” should be understood in Heidegger as a change of course and direction from his early to his later thought, Heidegger had rejected any characterization of the “turning” in this sense.47 Without having access to Contributions to Philosophy in 1962, William J. Richardson formulated a split between the so-called “Heidegger I” and a “Heidegger II.”48 As the title of Richardson’s book illustrates, Heidegger abruptly changed the direction of his philosophy, by leaving behind the phenomenological exposition of Dasein in order to find a more original path for thinking. As a result of this misunderstanding of the “turning,” a debate has raged in the secondary literature for four decades as to whether Heidegger abandoned his earlier phenomenological exposition of Dasein in favor of a poetic, meditative style of thinking centered exclusively on “being.” Without paying any attention to Heidegger’s explicit warning that “‘the turning … is above all not a procedure adopted by the thinking [that] questions (being)…” Richardson conceives of, and translates the “turning” (die Kehre) as a “reversal,” that is, a change of course and direction, leading Heidegger supposedly to privilege the so-called “later” attempt to thinking the truth of being over the “earlier” phenomenological analysis of Dasein.49 In responding to Richardson, Heidegger cites his discussion from the “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” in which he addresses the “turning


48 In the “Preface to the U.S. Edition” of his book, which contains both William J. Richardson’s letter to Heidegger and his reply to Fr. Richardson, Richardson concedes that the publication of Beiträge zur Philosophie requires “nuanc[ing] the understanding of the Kehre” as the division between “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II.” See William J. Richardson, S. J., “Preface to the U.S. Edition” in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 4th ed., p. xxxvi.

49 This misinterpretation of die Kehre as a “reversal” and not as the “turning,” occurs most overtly in Kockelmann’s characterization of Heidegger’s thought as having two phases, one “Dasein-oriented,” and the other “being-oriented.” See Joseph J. Kockelmann, Heidegger on Art and Art Work (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 76. For a critical account of the secondary literature about the “turning,” see Emad, op. cit, note #41, p. 214.
around” (umkehren) of the question from “being and time” to “time and being” in reference to the unpublished third division of his magnum opus. In translating “umkehren” as “reversal,” however, Richardson overlooks the meaning of “sich kehren” as “turning around,” thereby spawning his confusion about “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II.” As a result, his mistranslation of “Kehre” as “reversal” opens the path to the reductionism that has distorted the ownmost of Heidegger’s thought instead of letting this ownmost show itself as it is. Specifically, this reductionism forecloses the avenue of “returnership” (Rückkehrerschaft) to being’s unconcealing-sheltering in a twofold way: first, by imposing an extraneous model which bifurcates his task into “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II,” and, secondly, by overlooking the foremost hermeneutic premise, namely, that any attempt to translate the key-words of Heidegger’s philosophy must proceed from a prior directive to think the reciprocity between Dasein and being in terms of “enowning.”

Once this initial level of confusion has been undone, and “die Kehre” has been properly translated as “turning,” the way is then cleared for undoing the subsequent misunderstanding that is evident in the division between “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II.” In his “Letter” to Richardson, Heidegger cites his lecture-course text from the winter semester of 1936/37 in which he talks about the transformation of man, in order to illustrate that the “turning” does not involve a “reversal” of the hermeneutics of Dasein in Being and Time in favor of thinking the truth of being. He says:

This transformation is not the result of new psychological or biological insights….On the contrary, man here is in question in the most profound and the most extensive respect…i.e., we are questioning man in his relation to being, or, in the turning, we are questioning being and its truth in relation to man. The determination of the essential sway of truth is accompanied by a necessary transformation of man. Both are the same.

The dislocation of humanity – to be this ground – turns man away from himself the furthest and into a relation to being itself. But only out of this furthest distance can man truly find himself back, i.e., be who he truly is.

When placed within the context of Contributions to Philosophy, this passage clearly shows that Heidegger never divorced his hermeneutics of Dasein from his endeavor to think the truth of being; nor did he maintain that the former in any way replaces or supersedes the latter. By realizing that Da-sein provides a “place” for unconcealment to occur, and that Dasein resides in this expanse of openness, we also discover the impossibility of separating the hermeneutic-phenomenological account of Dasein from the task of thinking the truth of being.


Several key passages in *Contributions to Philosophy*, which suggest that the “turning” is a transformation that reveals the reciprocity between being and Dasein, go far to clarify the crux of the confusion that bifurcates Heidegger’s philosophy into two distinct phases. Specifically, Heidegger characterizes the “turning” as “the turning relation of be-ing” (*der kehrige Bezug des Seyns*), in which be-ing solicits Dasein to participate in its openness and cultivate an abode for its manifestation in language. With this distinctive expression, Heidegger construes the “turning” as a transformation whereby “enowning” brings Dasein into its ownmost relation to, and reciprocity with, be-ing itself, rather than “subjectively” as a change of direction in his philosophy. Rather than assuming a “break” between “Heidegger I” whose thinking traverses the transcendental-horizonal pathway, and “Heidegger II” whose thinking opens the being-historical pathway, and instead of assuming that Heidegger first attends to Dasein only to leave behind fundamental ontology in order to attend to being, we must heed, in Emad’s words, a constant “passage” and a “back and forth” occurring between transcendental-horizonal and being-historical thinking. By drawing upon central passages of *Contributions to Philosophy* and carefully interpreting them, Emad concludes that any account of the relation between transcendental-horizonal and being-historical thinking must take its orientation from Heidegger’s discovery, in the course of his fundamental ontology of Dasein, of the two structures called “projecting open” (*Entwurf*) and “thrownness” (*Geworfenheit*):

There is no break between the transcendental-horizonal and the being-historical thinking because there is no break between the transcendental-horizonal and the being-historical determination of projecting-open and thrownness. Heidegger does not discard the transcendental-horizonal determination of projecting-open and thrownness in favor of their being-historical determination but passes “back and forth” from the one to the other. More specifically, there is no break between the transcendental-horizonal and the being-historical determination of this structure because the former determination is contained in the latter.52

In *Contributions to Philosophy* “projecting open” is no longer conceived as opening up the factual possibilities of Dasein,53 and “thrownness” is no longer thought of as “thrownness” into that facticity. Rather, “projecting open” now appears as the act of opening up a historical clearing, enowned by be-ing, into which the thinker who enacts the projecting is “thrown.” Both “projecting-open” and “thrownness” *unfold in their primordial unity* as enowned by be-ing’s clearing, that is, by en-owning (*Er-eignis*). En-owning holds the key to understanding the retaining and the simultaneous transforming of “projecting open” and “thrownness.” Because Richardson was unaware of this retaining and simultaneous transforming, he

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53By demonstrating that in being-historical thinking the two structures called “projecting open” and “thrownness” are retained and simultaneously transformed, Emad opens the path toward approaching Heidegger’s thought with no need for the premeditated thesis of a “Heidegger I” “Heidegger II” distinction. *Ibid.*, pp. 200–201.
assumed that “Heidegger I” discards the fundamental ontology in order to become “Heidegger II.”

Seen in light of Contributions to Philosophy, and the novel thematization of “projecting open” and “thrownness,” we must now acknowledge that the “Heidegger I” “Heidegger II” distinction has become obsolete. No longer blocked by the assumption of “two” Heideggers, thinking is set free to enact the history of be-ing as the history of en-owning. By underscoring Heidegger’s characterization of the “turning” as “the turning relation of be-ing,” in which be-ing solicits us to “project open” its truth and cultivate an abode for its manifestation in language, we avoid the mistake of assimilating Heidegger’s thought to preset models of interpretation. Without the confusion stemming from these errant, reductionistic models for interpreting Heidegger’s thought, we can now appreciate the fact that the hermeneutic phenomenological analysis of the occurrence of Dasein in man can no longer be left out of the equation.

In other words, being’s turning relation requires an enactment by thinking since this relation is a relation to what is ownmost to man....This turning turns unto thinking because it needs thinking to sustain it. And for thinking to respond to this need and thus to sustain be-ing’s turning relation, it must act—must occur as acting (Handeln).

Because it pertains to what is decisively original, indeed, what is ownmost to the hermeneutic-phenomenological mode of investigation, the debate over the “turning” is not a purely academic exercise. Far from making the concern for Dasein irrelevant, the enactment of being-historical thinking gives further impetus to question Dasein more fundamentally, that is, in terms of the power granted to it by virtue of its inhabitation of language. This means that rather than forming a disjunction with Being and Time, Contributions to Philosophy opens up a “passageway,” thereby facilitating the appropriation of the insights gained in Being and Time.

Through the “being-historical perspective” opened up in Contributions to Philosophy, we rediscover the unity of Heidegger’s thinking, as it comes to light in three permutations of the “turning.” Given thought’s “enownment” by and belongingness to being by virtue of inhabiting language, we can distinguish (1) the turning around of the question from “being and time” to “time and being,” (2) Heidegger’s own way of thinking the “turning,” and (3) as the hallmark of “die Kehre” the dynamic of Da-sein’s thrownness into the clearing of be-ing, by dwelling within it and projecting it open through language—the “turning in enowning.” In this turning resides the possibility that Da-sein can experience the gifting-refusal that both

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54 On this point, see GA 65, pp. 238–239; tr. 169. See Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 188–189.

55 For a good example of Heidegger’s discussion of this “occurrence,” see GA 3, p. 229; tr. 160.

56 Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 190.

57 Ibid., p. 200.
thrusts it into the clearing, and reveals it as vulnerable to the danger of technicity. As Heidegger states in *Mindfulness*, “…Da-sein is *that belongingness that, holding unto the ab-ground, belongs to the clearing of being....Dasein’s ownmost is be-ing-historical.*”

Yet even as thinking takes its directive from the “turning in enowning,” and learns to dwell in the silence of the word, the debate concerning the meaning of the “*die Kehre*” has not been in vain. For that debate brings to the foreground (1) the importance that *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* has for clarifying the misunderstandings of the “*Kehre*,” and (2) how the pendulum for interpreting Heidegger’s thought swings in the direction of re-examining the meaning of his key terms, as well as the hermeneutic guidelines for their translation into English. As the following essays will help to illustrate, there is a singular direction to Heidegger’s thinking no matter where we stand at its crossroads.

6 Summary of the Essays

The essays in this volume follow a twofold development, which addresses, first, “The Search for Beginnings and the Onset of Being-historical Thinking,” and, second, “The Place of Translation in Heidegger’s Thinking,” including its precise methodology, and the challenge (as well as the controversy) of translating his writings into English. The division of this volume into *Part I*, *Part II*, and *Part III* will help the reader to identify common themes throughout the paper. By the same token, it is important to emphasize that the essays complement each other and form a mosaic, in order to help the reader to understand Heidegger’s thought in greater degrees of subtlety and depth.

Proceeding from Heidegger’s essay, “Poverty” (Part I), the essays in Part II initiate different points of entry into his thought, and yet in a manner which recalls the tentativeness of these beginnings. Whether guided by the preliminary hermeneutic of Heidegger’s exposition of “everydayness” on the one hand or, on the other, by the “language of the thinking of and by being,” each of these pathways seeks to project open the space of inquiry, which guides his own philosophical journey. Despite the natural temptation and historical precedent to do, we must avoid the precedent of polarizing Heidegger’s thinking in “early” and “later” phases, or in any way succumbing to a “chronology” of his development. On the contrary, to distinguish between the “transcendental-horizontal perspective” and a “being-historical perspective” is not to suggest contrary viewpoints, but, instead to experience the

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58 For a discussion of this key transformation, see Heidegger, “Die Kehre,” in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* GA 7, pp. 113–124.
60 For a critique of this chronological view, see Thomas Kalary, “Towards Sketching the Genesis of *Being and Time*,” *Heidegger Studies*, 16 (2000): 200–207.
remarkable “back and forth” movement, which shapes the direction of Heidegger’s entire philosophical journey. The concern for “Dasein” and the concern for “being” are not separate in any way. Indeed, among its many seminal insights, Contributions to Philosophy makes explicit the manner in which Dasein belongs to being, and, reciprocally how being addresses thought. In the distinctive language of Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger characterizes this reciprocity as the “turning relation of Dasein and being.” While much more can be said about the turning, it is worth noting that its importance is discussed throughout this volume and appears as a key motif in several essays.

If there is any lesson to be learned from the “turning,” it is that thought cannot induce its own change, but that any transformation stems from the direction and guidance of being. This is the simple message, the hermeneutic reminder, housed in the parenthetical title of Beiträge zur Philosophie, that is, “Vom Ereignis,” and, conversely, the importance of its translation: that any transformation stems “from enowning.” In this regard, thinking is always underway, both in its “inception” and in its transition to the “other beginning”—or what Heidegger calls “inceptual thinking.” The characterization of thought as always “underway,” and his own claim that thinking is a movement of “returnership” back to its origins, constitutes a crucial theme in understanding and appropriating his philosophy. The dawn of, and the unfolding “mindfulness” of what Heidegger calls “inceptual thinking” epitomizes this quest. In this way, Heidegger’s methodology is unique in that he emphasizes that the arrival of a deeper understanding of being is always predicated upon philosophy’s reciprocal return to, appropriation of, and transmission of its origins.

In this respect, the key phenomenology maxim, “back to the things themselves,” is grounded in the deeper movement of returnership and in the counter concession that the origins are granted from and reserved within the sheltering (Bergung) of being’s own self-concealment. In the opening essay, Burt C. Hopkins takes up this issue within the context of exploring the roots of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. Specifically, in “Deformalization and Phenomenon in Husserl and Heidegger,” Hopkins addresses the uniquely hermeneutic manner by which Heidegger grounds the self-showing of the “things themselves” in the dynamic of being’s self-concealment. Hopkins thereby outlines the radicalization of Heidegger’s concept of phenomenology as occurring through a dialogue with, and yet in contrast to, his mentor, Edmund Husserl. In “A Purview of Being: The Ontological Structure of World, Reference (Verweisung) and Indication (Indikation),” Marylou Sena examines another crucial step in the development and unfolding of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. In this essay, Sena outlines the “projecting-opening” of world as the key to a phenomenological access to being. This projecting-opening makes explicit both the error of the attempt by “pragmatism” to reduce world to the totality of the self’s dealings with equipment on the one hand, and, on the other, the importance of translating Heidegger’s key phrase of “das Seiende im Ganze” in a

61 GA 65, p. 315; tr. 221.
62 See GA 66, pp. 40–42; tr. 31–33.
manner recalling Dasein’s situation within the world, that is, as “beings in a whole” rather than “beings as a whole.”

The claim of returnership also carries with it, and echoes, a new intimacy between language and thinking. This interdependence between the two harbors the possibility of thinking’s addressing what otherwise remains “unspoken” in terms of being, including the counter sway and withdrawal of its concealment and sheltering. In “Heidegger’s Experience with Language,” George Kovacs illustrates how the power of the spoken word hinges on preserving and safeguarding what remains unspoken, which gathers forth the wealth of possibilities for translating Heidegger’s terminology in novel, albeit fundamental ways. The emphasis on being’s sheltering and concealment simultaneously highlights a topic which, despite its religious implications, actually opens up the space of difference (e.g., the “theological difference”), prior to any theological focus, namely the last god (der letzte Gott). In “Heidegger’s Thinking of the Difference and the God-question,” Thomas Kalary points to the “last god” as highlighting the gifting-refusal of be-ing (Seyn), which both shelters and preserves the mystery of the divine. In the process, he argues that the “question of God” cannot be developed in a historical vacuum, but must also be joined with, and depend upon, the “turning around” of Heidegger’s own question from “Being and Time” to “Time and Being”—in other words, hinge upon the “turning in enowning.” The designation of the “theological difference” not only holds the key to understanding the flight and arrival of the gods, but also the counter resonance of what is singular and ownmost in the “letting be” of the divinities, that is, in granting them the leeway to abide in their mystery.

By emphasizing the theological difference, and the methodological priority of the question of being, we open the space for developing the religious implications of Heidegger’s thought (rather than foreclosing it). Among one of the more prevalent trends in this regard is the discussion of the parallels between his thinking and Eastern spirituality. In “Substance and Emptiness: Preparatory Steps toward a Translational Dialogue between Western and Buddhist Philosophy,” Paola-Ludovika Coriando explores the possibility of a “translational” dialogue between Eastern thinking and the Western tradition. She outlines the path of a translation between the key terms of Eastern and Western traditions, in order to retrieve their meanings from a deeper origin, which enriches each tradition. In the process, Coriando shows how the reciprocal dialogue of this translation forms the cornerstone of tradition, preserving it within the “other beginning.” In the concluding essay to Part I, Bernhard Radloff brings the discussion of Heidegger and religion full circle, as embodying both the movement of “returnership” and his critique of the Western tradition of “onto-theo-logy” (and its expression in Christianity). In “Preliminary Notes on Divine Images in the Light of Being-historical Thinking,” Radloff details Heidegger’s way of addressing religious experience through such key works as Mindfulness and Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. Proceeding from “clues” (adopted from Emad) as to the methodological connection between hermeneutics and being-historical thinking on the one hand, and the question of the arrival and flight of the gods on the other, Radloff addresses the simultaneous concealing and sheltering of the (divine) mystery within the age of “machination.” He shows how the Christian revelation of God both
hinges on the preservation of this mystery and yet jeopardizes it through its metaphysical expression as the ground of the “causa sui.”

The themes of returnership, being-historical thinking, and the search for beginnings, which the second part of this volume develops, are amplified further in Part III when the focus shifts to developing the question of translating Heidegger’s writings and its intersection with the question of being itself. As we make the transition to Part III, however, we discover that the issue of translation is not self-contained, but also punctuates and originates in the preceding group of essays. This observation helps us to see to what extent the hermeneutic unfolding of Heidegger’s thought unifies the various essays in this volume, despite the diversity of their topics. In this way, the study of translation is not a concern about providing a “theory” per se, but instead answers the more original claim of providing an “access” to Heidegger’s thinking and the unfolding of its “being-historical” perspective.

The attempt to provide a “gateway” to Heidegger’s thought through translation, particularly as it pertains to translating the key terms of his philosophy, is not without controversy. No doubt, this controversy reaches its zenith in the English translation of Beiträge zur Philosophy (vom Ereignis). In the unique style of a “Conversation,” Parvis Emad provides his responses to questions (posed by Frank Schalow) as to the decisions involved in rendering the meanings of such key terms in Contributions to Philosophy, including Ereignis as “enowning” and Abgrund as “abground.” To appreciate the import of these responses, it is necessary to place them within the larger context of the ongoing debate over rendering the key terms of Beiträge and the criticism over using “neologisms” in the English translation.63

The “setting into opposition” (Auseinandersetzung) of the sides of this debate does not merely seek the finality and closure of a “polemical” resolution, but instead directs us to the frontier of a new arrival and onset of Heidegger’s thinking. In “Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge of its Translation,” George Kovacs tackles the difficulties inherent in the English rendering of Beiträge, as well as the various criticisms which have arisen in recent years. In the process, he explores (1) the hermeneutic methodology of translation and (2) examines the specific “decisions,” which are involved in translating the key terms of that text, including Ereignis as “enowning.”

In addressing the controversy over addressing terms in Beiträge, we cannot overlook, however, the importance of revisiting the key terms of Sein und Zeit. In “Dasein and Da-sein in Being and Time and in Contributions to Philosophy,” Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann addresses the interlingual translation of the “Da”—a central

63 It should be pointed out that using neologisms is one of many ways in which Heidegger faces the task of thinking in relation to language. Perhaps, it suffices to mention a few cases. From the transcendental-horizontal thinking: Alltäglichkeit, Bewandtnisganzheit, Erschlossenheit, Jemeinigkeit, Befindlichkeit; from being-historical thinking: Anfängnis, Bewegen, Eignung, Ereignung, Gegnet, Jeweiligkeit, Übereignung, das Seiendste, Ge-Stellnis, and Wesung. For a discussion of the importance of neologisms in translating Heidegger's writings, see Frank Schalow, “Freedom, Truth, and Responsibility in the Recent Translations of the Gesamtausgabe,” Heidegger Studies, 23 (2007): 104–105.
concept of *Being and Time*. He also deals with the translation of *Ereignis*—a central concept of *Contributions to Philosophy*, while taking issue with the naive rendering of the “Da” in English as the “there.” Von Herrmann observes that, from within a “transcendental horizontal perspective,” the “Da” includes the projecting-opening of disclosedness and thus never refers to a spatial determination as “there.” Correlatively, from the perspective of being-historical thinking, the “Da” implicates the enowning throw of be-ing. Turning his attention to *Ereignis*, von Herrmann argues for its rendering as “enowning.”

Ivo De Gennaro develops further the question of translating the key terms of *Being and Time* in “Husserl and Heidegger on Da-sein: With a Suggestion for its Interlingual Translation.” Specifically, De Gennaro points to the hyphenation of the word “Da-sein” as marking not just a grammatical shift, but a distinctive “moment” in the enactment of being-historical thinking that uncovers the reciprocity between be-ing (*Seyn*) and man. The interlingual translation of Da-sein, then, points to the “cut” in the origination of history, as the place for the manifestation of be-ing itself. But just as the term “Da-sein” has a distinctive ancestry in the German language, so the origin of its meaning in English must also be addressed through the “crossing over” of an “interlingual translation.”

In “Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Eccentric Translation,” Julia A. Ireland turns a spotlight on the “violence” of translation, in order to show how language’s capacity for creativity and innovative breaks with the conventional usages of words. As a corollary to her argument, she shows how the meaning of Heidegger’s grounding words is shaped by both the idioms of Hölderlin’s poetry and Greek tragedy. In this way, Ireland develops a new interpretation of the hermeneutic directives for translating Heidegger’s writings, which simultaneously complements and departs from that of Emad.

A question that inevitably arises in addressing the task of translation is how we can characterize it as a “craft,” in a way analogous to thinking, and thereby in some way as “commissioned” and “enowned” by language in its way of providing a place for the manifestation of being. While there is “guidance” within the act of translating, it is not necessarily governed by external standards any more, than for example, Heidegger would maintain that his own vision of an “original ethics” could be reduced to normative principles of morality. The concluding two essays address precisely this issue of the “guidance” inherent in translation and its distinctive character as a craft. In “Individuation, Responsiveness, and Translation: Heidegger’s Ethics,” Eric Sean Nelson shows how translation is a pursuit that safeguards the word and responds to the subtlest inflections, which echo the truth of being. The task of “original translation” points to the underlying ground of the human capacity “to be ethical” in which “responsiveness” is the key to responsibility (*Verantwortlichkeit*). But how can we thematize this responsiveness, which relocates its origin, not in the subjectivity of human choice, but within the open space of freedom and its power to “let be”? “Attunement and Translation” (Frank Schalow) specifically addresses this question of how hermeneutic directives govern the task of translating the key terms of Heidegger’s thinking. These directives are never reducible to the standards of semantical equivalency supported by a dictionary; instead, they issue from the
hidden wellspring of what is unspoken and unsaid, whose manner of attunement brings thinking into its reciprocity with being and permits its disclosure in the most “elemental words.” A “hermeneutically sound” translation, then, renounces the presumption of an absolute transfer of Heidegger’s key words, taking its orientation instead from the attuned response and comportment toward the disclosing power of language. In a way that harks back to Heidegger’s essay at the inception of this volume, it is seen that the venture of translating, like thinking, must first descend into the “poverty” of language in order to experience the “wealth” of its power to let being become manifest.

As diverse as these essays are, they converge at the point of a single realization: that the task of translating Heidegger’s writings is not merely an academic exercise, but instead interfaces with the enactment of his thinking. In this humble way, an attempt is made not only to pay tribute to the work of a colleague, but also to forge a new avenue for understanding and appropriating Heidegger’s philosophy.

References


Part II
The Search for Beginnings and the Onset of Being-Historical Thinking
Deformalization and Phenomenon in Husserl and Heidegger*

Burt C. Hopkins

1 Deformalization and the Project of Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger

Husserl’s thought from beginning to end is preoccupied with the problem of “deformalization.” The problem guiding his first philosophical work (the Philosophy of Arithmetic) is precisely that of “deformalizing” the symbolic calculus characteristic of formal arithmetic (arithmetica universalis). In investigations that he himself later came to regard as “implicitly” phenomenological, Husserl sought in that work to establish the genesis of the “logic” of symbolic mathematics in the content proper to the authentic presentation of the nonsymbolic concept of cardinal number. Husserl’s last great investigations in the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology are likewise guided by the problem of deformalization, albeit with a greatly expanded scope in comparison with the Philosophy of Arithmetic. By linking the “crisis” of the “ungrounded” formalization characteristic

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*I dedicate this paper to my Doktorvater Parvis Emad, who not only taught me how to read Heidegger’s texts, but whose work continues to point my own thinking in the direction of “das Denken” contained therein.

To my knowledge Husserl uses the term “Entformalisierung” in his published corpus only once (Ideen I – see below), defining it “as the filling-out of an empty logical-mathematical form or a formal truth [als ‘Auszufüllung’ einer logisch-mathematischen Leerform, bzw. einer formalen Wahrheit]” (26). What, exactly, is meant by the “Auszufüllung” of a (formalized) logical-mathematical form or truth is not specified by Husserl in this passage (or in any other passage I am aware of), which is limited to “going back to essential intuition [auf die Wesensintuition zurückzugehen]” (27) in order to clarify the logical distinction between “generalization” and “formalization.” The underlying thesis of the discussion to follow, however, is that Husserl’s phenomenology as a

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of the method of mathematical physics to the contemporary crisis of European humanity, Husserl at once ties the prospect of cultural renewal to that of deformatization and elevates transcendental phenomenological philosophy to its vanguard, because of its philosophically privileged capacity to bring about deformatization.

In the works situated between his first and last works, it is, of course, precisely the self-critical task of overcoming the psychologism characteristic of the attempted deformatization in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* that led to Husserl’s “breakthrough” phenomenological discovery in the *Logical Investigations*, namely, to intuitive acts whose content fulfills the formal significations characteristic of the “symbolic” and therefore intentionally “empty” acts of logical signification. Even Husserl’s turn to transcendental phenomenology is rooted in the problem of deformatization. As Husserl himself came to recognize approximately 100 years ago the “rational psychology” of both editions of the *Logical Investigations* precludes, on methodical grounds, “pure” logic’s (the *mathesis universalis*) deformatization, because implicit in its method is the assumed validity of formal logic’s most basic concepts and laws. This assumption therefore prevents, in principle, even “phenomenological psychology” from “grounding” and therewith deformatizing the formal.

Heidegger’s thought from beginning to end is likewise preoccupied with the problem of “deformatization.” *Being and Time* explicitly formulates the problem driving the “preliminary concept” of phenomenology as the “phenomenological” deformatization of the formal concept of phenomenon, which both follows and must be kept distinct from its “ordinary” deformatization. And although not denominated as such by Heidegger in his magnum opus, the “ontological difference” that results from both of these deformatizations is the target of his self-critique in *Contributions to Philosophy*, and it is so, again, on the grounds of what can only be called deformatization. By approaching the meaning or truth of be-ing (*Seyn*) from within the thematization of the difference between beings (*Seiende*) and being (*Sein*), and, thus, from within the thematization of the “formal” “is” that belongs to beings in their manifestation, Heidegger maintains that the forgottenness of the

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whole amounts to the attempt to bring about precisely a “deformatization” of the formalization of cognition initiated (as I will argue below) by modern mathematics with François Vieta and modern philosophy beginning with Descartes. My discussion will therefore employ the terms “formalization” and “deformalization” in the descriptive-phenomenological sense signaled by phenomenology’s motto of “return to the things themselves” and not in the radically different conceptual-logistical sense in which contemporary logic employs these terms. Thus, whereas the contemporary logical sense of both formalization and deformalization signifies conceptual processes possessing an (canonically fixed) exact meaning, their phenomenological sense is descriptive and therefore fixed exclusively by a phenomenological appeal to intuitive evidence. Among other things, this means that the common thread of “deformalization” here identified in Husserl’s works refers not to a universal concept but to the project of restoring the integrity of formal knowledge by retracing its origin back to the immediate givenness of a true content that is pre- and ultimately nonformal.

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“onefold” proper to the meaning (or truth) of the relationship between being and a being is “settled” as a “‘setting apart’ [aus-ein-ander] and a “‘setting unto’” [zu-einander]. This consolidation, in turn, gives rise to the need to think the “is” of this onefold from a beginning that gives up the formality of the “first beginning.” As Parvis Emad states:

The ontological difference opens an avenue to enowning [Ereignis] insofar as this difference itself would not occur without the swaying of be-ing. Without this swaying the ontological difference would not appear; it would not reveal what transpires in the ‘first beginning,’ that is, thinking’s submission to the perspective of beings and thinking’s domination by the forgottenness of be-ing.

Despite Husserl’s and Heidegger’s common recognition of the need for deformalization in order to realize their respective phenomenologies, what each means by the “formal” and, therefore, how each understands its deformalization to yield the phenomenological domain, is different. There is, of course, what amounts to the standard view of this matter. Husserl’s account of the formal is characterized as logical and epistemological, while Heidegger’s account is ontological. It follows from this that the phenomenon revealed by Husserl’s phenomenology, when the formal, in this sense, is deformalized, is limited by the cognitive structure of the formal that functions as the clue that guides the methodic process of deformalization. In Heidegger’s phenomenology, the sense of the formal, as “ontological” and therefore not limited in this regard, functions as the guiding line that leads the methodic process of deformalization to a phenomenon that is presupposed by the cognitive structure of Husserl’s phenomenon, and which discloses a domain of ontico-ontological meaning “prior” to this cognitive limitation. Thus, even when Husserl’s phenomenology addresses the being of something or the meaning of being in general, the original logical and epistemological limitation of the sense of the formal that it deformalizes in order to get at ontological phenomena precludes access to them other than in the mode of the “objectification” that is characteristic of “straightforward,” pre-philosophical cognition. Heidegger’s phenomenology, on the contrary, being mindful of the ontological limits imposed by the transposition of pre-philosophical cognition into the theoretical domain of the non-objectifying “cognition” proper to philosophy, is therefore truer to the original intention toward deformalization that motivates Husserl’s phenomenology than Husserl’s own phenomenology is.

It what follows, I will not challenge this view of the matter. Rather, I will investigate its two most obvious presuppositions: (1) Husserl’s, that the formal, in the sense of the logical-epistemological structure of cognition, is capable of being deformalized; and (2) Heidegger’s, that the phenomenon of being is such as to lend

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itself to a formal conceptuality. My investigation intends to show that Husserl’s presupposition is only possible on the basis of the conflation of the origins proper to two very different senses of the formal: (1) the modern sense of the formal, which is derived from the indeterminacy of the object of cognition proper to the formal sciences of logic and mathematics, the “object in general” (Etwas überhaupt); and (2) and the premodern sense of the formal, which is derived from logic’s and mathematics’ “general treatment” of objects that are manifestly determinate. And having called attention to the conflation at work in Husserl’s phenomenology of the formal, I will show that the presupposition underlying Heidegger’s phenomenology is only possible on the basis of his uncritical appropriation of the conflation composing Husserl’s presupposition.

2 Generalized and Formalized Universality in Husserl

Even before his introduction of a specifically historical reflection to the phenomenological method of deforming, Husserl’s investigations called attention to a fundamental difference in the conceptuality proper to the “formal” in Aristotle’s logic and in modern, algebraized logic. In Formal and Transcendental Logic, he locates this difference in the fact that modern logic has been formalized in a way that contrasts with the concrete (gegenständlichen) relation to reality that defines Aristotle’s logic. Not being formalized, Aristotle’s logic lacked formal ontology and the cognition of its intrinsic priority over the ontology of realities. Being formalized, modern logic, together with modern mathematics (which is also formalized), investigates precisely the same “ontological” domain, that of the “object in general” or, in its more proper phenomenological rendering, the “anything whatever” (Etwas überhaupt). Indeed, it is precisely this circumstance, that is, the formalization of both mathematics and logic in modern thought, that is one of things responsible for the formal unity of these two disciplines, which is something, Husserl notes, that did not characterize ancient mathematics and logic. Husserl, of course, following the early moderns but above all Leibniz, termed the unity of formalized mathematics and formal logic the “mathesis universalis,” and devoted the mature logical investigations in Formal and Transcendental Logic to a programmatic discussion of the phenomenological foundation of this unity in a transcendent phenomenological theory of judgment.

Husserl first thematically articulated the difference between the formality or “universality” characteristic of modern logic and mathematics and that of the nonformalized ontology of realities in Ideas I, when, on eidetic grounds, he characterized

6Edmund Husserl, Formale und Tranzendentale Logik (Hua XVII), 70.
7Edmund Husserl, Formale und Tranzendentale Logik (Hua XVII), 70.
the “heterogeneity” of “formalization” and “generalization.” In that text, he located their eidetic difference in generalized universality’s (1) material content (i.e., generalized formality is inseparable from both individual and ideal objectivities) and (2) hierarchical structure (there is both an upper limit to generalization, the material region, and a lower limit, the concretum), neither of which characterizes the materially empty character of formalized universality. Husserl also came to distinguish (in Experience and Judgment) formalized from generalized universality on the grounds of their different origins, because generalization yields formal essences on the basis of eidetic variation (both of individual objects and their genera), whereas formalization yields formalized essences on the basis of what Husserl characterizes as the “emptying” of the material content from the essences yielded by generalization.

Oddly enough, Husserl’s recognition (in Formal and Transcendental Logic) of a “historical” aspect belonging to the distinction between the conceptuality of the “formal” in ancient and modern logic is something that he does not pursue any further. He does not pursue it either on its own terms, or in terms of the transcendental phenomenological theory of judgment to which he assigns the task of accounting for the origin of the “unity” proper to the formalized unity of the “anything whatever” in the perceptual experience and evidence of individual objects. His failure to do so is not just philosophically but also phenomenologically significant, because notwithstanding the development of his thought and the differences this introduces into his account of the methodology and content of deformalization, the conviction that formalized unity has its origin in the experience and evidence of individual objects remains constant throughout this development. Thus, despite the fact that Husserl recognizes a difference between the generalizing abstraction that yields the formal universality of the material a priori and the formalizing abstraction that yields the formal universality of the materially empty a priori, he nevertheless remains convinced that the individual objects in which the material a priori is rooted are relevant to the constitution of the formalized a priori. As he puts it in Formal and Transcendental Logic, if this is not the case, then the formalized a priori investigated by formal ontology would lack “ontological” significance – which, for Husserl, it clearly does not.

Husserl’s conviction is, in fact, a presupposition that cannot be realized. Specifically, that whatever the “ontological” significance of formal ontology is, it is clear that the constitution of the formalized unity, as inseparable from its basic concept, the “anything whatever,” cannot be phenomenologically grounded in the unity

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10 See especially Edmund Husserl, *Formale und Tranzendentale Logik* (Hua XVII), 42–43.

11 Edmund Husserl, *Formale und Tranzendentale Logik*, (Hua XVII), 190.
belonging to individual objects. Generalizing abstraction is “founded” in perceptual acts directed toward individual objects. It sets into relief generalized “states of affairs” in a concrete perceptual content. These states of affairs are “moments” of a logical whole that includes individual and ideal material contents. Formalizing abstraction, from the Logical Investigations onward, is said to abstract from the “specificity” of the species contents yielded by generalizing abstraction, in a manner that at once empties their material categorial content and reveals the manifold relational categories responsible for their syntactical connections.\(^{12}\) As such, these syntactical categories (e.g., “and,” “or”) neither refer to nor are abstracted from individual objects, but, rather, are abstracted from the connections between the categories that are grounded in individual objects and that determine “what” they are.\(^{13}\)

Given Husserl’s account of formalizing abstraction, two fundamental questions emerge. One, why, despite the explicit recognition in his account of formalizing abstraction according to which formalized categories are abstracted from the relations between the species of individual objects and therefore not from these species or objects themselves, does he think that the original evidence for the unity proper to formalized concepts must be sought in the experience and evidence of individual objects? That is, whence Husserl’s conviction that the constitution of the unity of the formalized concepts that are modes of the “anything whatever” has to be capable of being deformed in a manner that traces its phenomenological source to the perception of sensible, individual objects? Two, just how are multiple formalized syntactical categories able to constitute the unity of the materially empty (and, therefore) materially indeterminate formalized categorical region, the “anything whatever” that composes the subject domain of the mathesis universalis?\(^{14}\)

3 Husserl’s Conflation of the Unity Proper to Indeterminate and Determinate Formal Universality

The answers to these questions are interrelated. Husserl never tells us how multiple syntactical categories can nevertheless constitute a formalized unity because he brings to his philosophy and therefore his phenomenology the conviction that all unity is originally determinate and, therefore, grounded in individual objects.\(^{15}\)


\(^{13}\)Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (Hua XIX/1), 657.

\(^{14}\)On this point, see J.N. Mohanty: “Husserl regards ‘object’ [i.e., the formal concept of ‘object in general’] as a purely syntactical category. The object is what is designated by a syntactically nominal expression. . . . For Husserl, concepts are also objects, so also are relations and functions. His idea of ‘object’ is therefore vacuous.” The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 180.

\(^{15}\)See Mohanty again: “‘Being’, for Husserl . . . is not the most general concept, but a formal concept. Husserl’s problem . . . is how to reconcile this formulation with an intuitionist epistemology” (180).
This conviction brings with it the related conviction that all higher-level unities, whether generalized or formalized, must have their basis in the unity of individual objects, because Husserl thinks that this is the most originally given unity. Thus, in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, the materially empty character of the formalized precursor to the *Etwas überhaupt*, the *Etwas*, is said to be generated by “reflexion upon the psychical act of presenting (*Vorstellungs*), for which precisely any determinate object may be given as the content.” In later works, the origin of the concept “anything whatever,” of course, is no longer said to be grounded in a psychical relation, but in what exactly it is grounded or how it otherwise originates is never discussed with any specificity. These works now approach the problem of accounting for this unity programmatically, by attempting to tie the earlier “static” analyses of the constitution of formalized unity to the unrealized project of desedimenting this unity’s genesis in a hierarchal trail of evidences that ultimately terminate in the pre- and therefore proto-logical “unity” of the conceptually unmediated experience of individual objects. Thus, these works account for the formalized universality of the a priori by repeating the earlier work’s vague references to “emptying” the material a priori of its material content, only now these references are cast in terms of their propaedeutic (and, therefore, incomplete) status as the epistemological “spade work” for the more fully realized transcendental phenomenological theory of judgment. Or, as in the first appendix to *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, the “ultimate” formal structures are characterized as “cores” – which are themselves syntax-less – of formalized meaning that are presupposed by all levels of formal logical syntax. Such cores, significantly, are not said to originate in material emptying but by “comparisons” that yield the formal structures of the “core-stuffs” presupposed by logical syntax in “formalizing universality.”

Had Husserl pursued the insight implicit in his recognition of the historical aspect of the difference between generalization and formalization, however, he would have been forced to abandon his conviction regarding the ontological and therefore logical priority of determinate unity, and, with this, his conviction that the symbolic or empty conceptual content of formalized unity must be of such a nature to lend itself to a deformationalization that leads (ultimately) to individual objects. In other words, on the basis of his recognition that the formal conceptuality found in Aristotle does not refer to a logical concept whose indeterminate conceptual content possesses ontological significance, but to a general method of treating the cognition of determinate objects, Husserl would have had to confront the fact that the origin of the conceptuality of the modern concept of just such an indeterminate concept and therefore formally ontological object has to be sought elsewhere than in Aristotelian abstraction. Moreover, the argument could be made that Husserl’s *Crisis*-texts begin

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18 Edmund Husserl, *Formale und Tranzendentale Logik*, (Hua XVII), 197.
to do just this, in their attempt to render the formalization driving the mathematization of nature comprehensible by desedimenting the unity composing its meaning and exposing thereby the early modern transformation of the ideal mathematics of the Greeks into the formalized mathematics that grounds, to this day, modern mathematical physics.

4 Heidegger’s Uncritical Appropriation of Husserl’s Conflation of Determinate and Indeterminate Formality

To complete this task, Husserl would have had to desediment François Vieta’s invention of modern algebra and, with this, the origination of formalization, which makes its first historical appearance in the mathematical calculation with materially indeterminate concepts that define Vieta’s \textit{logistice speciosa}.\textsuperscript{20} The fact that this task remains incomplete in Husserl’s thought, however, does not mitigate against its either being completed or using the results of its completion to address the topic of deformalization and phenomenon in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies.\textsuperscript{21} What I intend to show in the remainder of my discussion is the genealogy of Heidegger’s formal concept of phenomenon in Husserl’s formulation of the heterogeneity of generalization and formalization, including Husserl’s account of the origin of formalization in an act of emptying that does not rely on anything that is pregiven, other than the concepts yielded by generalization. Once I have shown this, I will articulate the conclusion that necessarily follows, namely, that because Heidegger situates his project of deformalizing the formal concept of phenomenon in terms of Husserl’s account of the origin of formalization and formalized unity, his account of phenomenology both inherits and exacerbates some of the problems inherent in this account. These problems are (1) the presupposition that the phenomenological origin of the formalized unity of the \textit{Etwas überhaupt} originates from the unity of individual objects and that therefore deformalization “returns to individual

\textsuperscript{20}Husserl was well aware of Vieta’s role in the history of mathematics, correctly crediting him with “[t]he genuine discovery of the formal” (Edmund Husserl, \textit{Formale und Tranzendentale Logik}, (Hua XVII, 70).

objects with particular concrete content," and, essentially related to this, (2) the articulation of the methodology proper to the (phenomenological) access to the phenomenon of being in terms of the deformalization of the formal concept of phenomenon. Because the distinction Heidegger’s phenomenology makes between the “self-showing” of the phenomenon of being and its opposite, its “concealment,” takes its methodical point of departure from its formal conception, Heidegger’s deformalization of this distinction will be plagued by the problems inherent in the Husserlian account of deformalization.

The genealogy linking Heidegger’s phenomenological project of deformalization to Husserl’s account of formalization, however, is not direct but mediated through Heidegger’s notion of formal indication. Thus, I will also articulate how this notion arises from both an aspect of his uncritical appropriation of Husserl’s thought and the attempt to reformulate critically another aspect of it. On the one hand, Heidegger takes over Husserl’s account of the spontaneity of formalizing emptying and its capacity to yield a region of formalized objectivity, while, on the other hand, Heidegger attempts to distance the “phenomenological” meaning of the formal that characterizes Husserl’s theoretical objectivism from what he (Heidegger) maintains is the genuine meaning of phenomenology, which is “primarily a concept of method.”

Before being able to show all of this, I first need to discuss the salient features of formalization’s origin in Vieta’s *logistice speciosa*, which will permit me to make good on my claims that Husserl conflates the radically different (and, in their origins, historically dated) conceptuality of determinate and indeterminate formality. Thus, it is my claim that the “historicity” of formalization’s origin of this very distinction prevents the unity proper to the modern, formalized *mathesis universalis* from being deformalized into the unity proper to the abstracted Aristotelian universal. Once this is established, both Husserl’s account of formalizing abstraction as an essentially Aristotelian material emptying and Heidegger’s account of its origin in the relational sense of the objectively theoretical attitude will have to be rejected on rigorous philosophical grounds, and with this, so, too, their formulations of phenomenology as the project of deformalization.

Desedimentation of Vieta’s invention of the modern, formalized concept of a materially “indeterminate” mathematical object coincides with the rediscovery of the original (and determinate) mathematical evidences of Greek mathematics. This is the case because the unit of calculation in Vieta’s algebra is a magnitude that

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is identical with neither the discrete nor continuous magnitudes that compose the two possible objects of Greek mathematics, numbers and geometrical shapes (and their elements), respectively. Rather, Vieta’s unit of calculation, which he called a “symbol,” is identical with the concept of magnitude in general, that is, a magnitude that is “indeterminate” with respect to numbers and shapes. As such, this concept manifestly does not owe its origination to the disregarding of the material content of the species of numbers and geometrical shapes. Within the context of Greek mathematics, the species of numbers are the “odd” and the “even,”\textsuperscript{25} and emptying them of their material content, which, presumably, would be the unlimited multitude of positive integers beginning with “two,” does not yield modern algebra. Likewise, emptying the species of geometrical shapes, circles, squares, etc., together with their elements, lines, points, etc., of their material content does not yield analytical geometry.

The conceptuality of the formal unity proper to Greek mathematics is not identical with the species of the only kinds of objects recognized by this mathematics, discrete and continuous magnitudes, both of which are always determinate, but with the objects that are required for these objects’ cognition, which are accessible only to thought (νοητά). Aristotelian abstraction therefore can only be understood within this context of the “ontological” status of ancient Greek mathematical objects.\textsuperscript{26} Aristotle’s controversy with the Platonists was therefore not about whether such noetic objects exist, but about their true mode of being. His account of this mode of being, “from abstraction,” can only be properly understood within the horizon of this controversy. Abstraction is therefore not only the psychological process of disregarding the sensible characteristics of the bodies with which the arithmetician and geometrician deal (when they calculate their amounts, demonstrate their theorems, and construct their figures) in order to treat as separate what, in truth (and, therefore, in contrast to the χωρισμός thesis of the Platonists), is not separate from them. Abstraction in Aristotle is also inseparable from the “logical” process of providing an account of the origin of the noetic objects that compose the true objects of mathematical επιστήμη. And these objects are decidedly not “universals,” which, in the context of ancient Greek mathematics, would mean that they are the species of mathematical objects, and, therefore, not these objects themselves. Thus, for Plato as for Aristotle, there is no such “thing” as mathematical objects that being neither a discrete nor continuous magnitude are indeterminate and in precisely this sense “general.”\textsuperscript{27} The formal conceptuality of determinate mathematical unity in the abstractive sense relevant to my discussion is – owing to its origin – completely determinate. Aristotle characterizes this origin as (1) disregarding the sensible contents perceived in bodies in order to treat their species as separable from these bodies and (2) disregarding the specific natures of the abstracted species themselves,

\textsuperscript{25}See Jacob Klein, \textit{Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra}, 57.
\textsuperscript{26}See Jacob Klein, \textit{Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra}, 100.
\textsuperscript{27}See Jacob Klein, \textit{Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra}, 123.
in order to abstract from these a species-neutral unity, which, in turn, is treated as separable from this or that species. The resulting “universal” of the abstracted species-neutral unity is therefore, in truth, not separate from the determinate species of determinate objects; as such, it is an abstracted “piece” of a determinate object. Its function of being able to refer to the whole of any arbitrary determinate object is therefore not the result of its putative indeterminate content, such that these objects could be legitimately understood to “fall under” its concept. Rather, this function is the result of the species-neutrality of the determinate mathematical object assisting the mathematician in picking out what it is in (fully determinate) sensible objects that permits their general mathematical treatment and, therefore, mathematical "πστήμη" with respect to them.²⁸

The conceptuality of the species that compose the formalized units of calculation in Vieta’s *logistice speciosa*, in contrast, does not owe its origin to having been “lifted off” sensuously perceived objects. Vieta’s formalizing innovation does not have its basis in a “perceptual modification” but in the transformation of a preexisting mathematical procedure for the discovery of unknown magnitudes, “analysis and synthesis.” This procedure granted as given the magnitude that is unknown and therefore sought (which was called analysis) and proceeded to perform calculations that either terminate in an impossible magnitude (one that contradicts existing mathematical knowledge) or in a magnitude that (being consistent with existing mathematical knowledge) is possible. In the latter case, the granted as given magnitude that is sought is then demonstrated to be the “true” one by resolving the problem (which was called synthesis), either by constructing a geometrical figure or performing determinate arithmetical calculations. Vieta transformed this whole procedure by restricting the magnitudes involved in the “analysis” to numbers, and treating both the unknown (as was traditionally done) and the known numbers (which was not done traditionally and, therefore, is a major part of his innovation), as “granted as given,” and, in precisely this sense, as “indeterminate.” This enabled him to restrict all calculations with arithmetic magnitudes to the indeterminate mode of traditional analysis, and to then “solve” the problem of finding an unknown number in the indeterminate mode, dispensing with the determinate calculations required by traditional synthesis in order to resolve the analysis.

Vieta’s innovation, which, being self-conscious of its lineage, he named the “analytical art,” is therefore not based in an abstraction from the individual, determinate, mathematical objects of traditional arithmetic. The reactivation of the original evidence of Vieta’s procedure, which “anticipates” the transformation of the formal conceptuality of traditional mathematics into the formalized conceptuality constitutive of modern symbolic mathematics, discloses that what makes this conceptuality possible is the shift in the “true object” of arithmetic, from the apprehension of a determinate number, to the apprehension of the apprehension of determinate numbers – in general. This “apprehension of apprehension” is indeterminate, in the

precise sense of its noncoincidence with both known and unknown determinate numbers. Vieta used the Latin translation of εἶδος (a term he appropriated from the traditional arithmetic of Diophantus), “species,” to characterize the formalized (because indeterminate) “units” employed by his method of calculation using indeterminate magnitudes, and used letters from the alphabet to designate them.

Significantly, it was Descartes, and not (as Husserl thought) Leibniz who was the first to connect the new dimension of indeterminate magnitude that is characteristic of the “pure” algebra made possible by Vieta’s “analytical art” with the “mathesis universalis,” the word that Baroccius, Proclus’s translator into Latin, used to designate the highest mathematical science of Greek antiquity. And likewise it was also Descartes who, significantly, first attributed to this science an ontological significance, as he identified its indeterminate and therefore general concept with the essence of the substance of the world, “extension.”

Finally, Descartes was the first – and also the last – philosopher to attempt to fix conceptually the mind’s ability to “intuit” and calculate with the indeterminate concepts that it has abstracted from its own power of knowing, from its “apprehension of its apprehension,” given the fact that the “purity” (as indeterminate) of these concepts does not allow them to be predicated – without contradiction – upon determinate objects. What allows the mind to do this, according to Descartes, is its enlistment of the imagination’s capacity to make visible to the mind its (the mind’s) “pure” concepts by employing determinate images to represent the indeterminate content of such concepts. This is effected via the identification of the mind’s “pure” concepts with visible letters and figures. In other words, according to Descartes, the “pure” intellect enlists the service of the imagination’s power to make its images visible, but not these visible images themselves, in making visible its pure concepts by using the medium of sense perceptible letters and figures that, because they employ a determinate mark to represent an indeterminate conceptual content, now function as symbols.

This necessarily brief and abbreviated synopsis of the desedimentation and reactivation of the origination of indeterminate and therefore formalized objects in Vieta’s logistice speciosa and its connection with Descartes’ ontology is intended to show the deficiency of Husserl’s account of the origin of formalized unity. By attributing this origin to an abstraction that has its basis on a perceptual modification, Husserl, in effect, employs Aristotelian abstraction, which is only capable of yielding a universality whose “formal” status is inseparable from the determinate objects given in sensuous perception, to account for the “formalized” universality of concepts that are generated from the mind’s apprehension of its own apprehension. Because Husserl’s phenomenological project of deformatization is borne of the conviction that the unity of such formalized universality must be “reducible” to the intuitive givenness of the unity of individual objects, the conclusion that this project has its basis in an unsustainable conflation of the origin of two essentially different kinds of unity is unavoidable.

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29 See Jacob Klein, *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra*, 210–211.
5 The Problematical Link Between Husserlian Formalization and Heidegger’s Formulation of Phenomenology

Heidegger’s account of “formal indication” in the 1920/1921 lecture course, “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,” makes explicit its connection to Husserl’s account of formalization and the considerable degree to which this connection draws on Husserl’s distinction between formalization and generalization. This distinction, according to Heidegger, is known to mathematics from at least the time of Leibniz, but is only logically explicated for the first time by Husserl. Heidegger glosses Husserl’s account of the difference between generalization and formalization, characterizing generalization as “universalizing [Verallgemeinerung] according to genus” and formalization as arising “out of the relational sense of the pure [theoretical] attitudinal relation itself.” Thus, as for Husserl, “the formal predication is not bound in terms of its material contents” whereas generalization is said to articulate “the concretely determined ordering of the levels of ‘generalities’ (genus and species).” Formalization’s origin is characterized by Heidegger, again following Husserl, in terms of a turning away from “the particular ‘what’ of the object to be determined” in order to determine it “as that which is grasped; as that to which the cognizing relation refers.” What is thereby grasped is the “object as such” in the sense of the “to which” of the “theoretical attitudinal relation” and not the “what content” in general of something that is materially determined. Heidegger’s account of formalization even mirrors the obscurity in Husserl’s account regarding how, exactly, the multitude of formalized syntactical categories is able to constitute the unity of the “Etwas überhaupt” that composes the subject domain of the mathesis universalis. This can be seen in his claim that “this attitudinal relation contains a manifold [mannigfaltigkeit] of senses that can be explicated,”

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30Heidegger, Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion, in Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, GA 60 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996), pp. 1–156.
31GA 60, p. 58.
32GA 60, p. 58.
33GA 60, p. 58.
34GA 60, p. 58.
35GA 60, p. 61.
36GA 60, p. 61.
37GA 60, p. 61.
38GA 60, p. 61.
39GA 60, p. 61.
40GA 60, p. 61.
41GA 60, p. 61. Theodore Kisiel’s reconstruction of a crucial sentence in the lecture course concerning formalized objectivity adds supplemental material from the student transcript of Fritz Neumann (Leuven Archiv) (personal communication from Kisiel) that is relevant to the claim I am.
such that the “manifold” proper to the attitudinal relation “is formed out into a formal object-category to which a ‘region’ corresponds.”

Heidegger’s account of “formal indication,” however, attempts to go beyond Husserl’s account of the difference between generalization and formalization, by distinguishing “formal indication’s” formality from that of formalization. Under the heading of the “Phenomenology of the formal,” which he characterizes as the “original consideration of the formal itself and explication of the relational sense within its accomplishment [Vollzugs],” Heidegger holds that formal-ontological universality does not prejudice philosophy “insofar as the formal-ontological determinations are formal.” He thus maintains “it is fitting to lead philosophy back to them.” Only if the thesis that philosophy is an attitude is withdrawn, and with this, the thesis withdrawn that philosophy is a theoretical science, can “the accepted formal-ontological grasp of the object” be understood as “prejudicing.” In other words, on Heidegger’s view, the question whether the formal-ontological prejudices philosophy only “makes sense if one accepts the thesis that philosophy is not an attitude.” Once this “presupposition” is accepted, then “formal-ontological study cannot be the final one.”

The final study, of course, is phenomenology. It does not originate in an attitude and is therefore not a theoretical science. What it is, and what a phenomenon is,

advancing here that Heidegger’s account of formalization closely follows Husserl’s. GA 60 printed Oskar Becker’s transcript, which does not contain the crucial words “something . . . and, or” that Kisiel restores following the Neumann notes, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 167, and which would have found its place in GA 60, p. 59, line 4. These words, of course, are found in Husserl’s account of formalized universality and therefore highlight all the more the proximity of Heidegger’s account of formalization to Husserl’s.

Neumann’s transcript verbatim is as follows, with the omitted sentence (in square brackets) flanked by the sentence before and after to delineate the entire context in which it belongs:

“Das formale Gegenständliche entspringt nicht aus einem Wasgehalt überhaupt, sondern aus dem Bezugssinn des reinen Einstellungsbezuges selbst. [Und erst auf Grund dieses Ausganges können die Bezugssinne selbst als Gegenstände gefaßt werden und weiterhin als formale Kategorien: Etwas, Und.] Der reine Einstellungsbezug muß noch selbst als Vollzug betrachtet werden, um der Ursprung des Theoretischen zu verstehen.”

42GA 60, p. 62.
43GA 60, p. 62.
44GA 60, p. 62.
45GA 60, p. 62.
46GA 60, p. 62.
47GA 60, p. 62.
48GA 60, p. 62.
49GA 60, p. 62.
50GA 60, p. 62.
51GA 60, p. 62.
52GA 60, p. 62.
53Correcting the obvious omission of “nicht” in the text.
“can be itself indicated only formally,” albeit not formally in the sense of the objectivation of the relational sense characteristic of formal ontology – despite its proximity to the latter. Each experience, according to Heidegger, qua its experiencing and what is experienced, can be interrogated with respect to its original “what” (content sense), its original “how” (relational sense), and the original “accomplishing [vollziehen]” of the “how” proper to its relational sense. Phenomenon is the totality of sense in these three interrogative directions, and phenomenology its explication. This explication, however, faces a formidable obstacle, insofar as “formal ontological determinateness” either “prescribes, or at least contributes to prescribing, a theoretical relational meaning” that “conceals the accomplishment aspect [das Vollzugsmaßige]” of the relational sense “and turns one-sidedly to the content.” Heidegger presumably means here that formal-ontological determination leads to “theory” (in the name of philosophy) turning to the “what sense” of each experience in a manner that makes it “objective” and, therefore, “entirely indifferent as to content.” It is to “formal indication” that Heidegger assigns the task of preventing this “prejudice,” which dominates “the history of philosophy” and which is “fatal for the relational- and accomplishment side [Vollzugsseite] of the phenomenon.”

Heidegger is quite clear that the meaning of “formal” in “talk of formal indication” is something that “has nothing to do” with the “the sense of universality” that “is common to formalization and generalization.” Thus he writes: “the meaning of ‘formal’ in the ‘formal indication’ is more original.” Within the formalized, the differences between “something is an object” and “experience as such” go together with the “sense of ‘universal’,” whereas “the formal indication has nothing to do with this.” Formal indication is nevertheless called formal because “the formal
is something relational,” albeit the “relational” in formal indication concerns neither the “direct” ordering in generalization nor the “indirect” ordering of formalization. Rather than concern any kind of universal ordering, formal indication “should indicate beforehand the relation of the phenomenon.” Heidegger unpacks this relation in two senses, one of which is “negative” and the other of which “means the *positing* of the *phenomenological explication*.” The negative sense indicates that “a phenomenon must be pregiven in a manner that holds its relational sense in suspense,” and therefore functions “as a warning” against “taking it for granted that its relational sense is originally theoretical.” The other sense, having nothing to do with ordering and classification, leaves “everything undecided,” and therefore “has sense only in relation to the phenomenological explication.”

Precisely, how the taking of something as formally indicated is able to find in the “admittedly improper” character of the “formal” (as Heidegger puts it the following year in his 1921–1922 lecture course “The Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle”) “a positive reference,” whereby “the empty content in its sense-structure is at the same time that which provides the direction toward its accomplishment (*Vollzugrichtung*),” is a secret that Heidegger apparently took with himself to the grave. The proximity of Heidegger’s talk of formal indication to Husserl’s account of formalization, nevertheless, does permit the discernment of Heidegger’s reasons

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72 GA 60, p. 59.  
73 GA 60, p. 63.  
74 GA 60, p. 61.  
75 GA 60, p. 61.  
76 GA 60, p. 63.  
77 GA 60, p. 63.  
78 GA 60, p. 64.  
79 GA 60, p. 63 f.  
80 GA 60, p. 63.  
81 GA 60, p. 64.  
82 GA 60, p. 64.  
83 GA 60, p. 64.  
85 Daniel Dahlstrom, for instance, maintains in this connection “that Heidegger’s emphasis on the formality of philosophical concepts is somewhat misleading,” because they “are clearly not understood by him as being so devoid of content that they are unable to preclude errant presumptive determinations of their meaning.” Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications,” *Review of Metaphysics*, 47 (June 1994): 775–795, here 785. Steven Crowell, on the other hand, maintains that “Formality here is not the emptiness of logical formality, but rather like Husserl’s ‘empty’ intentions that contain directions for their own fulfillment.” Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p. 141. Crowell also characterizes the “accomplishment of evidence” that follows the formal indication’s fulfillment as its becoming “deformalized” (ibid.).
for persisting in calling the indication involved “formal,” despite its critical relation to the formalized sense of the formal that (on his view) has dominated philosophy throughout its history. The formalized sense wherein “something as object” is theoretically determined as an objective content nevertheless indirectly refers to the relational sense of the original “how” in which the content sense of “what” is experienced in experience is experienced. Because of this, the suspension of this formalized sense is able to avoid formalization’s theoretical classification of the phenomenon’s relational sense while retaining the sense of the “formal” as something relational. Specifically, the suspension of the theoretical positing of the relational sense achieved by formal indication permits the positing of the original “how” of this relational sense’s “accomplishment” (Vollzug), that is, it permits the positing of phenomenological explication.

This proximity of Heidegger’s account of formal indication to Husserl’s account of formalization, however, also brings with it the problem (identified earlier) that plagues Husserl’s account. Namely, Husserl’s misguided conviction that the indeterminate unity that characterizes the materially empty and therefore formalized “Etwas überhaupt” lends itself to being deformalized in a manner that leads back to its origin in the unity of determinate individual objects. This problem shows up in Heidegger’s conviction that the “original fulfillment of what is indicated” by the formal indication is “factual life.” Thus, he holds that formal indication “as the method of approach” to this life is “factically necessarily.” The problem here may be put succinctly: the statement of the factual necessity of the method of formal indication presupposes rather than establishes that its directional sense finds its fulfillment in a phenomenon that is not ordered in any way by its putatively non-theoretical relational sense. Stated differently: because the formality of the “formal” proper to “formal indication” is understood by Heidegger to be initially distinct from the phenomenon that it indicates, justifying this formality (viz. indication) “phenomenologically,” that is, on the basis of the phenomenon, cannot but prove impossible.

Heidegger himself seems to have realized this. Thus in Being and Time, the formality proper to the phenomenological method is collapsed into the concept of phenomenon itself. This enables him to distinguish the formal concept of phenomenon from the “deformalized” phenomenological concept and to formulate the methodical locus of ontology’s possibility as phenomenology in precisely the formal concept of phenomenon’s deformalization. The formality of the formal concept of phenomenon, unlike the formality of formal indication, is not characterized by its “relational sense” but by its ontico (related to beings)-ontological (related to the

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86 GA 61, p. 33.
87 GA 61, p.134.
88 GA 61, p.134.
89 GA 61, p.134.
90 GA 2, pp. 46–47.
being of beings) indeterminacy. Thus, the formal concept of phenomenon is grasped by leaving “undetermined which entities are to be addressed as phenomena” and “whether the self-showing is actually a particular entity or a characteristic of the being of entities.” Related to this, if “we understand the self-showing that is inseparable from the concept of phenomenon in terms of entities, “phenomenon has the meaning of the *ordinary* concept of phenomenon.” The phenomenological concept of phenomenon differs from the ordinary concept, because what is “let to be seen” by “phenomenon in the distinctive sense” of phenomenology is “something that does not show itself initially and for the most part, something that is concealed, in contrast to what initially and for the most part does show itself.” Because, however, the deformalized phenomenological concept of phenomenon “essentially belongs to what initially and for the most part shows itself,” and does so as “its meaning and ground,” the “ordinary concept of phenomenon becomes phenomenologically relevant.” And this means that not only is the deformalized phenomenon in the phenomenologically proper sense – the being of entities – something that is initially and for the most part concealed and therefore something whose self-showing must be won in the way of access that genuinely belongs to it, but that, so, too, the original self-showing of these entities themselves is concealed and therefore must be phenomenologically secured.

By shifting the *terminus a quo* of the proper task of phenomenology – deformalization – from formalized objectivity’s theoretically liberated relational sense to the ontico-ontological indeterminacy of the formal concept of phenomenon, Heidegger posits three interrelated things. (1) The formulation of the methodological meaning of phenomenology properly situates the locus of the phenomenon’s initial concealment within the phenomenon itself, rather than within an attitude that is intrinsically alienated from the phenomenon. (2) Deformalizing phenomenology’s formal component does not lead to an original accomplishment of sense but to the concealed self-showing of both beings and their being. Thus, deformalization leads to the hermeneutic problem of wresting from this twofold concealing “the proper meaning of being and the basic structures” of the ontically privileged being, that is, Dasein, such that these structures “are made known to the understanding.

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91 GA 2, pp. 41–42.
92 GA 2, pp. 41–42.
93 GA 2, pp. 41–42.
94 GA 2, pp. 41–42.
95 GA 2, pp. 46–47.
96 GA 2, pp. 46–47.
97 GA 2, pp. 46–47.
98 GA 2, pp. 46–47.
99 GA 2, pp. 46–47.
100 GA 2, pp. 49–50.
101 GA 2, pp. 49–50.
of being”\textsuperscript{102} that belongs to this being. And (3), the indeterminateness of the distinction between beings and characteristics of the being of beings implicit in the formal concept of phenomenon nevertheless indicates that this distinction’s deformalization leads to the proper origin of the phenomenon of the meaning of being in the being of a being.

It is not necessary to turn to Heidegger’s own self-critique in \textit{Contributions to Philosophy} in order to question whether the presupposition running through these three things, namely, that the phenomenon of being is such as to lend itself to a formal conceptuality, is unwarranted. The proximity of the sense of the formal here to Husserl’s conflation of the origin of formalized universality with that of generalized universality is sufficient for this purpose. Heidegger’s formulation of the meaning of the phenomenological method as the deformalization of the formal concept of phenomenon assumes that the path to the origin of the phenomenon of the meaning of being leads through the interrelated and interdependent concealed self-showing of both beings and the being of beings. In both cases, what is responsible for this concealment turns out to be the ontology of the “present-at-hand.” This ontology is derived ultimately from the mistaken positing of the formal sense belonging to beings (as the result of their cognitive apprehension) as the true meaning of their being, and, conversely, the concealment of the phenomenon of world (\textit{Welt}) through which the being of beings becomes manifest within the purview of Dasein’s everydayness.\textsuperscript{103}

I conclude with two questions about the “present-at-hand’s” formal sense in Heidegger’s phenomenology and a remark on the proper context for answering them in a way that renounces the formality of the “first beginning.”

The two questions: One, is the “present-at-hand” formal in the sense of the formalized universality that characterizes the modern project of a \textit{mathesis universalis}, first formulated by Descartes? The formality of this sense of the formal presupposes (as we have seen) the ontological independence of a mathematical object that is indeterminate (i.e., neither arithmetical nor geometrical), namely the “magnitude in general” whose expression (and progressive formalization into the \textit{Etwas überhaupt}) is only possible via the sense perceptible symbols of a symbolic logistic. Or, two, is it formal in the ancient Greek sense of the general treatment of the two different kinds of determinate mathematical objects, discrete (i.e., numbers) and continuous (i.e., shapes) magnitudes? (Husserl, as we have seen, recognized the difference between the formality of these two formal senses but not the fact that their different unities must have different “phenomenological” origins.)

The remark: the present-at-hand’s sense of the formal cannot be understood, as Heidegger apparently understood it, to encompass both of these senses of formality\textsuperscript{104} without inheriting Husserl’s conflation of their phenomenological origins and

\textsuperscript{102}GA 2, pp. 49–50.
\textsuperscript{103}GA 2, pp. 212–213.
\textsuperscript{104}GA 2, pp. 82, 480–481.
exacerbating the problem this conflation poses to phenomenology. In the former case, Husserl’s failure to distinguish the different origins of two very different senses of the formal is continued. In the latter case, the historicity of these different senses is concealed in a way that it is not in Husserl’s phenomenology.

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1 Introduction

Fundamental to the very task of *Being and Time*, and profoundly striking in its own right, is Heidegger’s claim that traditional ontology has failed to ascertain the ontological status of the world “closest” to Dasein, that is, the everyday world that Dasein finds itself already *in*. Heidegger’s phenomenology promises to attend to this neglect, not, as might be expected, by investigating this everyday world *directly*. Instead, Heidegger holds that it is better to attend to the ontological status of this world *indirectly*, by way of “laying bare” the phenomenal basis (*Grund*) of beings. Sections 15–17 of *Being and Time* carry out this specific task through a series of analyses that attend to the *indicative* character of beings. When encountered phenomenally, beings are neither objects of theoretical concern nor objects that are “useful” in a “pragmatic” sense. Rather, beings are signs (*Zeichen*) *indicative* both of their own being and of the phenomenon of world. As signs, beings point to what they are in their own being and, at the same time, to the phenomenon of world. Yet, it is the phenomenon of world that delivers beings over to themselves, allowing them to be seen and to be in their own right. Specifically, this indicative capacity defining all beings reveals a paradoxical state of affairs regarding the exact ontological status of the relational character between beings and world. While any being in its readiness-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*) provides “access” to the phenomenon of...
world, it is precisely the phenomenon: world,¹ which, when caught sight of in its ontological dimension as reference (Verweisung), grants to all beings in their being (Sein) as having the capacity to indicate. When encountered in their own right as readiness-to-hand, beings have the phenomenal modality of “being-towards” as signs. As signs, they have the dual capacity of pointing to themselves and beyond themselves to the phenomenon of world as the very ground of their own being. Beings, then, show themselves in themselves, in their ownmost being (Sein), as having this dual capacity of indication, while the phenomenon of world, initially “accessed” by the readiness-to-hand of beings, is itself manifest as already disclosed, and as such, as the a priori ontological condition for the possibility of any being’s indicative capacity. The ontological status of any being then (including those beings taken and characterized as equipment), considered in terms of their paradoxical relation to world (what Heidegger calls their “phenomenal basis” [Grund]),² is that of “indication” (Indikation). This means that their ownmost being as this capacity of indication is granted to them, as it were, by the phenomenon of world.

With few exceptions, however,³ Heidegger’s readers have not considered the ontological status of the world as the primordial reference (Verweisung) wherein beings are encountered in their ownmost being as having the capacity to indicate. While Sections 15–17 of Being and Time continue to receive new attention, a sustained treatment of the ontological status and relational character of beings as signs with the capacity of “indication” and the phenomenal basis (Grund) of world as “reference” remains sorely lacking. To the extent that the literature treats the issue,

¹Despite the clumsiness of the locution “the phenomenon: world,” I prefer to use it at times to what is perhaps the grammatically more graceful expression “phenomenon of world.” My preference is based on what I take to be suggestive in the latter phraseology, viz., that in addition to the world as phenomenon, there is another world, to which the world as phenomenon is somehow related or involved. In my view, however, this is precisely not what is at issue in Heidegger’s phenomenological treatment of “world.” Hence, in what follows I will employ at times the phrase “the phenomenon: world” in the attempt to forestall any suggestions regarding what is phenomenally at issue for Heidegger.


it treats the phenomenal status of world, for the most part, without treating the ontological status of beings. Indeed, Heidegger’s readers have neglected almost completely the indicative mode of beings as signs, and, in so doing, have neglected their inseparable ontological relational status to the phenomenon of world.

I am convinced that this neglect is largely due to a lack of consideration and treatment of Heidegger’s self-understanding of the “primary aim” of these sections. Heidegger states explicitly that the analyses of everydayness, by way of the analysis of readiness-to-hand, come “prethematically” into view by way of “a ‘knowing’ which primarily looks toward being (Sein).” Further, Heidegger clearly states that being (Sein) is the “primary aim” of the analysis of everydayness, while beings are its “accompanying theme.” Here two points are to be noted regarding this “primary aim” and its “accompanying theme”: (1) that the analysis of the relational character between beings in their indicative capacity and the phenomenon of world as the primordial reference wherein beings first appear is essentially to be taken as an analysis of being (Sein) and not singularly, nor most essentially, as an analysis of beings as such; and (2) that when conceived properly, Dasein’s everyday comportment (Verhalten) in each of its factual involvements with beings shows how being (Sein) is rendered concrete as the phenomenal basis of both Dasein and all other beings. Both these points address the issue of “access” to being and clarify in an exciting way the task of the “primary aim” and “accompanying theme” of the analyses of everydayness: to render how being (Sein) becomes accessible to phenomenological thinking, such that it shows itself concretely as that which is given beforehand (vorgängig) with respects to beings. In fact, Heidegger tells us that the analyses of everydayness are to make explicit how being (Sein) shows itself in any instance of Dasein’s involvement with beings. The analyses of everydayness as an investigation of being are to “brings to completion, autonomously and explicitly, that understanding of being which belongs already to Dasein and which ‘comes alive’ in any (my emphasis) of its dealing with beings.”

If we keep in mind, then, that the analyses of everydayness brings into view the structure of being that determines beings, we can better understand Heidegger’s formal notion of being that is passed over by traditional ontology. Being (Sein) is not a “matter of soaring speculation” about the “emptiest of concepts.” In fact, being’s universality of transcendence is not a concept of any kind. Being’s universality is rather that which is “most basic and the most concrete.” This is the case since being phenomenologically comes into view in any instance of Dasein’s comportment toward beings as the primordial disclosure of the “there” (Da) given beforehand. Being, as the prior disclosure of the “there,” is what makes possible the encounter of beings as they are in themselves. Being is what is given beforehand

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4 GA 2, p. 90; tr. 95–96.
5 Ibid.
6 GA 2, p. 90; tr. 96.
7 GA 2, p. 12; tr. 29.
prior to any ascertainment, conception, or misconceptions of beings. Given beforehand, being provides Dasein with the most basic and fundamental way of factual orientation toward beings. Heidegger’s, non-conceptual, formal account of being as the concrete disclosure of the “there” given beforehand is “that which determines beings as beings, that in view of which (woraufhin) beings are already understood.” This means that being’s universality, rendered concrete as always and already operative in each and every encounter with beings, is the phenomenal basis of beings. This pre-ontological understanding of being closest to Dasein, given beforehand, alive “in any way of comporting oneself towards beings as beings,” is always and already operative even if presupposed and, indeed, misconceived by traditional ontology and its present-at-hand (Vorhandensein) conception of both being and beings. In fact, it is also the case that the prior disclosure of being, while presupposed and unaccounted for, makes possible the conceptual notion of being as the “highest concept” in traditional ontology.

To remedy the present-at-hand misconceptions of both being (Sein) and beings operative in traditional ontology, Dasein only needs to attend to the structure of being that determines beings in their own capacity of indication. For while continually passed over and misconceived by traditional ontology, being (Sein) nevertheless comes into view “completely” and “autonomously” whenever Dasein subordinates itself to an encounter with beings in their dual capacity of indicating. For this reason, Heidegger maintains that Dasein’s history, if it ever were to admit of an understanding of being (Sein), is completely bound up with Dasein’s factual life defined by proper orientation and involvement with beings in their readiness-to-hand:

The concept of “facticity” implies that an entity ‘within-the-world’ has being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ (Geschick) with the being of those beings which it encounters within its own world.11

This subordination, or what Heidegger also calls “submission” (angewiesen), to beings as they are in themselves and to that which grants to them their freedom to be, is the meaning of the primordial sense of the λόγος as a “letting be seen.”12

In light of this submission to beings, the primary aim of Sections15–17 comes into view. Indeed, the aim of these sections is to show how being (Sein) in the distinctive sense as the dynamic of manifestation shows up and is rendered concrete in any instance of Dasein’s comportment towards beings when taken phenomenally as signs. Indeed, the analyses of Sections 15–17 demonstrate how being (Sein) first

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8 GA 2, p. 12; tr. 29.
9 GA 2, p. 9; tr. 26.
10 GA 2, pp. 6–7; tr. 23.
11 GA 2; p. 74; tr. 82.
12 GA 2; p. 118; tr. 121–122.
announces itself as the phenomenon of world by way of phenomenal character of beings as signs. World, as the prior disclosure of the “there,” is the first naming of being. Put differently, world as being (Sein) is the primordial “wherein” of disclosure in which particular beings come into view and stand on their own. Thanks to the phenomenon of world/being (Sein), beings come to stand on their own and show themselves in their own right as signs. As signs, defined by the phenomenal structure of Erscheinung, beings in turn bear a necessary and inseparable relationship to being, to what determines their possibility of manifestation. Through the indicative character of beings, the world announces itself.

Yet, the pragmatists who read these sections do not see that the analyses of everydayness have just this “primary aim”; the pragmatists fail to see that the analysis of world and beings is to be taken as a way of knowing that “looks primarily towards being (Sein).” Nor do they take seriously the ontological status of beings as the “accompanying theme” of these analyses, a theme that renders concrete how the phenomenon of world/being is manifest “completely” and “autonomously” beforehand. Lacking such basic grounding considerations, the pragmatists treat and understand these sections by misconceiving them at their very inception. In the effort to counter the pragmatist misconceptions, the following discussion will provide a sustained treatment of these sections. By showing how the pragmatists stifle and misconceive these sections, I will show in what follows that (1) the goal of Heidegger’s analysis of readiness-to-hand is to disclose how the phenomenon of world taken as the phenomenon of being (Sein) shows itself concretely with respect to beings, and shows itself in every instance of Dasein’s comportment, (2) how world/being shows itself as the phenomenal basis (Grund) of beings in their being-character (Seinscharakter), and (3) that the phenomenal clues for the disclosure of world/being as the phenomenal basis for the “being-character” of beings are uncovered only in Dasein’s factual concern and comportment toward beings as they are in their readiness-to-hand.

2  The Pragmatists’ Misconception of Everydayness

The pragmatists maintain that the analysis in Sections 15–17 is an investigation of everydayness, which aims at showing how the understanding of beings and the world as present-at-hand (Vorhandensein) are derivative of a pragmatic understanding that Heidegger is said to clarify by way of Dasein’s pre-thematic, ready-to-hand, modality of “being towards” the readiness-to-hand of beings called equipment. Generally, the pragmatists understand and interpret these sections as an analysis (rather than a series of analyses) directed toward clarifying and making explicit the distinction between understanding vorhanden things and zuhanden things. Heidegger’s analyses of everydayness, as interpreted by the pragmatists, are taken as an analysis of tools in which the being of equipment in its readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), is characterized in terms of a usability, instrumental for Dasein. This pragmatic understanding has found wide support even among the more “strict”
Heideggerians\textsuperscript{13} (those Heideggerians who place most of their efforts toward clarifying Heidegger’s text as such) as well as among those who, with the “discovery” of this so-called “pragmatic” dimension of Heidegger’s thought, see a possible dialogical mediation between the phenomenological and analytical traditions.\textsuperscript{14} But no matter how well informed or supported this “pragmatic” understanding of the analyses of everydayness in Sections 15–17 might appear to be, it is, to put it bluntly, severely limited due to its lack of insight into the ontological problematic present in these analyses.

In fact, Heidegger himself, in his analyses of “readiness-to-hand,” characterizes such a “pragmatic” understanding as “ontic.” Such an understanding for Heidegger is “ontic” and therefore, not yet “ontological,” because the phenomenal character of beings (equipment), seen in light of their phenomenal basis, is not recognized and made explicit by this understanding. Specifically, the pragmatic, “ontic” understanding (Verstehen) and its (restricted) sight (Sicht) neglects to see the phenomenon of world as the a priori in terms of which the being of equipment and beings in general first become encountered in themselves. In the specific case of equipment, this means that the pragmatic understanding falls short of giving an account of the phenomenal basis in which the being of equipment as equipment is first encountered in its own right as available and usable in its readiness-to-hand. Yet, it is not only the case that the pragmatic interpretation passes over the phenomenon of world as making possible the usability and in general the encounter-ability of beings in their own right. It is also true that this interpretation fails to understand that equipment and beings in general not only have the capacity to point to their own being and to show themselves from within themselves. In the case of equipment, this means that the capacity of being “available for use” and usable is not their only capacity of indicating. Beyond the indicative capacity of pointing to their own being as equipment, equipment and beings in general are able to point to the very ground of their being that first grants to them their capacity to be. Indeed, it is the phenomenon of world, a phenomenon that is through and through ontological, that grants to beings this dual capacity of indication.

The dual character of indicating is made more apparent in the specific being of equipment since equipment in its very being as equipment points beyond itself. Not only is equipment usable in itself; equipment in its being as serviceability makes readily apparent how all beings also point beyond themselves. While the pragmatic interpretation of equipment sees how any item of equipment in its being points beyond itself to an involvement with a totality of other beings, it fails to see that beyond the “pragmatic” totality of the “in-order-to” of equipment, equipment point to the phenomenon: world. The beings of equipment, and beings in general are indicative not only of themselves and of their being with other beings; equipment and beings in general are indicative of their being in the world. The pragmatists,

\textsuperscript{13}GA 2, pp. 75–76; tr. 82–83.

however, restrict the phenomenal “being-in” of beings to what Heidegger characterizes in terms of an involvement that beings have “with” one another. This leave unclarified, the more fundamental condition of the “being-in” of beings as rendering manifest a free involvement “with” other beings by virtue of being in the world.

This oversight reflects a general tendency among various scholars, whether of a “pragmatic” orientation or not, to misconstrue the “im” in Heidegger’s reference to “das Seiende im Ganzen” as defining a relation among “beings as a whole,” rather than the inclusion of “beings in a whole,” which in principle transcends the free forming of any given totality of involvements. As a result, the pragmatists fall short of seeing that beings, by virtue of their inclusion in a whole, point to the very source of their capacity to indicate; they fail to see that the ontological basis (Grund) of beings arises through their inclusion within the world. The pragmatists do not address the genesis of usability, availability, and the most basic ontological capability of beings, that is, their functioning as signs indicative of world and finally, as Heidegger’s analyses show, of being (Sein) itself. Thus, the ontological structure of the “im,” of the phenomenon: world, in terms of which beings are granted, as it were, these indicative capabilities and out of which totalities first emerge and come into play, remains unthought by the pragmatists. Indeed, to the degree that the within of beings is identified as “world,” it (the “within”) is misinterpreted “ontically” by the pragmatists as a relational whole of beings. This misinterpretation of the ontological basis (Grund) of the “being-character” of beings is guided by an understanding, which conceives of this basis in terms similar to the status and character of a being. However, the basis of the “being-character” of a being, as the phenomenal condition of the possibility of a being’s availability and usability (emerging with respect to the being’s relational context of being with other beings) is itself neither a being nor a whole of beings. The phenomenon of world is rather the “wherein” of a being. Stated simply, then, the pragmatists leave essentially unexplored the deeper phenomenal basis of a being, that is, its being with other beings as something that is made possible by way of its being within the world. In silence, the pragmatists pass over the phenomenon of world, failing to recognize its a priori status for the “being-character” of beings.

The pragmatic understanding is restricted also in its treatment of the role of Dasein as the ontic a priori condition that frees beings in their dual capacity of indication and that keeps Dasein open to them and to the phenomenon of world. Heidegger expresses this admittedly difficult thought as follows:

> Ontically, “letting something be involved” signifies that within our factical concern we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it is already and in order that it be such....This a priori letting-something-be-involved is the condition for the possibility of encountering anything ready-to-hand, so that Dasein, in its ontical dealings with being thus encountered, can thereby let it be involved in this ontic sense.15

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Dasein’s ontic a priori character is manifest in the structure of the “for-the-sake-of-which,” a structure that signifies, among other things, “letting something be involved.” Involved in this ontic capacity of Dasein is its understanding and interpretation of all beings (and not just other Daseins) in their being. Heidegger emphatically formulates what is involved here as follows:

Dasein is the ontic condition for the possibility of discovering beings, which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of being, and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves.

The pragmatists, however, interpret beings as being solely “for-the-sake-of” Dasein’s being. When the “for-the-sake-of” is interpreted in this manner, beings must exist for the sake of Dasein’s use, with the consequence that Dasein’s orientation toward beings is taken by the pragmatists exclusively in terms of their “usefulness” for Dasein. With this understanding, the pragmatists never reach the phenomenological level of understanding Dasein as the “ontico-ontological” a priori condition for the possibility of beings being themselves. Specifically, the pragmatists fail to see the “for-the-sake-of-which” of Dasein’s being back into the fuller phenomenon of world. As a consequence, they completely miss Heidegger’s ontological account of how Dasein is first delivered over to itself by way of the “there” of the world. Specifically, the pragmatists fail to see that characteristics of Dasein itself as “mineness” and “existence” are first granted by way of the phenomenon of world. Completely missed, then, is Dasein’s encounter with itself in its mineness and existence as being-for-the-sake-of others only by way of the manifestation of the phenomenon: world. The pragmatists, then, pass over the ontological status of Dasein, whose “for-the-sake-of-which” in its capacity as being-in-the-world, is disclosed as the ontic capacity of letting beings be. They fail to see that the phenomenon of world first frees Dasein for its ontic capacity of “letting beings be involved.” “Letting beings be involved” is therefore the primary character of the λόγος, which clarifies Dasein in its ontic a priori status as that which lets beings be themselves. In letting beings be involved with their most appropriate being by way of indicating, Dasein’s being is “for-the-sake-of-the-other.” Interpreted from within the structure...
of being-in-the-world, the “for-the-sake-of-which” is not Dasein’s being for itself, but rather its being for those beings both like and unlike itself. Thus, it is not the case that the world and beings exist “for-the-sake-of” Dasein.

There are reasons, however, why the pragmatists’ interpretation has not advanced toward an understanding of the ontological and ontic a priori conditions for beings as they are in themselves. Their limited understanding has its basis in certain preconceptions and misconceptions that they hold regarding the concepts of everydayness and world. In my view, the pragmatists fail to grasp the role of everydayness and world as essential for an orientation to the deeper dimension of Heidegger’s analyses of everydayness. Heidegger clearly states that the concepts of everydayness and world have a “hidden” ontological dimension. This dimension, then, needs to be taken into account both at the start and throughout the analyses of everydayness, if the appropriation of the latter is to move in the direction of making “explicit” the hidden character of the former.

Generally speaking, the pragmatists think “everydayness” in terms of Dasein’s “unowned” mode of “being-in.” While it is true that “everydayness” in Heidegger’s analyses is explicitly identified as a particular mode of Dasein’s being, it is also the case that this “mode” of trending toward unownedness, characterized by Dasein’s “absorption” in the world, is understood by Heidegger to provide the starting point for the analyses of everydayness. The analyses of everydayness are to start with and depart from this mode, as they move in the direction of unfolding the phenomenal basis and the “being-character” of beings. Heidegger conveys this when he says that the analyses of everydayness are meant to move toward ontological determinations by way of a “critical” departure from the mode of “being” characterized as “being-alongside,” in the particular mode of “absorption.” Symptomatic of the pragmatists’ failure is the identification of everydayness with the derived mode of Dasein’s “being-in” as “being-alongside” in the particular mode of “absorption.” With this identification, the pragmatists fail to see that one of the tasks of Heidegger’s analyses of everydayness is to provide an account of the mode of everydayness, which shows it to be not the preeminent but a derive mode of everydayness. Due to too much “absorption” in the world, the derived mode of everydayness “takes” (in an unreflective mode of immediacy) and interprets pre-thematically the being character of beings in their readiness-to-hand as a “usability” defined by instrumentality. Ironically, the pragmatists understanding is itself limited to the derived mode of absorption, which due to too much “absorption” interprets beings (equipment) in terms of their immediate usefulness for Dasein.

The misconception of everydayness by the pragmatists is not only to be found in this identification of everydayness with the mode of being-in characterized by absorption. They also misconceive Heidegger’s account of the “positive signification” of everydayness, a signification that, were it considered, would lead to a critical assessment of “everydayness.” By drawing attention to the “positive” character of

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20 GA 2, p. 73; tr. 80–81.
everydayness, Heidegger shows that “everydayness” is more than an account of Dasein’s being towards equipment in its being as readiness-to-hand. The “positive” character of this “more” of everydayness lies precisely in its “hidden ontological” dimension. Every dayness refers to a “basic state of being” in which Dasein’s being in terms of “mineness” and “existence” is “delivered over” to itself. Expressed “positively,” the phenomenon of everydayness is most fundamentally characterized by the structure of being-in-the-world, in terms of which the very capacity of “existence” and “mineness” is given to Dasein. Everydayness in this sense, then, distinguishes Dasein’s existential states of both “mineness” and “existence,” because everydayness first and foremost is characterized by the basic structure of the phenomenon of world. Thus, the hidden ontological dimension of everydayness is equivalent to the “basic state of being,” that is, being-in-the-world. Mirroring this “basic state” of “being-in-the-world,” everydayness is indicative of the following structural items: (1) the phenomenon of world and (2) Dasein’s varying modes of being-in-the-world. As such, everydayness is both an ontological and existential concept.

The pragmatists are not clear in distinguishing the two distinct meanings of world as an ontological-existential concept. For the most part, ‘world’ is understood by them as an existential mode, which is characteristic of Dasein’s being. World as an ontological concept refers specifically to the “phenomenon of world” as that which makes possible various modes of being-in-the-world, ranging from ownedness to unownedness, is thus completely missed by the pragmatists as being only an existential mode of Dasein’s being. As an “ontological concept,” the phenomenon of world is that structural item which makes possible both the “being-character” of beings and Dasein’s mode of being as being-in-the-world. The phenomenon of world, unfolded in terms of the “how” of its phenomenal “already there,” is, further, that which makes possible every mode of Dasein’s “being-in” and its orientation “toward” the world. Everydayness and world are existentials of Dasein’s being because, first and foremost, they are indicative of the ontological structure of the phenomenon of world. This phenomenon yields and makes possible the deliverance of Dasein’s “mineness” and “existence” “over” to itself. Both “existence” and “mineness” are “delivered over” to Dasein by virtue of an enigma, announced both in the analyses of everydayness as the phenomenon of world and earlier in the Introduction to Being and Time, section one, as being itself.

The failure of the pragmatists to treat “everydayness” and “world” as existential and ontological concepts is hidden in their charge against Heidegger that goes so far as to accuse his analysis of equipment of “contributing” to a technological

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21 GA 2, pp. 58–59; tr. 68–69.
22 Regarding elucidation of the Introduction to Being and Time, as well as discussion of being in section one of this Introduction, see F.-W. von Herrmann, Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins: Eine Erläuterung von “Sein und Zeit”, I. Einleitung: Die Exposition der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985).
understanding of both equipment and world. Dreyfus, who has continued his reflections on Sections 15–18 of *Being and Time* for two decades now, still wavers in deciding whether Heidegger’s analysis of equipment is a “contribution” to the further development of technology or its “critique.” In his interpretation of these sections, however, Dreyfus makes something of an argument for the former. According to Dreyfus, Heidegger fails to see in the readiness-to-hand of beings what he later identifies as the power of nature (φύσις). As a result of this, Dreyfus claims that Heidegger is led to a conception of both equipment and world in *Being and Time*, which in fact advances the technological framing of the world. Yet, it is Dreyfus and not Heidegger who adheres to the “instrumental” misconception of equipment, which in fact has no place in Heidegger’s analyses of it. The profound insistence of giving an account of the being of equipment as *it is in itself* defies in principle the instrumental misconceived interpretation of equipment that misplaces and misinterprets the source of its being. In the instrumental misconception of equipment, the being of equipment is *not* seen as having its being in itself, but rather in Dasein as the “ends” of things. Ironically, Dreyfus charges Heidegger with his own lack of ontological insight. He does not see how Heidegger takes seriously, and indeed wants to preserve, already in *Being and Time*, the “refusal of earth,” which is characteristic of the *self-givenness* and being-character of equipment through its withdrawal into inconspicuousness. As a result, Dreyfus ignores the fact that this “refusal,” as Heidegger emphasizes in *Contributions to Philosophy*, is also a *sheltering* concealment, which is necessary for the earth to enter into its “strife” with world.24 Such misunderstandings could be mitigated, if not eliminated altogether, by recalling Heidegger’s emphasis on the phenomenal manifestness of beings through their inclusion “in” the whole, rather than merely collected as a whole by virtue of their instrumentality. Conversely, we discover that the concealing, withdrawing character of world allows beings to withdraw into themselves, and become “inconspicuous,” so as to be available and usable.25 In what follows, I shall take up in detail the issues involved in Heidegger’s advancement beyond the narrow and limited misunderstanding of beings by the pragmatists. Essential to this advancement are Heidegger’s analyses of the “inconspicuousness” of ready-to-hand beings, that is, their potential for revealing the “refusal of earth.”

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25 GA 2, p. 100; tr. 106.
3 The Phenomenal Character of Withdrawing and Appearing

I shall begin with an overview of Sections 15–17 of *Being and Time*. The analyses of everydayness have as their task, as I have already suggested, something more than clarifying and making explicit the ontological status of the concepts of everydayness and world. These analyses are to make explicit how being (*Sein*) shows itself “with respect to beings.” The phrase “with respect to beings” is carefully chosen here to emphasize that, for Heidegger, the primordial manifestation of being (*Sein*), that is, its showing itself from itself, although inextricably bound up with beings, is not to be reduced to nor conceived of in terms of their own manifestation. Indeed, in this connection I would want to say that the task of phenomenology, as Heidegger conceives it, is to make explicit the very distinction between the manifestation of being (*Sein*) and that of beings. The move from the formal to the deformed conception of phenomenology demands, on the one hand, that being be rendered concrete, that is, that it be seen by way of and “with respect to beings,” while, on the other hand, it demands that being be explicitly encountered in its manifestness as distinct from the appearance of beings.

As is well known, Heidegger’s phenomenology attempts to retrieve the Greek conception of being still shrouded in darkness. Accordingly, “phenomenon” in its primordial signification as that which shows itself from itself, that is, the “manifest,” as well as phenomenon in the modes of showing of entities as *Schein*, *Erscheinung*, etc., is to be brought to self-showing. In my view, everydayness is seen by Heidegger as the place in which being is seen as the phenomenal ground of beings. Phenomenological seeing is first and foremost to render transparent that being is the phenomenon of phenomenology. The phenomenological analyses of everydayness clarify, make explicit, and render concrete how being as the phenomenon of world announces itself by way of an investigation of beings as they appear in the mode of *Erscheinung*. Being is to be clarified, made explicit, and rendered concrete “with respect to beings” as they appear structurally as indicative of the phenomenal ground that determines them in their own being. To see this structure of the being of beings, beings must be seen phenomenally as they are in themselves as structurally related to being (*Sein*) by way of Dasein’s factual comportment toward them, in the mode of “letting them be seen.” But since being is “that which is ontically ‘closest’ to Dasein” but “ontologically farthest from Dasein” (due to Dasein’s lack of phenomenal insight), Heidegger returns to everydayness where the structure of the being and beings is still pre-thematically operative. Indeed, everydayness addresses this neglect so as to bring Dasein nearer to an ontological understanding of itself, beings, and being. That which is ontically “closest” and ontologically farthest from Dasein, namely Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding of being alive in its everyday being towards its concernful dealing with equipment, is to be rendered manifest by the phenomenological analyses of everydayness.

The twofold task of rendering being concrete by way of beings, while carefully distinguishing being in its manifestation from beings, when applied to the analyses of everydayness, involves a “pre-thematic” interpretation of those beings “closest”
to Dasein, of those beings that are encountered in terms of their readiness-to-hand. This means that readiness-to-hand reveals the phenomenal manifestation of beings. Heidegger is clear that these beings, when treated pre-thematically, are neither objects of theoretical observation nor of pragmatic usefulness. Rather, when taken pre-thematically, they are those beings that Dasein comes across in its concernful being-in-the-world. Phenomenological “seeing,” in its task of working and staying within the pre-thematic encounter with beings, sees through the theoretical eidetic mode of seeing that traditionally determines both the theoretical and pragmatic (productive) mode of interpreting beings. Phenomenological seeing is guided beforehand by being (Sein) as it attends to the indicative, readiness-to-hand, the “being-character” of beings. In the move to being, phenomenological seeing is already directed beyond the ontic interpretation of beings closest to Dasein that misunderstands them in terms of a “productive” modality. In the move to being, phenomenological sight is directed toward the ontological origin of beings, and in particular those beings “closest” to Dasein, that is, beings that Heidegger identifies as equipment. The investigation of equipment therefore seeks the ontological origin of equipment and of beings in general when attending to the indicative phenomenal character of beings in terms of their own being as “readiness-to-hand.” Being (Sein) as the phenomenal ground, provides proper orientations to beings, while readiness-to-hand provides access to beings as they are grounded in themselves so as to show themselves from within themselves. Orientated to beings by way of being means that beings are encountered in their own right as indicative of their own being and, in turn, of the origin of what grants to them their own being as readiness-to-hand. Treated phenomenologically, beings as beings (and specifically beings as equipment), are not to be interpreted solely in terms of the being that they possess in their own right as beings with the character of equipment; they are to be pre-thematically taken and interpreted in terms of “the structure (my emphasis) of being (Sein) that they possess.” When taken as such, beings not only point to their ownmost being, to what they are in their own right; they also point beyond themselves to being.

Thus, when attending to beings “phenomenally,” phenomenological analysis is directed by the phenomenal character of beings, that is, their readiness-to-hand characterized as “inconspicuousness,” as they point both towards themselves and beyond themselves towards being. Accordingly, Heidegger’s analyses of everydayness are directed toward disclosing the “phenomenal basis of beings” by way of the analyses of readiness-to-hand. These analyses aim at the “ontological” clarification of the structure of being that beings possess. To be seen in terms of this structure, beings must be grasped phenomenally in their being as being with other beings and fundamentally as already being in the world. Understood phenomenologically, the presuppositions “in” and “with” refer to the “broadest” phenomenal basis of beings, in terms of which the various phenomenal showings of beings are investigated. As the analyses of everydayness unfold, Heidegger makes both concrete and explicit that

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26 GA 2, p. 90; tr. 96.
the “wherein” of being (Sein) is the phenomenal basis of beings. Beings in turn are indicative of being only insofar as they are encountered in their “inconspicuous” character as readiness-to-hand. Indeed, Heidegger’s analyses of the inconspicuous character of readiness-to-hand, ontologically clarifies the distinction between being and beings and the “concrete” character of both. These analyses render explicit and secure from within the phenomenon of world the distinction between being and beings by way of a careful “reading” of beings in their indicative capacity.

Again, it needs to be emphasized that this “concreteness” means seeing being “with respect to” beings and yet as distinct from them. With the securing of the more “primordial” conception of being, being can no longer be seen as a matter of “soaring speculation” nor as a matter reduced by representational thought to the status of a being. Being is rather seen and secured as the most basic and most concrete of all matters; “primordially” conceived, being is always manifest as the “there that is” whenever Dasein comports itself towards the inconspicuous, readiness-to-hand “being-character” of beings.

How are beings in their phenomenal character of readiness-to-hand to be encountered so as to disclose the structure of being that they possess? How is being to be conceived if it “transcends” and is other than any and all beings? And finally, what is the nature of the phenomenal relatedness of being and beings; how is this relatedness to be conceived without reducing being (Sein) to a being and without reducing beings to their derived conception as something extant (vorhanden)? To discern the phenomenal basis of the being of readiness-to-hand and its “being-character” involves more than securing “readiness-to-hand” as the point of access to the genesis of beings. Dasein, in its mode of being toward ready-to-hand beings, also must be secured properly if beings in their readiness-to-hand are to be seen aright, if indeed beings are to be seen as they are in terms of their phenomenal givenness. For Heidegger, Dasein’s mode of seeing is rooted in its factical involvement. Dasein’s facticity consists in the enigmatic state of affairs that Dasein’s very being is tied to beings.27 In an exciting way, “facticity” points to Dasein’s encounter with the ontological condition of both its own being and the readiness-to-hand of beings in terms of its engagement with them. Dasein must be engaged in a mode of comportment and involvement, which lets beings indicate, if Dasein is to have any ontological access to being itself and the beings it encounters in concernful involvement. Dasein must comport itself toward beings in such a way as to be guided by both being and beings, if it is to have any ontological access to itself and to beings themselves as they are given in terms of their ontological origin.

Heidegger’s phenomenological elucidations of readiness-to-hand in Section 15 are general and therefore removed from the concrete unfolding of how beings, in their

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27 GA 2, pp. 75–76; tr. 82–83.
readiness-to-hand, are indicative of the structure of being that they indicate. However, this general encounter with readiness-to-hand is nevertheless addressed from within the question of its ontological horizon. Heidegger beings his analysis of readiness-to-hand by nothing that beings first become accessible in the inconspicuousness of their readiness-to-hand by virtue of the structure of reference called the “in-order-to.”  

A being is ready-to-hand only in its being with other beings. Phenomenologically “following through” in the direction of this referential structure, Heidegger notes that the referential structure of the “in-order-to” is multidimensional. Beings as equipment first become ready-to-hand (accessible in their being as usability) in terms of the referential structure that they bear to one another and to themselves. The “in-order-to” points beyond itself to other equipment, to nails, leather, to the work, to nature and its by-products, and to Dasein in its shared world. Yet, the “in-order-to” also refers to the “for which” of the being itself, to the hammer’s own usability, which is used “in-order-to” fasten and hold secure the different materials that are needed in the making of the work. The structure of the “in-order-to” has, then, both a self-referential structure that points to itself, as well as, a structure that “points” beyond itself to its mode of being (Seinsart) as being with other beings. In the “following through” of the referential pointing of readiness-to-hand, Dasein is freely transported to the “where of,” that is, to the “beyond” of the materials that the work is dependent upon and to the readiness-to-hand of the equipment itself, to its self-referential character, what Heidegger refers to as its own serviceability.

It is also the case that the readiness-to-hand of the work (although not as immediately apparent as the readiness-to-hand of a particular piece of equipment), exhibits this twofold referential character: The readiness-to-hand of the work freely points beyond itself to the “towards which” of a whole of equipment and toward the “for which” of a particular item of equipment that is needed in the making of the work. The work also has a self-referential character, even when the work is considered in the process of being made. The clock, as the work to be produced, points to its own usability, which is “in-order-to” tell time, as well as to those other items of equipment that are needed in bringing forth the clock. Heidegger emphasizes the free play of referential pointing that is underway between works and beings, works and equipment. Dasein’s comportment moves freely from a particular item of equipment in its readiness-to-hand to the work and vice versa, from the readiness-to-hand of work to the readiness-to-hand of a particular piece of equipment.

Thus, the analysis of readiness-to-hand in Section 15 lays bare the general character of readiness-to-hand. This analysis finds that any item of equipment (be it a particular item of equipment of the work itself) exhibits this twofold referential character. Beings in their phenomenal character, identified as readiness-to-hand, point (by way of indication) both beyond themselves and to themselves. Indeed, all beings in their readiness-to-hand bear the marking of this free twofold referential play of indicating. Yet for all this, the analysis in Section 15 leaves unclear the

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28 GA 2, p. 92; tr. 97.
ontological conditions that make possible this play of indicating; this first analysis leaves unclear what Heidegger refers to as the “ontological genesis” (ontologischen Genesis) of the referential character of beings.

The analyses of everydayness in Section 16 advance by getting closer to the ontological concretion of the everyday in that these analyses attempt to locate the “ontological emergence” of the referential character of beings. This is accomplished by the way of a deepened insight into the “emergence” of readiness-to-hand:

In the “in-order-to” as a structure there lies an assignment or reference of something to something. Only in the analyses which are to follow can the phenomenon which the term “assignment” indicates be made visible in its ontological genesis (ontologischen Genesis).29

Here, Heidegger makes explicit the specific issue that overall informs his analyses. Proceeding in the interrogative mode, the issue emerges in terms of the question of the “ontological genesis” of beings: What makes possible their referential capacity as manifested in the structure of the “in-order-to”? What makes possible the availability and usability of beings as seen by way of the relational being with one another of beings? To answer the questions concerning the manifestation of the being of beings, Heidegger must again hold open the phenomenal character of readiness-to-hand so as to follow through and make explicit the nature of the referential capacity of beings. This means that phenomenological seeing must try to see beyond the referential capacity of beings as emerging in their beings with one another, to the source of the very indicative capacity of such “being with.” While attempting to hold open the phenomenal basis of beings by means of the referential character of readiness-to-hand, Heidegger advances his analyses by making explicit the issue of the place and source of the referential capacity of beings. This issue concerns the probing of a highly significant question: whether the free referential pointing of the “in-order-to” most properly belongs to readiness-to-hand per se, to the character of beings in their own right, or to a source that renders “their” so-called referential capacity possible.

The attempt to locate the “ontological genesis” of the referential pointing of the “in-order-to” is carried out by attending to both the conspicuous and inconspicuous character of readiness-to-hand form within the context of unreadiness-to-hand. To my knowledge, no one has yet observed how, in his analysis of readiness-to-hand, Heidegger persistently emphasizes that the conspicuousness of beings is never in fact completely severed from their inconspicuous character and source. Heidegger states in various ways the same essential insight throughout the analyses in this section, namely, that the phenomenal character of beings is such that “the presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand.”30

To demonstrate phenomenologically this point, Heidegger looks to both the conspicuous and inconspicuous moments of the ready-to-hand. The “moments,” while

29 Ibid.
30 GA 2, p. 92; tr. 97.
never separate, give insight into the whole phenomenal character of beings (that the “conspicuous” character is never completely severed from its inconspicuous character) as well as into the genesis of the phenomenal nature of beings. Taking his clues from these varying moments, Heidegger is able to discern more fully the locale of the “in-order-to.” By attending to the phenomenal disclosure indicated by these moments, Heidegger attempts to facilitate access to the phenomenal structure and grounding that makes possible readiness-to-hand.

Attending to the inconspicuous “moment” of a damaged item of equipment, that is, to the unreadiness-to-hand that is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand, Heidegger’s analyses of readiness-to-hand move toward ontological considerations that are involved in the phenomenal structures that make readiness-to-hand possible. According to Heidegger, unreadiness-to-hand points to the deeper ontological state of their being in the world, which makes possible the relational whole of beings. In this pointing back to the phenomenal basis (grounding) of beings by way of what still remains of the mode of being of unreadiness-to-hand, that is, of the phenomenal character of beings, Heidegger uncovers a distinction within this very phenomenal basis. This distinction concerns the phenomenal moments of “with” and “in.” The readiness-to-hand of a damaged item of equipment brings to the fore the whole of other equipment that the damaged equipment was with. It brings to the fore the “how” of the availability and usability of beings as emerging by way of their being with a whole of other beings. Heidegger notes that the “in” of this whole is indicated by way of what still remains of the phenomenal character of readiness-to-hand. Yet, beyond this totality of being with other beings and along with the whole of assignments of beings, as that “wherein” concern always dwells, the “world announces itself.”31 Here, it is important to emphasize Heidegger’s exact words: “with this whole, the world announces itself.” He does not say that the world announces itself as this whole. The “wherein” of the phenomenon: world, announces itself as “already there.” It announces itself as a distinct moment, and indeed as the more primordial phenomenon that first makes possible a freeing of the indicative capacity of beings as having an involvement “with” one another. Beings, then, are indicative of their involvement with other beings. Yet beyond this indicative capacity, beings are indicative of their own origin. The origin, again, announces itself as the phenomenon: world. However, this indicative ability of beings to point to the phenomenon of world must be seen by Dasein. Heidegger is exceedingly clear on this point when talking about how the indicative character of readiness-to-hand still shows up in the unreadiness-to-hand of something missing. Following in the direction of the indicative capacity of what is missing, the world announces itself. The announcement of the world through the unreadiness-to-hand of beings, however, is “inaccessible to circumspection so far as circumspection is always directed towards entities:”

Similarly, when something ready-to-hand is found missing, though its everyday presence [Zugegensein] has been so obvious that we have never taken any notice of it, this makes a

31 GA 2, p. 100; tr. 105.
break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what was ready-to-hand for. The environment announces itself afresh. What is thus lit up is not itself just one thing ready-to-hand with among others; still less is it something present-at-hand upon which equipment ready-to-hand is somehow founded: *it is in the ‘there’ before anyone has observed or ascertained it. It is itself inaccessi-
sible to circumspection so far as circumspection is always directed towards entities (my emphasis).*³²

The priority and distinction of the structural moment of the wherein of world are not brought into view when attending to the still inconspicuous character of the pointing of unreadiness-to-hand. The priority of the disclosure of world as making possible the capacities of beings as indicative of their own availability and usability is made explicit by attending to the so-called “conspicuous” moment of beings in their unreadiness-to-hand. Attending to just the conspicuous character of the unreadiness-to-hand of a damaged item of equipment, its being-just-present-at-hand, Heidegger points out that the damaged being itself, and the other ready-to-hand beings with it, all become deprived of their referential pointing. Expressed differently, when attending to beings in such a way as to “bracket out” their phenom-
ena\-nal character of referential pointing, as if they were indeed, in their being-in-
themselves, present-at-hand (and as such, autonomous and independent with respect to both their being with other beings and their being in the world), Heidegger sug-
gests that the conspicuous being of the damaged being becomes deprived of the “phenomenal pull,” which links it to itself by way of other beings and, most essen-
tially, by way of the phenomenon: world. The damaged being shows itself as some-
thing merely extant. Indirectly, Heidegger’s analyses of the structure of reference (Verweisung), made explicit in this conspicuous moment, suggest that this structure of reference, the structure of the “in-order-to,” cannot belong to beings as such. For if they did, if this referential capacity belonged to beings themselves, *beings would not suffer the loss of their inconspicuous character when isolated from their inter-
connection with other beings in the world.* If the indicative capacity of readiness-to-hand belongs properly to a being as such, it would not lose this capacity of pointing to itself and beyond itself when separated from its involvement with other beings in the world. In this connection, Heidegger notes:

That the world does not “consist” of the ready-to-hand shows itself in the fact (among oth-
ers) that whenever the world is lit up in the modes of concern which we have been interpret-
ing, the ready-to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood so that being-just-present-at-hand comes to the fore.³³

The fact that beings lose their capacity to indicate when treated as if they were just this being “in themselves” brings into relief the structure of reference; reference

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³² Ibid.
³³ GA 2, p. 101; tr. 106.
belongs most properly to the referential releasement of the phenomenon: world. This structure of reference does not belong to beings in their own right, but indeed to the phenomenon: world.

In general, Heidegger’s analyses of both the inconspicuous and the conspicuous moments of unreadiness-to-hand shows the structure of reference, the structure of the “in-order-to,” to be granted by the phenomenon of world and not by beings as such. The “wherein” of the phenomenon of world, in withdrawing, frees beings and grants them the possibility of being what they are in their own being and for involvement per se. Thus, the phenomenal referent of world is ontologically prior to the limited referential pointing of beings. Specifically, the priority of the “wherein,” that is, the phenomenal referent of world, over the indicative capacity of beings, shows itself in a disclosure that cannot be accomplished by the specific pointing ahead by readiness-to-hand. Readiness-to-hand points in the direction of this disclosure, it partakes of this disclosure, but without being able to bring it about. The phenomenon of world, as the disclosure of the “wherein” is then that which allows the multidimensional indicative capacity of beings to become manifest; beings are “with” other beings, but only as being in the world. The phenomenon of world as the primordial referent shows itself as the phenomenal horizon “wherein” the inconspicuous being-character of beings becomes accessible as the capacity of indicating that which is granted to them. The analyses of both the inconspicuous and conspicuous modes of being of unreadiness-to-hand suggest that the phenomenon of world announces itself already there, that is, as the ontological horizon “wherein” beings in their readiness-to-hand are granted their capacities of being available, usable, and, most essentially, their capacity of indicating or pointing to the phenomenon of world. The phenomenon of world emerges as the ontological basis for “delivering beings over” in their being. Conversely, because of their dual character of “pointing to” and remaining “inconspicuous,” beings themselves suggest a mode of concealment, which parallels the self-sheltering “refusal” of the earth.

Before taking up again the analyses of readiness-to-hand, Heidegger formulates the ontological advancements achieved by the analyses in Sections 15 and 16. At the phenomenal level, the formal distinction between beings and their ontological tie to the phenomenon of world is articulated. The term “sign” denoted the capacity of “referring” as indicating that is manifested by the phenomenal being of ready-to-hand beings in their readiness-to-hand. In contrast to this, the term “reference” characterizes the “phenomenon of world.”\(^34\) To the latter belongs the structure of reference proper. For the disclosedness of world makes possible the kind of “referring” as indicating manifested by ready-to-hand beings in their readiness-to-hand. These beings are limited in their referential pointing in that they point to the disclosedness of the phenomenon of world, which is already there since they are unable to reach or to claim this phenomenal character on their own. The specifically limited pointing of beings in their readiness-to-hand, as distinguished from the reference proper, which belongs to the phenomenon of world, is called by Heidegger “indication.”

\(^34\) GA 2, pp. 110–111; tr. 114.
With the clarification of the distinction between the phenomenal character of beings and world, Heidegger’s analyses of everydayness, “of that which is ontically closest but ontologically farthest from Dasein,” move toward further ontological explicitness. Taking up again the “accompanying” theme of beings in their phenomenal capacity of indication, the analyses of readiness-to-hand now move into their final and decisive phrase. Having established that the phenomenon of world is the primordial locale, the referential horizon, “wherein” beings become manifest in themselves, Heidegger now investigates the readiness-to-hand of beings with a view toward being (Sein). With the securing of the phenomenon of world in the earlier analyses, this phenomenon of world now can be treated phenomenologically not only as the phenomenal basis of beings, but also as the first naming of the “wherein” of being (Sein). For being, while itself not a being, when encountered in the middle voice form, is the primordial “wherein” of “openness” in which beings first come to stand and appear in themselves and therefore as having their being in themselves. Here, two senses of the “wherein” must be clarified and radically kept distinct. There is the “wherein of beings;” indeed, because the “wherein” in which beings appear, that is, the place in which they appear in their own right, is in themselves. Beings therefore have their own being in themselves and show themselves from within themselves. Put differently, beings are self-grounding since the ground of their own individual being lies within themselves. But first and foremost, there is the “wherein of world” as the first naming of being (Sein) as the primordial disclosure of the “open,” the expanse of openness as the prior ground, that is to say, the abgrund (Abgrund), which delivers beings over to themselves.35 Given the ontological priority of this primordial “wherein” of world/being, beings can be encountered and interrogated in their own modes of showing and brought to the primordial mode of self-showing, that is, as that which shows itself from within itself, with respect to being.

The final phase of the analyses of everydayness concerns then the “primary” theme of being by way of the “accompanying” theme of beings. Yet, in this final phase, Heidegger only hints at the relational character of these two themes by making a few comments regarding what he now discerns as a more “primordial” way of taking and interpreting readiness-to-hand.36 Access to the more “primordial” way of “taking” and “interpreting” the “readiness-to-hand” of beings as signs, however, is apparent only to those Daseins who are phenomenally rooted in the world. In the case of those Daseins who already stand in the world, in the modality of fully encountering beings in their own right as sign, the indicative capacity of beings is seen as manifesting itself as having the capacity to reveal (entdecken). Secured in terms of the phenomenon of world as the horizontal “wherein,” beings are interrogated as to how they appear. Beings appear as they are in themselves but also in terms of the structure of being that determine them. As indicative of both

35 For a pertinent discussion of Heidegger’s description of the “open,” see GA 65, p. 329; tr. 230.
36 GA 2, p. 107; tr. 111.
themselves and being (Sein), beings have the phenomenal character of Erscheinung. Erscheinung means “the announcing-itself by something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself.”

Deformalized, this means the world/being (Sein) announces itself as the already there through the indicative capacity of beings. Here, the gain of Heidegger’s analyses of everydayness is seen through the appearing of beings. The indicative character of beings as “(Erscheinung)…means a reference-relationship which is in an entity itself.” This phenomenal structure of Erscheinung, as manifest[ed] by beings, is indicative of how the phenomenon of world/being (Sein) announces itself through beings as they point beyond themselves to this very ground of their own being. Yet, still concealed, world/being (Sein) does not show itself from within itself by way of beings. Rather being world/being “announces” itself in and through beings. Formally conceived, the structure of Erscheinung brings into relief that the phenomenon of world/ being (Sein) does not show itself from itself; rather, it announces itself through something that appears, that is, beings. Beings then point Dasein in the direction of the opening/“there,” yet it is Dasein in its worldly character that must encounter it. The announcing of being in principle can be brought to self-showing as the manifest, but only insofar as Dasein in its worldly character releases itself towards the “open.”

But while the world announces itself through beings, it is also the case that beings can become the occasion through which another particular being announces itself. While at all times world/being announces itself through beings, beings can become as well the occasion through which the announcing of something that is not immediately present phenomenally appears. Heidegger uses the example of a farmer who stands in the world and encounters beings in the primordial capacity of revealing. In these beings, taken as signs, the sign is still not “free from what it indicates.” The farmer takes the appearance (Erscheinung) of the south wind as a sign revealing the approaching rain. Here, in this example, Heidegger suggests that this primordial mode of taking and interpreting beings is already a way of being towards both being (Sein) and beings. For it is the case that proper orientation towards being is already called for if Dasein is to encounter beings in their full indicative capacity where both being and other beings appear through them in the modality of an announcement. In Section 7, Heidegger already draws explicit attention to the phenomenal mode of Erscheinung defining beings. There, he states that all indication has the formal phenomenal structure of Erscheinung:

All indication, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing, even though they differ among themselves.

For the farmer, the approaching rain as a phenomenon does not show itself from itself; rather, it announces itself in and through the appearing, and hence indicating

37 GA 2, p. 40; tr. 52.
38 GA 2, p. 41; tr. 54.
39 GA 2, p. 40; tr. 52.
of a being that does show itself, that is, the south wind. For Heidegger, then, the structure of Erscheinung has a double significance. This can be seen in the example of the rain and wind, insofar as there is (1) the appearing of the phenomenon that does not show itself but rather announces itself, that is, the rain; and (2) the appearing of the south wind as such, as it shows itself in itself. The rain not yet appearing in itself announces itself through the wind that does appear. The double significance of Erscheinung shows itself in these two different senses of appearing.

The encounter with the so-called natural phenomena (and not signs that are formally produced or set up by Dasein) shows, then, that sign-beings in their mode of indicating as revealing, when encountered from within the disclosure of the “there” (Da), ultimately are the “carriers” and “bearers” of the meaning of other beings. When in the mode of revealing, signs “coincide with that which is indicated.”40 Here the sign is not a “substitute for what it indicates;” rather the sign is already what is indicated.41

4 Conclusion

Heidegger’s careful and continuous probing into the phenomenological character and origin of beings in their readiness-to-hand exhibits that it is by virtue of the referential character of the phenomenon of world/being (Sein) that beings are freed to “carry,” to “take on,” and “to bear” a significance that points beyond themselves to both being and to the significance of other beings. By virtue of the difference between the referential referring of the phenomenon of world and the ‘referring’ involved in the indicating of sign-beings, beings are freed in their indicative capacity to be the bearers of meaning characteristic of other beings. By tracing the structure of the “in-order-to” back to the more primordial phenomenal taking of beings as signs that both indicate, and, more primordially, “reveal,” Heidegger’s analyses of everydayness show that beings, when encountered from within the disclosure of the world, appear in their own right and at times become the occasion for other beings to phenomenally appear in the mode of an announcement. Indeed, being is not a matter of “soaring speculation” accessible only to the philosopher. It rather issues forth out of the attentiveness that approaches the so-called things in the world out of a regard for the phenomenal basis (Grund) in which beings first appear in their own rich indicative capacity.

In this way, my discussion reaffirms Heidegger’s emphasis on the “in” of beings as a phenomenological precondition for their becoming equipment through the dynamic of their “indicating,” revealing potential, which ultimately presupposes the phenomenon of world as the first naming of being (Sein). I thereby expose the

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40 GA 2, p. 110; tr. 113.
41 GA 2, p. 110; tr. 113.
misconception in the pragmatist attempt to construe beings exclusively in terms of their uses, and to define their appearance merely as a network of instrumentality. Because of this misconception, the pragmatists overlook the subtlety of Heidegger’s insight that beings always occur “in,” rather than “as” a whole. The root of this misunderstanding, and its corollary mistranslation of “das Seiende im Ganzen” as “being as a whole,” rather than “beings in a whole,” however, is not reserved to the pragmatists; instead this error re-emerges in other genre of Heidegger scholarship, and, indeed, in the most recent literature. As one such example, we need to look no further than Michael Lewis’s new book, *Heidegger Beyond Deconstruction*. While discussing the relation between world and thing, in which the “im” of the thing is paramount to understanding the singularity of its manifestness, Lewis proceeds from the same errancy as the pragmatists do, that is, of neglecting the “in” and the “with” as the phenomenological preconditions for the manifestness of beings. Specifically, he describes the realm of nature (with the emphasis of his own italics) as “the finitude of beings as a whole.”

By exposing a failure that is endemic to, but not limited to pragmatism, I have shown that the pragmatists’ misunderstanding provides an occasion to re-examine the thrust of Heidegger’s insight into the primordiality of the phenomenon of world as a preliminary phenomenological exposition of being (Sein). In this way, my discussion elucidates both the phenomenal manifestation of “beings in a whole” (das Seiende im Ganzen), and the “wherein” of their appearing through the opening of the world itself. In this way, Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology paves the way for thinking being as the “open,” and, conversely, the openness as the “clearing” (Lichtung) of being.

**References**


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Heidegger’s Experience with Language

George Kovacs

This chapter explores the following dimensions of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of language: the nature and significance of his concern with language (1); his experience with language as the way to what is ownmost (Wesen) to language (2); his trans-iteration to be-ing-historical language (3); the hermeneutic lessons in his experience with language (4).

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Heidegger’s attunement to language is endemic to his way of thinking, to his entire journey of thought. His lifelong attempt to rethink (to reopen) the question of “to be,” as the most primordial and profound concern of philosophy, in fact of human being, is conditioned by the power of saying (Sagen), by the disclosive potential of the word (Wort), of language (Sprache). As he observes in his 1939 summer semester seminar on language, focused on J. G. Herder’s treatise Über den Ursprung der Sprache (On the Origin of Language), “when the word breaks off (gebracht)—be-ing (Seyn) refuses (versagt) itself,” reneges itself,1 it does not come into the word.


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This concise statement is consistent with his earlier remark that the “word” originates, arises “out of the essential swaying (Wesung) of be-ing.” In his 1957–1958 essay “Das Wesen der Sprache” (What is Ownmost to Language), included in his Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950–1959) (On the Way to Language), Heidegger concludes from his meditation on language, including his assessment of Stephan George’s poetic saying that “Where the word breaks off (gebricht) no thing may be,” with the telling claim that “An ‘is’ (ist) gives itself (ergibt sich) where the word breaks up (zerbricht),” adding his remark that this “breaking up of the word is the singular (eigentliches; true, real) step back on the way of thinking.” Thus, the breaking up, the failure, of the word (the experience with language) says something about the “is” as well as about thinking. According to Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936–1938), language “arises (entspringt) from be-ing” and thus belongs to be-ing; in fact, as Heidegger clearly explains, both language and human being “belong equally originarily (gleichursprünglich) to be-ing.” These ideas go beyond (they radicalize) the metaphysical understanding of the relation of language to human being and to beings (Seienden), and thus ultimately to being (Sein); they lead (are on the way) to the discernment and enactment of the hermeneutic-enowning thinking of the relationship of language to be-ing (Seyn), to human being as Da-sein, and to be-ings (Seyenden).

For Heidegger, as these considerations indicate, the discovery (assessment) of what language truly is, of what is ownmost (Wesen) to language, is intertwined (historically as well as thematically) with the depth of thinking “to be” (esse; being; be-ing), with the interpretation of human being as Da-sein (as “more” than subjectivity, as other than animal rationale, as different from the metaphysically defined rational animal), as well as with the understanding of beings (and be-ings) in light of their relationship to (root in) “to be.” The expanding, even if limited, interaction between cultures in our life-world, including diverse languages and ways of thinking, renders the question of language (of language as such, not merely the concern with a particular language and with the diversity of languages, not just the interest in comparative linguistics) more and more intriguing, urgent, and significant (existentially and philosophically). The hermeneutics of language in Heidegger (as well as in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Buber, and others)

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2 GA 85, p. 65; tr. 55 (translation modified).
4 Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1989), pp. 501, 497 (hereafter: GA 65); Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 352, 350 (referred to in the text with Contributions).
reopens the entire question of language; it raises the sense of wonder, astonishment, as well as suspicion and anxiety, about the “place” and the “future” (the destiny) of the “word,” about the power of “saying,” about the disclosive potential of human language and speech. Heidegger speaks of his own experience with language in the age of technology. He remarks in his letter to Elisabeth Blochmann, dated Oct. 12, 1968, that much of his thought becomes more simple (einfach), that is, more readily understandable, with the passage of time, and with the work put into it; however, he continues, it becomes, at the same time, “more difficult to say (zu sagen)” it, to put it into language, in an age, in our technological age and culture, where human beings “lose the true relation with language and become slaves of the computer.” He is concerned with the loss of the power of “saying,” with the undermining of the disclosive potential of language in technologized culture, with the alienation of human being from what language really is. In his first lecture course at Marburg, given in the winter semester of 1923–1924, published as Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (Introduction to Phenomenological Research), Heidegger perceptively observes that language is “the being and becoming of human being himself,” that the genesis of the word is not in the physiology but in the genuine, actual “existence of human being.” Language, he explains, is “a specific way of being of human being, of being in the world.” Thus, concern with language entails caring for human being, attending to Da-sein as being in the world.

2

Heidegger’s concern with language is existential and hermeneutic; it is not a linguistic theory, not a preoccupation with mere semiotic issues or semiology. His own experience with language is hermeneutic disclosure; it is an integral part of his philosophy of language, of his way of unearthing what is ownmost to language, what language really is. The diversity and depth of his actual work with language become an opportunity for learning about and for discerning (discovering) language as such, thus much more than expanding the knowledge of a (or any) particular language. His insights into the life and place of language in human culture, in human existence, lead to the rethinking of the ordinary, traditional understanding of language, and to the assessment of the uses and abuses of the power of language in human history, in the history of thought, as well as in the realm of politics.

7GA 17, p. 317; tr. 240 (translation modified).
Accordingly, the inquiry into Heidegger’s experience with language ought to respond to the following two questions: What is his experience with language? What does it mean to have (to undergo, to live through) an experience with language according to his understanding? The next phase of these reflections is focused on the issues at stake in these questions.

Heidegger’s experience with language, including his care for and sensitivity about speech and language, accompanies (cuts across) his entire journey of thought. He clearly states that “mindfulness (Besinnung) of language, and of being, has determined my pathway of thinking from early on.”8 His entire body of writings gives ample evidence of the depth of his persistent concern with language. The emergence of Heidegger’s understanding of language, of his hermeneutic sensitivity about language, may be seen in his readings of (working with) Aristotle’s texts, in his alertness to the basic words and concepts of Aristotle’s philosophy, and not just in his (Heidegger’s) background in (in his acquaintance with) biblical and theological hermeneutics. His work with the writings of the great thinkers (from the pre-Socratics to Nietzsche) surely made him into a perceptive, insightful, astute observer of the “play” (life), of the saying, disclosive power of language, of the determining (defining) function of basic, distinctive (hermeneutically-situated) words and telling expressions. His vocabulary and diction, though inventive, are rooted, at least in part, in his encounter (dialogue) with the insights and the language(s) of seminal thinkers, with the disclosive power of their words, saying (sagen), and language. It is not accidental at all that he retains his persistent claim that language (speaking, saying) and thinking are bound together, that we as mortals and thinkers “dwell in language,” that “to say what is worthy of thought” is (means) “thinking.”9

Thus, language, in Heidegger’s own experience with it, is more, or rather other, than the expression of ready-made ideas, more than a simple communication of ideas, more and deeper than the exteriorization of human subjectivity, of the “I think.” Even his fascination (work) with etymology (Greek, Latin, German; and occasionally other languages) comes from his understanding of the (existential, hermeneutic) connection between speaking (language) and thinking (thought), from his attunement to the “twofoldness” of λόγος as ratio (reason, thinking) et (and) oratio (speaking, discourse), from the richness of his experience (work in learning, reading, research, teaching) with language. There is no doubt that his careful, innovative, inventive work with (“use” of) language and his elucidations of Hölderlin’s poetry, as well as of other poetic texts and works of art, enriched and reawakened the genius, power, and beauty of the German language. His words (not engendered by the established dictionary or lexicography) and philosophical, often poietic diction, the “thesaurus” of his thought and language, illustrate, embody, and enact the affinity of the German language, of its disclosive power (potential), with nature,

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8GA 12, p. 88; tr. 7 (translation modified). See also GA 12, p. 89; tr. 8.
9GA 12, pp. 34, 224; tr. 161 (translation modified), 155 (translation modified). See also GA 12, pp. 168, 169; tr. 74, 75.
earth, and sky, with existential experiences, with the emergence of saying, with its primal origin, and with its pre-semiotic life and grounding. This experience with language does not lead (surely not Heidegger) to the glorification, to the affirmation of the superiority (supremacy) of the German language (culture and thought); it, much rather, according to Heidegger’s assessment, opens up the way to the primordiality of language (of saying and speech) to the discernment and discovery of what is ownmost (Wesen) to language, of what language truly is or can be.

Thus, Heidegger’s experience with (in fact his extensive encounter with or exposure to) language amounts to a hermeneutic disclosure and discovery, to the (thematic and existential) source of origin (background) of his own language; it is neither a chronometric-developmental genesis nor a biographical-influential account (derivative explanation) of his inventive, unique language. As his hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis of what is ownmost to language as such (thus not simply to the German or Greek language) amply shows (demonstrates), the range of his experience (working, thinking) with language moves from ontic language to more and more ontological language, from the language of metaphysics to be-ing-historical language; it runs up against, and breaks through, the bounds and endemic limitations of ordinary, accepted, accustomed language and speech. Facing up to the limitations of lexicographically and dictionary-based prefixed language is part of Heidegger’s lifelong experience with language. Gadamer rightly claims (in 1962) that according to Heidegger “all thinking is confined to language, as a limit as well as a possibility.”10 This observation, supporting Heidegger’s claim, captures well Heidegger’s experience with language as the discernment of the limitations of the language of metaphysics, of the metaphysical tradition of thought, and as the discovery of the need for another, unique language for thinking the question of “to be” entirely otherwise than metaphysics, otherwise than representational thinking. For Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, as Gadamer explains, language is “a mode of interpreting the world that precedes all reflective attitudes.”11 The hermeneutic approach (way) to language is concerned with the primordial origin and “nature” of language, with its disclosive potential, as well as with the obstructions of its disclosive power as what is ownmost to it, prior (structurally and even historically) to its semiotic and lexicographic solidification, fixation, and manipulation. Heidegger’s philosophy of language is (it is based on and remains) his experience with language, and not a theory of, not a speculative or ideational construct about, language; it transcends, breaks out of, the instrumentalization (and objectification) of language, and opens the way to the discovery of the (hermeneutic) ontological status and origin of language (its originally belonging to be-ing),12 to what is truly ownmost (Wesen) to language as such.

11Ibid., p. 126.
12GA 65, p. 497; tr. 350.
The language of metaphysics ultimately cannot say (speak) be-ing; it objectifies being and language, and lacks the “grammar” and the appropriate words for be-ing, for speaking and rethinking the question of “to be.”\(^\text{13}\) Be-ing-historical, enowning language is able to say and speak be-ing according to its essential sway (unfolding). This language is Heidegger’s final, most ambitious, unique, ontological language, as his *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (GA 12) and the works leading up to it quite powerfully demonstrate. His unique, as well as difficult, language (diction, saying, words) is the gift and promise of his experience with language, his response to the beckoning and intimation of be-ing, to the call of be-ing as dwelling in language, in the word of saying, in saying.

3

The very idea of experience with language in Heidegger, according to his own claim and analysis, is not reducible to (is not identical with) external, genetic, developmental influences on his language, on his way of “saying” (speaking, writing, diction, vocabulary) or thinking; it is an in-depth, intra-lingual (not inter-lingual) event, the attunement to the saying power of language, the observation and enactment of the way(s) language as such (not simply a given particular language) speaks, the discovery of and thus learning from the belongingness of language (as well as of human being as *Da-sein*) to be-ing (as enowning).\(^\text{14}\) Heidegger’s experience with language is “internal” and not “external”; it is the letting emerge (speak) of language from within (as what is ownmost to it), and not the appropriation (adoption) and manipulation of its utilitarian function, not the accumulation of erudition derived from external observation. His experience with language, then, is quite radical, originary, and transformative; it is a disclosive, hermeneutic event.

Language, like thinking, is always on the way (*unterwegs*), on the move to become more disclosive, to say (speak) more and more radically, more be-ing-historically; it may not be reduced to (transformed into) a fixture ready to hand, well established and preserved in the dictionary, in a fixed grammar of a particular language.\(^\text{15}\)


\(^{15}\)GA 12, p. 181, Wort; Wörterbuch; tr. 87 (“…a dictionary can neither grasp nor shelter the word…”) [translation modified]. See also Heidegger’s *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*, GA 38 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1998b), pp. 24 (we do not find language in the dictionary), 19–28 (hereafter: GA 38).
Thus, there are many dimensions and implications of undergoing an experience with language. There is no doubt, however, that the core (the final horizon) of Heidegger’s experience with language is education for be-ing-historical language, a training in the hermeneutics of language. Accordingly, the culmination or “substance” of his experience with language is the trans-ition, the crossing over, from the language of metaphysics to (or at least toward) be-ing-historical language. The “ideal” of this trans-ition, that is, be-ing-historical, enowning language (hermeneutics of language), together with the “idea” of experience with language, is well explored and explained in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (GA 12) and in several related works; the trans-ition (crossing over), the dynamics (difficulties, struggle; boundaries, transgressing boundaries) of this movement (going over) is contained and thus observable in Heidegger’s writings leading toward the “ideal.” Contributions (GA 65) and the texts composed in its “vicinity,” for example, *Mindfulness* (GA 66) and *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (GA 69), embody and document his experience with language in trans-ition, his journey toward the hermeneutic discovery of what is ownmost to language, toward his unique language. What does the trans-ition to be-ing-historical, enowning, and ontological language, according to and based on observing Heidegger’s experience with language in trans-ition, his experience of trans-ition, can teach, “say,” and show (disclose) about language? How does the experience of trans-ition pave the way toward what is ownmost to language? What is the hermeneutic connection between language and be-ing? The main thrust of the rest of this study, of these considerations, is an attempt to grasp, to shed some light on, the issues that are at stake and entailed in these questions.

(a) The depth of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of language may be seen and observed in his concise, though well-expressive claim in *Mindfulness* that “basically language is determined initially only from out of the sway of be-ing” (*aus dem Wesen des Seyns*). Thus, for Heidegger, language is not, as the conventional view maintains, merely the expression, articulation or communication of “meaning” (*Bedeutung*) that is spoken or written, not a system of signs of fixed significations. Language, as he insists, is determined, defined “firstly and only” out of and based on the essential sway (unfolding) of be-ing. The essential sway of be-ing, and not the speaking subject, shapes language. Language is grounded, anchored in the history of be-ing, not in the story of the speaking or writing subject, that is, not in merely expressing or stating a meaning, not in fixing a signification; language is closer to (has its ground and shaping in) be-ing than to expression (statement, enunciation) of meaning. Thus, language is prior to (deeper than) its function as signification (signifier), as sign, as expression of meaning; the very “nature” of language is determined by the history, by the essential sway of be-ing, not by the semiotic mastery of meaning. Language,

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16 The dynamics of this “trans-ition” is quite discernable in Heidegger’s 1939 summer semester seminar on Herder (GA 85). A discussion of this issue may be found in George Kovacs, “Heidegger in Dialogue with Herder: Crossing the Language of Metaphysics toward Be-ing-historical Language,” *Heidegger Studies*, 17 (2001): 45–63.

17 GA 66, p. 127; tr. 107.
then, accordingly, is originarily the language (speaking) of and from, and not, not firstly, the speaking and “writing” of and about beings. Heidegger retracts (“drives”) language back to be-ing, to the phenomenon of “to be,” to the little word “is”; he does not bind (tie) or chain it (language) to beings; he does not confine (he does not consign) it to conveyor of fixed meaning or signifier (announcer) of beings. This means, then, that language is (basically, according to its own ground and destiny) be-ing-historical, ontological, and not (surely not merely, not firstly) ontic. Heidegger’s experience with language is more than ontic (not reducible to the status of a tool, of an instrument), more than semiotic, more than cultural; it is ontological, be-ing-attuned, be-ing-dimensional, not beings-bound; it is liberating, not confining. His be-ing-on-the-way to language is crossing over from beings-bound (metaphysical) language and thinking to be-ing-historical language and mindfulness. This is the deepest or final experience with language defining (embracing) Heidegger’s lifework.

(b) It may be said, based on these considerations, that Heidegger’s experience with language amounts to a rediscovery of language as such. His lifelong experience with language brings language into language, lets language speak in a greater depth. He shows and attempts to enact language according to what is ownmost to it. To “bring language as language into language,” as he says in _Unterwegs zur Sprache_, means letting language come into its own (Ereignis; enowning language) as saying; language speaks as saying; what is ownmost to language is “the saying as showing,” letting appear. The dignity of the word may be described as “the well of being (Sein),” as the fountain or spring that wells and springs (that comes) from “to be”;20 language, as Heidegger likes to say, is “the house of being.”21 His experience with language includes and shows, accompanied by, a deeper, more radical experience of being (esse), of “to be.” This hermeneutic, ontological “ideal” of language is the sense of direction of his experience with language. According to _Contributions_, language “belongs to be-ing,” is related to be-ing, because it “arises from be-ing.”22 Thus, Heidegger’s experience with language, quite clearly in this text, is moving toward, crossing over to ontological, be-ing-historical language. The same experience with language speaks in his saying, in _Die Geschichte des Seyns_ (GA 69), that “the word is the clearing of the stillness of be-ing.”23 Be-ing shines fort (shows itself) and sounds through in its stillness.

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18 GA 12, p. 250; tr. 130 (translation modified).
19 GA 12, p. 242; tr. 123 (translation modified). See also: GA 12, p. 255; tr. 234, 235; and Kenneth Maly, _Heidegger’s Possibility: Language, Emergence, Saying Be-ing_ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 57.
20 GA 12, p. 159; tr 66 (translation modified).
21 GA 12, p. 156; tr. 63 (translation modified).
22 GA 65, p. 501; tr. 352–353. See also Heidegger’s _Grundbegriffe_, GA 51 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1981), p. 64 (das Sein als die Verschweigung auch der Ursprung der Sprache; Verbergung, Sagen) (hereafter: GA 51).
The experience with language as crossing over, as trans-ition, to be-ing-historical, enowning language, to the discovery and enactment of what is ownmost to language, that is, to Heidegger’s “ideal” or hermeneutics of language and to our understanding of it, is not a smooth sailing; it includes recognizing and facing up to boundaries, obstacles, and difficulties. Heidegger’s philosophy of language is as exacting and intriguing as is his attempt to think be-ing. He rightly remarks that mere clarification of words is not enough for understanding language, meaning, be-ing, and beings; what is required for grasping, for rethinking “to be,” and for rediscovering language, thus for a disclosive experience with language, is “to be mindful of the word and of be-ing”; however, he adds, such mindfulness “indeed is difficult.”

Heidegger’s lifelong experience with language clearly knows and is mindful of this serious difficulty. The grounding of language in be-ing (its belonging to be-ing) is part of, it is connected with, Heidegger’s understanding of be-ing at the beginning of the trans-ition (crossing over) to the other beginning of thinking, the “beginning of the crossing over from the preeminence (Vorrang) of beings” to(into) the “still-ness of the mastery (Herrschaft) of be-ing.”

In thinking being (more radically and in depth) as be-ing, that is, in knowing and becoming aware of the fact that “being is be-ing,” the word “be-ing” is no longer a “statement, an expression, and a sign,” not simply a semiotic phenomenon or function; it is, as Heidegger explains, the “sustaining, elevating and comporting power of resonance (verhaltende Swingungsmacht) of be-ing itself.” The power of “resonance” at work in radicalizing the thinking of be-ing (Sein) as be-ing (Seyn) shatters the metaphysical concept of being; in this shattering, “to be” (be-ing) is not (not any more) a being, not simply (the ordinarily understood) nothing, not something manifest or taken for granted, not something at all, not a (particular) being, not anything. Be-ing is more primordial than all this, be-ing as origin, that is, as “prime-leap” (Ur sprung), shatters, breaks apart prefixed concepts about “to be,” calls (prompts) us to think of be-ing beyond all this (beyond all beings).

This shattering is clearly a historical event and phenomenon; the word “be-ing” shatters (lets fall apart) the previous, accustomed words for being, for “to be” (and ultimately for beings as well), it is the very coming of be-ing into the word; the word of language (in the last analysis) is coming from be-ing, not from beings. The be-ing-historical word is anchored or grounded in be-ing, not in beings, not in beings-based meaning and expression. Heidegger’s experience with language takes place at the edge of (beyond) beings, according to his
description, as “prime-leap” that shatters the confines and habits of ontic, beings-bound language and frame of mind. His experience with language becomes the coming of be-ing into the word (“to be” makes us speak and “say”); it originates in and with be-ing. Thus, Heidegger’s language becomes (is crossing over) liberating, be-ing-historical language; it reaches and resonates (resounds, sounds through) far beyond (that is, speaks entirely otherwise than) beings-dominated, historiological, chronometric, ontic language, and diction.

Heidegger’s expression “the be-ing-historical word” clearly distinguishes (separates) be-ing-historical language (saying, speaking, vocabulary, naming, diction) from the language of metaphysics (speaking about and denoting things, objects, beings with prefixed meanings and confined boundaries). The be-ing-historical word is “ambiguous” (mehrdeutig); it does not “mean,” however, different “objects,” it does not signify or stand for any object or thing at all, but “says be-ing nonobjectively (ungegenständlich).” Thus, the be-ing-historical word does not mean any object(s) at all, because be-ing, “the sustaining enowning” essentially sways (unfolds) in manifold ways particularly (specifically) and ceaselessly, and, nevertheless, “demands simpleness from its word.” The be-ing-historical word is simple, though be-ing sways (essentially unfolds) in many ways in its history and as history. Symbolic speaking (sinnbildliches Reden), that is, symbolic language, through signs and explanatory definitions, as well as indefinite (undefined, cryptic, esoteric) speaking through signs, are useless here (in be-ing-historical speaking, saying, language); they cannot function as be-ing-historical words or speech (speaking); they fail to measure up to the “ideal” of “simpleness” (Einfachheit; simplicity, plainness) of the be-ing-historical word (e.g., fissure, enowning, be-ing) and of be-ing-historical speech (Rede) as demanded (called forth) by be-ing. Thus, for Heidegger, be-ing-historical words are not symbolic, not signifiers of objects, not explanatory definitions.

(d) The be-ing-historical word, as Heidegger explains, speaks entirely otherwise than the words and language of metaphysics, of metaphysical thinking. Though it is simple, the be-ing-historical word speaks (says) in many ways; it is not prefixed, not one-dimensional, not confined, not tied to a particular object or being, not a tool in the hands (at the service) of the speaking subject. According to Heidegger’s analysis and description, the manifold saying of the be-ing-historical words is “creative within the stillness of the contexts that are inaccessible to a calculative systematization.” Thus, the diverse, manifold saying of be-ing-historical words originates (comes forth) in stillness, not in the noise of calculative systematization, not in the calculative, manipulative construction of systems, not in philosophical and scientific system-buildings (systematizations). As Contributions states, “language is grounded in silence.” According to

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29 GA 66, p. 103; tr. 86.
30 GA 66, p. 103; tr. 86.
31 GA 66, p. 103; tr. 86.
32 GA 65, p. 510; tr. 359.
Mindfulness, historical contexts (Zusammenhänge), their stillness, continuously and necessarily “reserve” (zurückhalten; hold back) what is “sheltered-hidden” (Verborgenes) in them and what is still “undecided” (noch Unentschiedenes) in them. This undecided, hidden, and unsayable (dies Unsagbare), however, is not something irrational, “not the irrational of metaphysics”; it is, much rather, that “which in the ground of the truth of be-ing is ‘first to be decided.’” The sheltered, the hidden held back in the ultimately be-ing-historical contexts is neither something irrational, nor something that can be calculated, measured; it is something yet to be decided based on, according to, and as grounded in, the truth of be-ing, not in a calculative system, not in the irrational of metaphysics.

This analysis of the manifoldness of “saying,” of the be-ing-historical word, is an expression (description, narrative) of the experience with language, with the inadequacies of the language of metaphysics, as well as with the language of science, of calculative thinking and inquiry. The saying or language of the truth of be-ing does not originate from calculation, from irrational obfuscation or anticipation; it comes about, arises in the course of becoming attentive to the unsayable, to the yet to be decided, to the realm beyond the readily graspable and calculable, to the stillness of the historical contexts, to the hermeneutic situatedness in (and of) saying and thinking.

Heidegger’s experience with language in writing (e.g., in Contributions and Mindfulness) and in teachings (in his university lecture courses, in his numerous conferences) amounts to an encounter with the endemic limits of ordinary, established language, with the bounds and closures of culturally fixed (especially metaphysical) language, with the fixtures of any given (at least Occidental) language, and even with the confines of the so-called mother tongue. The encounter with the limit, with the confines and limitations inherent in ordinary, taken-for-granted, accustomed language, however, is not negative, not failure-bound; it is positive, liberating, promising, and hermeneutic. Thus, reaching the limit, at least for Heidegger, is not a closure; it does not end in failure; it is breaking-through, opening, a new beginning, the disclosure and possibility of a deeper, liberating-ontological, be-ing-disclosing-surmising language and saying.

4

There are some hermeneutic lessons (directives) in Heidegger’s experience with language for more fully grasping, and thus for more discerningly assessing, his hermeneutics of language and his way of thinking. The attunement to his unique, ontological language is indispensable for surmising his attempt to think “to be”

33 GA 66, p. 103; tr. 86. (Regarding decision, see also GA 69, p. 61).
(be-ing) entirely otherwise (that is, not simply against, but rather beyond) the metaphysical tradition. His words and names for “to be,” and quite intently for be-ing (e.g., enowning; fissure; the little word “is” as swaying; be-ing as other than being and any beings), are not concepts, not self-enclosed, speculative assertions or assumptions; they are, much rather, hermeneutic beckonings and initial surmisings of the unsayable, of be-ing; they do not coalesce into a technical, abstract, elusive, esoteric construct or system. The words for be-ing, as Heidegger insists, are neither symbolic (filled with metaphysical assumptions) nor explanatory (compact, self-enclosed definitions); they in fact are simple, more and more disclosive; they speak, they say “something” of be-ing, as long as we listen with the disposition of openness, as long as we acknowledge that language is saying (speaking) as showing. The hermeneutic attunement to language is liberating, opening, not closing, not confining. The greatest obstacle to the hermeneutic attunement to language is selective, self-assured listening, that is, “to hear only what we already understand.” The simplicity of the (be-ing-historical) word preempts vagueness and lets (allows) be-ing, the primordiality of “to be,” speak and sound-through it.

The openness and multi-dimensionality (manifoldness) of the be-ing-historical word, of its originary disclosive power of saying, its arising from be-ing beyond the confines of the ontological difference, may be observed in Heidegger’s hermeneutic strategy of using paradoxical words (expressions) for speaking and thinking be-ing. In his *Grundbegriffe* (*Basic Concepts*; lecture course at Freiburg, summer semester, 1941), he describes (speaks of) being as: “the emptiest and at the same time the abundance” (overflowing), “the most common and at the same time the most unique,” “the most understandable and at the same time the concealing,” “the most worn-out and at the same time the origin,” “the most spoken (of) and at the same time the kept in silence,” “the most forgotten and at the same time the most remembered.” These paradoxical juxtapositions are not dialectical oppositions destined for sublation (*Aufhebung*), for speculative-metaphysical (or symbolic) resolution; they function as hermeneutic strategy of disclosure, of attempts to say (to show) the ultimately unsayable (the concealed). In a simple saying in his brief essay in 1945, “Die Armut,” Heidegger exemplifies this strategy by echoing Friedrich Hölderlin’s turn of phrase: “we became poor, in order to become rich.”

The simple words speaking of be-ing, as appropriated (adopted) and function in Heidegger’s more and more ontological (from be-ing-arising) language, even when paradoxical, are not explanatory, not concluding or pre-securing definitions, not vague and indefinite, obscure, esoteric expressions. They say “something” of

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34 GA 12, p. 242; tr. 132.
35 GA 12, p. 150; p. 58 (translation slightly modified).
be-ing, they speak of be-ing, even when they “fail” in attempting to “say” the unsayable. These hermeneutic strategies manifest and document Heidegger’s “struggle” (experience) with the bounds and confines of the language of metaphysics and with the pretensions of (modern, technological) “scientific” language, with objectifying speaking and grammar. The simpleness and uniqueness of be-ing demand (call for and call forth) the simpleness and uniqueness of the word(s) for its saying and speaking. Heidegger’s attempt to find the (proper, disclosive) word(s) for (saying, naming, thinking) be-ing, according to the manifoldness of its essential swaying (unfolding) as enowning, that is, in (based on) its historical coming into its own, is the final range and concern of his experience with language from his earlier writings to Contributions, to Mindfulness and beyond.

These considerations, then, lead to the conclusion, to a hermeneutic lesson based on Heidegger’s experience with language, that indeed his be-ing-historical, ontological language is something unique; it is to be sheltered, treasured; it is to be preserved as indispensable for understanding, for truly grasping his unique way of thinking, his distinct experience of thinking. William J. Richardson foretellingly and apprehensively observed, based on his pioneering work with Heidegger’s texts, including the arduous labor of rendering his thought in English, that there is “the dreadful difficulty in reading Heidegger” (the Germans claiming no exception), that his language “presents a special problem of translation,”38 that Heidegger “has rendered a service by interrogating the relationship between thought and language.”39 Heidegger himself (in 1963), in his letter to William J. Richardson, S. J., recognizes “an almost insurmountable difficulty in making” himself “understood.”40 Walter Biemel rightly claims in his book, highly regarded by Heidegger in his July 29, 1973 letter to Hannah Arendt,41 that Heidegger’s retrieval of the question of being is “gathered together” (takes place, occurs) in his experience with and understanding of language.42 Parvis Emad insightfully demonstrates that the attunement to Heidegger’s unique, liberating, ontological language is the hermeneutic precondition for grasping and assessing his thought, as well as for rendering it in English (and in

39 Ibid., p. 635.
any other language). Heidegger’s experience with language calls the attention to the demands and difficulties endemic to his attempt to say (to utter) be-ing according to the manifold essential swaying of its simplicity and uniqueness, that is, as enowning, as history.

It is worth noting that Heidegger’s unique, liberating, ontological language would be profoundly misunderstood by reducing it to the confluence of diverse influences on the history (pathway) of his thought and language. The recognition and treasuring (sheltering and preserving) of his unique, be-ing-historical, enowning language condition the disclosive power of the translations of his texts, as well as the worth and depth of scholarly appropriations of his lifework, and thus the future and destiny of his unique way of thinking.

References


Heidegger’s Thinking of Difference and the God-Question

Thomas Kalary

The general tendency until recently has been to brand Heidegger as someone, who – in spite of his Christian origin and upbringing, and even some early unsuccessful attempts at elaborating a religious phenomenology – was convinced about the atheistic character of philosophy, broke away from the Catholic Church, and bracketed out religion not only from his philosophy but from his personal life as well. For, had he not publicly argued for the “fundamental atheism” of philosophy; considered faith and philosophy as “deadly enemies” and described Christian philosophy as “wooden steel”? However, with the availability of the key texts of being-historical thinking such as Contributions to Philosophy and Mindfulness where the god-question is shown to belong to the heart of this very thinking, a renewed enthusiasm surfaces in Heidegger research for taking a radical re-look at the possible place of the god-question in Heidegger’s philosophy. It is ironic that


2 Both these expressions are found in Martin Heidegger, “Phänomenologie und Theologie,” in: Wegmarken, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 66. Hereafter referred to as GA 9, page number, and included in the text.

3 Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989) and its English translation as: Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). The references to this work will be incorporated into the text and German pagination will be followed by the English as GA 65, page/CP page.

4 Martin Heidegger, Besinnung, GA 66 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997) and its English translation as: Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London: Continuum, 2006). The references to this work will be incorporated into the text and German pagination will be followed by the English as GA 66, page/M page.

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despite the earnestness of the various efforts, fundamental flaws are equally evident in many of the elucidations of god-question in Heidegger, either because of the flaws in the hermeneutic presuppositions with which Heidegger’s philosophy is approached and interpreted, or because of the burden of some of the unexamined and unfounded prejudices that one already brings into discussion while examining this question. It is against this background, that the present essay concentrates on a key aspect of Heidegger’s thinking, viz. the thinking of difference and its relevance for the god-question in his philosophy.

Considering its place within Heidegger’s entire thought and especially with regard to his treatment of the god-question, the thinking of difference is yet to attract appropriate attention. What is fundamental to Heidegger’s treatment of the god-question is that it is determined by the thinking of difference as such encompassing both the “ontological difference” as well as “theological difference.” What is significant in this context is an immanent transformation occurring in Heidegger’s thinking that introduces specific nuances to his understanding and elucidation of this twofold difference. However, the point to keep in mind is that both, that transformation and these nuances have strong bearing on Heidegger’s treatment of the question of god. The present study is an attempt at highlighting three dimensions that are of vital importance to any inquiry into Heidegger and the god-question. These dimensions are as follows: (1) the thinking of difference within the fundamental ontological pathway and the systematic place of the question of god within it; (2) the transformation of the thinking of difference in the thinking of enowning and its relation to the “last god”; and (3) The actual legacy of Heidegger’s “last god.”

It can be said without any exaggeration that according to Heidegger, the main problem with the Occidental metaphysical tradition has been its inability to think in terms of the essential difference that prevails between being, beings, and god. Although the formulation of the concept of being remained fundamental to almost every attempt in the Occidental tradition, everyone of those attempts remained faithful to the Aristotelian interpretation of being as essence (οὐσία, beingness, Seiendheit). In the seventh book of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle says that the question that was asked from the beginning, that is still asked in his time, and will always be asked and will disturb us eternally, is the question, what is the being of beings. Aristotle himself sets the tone for the line of interpretation that was to follow when he explicated being in terms of beingness or in terms of the essence of beings. This decisive directive for the interpretation of being ensured that the question of being remained always a question of essence in the succeeding Occidental metaphysical tradition. This line of elucidating the question of being in terms of beingness (οὐσία, essence and Seiendheit) found its apex in the

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Scholastic Tradition that identified being with the Highest Being *qua* God, what Heidegger terms onto-theo-logy. His objection to this “onto-theo-logical” approach of the tradition, however, is not an effort at proving that such an approach is totally wrong, but that this metaphysical determination of being as beingness, of man as rational animal, and of god as the highest being is not originary enough in experiencing and articulating the ownmost of being, man and god. On his part, Heidegger initiates a pathway of thinking into the truth of being within a framework provided by both ontological and theological difference.

Max Müller credits Heidegger with having “discovered” the “ontological difference.” He says that although it is present in every great philosophy, it is somehow pushed aside and identified with something else. “It is actually never taken as itself, always it has its place somewhere else, while it is in effect the place of everything else.”6 Towards elucidating how Heidegger understands ontological difference within the pathway of fundamental ontology, let us begin with a passage from a letter that Heidegger wrote to Max Müller in 1947. In this letter, Heidegger speaks of a threefold difference, viz. transcendence-akin7 difference, a transcendental difference, and a transcendent difference. While subscribing to Müller’s elucidations of the ontological difference in his letter to Heidegger, Heidegger adds after a cautionary note: “In the initial working out of the III Division of the first part of *Being and Time*, where a turning to “Time and Being” unfolds itself, I have called what is intended there (*Gemeinte*) a transcendence-akin difference in relation to transcendental (ontological in a narrow sense) and transcendent (theological) difference.”8 It has been customary up to now to interpret the transcendence-akin difference as a difference between extant beings and their beingness, whereas transcendental difference has been interpreted as a difference between being and extant beings. But a closer reading of the concerned texts would show that this line of interpretation has already missed the point.9

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7 I am indebted to Parvis Emad for the rendition of the key German word “tranzendenzhafte” into “transcendence-akin.”
8 Heidegger, *Briefe an Max Müller und andere Dokumente*, p.10.
9 Throughout his book *Existenzphilosophie*, Max Müller had already made the topic of ontological and theological difference public, which he had learned from Heidegger through his discussions and correspondence. Although he reproduces in his book all the three titles (cf. Max Müller, *Existenzphilosophie*, 4th ed, Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1986, p. 86), his explanation seems to have taken a wrong direction. He elucidates *transcendental difference* (ontological difference in the narrow sense) as the distinction between a being and its beingness, whereas the difference in the manner of transcendence (ontological difference in the broad sense) as a distinction of a being and its beingness from being itself. It is my considered opinion that the error is not simply an interchanging of the terms for the wrong matter as Coriando opines (cf. P. Coriando, *Der letzte Gott als Anfang. Zur abgründigen Zeit-Räumlichkeit des Übergangs in Heideggers “Beiträge zur Philosophie”* (München: Fink, 1998), p. 117, footnote 2.), but it is a misunderstanding of the very matter itself. Going by the textual evidences, Heidegger is not concerned in the 3rd division of the first part of *Being and Time* with the difference between beings and their beingness at all. Thus, the differentiation here has to be between the pre-thematized, enactmental ontological difference and transcendental-horizontally disclosed and thematized ontological difference.
To understand what this transcendence-akin difference and transcendental difference actually stand for, first of all we need to see the context itself. For this, we have a relevant clue in Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism. There, he points out that “The subsequent and ongoing unfolding [Nach- und Mit-Vollzug] of this other thinking that abandons subjectivity in an adequate manner is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of Being and Time the third division of the first part “Time and Being” was held back (cf. Sein und Zeit, p. 39). Here [in this third division] the whole [das Ganze] turns around. The division in question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics” (GA 9, 327–328).10 Commenting on this particular text, Heidegger clarifies in his letter to Richardson that the expression used in the Letter on Humanism refers to a dynamism “inherent in the very matter designated by the headings: ‘Being and Time,’ ‘Time and Being.’” The expression “the whole” in the abovementioned text refers to “the matter [involved] in ‘Being and Time’, ‘Time and Being’. A ‘turning around’ is in play within the matter itself,”11 a turning around within the third division of Being and Time.

After having unfolded in the second division ecstatic temporality as the meaning of care – the being of Dasein –, the third division has the assigned task of elucidating the meaning of being as such. This is to be unfolded in two further steps: firstly, the horizontal time that belongs to the existential temporality is to be brought out as the meaning of being as such. Secondly, the manifold modes of being are to be inquired as to how they receive their temporal determination from this time-horizon. Up to the explication of horizontal time, that is, through the first two divisions as well as through the first step of the third division, the perspective moves in the same direction. It is directed towards Dasein and its ecstatic temporality with its horizontal time. After that, “the whole turns around.” Understood in this sense, the expression “the whole” here, as well as the expression “what is intended” [das Gemeinte] in his letter to Müller, refers to the hitherto obtained matter of “Being and Time” in its belongingness to “Time and Being.” After this, the phenomenological vision re-orientates itself in the manner of a turning around from out of the horizontal time towards the modes of being that are determined from out of this horizontal time. This is necessary for showing that all the modes of being such as “the handy,” “the extant,” “life,” “stock,” etc. have the character of presence. Thus, turning as used here is a turning around or a re-orientation of the perspective within the fundamental ontological inquiry that takes place within the third step of the transcendental-horizonal approach to the question of being and it is therefore aptly termed a fundamental ontological turning.

It is in this turning that the transcendental-horizonal disclosure of being as such is subjected to a systematic thematization.


In what way does this reference to the fundamental ontological turning become significant for the clarification of transcendence-akin ontological difference as different from transcendental ontological difference? This becomes clear when we turn to another text, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, the text that presents Heidegger’s renewed attempt at working out the third division of the first part of *Being and Time*. In this text, Heidegger makes an explicit differentiation that is decisive to our elucidations. He says: “The distinction between being and beings is pre-ontological, that means, without explicit concept of being, latent there in the existence of Da-sein. As such it can become an explicitly understood difference” (GA 24, 454). This text makes it very obvious that the ontological difference can be understood at two levels: (1) the pre-ontological, enactmental level that belongs to the very fundamental ontological constitution of Dasein as existence and (2) the explicitly understood and fundamental ontologically thematized level. We have a further confirmation of this line of interpretation in the treatise *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. While making a distinction between ontic truth as the unconcealedness of beings in their being and ontological truth as the unconcealment of being of beings, Heidegger says that they belong essentially together on account of their relation to the ontological difference, that is, “the difference between being and beings.” He then goes on to add further that if “what distinguishes Dasein consists in the fact that it comports to beings by understanding their being, then this being-able-to-differentiate, in which the ontological difference becomes factic, has to have thrust the root of its own possibility in the ground of what is ownmost to Dasein” (GA 9, 134–135).

Thus, the distinction between transcendence-akin difference and transcendental difference is this: the former is the pre-theoretical, enactmental difference between being and beings, which can be called the ontological difference in the broad sense. This is a pre-requisite for Dasein’s everyday encounter with innerworldly beings in their worldliness (*Weltlichkeit* as its *Bedeutsamkeit*). Only because Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of the being of beings, that is, only because the being of an innerworldly being is always already disclosed to Dasein, it can discover that being in its worldly character. Let us explain this difference between the pre-theoretical disclosure of being and the pre-theoretical discovery of an entity with an example. I encounter or discover a pen as an instrument for writing. It worlds for me in its “in-order-to-write” reference. This in-order-to reference is part of a referential totality like pen referring to paper, paper to learning, and learning as a possibility of man. Unless this totality is already pre-theoretically disclosed to me, I would not be able to discover that entity before me in its instrument character as something in order to write. When this difference is specifically taken in to the phenomenological vision, and phenomenologically, that is, fundamental ontologically, thematized in

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12 *Vom Wesen des Grundes* was written in 1929 as a contribution to the Husserl Festschrift, and is still anchored in the transcendental-horizontal perspective and stands on the basis of the query *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1927) and *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik* (1928), the last Marburg lecture-course.
its structure of transcendental-horizontal disclosure without, however, losing its pre-theoretical character, it is called the ontological difference in the strict sense. Thus, the transcendence-akin difference and transcendental difference refer to one and the same difference, the difference between being and beings. When, however, Heidegger speaks of ontological difference in general without making the above-mentioned distinction between unthematized enactmental and phenomenologically thematized difference, difference stands for the transcendentally disclosed fundamental difference between being and beings, the utmost ground of metaphysics that continues to remain uninquired throughout the history of Occidental metaphysics.

This brings us to the transcendent or theological difference, which is indeed the difference between being and god. But the question that we need to look into is this: what actual role does the thinking of theological difference play in the fundamental ontological unfolding of the truth of being. While speaking of Heidegger’s use of transcendent or theological difference in the 1920s, it is imperative to keep in mind that it is the theological difference as grasped within the fundamental ontological framework. That is to say that within that framework, theological difference is the difference between being – as disclosed in the transcendental-horizontal manner – and a god, whose place within the scheme of fundamental ontology we are yet to specify.

It is to be recalled that Heidegger wanted to work out fundamental ontology on its own without appealing to any theological grounds. His conviction that philosophy in itself is essentially “a-theistic” in character prompted him to make the conscious methodological “decision” to inquire into “factic life from out of itself, from out of its own factic possibilities” without any reference to god, in order then to inquire into “Dasein’s ontological relation to god” (GA 9, 159). Thus, the fundamental ontological pathway of elucidating the transcendental-horizontal disclosure of being took place under the methodological decision of what von Herrmann calls a theological epoché. Thus, the “fundamental atheism” of philosophy is essentially

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14 Cf. F.-W. von Herrmann, “Stationen der Gottesfrage im frühen und späten Denken Heideggers,” in: *Die Gottesfrage in der europäischen Philosophie und Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts*, eds. R. Lanthaler and W. Treitler (Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2007), pp. 24f. This is perhaps the best essay to have appeared in print so far that gives a comprehensive orientation to the place the god-question occupies in the entirety of Heidegger’s thinking. The same theme is again elaborately treated by the same author in: *Die Metaphysik im Denken Heideggers* (Rome: Urbania University Press, 2004), pp. 105f. Hereafter referred to as von Herrmann, *Die Metaphysik*, followed by page number. This is again a remarkable contribution by the author from two perspectives. It throws for the first time rare light into what is actually happening when Heidegger describes his philosophy as an attempt at overcoming metaphysics. As long as thinking understands the metaphysical tradition as the first beginning of the history of being and being-historical thinking as the other beginning of the same history of being, the history of being forms the onefold within which both of the questions of being fundamentally belong-together. This shows that all talk of Heidegger’s thinking as “post-metaphysical” and “post-modern” is senseless talk.
a hermeneutic a-theism, a methodological procedure as different from atheism as a theoretical position. Why such a methodological decision was necessary at all is clarified in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* where we are told that “with the ontological interpretation of Dasein as being-in-the-world, no positive or negative decision is made concerning the possible being of god. However, by illuminating transcendence we first of all obtain an adequate concept of Dasein, with reference to which we can now ask, in what ontological relation does Dasein stand towards god” (GA 9, p. 159, footnote 56). Thus, while in the traditional metaphysics, the inquiry into being as beingness culminated in god as the highest being, the fundamental ontology maintains the difference between the transcendental-horizonally disclosed being and god. Consequently, the god-question can be taken up only after the truth of being is sufficiently illuminated in itself.

Now, the question we need to look into is, whether Heidegger had foreseen any place for the god-question within the fundamental ontological pathway or was the theological epoché his final word on the matter? Had there been no place whatsoever for it in his version of philosophy as fundamental ontology of Dasein? In answering this question, the Heidegger research has by and large let the Heidegger readership hopelessly down. As long as metaphysics understood its leading question as inquiring into beingness of beings and worked out this question in terms of the general principles of being as well as in terms of the highest divine being, the god-question formed an integral part of the leading question of metaphysics. With the outbreak of fundamental ontology, however, the leading question of metaphysics concerning the beingness of beings gets transformed into the grounding question concerning the more originary phenomenon, the transcendental-horizonal disclosure of being. Along with this transformation, the place the god-question occupies in philosophy also undergoes a substantial transformation.

A clue towards envisioning the place Heidegger had foreseen for the god-question within the fundamental ontological perspective is available in Heidegger’s lecture-course given in Marburg in 1928. In this lecture-course, Heidegger clearly indicates that only on the basis of an already elucidated fundamental ontology of Dasein, the god-question can be taken up. Thus we read: “This whole [dynamics] of founding and working out ontology is fundamental ontology; it is (1) the analysis of Dasein, and (2) the analysis of the temporality of being. But the temporal analysis is at the same time a turning, where ontology itself expressly turns back into the metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains. Through this dynamics of radicalizing and universalizing, the aim is to bring ontology to its latent turning over [Umschlag]. Here a turning is enacted, and it leads to a turning over, into metontology” (GA 26, 201). The abovementioned “analysis of Dasein” includes the analysis of Dasein in terms of its temporality that is carried out in the first two divisions of *Being and Time*. The usage “the analysis of the temporality of being” refers to the thematic that was intended for the third division under the title “Time and Being.” Now, Heidegger says that this analysis of the temporality of being is at the same time a “turning” in which the fundamental ontology expressly turns back into metaphysical ontic as a turning over into metontology. Metontology stands for the ontological thematization of beings akin to Dasein as well as beings other than Dasein. This in turn
presupposes an explication of the full phenomenon of originary time. This means that the turning over into metontology takes place, after the ecstatic temporality is revealed as the ontological meaning of care – the being of Dasein – and the horizontal time as the meaning of being of beings other than Dasein is revealed and manifold modes of beings other than Dasein are laid free in their temporal meaning through a fundamental ontological turning. And this turning over into metontology is called the *metontological turning*. This is what Heidegger had in mind, when he stated in the Introduction to *Being and Time* that “the question of being thus aims at an a priori condition of the possibility not only of the sciences which investigate beings of such and such a type . . . but it aims also at the condition of the possibility of the ontologies which precede the ontic sciences and found them” (GA 2, 15).\(^\text{15}\)

While highlighting the priority of the question of being, Heidegger indicates that only under the orientation of the meaning of being as such regional ontologies can be developed, which in turn lay the ground for positive sciences.

Thus, it was Heidegger’s stated intention first to work out the fundamental ontology and then in a metontological turning take up all specific questions like man, ethics, god, etc., which were to be unfolded into various regional ontologies, which in turn would serve as the condition for the possibility of ontic or positive sciences. It is a fact that Heidegger did not come to an explicit and detailed working out of any of such regional ontologies, and as a result we do not have an ontology of god, which would have gone into the question of god from the fundamental ontological perspective. Yet, we find a number of elements that concern such an effort in his lecture “Phenomenology and Theology.” Heidegger is of the opinion, as has been his wont right from the early 1920s, that from the time of antiquity, through the neo-Platonic, Aristotelian, and medieval times not only was the being question identified with the god-question, but the whole Christian theology on its part was given an essentially Hellenistic formulation. In this lecture, he makes an attempt at a de-Hellenized Christian theology, because he wants to concretely show that moving away from the essentially onto-theological framework of the Greek tradition, a de-Hellenized theology can provide a different and perhaps more meaningful framework for a Christian account of the divine.

Let us single out a few important insights Heidegger provides in this lecture delivered in 1927 in Tübingen.\(^\text{16}\) Here, he takes “philosophy” as “phenomenology” in the sense of “hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein” and “theology” in the narrow sense of “Christian theology.” As the first insight, we should note that the thinking of difference provides the framework for his entire discussion. As he examines the relation between two sciences, “hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein” and “Christian theology,” he stresses their “absolute difference.” Philosophy for

\(^{15}\)Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), hereafter referred to as GA 2, followed by page number.

\(^{16}\)Cf. F.-W. von Herrmann, *Heideggers tübinger und marburger Vortrag von 1927 “Phänomenologie und Theologie,”* unpublished manuscript. Insights from this text are made use of for the elucidations here.
Heidegger is existential ontology of Dasein, where the inquiry is based purely on being’s self-disclosure in the t/here of Dasein. And faith as a specific possibility of existence, insofar as it takes its bearings from revelation stands in “existential opposition” to philosophy. They “are sworn enemies” and in this sense a Christian philosophy is like “wooden steel,” a contradiction in terms. Insofar as the framework of their respective inquiries is fundamentally different, they cannot be in principle identified.

While stressing the “absolute difference” between philosophy and theology, Heidegger points out that what makes theology a positive science, is “Christianness” (Christlichkeit), which is initially grasped as “Christian faith,” which is articulated as a “way of existence of human Dasein” (GA 9, 52). What is decisive here is that “faith” is already viewed from the perspective of philosophy as fundamental ontology of Dasein, whose being as existence has a specific ontological structure. Thus “Christian faith” is not something lying outside the ontological structure of Dasein, but rather it “is itself a manner of existing in t/here.”17 In Being and Time, Heidegger shows that depending on how Dasein enacts its possibilities of being in each case, whether from the possibilities of itself or from that of the world, it exists in the modes of ownedness (Eigentlichkeit), unownedness (Uneigentlichkeit), or everyday indifference. While these modes remain what they are, with the enactment of faith as a possibility of existence, there comes an additional mode, which Heidegger calls “re-birth.” Faith as a possibility of existence is such that the believing Dasein cannot be in command of this possibility, because in it, Dasein “has become a servant, brought before god and thus re-born” (GA 9, 53). Important is Heidegger’s usage of pre-believing or un-believing existence of Dasein. The transition to the new mode of faith takes place on the basis of religiously undifferentiated mode of existence. Existence as such is a-religious, or, to use Heidegger’s terminology, it is pre-Christian existence. This existence in its pre-Christianness is overcome with the transition to Christianness, but even then the mode of existence is itself not overcome, but rather Christianness itself can be understood only as a further modification of existence. Even after the modification of Dasein and existence into Christian existence, man continues to retain his fundamental existential ontological constitution as Da-sein. Through careful analysis, Heidegger shows that the Christian concept of sin is rooted in the existential phenomenon of guilt. He takes this as an example to illustrate that the religious content of all theological concepts shelters in itself an understanding of being. For this reason, the development of theology as a science with the help of such concepts requires philosophy as existential ontology of Dasein.

By way of summing up, let the following be made clear. First, even in this lecture “Phenomenology and Theology” Heidegger is not concerned with elucidating the details of a thinking of god within the fundamental ontology. He had, while speaking of the metontological turning, indicated the site where such a thinking should be rooted and within what framework such a thinking should unfold. Yet, two things

17Ibid., p. 2.
need special mention here. Fundamental ontology has to unfold itself under a theological epoché and only on the basis of what is so unfolded, one can turn to the god-question as one of the regional ontologies, which would provide the ontological basis for a specific theology as a positive science like Christian theology. Second, when Heidegger speaks of God and theology within the fundamental ontological perspective, he is still concerned with Christian theology and Christian understanding of God. By shifting his focus from the theoretic-reflexive, onto-theo-logical basis of the hitherto Occidental philosophical tradition to a more originary basis, namely the pre-theoretical basis of philosophy that is rooted both in the ontological and theological difference, Heidegger intends to provide a more originary and a de-Hellenized philosophical basis for a fruitful theological reflection. He shows concretely, perhaps without manifesting his own personal stance, how a Christian theology could re-invent itself and in the process rediscover its own unique experiences that got lost in the process of Hellenization. In tracing such a possibility, he provides a number of important insights into what could form the essential basis of a religious ontology, thought out of fundamental ontology of Dasein. But with transition to the being-historical perspective, the thinking of difference in its both forms, namely the ontological difference and theological difference undergoes a transformation. And the location of the god-question also undergoes a radical change. The sway of being as enowning becomes the very site for the self-manifestation of the divine phenomenon. Or to put it differently, the fact that there is fundamental difference between being and god remains decisive for the entire thinking of Heidegger. But this fundamental difference is experienced and articulated quite differently in both perspectives. While the unfolding of the fundamental ontology of Dasein takes place under a strict theological epoché, where the god-question is a matter of one of the regional ontologies, the god-question is very much a co-dimension of the sway of being as enowning.18

18There is an age-old, but totally absurd thesis, propped up and vigorously defended even today by eminent Heidegger scholars, that Heidegger's turning was a ‘re-turn’ to his early position, after having had to concede the failure of the project that Being and Time was. According to this line of interpretation, there was already a “turn before the turn.” In tune with this line of interpretation, Benjamin D. Crowe, Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religion: Realism and Cultural Criticism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), believes that a project of a phenomenology of religion was present in Heidegger’s thought throughout. The so-called differences between the ‘early’ and ‘later’ Heidegger rather “represent shifts of emphasis in a more or less stable, well-established project of critically addressing the religious situation of late modernity through a phenomenological methodology.” The evidences “are not sufficient to warrant the claim that his later work is a radical departure” from the earlier one (p. 99). From our elucidations of the thinking of difference and the question of god, it becomes clear that Crowe has not been able to gain an access to Heidegger’s thinking of the “divine,” especially when he makes statements like: “The ‘holy’ is Heidegger’s term for the objective side of an understanding of being that anchors the intelligibility of religious concepts and practices” (p. 115).
Let us begin again with the first dimension of the thinking of difference and ask what happens to the ontological difference with the immanent transformation that occurs in Heidegger’s thinking? The first clue towards answering this question is available in a marginal note in *Being and Time* that in a retrospective glance Heidegger jotted down to the third division “Time and Being.” It reads: “The transcendental difference. Overcoming of horizon as such. Turning back unto the provenance. Presence from out of provenance” (GA 2, 53). The immanent transformation is a turning back or returning to the provenance, a turning back that “overcomes” both the transcendental-horizontal approach as well as that specific characterization of ontological difference that is rooted in this approach. An appropriate understanding of the usage “overcomes” is important in grasping the direction thinking takes here. The experience of the truth of being as the provenance prompts thinking to realize the inadequacy of the transcendental-horizontal perspective and the transcendental-horizonally understood characterization of ontological difference. When the truth of being is experienced as provenance, it reveals itself no longer as horizon for the disclosure of the being of beings in the sense of *praesens*, but as the counter-resonance of the forth-throw of being and projecting-opening of Dasein.

Section 132 of the *Contributions* clarifies this point further by referring to the counter-resonance of being. On the one hand, Heidegger says, that this transcendental-horizonally conceived distinction between a being and being was “necessary” in providing “a preliminary perspective for the question of be-ing,” as well as in “safeguarding the question of the truth of be-ing from all confusion” (GA 65, 250/CP 176). It was precisely because the traditional metaphysics did not preserve the ontological difference in its inquiry into the question of being, that this difference got confused with the beingness of beings as well as with the highest being. Thus, it was vital for Heidegger to underline the importance of ontological difference in order to keep the inquiry into being free from all such confusions. But, on the other hand, Heidegger felt that the ownmost of this difference was not adequately grasped by the transcendentally and horizonally structured distinction had a “tormenting and discording character” as it was still inadequate to reveal the truth of being in its originary onefold. Therefore, however “necessary” the ontological difference was, it continued to be “disastrous” to the extent this distinction “does arise from a questioning of beings as such (of beingness)” [GA 65, 250/CP 177]. Although the traditional

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19 For an excellent account of the thinking of difference in the thinking of being as enowning, cf. Parvis Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), p. 127 f. This is incomparable work in its effort to think and co-enact the various nuances of the being-historical unfolding of the truth of being in its both ways of dis-enowning as well as enowning. For further elucidations of the thinking of difference, especially in being-historical thinking, cf. von Herrmann, *Die Metaphysik*, p. 107 f.
metaphysics was leapt over in and through the fundamental ontology as the latter was concerned with going beyond beingness of beings, fundamental ontology still continued to move within the perspective of the structure of transcendence and horizon and to that extent and in that sense it could still be considered metaphysical, in so far as this ontology unfolded the disclosure of being as a transcending of beings. The transcendental-horizontal perspective proposed to arrive at the truth of being by transcending beings, not realizing the fact that this procedure itself was inadequate. When the ontological difference is so conceived, “this distinction itself becomes the real barrier” because it actually “misplaces the inquiry into the question of be-ing, insofar as, by pre-supposing this distinction, one attempts to go further than this distinction and to inquire into its onefold. This onefold can never be anything but the mirroring of the distinction and can never lead to the origin, in view of which this distinction can no longer be seen as originary” (GA 65, 250/CP 177). What is denied here is not the distinction between being and beings, but the transcendentally and horizontally elucidated structure of this distinction and its inappropriateness. Therefore, the so conceived distinction becomes a hindrance in reaching the truth of being in its originary onefold: “Therefore the task is not to surpass beings (transcendence) but rather to leap over this distinction and thus over transcendence and to inquire inceptually into be-ing and truth” (GA 65, 250–51/CP 177). What was still inappropriate within the transcendental-horizontal approach, must be leapt over.

Thus, it would be a misunderstanding, if one were to think that the “ontological difference” and with it the “thinking of difference” as such is “overcome” and is irrelevant for the thinking of enowning. Heidegger himself says very clearly that “varying attempts were needed to master the “ontological difference,” to grasp its very origin and that means its genuine onefold” (GA 65, 250/CP 176). The term used here is to “master” and not “abandon.” Even the transcendentally and horizontally conceived ontological difference was an attempt at mastering the “ontological difference,” an attempt that proved “inadequate.” Thus it is our task to follow the thinking of difference as it unfolds in being-historical perspective. Let it be said in anticipation: while in the transcendental-horizontal perspective, both the ontological difference as well as the theological difference were used as the springboard (as the condition for the possibility) to follow the manner in which being as such discloses itself, being-historical thinking unfolds as the counter-resonance of the truth of being and projecting-opening of Dasein, where the divine phenomenon shows itself as a co-dimension of this counter-resonance. That means, the thinking of difference has its provenance in the intimacy of the onefold of the sway of the truth of being as enowning.

With these preliminary clarifications, we can now follow the being-historical thinking of ontological difference. Being-historical thinking as leap has a twofold dimension. First of all, it leaps over not only the metaphysical tradition of the Occidental thinking, but also the thinking of transcendental-horizontally conceived ontological difference. Secondly, this leap is a leap into the sway of being as enowning, which shows itself to thinking in a new light. Contributions articulates this as follows: “the thrower of the projecting-open experiences itself as thrown – i.e., as enowned by be-ing” (GA 65, 239/CP, 169). We recall here that, while elaborating
the transcendental-horizontal perspective, Heidegger had explicated thrownness and projecting-open as the two equally-original ontological structural moments of Dasein. In being-historical thinking, the sway of being presents to thinking this ontological structure of Dasein in a new light, providing an insight into the very origin of the existential thrownness. By experiencing the provenance of thrownness from out of the forth-throwing truth of being, the thrower of the projecting-opening, that is, Dasein, no longer experiences itself merely as the one thrown “into the facticity of disclosedness” and projects-open what is pre-given, but rather as the one “thrown into and being en-owned”\textsuperscript{20} by the en-owning forth-throw of the truth of being. With this experience, Dasein experiences itself as the ownhood of the truth of being. However, this experience of being thrown into and en-owned by the truth of being does not in any way level off the projecting-open. If that were to be so, then the actual distinction between being and Dasein would have been totally compromised. The fact is, the enowning-forth-throw is just one dimension of the sway of the truth of being as enowning. There is no enowning without the receiving and projecting-opening of what is thrown-forth. But, with this experience of being the ownhood of the truth of being, projecting-opening of Dasein does no longer project-open in the manner of a projecting-opening upon a horizon, but rather in the manner of an en-owned projecting-open. It projects open what is en-owningly thrown-forth to it from out of the truth of being.

This turning-relationship of en-owned projecting-opening of Dasein and the en-owning forth-throw of the truth of being is characterized further, in Section 133 of the \textit{Contributions}, as a relationship of “needing and belonging.” This dimension of “needing and belonging” builds up further on the co-relationality between thrownness and projecting-open as explicated in the course of the transcendental-horizontal perspective. Specifically, Heidegger says: “Be-ing needs man in order to hold sway; and man belongs to be-ing so that he can accomplish his utmost destiny as Da-sein” (GA 65, 251/CP, 177). The turning-relation of being to Dasein, as Emad rightly points out, is “a turning \textit{unto} thinking” because being “needs thinking” to project-open and sustain being’s self-unfolding.\textsuperscript{21} To this need of being, Dasein responds by acting, which acting as thinking sustains the self-unfolding of being by projecting it open. This demonstrates that the en-owned projecting-opening Dasein \textit{belongs} to the swaying dynamics of the en-owning forth-throw of the truth of being. With its needing, being is turned unto thinking or the projecting-opening Dasein. By acting, that is, by opening-projecting the unfolding of being, Dasein responds to this need.

With this dynamics of needing–belonging relationship between being and Dasein, Dasein shows itself in a new light. Dasein no longer shows itself in the manner of “\textit{ex-sistere},” that is, in the manner of transcending beings for the horizontal disclosure of being, but as an \textit{inabiding} (\textit{Inständigkeit}) in the intimacy of the onefold of the truth of being. The aforementioned dynamics of swaying enacts itself

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 199.
\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., pp.190f.
in the wholeness of the turning-relationship. This co-relationality of needing and belonging between being’s en-owning forth-throw and Dasein’s en-owned projecting-opening is what Heidegger calls “counter-resonance” (GA 65, 251 /CP, 177). This dynamics in its wholeness is what Heidegger calls enowning. Being-historical turning stands for the resonance of this counter-resonance, for the alternating co-relationality between the en-owning forth-throw of being and the en-owned projecting-opening of Dasein. This relationship is called “turning in enowning” (GA 65, 57 /CP, 40).

To sum up: in fundamental ontology, it is the thinking of ontological difference that takes us to the disclosure of being as such. Even there, in the disclosure of being, there is a “belonging-together” of being and Dasein as long as there (“Da-”) of Dasein stands for the disclosure of being. But the transcendental-horizontally conceived structure of ontological difference could not provide an adequate account of the actual dynamics of this “belonging-together.” On the other hand, the thinking in being-historical perspective glimpses first into the dynamics of the sway of being as enowning. This sway of being comes to pass as a counter-resonance of the enowning forth-throw of being and enowned projecting-opening of Dasein. Thus, the dynamics of the swaying of being shows itself in a genuine onefold of being and Dasein in their needing–belonging relationship. Both the transcendental-horizontally conceived structure of ontological difference as the condition for the possibility of the disclosure of being and the very term “Differenz” seemed to overemphasize the difference so much so that the actual “belonging-together” of being and Dasein was not adequately thematized. Being-historical thinking levels off such inadequacies and provides a more originary account of the “belonging-together” of being and Dasein, on the basis of which the ontological differentiation can be carried out. On account of this, being-historical thinking uses instead of “Differenz” other terminologies like “Unterscheidung” or “Unter-schied” in order to indicate this transformation in the understanding of ontological difference. While “Differenz” could sound like a permanently prevalent state of affair that would preclude any genuine “belonging-together,” the usage “Unterscheidung” has an enactmental tone, implying a dynamics of something being eventually differentiated. And it is to this dynamics that Heidegger’s usage of “Unter-schied” refers. He writes the word “Unter-schied” with the separating hyphen in order to indicate that the first part “unter-” stands for the intimacy of the onefold of the swaying of being, while “-schied” names the separateness and distinction between being and beings. It is the dynamism of the “differentiation” that can appropriately be made only “in the intimacy of the onefold” that is expressed with the term “Unterscheidung.” Elucidating the being-historically understood ontological difference, von Herrmann sums it up saying: “Difference and belonging-together of what is differentiated are grasped differently from the swaying of the truth of be-ing as enowning.”

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21Ibid.
After having sufficiently dealt with the nuances of how the thinking of ontological difference, upon which the transcendental-horizontal disclosure of being was investigated, gets transformed into a thinking of differentiation rooted in the onefold of the intimacy of the sway of being, we now turn to the question of what becomes of the theological difference within the being-historical thinking as enowning. To what extent, if at all, is the theological difference relevant for the treatment of the god-question within the being-historical perspective? To put the same matter from a different perspective, let us recall that the fundamental ontological perspective unfolds in terms of the ontological difference. Within this perspective, the theological difference also played a crucial role in keeping the inquiry into being from not getting mixed up with the question of god. Thus, fundamental ontology unfolds strictly under a theological epoché. Now, the situation in being-historical thinking is quite different. On the one hand, as we have already seen, ontological difference is grasped differently in being-historical thinking. On the other hand, the god-dimension is an integral element of the being-historical thinking, as what is thought under the title “the last god” is one of the six “Joinings” of the jointure of the truth of being as enowning. In what way, then, does the theological difference come into play in the thinking of as enowning? What is unfortunately overlooked by the hitherto Heidegger research is the fact that an appropriate understanding of this question is crucial to the very understanding of being-historical thinking.

Let us begin our considerations with the very term “the last god,”24 the title Heidegger gives to the sixth “Joining” of Contributions. He sums up the immediate apprehensions the readers would possibly have when confronted with such an odd title by asking, is not the expression “the last god” a matter of “debasing god” or even “the greatest blasphemy”? Ruling out an obvious tone the title may sound, he hastens to add that it is not an instance of calculative thinking where “last” means something like “cessation” or “end.” The first important insight into the expression “the last god” is provided in the form of a question: “but what if the last god has to be so named because in the end the decision about gods brings under and among gods and thus makes what is ownmost to the uniqueness of the divine being [Gottwesen] most prominent?” (GA 65, 406/CP 286). To be specially noted here, as von Herrmann cautions, is the usage of “in the end” in this passage: “in the end” when being shows itself no longer only as beingness of beings, but also as the truth of being in its jointure of enowning, there arises the possibility of thinking in an experiential manner the ownmost of the uniqueness of divine being and with it the last god as the godly god.”25 If we focus our attention on the word “last” in “the last god,” we cannot miss the implicit

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24 Although Polt’s recent work The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006) is a thoroughly researched book, excellent on many counts, giving a lot of praiseworthy insights into Heidegger’s thinking, there are key areas where his elucidations struggle unsuccessfully to come to terms with some of the key aspects of Heidegger’s thinking. One such area is his elucidations of Heidegger’s “last God.” Translating the term “last” as “final,” he makes such claims as: “The final god, then, is an ‘end’ as a goal” (p. 209.). “Heidegger’s ‘passing’ indicates that our relation to the god is an event and advent, not a fixed structure” (p. 210). His elucidations have not been able to get hold of the thinking of difference at all (pp. 211 f.) rooted in the onefold of the sway of enowning.

yet obvious interplay of the “first beginning” with the “other beginning.” For Heidegger, the hitherto history of philosophy with its long metaphysical tradition and its leading question of being qua beingness of beings forms the first beginning of the history of being. But this first beginning as the first beginning of the history of being already plays forth the possibility of the other beginning of the history of being that begins with the being-historical thinking that thinks the grounding question of philosophy as the truth of being. Alluding to the fact that the god-question occupied a central place in the first beginning, and the fact that the god-question received a specific line of interpretation within this so-called onto-theo-logical tradition, with the usage “the last god,” Heidegger wants to convey straight away that the reference is purely to the “god” of the other beginning. Implied further in the usage is that the “god” of the thinking of enowning is grasped totally and fundamentally differently from the “god” as thought in the first beginning and yet, like in the first beginning, the god-question has a central place within this thinking. That calls our attention to the word “god” in the usage “the last god.” How are we to understand this “god” of the other beginning? It is in this context that the significance of the guiding dictum given to sixth “Joining” of Contributions immediately after the title “The Last God” becomes obvious: “The totally other over against gods who have been, especially over against the Christian God” (GA 65, 403/CP 283). Even before Heidegger elaborates on the god-question within the thinking of enowning, he absolutely demarcates, as a first hermeneutic step, the last god from all the specific forms of god in the entire history of thinking, especially the biblically revealed Christian God. All of them are for Heidegger some modifications of a god in terms of beingness and highest being. In contrast to such historical forms of god, the last god, the god of the other beginning, is “totally other.” We should remember that in the 1920s, Heidegger had made a distinction between the originary “Christianness” and its formulation into a “system” in terms of Hellenistic philosophical conceptuality. On the fundamental ontological pathway, he spoke of the need to rediscover this originary Christianness through a process of de-Hellenization. Now, the “totally other god” of the thinking of enowning should not be identified with even such a de-Hellenized Christian God. For, even such a god is still a form of historical specification. The godly god as the “totally other” stands for the divine phenomenon that is free of any such concretizations.

It is for this reason that being-historical thinking, while referring to the divine phenomenon, uses different but unusual expressions such as “the last god,” “godly god,” “goddiness of gods,” “the divine” [das Gott-hafte], the plural form “gods,” etc. and takes care to avoid all customary terminologies for it. We have here Heidegger’s own clarification: “The talk of ‘gods’ here does not indicate decided assertion on the extantness of a plurality over against a singular but is rather meant as the allusion to the undecidability of the being of gods, whether of one single god or of many gods. This undecidability holds within itself what is question-worthy, namely, whether anything at all like being dare be attributed to gods without destroying everything that is divine. The undecidability concerning which god and whether a god can, in utmost distress, once again arise, from which way of being of man and in what way – this is what is named by the name ‘gods’” (GA 65, 437/CP 308). Thus, it becomes clear that Heidegger’s interest consist in letting the “godly” to manifest itself in its uniqueness, without already destroying what is divine by beginning the inquiry itself with some already

prevailing historical specifications. The “Joining” entitled “The Last God” essentially and exclusively unfolds the originary divine dimension factically from out of the truth of being, becoming thus the utmost god, “the totally other god” of the other beginning, showing itself in its originary dimension that is before every form of individuation and concretization as experienced in and by any particular religious tradition.

This brings us to the next question: how does being-historical thinking think this “totally other god”? Toward answering this question, we turn to a crucial passage from the Contributions. “The last god is not enowning itself; rather, it needs enowning as that to which the founder of the there [Dagründer] belongs” (GA 65, 409/CP 288). Here, we have the clearest formulation of the being-historically grasped occurrence of theological difference. Thereby, Heidegger is giving an initial expression of how being, man, and the divine are related, but related in their unique differences. First of all, there is indeed a reaffirmation of the needing–belonging relationship between being and Dasein, a reaffirmation of the being-historically conceived occurrence of ontological difference. As the grounder of the truth of being as enowing, man of Da-sein belongs to being in a grounding-response to the enowning forth-throw of being through an act of projecting-opening what is thrown-forth to it. Then comes the crucial part of the statement, an unequivocal affirmation of the fact that there is an essential difference between being and god, that the “last god is not enowning itself.” As we have already seen, Heidegger has shown, how being as enowing unfolds in a counter-resonance of forth-throw and projecting-open. The first hermeneutic orientation is given here that the “totally other god” of the thinking of enowning is “totally other” than being also. Be-ing does not hold sway as god itself (GA 65, 26), being is never a determination of god itself (GA 65, 240/CP 169), and god is also not enowning itself (GA 65, 409). The second hermeneutic orientation is that the “totally other god” rather “needs” being.


Jason Powell’s book, Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: Life and the Last God, (London: Continuum, 2007), which is written with the all too noble intention of providing the readers with an easy access to Heidegger’s second masterpiece, makes instead a total mess of the thinking of and by being as unfolded in Contributions. The preface itself betrays the actual problem with the book, where the author states that since there is a lack of agreement among specialists concerning the meaning and translation of key words in the work, he has “provided . . . [his] own understanding of these words.” (p. ix) And any diligent reader will soon realize that this book is just that, an account of his total misunderstandings of the thinking of Contributions. What disastrous consequences such an account will have on an unsuspecting reader can only be imagined when one is confronted, page after page, with statements like: “Gods are reflections of be-ing, and a new sort of be-ing means a new sort of god...... the name ‘last’ or ‘ultimate’ is the essential name of god, since it highlights the ‘oneness’ and unique transience of the god. Besides, ‘last’ means that this god, too, would be finite” (p. 115). If only one were to familiarize oneself adequately with the very dynamics of such a thinking before embarking upon such ambitious projects like introducing it to others, one would have truly served the cause of thinking better and spared the readers a whole lot of trouble!
Coming as we are from having seen the needing–belonging relationship between being and Dasein, we already have an inkling that this usage “gods need being” presents an attempt to capture the being-historical relationship between being and the godly phenomenon. So we read: “be-ing is that which the godding of gods needs, in order nonetheless to remain totally differentiated from be-ing” (GA 65, 240 /CP 169). Gods need being for their “godding.” In order that they can appear as they are in themselves, in their originary “godly” or “divine” character, they need the truth of being as enowning. Here it is by no means a question of putting be-ing over god, or devaluing in some way the supremacy of the divine. Such talk would make sense only as long as the ontological difference and theological difference are forgotten. It is not one entity fighting for supremacy over another, it is not about a chronological priority either. What is at issue is the unveiling of that primordial region where the divine comes to show itself in its uniqueness.

After having given the first two hermeneutic orientations, namely that the “totally other god” is “totally other than being” and that this god stands in a relationship of “needing” to being, Heidegger gives the third hermeneutic orientation in the abovementioned passage. It is about the role of man as the “grounder of the t/here (Da)” in the “godding of gods.” If the sway of being as enowning comes to pass as the counter-resonance of enowning forth-throw of being and Dasein’s grounding response of projecting-opening what is thrown-forth, and if the godly god needs enowning for its “godding,” then “the last god” also needs man. A clear statement of this is given in Mindfulness: “grounding of the godhood of the last god already needs the man of Da-sein” (GA 66, 244/M 215). The “totally other” god needs man in his capacity as the grounder of the t/here: “In participating in the grounding of the t/here, Da-sein as enowned projecting-open prepares the site for the possible appearance of god, which Heidegger following Hölderlin calls the “passing-by” of the last god.”

Being-historical appearance of the godly god is what Heidegger calls the “passing-by of the last god.” It stands for the possible and being-historically transformed re-reappearance of the holy, godhood, and god. The projecting-open of Dasein belongs necessarily to this appearance or passing-by of the last god within the happening of enowning, that is, the passing-by of the last god needs man because of his role in the swaying of the truth of being. That is, man has also a share in preparing the site for the appearance of the godly god.

In order to understand further this phenomenon of the appearance of the godly phenomenon within the site of enowning grounded by man, we turn to another passage from the Contributions: “Enowning owns god over to man in that enowning owns man to god. This “owning-to” that “owns-over” is enowning, wherein the truth of being is grounded … and wherein history takes its other beginning from be-ing” (GA 65, 26/CP 19). We have already elucidated how the sway of being comes to pass as a counter-resonance of enowning forth-throw of being and enowned projecting-opening of Dasein. With the above-cited passage, Heidegger

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illuminates further the moment of being’s enowning forth-throw in two additional dimensions: (1) that the enowning forth-throw is an enowning owning god over to man and (2) that the enowning forth-throw is an enowning owning man to god. Now, what is enowningly thrown-forth has to be acted upon by Dasein by projecting it open. Thus, enowned projecting-open, being the co-dimension of the counter-resonating sway of enowning has to respond also to these two dimensions of “owning god over to man” and of “owning man to god” for the actual swaying of enowning. In this way, Heidegger locates the god-question, the thinking of a “totally other god,” within the heart of the sway of being as enowning and thus at the center of being-historical thinking. It is decisive to his being-historical thinking of god that only when thought out of the sway of being as grounded by the man of Dasein, the godly god, in its difference from both being as well as beings in their beingness, can show itself as it is in itself, in its incomparable uniqueness.

This brings us to a few vital aspects, which can only be broadly indicated here. Having explicated the enowning forth-throw of being in its two dimensions of “owning-over” and “owning-to” in conjunction with the enowned projecting-open of Dasein as a response to both, it becomes clear that without the godding of the godly god the whole phenomenon of enowning is not taken into account. Or to put differently, as long as “the last god” is one of the Joinings of the jointure of enowning, grasping the entirety of the happening of enowning includes also the dimension of the godly god. Thus, it is one of the central insights of being-historical thinking that a godless enowning is inconceivable. For this reason, borrowing an expression from von Herrmann, we can also speak of being as well as man standing in need of the godly god for a “god-filled” rather than “god-less enowning” and a “god-filled Dasein” rather than a “dis-humanized Dasein.” Von Herrmann points out that “the truth of being that comes to pass as enowning needs also god and its passing-by, if enowning is to come to its fulfilment: not the enowning that is abandoned by god, but filled by god. If enowning comes to pass filled by god, then the unconcealment of each being is not only the sheltering of the truth of its “being-what” and “being-how,” but also the sheltering of the god-filled enowning.”29 Let us try to understand this further. Any calculatively thought god, as found in various forms of both monotheism and pantheism, is nothing but a “dis-owning god” as long as the godly phenomenon is not thought out of the light of being. The divine phenomenon can show itself in its uniqueness only in the light provided by being. Thus, the divine phenomenon does stand in need of the light of being for its self-manifestation. When the various historical articulations of the godly phenomenon do not take this fundamental dimension as a guiding orientation, but let themselves be guided by other calculative considerations, what they eventually arrive at is a “dis-owning god.” Entirely different from this, speaking from within the sway of being itself, and trying to understand the sway of being in its entirety, any attempt to elucidate the sway of being keeping the “godding of the godly god” out of consideration is incomplete and to that extend it is a “god-less” enowning, which follows the attempt

29 von Herrmann, *Die Metaphysik*, p. 121.
at grasping the sway of being without one of its constitutive dimensions. In other words, placed under a methodological theological *epoché*, the thinking of and as enowning cannot unfold in its fullness.

In the same vein, there is a definite sense in which man also needs god. Only when he recognizes that his being is owned-over-to god, he has an inkling of the full depth of the uniqueness of his ownmost and only then he can truly overcome all forms of dis-humanization: “The same ground that gives rise to the sway of the godhood of gods also gives rise to the beginning of the respective fundamental worthiness of man by virtue of which he overcomes the “dis-humanization” as the most acute danger to his ownmost” (GA 66, 245/M 216–17). Being-historical thinking shows that only when the ownmost of man is thought out of and understood from out of the counter-resonance of being as the grounder of the truth of being, we grasp the uniqueness of man. Since the sway of enowning necessarily includes the godding of the godly god, grasping man’s ownmost necessarily implies grasping it in its god-permeated character. This insight of being-historical thinking has far-reaching consequences. To be human then would mean to be grounded in the light of being and embraced by the divine. Understood from this perspective, the full phenomenon of dis-humanization implies that the dis-humanized human existence, abandoned by being and devoid of the godding of the goldly god, unfolds itself in a forgottenness both of being as well as of the godly god.

To sum up our elucidations of the being-historical thinking of the theological difference and “the last god,” we can say that on the one hand, as thought out of this difference, being-historical god is not a being, nor the highest being. Neither is it being itself, or the truth of being in its sway as enowning. On the other hand, within the space illuminated by being and grounded by Dasein, and only within that, the godly god that is as yet untouched in its unique divine character and undifferentiated into specific historical forms can and does appear. It means, even in all its difference, the last god has its originary space within the intimacy of the onefold of being, insofar as the sway of being as enowning is incomplete without the “passing-by” of the “last god.” This is the being-historically transformed phenomenon of theological difference, the difference between god and the truth of being. In the same vein, being-historical thinking grasps also the relation between the “last god” and man differently. The utterly other god needs the site prepared by Dasein for its appearance. But thereby, being-historical thinking does not carry out a reversal of the traditional priorities. In being-historical thinking, such calculative considerations have definitely no place. Being-historical thinking just shows the originary intimacy of the sway of being, grounding of man, and the godding of gods. This thinking is concerned with the intimacy of the onefold of an occurrence, and only out of this onefold differentiations can be genuinely made. Accordingly a key passage in *Mindfulness* gives a very precise expression to this: “Neither do gods create man nor does man invent gods. The truth of be-ing decides “on” both but not by prevailing over them but by enowning itself between them and thus by first enowning them themselves unto the countering” (GA 66, 235/M 208).
Having traversed the path of Heidegger’s thinking in order to gain an experience of how the thinking of difference in both its ontological and theological dimensions shapes his inquiry into the truth of being; how this thinking of difference undergoes a transformation along with the immanent transformation his very thinking undergoes and how the question of god unfolds within the dynamics of the thinking of difference, it is important to conclude this essay with a further question: what is the significance of Heidegger’s thinking of the “last god,” the “totally other” god of the thinking of enowning? We should be aware of efforts that still refuse to concede that Heidegger has something significant to contribute to the discussion on god. Our elucidations above, however brief, suffice to make one realize that such claims are born out of an actual ignorance of the very thinking of Heidegger as well as the unwillingness to let go the popular prejudices that have been built and even consciously nurtured over the decades. Serious efforts are also made to approach especially the thinking of enowning from the angle of its possible relation to Christian theology. However attractive such efforts may initially appear to be, they sadly miss the ownmost of Heidegger’s philosophy as such as well as what is outstandingly unique to his contributions to the thinking of the question of god. It is therefore important to highlight what is unique to Heidegger’s “last god.”

Philosophical thinking in its originary shaping as the thinking of the truth of being as enowning necessarily implies the question of the divine. After having pursued fundamental ontology within a theological epoché as a necessary hermeneutic measure, thinking gains the realization that the intimacy of the onefold of the swaying of being as enowning lights itself up as a belonging-together first of all of the truth of being and the man of Da-sein, a belonging-together that at the same time opens up the space for the self-revelation of the divine. Secondly, the onefold of the swaying of being becomes thus not only the source of the originary relatedness of the grounding Dasein and the godding of gods, but a relatedness in their essential difference.

Within the thinking of enowning, thinking opens thus the space and method to think of a “totally other” god under the clearing of being. In my considered opinion, what is exceptionally unique to Heidegger’s thinking of the god-question, and what is absolutely missed by practically all the studies on the matter, is his thinking of the “divine” [das Gotthafte]. If we take Heidegger’s contribution on the topic as an illustration of a thinking of post-metaphysical, post-modern god, or as an essential criticism of some particular religious tradition, showing a way out of it, especially that of Christian tradition, we may be missing the essential point. In the intimacy of the onefold of the swaying of being as enowning, thinking opens a site for the “godding of the godly god,” where the divine shows itself in its undifferentiated originary divine character: “The last god has its most unique uniqueness and stands outside those calculating determinations meant by titles such as “mono-theism,” “pan-theism,” and “a-theism.” .... the multitude of gods cannot be quantified, but rather is subjected to the inner richness of the grounds and abgrounds in the site for
the moment of the shining and sheltering-concealing of the hint of the last god” (GA 65, 411/CP 289). Being lights up to thinking the ur-dimension of the divine, as un-decided and un-differentiated in its nature and specific historical manner of manifestation. Heidegger’s legacy then would be the opening up of a domain that is still untouched by any form of concretizations and objectifications, decisions in favor of one or many, male or female gods. This ur-domain of the divine shows itself as the provenance from which every religious tradition could experience its individualization. Thus, Heidegger’s “other god” perhaps need not be seen as taking a way out of any particular religious tradition, let alone the Christian tradition, but as providing the common site that leads into every specific religious traditions. Thus, Heidegger provides us with a common philosophical, yet factic basis for a meaningful dialogue between all historical religious traditions and their specific god-experiences. Thus, Heidegger can truly say that “the last god is not the end but the other beginning of immeasurable possibilities for our history” (GA 65, 411/CP 289).

Illuminated by the truth of being and understood from out of the intimacy of the onefold of the sway of being, man attains the realization that the ownmost of his facticity is always already permeated by the divine character. The divine is no longer located in some unreachable metaphysical heights, nor is it man’s own illusory creation. The divine prevails within the very core of one’s ownmost, not seeking some form of forced artificial relationship, but shows itself in an always already prevalent relationship that calls for and calls forth a continuous response. It is the type of human response that would decide whether the divine “passes by” or “stays away,” whether man remains god-less and thus dis-humanized or god-filled and thus genuinely humanized. Thus, we can say that with the “last god” Heidegger offers an answer to his own complaint about the god of the metaphysics, when he said that “to this god man can neither pray or offer sacrifice. Before the causa sui man can neither kneel down in deep awe, nor can he musicise or dance before this god.” In any case, if only one understands the depth and wealth of the thinking of the “last god,” one can understand what he meant, when he emphasized that, “the god-less thinking, that sacrifices the god of philosophy, the god as causa sui, is perhaps closer to the godly god.”

References


Heidegger’s Thinking of Difference and the God-Question


1 Introduction

Is philosophy as the thinking of “be-ing” exclusively Greek and Western? Do the onsets of thinking of other traditions allow themselves to be translated into the Western horizon of experience? Can such a translation remain mindful of the ownmost of what is irreconcilably foreign, and in spite of this foreignness initiate a dialogue?

In its classical, metaphysical form, Western philosophy is rational theory in the sense of logical and discursive knowledge. Its conclusions are (1) obtained and disproved argumentatively, and (2) only secondarily, they possess a practical relevance to life. In fact the Eastern tradition does also possess discursive thought, as well as a highly sophisticated and elaborate logic, and a systematic ontology, which unlike Western metaphysics always encompasses an ethic. Nevertheless, both traditions are characterized by fundamentally different impulses. Whereas in Western philosophy the (rational) knowledge of reality assumes the position of a prima philosophia (first philosophy), in the Eastern tradition, it always serves the interpretation, preparation, or the possible bringing-about of a condition (Zustand) that itself has a pre-rational and extralinguistic character. Knowledge is not achieved in the rational cognition as such, but in a “conditional” experience (“enlightenment”), which (1) is attained intuitively and not discursively, (2) has direct consequences for life experience, and (3) is always soteriologically oriented. Here, knowledge is a synonym of salvation and transformation. While the truth of a metaphysical proposition coincides with and is exhausted by the spoken word, the discursive thought of...
the Eastern tradition is directed toward a conditionality that is not theoretically communicable (whether it be its source or its ultimate goal). Eastern thought is therefore directed toward a level of experience that from the Western perspective would be attributed more to psychology and/or religious experience.

These fundamentally opposed approaches have essential consequences. Whereas the metaphysical, Western questioning of the phenomenal world leads to an essential determination of beings as substantial realities and to the setting up of a “true world” with its features of eternity, immutability, and absoluteness (whether it be a theoretically ascertainable “true world” or, as with Kant, one postulated in practical reason), Eastern philosophy is completely open ended. This manifests itself especially clearly in Indian philosophy, in which the “metaphysical” doctrine of Ātman (soul), of Vedist origin, and the Buddhist approach confront each other—leading to the overcoming of all metaphysical concepts and all categories of being.

In what follows, I would like to initiate a dialogue between Western (metaphysical) and Eastern (Buddhist) thought concerning the “ultimate reality.” In this connection, I will first address the classical, metaphysical concept of substance using Aristotle and Descartes as examples. In the next step, I turn to Nāgārjuna, the most important figure in Mahayana Buddhism, and present somewhat more extensively his theory of emptiness. Finally, I will attempt to show the paths that a dialogue with Buddhist philosophy can open toward a new self-conception of Western philosophy.

2 Theories of Substance in Western Philosophy

2.1 Aristotle

Philosophy as metaphysics is sustained by a theoretical fore-grasping of the unconditioned, independent absolute. For Aristotle, theory means observation and comprehension of the entity, with the goal of containing it by naming it (ἁρμονία). According to its distinctive character, θεωρία leads to multifarious determinations of being, which are grounded in ὤντος as the ultimate, logically-ontologically, irreducible core essence of beings, which can nevertheless be conceptualized in many ways. The concept of ὤντος is itself multifaceted, and bears within itself the tension between the particular and absolute. ὤντος is that which cannot be predicated of another, and which, as enduring substrate ὑποκείμενον, supports changing qualities. ὤντος, however, is no generality; rather, in one respect, it is the τὸ τί ἡ ἐν συνόλῳ, the concrete that individuates beings through its specific materiality. In another respect, though, ὤντος is the τὸ τί ἡ ἐν συνόλῳ, the τὸ ἐν τῷ, by which it completes as it were the tension between the general and particular, and finally leads to the first ὤντος, the τὸ ἐν, which as the ultimate unconditioned resides within itself, and grounds the teleological organizing and ordering of all beings. Because theoreti-
cal fore-grasping of reality determines in advance being-extant as the highest value, the levels and ranks of beings obtain completion in ὀσῶν as the most extant and highest being.

2.2 Descartes

In Descartes, for the first time, the ultimate knowledge of beings is attained in a rational meditation, which by reductionistically fore-grasping the ego cogito with a view toward certitudo (certainty) discloses the ego cogito (I think) as the fundamentum inconcussum (unshakeable foundation). Here, meditation means self-reflection and rational self-knowledge guided by clara et distincta perceptio (clear and distinct ideas). The Cartesian definition of substance as “ita existit, ut nulla alia re indiget ad existendum” (it exists such that no other thing is required for its existence) confirms the insight into absoluteness and autonomy. These obtain completion only in God as causa sui, but in such a way that first the res cogitans (thinking thing) and res extensa (extended thing) can be posited as final and finite certum (certainty), needing no other entity “other than God” in order to exist as enduring substrate. Here too, as in Aristotle, ontology leads into a theology that nevertheless remains – on this level – untouched by the contents of Christian soteriology. Thus, the human “I” attains rational knowledge independent of God, and thus provides the foundation for the separation of philosophy and faith.

3 Buddhist Antisubstantialism: Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy of Emptiness

3.1 The Initial Situation: Pre-Buddhist Metaphysics (Ātman) and the Debate Between Eternalism (Sarvastivādin) and Instantaneousness (Sautrāntikas)

Nāgārjuna’s philosophy shows some parallels to Kant’s critical philosophy, and not only formally. His Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, on the one hand, turns against the pre-Buddhist (Vedist/Hindu) tradition and its main positions, which were still alive in the second century A.D.: the system of Sāṃkhya with its theory of identity of cause and effect, and the emphasis on the potential containment of the

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1For an English translation of Nāgārjuna’s text, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, see The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, trans. Jay L. Garfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Translator’s Note—the translator would like to thank Dr. Guy Beck for providing this reference as well as the meaning of the Sanskrit terms.
effect in the cause (satkāryavāda), and the converse thesis, advanced by Vaiśesika, according to which cause and effect are two different ontological factors (asatkāryavāda). On the other side, two Buddhist schools from the Hinayāna tradition faced each other with comparable views: the Sarvastivādin (from sarvam asti, all exists) advanced the thesis that all existing elements (dharmas) possess eternal substantiality and peculiar being (svabhāva), while the Sautrāntikas, appealing to Buddha’s doctrine of not-oneself (anatta), attributed to existing elements only a momentary, substanceless existence (ksanikavāda), which flickers and is extinguished with the coming into being and passing away of the phenomenal nexus. Vis-à-vis the ontological eternity belief (eternalism) of the first school, and the doctrine of annihilation of the second, Nāgārjuna, strives for a restoration of the original, essential core of Buddhist doctrine, which he connects to the thought of not-oneself (anatta), substancelessness (asvabhāva), and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda).

3.2 Nāgārjuna’s “Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way”: The Destruction of the Concept of Substance and the Soteriological Application of Emptiness

In the following, I refer to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), Nāgārjuna’s most important treatise on the philosophy of the middle way. Nāgārjuna’s antimetaphysical doctrine centers on the destruction of the concept of substance (svabhāva). In order to understand his argument, the ontological character of the concept of svabhāva must be explained more precisely. The Indian philosophy conceives substance or the proper nature of things in the absolute sense of causa sui and absolute independence. Svabhāva literally means that which bears its own (sva) existence (bhāva) in itself, and is thus self-subsisting and independent of external conditions, bearing the ground of its coming to be and subsistence within itself. Svabhāva (self-existing) is absolute self-identity, referring to nothing other than its own existing.

In order to demonstrate the non-existence of substance, Nāgārjuna appeals to empirical experience, which he scrutinizes with the help of the ‘four sided logic’ or Buddhist Tetralemma (catuskoṇī). His approach is of an empirical, phenomenological nature and is based on the examination of the evidence pertaining to a state of affairs. He arrives at the conclusion that, since nothing escapes the causal nexus and conditionality; because everything is transient and in the process of continual development, there is nothing in the world having the character of self-existence. Svabhāva is a linguistic convention arising out of nominalization and lacking any real magnitude. (Thus Nāgārjuna’s direction is similar to that of Aristotle’s, but leads to opposite results). In similar veins, he also rejects the thought that everything can be grounded in a foreign nature (parabhāva), or, as it were, in pure otherness and difference; because a foreign nature carries within itself a reference to the “own,” and can only be thought of as its negation. Insofar as existence cannot be attributed to either (absolute) self-identity or to (absolute) self-difference, or to
(absolute) being or to (absolute) non-being, an ontological grounding of reality in a substance-principle becomes untenable. Consequently, everything that comes to be, becomes dependent on something else and as a result lacks a self (nairâmya), and an essence (asvabhâva), and is “empty” (śûnya).

Dependent (conditional) coming into being and emptiness (śûnyatâ) are interchangeable concepts having an indicative character. With these concepts, Nâgârjuna does not intend to nihilistically destroy the existing character of the world but rather to overcome the duality of being and non-being, of existence and non-existence. Opposing the absolutization and substantialization of emptiness, Nâgârjuna stresses the methodical and soteriological character of the concept of emptiness. “Emptiness” is not a statement made about the being or non-being of beings in the whole. Rather, “emptiness” always refers only to a particular thing: all this is empty (sarvam idam śûnyam), and not all is empty (sarvam śûnyam). The notion of emptiness is understood as a methodical means of overcoming the differentiating thought (vikalpa), caught in the duality of existence and non-existence. Emptiness itself must finally become emptied of all ideas adherent to being or non-being. At the very end, though, this step leads into the realm of the nonverbal: language accompanies thinking up to the preliminary stages of the highest insight (prajñâ) only to retreat at its threshold (sigetic).

3.3 The Two Levels of Truth (Satyadvaya) and the Identity of Nirvâna and Samsâra

With this strong emphasis on the extralinguistic character of the highest insight and the sharp distinction between a conventional truth (saṁvrtisatya) that uses language, and a highest truth (paramârthasatya), which withdraws from all spoken and discursive argumentation, Nâgârjuna radicalizes the original thrust of the Buddhist distinction between phenomenal reality and the highest reality of dharmatâ (the nature of the elements of existence). The highest truth is no longer conceived as an ontological magnitude whose being in fact can be intuitively but not linguistically grasped. The highest truth is emptiness itself, this, however, is the self-overcoming indicator of a condition (salvation or Nirvâna), unto which emptiness itself is dynamically emptied. At this level of truth not only discursive thinking but also the differentiation between conventional and highest truth becomes untenable. Samsâra (the phenomenal world with its circle of suffering and rebirth) and nirvâna (the completed turning back unto emptiness) prove to be the same. These two are not realities, but conditions corresponding to no ontological objectivity. Nâgârjuna writes: “There is nothing that would distinguish saṁsâra from nirvâna, and nirvâna from saṁsâra. The border of nirvâna is at the same time the border of saṁsâra. Between these two not even the most subtle difference can be found” (MMK 25, 19–20).2

2See The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Chapter 25, verse 19–20 (p. 75).
Where then is the border between the conventional and the highest, between being entangled in samsāra and salvation in nirvāṇa? Does in the end prajñā (insight), the highest experiment with the “ultimate reality,” dissolve itself into an indeterminate psychological condition, which withdraws from every form of communicability and verifiability?

Seen from the Western point of view, this question must be answered in the affirmative. Determinateness, communicability, and verifiability are criteria of argumentative thinking. Because from the Buddhist (and generally Eastern) perspective, conditionality, not rational cognition, is the final goal of knowledge, the question whether this conditionality is a true experience or an illusion cancels itself out. For the true experience and illusion both presuppose a reality existing in itself as object of cognition, with which the experience itself could be measured. Because the highest goal of prajñā is the overcoming of the “obsession with individuality” (prapañca) and with it the thinking of difference, in terms of content, prajñā must remain indeterminate. At the end, any attempt to grasp this “highest” knowledge with rational arguments founders on this indeterminateness and unverifiability. In the face of the ultimate reality, the boundaries between thinking feeling, and belief become permeable.

But the pathway traversed by Nāgārjuna also offers decisive insights to be used in the “Western” approach. His thought resembles a balancing act between two planes of experience, which complement and relativize each other. By discursively demanding that one should become free from all (conditional) attachments not only to the phenomenal truth, but also to the highest truth (nirvāṇa), he does not allow the highest insight to lead to an ascetic escape from the world. Because the experience of emptiness transcends all axiological ideas and dwells in pure reception of (emptied) being, it becomes the realization of the world as world. A much cited saying in Mahāyāna Buddhism reads, “samsāra-as-it-is is nirvāṇa.”

4 Nāgārjuna and Western Metaphysics

Without any claim to completeness, I would now like to address briefly some parallels that appear to me to be fruitful for a dialogue between Western and Eastern traditions.

For the first time in Western philosophy, David Hume subjected the concept of substance to a systematic destruction. He criticized the concept of substance more radically than that of causality, to which he indeed did not concede any necessity, but a validity, which is guaranteed through induction and habit. Substance is a mere fiction of the faculty of imagination: “nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned to them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection” (Treatise, I, 1, sect. 6).\(^1\) Admittedly, Hume’s criticism of substance is determined solely destructively.

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This criticism sets limits to the knowable and, as is the case later with Kant, entails a rational self-constraint of discursive thought, and not the opening of another source of experience.

It is different with Nāgārjuna. Reminiscent of the Kantian “as if,” Nāgārjuna’s samsāra and nirvāṇa overcomes ultimate reality as an ontological magnitude at the same time as he wins it back into the practical conduct of life. To put it in Western metaphysical categories, the saying, “samsāra-as-it-is is nirvāṇa,” means that the (conditional) grasping of reality as such (ens qua ens) [ōv ᾑ ēov], that is, beings as beings, transcends and transfigures the being of reality and “lives” (lebt) this as emptiness that empties itself. To be sure, Nāgārjuna’s postulates remain undetermined. For the distinction between a world of appearances and a world of emptiness, made on the plane of linguistic, conventional truth, which is reminiscent of Kant’s distinction between appearance and the thing-in-itself (here with a complete reversal of the premises), is in truth the self-overcoming indication of something ungraspable, that lies beyond being and non-being. Nāgārjuna’s thing-in-itself is the continuous process of resolution of any in-itself. Nevertheless, even this process contains an inner obligation. Whereas in Kant, the postulates of pure practical reason lead to the concept of the “as-if” of the absolute moral law: (live in such a way as if God, freedom, and immortality were theoretically knowable), in Nāgārjuna, the separation of the “as-if” vanishes at the end in the living identity (or non-difference) of samsāra and nirvāṇa. However, the inner tension between these two remains present in the practical conduct of life as ethical instance, and concretizes itself in the demand to shape life according to the experience of emptiness (in accordance with the eightfold path of Buddhism).

Nietzsche’s project of an antimetaphysical anthropology also seems to lead to similar results. If one reads Nietzsche not as the last metaphysician, but as the sign of a rift, and thus takes the “overman” (Übermensch) as a balancing act between self-attainment and self-loss, between the post-metaphysical dissolution of the self and the instantaneous self-individuation via affirmation of the eternal return, then the eternal return appears as the transforming glance at the world of finitude and transitoriness, transfiguring both in the manner in which the middle holds samsāra and nirvāṇa together as the same. Nietzsche too distinguishes between two planes of truth, which in a note in the Nachlaß he sums up in the two concepts exoteric and esoteric. What exoterically must be conceived as will to power (instead of exoteric Nāgārjuna would say “conventional”) stating “all is will against will,” turns in the esoteric “redeemed” view of the overman reading into its opposite stating “there is no will at all.” And yet Nietzsche’s “esoteric” truth also remains an affirmation – the highest affirmation – of eternally returning reality (the reality of samsāra as such, not its overcoming in nirvāṇa).

In both Western and Buddhist philosophy, the talk about ultimate reality or the attempt to live according to it shows an inner tension and a wavering between two planes of experience. This framework of the dual truth, of the “as-if,” proves to be of decisive importance for the philosophy of religion. In the early Christian tradition, it is above all the Pauline hos me [ωζ μη] (“as if not”) that points to a similar
direction. The demand put to the Christians to live in the world and to take part in it “as if” they do not partake of it brings together two dimensions, similar to Nāgārjuna’s dual truth, which despite the ontologically original chasm separating them are referred to each other. The hos me (ως μή) [“as if not”] indeed “negates” “the world” as absolute reality, but at the same time gains it back, by grounding the world in the realm of God, and so transfigured directly validating the world in its being.

Like Nāgārjuna, the Christian mystics, and above all Meister Eckhart too seek to overcome the adherence to the idea of the highest (God or nirvāṇa). In fact, Eckhart’s thoughts on eminness and relinquishing the self lead to becoming-fulfilled by God. Relinquishing the self and relinquishing even God happen for the sake of another experience of God, which is no longer oriented toward possession and objectification, but rather toward the birth of Christ in the soul, which is emptied of all that has to do with being and individuation. And yet this “emptied” fullness of the experience of God is not a wealth of determinations, but rather the simplicity of relinquishing all determinations.

Is that which is encountered in this emptiness not in the end the simple urground of the self and world? In the end, do not the mystics and does not Nāgārjuna’s way of the middle strive for a conditional experience of that which theory attempts argumentatively to grasp and describe with the name “substance?” Substance and emptiness: do these two names ultimately indicate two different experiences with the same phenomenon?

4.1 A Perspective: Substance and Emptiness Beyond Oppositionality

Substance as thought metaphysically (and also the Vedist svabhāva) is indeed connected with the ontological fullness of true beings. This fullness, however, is not a fullness of qualities, it is not a manifold; on the contrary, it is simple subsistence, the sub-sistere, that on the basis of this simple self-subsistence can above all exist as substrate (sub-stare) for changing qualities. Śūnyatā, emptiness, is on the other hand no vacuum, no lack, but is rather the free and freeing in the unfree, the independent in the dependent. If emptiness appears to conceptual thought as the negation of positivity, then as a condition, it offers itself beyond all oppositionality. This emptiness is neither pure nothingness nor its negation but an attunement and a being seized, that cannot be thought of as pathos (for pathos presupposes individuality)—an attunement that affects the existence of the whole human being precisely by dissolving his individual self-positioning.

Substance is disclosed by the theoretical gaze of thinking and exists for humans only as an object of theory. Is an experience of substance that surpasses ratio possible? Is a conditional comprehension of substantiality conceivable at all? The simple existence of theoria, and the simple dissolution of all existence in prajñā: are they perhaps two ways of viewing the same thing, which is disclosed theoretically
as substance (or its negation), but which is conditionally experienced as emptiness? Do Western philosophy and Buddhist philosophy perhaps agree on the experience of the simple fullness of a free vision—a vision of the simple existence of substance (in the end: of the silence of theion) \([\theta\epsilon\omega\nu]\), and of the dissolution in emptiness (the silence of nirvāṇa)? Is this vision the freedom that lets everything go, in order to gain everything back in another way—healed and simple?

I would like to leave this question open. It is not meant to usher in a conclusive theory, but only to be a directive toward an open field of work. Knowledge and conditionality are two possibilities of human self-experience and world-experience that should no longer be seen as oppositional, but complementary.

Heidegger expresses his own understanding of his dissociative exposition of the tradition when he says: “[The great philosophies] are towering mountains, unclimbed and unclimbable. But they endow the land with what is highest and show its primordial bedrock.” Can this experience, that shapes Heidegger’s being-historical thinking, be carried over to the non-Western traditions, assuming that the carrying over is understood in the essential sense of the translational delimitation (übersetzenden Entgrenzens)? Is there an unreflective reference to this delimitation in the being-historical concepts of reservedness (Verhaltenheit) and comportment, the characteristic traits of preparatory thinking—a delimitation occurring on this side of knowledge and conditionality, where the ownmost of Western experience may be brought to light more clearly, and that is: more freely?

References


Preliminary Notes on Divine Images in the Light of Being-Historical Thinking

Bernhard Radloff

1 Άλλα τότε μέν οὐκ εἴδότες θεόν, ἐδούλευσατε τοίς μὴ φύσει οὕσιν θεοῖς (Gal. 4:8)

1 Introduction

Heidegger’s brief text of 1955 on Raphael’s Sistine Madonna (1513–1514) raises significant questions regarding his understanding of Christianity and his sense of the image of the divine as a mode of presence.1 The text implies the context of being-historical thinking, and therefore the distinction between historical and aesthetic modes of analysis, on the one hand, and the “essential knowledge” (das wesentliche Wissen), which arises out of the mindfulness of the consummation of modernity, on the other. The art-historical appreciation of Western painting, including “religious art,” is put into question, along with the aesthetics of the museum and the entire critical apparatus which supports it. The text speaks the language of the being-historical works of the late 1930s, especially the Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) and Mindfulness, and implicates Heidegger’s hermeneutic critique of the mobilization of the artwork, which follows from the integration of art

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into the will-to-power of Nietzsche’s metaphysics. The possibility of the art-work as a founding moment in the projecting-opening of the Da of Da-sein is taken up in a way which recalls “The Origin of the Work of Art.” All of this is complicated, evidently, by the fact that the Madonna of Raphael speaks to us of the incarnation of a god, of the incarnate God of Christian belief, and that Heidegger’s confrontation with this heritage is intimately related to his attempt to rethink the Greek inception of Western thinking and to open up the possibility of an other beginning.

The first key distinction that Heidegger makes in his discussion of Raphael’s Madonna is between an aesthetic and art-historical appreciation of the painting and the uniqueness of its character as Bild. The fact that in the course of its history the painting has been placed in a museum and thus integrated into art-historical categories reveals, in a covert way, “the actual historical course of Occidental art since the Renaissance” (GA13, 119). This already raises the question as to what the institution of the museum reveals about the history (Geschichte) of art in modernity. The distinction between Geschichte and Seyngeschichte, on the one hand, and Historie, on the other, is also implicit in Heidegger’s distinction between the exhibition-space (Ausstellung) of the museum and the site (Ort) to which the painting belongs. This site is a church in Piacenza, not in the historical sense, but according to its own presenting as Bild. The mode of being-present in the museum-exhibition-space determines the painting according to a temporality quite distinct from the temporality of the site. For this reason, Theodor Hetzer’s contention that the picture does not require, or belong to, a specific “Aufstellung” (i.e., in a specific church) is characterized by Heidegger as aesthetically correct, but not true. The aesthetics of the museum is a form of re-presentation which reduces all works to their “position” within exhibition-space. This space conceals the site the painting in its own Bildwesen unfolds (GA13, 120). This uniform distancelessness conceals the distinction of near and far, the movement of withdrawal in the presencing of the work, and subjects it to being-present for representation. The site, conversely, is not something already-given, for it is determined by the picture itself, out if its own way of unfolding (Bildwesen). Failing this, integrated into the historical-aesthetic institution of the museum, the picture is estranged from itself. The museum, as aesthetic-historical institution, presupposes the representation and objectification of beings, which is integral to Historie. The self-estrangement spoken of here recalls the abandonment of the being of beings (Seinsverlassenheit) in the epoch of the consummation of metaphysics. Historie, Heidegger writes in Mindfulness, represents and produces the past with a view to the securing of the present and the future (GA66, 233/207). Securing grounds in the representational thinking, which inaugurates modernity. “This objectifying of whatever is, is accomplished in a setting-before, a representing, that aims at bringing

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2Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1989); Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). Cited in the text as GA 65. Martin Heidegger, Besinnung, GA 66 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1997); Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary, (New York: Continuum, 2006). Cited as GA 66. Reference to the translation, in these and all similar citations, follows reference to the original.
each particular being before it in such a way that man who calculates can be sure, and that means certain, of that being.” 3 Historie in principle blocks every access to the experience of what is not represented as an object.

In On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, Parvis Emad writes that Heidegger’s “complex relationship to Christianity… points directly to the very core of Heidegger’s being-historical approach to the question of God.” Heidegger’s “perception of his relationship to Christianity is closely tied to his being-historical insight into the ‘flight of gods’” as articulated in Mindfulness.4 Insight into the “flight of gods” emerges “out of hermeneutic phenomenology” and depends on its “method and presuppositions.” This method itself, moreover, has to be understood as the gift of “being-historical-enowning thinking” as unfolded in Mindfulness and the Contributions; therefore, if we wish to gain access to Heidegger’s relationship to Christianity as a “hermeneutic-phenomenological issue,” we “must keep in mind the being-historical-enowning insight into the flight of the gods and its implications.” 5 With respect to our consideration of Heidegger’s text on the Sistine Madonna, Parvis Emad’s comments offer us two interrelated clues: the methodological issue of the relation of hermeneutic phenomenology to being-historical thinking; and the question of the flight of gods.

I propose to consider the question of the flight or arrival of gods in relation to their shining-forth, or conversely their absence, from art. I have already intimated that Heidegger’s comments on the Madonna of Raphael offer an experience of the god, given in or through the image, within the context of the passage from the consummation of modernity into the other beginning. This leads us to back to the methodological problem of how our hermeneutic situation is to be characterized, with specific reference to art and artworks. In an effort to elucidate this question, I will turn, in the first instance, to the text of Mindfulness, and in particular, to Section 11, entitled “Die Kunst im Zeitalter der Vollendung der Neuzeit,” as well as to Sections 70 and 71, both of which directly raise the question of be-ing (Seyn) and gods. The elucidation of the question of the divine image in the artwork is evidently tied to the being-historical destiny of art. In the first instance, we are constrained to approach the Madonna of Raphael through the categories of the consummation of aesthetics, as intimated in Section 11 of Mindfulness. Yet, being-historical thinking is enjoined to think the passage into the other beginning. To gain a foothold on this path of thinking means, among other things, to gain a better understanding of the relation of the consummation of modernity to its inception. With this in view, I propose to examine a specific, early modern trace of the “flight

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5 Ibid., pp. 177–178.
of gods”: the iconoclasm of the Reformation. Iconoclasm experiences the image of the divine in art as an idol. How can a phenomenological explication of Reformation iconoclasm illuminate the temporality of the presencing of the divine that is proper to modernity? What is the being-historical import of iconoclasm as an event in the history of truth? An explication of the phenomenon of iconoclasm has to grasp this phenomenon in its temporality. In what follows, I argue that the idol of Reformation experience signifies the being-present of the image as an object of representational thinking and its truth. Understood in terms of the inception of modernity, this truth is the truth of certitude as anticipated in the will to assurance of salvation. The decision regarding the truth or untruth of the divine image in art is one, essential way in which the flight or arrival of the gods is decided.

The being-historical grasp of iconoclasm, considered as a manifestation of the flight of god(s), implicates an understanding of our own hermeneutic situation in the history of truth in its possible crossing from the consummation of the first beginning into the inception of the other beginning. “Thinking in the crossing,” Heidegger writes, “accomplishes the grounding projecting-open of the truth of be-ing as historical mindfulness” (GA65, 5/4). The “debasement” of the image in general into a manipulated object of consumption, its integration into the technical apparatus of mass consciousness, as well as its aesthetic-historical exhibition-value, all belong to a situation marked by the availability and functionality of the image. This suggests that the iconoclasm of the Reformation and the technically produced proliferation of images in our own time are correlative events in the history of being: in effect, that modern and post-modern image production is itself a form of iconoclasm. The image in its power as a gateway to the divine, as the setting into the work of the unconcealment of be-ing, is broken. What remains is the image as a being in its mere actuality, understood as a function of technicity, and the lived experience that belongs to it. The image, once reduced to the temporality of availability and functionality, is, in a transformed sense arising out of the consummation of modernity, an “idol.” In this sense, Heidegger’s note on Raphael’s Madonna, which explicitly raises the being-historical question of the museum and the exhibition-value of painting, itself leads us back the inception of modernity, and hence to iconoclasm as one manifestation of this inception.

Heidegger’s account of formal indication as a component of the phenomenological method, in the period leading up to Being and Time, distinguishes three directions of sense in the explication of the phenomenon: the content-sense, the relation-sense, and the enactment-sense (Gehalts-, Bezugs-, and Vollzugssinn). Phenomenology

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7 See Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologie des Religiösen Lebens (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1995); The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei
“is the explication of this totality of sense” with a view to determining how temporality is factically lived in its originality (GA 60, 63, 65, 83-4/43, 44, 58). The phenomenon is the temporal, which has to be won from the complex of relations of the object-historical situation. The phenomenological situation is not a situation in time, but a situation of enactment that founds a time, in the sense of a decision, which initiates a beginning (GA60, 90-3/63-5). The enactment-sense implicates the existential appropriation of what is indicated by the content and relational-senses; this, in turn, implies a turn away from the abstracted concept of the content-sense understood as an objectification of what is indicated, toward the being of Da-sein.7 With reference to the explication of language in Sein und Zeit, this signifies a movement away from the truth of the statement and from the assumption that being is to be understood as being-present in order to open up a site for enactment in the very existence of Da-sein. Coriando has shown how the indicative of the formal indication is taken up into and transformed by being-historical thinking.8 The non-objectifying language of the indicative speaks as directive (Weisung), indicative sign, or hint (Wink), of how the passage from the first to the other beginning is to be enacted by Da-sein (GA65, 7, 383-85/6, 267-9). The “present” of enactment is held in the jointure of the movement away from the first beginning and its metaphysical history, and the movement-into the other beginning. The “present” of the Augenblick of Da-sein’s enactment of the passage enacts the historicity of the abandonment of the being of beings, which is experienced as the Anklang (GA65, 383-4/268). “Abandonment of being must be experienced as the basic event of our history and be elevated into a knowing awareness that shapes and guides” (GA65, 112/78). The enactment of turning-away and turning-into, as well the enactment of turning-toward the Augenblick of the endurance of the passage, is the way in which the formal indication of the phenomenological method is grasped in being-historical thinking. Inasmuch as Da-sein enacts the sense of each of these movements, it takes up what has been played toward it by the history of be-ing and projects and opens the other beginning, which is intimated by the refusal (Verweigerung) of be-ing; this refusal phenomenologically shows itself in the abandonment of beings.


What is Heidegger’s understanding of the art and the artwork in the age of the consummation of metaphysics and the abandonment of the being of beings? One way in which this abandonment manifests itself is in art. In this epoch, the metaphysical consummation of art points back to the inception of modernity. The dis-integration of the pre-modern artwork, the mobilization of art, and its integration into the exhibition-space of the museum are all integral to the positing of the world as picture. The “breaking” of the essential image is founded in the event which founds modernity: the becoming-picture of the world. The (post-)modern actualization of the world picture, however, in itself intimates a turn inasmuch as subject and object cease to stand over against each other and become functions of each other. This opens a possible space of withdrawal from representation and therefore a possible space for the art-work in the projecting-opening of an other beginning. We recall that Heidegger’s “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” is not a description of what art is today, but a remembrance of what it once was, and an anticipation of what it could be again, in a transformed sense. In the phenomenological terms of Being and Time, the essay calls for a deconstruction (Destruktion) of the history of aesthetics. This prepares the reduction of the art-work to its essential being as the setting-to-work of unconcealment in the work, and the construction of the truth of the work in the founding of Da-sein.9

Within the context of the being-historical thinking of the Contributions, the overcoming of metaphysics, and the inception of an other beginning, the art-work is thought in terms of the passage into the other beginning. The artwork essay enacts a contribution to the Gründung. As such, it is a turn-away from the metaphysical tradition of aesthetics, and the Entwurf of the founding of the other beginning. This leads us back to the questions of how is art experienced metaphysically, the provenance of this way of experience in the history of being and in the inception of modernity. The section of Besinnung entitled, in translation, as “Art in the Epoch of the Completion of Modernity” addresses these questions. Being-historically it belongs to the jointure of the Anklang as laid out in the Contributions, that is, it testifies of the “echo of be-ing as refusal in the abandonment of beings by being” (GA65, 108/75).

In line with Heidegger’s commentary on Nietzsche’s aesthetics in the Nietzsche lectures, “art” is conceived broadly to include all forms of making-manifest and giving form in accordance with the will to power.10 The dis-integration of the artwork, and its integration into technicity, takes the constitution of the “installation” (Anlage). The distinction between art and nature, moreover, no longer holds, because “nature” – the landscape, for example – is already seen in terms of a “technical” potential, which includes the aesthetic intensification of life through the heightened

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affect of its “beauty.” As a “natural resource,” it is thought in terms of its potential for the enhancement of lived experience as well as its economic utility. The installation, as the form of integration of subject and object, encompasses both “culture” and “nature.” Within the movement of Mindfulness, the mutual integration of subject and object, which the installation exemplifies, serves as an elucidation of the consummation of modernity as conceived by being-historical thinking (GA66, 31-35/23-7). What art in the narrow sense is today is determined by the dissolution of the artwork into installation-systems of the mobilization of art within the context of the operational thinking of socio-technical humanity. The museum is one form of the installation.

Section 11 of Mindfulness, as a mindful meditation on art in the era of the consummation of metaphysics, presupposes a reflection on our hermeneutic situation in respect to art. How is this situation won? In the first instance, by way of a phenomenological explication wrested from the object-historical situation. This object-historical situation, which can be empirically and historically established, is dominated by the art market, by art history and the aesthetic categories proper to it, and by the “reception” of art in all its forms, from the private collector, dealer, and speculator to the collective subject of national institutions dedicated to the preservation of national identity. Central to this interrelated complex determining what art “is” is the gallery and ultimately the museum, which grants to the artwork the exhibition-value and therefore the remnants of an “aura,” which allows it to manifest itself as a distinct class of entity. The “museum” is one essential phenomenological indication of the being of art in this epoch. Key to the phenomenological explication is the laying bare of the temporality of the experience of art in its integration into the installation. The temporal determinations of availability (being-present as stock-on-call), functionality (its Ersatz, and Einsatz-character), and its auratic exhibition-value, as forms of the intensification of lived experience, reveal the phenomenologically determined being of art. The museum as installation is the form of integration of the aesthetic, institutional, and historical-critical apparatus that together determines how “art” will be experienced. The installation is the active installing (integration) of sectors of production into each other, in such a way as to make them more functional, efficient, more fully operational. The installation serves the intensification of the lived experience (Erlebnis) of art through an integration of consciousness and technical-historical objectivity. Lived experience is the way in which the essential sway of technology – that is, machination (Machenschaft) – is experienced. In speaking of Erlebnis and Machenschaft, it is clear that the phenomenological explication of the installation has to be integrated into the movement of being-historical

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11 This is the extended argument of Martin Heidegger’s Nietzsche, I: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961).

thinking: the truth of the installation is inseparable from the way in which the truth of be-ing is sent to us in the thinking of the passage from the first to the other beginning. What art is in the era of the installation is not unfolded as a historical-cultural critique of this kind of entity, but is already thought in the light of the projecting-opening (Entwurf) of a site of “Seyn als Verweigerung.”

The rise of lived experience as the determining mode of consciousness in the era of the consummation of modernity encompasses all political directions, all of which are directed by the drive to make-secure, to calculate, and direct in advance the “mood” of the “masses.” The “masses” are “machinationally planned” (GA 66, 33/25-6), that is, they are “constructed” in accordance with the uniformity of a norm of experience, and each individual is equal to every other as an instance of the norm. The installation is the training apparatus of uniformity and normalization. Insofar as art is integrated into this paradigm of truth, it loses all power of decision because it can no longer offer an alternative to the truth of the making-secure of human resources for the processes of production; nor can it offer an alternative experience of nature; nor can it offer a hint of the presence or the flight of the gods because what is not calculable as a potential resource is excluded from what is real. If all beings are understood in advance as producible – and this is their uniform way of being – then no fundamental decision is possible. The question of decision leads us to the question of the god(s) as unfolded in Sections 70 and 71 of Mindfulness.

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In Section 70, entitled, “Götter. Das wesentliche Wissen,” Heidegger delineates three possibilities of knowing-awareness – das wesentliche Wissen – as ways in which the “differentiation between beings and be-ing is kept open as the decision” (GA66, 229/204). The question “about” the gods is raised as a possibility from within the horizon opened up by the fundamental knowing-awareness of mindfulness. Only then does Heidegger introduce the “gods” into his text in terms of their being-named, for the gods are thought in terms of being, in terms of their “distressing need of be-ing” (GA 66, 321/205). Knowing-awareness is directed toward the questioning of these three ways for the sake of becoming “strong in the still coming inquiry into remembering the decision between the exclusive predominance of beings and the originary grounding of the truth of be-ing” (GA 66, 231/205). As the knowing-awareness of the necessity of this decision, knowing-awareness enacts being-historical thinking. “Indeed, knowing is fundamental knowing only when it prepares what

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13 See Martin Heidegger, Die Geschichte des Seyns, GA 69 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1998a), p.185.
14 It should be noted that the installation-being of art does not cease to function when it moves out of the museum, into the cinema, and ‘onto the street,’ into corporate offices, into ‘nature’ and interactive displays—it is only more fully mobilized as art, that is, in accordance with its essence as a form of the ‘interactive’ interface of machination and lived-experience.
is known for transformation into what is to be inceptually grounded” (GA66, 232/206). As such, it is being-historical knowledge, and while it does not calculate “progress,” it does recognize signs of the completion of modernity. This recognition of what is calls for the phenomenological explication of the manifestations of modernity in the light of being-historical thinking. In the enactment of the crossing into the other beginning, thinking distances itself from the actual (GA66, 232-3/206). As inabiding in the truth of the distinction of being and beings, it does not think beings comparatively with other beings. Rather, the fundamental knowing of the consummation of modernity is a *remembrance* of the truth of modernity: it gives them over to the decisions of *Seinsgeschichte*. Remembrance brings into what is historically present and its calculable permutations the possibility of an authentic future, because as remembrance, it is not a planning arrangement of current actualities, but holds itself in the already-sent and projects open a site of essential decisions (GA66, 233/207).

The *first possibility* holds that in “laying claim on being, beings are again grounded inceptually” (GA66, 230/204). This way signifies the grounding of Da-sein through which history (*Geschichte*) and therefore also the artwork find their way into the *Ursprung* of their *Wesen* in opening up a site of truth as the site of the encounter of mortals and gods. This is the way of “The Origin of the Work of Art,” which is itself thought in terms of the being-historical jointures of the *Contributions*. Within this context of the being-historical, the *Sistine* text reads as a historical *remembrance* of the divine that opens a future possibility of the artwork, and of the divine as manifested in art. Thinking “about” the gods does not describe an entity: it is a questioning opening-projecting of what has been sent to thought as the originary gift of the tradition. The inquiry into the first way stands in the fundamental knowing-awareness of the second and third, for as preparatory it cannot thrust them aside (GA 66, 231-2/205).

In the *second possibility*, beings are defined according to a confused fusion of the historical categories of beingness (*Seiendheit*). This results in “total lack of decision” in respect to the decision of differentiation. Within this realm of decisionlessness, beings are integrated into and made operational for “ever-newer arrangements and ever-faster controllability” (GA 66, 230/204). This way signifies the triumph of *actuality* and the mobilization of the actual in the intensification of life. In reference to art and artworks, this is the way of the installation. Defined by the primacy of the making-operational of beings, the second way gives beings over to their abandonment by be-ing. This hermeneutic situation has to be raised into knowing-awareness. “The knowing awareness of the second possibility means inabiding (*Inständigkeit*) the ‘epoch’ of the beginning of the completion of modernity and thus the termination of the first Occidental history” (GA 66, 232/206). Knowing-awareness cannot close itself off to the second way “because the ‘actual’ in the second possibility does transform itself into what is passed over when the decision occupies the first or even the third possibility” (GA 66, 232/206). With this in mind, is it possible that the installation is a way in which the passage from the first to the other beginning manifests itself in the realm of art and artwork? Does the integration of the artwork into the installation offer evidence of the flight
of god(s)? These questions lead us to the third way and the fundamental attunement of the passage into an other beginning.

Within the second possibility – governed by the knowing-awareness of the operationalization of beings – the history of be-ing in the concealed founding of its truth in beings comes to word in the work of the solitary and rare ones. This is the third possibility. After the failure of the national socialist revolution as he himself conceived it, Heidegger appears to have understood the third way as the path of being-historical thinking in the epoch of the consummation of modernity. Is the third way our own hermeneutical situation? If so, what does this mean for our experience of the god(s), and in particular, for an art of the divine? In response to these questions, we have to consider more precisely what is at stake in all of the three ways: the fundamental attunement proper to the differentiation of be-ing and beings. This attunement is Entsetzen (dismay). In the face of the abandonment of beings, Entsetzen as dismay is the governing attunement of the leap away (Entsetzung) from the primacy of beings. This alone first opens a space for the thought of be-ing, and for the naming of the gods (GA 66, 231-32/204-6). In the sense of setting-free, dismay is already a distancing understood as a leap-away from the primacy of beings and their ontological “ground” in Sein as Seiendheit, and therefore an opening to be-ing. The leap away from beings to be-ing is attuned to the refusal (Verweigerung) of all ontotheological grounds and as leap abides in this Ab-grund. Thought in terms of the Ab-grund that belongs to Seyn, the abandonment of beings points to the enowning refusal of be-ing, and thus to the possibility of founding the sheltering refusal of be-ing in beings to open a site for “the passing of the last god” (GA 65, 7-8/6). The Ab-grund is to be founded as Ab-grund (GA 66, 236/209; GA 65, 379/264-5).15 The Ent-setzen, which lets go of beings, opens a space for the Entwurf. It is in this light that the artwork in “The Origin of the Work of Art” is thought – as one way in which the Ab-grund is founded in the site of Da-sein.

The title of Part XVIII of Mindfulness, to which Section 70 and Section 71 (“Gods and Be-ing”) in fact belong, reads in translation as “Projecting-opening [Entwurf] What is to be Thought Beforehand in Every Inquiring Naming of the Godhood of Gods” (GA 66, 227/201). Heidegger’s questioning about gods is raised from within the knowing-awareness of mindfulness and follows upon the laying out of the three ways: as I noted, only then is the god-question explicitly introduced in terms of the possibility of their being-named. The reason for this is that the gods are thought in terms of the “distressing need of be-ing.” The question of the gods is understood being-historically in terms of the abandonment of the being of beings (Seinsverlassenheit). It is the decision for be-ing, and the turn away from beings, which opens a space for the other beginning, and thus also for the encounter (Entgegnung) of humans and gods. Does this mean that the artwork has to be experienced in the turn away from beings, hence in the turn away from the aesthetics of

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15 As Emad, op. cit., pp. 118–19, argues, the giving-staying-away of “Ab-grund” as ground cannot be captured, and is in fact quite covered up, in the translation of Ab-grund as “abyss.” Hence the translation favored the Contributions: “ab-ground.”
representation? Yes, for in the thought of the knowing-awareness of being-historical thinking, “a work of art is neither a symbolic object, nor the installation that organizes beings, but is the clearing of be-ing as such which holds the decision for man’s other way of being. Now art has the character of Da-sein... ‘Artwork’ is now the gathering of purest solitude unto the ab-ground of be-ing” (GA 66, 37/28). This turn away from metaphysical art into the other beginning is already signaled by the installation, for the installation, in the unfolding of the functional mobilization of art as the production of affect, also withdraws the work from representation. This double withdrawal (the dis-integration of the work and the refusal of representation) is itself a phenomenological indication of the implosion of beings conceived metaphysically in terms of Seiendheit. Heidegger’s discourse on the installation is a being-historical reflection on the primacy of beings and their operational transformation. The integration of the art-work into the installation manifests the abandonment of the being of beings. This implies that in order to think the relation of the “art-work” and the “gods,” or the “naming of gods,” the artwork will have to be thought in terms of the truth of being, as opposed to the aesthetic categories of metaphysics. In this regard, the question also arises how the flight of gods is related to, and manifested in, the metaphysical-aesthetic understanding of art, and how this relation is revealed being-historically in the history of truth. This question will lead us to the matter of iconoclasm understood as an event in the founding-inception of modernity.

How is the Bildwesen, the sway (wesen) of the image as image, to be understood? Heidegger gives us this indication: Bild is to be understood as “countenance in the sense of en-countering looking as arrival” (Antlitz im Sinne von Entgegenblick als Ankunft) (GA 13, 119). Entgegenblick hints at Blick in the sense of the aspect of the god shining into what is; Entgegen hints at the mutual exchanging glance of god and man wherein Da-sein as the site of encounter is opened. In Contributions, this realm is intimated as follows: “But be-ing holds sway as enowning (Ereignis), as the site for the moment of decision (Augenblickstätte) about the nearness and remoteness of the last god” (GA 65, 230/163). In the Raphael text, the site of the moment of decision is experienced as countering (Ent-gegnung) arrival (Ankunft) in the being-historical sense. Arrival is the sudden, incalculable enowning of the Augenblick of the mutual encounter of the god and man in and through the site opened up by the shining-forth of the image of the god. Antlitz in the sense of face or countenance is not a representation of the god, but the moment (Augenblick) of arrival and mutual “recognition” in the exchanging of a glance. This implies a mutual openness within a site of openness. The image as Bildwesen refuses the determinations of subject and object, of subjectivity and world picture.

Heidegger writes that the painting, in its Bildwesen, has its origin in a realm more fundamental than the art-historical distinction between “Fenstergemälde” and “Tafelbild.” If we understand it as a Fenstergemälde, then what is a “window”?"
A window is defined by the frame, which limits and gathers the openness of shining-through: it is through the boundary (Grenze) that openness is given free and gathered as the shining it is. “The window as admission of a shining-forth bringing closeness is glimpse of arrival” (Das Fenster als Einlass des nahenden Scheinens ist Ausblick in die Ankunft) [GA 13, 120]. The “window” which the painting is, is brought forth by the painting itself, as this image of shining-arrival (GA13, 12). The picture itself is a communion, not the representation of the god who offers himself in communion. In the image, as this image, the shining-forth of the incarnation (Menschwerdung Gottes) happens; the transformation (Verwandlung) that enowns itself (sich ereignet) on the altar as the consecration (“die heilige Wandlung”) of the offering of the Mass enowns itself in and as image (GA13, 121). But in what sense could the image be communion? In what sense is the image a transformation and consecration? As the shining-forth of arrival – the Augenblick of the reciprocal, enowning counter-glimpse of god and man? In the sense that this counter-glimpse transforms what “man” has been and consecrates him to the service of be-ing, making him steward of be-ing and the preserver of beings? With the art-work the leap into Da-sein enowns itself in the few: “those who ground Dasein in creating-sacrificing – Dasein, in whose time-space beings are preserved as beings and with that the truth of be-ing is sheltered” (GA 65, 236/167).

The image is the shining-forth, or manifestation, of the play of time-space understood as the site of the celebration of the service of the Mass (GA 13, 121). The arrival (Ankunft) that shines-forth in its sudden incalculability in itself brings with it the sheltering concealment of its provenance (das verborgen Bergende ihrer Herkunft) (GA 13, 120). This offers a hint of how the communion of the image of the god is to be thought: as the celebration of unconcealing sheltering. For Heidegger explicitly interprets, in a being-historical sense, the incarnate god of Christianity in terms of a classical Greek understanding of truth as $\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$: “so the image opens and composes the site of sheltering unconcealment (of A-\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha), the unconcealment through which the image holds sway” [So bildet das Bild den Ort des entber-genden Bergens (der A-\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha), als welches Entbergen das Bild west] (GA 13, 121). The god is not the represented object of the work; nor does Heidegger’s evocation of Raphael’s painting historically represent a god as constructed or reconstructed from the confluence of Greek and Christian tradition. The painting, rather, as work, puts all of this in question in the sense of calling for a decision. In Section 11 of Mindfulness, Heidegger writes: “it is only work that within the mutual calling forth of the sway (Wesen) of the earth and the sway of the world puts to decision the sway of gods and the ownmost of man” (GA 66, 38/29). As the “clearing of be-ing,” the work “holds the decision for man’s other way of being. Now, art has the character of Da-sein, and moves out of all striving concerned with ‘culture’” (GA66, 37/28). As such, the god spoken of here is neither “Christian” nor “Greek,” but in knowing-awareness of both being-historical thinking indicates a way in which the image of the divine is to be founded in the Ab-grund of be-ing.

While the object-historical situation of Raphael’s painting is implicated by Heidegger’s reference to the museum-exhibition-space, this situation is understood, clearly, out of the being-historical context of the abandonment of the being of beings
Preliminary Notes on Divine Images in the Light of Being-Historical Thinking

(Anklang der Seinsverlassenheit). The being-historical, opening-projecting (Entwurf) of the text consists in the movement away from aesthetic-metaphysical categories of art, in the movement-toward the other beginning, and in the movement-into the Inständigkeit of enduring the Ab-grund of the refusal of be-ing as grounding-founding Ab-grund (cf. GA 65, 380/265). The relation of be-ing and beings, including the being of the art-work, is grasped in a fundamentally different way by the knowing-awareness of being-historical thinking, as distinguished from aesthetics: “nowhere and never can beings count as mere image and reflected splendor of be-ing” (GA66 92/77). Be-ing does not “give away its swaying (Wesung) to beings, but fulfills this swaying as itself and thus lights itself up as the ab-ground (Ab-grund), wherein, on the same plane, that which man calls beings may tower, may fall away and may linger” (GA 66, 92/76). In “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” Heidegger argues that the theory of mimesis conceals a more originary sense of the image (ἐιδωλεία) implicit in Plato’s understanding of Ἀλήθεια. Rather than the copy and representation of the atemporal form, the image is understood as the arrival of presencing and the darkening-withdrawal of presencing. This withdrawal shelters the image from conceptualization and objectification. Unconcealment (ἐλήθεια) manifests itself in and through the limit of the image in the historical specificity of its being. With the project of being-historical thinking, the site of the manifestation of beings, thought in the first beginning as Ἀλήθεια, is projected-open as “the ab-ground of the clearing,” which as the “free play of time-space” opens the sites “which allow the settlement (Austrag) between countering (Entgegnung) and strife to become the moment (Augenblick) and the ground of history” (GA 66, 91-92/76). The Entgegnung of man and gods, and the Streit of earth and world are given free as Seyn “enowns itself as enowning unto the ab-ground of the clearing” (GA 66, 91/76). What does this mean for our understanding of the image of the god?

“Only in Da-sein is that truth founded for be-ing in which all beings are only for the sake of be-ing – be-ing that lights up as the trace of the way of the last god” (GA 65, 230/163). This implies a non-metaphysical experience of the image as a “window” through which the trace of the god can manifest itself out of the Ab-grund of be-ing. The art-work is not, for “a being is not”: only Be-ing is. The truth of be-ing is experienced “through a leap as the clearing (Lichtung) and the ab-ground that lights up” (GA 66, 91/76). This truth of be-ing excludes the re-presentational truth of an object. It excludes all “idolatry.” The clearing that lights up as Ab-grund gives free the enowning countering of gods and mortals in and through which the god shines-forth in the image, not as a represented being, but as a way of attuning. Heidegger’s text is itself a leap-away from the art-image of the divine as represented being.


How can the question of gods, and their flight, and the question of attunement be brought into relation with the first beginning? It is noteworthy that in his *Parmenides* (GA 54), in speaking of the Greek gods, Heidegger suggests that the δαιμών is an attuning god, as distinct from the commanding God of the Jews and Christians. The δαιμών gives signs, points out, and conceals, but does not command. The δαιμών gives itself to the glance and offers itself in an aspect, it looks in on us to open a view for us, but it does not command. The command belongs to the realm of the imperial and its truth, the concealing-revealing hint, or directive, of the δαιμών does not. The δαιμών is not a being, but a way of attunement. The gods are “the attuning ones” [*die Stimmenden*] (GA 54, 164/111). The looking (*Blicken*) of the δαιμόν *ἐν ζ*, “in the original sense of emergent self-presentation” is “determined from ἀλήθεια” (GA 54, 159/107). For in all these respects, the “self-showing, pointing ones, are who they are and are the way they are only in the essential domain of disclosure and of the self-disclosing of being [ἀλήθεια] itself” (GA 54, 102/151). This also hints at a way of experiencing the image of the divine that would no longer be informed by the aesthetics of representation. The look is the gathered, self-emergent self-presentation of the god. As such, it is determined by unconcealment as the event of opening self-manifesting. Ἀλήθεια in this sense names being. “Therefore, the look (*Blick*) of the god who stems from Being can emerge ‘in’ man and can look out from the form (*Gestalt*) of ‘man’ as gathered in the look” (GA54, 161/109). The work of art, thought in a non-metaphysical way, “lets being appear and brings being into unconcealment” in and through the gestalt given to the god in the work (GA54, 170-1/115). Hence, we are led to two interrelated distinctions: the distinction between the commanding god as opposed to the attuning, self-emergent god that gives itself in the look; and the distinction between the divine image as the emergent self-presentation that offers a “window” for the lighting-up of being, and the image as object. These distinctions, in turn, help prepare the question of the flight or arrival of the god(s). The remembrance of the Greek divinities belongs to the playing-forth (*Zuspiel*) of being-historical thinking (GA65, 169/119). We have seen that the distinction between beings and be-ing is the realm of decision out of which the question of the flight of god(s) emerges. The “appearance of the divine,” Heidegger writes in the *Parmenides*, cannot find its site of unconcealment as long as “being is forgotten.” A “decision about the gods or the absence of the gods” can only be prepared out of “an experience of the essential sway of being” (GA54, 167/1112-13) [trans. modified].

The “historical,” that is, being-historical, reading of the Greek divinities in the *Parmenides* lectures would offer a remembrance of the image of the gods as a way into an attunement to the truth of being. This relation to the image has its own *ethos*

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as opposed to the fixation upon an object of representation, and consequently the evaluation and securing of representations, the image becomes, in the language of the Sistine text, a “window” (Fenster) of the shining-appearing of the presencing of be-ing in a being. The (ἦθος) ethos proper to this, in the being-historical reading of the Parmenides, is the Ent-schlossenheit of an openness to be-ing and the awe (Σεβεία ἐνστήθους), which belongs to it (GA 54, 111/75). Taking up a hint from Parvis Emad, Ent-schlossenheit already intimates a being-historical appropriation of the Entschlossenheit of Sein und Zeit, in the sense that the resoluteness of Being and Time is thought as un-closedness, that is, as openness, to be-ing’s “thrown-projecting-opening.”

For “while in Being and Time, Heidegger’s thinking projects-open the transcendental-horizontal disclosure of be-ing’s self-showing, in Contributions to Philosophy and in Mindfulness his thinking projects-open being’s historically self-transforming showing and manifesting.” Inasmuch as the “historical” lectures, such as Parmenides, belong to playing-forth as one of the six articulations of the Contributions, what Heidegger has to say about the Greek gods would also have to be understood as “conferred upon thinking by be-ing,” hence as the enactment of the mindfulness proper to being-historical thinking. The interpretation of the δαιμόν as a way of attuning, therefore, is not an object-historical statement, but essential to the passage into the other beginning. Moreover, since being-attuned is integral to mindfulness itself, and because attunement itself is being-historical enowning, the Ent-schlossenheit of Parmenides already intimates the leap away from beings, into the openness of be-ing. The understanding of beings as representations, and hence as “idols,” and the leap-away in dismay in face of their abandonment by be-ing to their machinational production is the way in which the playing-forth of the first and the other beginning resound in the Anklang of the consummation of the first beginning.

What hint does the attuning aspect of the δαιμόν offer for our understanding of the image? In the Sistine text, the evocation of the δαιμόν is still audible: the Madonna of Raphael, as a Fenstergemälde in an essential sense, gathers and gives free the shining-forth of god to offer Ausblick in die Ankunft. It is in this sense that the image (Bild) is what it is – in the suddenness and unexpectedness of its shining-appearing (das Bild “ist nichts anderes als die Jähe dieses Scheinens”) [GA13, 120]. Heidegger speaks of the sway of the bringing-into-appearance of Maria and the Jesus-child in the painting, a bringing, which gathers its happening in the encountering emergent look (“das blickende Schauen”) in which the sway of both take gestalt (GA13, 121). Is “das blickende Schauen” spoken of here no less an echo, or remembrance, in the being-historical sense, of the divinities of the Greeks than of the incarnate God of Christianity? Does the way toward a being-historical “retrieval” of the Christian tradition lead through the first inception of Occidental thinking,
and therefore through an encounter with the Greek understanding of being, of ἄληθεν τα, and of the δειμων? Heidegger’s understanding of the being-historical would seem to support this. For only with the leap away from beings, into the truth of be-ing as Ab-grund, only with the leap away from the ontotheological god, does the possibility of a decision regarding the gods open up. The other beginning can only be thought in being-historical relation to the first, Greek beginning. Given that Heidegger’s early lectures on St Paul focus on the temporality and historicity of primordial Christianity, the being-historical itself, in Heidegger’s thought, evidently has “Christian” origins (GA 60, Sections 23–33). However, if Greek philosophy concealed this original Christian experience of historicity as lived temporality (GA 60, 104/73), Heidegger’s reading of the tradition also holds that the Judeo-Christian God of creation and command covered up the original Greek experience of the divine as attuning δειμων. Moreover, because the second commandment (in the Reformed numeration) forbids images, the image was required to justify itself, and hence to reveal itself in conformity with the articles of accusation. The attuning-opening and releasing power of the image, in the sense that it releases us from “representations” and attunes us to the openness of the ab-ground (Ab-grund) of be-ing, remains concealed as long as the image remains under the ban of the commandment. The ontological conjunction of the commanding god and the image as representation blocks all access to the image as a way of attunement to the attuning god(s).23

If it is indeed true, as has been argued, that Heidegger’s early lectures on St Paul and Augustine stand in the light (or shadow, as some aver) of his engagement with Luther and Protestant theology more generally, this still does little to support the notion that Sein und Zeit constitutes a “secularization” of Luther’s theology of the cross, with particular reference to the fallenness and unownedness of existence.24 The fundamental problem with this thesis, as I see it, is that the method of formal indication, which guides Sein und Zeit as well as the lectures on religion, is misconceived. The procedure of abstracting the concept-senses of key elements of Christian existence from the lectures on St Paul and Augustine, and then finding parallel or comparable concepts in Sein und Zeit, ignores the enactment-sense of what is formally indicated.25 The enactment-sense of “ownedness,” for example, as called for

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23 It should be noted that the being-historical question of the relation of the experience of the Greek gods (as articulated in Heidegger’s Parmenides) to the experience of the Christian God (as articulated in the Raphael text) leaves open the issues of many gods or one god. This pertains to the “undecidability of the being of gods”: see Emad, op. cit., 129–30.


by *Sein and Zeit*, is quite distinct from the enactment of “living in Christ” in St Paul. But this methodological issue also raises the question of the relation of the enactment of the formally indicated to the being-historical remembrance of the already-sent of the tradition. If the “Christian elements” of the tradition are not “secularized,” then what kind of non-conceptual, enactment-related reality do they have for mindfulness? What is Heidegger “doing” with the *Sistine Madonna* of Raphael? Is there any sense in which the “incarnation” of the divine still reverberates for Heidegger, even if the incarnation of the ontotheological God of Christian dogma in Jesus of Nazareth no longer induces belief? It may be that in some transformed, being-historical sense, Heidegger’s phenomenology is “incarnational”: the founding of the *Ab-grund* of be-ing in beings in the site (Da-sein) of the encounter (*Entgegnung*) of “mankind” and the god(s). As we have seen, the *Sistine*-text evokes the incarnation in two senses: the incarnation of the Christ-child as brought-forth in Raphael’s work, and the incarnation given in the Eucharist. Is this passage to be read as a formal indication, or *Wink*, within the context of a being-historical overcoming of the ontotheology of creation and created? Perhaps, it is such a formal indication, one that points in the direction of attunement to be-ing, inabiding in be-ing as the *Ab-grund* of an “incarnation,” which is no longer thought in terms of created and uncreated, nor in terms of the body or *life* conceived metaphysically. Conversely, the reduction of the image of the incarnation to the being-represented of the divine, and the refusal of this representation, reveals the ontotheological ground of iconoclasm in the transcendent life of God-creator. This is a god of commandments.

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The imperial Christianity *specific to modernity* calls for a requisite *attunement*, which Heidegger holds is founded in the truth of certitude that inaugurates modernity. This attunement, understood as the modern form of resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) of the will, is defined by the drivenness of the will, by fanaticism (GA 54, 111/76). How is the attunement of imperial Christianity and iconoclasm related? The second commandment forbids “graven images.” Because the God of Christianity is a commanding God, and because God forbids graven images, the status of the image of the divine is in principle questionable. The Reformation debate was preceded by the great iconoclastic controversy initiated by Byzantine Emperor Leo III in 726 AD. Arguably, the most sophisticated theological defense of icons, that of John of Damascus, dates from this era.26 The question arises nonetheless if Reformation iconoclasm is not of a historically specific quality, and if so, what this quality is. The object-historical attempt to determine the causes of iconoclasm is distinct from, although not unrelated to, a being-historical understanding of iconoclasm, and

Reformation iconoclasm in particular. Because the command is intimately related to
imperial truth, the rejection of images of the divine, as well as their acceptance and
propagation implicates a relation to the imperial.

My discussion of iconoclasm presupposes the distinction between object-historical
determination of causes and effects and a phenomenological explication, it being
understood that this explication is historical in the sense of Seinsgeschichte. It also
presupposes, moreover, that within being-historical history and hence the interplay of
the first and other beginning, there are two major crossings or transformations in the
history of truth: the crossing from ἁληθεία to veritas; and from verum to certum in
the inception of modernity (cf. GA 54, 75-6/51). Taking a clue from Heidegger, this
brief discussion also assumes that the formation of the early modern English state
plays an exemplary being-historical role in the inception of modernity.

Heidegger notes that one of the ways metaphysics takes shape with the inception
of modernity is that the work of art is integrated into aesthetics and art becomes an
expression of the life of humanity (GA 5, 73/AW, 115-6). Of particular significance
in this context is the question of how the fate of art is related to de-divinization
(Entgötterung) as a “manifestation of modernity.” De-divinization means that the
world picture is “Christianized” “inasmuch as the cause of the world is posited as
infinite, unconditional, absolute,” even as “Christendom transforms Christian
doctrine into a world view” (GA 5, 74/AW, 116-7). The transformation of Christianity
into a world view becomes manifest in the Reformation, inasmuch as the regulation
of the Christian confession becomes a matter of state policy. In England, this
integration of religious confession and the power and legitimacy of the state is initiated
by Henry VIII and carried through with increasing rigoroussness by Elizabeth I and
James I. The national-collective identity is constructed with the aid of a national
religion. For de-divinization does not mean lack of religiosity, but rather that the
relation to the god is transformed into religious experience (Erleben), both private
and collective (GA 5, 74/AW, 117). In this respect, it is telling that the iconoclastic
movement that swept England in accordance with the decree of 1548, which led to
the removal of images from the churches, ultimately culminated, in the reign of
Elizabeth I, in the replacement of the crucifix above the altar with the royal arms.27
In Elizabethan England, the cult of the Virgin Mary, regarded as an abuse by reform-
ers, was replaced by the cult of the Virgin Queen as the incarnation of truth, justice,
and England’s imperial ambitions.28 While local devotional cult images and
pilgrimage sites of pre-Reformation England supported de-centralization, the
Reformation in England, and thus the iconoclastic movement integral to it, central-
ized and concentrated power.29 James I will claim the “divine right” of rule for the

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English sovereign. The English experience shows that the refusal of the divine in the image is intimately related to the elevation of the sovereign in imperial pomp, and that this, in turn, has its ground in collective subjectivity and its imperial truth. The metaphysical mobilization of the image, as a function of the national, collective subject, is already pre-figured in the integration of the discourse of the elected nation, the refusal of the divine image, and the elevation of the image of the sovereign.

Knowing-awareness of the inception of modernity is a remembrance of what this inception sends us, thus to reveal the truth that founds it. This truth is the imperial truth of the command in the conjoined sense of the Roman and Christian (cf. GA 54, 57-72/39-49). On the ground established by subjectivity, and the truth that belongs to it, both nature and historical being are conceived in their calculability, and are made-calculable in service to the commonality (GA 66, 233-34/206-7). Being-historical thinking does not close itself off from the “actual” of what is today, nor from what can be established object-historically concerning the inception of early modern Europe: rather, it “preserves from beings the truth of their be-ing and hands over this truth to the decisions of the history of be-ing” (GA 66, 233/207). In this regard, it is indicative that Heidegger explicitly links the consummation of modernity in metaphysical “communism” to its inception with the “modern history of the English state.” What is at stake in this judgement is the being-historical understanding of the origins of the planetary securing and mobilization of beings – a process commonly known as “European imperialism.”

In The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm and Theater in Early-Modern England, O’Connell states his fundamental thesis as follows: “The iconoclasm of the Reformation was not a mere change in the style and emphasis of worship of Christian Europe. Rather, it emerged from the tensions in the relation of word and image that inhere in the central doctrine of Christianity, the incarnation, the belief that God, in taking human form, became subject to representation in an image.” This evaluation of representation is supported by Calvin’s injunctions against images. Calvin’s Institutes clearly condemn images of the divine as false representations: “In short, if it were not true that whatever knowledge of God is sought from images is fallacious and counterfeit, the prophets would not so generally have condemned it.” The falsity of the representation is rooted in the problem of representation itself. For the origin of the image as idol is to be found in the “natural” tendency of human beings to represent what is to the mind; and representation arises in the desire to bring the spiritual near to us by representing it in the visible and material (Institutes, I. xi. vii). The mind, in effect, by its very nature produces “idols.” Consequently, the distinction deriving from the Byzantine defense of images, that is, the distinction between

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30 In this regard, see Bernard Bourdin, La genèse théologico-politique de l’État moderne (Paris: PUF, Bourdin 2004).
31 GA 69, p. 208.
32 In this regard, see Bourdin, La genèse théologico-politique de l’État moderne.
idol worship (latria/λατρεία), and idol service (dulia/δούλεία), is categorically rejected, for not only is dulia no less pernicious than latria, but the representation as representation remains an idol in the sense of the making-material of the spiritual (Institutes, I. xi. xi; I. xi. xiii–xiv; I. xii. iii). This ontotheology of re-presentation and image-devaluation, which goes back to Plato, is supported by an elevation of the scriptures (of the Word) as an object of subjective certainty. As O’Connell argues, the shift in the relation of word and image involves a making-certain of the Word associated with the historical-critical method of humanism, as exemplified by Erasmus’s edition of the New Testament (1516); it also implicates, according to O’Connell, the change to our relation to language brought about by print culture. The “role of print culture,” O’Connell writes, “was to give a new confidence to the verbal formulation of God’s self-revelation, to provide the word of God, spoken and preached, with a secure grounding and to winnow from it the accretions of myth and tradition. This altered status of the word stands behind Reformation anxiety about biblical representation generally.” The “secure grounding” referred to here leads us to the question of how truth is experienced, and in what sense the truth of scripture presupposes the making-secure of scripture. “It is no accident,” Heidegger writes in the Parmenides lectures, “that the invention of the printing press coincides with the inception of the modern period” (GA 54, 124-5/85). For with this invention, the word is moved into the realm of technicity, and hence the calculable and secured realm of subjectivity.

The question of truth also arises in respect to the representation of God in the image: why would the truth of language, conceived as the secured text of scripture, implicate a devaluation of the image, and its reduction to the untruth of being an idol? The image as “representation” is apparently less secure, less true, than language as represented. The image of the incarnated God is treated as a representation, rather than a self-manifestation or revelation. In this respect, the platonic theory of mimesis supports the second commandment in the devaluation of the image. The key to both the truth of represented language and the untruth of the image as representation is the understanding of the underlying ground of representing subject and represented object that breaks through to found modernity. In this light, the fundamental significance of iconoclasm consists in the making-certain of the God of Christianity for the representing subject. In “The Age of the World Picture,” Heidegger asks what understanding of beings, and what interpretation of truth underlies the modern age (GA 5, 74/AW, 117). For the Christianity of the Middle Ages, the highest truth is given in the theological explication of the Word of the divine revelation, as laid down in the

34 O’Connell, op. cit., pp. 36, 51.
35 O’Connell, op. cit., p. 29.
36 Even when, as in Luther’s view, the divine image is not rejected as idolatrous, but treated as adiaphora, the relation of text and image, and nature of the image itself, changes. The relation of text and image is transformed in Lutheran iconography. See Joseph Leo Koerner, op. cit., with reference to the example of Lucas Cranach the Elder’s Crucifixion with the Converted Centurion (1536), pp. 226–29.
scriptures (GA 5, 79/AW, 122). In this light, the Renaissance doctrine of *ad fontes,* and Reformation doctrine of *sola scriptura* can both be seen as transformations of the truth of the Word, and in particular, of the Scriptures as freed from the accretions of (false) tradition and “verified” by a return to the sources. This transformation shifts the enactment of truth onto another ground: the ground of subjectivity, which will judge revealed truth by the standard of its being a secure representation for a subject. The making-secure of the scriptures through an evaluation of the sources presupposes the historical-critical method as founded in the objectification and explanation of the past as a system of causal inter-relations (GA 5, 81/AW, 122-3). In the early sixteenth century, the historical-critical edition of the New Testament of Erasmus exemplified this return to the sources of the Christian tradition through a thorough attempt to establish the original text of the New Testament and to produce a revised translation. The so-called “biblical humanism” of Erasmus and his Reformation followers is founded in the truth of *Historie* as the representation and objectification of the Holy Scriptures, a fact that was already uneasily noted (although not in these terms) in his own time. If humanism is a form of philosophical anthropology, this means that man will be philosophically understood on the basis of the being of man and all beings in respect to man. The condition of humanism, however, is the world picture and the subjectivism integral to it (GA 5, 91/AW, 133). The Word that is established in this light, as well as the emphasis on the Word alone (*sola scriptura*) will stand in a different relation to the embodiment of the divine image than the “incarnational” tradition of medieval Catholicism. The opposition between the incarnational theology of the Church and the truth of the historical text of the Gospel, in the eyes of iconoclasts, is the opposition between the truth of Christianity and the falsity of mere representations. Not only is the image, in line with platonism, reduced to a second-order reproduction, but the word is elevated on the grounds of its truth for the representing subject.

While the philosophical grounds of the truth of certitude are first laid out and laid down by Descartes, whose philosophy founds science as research in the truth of the certitude of representation (GA 5, 85/AW, 127), Heidegger notes that the certitude of subjectivity was prepared by the certainty of salvation of Christian experience (GA 5, 109/AW, 153). “The inception of the metaphysics of the modern age rests on the transformation of the essence of *veritas* into *certitudo.*” With reference to Luther and question of justification and certainty, Heidegger notes that “the doctrine of justification, and indeed as the question of certainty of salvation, becomes the center of evangelical theology” (GA 54, 75-6/51). Assurance of salvation, for both Luther and

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Calvin, as Zachman argues, is a “form of reflexive self-knowledge.” The making-certain of the biblical text as the true text, moreover, is intimately related to the subjective self-certainty of the believer, for assurance of salvation is won from a personal, unmediated relation to the Scriptures. Assurance is lived in and through the biblical text, for it is through the Word that the Holy Spirit illuminates the believer. The making-present of an object for a subject (believer) and the doctrine of sola scriptura as founded on the “certified” historical text are related on the common ground of subjectivity. “Biblical humanism” as anthropology is already a form of lived experience, for what is has its being only in being “referred back to this life, i.e., [it] is lived out, and becomes life-experience (Er-lebnis)” (GA 5, 92/AW, 134).

Iconoclasm is directed against the “idolization” inherent in any representation, be it pictorial, sculptural, or theatrical. Does the “representational” conception of religious art, as arising out of the world picture of the inception of modernity, offer an insight into the flight of gods understood being-historically as an essential event in the founding of modernity? Picture (Bild) refers to how beings are represented (vorgestellt) for us; “world,” includes nature, history, and the Weltgrund. “World-picture” refers to how beings are represented and integrated into a comprehensive system of relations into which we ourselves are integrated. Heidegger holds that modernity, in contradistinction to the Middle Ages and its doctrine of analogia entis, is inaugurated by the becoming-picture of the world: “What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only in being, to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth” (GA 5, 87/AW, 129). When this happens, humans set themselves into the scene, that is, go on stage in the open realm of what is represented and established as the open. Hence that “the world becomes picture is one and the same event with the event of man’s becoming subjectum in the midst of that which is” (GA 5, 90/AW, 132). This suggest that iconoclasm in its being-historical import is an indication of the flight of gods from the “world.” The breaking of the image in its Bildwesen is integral to the dis-integration of the phenomenal world of medieval incarnational Christianity—the world of the correspondences—and the integration of the subject-object “paradigm,” which replaces it, into the world picture. Besançon suggests that what “changed with Calvin,” to constitute the ground of his iconoclasm, was not “the idea of God but the idea of the world, which was de-deified.” Now “heaven and earth, rather than telling of the divine glory, are the deserted and neutral theater on whose stage the individual subject, if he has the gift of grace, can experience God as he declares himself though his Word.” This “neutral stage” is indeed, as Besançon adds, the

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39 Randall C. Zachman, *Conscience in the Theology of Martin Luther and John Calvin. The Assurance of Faith* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), summarizes the key point as follows: “In order to be fully assured of salvation, we must not only trust in Jesus Christ, but we must know we trust in Jesus Christ....For both Luther and Calvin, this involves not only our knowing that we find assurance and peace of conscience in Jesus Christ alone – which is itself a form of reflexive self-knowledge, even if its object is outside ourselves – but we must also know that our faith is sincere and not hypocritical, by finding within ourselves both the fear of God and the testimony of a good conscience” (230).

“almost Cartesian context” of the iconoclastic argument of the Institutes.⁴¹ In effect, the world picture com-poses the stage of subjectivity upon which subject and image as object must appear. The world picture is the horizon of intelligibility of the installation. The world picture is evidently quite distinct from the understanding of “world” Heidegger unfolds in “The Origin of the Work of Art” and which guides his reflection on the Madonna of Raphael.⁴² The world picture is founded in re-presentation, which makes it clear that the relation between world and world picture is ultimately a being-historical relation. The co-ordinated standing-together of beings, that is, their systematic inter-relation, Heidegger holds, belongs to the unfolding of the world picture (GA 5, 98/AW 141). System means: “the unity of structure in that which is represented as such, a unity that develops out of the projection of the objectivity of whatever is” (GA 5, 98/AW, 141). Conversely, the Middle Ages did not allow for system, because all beings are governed by the order of correspondences. Heidegger insists that the medieval theory of correspondences, understood as the fundamental trait of the being of beings, offered determined ways of setting the truth of being to work in beings. The art of the Middle Ages can only be thought in terms of the absence of a world picture (GA 5, 100/AW, 143). The becoming-picture of the “world” and the devaluation of the images of the divine “in” the world, and thus their reduction to being possible objects of iconoclasm, are correlative events in the inception of modernity. The unity of the represented cannot allow the image as essential image, as this unique mutual encounter of man and god(s), to be. Both past and future become objects of calculation, of Historie.

The incarnation of Christ as an event in time conceived chronologically as a past event led to the valuation of the historically secured biblical text as the site of experience of the incarnation. The phenomenal world, and therefore the image, cannot “provide access to the sacred” because the incarnation of Christ pertains only to his embodied historical existence. The incarnation speaks to us solely through the scriptures. Incarnational theology, conversely, implies the transformation of the creation itself.⁴³ The objectification of the past by historical-critical research would therefore be integral to the reduction of the image to an idol. According to Heidegger’s argument in “The Age of the World Picture,” and again in Mindfulness, the representation of nature and history determine both as objects, and only as objects are they allowed to be (GA 5 84-5/AW, 126-7; GA 66, 234/107). As an object the image of the divine is in fact an idol. Temporally it is determined in terms of the Now of its being-present. This Now is an event “in” time. The incarnation of Christ is a past event “in” time and his second coming is an anticipated event “at” a future time – the event that ends time. Taking a clue from Heidegger’s lectures on


⁴³ See O’Connell, op cit, p. 47.
St Paul we can see that what is at stake here are two different understandings of the παρουσία. The original sense of the παρουσία signifies that Christian factual life lives historicity itself in the enactment of one’s having-become called to Christ. The enactment of the “past” and the “future” as promise, in the Now of serving (δουλεῖτε) and waiting (ἀναμένετε), signifies the comportment of a turning-away from the idols of the world toward God (GA 60, 95, 112/65, 79). The παρουσία, therefore, is not understood as an expected end-time, but is the Now of witnessing the presence of the Messiah through one’s comportment. One does not make God an object of speculation in terms of the expectation of an event “in” objective-historical time: “To the Christian, only his τὸ νῦν [now] of the complex of enactment in which he really stands is decisive, but not the anticipation of a special event that is futurally situated in temporality” (GA 60, 114/81).

Iconoclasm, therefore, is only possible for Reformation theology on the basis of the founding of the world picture. Only in the wake of the reduction of the image to its being-present for a subject can it be conceived an idol, for to be an idol signifies mistaking the being in its being-present for the God toward which it “points.” But as such, in its mere being-present, the image as the refusal of objectivity, and as the withdrawal of being-present, is concealed. The consummation of modernity accelerates its inception: the being-present of an object is transformed into the actuality of a function. The image is experienced in its pure actuality for consciousness, and serves the intensification of consciousness. In Walter Benjamin’s dialectical interpretation of the relation of mass consciousness, aesthetics, and technology, the image loses the “distance” that allows it to unfold its “aura”; what it gains is the “revolutionary” power inherent in the transformation of individual contemplation into collective agitation. Liberated from “parasitical” dependence on religious ritual, the image can be fully integrated into technology – hence the importance of the film, and the collective experience it offers, for Benjamin.44 The consummation of modernity, under the impact of (post-)modern information technologies, manifests the degradation of the word to a “sound-byte” of information, and the elevation of the image in the imploded form of its mere actuality as affect. Information and affect are mutually attuned to each other in the production of an integrated whole. The functional unity of the world picture overshadows both word and image as ways of revealing and sheltering the phenomena as phenomena. The inceptual objectification of the image is consummated in its functional integration into the

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44 In his account of modern art, Benjamin emphasizes the dialectical relationship of technology and the generation of mass, collective consciousness, especially in his discussion of the cinema. See “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit,” op. cit., pp.31–41; trans. pp. 229–40. Benjamin’s essay on art and Heidegger’s “Die Kunst im Zeitalter der Vollendung der Neuzeit” could be brought into fruitful contact with particular reference to the fate of religious art in the shadow of modernity. While their premises are radically distinct, one will find a perhaps surprising similarity in the phenomenological ‘results’ of the explication of the death of the artwork. This only makes the fundamental difference between Benjamin’s understanding of the consummation of modernity and Heidegger’s projecting-opening of an other beginning founded in the distinction of be-ing and beings (and the beingness of beings) all the more extreme and unbridgeable.
installation. This is one essential way in which god withdraws from a world that is no world. In the light of being-historical thinking, the primacy of representational thinking evidences the triumph of beings, in their functionality and loss of be-ing, and the oblivion of be-ing. The iconoclasm of the inception of modernity and the techno-iconoclasm of its consummation both, in different ways, manifest this triumph and oblivion: the one, in the reduction of the image to an idol, the other in the integration of the image into machination and lived experience.

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Gods do not create humans; humans did not invent the gods (GA 66, 235/208). Rather, Heidegger writes, the “truth of be-ing decides ‘on’ both but not by prevailing over them but by enowning itself between them and thus by first enowning them themselves unto the countering [Ent-gegnung]” (GA 66, 235/208). Therefore, everything depends on how be-ing finds into its truth and on how this truth is grounded in the en-countering of man and god(s). Only thus, accordingly, will the enactment of the naming of gods be fulfilled (GA 66, 235/208-9). The gifting-refusal of be-ing shelters the mystery (Geheimnis), which historically comes to pass as the flight and the arrival of gods. As mentioned at the outset, Emad’s two interrelated clues — the methodological issue of the relation of hermeneutic phenomenology to being-historical thinking, and the question of the flight of gods – point to the “undecidability” of “deciding” Da-sein’s place on the earth through its openness to this mystery.

Every objectification of the god and the “explanatory reckoning” with the god, for example, as creator, has its ground in beingness (Seiendheit) as the production of presence (GA 66, 236/209). When this happens, being-a-cause as such is made the criterion of divinity, and God as highest cause constitutes the divinization of causality itself (GA 66, 240/212). This creates the appearance of transcendent spirituality, and therefore, in respect to iconoclasm, every “material” representation of the god in the image must be mis-apprehended as a degradation of the divine. For the beingness of God as highest cause is presupposed in this experience of the image; the image itself is represented for a subject; and this constitutes a being-lost to beings, even if and when the image is “broken” and cast aside, for it is cast aside as a false image of God. The casting-aside presupposes the distinction of true and false images and in this way degrades God to being a representation. Calvin’s injunctions against images illustrate this clearly, for he proposes that the Eucharist and Baptism, both revealed in the scriptures, are the sole true images of God (Institutes I. xi. xiii).45 Re-presentation in fact reduces the image to its being-present; no longer a “window” to the divine,

45 “The notion that the Eucharist should be the only worthy image – an iconoclastic principle par excellence – had been refuted by the common belief that the holy species were not the image but the reality of God himself: Calvin, who did not have such an unconditional faith in real Presence, was consequently able to assign them the status of an image, this time in the strongest and almost iconic sense of the term.” Besançon, op. cit., p. 188.
it loses its unique character as Bild. The subjective positing of the image as idol as well as the destruction of the image-idol are both exemplary evidence of the flight of the Christian God: “God” as causal ground signifies that beings are to be understood as produced, and as produced they not only suffer a loss of being but also, by presupposing God to be a causal ground, God is deprived of his godhood, the sheltering, and safeguarding of a mystery.

References


Part III

The Place of Translation in Heidegger’s Thinking
A Conversation with Parvis Emad on the Question of Translation in Heidegger

Frank Schalow

The publication of Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) in 1989, and its translation a decade later under the title, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), has dramatically transformed the landscape for understanding, interpreting, and appropriating Heidegger’s thought. Because of the pivotal importance of Heidegger’s text, the English translation has also assumed special prominence, if only as a result of the degree of controversy it has stirred.

Given the highly volatile character of the dispute over this and other translations, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to counterbalance all the various disagreements. Within the context of this Festschrift, however, we have the unique opportunity to re-examine some of the key translation “decisions” in the precise words of one of the translators of Contributions to Philosophy. The following reproduces a transcript of Parvis Emad’s responses to many of these decisions, as well as his own insights into the methodology of translation. It is hoped that this “Conversation,” when read within the context of the following papers, will cast light on the aforementioned “controversy.”

As Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes, thinking is always a gift of be-ing (Seyn), which, in the wake of be-ing’s “gifting refusal,” necessarily is ushered with a genuine sense of thankfulness. In Mindfulness, among other places, Heidegger reiterates this view when he says: “the splendor of Da-sein rests upon the alternating, and overreaching struggle that consumes within and belongs to the self, shelters and conceals the most reticent and yet remains inexpressibly grateful for every little help.”

A Conversation with Parvis Emad on the Question of Translation in Heidegger

Frank Schalow

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Let me begin, then, by saying that I am grateful, Professor Emad, for your willingness to engage in this conversation, and thereby provide an occasion to project-open the question of translation, not merely as an academic exercise, but as a signpost along the path of thinking. As we proceed with this dialogue, I will put several questions to you, and present your responses to them for the benefit of an audience who is both steeped in Heidegger’s writings and challenged by the complex issues of their translation.

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Frank Schalow: Ever since the publication of Being and Time in 1962, the interest in the question of translating Martin Heidegger’s writings into English has established itself as a pivotal issue in the study of his thought. Yet, while over the years, various discussions have gravitated toward that issue, only within the past decade has it become the axis around which the entire interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy revolves. The catalyst for this dramatic change in the focus of Heidegger studies has occurred as the result of the publication of Contributions to Philosophy: (From Enowning), and its sequel Mindfulness. As the co-translator of these translations, you have helped to spearhead this change by drawing attention to the direct synergy between the hermeneutic method governing the translation of Heidegger’s writings and the task of interpreting his philosophy. At the forefront of this development is your pioneering insight into the difference between intralingual and interlingual translation leading specifically to the issue of how the former, which is Heidegger’s own way of projecting-opening the meaning of the grounding words (Grundworte) of his philosophy, guides the latter when the rendering of the words from Heidegger’s German into English takes shape. What at first sight had been construed as representing two separate endeavors – one aiming at interpreting Heidegger’s thought and the other devoted to translating his writings – you have, through the insight into intralingual and interlingual translation, interwoven into a unified task and mission.

Beginning with the obvious, there are different views of translation, even within the hermeneutic tradition. In this regard, what do you consider to be singular, unique, and decisive about Heidegger’s hermeneutic method governing the task of translation, that sets it apart from other approaches, for example, that of Paul Ricoeur?

Parvis Emad.: Let me first address the last part of this question by saying that Ricoeur’s views on translation belong to the vast stock of theories on interlingual translation advanced from Cicero and Goethe to Walter Benjamin and beyond. Common to all these theories is their concern with the question of the validity of interlingual translation. This concern is expressed in three distinct positions: (1) that interlingual translation “produces” nothing but a distorted version of the original, (2) that basically an interlingual translation is possible that “produces” an absolutely identical version of the original, and (3) that the “products” of an interlingual translation need not be rejected or accepted wholesale, for they take their place next to the original and do not replace it. These three positions also shape Ricouer’s views on translation as laid out in his book, Sur la traduction.²

Exposed to the overwhelming impact of the thinking of and by being (das Denken des Seins) as this thinking is nurtured and sustained by the question of being or Seinsfrage, these positions undergo a profound transformation in Heidegger. Just as this thinking transforms our understanding of mortality, space, time, technology, and science (to name only a few), the thinking of and by being also transforms our understanding of the question of the validity of the interlingual translation. To bring into view the most salient feature of this transformation, we need to recall that Heidegger’s hermeneutic method governing the task of translation begins and ends with what he calls “the ownmost of language” or “das Wesen der Sprache.” This “ownmost” is not the property of any given language nor is it the universal “essence” of all languages. Insofar as neither the mother tongue nor the entries in a dictionary possess and thus provide an access to this “ownmost,” Heidegger’s hermeneutic method governing the task of translation questions the supremacy of the mother tongue, and the authority of a dictionary. It is in his Hölderlin lecture course text of 1942 that Heidegger shows why the authority of a dictionary should be questioned, and it is in his Parmenides lecture course text of 1942/43 that he addresses the supremacy of the mother tongue.3

Originating from within the ownmost of language, and freed from the supremacy of the mother tongue and the authority of a dictionary, Heidegger’s hermeneutic method governing the task of translation assigns a derivative status to the interlingual translation, while giving a more original and prominent status to intralingual translation. It is this original and prominent status of the intralingual translation that in my view defines what is singular, unique, and decisive about Heidegger’s hermeneutic method governing the task of translation and sets this method apart form other approaches to translation like that of Paul Ricoeur. Insofar as Ricoeur is stuck in the issue of the validity of the interlingual translation, and insofar as he has no inkling of the de facto occurrence of an intralingual translation in Heidegger, we cannot expect Ricoeur to make any contribution to our understanding the task of translating Heidegger’s writings.

F.S. Paul Ricouer may not have been the first, and probably will not be the last, to suggest that every “translation involves an interpretation.” On the surface, this statement makes sense. But then again, appearances can sometimes be misleading. We must remember that Heidegger construes “interpretation” ontologically as the disclosedness of being, as a way of “projecting open” its “meaning.” That is, interpretation is a fundamental way in which the interpreter belongs to this disclosedness, and is claimed by it, rather than simply offering one subjective viewpoint among others. Furthermore, we must also recall that within the context of Being and Time Heidegger outlines the structure of interpretation from the “transcendental-horizontal perspective.” Could it be the case that, conversely, translation – understood intralingually (as the exercise of transmitting the meaning of “grounding words”) as

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well as interlingually (understood as transmitting the meaning of “grounding words” from German into English) – actually provides both the directive and the original impetus for interpretation? By posing this question, we enter the orbit of the “being-historical perspective” (lacking by Ricoeur and others), in which case originary translation would itself be an enactment of thinking, which provides the hermeneutic guideline and thrust of “returnership” within any act of interpretation.

P.E.: By outlining the manner in which both interpretation and translation are housed in the transcendental-horizontal and being-historical perspectives, you show clearly that when it comes to Heidegger, these two issues assume special status and require special treatment. It seems to me that we will overlook this special status and special treatment when we apply Ricoeur’s position to Heidegger and hold that “every translation of Heidegger’s key words and phrases involves an interpretation of them.” We also overlook this special status and special treatment when we hold that “translation and interpretation are not distinct moments but are like a wave and its crest.” Both of these views come with dangerous consequences, the most important of which is the complete disregard for mistranslations that beset the renditions of Heidegger’s keywords and phrases. If, for example, the renditions of die Kehre as “reversal” and of Wesen as “essence” are translations indistinct from interpretation, then neither reversal nor essence is a mistranslation of Heidegger’s keywords and phrases: “reversal” is as good and appropriate a rendition of die Kehre as is “turning,” and essence is as accurate and acceptable a rendition of Wesen as is “ownmost.” The moment we assume that translation and interpretation are not distinct moments but are like “a wave and its crest,” we also assume that in translating Heidegger’s keywords and phrases, everything goes: “oblivion of being” for instance is as good as “forgetfulness of being,” and the latter as good as “forgottenness of being.” The moment we assume that translation and interpretation are not distinct moments, we also assume that “essentialism” is as precise and appropriate a characterization of Heidegger’s thought as is its characterization as the “thinking of and by being.”

The other danger, which ensues from overlooking the special status of translating Heidegger’s keywords and phrases, lies in failing to realize that translating them requires that each be projected-open. To relativize the connection between translation and interpretation by maintaining that translation involves interpretation, or to abolish the differences between translation and interpretation by suggesting that they are not distinct moments, amounts to failing the task of translating Heidegger’s keywords and phrases by projecting-opening them. And the full enactment of such projecting-opening refers the translator as thinker to what Heidegger calls “returnership.” Projecting-opening each key word and phrase of Heidegger’s thinking cannot be achieved by seeking recourse in dictionaries. Rather, it must take its orientation from the words hidden in the treasury of “returnership.” As I have stated elsewhere, “rather than thinking of translation as a means leading to interpretation,

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1For a further discussion of this issue, see Parvis Emad and Ivo De Gennaro, “Putting in the Seed: ‘Saying Again’ or ‘Approximating’ and Other Questions Concerning the Interlingual Translation of Heidegger’s Keywords,” *Existentia*, 19/3–4 (2009): 186.
we necessarily have to think of translation as a permanent, and perhaps as a thrust powerfully present within interpretation.”

The mere exigencies of “returnership” not only enliven, sustain, and bring to fruition the process of translation, but also do exactly the same in interpretation.

F.S.: There are certain keywords in the language of the thinking of and by be-ing whose interlingual translation seems to be almost impossible. One such word is Ereignis. How does the rendering of Ereignis as “enowning” both originate from, and confirm your key insight into the de facto occurrence in Heidegger of an intra-lingual and interlingual translation?

P.E.: To respond to this question, I must begin with addressing the two different intralingual translations of the keyword Ereignis. At two junctures in his path of thinking, Heidegger comes upon this word Ereignis, translates it intralingually, and gives it two entirely new and different meanings. We find the first juncture in the War Emergency lecture course text of 1919, and the second one in the 1936–1938 written text Contributions to Philosophy. In the first juncture, Heidegger shows how lived-experience attains its structure when the environing world (Umwelt) lights up, and in the second juncture, he is concerned with the question “How does be-ing (Seyn) sway?”

In the first juncture, he shows that when the environing world lights up, the lived-experience (Erlebnis) will be “made one’s own.” However, this “making one’s own” of the lived-experience resonates along with the “I”: it is not something the “I” accomplishes. Considering the lived-experience of seeing the lectern in the lecture hall, Heidegger says:

In seeing the lectern I am fully thereby with my I, which … resonates along with this seeing as a lived-experience specifically for me … However, this lived-experience is not a process but a making one’s own (ein Ereignis) ……The lived-experience does not pass by in front of me like a thing that I place before myself as an object. Rather, I myself make it my own (er-eigne es mir) as it comes to pass according to its ownmost.

In the War Emergency lecture course text of 1919 then Heidegger translates Ereignis intralingually as “making one’s own.” This means that in this lecture course text, Ereignis has relinquished its familiar meaning, “event,” and has acquired a new meaning to which Heidegger alludes when he hyphenates er-eigne in the phrase “er-eigne es mir” “making it my own.”

In the second juncture, Heidegger is exclusively concerned with the question “How does be-ing sway?” to which he responds by saying that be-ing sways as Ereignis. Here too he focuses on the syllable “eignis,” and relinquishes the familiar meaning of the word “Ereignis,” that is, “event.” However, while in 1919 Heidegger’s intralingual translation of this syllable reflects the meaning of the phrase “er-eigne es mir” or “making it my own,” which is a process taking shape when the environing

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5 Ibid., p. 187.
world lights up, in 1936–1938, his intralingual translation of this syllable *eignis* is shaped by the word “ownhood” (*Eigentum*), which comes to pass when be-ing’s sway lights up as an “enabling owning.” As erroneous as it is to take *Ereignis* as meaning an “event,” it is equally erroneous to take *Eigentum* or “ownhood” in the sense of property and possession. Here, *Eigentum* reminds us of *Reichtum*, *Königstum*, *Dichtertum*, and the like: in this word, the construct “tum” indicates a domain, a realm, and sometimes a sphere.

To capture and reflect this “enabling owning” in the interlingual translation of “*Ereignis*” from German into English, I heeded this “enabling owning” to which Heidegger calls attention by hyphenating “*Er-eignis*,” and brought this word into English with the word “en-owning.” This word is minutely constructed in accordance with, and reflects Heidegger’s intralingual translation of “*Er-eignis*” insofar as the prefix “en” stands for the prefix “*Er-*,” and the word “owning” for the syllable “*eignis*.” Considering the significantly different meanings of *Ereignis* in 1919 and 1936–1938, it should not be difficult to realize how erroneous and misleading it would be to follow those who, while proclaiming “the demise” of *Being and Time*, see no difference between the 1919 and 1936–1938 renditions of *Ereignis*, and thus adopt Gadamer’s misconception by wrongly assuming that Heidegger in *Contributions to Philosophy* returns to his 1919 usage of the word *Ereignis*. The being-historical meaning of the word *Er-eignis* should not be confused with the meaning this word had in 1919, that is, a time when Heidegger was taking a few preliminary steps that by 1927 would lead him to the path of transcendental-horizonal thinking culminating in *Being and Time*.

You ask to what extent “enowning” originates from, and confirms the insight into the de facto occurrence of an intralingual and interlingual translation in Heidegger. My answer is that given the correspondence of the prefix “en-” and the syllable “owning” to the prefix “*Er-*” and the syllable “*eignis*,” it is Heidegger’s own intralingual translation of *Ereignis* that sustains the interlingual translation of *Ereignis* as “enowning.” Having said this, I must hasten to add that what an appropriate interlingual translation attempts to achieve is an approximation and never an exact substitution or an absolute transfer. Accordingly, the word “enowning” approximates the dynamism as captured through the intralingual translation of *Ereignis*, without pretending to replace the word *Ereignis*. To pretend that “enowning” replaces the word *Ereignis* is to ignore two things: (1) that in Heidegger’s own understanding, *Ereignis*, much like the Greek λόγος is a *singulare tantum*, and (2) that as an approximate rendition, “enowning” emerges out of the domain of stillness (*die Stille*) and freedom, which is a far cry from the sphere where the dispute over the validity of an interlingual translation of the keyword *Ereignis* actually takes place. An interlingual translation of this keyword purporting to be valid at all costs should be a replacement, an exact substitute of the original, and should function as a vehicle for an absolute transfer. But as I have shown elsewhere, none of these terms – replacement, exact

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7 On the matter of designating *eignis* as a syllable and its intralingual translation, see F.-W. von Herrmann, *Hermeneutik und Reflexion* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), pp. 49–52.
substitute, absolute transfer – applies to the interlingual translation of the key words of the language of the thinking of and by being including Ereignis.\(^8\)

Those who submit to the authority of a dictionary by rendering Ereignis as “event,” or opt for “appropriation” or “event of appropriation” or use the neologism “properizing event,” overlook the fact that in his writings, Heidegger is always engaged in an intralingual translation. The renditions of Ereignis just mentioned not only are based on a total lack of awareness of an ongoing intralingual translation in Heidegger, but also demonstrate that those renditions, each claiming to be an exact substitute of Ereignis, are entrenched in the dispute over the validity of an interlingual translation of Heidegger’s keywords. Would those who propose such renditions of Ereignis as “appropriation,” “event of appropriation,” or “properizing event,” still hold on to these renditions; and would they perpetuate the dispute over the validity of interlingual translation of the keywords, if they knew that in Heidegger’s writings, the keywords of the language of the thinking of being – such as Ereignis, Dasein, Abgrund, Wesen to name only a few – have irrevocably lost the familiar meanings they had within German language?

F.S.: In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger states that philosophy’s unique mission is to “protect the power (Kraft) of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself from becoming plain by common understanding and then function as the source of pseudo-problems.”\(^9\) How in your view does a renewed grasping of the meaning of Heidegger’s key words such as Ereignis, Abgrund, Wesen provide us with a hermeneutic foothold on understanding this unique mission of philosophy?

P.E: Let me preface my response to your question concerning a hermeneutic foothold by saying first that it is important not to mistake the passage you quote from Sein und Zeit with one that has a programmatic intent. Making this statement right after the two paragraphs in Section 44 b of Sein und Zeit where he has already protected the power of one elemental word, namely ἀληθεία, by translating this word interlingually as Unverborgenheit, Heidegger draws attention to three things: (1) that the power of elemental words is de facto protected in the language of the thinking of and by being, (2) that in some highly significant instances, this protection happens through interlingual translation, and (3) that accomplishing the unique mission of philosophy via protection of the power of elemental words is not a task lying ahead in the future, but one that is achieved whenever the thinking of and by being is enacted.

Now, turning to the question you raise right after quoting that passage from Sein und Zeit, I would say that the hermeneutic foothold you inquire about is already in place when we, guided by Heidegger’s own intralingual and interlingual translation, realize (1) that the language of the thinking of and by being is not just a

\(^{8}\)For a discussion of terms such as replacement, exact substitute, absolute transfer in connection with the question of translating Heidegger’s keywords, see Parvis Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), pp. 10–16.

\(^{9}\)Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), p. 291.
proliferation and extension of German language but an autonomous language requiring an *interlingual enactment of the thinking of and by being*, (2) that meeting this requirement is not entirely in our discretion and up to us but depends on receiving and projecting-opening being’s enowning throw (*ereignender Zuwurf*),\(^{10}\) and (3) that it is this projecting-opening that allows the power of elemental words, such as *Er-eignis*, *Ab-grund*, and *Wesen* (to mention only a few) to echo in the approximate renditions of these words as en-owning, ab-ground, and ownmost.

I advisedly say “echo,” because as approximations, these renditions can only afford to echo the power of these elemental words. It is by affording to echo this power that these approximate renditions protect the elemental words from becoming plain by common understanding and thus give rise to pseudo-problems. Here, we should recall how the mistranslation of *Wesen* as “essence” failed to protect this elemental word from becoming plain and gave rise to the pseudo-problem known as Heidegger’s essentialism. The unique mission of philosophy will be accomplished only when the power of elemental words is preserved, leaving no room for pseudo-problems.

The characterization of Heidegger’s thought as essentialism, however, not only creates a pseudo-problem, it also brings to the fore the distortion of Heidegger’s concept of truth. Let me briefly address this issue. Far more consequential and far-reaching than creating a pseudo-problem is the fact that the rendition of *Wesen* as “essence” completely obfuscates Heidegger’s account of \(\dot{\alpha}\lambda\dot{\eta}\theta\varepsilon 1\alpha\). One typical instance of this obfuscation is to be found in the English translation of the Parmenides lectures of 1942/43. In the original German, this account appears as follows: “In der Un-verborgenheit selbst west noch diese Gegenerschaft. Im Wesen der Wahrheit als der Un-verborgenheit waltet irgendeine Art von Streit mit der Verborgenheit und der Verbergung.”\(^{11}\) In the English translation, this account appears as follows: “This opposition resides in un-concealedness itself. In the essence of truth as un-concealedness there holds sway some sort of conflict with concealedness and concealment.”\(^{12}\) Let us contrast this translation with the one I shall venture: “This counteraction sways in un-hidden-shelteredness itself. There prevails in the sway of truth as un-hidden-shelteredness some kind of strife with hidden-shelteredness and hidden-sheltering.”

By contrasting this translation with the version that appears in the English translation of the Parmenides lecture course text, several distortions come to the fore. (1) The word *west*, the present tense of the verb *Wesen*, is totally mistranslated when it is brought into English as “resides.” The counteraction to which Heidegger alludes cannot be conceived as something “residing” in \(\dot{\alpha}\lambda\dot{\eta}\theta\varepsilon 1\alpha\) because the word “residing” obfuscates the strange, sole, and unique occurrence, which is \(\dot{\alpha}\lambda\dot{\eta}\theta\varepsilon 1\alpha\).

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\(^{10}\)For “*ereignender Zuwurf*” (enowning throw) see, F.-W. von Herrmann, *Wege ins Ereignis: Zu Heideggers “Beiträge zur Philosophie,”* pp. 1, 6, 17, 23, 30, 33, 34, 36, 40, 56, 59, and 94.


The defining moment within \( \dot{\lambda} \cdot \dot{\eta} \cdot \dot{\alpha} \) called “counteraction” requires thinking to approach \( \dot{\lambda} \cdot \dot{\eta} \cdot \dot{\alpha} \) in terms of “action,” “activity,” “mobility,” “movement,” and “dynamism.” This “counteraction,” Heidegger says, west, that is, “sways” in \( \dot{\lambda} \cdot \dot{\eta} \cdot \dot{\alpha} \) – it does not “set up camp,” “get settled for good,” “became rigid and solidified,” in short, “reside in \( \dot{\lambda} \cdot \dot{\eta} \cdot \dot{\alpha} \).” (2) Since the English word “essence” is totally mute when it comes to expressing action, activity, mobility, movement, dynamism, and the like, Heidegger’s concept of \( \text{das Wesen der Wahrheit} \) cannot be brought into English as “the essence of truth.” How could one overlook the fact that \( \dot{\lambda} \cdot \dot{\eta} \cdot \dot{\alpha} \) or truth cannot have an “essence” since it is \( \dot{\lambda} \cdot \dot{\eta} \cdot \dot{\alpha} \) itself that bequeaths to thinking the very word “essence”? By rendering “Un-verborgenheit” as “un-concealedness,” the English translation of the Parmenides lectures sets a formulation in circulation (mechanically repeated in all the translations of the \textit{Gesamtausgabe} by the same transaltor) that leaves out the moments of \textit{Verborgenheit}, namely shelteredness and the moment of \textit{Verbergung}, that is, sheltering. What is singular and unique about \( \dot{\lambda} \cdot \dot{\eta} \cdot \dot{\alpha} \) is not only un-hiddenness – called in this translation un-concealedness – but also and equally importantly, the moment of sheltering and shelteredness. In contrast to the manner in which “essence” and all its proliferations lie in the light of the day, \( \dot{\lambda} \cdot \dot{\eta} \cdot \dot{\alpha} \) is distinguished by being un-hidden, while sheltered by and withdrawn into hiddenness.

F.S: Heidegger’s view of language, contrasted with that of major philosophers of the “analytic” and “Continental” traditions is radically unique. Indeed, when Heidegger emphasizes that “language speaks,” and that human beings speak only by first “corresponding to language,” he returns to the ownmost dimension of language, in a way that stands apart from the “analytic” and “Continental” attempts that conceive language as a “tool” and as the human capacity for communication. In this connection, I want to draw upon the following passage from \textit{Contributions to Philosophy} and raise a few questions:

What is ownmost to language can never be determined in any other way than by naming its origin. Thus, one cannot give out essential definitions of language and declare the question concerning its origin unanswerable. The question concerning the origin of course includes within it the essential determination of origin and of origination itself. But origination means: belonging to be-ing in the sense of the last formulated question: How does language sway in the essential swaying of be-ing?

Against the backdrop of the question Heidegger raises at the end of this passage, let me ask: how in your view does the “sway of language” imply its hermeneutic involvement in the task of translation? Or put another way, if at its most original level translation involves responding to language, and nurturing its disclosive power, how could translation be at the service of the language of the thinking of and by being?

P.E.: Taken at its core this question is mainly concerned with the relationship prevailing between the ownmost of language and the task of translating the keywords.

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of the language of the thinking of and by being. First, let me say that this relationship is not one brought to bear from the outside upon the two poles named “ownmost of language” and “the task of translating the keywords of the language of the thinking of and by being.” Rather, this relationship itself originates from within the ownmost of language, and inhering therein guides and shapes the task of translating the keywords of the language of the thinking of and by being. Second, let me also note that this relationship is de facto made possible by the sway of language within the essential swaying of being. In short, the relationship prevailing between the ownmost of language and the task of translating the keywords of the language of the thinking of and by being is one that is sustained by the sway of language within the essential swaying of being. To highlight this point requires that I briefly discuss the two determinations of the ownmost of language in Heidegger, one unfolding in Being and Time and thus belonging to the transcendental-horizontal thinking and the other unfolding in On the Way to Language and belonging to the being-historical thinking.

Transcendental-horizontal thinking determines the ownmost of language as Rede. To understand Rede, we must keep in mind the following characteristics of it. (1) The word Rede is the outcome of Heidegger’s intralingual translation insofar as in the transcendental-horizontal thinking, this word no longer retains its familiar meanings such as speech, discourse, talk, and the like. Rather, as I have shown elsewhere, as the ownmost of language, Rede “enters the speech without permanently residing there.”14 (2) Entering the speech, or the discourse, or the talk without permanently residing in them, Rede is the power to divide, join, and articulate (Heidegger’s word here is Gliedern) the Da (t/here), while remaining distinct from the Da. (3) This is the case because as the power to divide, join, and articulate, Rede co-originally determines disposition (Befindlichkeit) and understanding (Verstehen), while unfolding the Da. (4) Finally, the fact that Rede is the power to divide, join, and articulate shows that this transcendental-horizontal determination of the ownmost of language sways within the swaying of being as the Da.

Considering the abovementioned characteristics of Rede in connection with the question of translation, we arrive at the following insight. As the ownmost of language, Rede allows for and guides both the intralingual translation and interlingual translation occurring in Heidegger’s transcendental-horizontal thinking. Instances of the intralingual translations occurring within transcendental-horizontal thinking are Ereignis, Dasein, and Wesen. Intralingually translated, these keywords lose their lexicographic familiar meanings. Instances of Heidegger’s interlingual translation made possible and guided by Rede occurring within his transcendental-horizontal thinking are ἀνυβρογθεντι as Unverborgenheit and λόγος as Aussage.

Being-historical thinking determines the ownmost of language as “the ringing of stillness” (das Gelaüt der Stille). However, in the passage from the Contributions to

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14 For a further discussion of the character of Rede, and of its implications for the three following points, see Parvis Emad, “The Significance of the New Edition of Subjekt und Dasein and the Fundamental Ontology of Language,” Heidegger Studies, 2 (1986): 142.
Philosophy that you cite, this determination has not yet achieved its full conceptual form. But this does not mean that at the time of the writing of Contributions to Philosophy, the ownmost of language, that is, “the ringing of stillness,” has not yet entered Heidegger’s purview and is not yet operational in the being-historical thinking unfolding in that work. How else would Heidegger in that work succeed in translating intralingually the word Ereignis if he did not have this ownmost in his purview? However, the important point here is this: “the ringing of stillness” too enters the speech, without permanently residing there. In the same vein, “the ringing of stillness” too constitutes the Da except that the Da now unfolds being-historically. When in the passage you quote, Heidegger asks “How does language sway in the essential swaying of be-ing?,” he has in his purview this being-historically unfolding Da. The fact that Heidegger after the lapse of several decades in On the Way to Language obtains the full conceptualization of the ownmost of language and calls it “the ringing of stillness” shows that when in Contributions to Philosophy, he formulates the question concerning the sway of language within the essential swaying of being, he has this determination of the ownmost of language in his purview. Put a little differently, when Heidegger in On the Way to Language determines the ownmost of language within the being-historically unfolding Da as “the ringing of stillness,” he articulates the appropriate conceptual determination of language, which was already operational in Contributions to Philosophy.

You ask “how could translation be at the service of the language of the thinking of and by being?” My answer is that the possibility (as distinguished from the actuality) of an interlingual translation of the keywords of the language of the thinking of and by being lies sheltered within the relationship prevailing between the ownmost of language and the task of translating the keywords. It is important to distinguish an interlingual translation that originates from within that sheltered possibility, and an interlingual translation that arises out of the forgottenness of that possibility. To be cognizant of that sheltered possibility, an interlingual translation of the keywords of the language of the thinking of and by being must take the following points into account. (1) Rather than operating under the assumption that Heidegger’s language is merely another proliferation of the German language, albeit shaped by his “idiosyncratic” use of this language, interlingual translation should acknowledge the insight that there is such a thing as the language of the thinking of and by being. The majority of the actually existing English translations do not take this insight into account. The obstinacy with which one still sticks to the translation of Wesen as “essence,” the blindness toward Heidegger’s own intralingual translation of the word Ereignis and the naive insistence of rendering this keyword as event, show that the actually existing English translations make no distinction between translating the language of the thinking of and by being and, say, translating Jürgen Habermas or, for that matter, translating Günther Grass. (2) By acknowledging the insight that there is such a thing as the language of the thinking of and by being, interlingual translation abandons the “biographical,” “subjective” dimensions and along with these the deep-seated predilection toward “historicizing” Heidegger’s thought as is evident in the prejudice toward searching for its “genesis,” and as is conspicuous in the urge to identify and then to elaborate on “the received influences.”
To acknowledge the special status of the language of the thinking of and by being is not the same as what French déconstruction calls “privileging”: it is simply recognizing a philosophical necessity. (3) Abandoning those dimensions and this predilection, the interlingual translator also relinquishes the naive assumption that by submitting to the authority of the dictionary, the translator would find exact substitutes in English for the keywords of the language of the thinking of and by being. An example that comes to mind is the naive assumption that “essency,” supposedly found in some dictionaries, is an exact substitute of Wesung. If “essence” fails to bring Wesen into English, adding a “y” to “essence” and coming up with “essency” will not offer a new possibility for bringing Wesung into English. (4) By acknowledging the fact that there is such a thing as the language of the thinking of and by being, the interlingual translator realizes that the task of translating the keywords of this language refers him to the thinking of and by being. With this realization, the interlingual translator becomes impervious to the lures of “associative” thinking and instead places his work under the guidance of the “principles” governing hermeneutic phenomenology. Thus, his work unfolds within the ownmost of language, which belongs neither to German nor to English nor to Greek, but enters these languages without permanently residing in them. Henceforth, whenever the interlingual translator of the keywords of the language of the thinking of and by being thinks and translates, he does so because he listens to the ownmost of language and attempts an approximate translation of the keywords.

F.S.: If the ability to “listen,” as you suggest, is as central to the task of translation as it is to the task of thinking, then is the translator, like the thinker, also “called through listening” to his unique vocation?

P.E.: If the hermeneutic preconditions for the enactment of the interlingual translation of the keywords of the language of the thinking of and by being are properly understood and heeded, then it is also understood that there is no difference whatsoever between the task of thinking and the task of translating, and by extension no difference between the thinker and the translator. We tend to separate the two as long as we fail to recognize that the thinker and translator both depend on being’s enowning throw and both are called upon to project-open that throw. Failing to recognize the manner in which both thinking and translating are referred to being’s enowning throw, we also fail to realize that the language of the thinking of and by being is not just another extension and proliferation of German language, but is an autonomous language requiring enactment in interlingual thinking and interlingual translating.

F.S.: The publication of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, beginning in 1975, and the subsequent need to translate these volumes, has continually thrust the importance of translating his writings into the forefront. Yet, as you stated above, the majority of the actually existing translations are not aware of the fact that there is such a thing as the language of the thinking of and by being. Indeed, prior to the publication of Contributions to Philosophy and Mindfulness, there was little appreciation of the direct synergy, which occurs between the hermeneutic principles of translation and the essential sway of Heidegger’s thinking. Accordingly, a growing awareness of the task of translation
has not necessarily followed from the fact that more and more of Heidegger’s works have been now translated into English. As Heidegger states in *Mindfulness*:

This mindfulness puts into question the ownmost of philosophy and remains unaffected by the affirmations and negations of what is ‘historically’ current, that is, the un-ownmost of the philosophy-industry.

Philosophy’s mindfulness of itself is philosophy itself, is the thinking that is en-owned by be-ing. Mindfulness is always historical and enacts a decision of the history of be-ing.15

Regardless of our evaluation of the various English translations of the *Gesamtausgabe*, how does the introduction of the being-historical perspective, and the mindfulness of this perspective, in your view, change our future approach, both to translating Heidegger’s writings and interpreting his thought?

P.E.: It seems to me that the question you raise at the end aims at identifying the impact that Heidegger’s *Mindfulness*, along with the introduction of being-historical perspective in *Contributions to Philosophy*, may have on the current state of interpreting and translating his work in the domain of English language. I shall attempt to respond to this question by addressing what I take to be the hermeneutic preconditions for answering this question. We find the first hermeneutic precondition in a remark that Heidegger makes about the present epoch and the availability of his *Mindfulness* – a remark whose hermeneutic range in my view extends beyond *Mindfulness* to all his works. He states:

And more erroneous still would be the view that in the epoch of asthenia for and lack of joy in foundational word one could ever eliminate this state of affairs overnight by publishing a “book.”16

Are not that asthenia and this lack of joy in foundational word what lead to the misleading view circulating now in full force that *Being and Time* has met its demise? Is not that asthenia behind the prevailing bifurcation of Heidegger’s thought into a “Dasein-oriented” (“Heidegger I”) versus a “being-oriented” (“Heidegger II”) periods – a bifurcation which to this day shapes the majority of the interpretations of his philosophy? Is not that asthenia what leads to the blindness toward the question of being evident in the misconception of it as an “ethereal question”? Is not that asthenia what leads to the assumption that by raising this question, Heidegger privileges questioning versus other mental and intellectual activities such as judging, perceiving, etc.? Are not these very same misconceptions of the question of being responsible for the failure to recognize that, rather than being created by thinking, this question is handed to thinking via being’s enowning throw? I raise these questions because they lead to the following question. When in the passage just quoted, Heidegger casts serious doubt on the efficacy of his writings, does he thereby deny that the introduction of those writings via transcendental-horizontal as well as being-historical perspectives, and the mindfulness of what he conveys in those writings via both perspectives, amount to nothing?

15GA 66, pp. 57–58; tr. 47.
16GA 66, p. 74; tr. 60.
If philosophical thinking is seriously concerned with the question whether Heidegger’s writings may have any claim to efficacy, then such thinking should meet the second hermeneutic precondition for interpreting and appropriating Heidegger’s thought, and steadfastly avoid what I have called “associative thinking.”¹⁷ In my view, the present imperiousness of philosophical thinking via-à-vis the language of the thinking of and by being, and the ensuing misinterpretations of this language and by extension of Heidegger’s writings, directly stem from the deep-seated proclivity of philosophical thinking to succumb to associative thinking. Only when we associate questioning with perceiving, judging, and the like can we come to the conclusion that Heidegger privileges questioning. Had we avoided this associative path, there would have been a good chance that we would recognize that the word question in the phrase, “question of being” is not one of many intellectual activities, since the question of being is handed to thinking via being’s enowning throw. Only when we associate fundamental ontology of Dasein with anthropology can we come to the conclusion that there are two periods in Heidegger’s thought, one “Dasein-oriented,” the other “being-oriented.” Had we avoided this associative path, there would have been a good chance that we would recognize that fundamental ontology of Dasein is all about the Da, that is, the disclosedness of being, and the assumption of two periods in Heidegger’s thought is an untenable assumption. Only when we associate Being and Time with the possibility of speculating on man’s existence as something bereft of any exposure to and knowing awareness of the Da of being, do we remain oblivious of the hermeneutic range of this work, misconceive it as a patchwork put together from Heidegger’s Marburg lectures, and misconstrue the question of being as an ethereal question, thus remaining ignorant of the fact that this work is devoted to an analysis of the Da, that is, disclosedness of being. Had we avoided this associative path, there would have been a good chance that we would recognize the continuing vitality (not demise) of Being and Time. Heidegger alludes to this vitality in his “Preliminary Remark” (Vorbemerkung) to the seventh edition of Sein und Zeit when he points out that the path traversed by this work, “remains even today a necessary one if the question of being is to move our Dasein (wenn die Frage nach dem Sein unser Dasein bewegen soll).”¹⁸

Having laid out the hermeneutic preconditions for answering the question you raised at the end, let me now ask what would we gain, if philosophical thinking is

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¹⁷On this point, see, Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 4 and 22.

strong enough to heed those hermeneutic preconditions, and avoids the pitfalls of
the associative thinking? To answer this question I would have to return to the first
few pages of *Being and Time* and say as straightforwardly as possible that by avoid-
ing the associative thinking, and by taking its orientation from the principles gov-
erning hermeneutic phenomenology, philosophical thinking will be prepared for
“what shows itself in itself, the manifest.” Subsequent to this preparedness, philo-
sophical thinking becomes receptive to the efficacy of Heidegger’s writings, and
ready to adopt new approaches, both to translating those writings and interpreting
his thought.

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Heidegger’s *Contributions to Philosophy*: The Challenge of Its Translation

George Kovacs

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It is worth noting that Heidegger scholarship in English, in spite of its occasional distractions and seeming weariness, made significant progress during the last two decades, thus clearing the way toward a deeper grasp, a more thoughtfully measured assessment of his thought. The sustained interest in his attempt to think entirely otherwise than the long-solidified frame of mind is clearly manifest in the increasing and persistent attention to his now available lecture courses and other substantial writings published in the last two decades. Thus, elucidations of Heidegger’s thought venture “beyond” the gravitational pull of *Sein und Zeit*, his seminal ground-work; they intend and claim to become more and more attuned to the thought of enowning (*Ereignis*), to another beginning of thinking, to his *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, his second main work, to the long-range hesitating-sheltering dimension of his thought. Another, perhaps even more telling and promising omen of the future of the sense of wonder about Heidegger’s lifework is the steady increase of better and better translations of his writings, including translations into English.3

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Translation and scholarly research are interconnected, inseparable, even when the research is based on the original, primary source in the original language; both entail and enact hermeneutic practices. William J. Richardson’s pioneering magnum opus *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* is as much the probing labor of translation as the persistent work of scholarly exploration. Reading and exploring Heidegger’s texts, as Richardson warns his readers, are tantamount to somehow making one’s way “over the rocks.” He observes that “Heidegger’s language, of course, presents a special problem of translation.” These remarks become even more intimidating when Heidegger in turn, in his letter to Richardson, speaks of his own experience of expressing and communicating his thought as leading him to “the recognition of an almost insurmountable difficulty in making oneself understood.” One ought to acknowledge that the history of Heidegger studies, including the translations of his writings into English and numerous other languages, gives ample testimony to defying the odds, to the actual overcoming of or successful dealing with the difficulties that are endemic to thinking-questioning, to philosophical inquiry; this history shows, *in actu exercito*, that it is possible to find one’s way “over the rocks,” to make one’s way “over the rocks.” The success of Richardson’s pioneering rendering of Heidegger’s work into English (as translation and as scholarly labor) and the translation of *Sein und Zeit* into many languages, not to mention the extensive scholarly writings, surely demonstrate the timidity entailed in the early despairing assessment that Heidegger’s thought is “extremely complex and subtle,” that “it is set down in a style which might be characterized as deliberately untranslatable.”

The publication of *Contributions*, the English translation of *Beiträge*, in 1999, 10 years after the publication of the German original, ought to be recognized as a major event in the history of Heidegger scholarship in English. The first English translation of *Sein und Zeit*, *Being and Time*, was published in 1962, 36 years after the publication of the German original. The experience of translating Heidegger’s lecture courses and the ventures of scholarship no doubt have contributed to the shortness of the passage of time between the publication of *Beiträge* and its English translation, *Contributions*. In thinking through and working with the German text

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2. Ibid., p. xxviii.
3. Ibid., p. xxvii.
4. Ibid., p. xiii.
(including Parvis Emad’s seminar on it with Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, editor of the German original), with the help of their experience in translation and scholarship, fighting all the odds and apprehensiveness about the nature of the text at hand. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly made their “way over the rocks,” brought forth a pioneering, scholarly, thoughtful and thought-provoking rendering of *Beiträge* in English: *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning).*

*Contributions* came about through a daring, “innovative struggle” with the “matter” (*die Sache*) and the language(s) of thought sounding through (echoing in) the “texts” under consideration. This English text, like any other scholarly translation, is neither the final nor the only possible way of rendering the German original. It should not be regarded as a substitute for Heidegger’s original. This translation is an attempt to recapture in English a measure of Heidegger’s way of thinking and his struggle with his own language, with its bounds and potentials. A good translation never becomes detached from its original; it, rather, paves the way toward and is marked by the interplay with the original experience of thought and language. Translating, like reading, is the labor of thinking and saying; it entails an immersion into, not the expropriation of, the original text.

Admittedly, *Beiträge* ought to be regarded as Heidegger’s most difficult, exacting, as well as though-provoking and puzzling work, even without necessarily agreeing with the hyperbolic claim that it may force us “into a new paradigm,” into a “more fruitful way” of understanding and “reading Heidegger’s texts.” The impatience for solutions and quick exits out of difficulties should be tempered by keeping in mind that *Beiträge* is a “preparatory” work, that, as Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann observes,

A hermeneutically cogent interpretation of Contributions should hold open the being-historical perspective, which is worked out in this treatise, as a perspective which is indispensable for an interpretation of Heidegger’s later writings of the fifties and sixties.

Thus, it should be recognized that the idea of “a paradigm shift” or rather the conclusion (final understanding) regarding the weight and the significance of Heidegger’s work ought to follow (ought to be derived from), and not to run ahead of (not to be posited as an a priori assumption or desideratum) its interpretation. The discernment of the final significance and the exploration of the full depth, as well as the critical assessment, of this text, rightly described as Heidegger’s second

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main work,\footnote{GA 65, p. 511; dust jacket of GA 65. See also George Kovacs, “An Invitation to Think through and with Heidegger’s \textit{Beiträge zur Philosophie},” \textit{Heidegger Studies}, 12 (1996): 20. \textit{Cf.} also Heidegger’s \textit{Besinnung} (1938–1939), GA 66 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1997), pp. 424, 427 (hereafter: GA 66); \textit{Mindfulness}, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London: Continuum, 2006), pp. 375, 378.} are yet to come; such exploration and assessment constitute an arduous task to be accomplished. The publication of the translation of \textit{Beiträge} into English and the developing scholarly attention to it are promising signs of courage and intimations of readiness to endure the exactions of the work to be done. \textit{Contributions} is a clear, faithful, thoughtful, scholarly rendering of its German original; it lets Heidegger’s text (his thought and struggle with saying) speak in and sound through the English language. The translators’ judicious decisions in rendering basic, difficult, subtle terms (\textit{e.g.}, “enowning” for \textit{Ereignis}; “what is ownmost” for \textit{Wesen}), their grasp of Heidegger’s way of thinking, and their attention to (familiarity with) the treasures and workings of the languages involved (German, English, Greek, Latin), as well as their experience in contending with Heidegger’s writings, account for the philosophical depth and the expressive power (the saying-potential) of the translation under consideration. A (if not the) most remarkable achievement (quality) of this translation is its sensitivity to the difference between the language of metaphysics and be-ing-historical language.\footnote{For more about this difference, see George Kovacs, “Heidegger in Dialogue with Herder: Crossing the Language of Metaphysics toward Be-ing-historical Language,” \textit{Heidegger Studies}, 17 (2001): 45–63.} A fair-minded and philosophical assessment of recent Heidegger translations, including \textit{Contributions}, would not obviate the conclusion that the English rendering of \textit{Beiträge} made its way “over the rocks,” that it represents a substantial, decisive contribution to a deeper grasp and exploration of Heidegger’s thought, especially to the attempt to “hold open the being-historical perspective” of his (later) way of thinking.\footnote{Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, “\textit{Contributions to Philosophy} and Enowning-Historical Thinking,” \textit{Companion to Heidegger’s ‘Contributions to Philosophy},” ed. by Charles E. Scott et al., p. 125.}

The ideal of translation, one ought to admit, ought not to be ignored, not to be obscured, in examining and evaluating, in “measuring” the worth and success of the translation, of its ability to render the original text into another language. The worth and fairness of the assessment of the translated text are contingent on keeping in view the significance (the “weight,” for example, \textit{Beiträge} as Heidegger’s second main work) and the nature (\textit{e.g.}, the be-ing-historical perspective in \textit{Beiträge}) of the original (in this case German) text, as well as the actual accomplishment of the translation, that is, its relationship to the original text of \textit{Beiträge}, its ability to allow the experience of thinking at work in the original language of this text to come...
through and re-emerge, to “play forth,” in the translation, to “play forth” in another saying, in another (in this case English) language. These three (significance of the original work, its nature or basic perspective, and the relationship between the translation and the original) are interconnected; they belong to the hermeneutic situatedness that conditions the assessment, a genuine re-view, a fair and open view, of the degree of success of the work of translation. It is understandable, then, that the misperception of (underestimation of what is at stake in) any one of these three (i.e., of any one of the three elements or dimensions of the hermeneutical situatedness just indicated) leads to a distorted glance at, narrows the view of, the others.

The criticisms by various scholars, including Theodore Kisiel, paints a portrait of substantive deficiencies, including the cumbersome use of “neologisms” and the fractured use of the English language—and the final assessment that the translation of *Beiträge* is itself “disastrous.”¹⁷ This attack itself on the English translation of *Beiträge*, however, *respondeo dicendum*, is a disaster, a major disappointment; its fragile and self-assured claims (lengthy and obtuse Translators’ Foreword; proliferation of neologisms; en-coinages not found in the Oxford English Dictionary; the translators’ contempt for readable English prose) collapse under their own weight.

As suggested earlier, the depth of exploring the relationship between the translation of *Beiträge* and its German original requires more than a “comparative linguistics”; such an exploration is affected by the significance (“the weight”) of, by the “momentum” granted to, *Beiträge*, as well as by keeping in mind (thinking within) the perspective (the way of thinking) embedded in this work. In this regard, we must, in the spirit of judiciousness and fairness, acknowledge “constructive” assessment of the English translation of *Beiträge*, of which Lars Iyer’s review thereof in the *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* is a foremost example. As the following quote from Iyer illustrates, the very feature of the translation, which one reviewer rebukes the other praises: “Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly reactivate the memory of forgotten words, revive dormant meanings in existing words and even coin new ones in accordance with the demand that Heidegger’s thought enacts.”¹⁸

The elements or dimensions of the hermeneutic situatedness are interconnected, as the above reviewer suggests. To restore a sense of balance and perspective, there is something to be learned from Albert Camus’ remark that, in dealing with the absurd, (in this case) with the “disaster” at hand (as conjured by Kisiel), “everything begins with consciousness and nothing is worth anything except through it.”¹⁹

Indeed, a fair-minded (*rather than polemical*), hermeneutically well-grounded assessment of translation includes the awareness of the standards of evaluation, requires clarity about the “measurement” adopted and used in “measuring” to what


extent the translation measures up to the very ideal of the work of translation. The question, then, that is called forth in, and arises out of, the course of striving for a fair-minded and hermeneutically-grounded, truly critical (κρίνειν; separating, sorting-out, delineating limits, judging, dividing) assessment (more than an “overview” or a survey) of the translation of Beiträge is this: With what measure is this translation to be measured? In other words, what is the standard for judging the translation of this text, and the degree of success or failure of the hermeneutic labor in listening to, in rethinking, and rendering the original (in this case the German) text in and with (translating it into) English? The answer: the (original) text if it is read, thought-through, and listened-to, and thus comes into (sounds across) the words of, in fact into, another language. Thus, the measure (the standard) for judging the quality of the translation of Beiträge is the original text, the relationship that obtains between the original and its translation. Translation is not transmigration of words from one dictionary into another; it comes about as a lived experience with language, not as an extraction from or contribution to an archive (as repository of some ideal, fixed language, of a fully transparent dictionary). Translating means rethinking, reading, and re-saying the original, it is a creative experience with the thought sheltered in the text of the thinker in (with) another language. The ambition of translating is not the procurement of adequation (adaequatio; representational agreement) between two contents in different languages; it is the struggle of the happening (movement, play) of unconcealment, the disclosure of what is sheltered in another language.

Contributions, the English rendering of Heidegger’s Beiträge, surely, one can readily admit, does not have the fluency or diction of a novel; it reads (sounds) neither as a poem nor as an editorial essay published in a journal or newspaper. This translation is a venture in exploring and saying; it is an approximation to and an appropriation of Heidegger’s experience of thinking, it is a philosophical-hermeneutical contention with the be-ing-historical perspective of his journey of thought, and not the enactment of a representational, “archival perspective.” In this translation language, diction, and vocabulary are called forth by thinking and questioning, they are not prescribed to thinking and questioning. Heidegger’s existential analysis, that is, the language of Sein und Zeit, stretches the boundaries and constraints of the established, prevailing language. He observes about the “awkwardness” (das Ungefüge) and the “inelegance” (Unschöne) of the language (expression, style, diction) of the existential analysis, of his text, he points out that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell (erzählend berichten) about beings (Seiendes), but [it is] another [thing] to grasp beings in their being (Sein).20

He continues even more tellingly: “For the later task we lack not only most of the words, but above all, the ‘grammar’.”21 According to this remark, the search for the

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20 GA 2, p. 52; tr. 63 (translation slightly modified).
21 GA 2, p. 52; tr. 63.
appropriate, fitting language includes the contention with the “harshness of expressions,” as well as with the “troublesomeness” (die Umständlichkeit; complicatedness) of “concept-formation” (Begriffsbildung). Translators of Heidegger’s texts, especially in attending to the be-ing-historical perspective (in Contributions and other related writings) of his way of thinking, no doubt are familiar with and share in the struggle with language, with expression, and concept-formation in German, and surely more exactly, more intensely in English. The transition to the other beginning of thinking entails another experience with language, the crossing-over to be-ing-historical language, the bursting of the boundaries of the language of metaphysics. According to Heidegger’s acknowledgement in his Über den Anfang (1941), already the first preparation for crossing-over to the other beginning stands before (runs up against) “hardly surmountable obstacles” in “becoming enowned by be-ing (Seyn),” in venturing to think based on and out of be-ing. As he states in Besinnung (1938–1939), “inquiring into the truth of be-ing” transforms “the manner of saying and grounding.” Thus, language is to be grasped (understood) based on (from, out of) its relation to the “truth of be-ing” and as “going beyond” (overcoming) the “prevailing grammar,” beyond the prefixed bounds of saying. The be-ing-historical word “says be-ing non-objectively,” thus otherwise than objectifying, representational language; it is simple, and different from “indefinite and symbolic speaking through signs.” These explanations by Heidegger clearly indicate that the saying (the language) of Contributions is more exacting and difficult than the language of Being and Time.

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What distinguishes the English translation of Beiträge is precisely its sensitivity to be-ing-historical language, to Heidegger’s own experience in saying, in expressing the thought of enowning. The translation’s vocabulary, diction, that is, its power of expression and manner of saying, are conditioned by their hermeneutic situation. The words adopted, the “style” of linguistic construction, the (“new”) concept-formations, as endemic to the labor of translation, do not “pop-out” of the dictionary, they are neither simply borrowed from nor fixed (controlled) by the “treasury” of an archive; they are brought forth by and constitute the residue of the experience of thinking, of the venture of saying “something” that is, nevertheless, not fully sayable. Without attending to the manner of saying at work (embedded) in the translation (in this

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22 GA 2, p. 52; tr. 63 (translation modified).
23 Martin Heidegger, Über den Anfang, GA 70 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2005), p. 94 (hereafter: GA 70).
24 GA 66, p. 385; tr. 341.
25 GA 66, p. 425; tr. 376.
26 GA 66, pp. 103, 299; tr. 86, 267–268.
case, in *Contributions*), the assessment of the accomplishments of the translation is destined to become a mere “reaction against” it, that is, a misguided evaluation due to failed, theoretical, a priori expectations (on the part of the evaluator). One is impelled to conclude that the reactive, not text-based, assessment of the translation under discussion in Theodore Kiel’s essay intimates the sense of frustration with the very failure of the adopted “manner” (the way and methodology; unexamined criteria or guiding standard and “measure”) of the assessment, of the evaluation. The sense of frustration with this failure at work (lurking) in the “manner” of the assessment leads to (shows itself in) hyperbolic generalizations (contempt for readable English, disastrous translation, deluge of neologisms), as well as to the tendency to acerbic, unyielding fixation on selected words, basic terms of the translation (“enowing,” “en-thinking,” “what is ownmost,” “being-history,” “inabiding”).

Responding to Theodore Kisiel’s reactions to the English translation of Heidegger’s *Beiträge*, as the preceding considerations suggest, entails more than “reacting” against his “reactions.” It amounts to recognizing the obstacles and discerning possibilities on the way to rendering sayable and audible “the matter” of thought in the text (of the translation) at hand. The attention of the rest of this “essay in response” is focused on some concrete, individual issues, and claims included in Theodore Kisiel’s reactions to *Contributions* based on, in fact governed by, his “archival perspective” as paradigmatically proclaimed in the very title of, and unwaveringly enacted in, his review and overview of this translation.

(a) The “Translators’ Foreword” to *Contributions* alerts the reader to the philosophical significance as well as to the unusual, unique nature of this work by Heidegger. It is a fitting, scholarly and clear explanation and justification of many translation decisions based on the examination of alternative possibilities for rendering many, though not all, basic, technical terms of Heidegger’s German in English. The translators open the range of possibilities for exploring, saying, and thinking through Heidegger’s insights and claims within the bounds (limitations and potentials) of another, in this case the English, language; they never claim final, unsurpassable authority or wisdom (e.g., based on some a priori principle or perspective) for their often difficult translation decisions (e.g., “enowning” for Ereignis; “en-thinking” for er-denken; “swaying” for Wesung), nor do they relegate it to a preferred dictionary, or to an archive of wisdom and dictionaries. In fact, they acknowledge, they do not close down (they do not exclude) different, possible alternative renderings of the same term or diction. They certainly can agree with William J. Richardson’s suggestion that the formation or establishment of a “terminology that will match Heidegger’s own innovative struggle with German,” in *Beiträge*, is not something to be fixed easily or quickly, not even “provisionally.”

The full extent of a common, basic vocabulary, a set of complete and relatively “final,” “agreed upon” technical terms in rendering *Beiträge* into English, its comprehensive, in-depth grasp within the bounds of the English language (as within those of others) are demanding tasks.

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The successful work toward their accomplishment is clearly manifest in the scholarly translation by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, as well as in the systematic explorations of this unique, difficult text of Heidegger.28

(b) A distinct, yet common, characteristic of Heidegger translations is the recourse to neologisms, especially for rendering (recreating, reinventing) decisive, technical terms. Another general characteristic of English translations of Heidegger’s writings is the generous use of hyphenated expressions for retaining the unity of multi-word-dictions. A third characteristic of many English renderings of Heidegger’s texts is the strategic use of hyphenated single words, including the adoption of hyphenated prefixes, for refining, emphasizing, defining, and safeguarding the meaning intended. These three characteristics of the English translations, in fact linguistic, hermeneutic strategies (practices) adopted by the translators, one ought to admit, are inspired by, and they are consistent with (found in), Heidegger’s own creative use, and struggle with the resources, of the German language. One should acknowledge that the adoption of these and other helpful strategies by the translators as well as by Heidegger himself are quite understandable; they are practically indispensable especially in working with Heidegger’s second main work, in translating and exploring this substantial and difficult text.

There is a unique, distinctive “style” of writing endemic to the significant, and great texts of the history of philosophy (the fragments of the Pre-Socratics, the dialogues of Plato, the works of Aquinas, Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*); this style is inseparable, though distinguishable, from the way of thinking embedded in and coming forth through the writing. How did Heidegger himself choose or came to invent his words, especially the more technical terms? How did he find, came to the discernment of, his linguistic, hermeneutic strategies, his diction and language? These are neither idle nor merely tantalizing questions. Their answers may be found, discerned, and not only conjectured or surmised, through careful reading and thoughtful work with his writings (his diverse texts). His etymological explanations and his strategy to unearth and grasp the original roots and meanings of basic words indicate that he consulted and judiciously used dictionaries (German, Greek, Latin) in his dialogue with seminal texts of the tradition, with the history of thought. These practices show that his “linguistic” decisions, choices and interpretation of words, his concept-formations, and invention (creation) of technical terms, do consider alternative possibilities of expression, they are not made in a historical, cultural vacuum. The Pre-Socratics, Meister Eckhart, and Hölderlin, that is, philosophers and poets, influenced his choice of words, “style” and diction in writing, thinking, and speaking; they awakened and nourished his fascination with (“what is ownmost” to) language, with its connection with thinking and “to be.” He surely treasured and creatively, inventively appropriated the living history (*Geschichte*, not *Historie*) of language and thought, without sublating (or absorbing) it into an a priori “archival perspective,” without viewing

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28 Examples of the interaction between translation and other scholarly endeavors may be seen in the collected volume entitled *Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*. See Charles E. Scott et al. (eds.), *Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*. 
and using it as the prefixed norm and measure of saying and thinking, as the safety (safe treasure and harbor) of regressive, retro-gressive, backward-looking, historicizing understanding and interpretation (reductionism), as hermetic-hermeneutical closure (sheltering a theoretical ideal or paradigm for language and thought). He appropriated and used the words chosen without obviating or interrupting the coming of “to be,” of “the matter” of thought at stake, into language (into the words of his language), without preempting or controlling (narrowing, pre-fixing) the “manner” of saying. The words, expressions, and their intended meanings in Heidegger’s experience of writing (in his texts) are not simply “extracts” from a “dictionary” or “thesaurus.” They were adopted and used by him inventively and spontaneously, though judiciously, as inspired by and acquired through his work with (readings of) philosophical, poetic, as well as biblical texts; his words and diction, his “style,” one might rightly suggest, emerged in the course, came to him (to his mind) in the experience, of thinking.

The manner of saying is inseparable from the way of thinking. Saying, words, and language are not prefabricated receptacles (structures) for thoughts and ideas migrating into them; they emerge in and belong to the movement (experience) of thinking. Heidegger’s basic insights or ideas (e.g., Er-eignung; en-ownment) came about through his way of thinking, through “recognizing and interpreting the signs,” even if from afar, that lead to them and thus “preserving them in simple words.”

Heidegger translations and scholarship may not capture (render) his way of thinking without being attuned to his thoughtful saying, to his experience with language, to the way-quality of his saying and thinking, to his thought and language. Translating his texts, then, is a hermeneutic ground-work, a basic experience in paving the way to their understanding, interpretation, and assessment.

Translation entails a final decision, a final choice from among alternative possibilities for rendering Heidegger’s German in another language; other scholarly works (exploration, interpretation, assessment) do have the luxury of exploiting alternative possibilities for rendering basic terms and expressions, even retaining and using more than one rendering—this in addition to the availability of the relative safety of explanation. Translation delimits the range of linguistic strategies adopted (chosen); explanation and scholarly exploration (research) expand the range of saying, of the adoption of linguistic alternatives and possibilities.

(c) A thorough study of the “Translators’ Foreword” is an indispensable preparation (prerequisite) for a meaningful reading of the text of Contributions, as well as for a fair-minded, instructive assessment of it as a work of translation. These two (i.e., the foreword by the translators and the text of Contributions itself) are as much interrelated (intertwined) (pedagogically and philosophically, not only linguistically) as Heidegger’s “Preview” and the “rest” of the text of his second main work. In fact the “Translators’ Foreword” amounts to an introduction to (a way leading into) Heidegger’s thinking and to his “manner” of saying (language, syntax) in this

29 GA 66, p. 349; tr. 310.
unique, difficult text. The guiding principle, one might say, the “ideal,” of the work of this translation is concisely defined as an endeavor, as “an act of disclosing the orienting power” of being-historical words (of the distinctive saying, of the unique language), thus of alerting the reader to the same power (the power of the unique, especially being-historical words of saying) that shapes and holds together the order, the systematic unity of the six divisions (called the six joinings) of the text, of the thinking exposition (of the thought, of the surmising) of being-as enowning.30

This means that it was the nature of the text of Beiträge itself, that is, the systematic unity (the interrelated “joining,” the order) of being-historical thinking, that is, the main perspective of the way of thinking embedded in the text, in the original source, that governed, “guided this translation toward disclosing the orienting power inherent in the key words” of Heidegger’s text at hand.31 This is a very significant explanatory statement by the translators; it is the main principle at work in their translation decisions, in accounting for the specific choices (discussing the “how” of the disclosing power in the given instance) for rendering in English main, key philosophical words and phrases of the German text. There is neither ambiguity nor obfuscation in their explanations. The translators, as if anticipating and responding to questions and misperceptions, clearly indicate the weight and implications of their adopted “principle,” of their approach at work, in the course and activity of the translation:

Thus the source from which this translation received directive and guidance was not primarily the lexicographical settlement of the relation between Heidegger’s German and the English words.32

The relation between Heidegger’s German and the English words, that is, the relation between the German text and its rendering into English (or any other language), is deeper and more comprehensive than “simply lexicographical.” It is, as the translators rightly claim, and as the preceding considerations (i.e., the claims of this “essay in response”) indicate, hermeneutical, philosophical, not simply “archival.”

(d) How can the translator render into English Heidegger’s being-historical German words, phrases, and manner of saying? Understanding the very idea of being-historical language in Heidegger’s German does not by itself guarantee its re-enactment in (into) another language. The translator, in addition to the immersion into Heidegger’s experience of thinking and creative saying, is inevitably prompted (compelled) to devise appropriate strategies that open up and appropriate the disclosing power of the English, of the second or rather other, language. The range of alternative sayings, together with the horizon and dimensions of meaning, opens up and becomes discernible in the experience, in the course, of saying as attuned.

30 Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, “Translators’ Foreword,” in Contributions, pp. xvii, xviii.
31 Ibid., p. xviii.
32 Ibid., p. xviii.
through listening, through letting (allowing) the other, the “new” language originate (emerge) out of, and as “grounded in,” “silence.” For, as Heidegger explains,

silence is the most sheltered measure-holding (das verborgenste Mass-halten). It holds (hält) the measure, in that it first sets up measures (Masstäbe). And so language is measure-setting (Mass-setzung)....

The act or work of translation (translating), then, is an origination that is governed by measure-setting; it is not (surely not lexicographical) adequation between two different languages (as preserved in an archive, as accumulated treasure of the past stored and ready-to-hand in a museum, as souvenir of the past); it is an experience with language, a thoughtful saying.

The translation of even the simplest words is more than an exchange of words, more than a mere lexicographic event. The word “thinking” harbors within itself diverse and telling shades of meaning in different languages. Heidegger’s German, for instance, connects it with (hears and understands it as) “thanking” (Denken: Dank, Danken, Gedane, Andenken), while in Hungarian it is connected with (it means) “caring” (gondolkodás). Heidegger was quite interested in knowing and hearing the “care” (gond; gondolat) and “caring” (gondolkodás; gondolkodni) connotations (understanding, meaning) of the word “thinking” in another (in the Hungarian) language.

The word Denken (thinking) is no doubt a key yet simple and hermeneutically rich word in Heidegger’s German, in all his writings, and perhaps more so in Beiträge. Thus, even the simple and more routinely translated words (e.g., denken as “thinking”) can give pause to (interrupt the labor of) the translator in the (in both) languages involved. This pause or interruption becomes more probing, thought-provoking, and perplexing in translating the more inventive (creative) words and constructions in Heidegger’s German, in letting resound his be-ing-historical saying in (and through) the English language. The translator has no choice but to decide which linguistic and hermeneutic strategies contribute more fully to the disclosure of be-ing-historical meaning (of Heidegger’s words and expressions) in English. The translator cannot wait; the translator ought (is bound) to venture, to make a final choice.

GA 65, p. 510; tr. 359.
GA 65, p. 510; tr. 359.
For Heidegger’s concise discussion of translation, see his Was heißt Denken? (lecture course at Freiburg, Winter Semester, 1951–1952 and Summer Semester, 1952), GA 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2002), pp. 236–237 (hereafter: GA 8).
Er-denken is clearly a be-ing-historical word in Heidegger’s second main work, as well as in his other related writings. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly opted for rendering it into English as “en-thinking.” This word does not fit into a metaphysical lexicography; Er-denken is not about thinking something, not about figuring out or representing and conceptualizing something. Er-denken stands for another than metaphysical way of thinking; it “says” and intimates the way of thinking proper to or originating at another inception of thinking; it conveys the origination and accomplishment (enactment) of the very way, of another way, of thinking; it re-thinks thinking itself. Thus, the meaning of Er-denken becomes more familiar, more discernible, audible, and understandable through working with the text, through hermeneutic labor, not through some “archival illumination” or erudition detached (at a distance) from the text, from its context.

Heidegger’s own understanding of Er-denken is at work, thus it may be observed, in his practice, in the way it functions in his text, in his writing; this “observation” is indispensable for, it is part of, the hermeneutic labor (act) of thoughtful translation. Translating includes reading and interpreting; it entails attending to the saying and meaning harbored, sheltered in the text in question. This part of the act of translation is not an esoteric adventure; it is a way of attending to the disclosing power of Heidegger’s words and explanations, especially to his elucidations of his basic words, key terms. There is no worthy, reliable translation of Heidegger that does not grasp his own explanations of his basic expressions, concepts, and claims. His explanation (a dictionary would codify it as the “definition”) of Er-denken is quite descriptive and thought-provoking. An instructive example of his elucidation (descriptive analysis) of Er-denken may be found in his discussion of be-ing-historical thinking in Section 98 of Besinnung, written in 1938–1939, on the heels of Beiträge. Here, he clearly explains that Er-denken refers to be-ing-historical thinking, that be-ing-historical thinking is Er-denken of be-ing (des Seyns), that Er-denken is a distinct way of thinking be-ing. This may give the impression, he observes, that be-ing is something “arbitrary” (eigenmächtig) and somehow just “figured out” (ausgedacht; thought out) and found, that it is the thinker who “figures out” (thinks out) and finds be-ing. What Heidegger has in mind here, however, is quite the opposite: “The word Er-denken,” rendered into English as en-thinking,

wants to say: thinking that is en-owned (er-eignet ist) beforehand by be-ing—by what is to be thought—and becomes enactable only in a history and as the history of be-ing.38

Er-denken is not reducible to (it is not identical with) the exertion (activity, imagining, contriving, arbitrarily figuring out something) of the thinker, of the thinking subject; it comes into its own (enowned, appropriated, takes place) beforehand (first) by what is to be thought (by the matter or issue of thought itself), by be-ing; it becomes accomplishable, enactable (it can be brought to completion) only in a history (Geschichte) and as (belonging to) the history of be-ing; it does not take place, it cannot be enacted, in the ahistorical vacuum of abstraction, but in the history of “to be,” of be-ing, thus not in the historiological (linear chronological, “scientific”) realm or ontic history as history of beings.

38 GA 66, p. 357; tr. 317.
Er-denken, then, is understood here as enowment (event, occurrence) of and by be-ing, as thinking based on and out of be-ing; \(^{39}\) it is the thinking of be-ing (in the sense of double genitive) in history and as history. For Heidegger, it is the enowment of be-ing that takes place in history (what history is all about); it (enowment) is what is ownmost (Wesen) to history, thus, one might say, defines history; in fact, history (Geschichte) “is be-ing itself.”\(^{40}\) This concise explanation unmistakably indicates that the meaning of Er-denken intended by Heidegger is different from its everyday usage, from its common, average understanding. Thus, he adds that if it is “…understood according to the ordinary linguistic usage, it is thoroughly misleading and should, therefore, be avoided.”\(^{41}\) The meaning of Er-denken, in Heidegger’s usage, as he concludes the explanation under consideration, is be-ing-historical, that is, understood as “en-owned by be-ing,” as a thinking that originates and is enacted out of (based on) be-ing; it is a way of thinking that is different from metaphysical, representational thinking, from “metaphysical representing that places beings as such before itself,”\(^{42}\) from beings-based thinking. The difference between these two ways of thinking, as Heidegger insists, is radical, substantial. Its recognition, then, is indispensable for reading Heidegger’s German text and for its rendering into another language.

The “Translators’ Foreword” to Contributions recognizes and takes into account the philosophical and linguistic issues entailed in translation decisions. It includes a clear, concise, and scholarly explanation of the “significant role of the prefix er-” in Heidegger’s text (in his thinking),\(^{43}\) and justifies its rendering in English as en- and thus the adoption of en-thinking for er-denken. This option retains the be-ing-historical meaning of the “er-” as intended by Heidegger (er- in er-denken, but also in the corresponding group of words with the prefix “er”), and the function of the “er-” in Heidegger’s German (including his creative use of German philology), that is, the nature of the relationship between the prefix “er-” and the conjoined word (in this case denknen) in Heidegger’s text, indicating origination and enabling (enacting, accomplishing). The English “en-” stands for the originating power (origination, enabling) of the German “er-.”\(^{44}\) The same strategy (based on be-ing-historical and linguistic sensitivities) accounts for translating many German words with the prefix “er-” into English with the prefix “en-” (erbringen as enbringing; Eröffnung as enopening; erzittern as enquivering; ersehen as enseeing), except when the prefix “er-” is conjoined with a German word in common usage with established, accepted meaning (erfahren; ermessen) and rendered in English without the prefix “en-” (experiencing; measuring). The “Translators’ Foreword” indicates, quite astutely, that rendering the prefix “er-” in the words with this prefix, as explained above, in English as “en-” discloses the connection

\(^{39}\) Cf. GA 66, p. 357; tr. 318.
\(^{40}\) GA 66, pp. 357, 358; tr. 318.
\(^{41}\) GA 66, p. 357; tr. 317.
\(^{42}\) GA 66, p. 357; tr. 317.
\(^{43}\) Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, “Translators’ Foreword,” pp. xxxvii–xxxix; see also p. xxi.
\(^{44}\) Ibid., p. xxxix.
with “Ereignis” and “enowning” respectively and calls attention to the be-ing-historical, enowning thinking (as well as language and saying) as the main perspective of Heidegger’s second main work. It may be claimed, then, that the very reading of the translation (Contributions) is a participation in, an approximation or getting closer to, the experience of thinking embodied in and expressing itself through (coming across) Heidegger’s German.

(e) Thus, as these considerations suggest, the rendering of er-denken into English as “en-thinking” may be regarded as paradigmatic, as typifying (illustrating) the hermeneutical directives (strategies and sensitivities) adopted in the course of translation, in making the often difficult final choices, the translation decisions. This paradigmatic example shows beyond doubt that the English rendering of Beiträge was guided by sound hermeneutic and linguistic considerations based on Heidegger’s German, as well as on the related suitable options available in the English language. This means, then, that the “measure” (criterion, standard) and the “ideal” (ambition) of the translation under discussion (Contributions) are grounded in the text; they are not based on, not extracted from, a priori, extra-textual, theoretical, historicizing assumptions, expectations; they are not prisoners of a prefixed (e.g., archival) perspective.

There are yet some additional, practical hermeneutic strategies that became available, viable through the rendering of “er-” in er-denken (as well as in other words with the prefix “er-”) as “en” and thus er-denken as “en-thinking” (and similarly in the case of other words in the same group) in English. Admittedly, “en-” is a simple term and “en-thinking” is a simple word; they are not convoluted, not contrived, though inventive. Their simplicity contributes to the clarity of, and to the discernment of consistency in, saying. One could have adopted or thought of some other strategy that might have provided, guaranteed, a priori assured (prefixed) greater conformity to the existing ordinary language and linguistic practices. It would not have been impossible to render the German prefix “er-” in erdenken (and similarly in other words with the same prefix) with an adjective (!) in English and thus, for example, as “radical thinking,” “primordial thinking,” or, horribile dictu, as “thinking-2” as different from “thinking-1,” the latter standing for “metaphysical, representational thinking” (one could have attempted rendering erdenken in English with “thinking” as a crossed-out word). The adjectival strategy (technique), a form of paraphrasing in disguise, surely would have led to ambiguities, in the last analysis, to obfuscation of meaning, to convoluted and thoughtless text in English. This strategy is simply not practical, not viable; it is preempted by the usage of many diverse, alternative adjectives preceding the word denken (thinking) in Heidegger’s German (e.g., ursprüngliches Denken, originary thinking; wesentliches Denken, essential thinking; anfängliches Denken, inceptional thinking; vorstellendes Denken, representational thinking; erdenkendes Denken, thoughtful thinking). The adjectival strategy may be useful in elucidating the word with the prefix in question; it may be helpful for making more discernible and graspable the intended (at times hidden) meaning of the word with the prefix (e.g., rendering, in fact replacing, the prefix

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with a suitable adjective in the given context); but this strategy is useless, destructive of the meaning of the German text, of Heidegger’s thinking and saying, in the case (in the work) of translation. This example calls the attention to the economy of translation.

“En-thinking,” then, is a strategic, simple, and faithful English rendering of the German er-denken. This translation is inventive, but not awkward; it is not without precedent in the English language, for example, en-compassing, en-closing, en-campment, en-chanting, en-trusting. These and many others can be found in dictionaries. Having examined the function of the prefix “er-” in Heidegger’s German and the senses and function of the English usage of “en-,” Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly opted for “en-” in translating erdenken as “enthinking,” as well as in rendering ersehen as “enseeing.” Working with the translation (Contributions) and keeping in mind the justifications of translation decisions bring about familiarity with the “en-words.” The simplicity of the “new” word in the translation signals its special, fuller meaning, and retains the disclosing power of the “German saying” in English. The consistent usage of the same word (for rendering the same original German), once grasped to the extent feasible, contributes to the “readability” of the text (of the translation). Working with the translation renders more and more familiar, more and more telling the initially new or seemingly unusual words and expressions (as well as the linguistic strategies at play); it opens up and preserves the disclosive power of saying, and thus the experience (movement) of thinking, harbored within the text.

(f) Learning another way of thinking includes discerning, working, and becoming familiar with new words, expressions, and ways of saying; the experience of thinking is (brings with it) at the same time an experience with language. According to Heidegger’s seminar on Herder’s treatise on the origin of language, λόγος means ratio (Vernunft, Denken; reason, thinking) and oratio (Sprechen, Rede; speaking, discourse). Thinking and language belong together. Thinking and saying are “equally-originary” (gleichursprünglich) and share what is “ownmost” (Wesen) to them; the ‘word’ is word ‘of’ be-ing. As Heidegger explains in his 1949 Bremen lecture “Die Kehre” (The Turning), language is the originating, primal dimension within which human being “is first able to correspond at all to Being and its claim, and in corresponding, to belong to Being.” He concludes that “This primal

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46 Ibid., pp. xxxvii–xxxix.
48 GA 85, p. 35; tr. 29 (trans. modified).
49 GA 85, p. 72; tr. 61 (trans. slightly modified).
corresponding, expressly carried out (eigens vollzogen), is thinking.”

Language, then, is “never primarily the expression of thinking”; it “is thinking.” Translation as an experience with language is thinking. Its hermeneutic labor with the (at least two) languages involved (but even the work with one language) cannot be reduced to reading and exchanging, comparing dictionaries. Consequently, the assessment of the accomplishments and shortcomings of the translation is more than a contention with its lexicography, more than a judicial application of an “archival perspective.” It is, or should amount to, a hermeneutic project, a hermeneutic labor.

The neologisms, the style of expression, the strategies of disclosure, the translation decisions embedded in, and thus accountable for, and defining (the text of) Contributions, as these considerations indicate, are not the result of arbitrary choices or a priori preferences and perspectives. They came about through working with and as based on Heidegger’s text.

One of the most significant and thought-provoking decisions made by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly is the rendering of the German Ereignis into English as “enowning.” Other creative, advantageous, and venturing translation decisions include Wesen and related words, admittedly, as the translators suggest, “the words Wesen and Wesung are the most crucial words for translating Contributions.”

The English renderings of these terms, together with the decision regarding Ereignis, one might suggest, “define” the nature and the “style” of the English text, of Contributions. Theodore Kisiel’s assertions (in his review of recent Heidegger translations referred to in this study) notwithstanding, Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly came to their final translation decisions (renderings and strategies adopted) through a scholarly, insightful discernment and analysis of possible alternatives. They carefully examined the usage of the words in question in Heidegger’s German, especially their rich and subtle meanings, their disclosive power and saying. The focused, meditative reading of the ensuing English text, which is supported by the habit of working with it, lets us see at work the hermeneutic and linguistic strategies adopted. Reading this text becomes, when sustained, an experience of the saying-power of Heidegger’s words in English; it becomes the recognition in actu exercito of conveying (retaining and bringing forth, as well as together) his thought and language, thereby leading back to, and not away (not astray) from, the original German text.

In the last analysis, every translation of a given text is the result of a final choice (from competing alternatives) made by the translator(s) in question. Contributions is no exception in this regard. The main issue here is the role of the text (of Heidegger’s German) as the “measure” of the act of translating, of the translation, and thus the role of the text in assessing (in critically reviewing) the translation, in

51 GA 79, p. 79; tr. 41.
52 GA 70, p. 71; tr. 41.
54 Ibid., p. xxiv.
this case, the English text. The so-called “archival perspective,” as these reflections have explained, obfuscates or obviates the role of the text itself in and as the criterion of translation, and as belonging to its assessment. The proclivity to giving primacy to the “archival perspective,” at least in *actu exercito*, displaces and undercuts (undermines) the more comprehensive hermeneutics of the text-based criterion (standard) of the work of translation; it preempts the raising of the question of translation, the critical inquiry into the “measure” and the “ideal” of translation.

There is neither space nor need here to review (to rehearse) the translators’ detailed, scholarly explanations (accounts) of the final decisions regarding the renderings of *Ereignis*, *Wesen*, and *Wesung*, as mentioned above, into English and various criticisms of them. However, a concise response to the critical assertions may be worthwhile. The translation of *Ereignis* as “enowning” is surely more descriptive (be-ing coming into its own) than its rendering as “event” (no matter how much one tries to “define” the unique meaning intended); its translation as “appropriation” (appropriating event, properizing) conveys more of Heidegger’s sense of it than the term “event.” However, “appropriation” retains a subjectivistic connotation (appropriating agent or subject), as well as, at least for some, an economical-political (not to say “capitalistic”) configuration (implication). These renderings, no doubt, fail to convey and tend to obfuscate the be-ing-historical meaning intended by Heidegger. The translation of *Wesen* is quite strategic and helpful: when its meaning (usage) is enowing-be-ing-historical, it is translated as “what is ownmost”; when its meaning (usage) is traditional metaphysical, it is rendered as “essence.”

These two renderings clearly convey and preserve the two different meanings (functions) of *Wesen* in Heidegger’s German. The adoption of “essential swaying of being,” “essential sway of be-ing,” and “essential sway/swaying” for translating *Wesung des Seins*, *Wesen des Seyns*, and *Wesen/wesen* respectively, one ought to recognize, defines the basic language and diction of *Contributions.*

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56 Ibid., pp. xvi, xxiv–xxvii.
57 Theodore Kisiel suggests (in his “Review and Overview,” 283–285) that reconnecting these (as well as some other) words with their Latin heritage (*essentia*; *proprius*) would lead to another, supposedly more acceptable, better renderings of the words in question, and thus to a more “readable” text. The primacy given to this strategy without knowing its limits, a return to the “Latin archives,” notwithstanding its helpfulness in the right context, would distract from (would be contrary to) Heidegger’s own strategy, from his “return” to the Greek, not to the Latin, roots of words. It would amount to a dangerous forgetting of his criticism of the translation of Greek philosophy (especially of its basic concepts) into Latin, of the significance of this transformation in the history of be-ing and thinking. For some references in this regard, see the following works of Heidegger: *Identität und Differenz* (1955–1963), GA 11 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), pp. 9–11, 13–16, 23–24, 65–67, 76–79; *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936–1954), GA 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2000), pp. 44, 48, 49, 177–178; GA 2, section 6; GA 8, pp. 236–237; *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (lecture course at Marburg, Winter Semester 1923–1924), GA 17 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1994b), pp. 187–194.
A fair- and open-minded assessment of *Contributions* as a work of translation entails more than a lexicographical, linguistic adjudication; it ought to include the attention to the disclosive power of saying and to the way of thinking at work in it. A translation text, like any great, seminal philosophical text, is not a one-way street, not one-directional, not monological; it is multi-dimensional, interactive, hermeneutic, dialogical. For Heidegger, language, that is, speaking, (the saying-power of the text, of the translation, of the original) *is* thinking. The possibility, viability, and suitability of alternative translations, thus the differences between diverse renderings of the same original (e.g., German) text into another (e.g., English) language, originate from what is ownmost to language, from the dynamics of thoughtful saying, from the experience of thinking embodied (at work) in the text itself. Criticism without clarity about its “measure” (standard) generates more heat than light; it undermines, it does not deepen, the “hermeneutic circle” of understanding, the work of thinking. The assessment of translation, if it is to be more than a contention about self-assured preferences, ought to contend with the very “ideal” of translation as a hermeneutic-phenomenological labor, with the equal-originality (primordiality; originariness) of language and thought, with the “manner” of saying and the way of thinking. Assessing translation teaches about, deepens the understanding, the work and act of translation.

The question of translation, together with its ideal and criticism, reawakens (raises) the sense of wonder about what is ownmost to the human word, to saying and language. The saying, disclosing power of the human word is inexhaustible. As Heidegger explains, the “word of utterance” (*das Wort der Sage*), the word that says something, is “inexhaustible”; it says each time something, inceptually “sheltering” the very inception and historically grounding its truth and “interpretation” (*Auslegung*). The saying-power of the human word does not diminish with the passage of time. The “word of utterance,” the word of saying, is inexhaustible, always saying more and more deeply, more inceptually; it is attuned through and to the “voice of the unsaid” (*durchstimmt…von der Stimme des Ungesagten*); the word of saying, then, is a listening word, a word that hears the unsaid; thus saying is listening even to the unsaid sheltered in the said, in the saying. For Heidegger, as well as for the translator, words are not fixed treasures of an archive, of a guarded collection; they are “wellsprings” (*Brunnen*; fountains), not like “buckets and kegs” filled with fixed contents to be drawn (mined), but living fountains that “well up” and must be “found and dug up anew again and again.” Thus, we need to pay attention to their “saying” (*Sagen*) and to what they say. According to Heidegger’s expression, “it is

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58 GA 70, p. 32.
59 GA 70, p. 32; see also GA 8, p. 82.
60 GA 8, p. 135.
61 GA 8, p. 135.
language alone that speaks authentically (eigentlich).”\textsuperscript{62} The translation, then, merely allows, paves the way for, in the last analysis, language to speak.

Thus Contributions is not a substitution for, but the enabling, the opening up of the saying-power of Beiträge in English. Language is the “house of being because language as saying is a manner (Weise) of enowning”; it “belongs to enowning.”\textsuperscript{63} It is understandable, then, as the translators rightly claim, that the sensitivity to enowning, be-ing-historical language determines the saying-power of Contributions, the thoughtful, faithful, scholarly rendering of Beiträge into English. One ought to admit that the striving for measuring up to this ideal of translation and research is a good omen, a sign of hope, for the future of Heidegger studies in English.

References


\textsuperscript{62}GA 12, p. 254.

\textsuperscript{63}GA 12, p. 255. \textit{Note}: All translations in this study, unless otherwise indicated, are by the author.


1 Transcendental-Horizontal Concept of Dasein

In *Sein und Zeit*, the concept of Dasein is introduced for the first time in the course of the investigation, in paragraph 9 of Section 2 of the “Introduction” entitled “The Formal Structure of the Question of Being.” There we read: “This being which in each case we ourselves are and which among other things may be engaged in the possibility of inquiry, we grasp terminologically as Da-sein.” Regarding what is henceforth terminologically designated as Dasein, the text immediately continues as follows: “To pose clearly and explicitly the question of the meaning of being requires in advance an appropriate explication of a being (Da-sein) with regard to its being” (GA 2/10). In paragraph 4 of Section 4 of the Introduction the terminological designation for the being of the being that is called Dasein is introduced: “We shall call the very being to which Da-sein can relate in one way or another, and somehow always does relate, existence” (GA 2/16). Thus “Dasein” seems to be exclusively the name for a “being” distinguished by the understanding of being, while “existence”...
appears to name the “being” of this being. But what motivates us to grasp the being having an understanding of being as “Dasein”? What does this word in its terminological signification mean? How is the being that understands being characterized, if this being is designated as “Dasein”? What does the term “Dasein” name considering the being itself of that being that understands being? Does the designation “Dasein” grasp that aspect of this being that understands being, which makes it “a being,” as distinct from its being? Following the introduction of the term existence in the paragraph 4, we read: “And because the determination of the ownmost of this being cannot be achieved by indicating an objective – what-content; because its ownmost is accessible insofar as in each instance it has to be its being as its own, the term Da-sein, as a pure expression of being, has been chosen to designate this being” (GA 2/16–17). Accordingly, Dasein is a pure expression of being, an expression for being, in terms of which and in respect to which the being having an understanding of being is designated as “Dasein.” In this way, the designation “Dasein” moves close to the concept of existence as the being of beings that understand being. For like existence, “Dasein” also has to do with the being of the being designated as Dasein. In connection with existence, we have to ask nonetheless what does the word “Dasein” name beyond existence.

The clarification of the terminological significance of the word Dasein, one that is decisive for the entire existential-ontological analytic of Dasein, follows in Section 28, “The Task of a Thematic analysis of Being-in.” In paragraph 5, we read: “The being which is abidingly constituted by being-in-the-world is itself always its ‘Da’” (GA 2/176). Here, the two syllables of the word Dasein are taken apart and their terminological significance is indicated. “Dasein” consequently signifies that the being having an understanding of being, in its fundamental constitution as being-in-the-world, always “is” itself its “Da.” But this “is” means “exists,” such that the “-sein” in the word Dasein has the meaning of “existence.” But then, what terminological meaning does the Da of Dasein now have? The paragraph 5 gives us the answer: “This being (that is always its Da) bears in its ownmost being in its existence the character of not being closed off” (GA 2/176). The “Da” in Dasein means neither “here” nor “there,” nor does it mean something present (anwesend) or extant: it is solely the designation for the phenomenon of “unclosedness,” that is, for “openness.” But what kind of openness? “The expression ‘Da’ means this abiding disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)” (GA 2/176–177). The “Da” of “Dasein” has the purely ontological significance of disclosedness, which is said to belong to Dasein abidingly. The last sentence of paragraph 5 offers an important clarification concerning disclosedness and its inner constitution: “By means of the (abiding) disclosedness this being (Da-sein), along with the Dasein of the world, is for itself ‘(da)’” (GA 2/177).

Author’s parenthetical additions – Translator’s Note.

Author’s parenthetical additions – Translator’s Note.
with the Da-sein of the world.” with the “being-disclosed” “of the world.” Thereby, two things are brought to light in the Da as disclosedness: being-disclosed-for-itself, and being-disclosed of the world. Being-disclosed-for-itself means the way in which existence, constituted as being a self, is open in itself and for itself. We call this “self-like” disclosedness’ (selbsthafte Erschlossenheit). In this self-like disclosedness, existence that has understanding is removed unto (entrückt) the being-disclosed (Erschlossensein) of the world. Inasmuch as the self in its openness, in its self-like disclosedness is in itself a being-removed unto, that is, insofar as it is ecstatically constituted, we can speak of self-like-ecstatic disclosedness. That unto-which (wohin) the existing self is ecstatically disclosed is first of all the “world.” In Section 18, world is determined as the totality of significance. Heidegger calls the “unto-which” of ecstatic being-disclosed “horizon” in the sense of a field of vision. The world-horizon includes the existential for-the-sake-of-which in the form of a possibility of existence in each case having a specific content. Consequently, the disclosedness of the world for the self-like-ecstatic disclosedness of existence (and the self) is ecstatically-horizonally constituted. Accordingly, two dimensions of disclosedness (of the Da) now come to light: self-like-ecstatic and ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness. Thus, we may say that as a whole, disclosedness (or the Da) is in itself constituted as self-like-ecstatic-horizonal. In self-like-ecstatic disclosedness, existence, together with the existentials that constitute it, is held open (aufgeschlossen); while in ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness, unto-which the existing understanding self is removed, world as significance and all non-existential, and thus also categorial modes of being (such as handiness and extantness) are held open. Insofar as the existing being understands all beings other than Dasein as innerworldly beings only from out of the antecedent ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness of the world as significance and its categorial modes of being, the ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness (the Da) shows to have a range and expanse that encompasses not only innerworldy beings, but also the whole of beings.

We take the following formulation from the paragraph 6 of Section 28: the existential being “is in such a way as to be its Da” (GA 2/177). For this reason, this being is grasped terminologically as “Dasein,” wherein “Dasein” signifies: to exist in such a way as to be “its Da,” its disclosedness. The possessive pronoun “its” could give rise to the opinion that the Da is only the disclosedness of the existence of the existing being and its existentials. This widespread opinion, however, misses the mark. The existing being is “its” Da, is “its” disclosedness, because Da as disclosedness is held open only in and with the being of this being, that is, with the enactment of its being. But disclosedness is not only held open as self-like-ecstatic, but also, at the same time, as ecstatic-horizonal. Ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness indeed belongs abidingly to self-like-ecstatic disclosedness, but is to be distinguished from it as the disclosed “unto-which” of self-like-ecstatic disclosedness. “Dasein is its disclosedness” (GA 2/177) in the sense that the enjoined self-like ecstatic and horizon disclosedness as such is held open in the enactment of the existing being in its own being.

Here, in paragraph 6, disclosedness is for the first time also called “clearing” (GA 2/177). The existing being, in and with its existence and its fundamental
constitution of being-in-the-world, is “cleared,” and in such a way “that it is itself the clearing” (GA 2/177). Sections 29 and 31, following up on Section 28, each take up a fundamental existential of Dasein within which the clearing is cleared, disclosedness is held open. Thus, we read in paragraph 9: “In attunement and in understanding, we see the two equally original constitutive ways to be the Da” (GA 2/177). The existential structure of attunement (Befindlichkeit) is throwness (Geworfenheit), that of understanding (Verstehen) is projecting-open (Entwurf). “Thrownness” signifies that the existing being always already experiences itself as placed in the factical disclosedness (clearing). The factical self-disclosing of disclosedness occurs in the mode of being called throwness. In this thrown disclosedness, the existing being enacts in the mode of projecting-open what is enactable on disclosing. In the equally original occurrences of factical self-disclosing and the enactable disclosing of disclosedness the Da is open, the clearing is cleared, disclosedness held open, but held open as self-like-ecstatic and ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness.

Section 28, which is decisive for an adequate understanding of the terminological meaning of “Dasein,” states most clearly that the term “Dasein” always has to be read and understood as the “being of the Da,” also and specifically in those cases where it is used as designation for the existing being. (By no means, however, should we read the “Da” without further differentiation as “disclosedness”; for as we pursue the hermeneutic-phenomenological interpretation of the analytic of Dasein – as the analytic of the being of the Da – we have to arrive at the insight that the self-like-ecstatic and ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness are enjoined in the Da). But if “Da-sein” always has to be thought as the “being of the Da,” then it makes sense to write Dasein with a hyphen (Da-sein) rather than without the hyphen, that is, “Dasein.” Heidegger already did this once before, at the end of the paragraph 5 of Section 28, when he spoke of the “Da-sein of world.” But Heidegger also writes “Da-sein” with a hyphen in the titles of those Sections in which the fundamental and equally original modes of being of existence are laid open, that is, modes of being wherein the existing being holds open the Da as disclosedness. Those are Sections 29 (“Da-sein as Attunement”), 31 (“Da-sein as Understanding”), and 34 (“Da-sein and Discourse: Language”). The fact that Dasein in Sein und Zeit is also written with a hyphen (i.e., “Da-sein”) is mostly overlooked. The secondary literature mainly tells us that in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger writes “Dasein” without a hyphen, and that he hyphenates Dasein for the first time in Beiträge zur Philosophie and in the being-historical writings. This thesis rests on a superficial observation that is not even correct, because it overlooks the use of the hyphen in Sein und Zeit. But with this thesis one wants to say that in Sein und Zeit, “Dasein” is solely the designation for the existing being, whereas only in being-historical thinking does “Da-sein” written with a hyphen have the meaning of the “being of the Da” in the sense of “standing-forth in the clearing of being

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4 Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989); Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). Cited in the text in square brackets as CP – Translator’s Note.
(be-ing [Seyn]).” Implied in this view is the assumption that the “Da” of “Da-sein” receives the meaning of “clearing” only in being-historical thinking. However, this widely-held and apparently self-evident view overlooks (despite the unequivocal evidence presented in Section 28!) that the Da in *Sein und Zeit* exclusively means unclosedness, disclosedness, and clearing. Moreover, this view overlooks that in *Sein und Zeit* too the being of the existing being as self-like-ecstatically-cleared being stands forth unto the horizontal clearing. Insofar as Heidegger determines the thrown-projecting – open of disclosing as a surpassing, that is, as the transcending of beings in the direction of ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness, we can speak of the transcendental-horizonal dimensionality and constitution of disclosedness or clearing. Only when we have come upon the insight into the inner jointure of the Da, as the inner jointure of the clearing, are we in a position to see and to think the difference between the being of the Da in *Sein und Zeit* and in *Beiträge zur Philosophie*. However, what fundamental-ontological and the enowning-historical conceptions of the existing being of the Da hold in common is their standing-open for the clearing. It is important above all to bear in mind this commonality. For self-like-ecstatic removedness unto the horizonal disclosedness is itself an ecstatically standing-open for the horizonal clearing.

The beginning of paragraph 10 of Section 31 announces: “The projecting-open has always to do with the complete disclosedness of being-in-the-world” (GA 2/194). The phrase “complete disclosedness” is of great significance. In this vein, we could also speak of a wholly enjoined (*ganzheitliche*) disclosedness. The talk of “complete disclosedness” aims at the difference between self-like-ecstatic disclosedness of existence and the horizonal disclosedness of world. The “complete” disclosedness is not only disclosedness of existence and its “being-in,” but also, together with existence, the non-self-like, horizonal disclosedness unto which existence and its existentials are removed (for which they stand open). With the significant statement made at the end of paragraph 5 of Section 28, namely “by means of disclosedness is this being (Da-sein), along with the Dasein of the world for itself ‘(da)’” (GA 2/177), the “complete” disclosedness, with its internal differentiations came into focus.

Horizonal disclosedness, however, is not only the dimension of disclosedness for world in “being-in-the-world,” but also for “being as such,” for being and the modes of being other than existence, which are understood – in the sense of the understanding of being – by existence in its removedness unto the horizonal dimension of disclosedness. At the beginning of paragraph 16 of Section 31, we are told:

The disclosedness of the Da in understanding is itself a manner of the ability of Da-sein-to be (*Seinkönnen*). The disclosedness of being in general lies in projecting-openness (*Entworfenheit*) of Dasein’s being unto the for-the-sake-of-which and simultaneously unto meaningfulness (*Bedeutsamkeit*) [world]. An understanding of being is already anticipated in the projecting-opening unto possibilities (GA 2/196).

This is to say that in the projecting-openness (disclosedness) of existence unto a possibility of existence (for the sake of which Dasein exists), as well as in the projecting-openness (disclosedness) unto the world as meaningfulness belonging to it, there lies projecting-openness and thus disclosedness “of being in general,” that is,
not just disclosedness of being as existence and as world, but “being in general,” that is, disclosedness of non-existential, categorial being such as handiness and extantness. This allusion to the Da of Dasein as not only the disclosedness of existence and of the world, but also as the disclosedness of being in general (as a whole) whose meaning is inquired by fundamental ontology, is of paramount importance. For this allusion makes clear that the theme of “Zeit und Sein,” the inquiry into the temporal meaning of all categorial being, does not have its place outside of “Da-sein” as laid open in the analytic of Dasein, but within the Da of Dasein, within the horizontal disclosedness, which is retro-related to the self-like-ecstatic disclosedness. Thus Dasein as the being of the Da means the being of the self-like-ecstatic-disclosedness of existence, of the horizontal disclosedness of world, and of the horizontal disclosedness of being in general.

Because from the very beginning and throughout, “Dasein” in Sein und Zeit, has the terminological meaning of “being of the Da,” Heidegger could have written Da-sein with a hyphen from the first introduction of the concept and throughout the entire treatise. Even if in the initial stages of the unfolding of Sein und Zeit the fundamental phenomenon of disclosedness and clearing as the ontological meaning of the Da is not demonstrated (disclosedness is first mentioned in paragraph 10 of Section 16), had Heidegger from the outset consistently used the hyphenated spelling of Da-sein, he would have indicated that this word has completely relinquished its usual meaning and received an entirely new meaning. The new English translation of Sein und Zeit by Joan Stambaugh, follows Heidegger’s directive that “Da-sein” has the ontological meaning of the “being of the Da” and writes the untranslated word “Da-sein” throughout the text with a hyphen. No objection should be raised against Stambaugh’s decision to write “-sein” with a capital S in contrast to Heidegger’s hyphenated spelling of “Da-sein,” because she thus takes up the spelling of Sein with a capital S from Heidegger’s explication of Dasein’ as the “Sein of the Da.” For even when the word Sein in “Da-Sein,” is written with a capital S this word does not mean being in general but only being as existence. But when the translator translates the “Da” as “there” – for example, in the important paragraph 5 of Section 28 – then given everything we have said so far about the specific meaning of the “Da,” we must view this translation as unacceptable. Because from the outset the word “Da” receives the purely ontological meaning of disclosedness, the word “there” should not at all appear in the translation. And yet, Stambaugh translates the following sentences (already elucidated by us) by using the word “there”: “Der Ausdruck ‘Da’ meint diese wesenhafte Erschlossenheit. Durch sie ist dieses Seiende (das Dasein) in eins mit dem Da-sein von Welt für es selbst ‘da.’” In her translation, these sentences read: “The expression ‘there’ means this essential disclosedness. Through disclosedness this being (Da-sein) is ‘there’ for itself together with the Da-sein of the world” (BT/125). Now, if the word “Dasein” is taken over untranslated, then one would also have to let the word Da in Da-sein remain untranslated.

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Should this be the case, then the English translation would have the following formulation: “The expression ‘Da’ means this essential disclosedness. Through disclosedness this being (Da-sein) is ‘da’ for itself together with the Da-sein of the world.” To translate the word Da from Da-sein with “there” while taking over the concept of Da-sein, untranslated, is inconsistent. Thus, for example, the translation of the title of the sub-section “A” of chapter five of Sein und Zeit, namely, “Die existenziale Konstitution des Da,” as “The Existential Constitution of the There” is extraordinarily annoying. There too the word Da should have been left untranslated. But if one wants the translation to reflect the meaning of the word Da, then one should, inasmuch as this word means nothing other than Erschlossenheit, speak of “disclosedness” or “disclosure” rather than “there.” 6 Although from early on Heidegger repeatedly emphasized that the term “das Dasein” is not translatable, nonetheless we have to see clearly that each component of the word has a meaning that is translatable and which in fact have been translated. The component “sein” of “Da-sein” is translated as “being” and insofar as the component “Da” has the meaning of “Erschlossenheit,” it is translated as disclosure. 7 In this vein, one could raise the question whether one could find a rendition of “Da-sein,” in the sense of “Erschlossenheit sein.”

The Da of Da-sein has the meaning of self-like-ecstatic and ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness, and this is disclosedness of existence, world, and being in general. Section 44 of Sein und Zeit shows that as clearing the fundamental phenomenon of disclosedness, constitutes “the primordial phenomenon of truth,” cf., the sub-section b, entitled “The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth and the Derivative Character of the Traditional Concept of Truth” (BT 201). Now, if “being in general” means “being (Sein) as a whole” and if being in general encompasses existence, world, and categorial being, then the disclosedness of being in general reveals the “truth of being,” truth understood here as disclosedness or clearing. Thus, with the words “the truth-character of being” (GA 24, p. 33), the fourth basic problem of hermeneutical-phenomenological fundamental ontology is spelled out – the problem that belongs to the theme of the third Division (“Zeit und Sein”) of the first Part of Sein und Zeit. 8

Section 44 of the existential-ontological analytic of Dasein sets the stage for the treatment of the “truth of being” in that third Division, whose “new,” that is, its second elaboration appears in Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24, p. 1), that is, in the Marburg lectures course text of the summer semester 1927. Thus, it behooves to keep in mind that the theme of the “truth of being” does not appear for the first time with the enowning-historical unfolding of the question of being in the Beiträge zur Philosophie. This theme belongs already to the fundamental-ontological unfolding of the question of being. The fundamental question of the meaning of being in

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6 All three words, ‘disclosedness,’ ‘disclosure,’ and ‘there’ in English in the original – Translator’s Note.
7 The two words, ‘being,’ and ‘disclosure’ in English in the original – Translator’s Note.
8 M. Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975).
general, which from a systematic point of view receives its answer in the third Division, “Zeit und Sein” encompasses the fundamental problem of the “truth of being” with the difference that in fundamental ontology, the “truth of being” is structured transcendental-horizonally, while in the thinking of enowning the “truth of being,” rather than having a transcendental-horizonal structure has an enowning-structure. Following this immanent transformation, the transcendental-horizonal concept of Da-sein also changes into the enowning-akin (ereignishaft) concept of Da-sein.

2 The Enowning-akin Concept of Da-sein

The passage from the transcendental-horizonal to the being-historical or enowning-historical posing of the question of being is preceded by the experience of thinking, that not only existing within the possibilities of existence of being-in-the-world, but above all, the truth of being itself, is historical (geschichtlich). This is experiencing that the historicity of the “-sein” of Da-sein is founded in the historicity of the “Da” as the truth of being. To the experience of the historicity of truth as the historicity of the clearing of being belongs the insight into the provenance of thrownness (unto the truth or clearing of being) from out of the primary forth-throw of the truth of being. The clearing forth-throw is distinguished by the relation of enownment to the throwing-opening being of Da-sein. From out of this enowning relation, “unto which” the throwing-opening being (Da-sein) is first of all thrown unto the forth-throw of the truth of being, the throwing-opening being (Da-sein), insofar as it is a thrown projecting-open, becomes an enowned projecting-open arising out of the enowning forth-throw. The enowning relation (Bezug) to the projecting-opening being and the enowned relationship (Verhältnis) of projecting-open the forth-throw of the truth of being – this counter-resonance of enowning relation and enowned relationship receives the terminological name “enowning” (Ereignis) [cf., in this regard Section 122 of Beiträge zur Philosophie, p. 239].

Holding in our regard the formally indicated structural relations of “enowning”; of enowning-akin belongingness of the “truth of being” and “Da-sein,” we shall now proceed to elucidate the enowning-akin concept of Da-sein and to distinguish it from the transcendental-horizontal concept of Da-sein. We shall draw upon a key passage from Section 140 of Beiträge entitled, “Die Wesung des Seyns.” The passage chosen for our purpose begins as follows: “The truth of be-ing and thus be-ing itself holds sway only where and when there is Da-sein” (GA 65, 261, CP 184). First commenting on this passage, we observe: truth as truth for being and this being itself as the being of truth – the truth of being understood in this way unfolds its sway as the happening of its essential swaying only where and when Da-sein is,

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9 Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie, GA 65, ed. F.-W. v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989).
that is, exists. Truth as the clearing of being does not prevail \((\textit{waltet})\) without Da-sein, not without the being of the Da. This also holds true in principle for the fundamental-ontological positioning of the truth of being and for the fundamental-ontological positioning of Da-sein. But while, within the transcendental-horizontal inquiry, it is the truth of being that becomes apparent in the Da of Da-sein, in the enowning-historical inquiry it is the \textit{way of truth, or the way of clearedness} of the lightening-clearing of being \((\textit{der lichtenden Lichtung des Seins})\) that at a given time \((\textit{jeweilig})\) shows itself in the Da of Da-sein. The clearing lights up at a given time in the enowning forth-throw of a \textit{historical} way of clearedness. So we have to distinguish between the lightening-clearing of being and the Da as the happening of a way of clearedness happening at a given time. The lightening-clearing itself \textit{does not exhaust itself} in the historicity of the Da of Da-sein at a given time. The way of clearedness of the clearing – \textit{historical} at a given time and hence historically self-transforming – is as thrown-forth also projected-open. Truth as the clearing of being sways (prevails) in the enowning forth-throw. But it \textit{belongs to} its abiding happening that the forth-thrown way of clearedness be received and enopened through the projecting-opening \textit{being} of Da-sein. Besides the enowning relation, there belongs to the abiding happening of truth as the clearing of being, the relationship to the ways of clearedness. This relationship comes from the enowning relation, and is enowned and only as enowned is projected-open. As an enowning forth-throw, the truth of being does not prevail without the enowned projecting-open.

But “Da-sein ‘is’ (exists) only where and when there is the being of truth” \([\text{CP 184, interpolations by the author}]\). This means: Da-sein can exist only as being, as the projecting-open of the Da, insofar as the being of truth lights up in the enowning forth-throw as the way of clearedness of the Da for the being that projects-open. Truth as the clearing of being prevails in the way of clearedness that is thrown-forth at a given time, but only insofar as this way of clearedness, is projected-open by the being that projects-open.

That the truth of being in its enowning forth-throw prevails only if the way of clearedness is seized and enopened by the being of enowned Dasein and projected-open and that, conversely, Da-sein as the projecting-opening of the being of the Da only exists insofar as the being of truth throws itself forth in a way of clearedness for the projecting-open; this is \textit{the turning, which points out precisely the essential sway of being itself as the counter-resonating enowning} \([\text{CP 184} \text{)}. Da-sein, as the projecting-opening of the being of the Da, does not exist over-against \((\textit{Gegenüber})\) the truth of being and enowning; rather, as the enowned projecting-open that counter-resonates with the enowning forth-throw, the projecting-opening of the being of the Da belongs \textit{in} enowning. Enowned projecting-open and enowning forth-throw are the two counter-resonating relations that – in their counter-resonance – make up the turning, that is, the enowning that is in itself turning \((\textit{das in sich kehrige Ereignis})\).

Accordingly, we can say: “Enowing grounds Da-sein in itself” \((\text{CP 184})\). Because the Da is cleared and thrown unto the enowning relation, and because the projecting-opening being, as thrown unto a forth-thrown way of clearedness is an enowned being that belongs to the enowing relation and so along with this relation, makes up the complete, counter-resonating turning-enowning, enowning
grounds the being of the Da not vis-à-vis itself, but “in itself.” Conversely, we have to say: “Da-sein grounds enowning” (CP 184). That is, through the enactment of Dasein’s projecting-opening being, Dasein grounds a way of clearedness that is thrown-forth in enownment. In enowning, a twofold counter-resonating grounding is in play: the enowing forth-throw grounds by lighting up a way of clearedness. The enowned projecting-open in this play grounds insofar as it takes over the way of clearedness grounded in enownment and allows it in enopening to prevail. Because the Da and the being of the Da are determined from out of the forth-thrown enownment, enowning as enownment grounds the being of the Da in itself, and Da-sein as projecting-opening being grounds the Da that is enowned from out of enownment. In this sense, the being of the Da grounds enowning (enownment as what is enowned in the Da).

But why is the clearing forth-throw of the way of clearedness grasped as “enowning”? What is here the primary meaning? Section 143 of Beiträge answers this question: “Being as en-owning. En-ownment determines man as owned by be-ing” (CP 185). The hyphenated spelling – en-owning, (Er-eignis), en-ownment (Er-eignen) – has an indicative function. It indicates that “-owning” (−eignis) and “-ownment” (eignung) are to be experienced and thought with an eye to “ownhood (Eigentum).” En-owning in its en-ownment determines Da-sein-akin-man (da-sein-smäßigen Menschen) as its ownhood, as owned by be-ing that en-owns. The being of the Da – the being of the Da-sein-akin-man – is thrown from the en-owning forth-throw of a way of clearedness unto this clearedness; and in such a way that this being can enact itself as a projecting-opening being only out of its being-thrown into a way of clearedness. As such a thrown being of the Da (way of clearedness), it is a being enowned out of the cleared enownment and as such it is primarily owned by the clearing-enowning-be-ing. Only as the enowned ownhood (ereignetes Eigentum) of be-ing is the being of the Da in itself and for itself enopened as a Self. Thus en-owning (Er-eignen) means “to determine as ownhood”; being enowned means “to be determined as ownhood”. En-owning (Er-eignis) is primarily en-ownment “in the sense of determining the being of the Da as ownhood”; and the counter-resonating-being-en-owned (gegenschwingendes Er-eignetsein) means to determine the projecting-opening being of the Da as ownhood.

This fundamental meaning of enowning (Er-eignen) and of being-enowned (Ereignetsein) – the determination-to-ownhood and being-determined-to-ownhood – is strictly to be observed in every attempt to translate the grounding word “Er-eignis” into another language. This ineluctable requirement has been outstandingly met by Parvis Emad in the English translation of Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), entitled Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning).10 In the “Translators’ Foreword,” he shows on what grounds the attempts previously made

10M. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1999); see also Parvis Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), pp. 21–42. Regarding the word “en-owning” and its first time use, see the discussion of Zueignung on p. 82 ff.
at translating the fundamental word “Ereignis” – “event,” “appropriation,” “event of appropriation,” “befitting” – are unsuitable for rendering the peculiar movement of enowning as enowment in the sense of “determining to ownhood.” This philosophical and ultimately philosophical insight leads him to take up the verb “to own” and to coin the word “Enowning.” Thus the first sentence of Section 143, upon which we drew to interpret Ereignis, reads in English translation as follows: “Be-ing as en-owning. En-ownment determines man as owned by be-ing” (CP 185). With en-owning as a point of departure, we can also easily enact the translation of “Er-eignung” as “en-ownment.”

We close this discussion by juxtapositioning the transcendental-horizontal concept of Da-sein, and the enowning-akin concept of Da-sein and by comparing them. In both concepts, Da-sein means: to be the Da, being of the Da. Consequently, the being that the Da is, the being of the Da, has the ecstatic character of being-removed- unto, or of standing-open-for, the Da. In the fundamental-ontological as in the enowning-historical concept of Da-sein, the Da has the meaning of unclosedness, openness, clearing of being in general and as a whole. Therefore, it makes sense to write not only the enowning-historical but also the fundamental-ontological concept of “Da-sein” with a hyphen.

In the fundamental-ontologically and thus transcendental-horizontaly constituted Da-sein, the being of the Da is determined as being-thrown into the Da, and as the projecting-open of the Da. In the horizontal dimension of the Da, the thrown projecting-open (opening up) is enacted as transcending while transcending is disclosed as the self-like-ecstatic Da. The Da as a whole is therefore transcendental-horizontal disclosedness.

In the enowning-historical determination of Da-sein, being-thrown “unto” Da receives the characterization of being-enowned out of the clearing of enownment. And correspondingly, what is thrown becomes enowned projecting-open (to be projecting-opening). From out of clearing enownment, transcending within the horizon transforms itself into the enowned projecting open of the Da as the historical way of clearedness. The horizon, the horizontal dimension of the Da, disappears unto the clearing-enownment. Here, the Da of Da-sein is thrown unto the clearing-enownment and is projected-open in the enowned projecting-opening. It is the Da thrown-forth unto enownment and projected-open in enowned projecting-opening.

References


11 Ibid., pp. xix ff.
12 In English in the original – Translator’s Note.


Husserl and Heidegger on Da-sein: With a Suggestion for Its Interlingual Translation

Ivo De Gennaro

To renounce or banish a new word or a new meaning of this word (no matter how foreign and barbaric it may be), when our language does not have an equivalent, or does not have it as precise, not having received it in that own and determined sense, is (and cannot be less than) to renounce and banish, and treat as barbaric and illicit, a new idea and a new concept of the human spirit.

Giacomo Leopardi, Zibaldone di pensieri, p. 2400

As shall soon become clear, the following text is not a “neutral” attempt to compare systematically the positions of two thinkers with regard to a certain concept or phenomenon called “Dasein.” In fact, such a comparison inevitably takes on the form of a computation, and thus of an evaluation, of the compared terms. In order to


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compute and evaluate these terms, we need to have previously seized them in a computable form, that is, as values. This is done by means of historical formats. The formatted and thus computable terms are pure data, that is, given concepts depurated of their philosophical stress. Moreover, in order to perform this formating seizure, our thinking self must have acceded to the will that wills the computability, and therefore formatability, of all sense, so that this sense may function as a willable value within the self-implementation of the pure will to will.

So much for the supposed neutrality of systematic comparisons.

Instead of carrying through such a comparison, the essay attempts to clarify the sense in which Da-sein is not a concept, or a thought, we could assign to a particular thinker, but “the crisis between the first and the other onset (Anfang)” of thinking. However, the clarification requires that this crisis be not merely “known” and “expressed,” but actually said, that is, shown as a knowledge that language itself, here the English mother-language, has already left to be thought. Finally, the path leading towards a tentative English word for Da-sein might show that the task of translation, which is the same as the task of thinking, has nothing to do with providing operative results, and is, instead, a matter of venturing on the path itself.

1 Introduction

The word Dasein was introduced in the eighteenth century as a German translation of the Latin existentia. Grammatically, it is a noun formed from the verb dasein meaning “to be there.” Where English, Italian, and French philosophy say, respectively, “existence,” esistenza and existence, German philosophy, when it starts speaking German, says either Existenz or Dasein, that is, “being there.” Hence, it is not surprising that we find the word Dasein throughout German philosophy: in Kant and in Hegel, in Schelling and in Nietzsche, in Husserl and in Heidegger. However, the sense in which anything is said to “be there” changes according to the metaphysical grounding-stance of each thinker. Consequently, an enquiry entitled, for example, “Kant and Hegel on Dasein” would have to show how the sense of Dasein is modified according to the respective grounding-thoughts of these two thinkers, namely, their determination of the being of beings. On the other hand, Heidegger’s use of the word stands out in at least two respects: firstly, Dasein here seems to have a more specific sense than that of the Latin existentia. Secondly, in this more specific sense it is not merely a received concept undergoing a certain interpretation and thus finding its place within a philosophical system; rather, it is itself one of the names of the grounding-thought of this thinking. Indeed, in Heidegger, Dasein does not have the generic meaning of “existence,” but refers to the being of man and only

This word, spelt with one “t,” is to be distinguished from the technical term “formatted” used in information technology and other fields.

See GA 65, p. 295; tr. 208–209.
to that: man is said to exist, but in a unique sense of “existing.” A critical passage of Being and Time\(^4\) reads: “Das ‘Wesen’ des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz”: “The ‘Wesen’ of Dasein resides in its existence.” In this sentence, Wesen, Dasein, and Existenz speak differently than they do in the tradition of philosophy.\(^5\) This difference is not merely the result of a diverging terminological choice, but the consequence of the rise of a new phenomenon. This is why in one of his lecture courses on Nietzsche Heidegger states: “Was wir mit ‘Dasein’ bezeichnen, kommt in der bisherigen Geschichte der Philosophie nicht vor”: “That which we indicate with the word ‘Dasein’ <has as yet not come to the fore and thus> cannot be found in the hitherto Geschichte of philosophy.”\(^6\)

Meanwhile, it seems that we have, so to speak in passing, already given an answer to the question implicit in the title “Husserl and Heidegger on Dasein,” namely the question: “What does Dasein mean, respectively, in Husserl and in Heidegger?” The answer reads more or less as follows: While in Husserl Dasein indicates the existence of any being whatsoever in a sense of existence that is to be determined in its pure intentional constitution, in Heidegger Dasein designates the peculiar being of man, and it does so in a sense that, moreover, proves to be crucial for the one and only question of his thinking, namely, the more general question of “being itself.” However, if this answer is correct, there seems to be hardly any point in contrasting the meaning of Dasein in these two thinkers. Once it is seen that, in using this word, Husserl and Heidegger indicate two different matters, there is not much left to be gained from contrasting the two positions.

However, despite its correctness, the answer is insufficient. It is insufficient in that it takes an external standpoint vis-à-vis the question. From this standpoint, we compare two positions relatively to a concept named Dasein, of which we know that “somehow it means existence.” But where exactly is this standpoint located? Can

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\(^5\) Wesen is written in quotation marks in order to indicate the suspension of the metaphysical sense of this word (i.e. Wesen as “essence”) in favor of the manner in which the same word speaks in the Denkweg (i.e., Wesen in its so-called “verbal” understanding). In a fully expanded version, the citation should therefore read: “Dasein’s biding – which the (now broken) forgottenness of the sake of thinking only allows to grasp as “essence” – resides in its existence.”

\(^6\) Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche I (Pfullingen: Neske, 1989b), p. 278. If we translate Geschichte with “history,” the quoted passage appears as a purely historical proposition, technically speaking, as a mere information. Alternatively, we can translate Geschichte, as a diction of the Denkweg, with the old English word “wyrd” (from the I.E. [Indo-European] root *uer-, as in German werden; cf. weird). In this word resounds the abruptness of the self-absconcing “giving to wit” (and thus assigning) in which Geschichte consists. By saying: “That which we indicate with the word Dasein cannot be found in the hitherto wyrd of philosophy,” the sentence loses its merely propositional and informational character and reads as a saying of thinking. (On the translation of Geschichte and schicken, respectively, with “wyrd” and “to weird” see below, footnote 24, and my article “Owning to the Belongingness to Be-ing or Thinking as Surrender: Parvis Emad’s Book on Beiträge and the English Denkweg,” in Heidegger Studies, 25, 2009: 115–141.) – The “quasi-adjectival” use of “hitherto” is attested in the Oxford English Dictionary (“The hitherto experience of men” – Green, Ethics).
there be an external standpoint to this matter? Certainly not, if the question is to be a philosophical one. As a matter of fact, philosophy is precisely the instant in which there is no more external standpoint. Philosophy consists in an interrogative stance that, irrupting in the middle of wavering contingency, and thus of the ever undecided and the infinite viewpoints that are based on it, sustains the want of that which provisionally we may call a schismatic decision. Philosophy is the schismatic instant, and therefore has no external standpoints that could serve as a basis for historical vistas or the scanning scrutiny of concepts. Hence, the answer we have just given to the question concerning the “use” Husserl and Heidegger make of the word Dasein is not philosophical. Why? Because we were implicitly relying on an undecided, merely given, operative sense of “existence,” a sense that does without the schism that in the first place asks for the assenting philosophical word in order for a reign of sense (a world) to arise. Philosophy sustains the “schismatic decision” that yields the sense in which anything is given.7 It belongs to, and thus haunts and heeds, the awareness of the initial giving that not only lies in all givenness, but silently transforms it.

2 Husserl

All of a sudden, we are set in the middle of things. In fact, givenness, being given, Gegebensein, is in Husserl a synonym of Dasein. For Husserl, philosophy is a decision concerning the sense of the natural, unreflected givenness of things. This decision originates in phenomenological ἐποχή (epoché) and reduction, that is, in the methodical a priori element of evidence. Evidence as a norm-giving methodical principle means: bringing into view the transcendental constitution of the sense of things in its (i.e., of this constitution) pure self-givenness. Husserl uses the words da, daseind, Daseiendes, etc., chiefly for the givenness of the world in the general thesis as carried out in the natural stance. For instance, in Ideas, we read the following: “… alles aus der natürlichen Welt erfahrungmäßig und vor jedem Denken Bewuβte, trägt in seiner Gesamtheit … den Charakter ‘da’, ‘vorhanden’”: “… anything belonging to the natural world, and conscious [i.e., given to consciousness] in the form of experience, before any thinking takes place, bears, in its gathered entirety, … the character ‘da’, ‘vorhanden’.”8 Dasein, or, which for Husserl is the same, Vorhandensein, is the achievement of a thesis (a position, a positive act), in the first place of the position we constantly perform, before any thinking takes place, in the natural stance, that is, by the mere fact of being the conscious beings we are.

But there are also other positions. For instance, in the arithmetical stance, we obtain the *Dasein* of the arithmetical world with its arithmetical objects. This peculiar positive or thetical stance coexists with the one that posits the natural world. Moreover, since *Dasein* is existence (i.e., “positedness”) *in the light of positive consciousness*, it is, strictly speaking, the name of a relation, namely, the relation between man and the world. Consequently, *Dasein* indicates a certain manner of “being there” of beings together with a certain “being there” of man – here, the “being there” as the naturally positing consciousness of natural experience.

The sense of phenomenological *epoché* as a decision concerning the natural conscious *Dasein* is to refrain from straightforwardly carrying out thetical acts, in the first place the position of the natural world. This counternatural refraining (i.e., abstaining, holding off, inhibiting, putting out of play) interrupts the exclusiveness of the general thesis. However, the negative sense of this interruption – the fact of saying “no” to the position of the natural world (i.e., of holding back from it) – consists in an eminently positive phenomenon. This phenomenon is the breaking, or, we shall say, the *irruption* of the dimension of pure transcendental intentionality, that is, the realm of apodictic evidence. The irruption of this dimension is positive in an original sense, in that it primarily establishes, that is, “ur-posit” (and in this sense decides) the likelihood (*Möglichkeit*) of the natural position. The interruption of the relative evidence of the general thesis and the irruption of transcendental or absolute evidence are the same.

*Epoché* therefore means: allowing the irruption of the realm of absolutely positing evidence. This irruption implies a detachment from natural positivity, that is, from natural *Dasein*. The detachment is such that it leaves the givenness and that which is given unchanged, literally untouched. And yet, nothing is as it used to be. In fact, everything now appears in the light of its transcendental constitution within the gathered entirety of consciousness. Everything is now overtly immanent in transcendental subjectivity, this immanence being either noetic (*reell*) or, in the case of that which transcends consciousness, noematic (*ideell*). The *da*-hood of the natural world is now supplemented (in a sense that shall soon be specified) by the absolute *da*-hood of experiencing life in the modality of abstinence. As a consequence, the natural faith in the being of the world is not any more merely *da*, but, Husserl says, “mit *da*,” that is, it is “there” – now as a “mere phenomenon” – together with the sight of pure experience in which it is seized. Hence, *Mit-da-sein* is the trait of phenomenality of all natural objects as such.

The supplementation accomplished thanks to phenomenological *epoché* can thus be characterized as a shift of the *da*-character of the being of things from the

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9We ought in fact to speak of an “allowing,” in that the *Urphänomen* of evidence consists in the ur-movement of appearing as giving-*itself by itself*, which, though being ur-posed in the transcendental stance, is nevertheless not made but admitted.

10The meaning of *ideell* is: *darinsein als immanenter gegenständlicher Sinn*, that is, being there-within as an immanent objective sense.

da-hood of natural positivity to the da-hood of evident or absolute positivity, or again, with an even shorter formula, as a shift from da to selbst-da, where the first, natural da does not disappear, but becomes mit da. As we shall see, this shift, which is constitutive for the self-being of things, is the liberation of the da-character itself that before was, in a sense, caught in (and covered by) the straightforward natural stance. The beginning of §24 of the Cartesian Meditations, in which Husserl characterizes the meaning of evidence, allows us to state this shift with his own words: “Im weitesten Sinne bezeichnet Evidenz ein allgemeines Urphänomen des intentionalen Lebens …, die ganz ausgezeichnete Bewußtseinweise der Selbsterscheinung, des Sich-selbst-Darstellens, des Sich-selbst-Gebens einer Sache … im Endmodus des ‘Selbst da’, ‘unmittelbar anschaulich’, ‘originaliter’ gegeben”: “In the broadest sense, evidence indicates a general original phenomenon of intentional life …, <namely,> the eminent manner of consciousness <that consists in> the self-appearance, the self-position as itself, the self-giving as itself of a thing … in the final mode of <being> ‘itself da,’ ‘immediately intuitive,’ given ‘originaliter’.”

If it is true that Dasein implies a relation of man and world, the detachment from natural Dasein must result in a transformation of this whole relation. The transformation that takes place, thanks to the lift-off (or the free-throw) from the general thesis, is the translation of all relations into structures of pure intentionality. As a consequence of this detachment, my own Dasein as a psycho-physical (i.e., animal) human being is inhibited in its exclusive natural validity in favor of the open abiding (Anwesen) of the pure self-reflecting transcendental I. In other words, a sort of de-animalization takes place. The structures of pure intentionality articulate the realm of evidence, which, in turn, is sustained by the evidencing eye of transcendental consciousness. The verb “evidencing” indicates the act in which evidence itself consists. In this sense, we say: evidence is evidencing, and that which ultimately evidences, and therefore is the ultimate, absolute evidence, is the pure I, that is, the original and originating, universally constituting subject. Hence, evidencing is the transcendental structure of natural positive acts. The transcendental I is the absolute universal είδος (eidos) for all ειδή (eide) as evidences. As a consequence, the relation between absolutely subjective evidencing and intentional evidence is, in a formal sense, the same as that between the idea of the good and any single idea in Plato.

What exactly happens in the shift of Dasein from natural to pure, from naïvely thetical to explicitly transcendental, from pre-phenomenological to phenomenological? A sufficient answer to this question requires in the first place that we further characterize natural Dasein as it appears within our asking. Therefore, the next question is: What precisely does Husserl mean with “the character ‘da’”? How are we to understand this character borne by the entirety of beings as such?

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13 However, as far as I can see, even in this formal sense, there remains in Plato an element that in Husserl we do not find, namely, the undecided relation between φύσις (physis) and είδος (eidos).
As mentioned earlier, Husserl uses the words *da*, *vorhanden*, *gegeben* synonymously. However, these words are not at all equal. In fact, *gegeben* says more than *vorhanden*, and *da*, in turn, says more than *gegeben*. If *vorhanden* indicates the mere contingency (as a manner of the concreteness) of a thing, *gegeben* suggests that this concreteness has a provenance, that is, that it owes itself to and rests on a giving. However, *gegeben*, in turn, does not say anything about the specific character of this provenance or the nature of the giving. This is, on the other hand, precisely what the word *da* does. In its primary sense, the German word *da* indicates the flagrant clearance (or simply the flagrancy) in which anything may show itself as itself, from itself and by itself, in which it may itself stand and rest in its selfhood, in short, the clearance by virtue of which anything (with a word of Gerald Manley Hopkins, here minted anew for the purposes of thinking) may itself selve. In other words, in *da* speaks the trait of this “may” for (i.e., in favor of) selfhood, and therefore also the element in which something like an ur-posited self-giving, that is, evidence, may take place. Anticipating what will be shown below in the elucidation of the dimension that the *Denkweg* names *Da*, we can say that *da*, as the clearance of the “may” for any showing, indicates two originally related traits: (a) pure, discontingent (unseizable and unseizing) towardness or favorableness (i.e., a liking) with regard to the (likely) self-same abiding of things; (b) the wanting truth of this towardness, namely, its (this truth’s) want of being sustained (i.e., of being, in turn, liked or believed) precisely in its seizelessness. Being, thus characterized as the liked liking of the likely, that is, as the “may,” whose flagrant clearance is indicated as *da*, can also be called likelihood. As we shall soon see, evidence is itself likely only on the ground of the forgottenness and unawareness of this likelihood as such, and therefore of the sake (*Sache*) that Heidegger eventually names das Da. It is by no means a contradiction if we say that, while evidence is likely only on the ground of this forgottenness, this same forgottenness, once it becomes flagrant, implies the unlike-lihood (*Unmöglicheit*) of evidence as the truth of beings.

In the quotation from *Ideas*, we find a trace of this forgotten may-element in the brightness and light – in this case, the natural light – of consciousness: “anything conscious – Husserl says – bears the character ‘da’.” The detachment described as an interruption of the general thesis and as the breaking of the realm of apodictic evidence, liberates the light of consciousness, which, as long as it is trapped in the natural relation of *Dasein*, remains invisible as such. The name of the liberated light of consciousness is: apodictically evidencing evidence. In the realm of evidence, the *Dasein* of the world is liberated into its pure intentional constitution, while thinking is, in turn, freed into its highest self-reflective clarity. Both that constitution and this

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14 On the rigorous meaning of “contingency” see below, p. 232.
15 The primary sense is the grounding-trait that says itself in a word. This trait is the *origin* of a variety of meanings and tones, and therefore does not coincide with any of the meanings a dictionary may record.
16 We need to keep the notion of likelihood clear both from the common and from the technical (statistical) meaning of this word.
clarity are absolute. Hence, phenomenological *epoché* and reduction consist in a coming-to-itself of transcendental subjectivity, which initially liberates, successively explores and finally secures the pure *da*-character of beings in the whole, that is, the absolute light of consciousness in which they appear.

At this point, it becomes even more urgent that we gain a sufficient insight into the *da*-character itself. For it is this character that the meditating eye becomes in a certain manner aware of and minds, and that, in its pure form, is the very element of eidetic phenomenology. We said before that, in the triad of (apparent) synonyms *vorhanden*-gegeben-*da*, *da* is richer than *gegeben*, which, in turn, says more than *vorhanden*. Nevertheless, as we shall now see, it is in fact the character “*vorhanden*” that will allow us to identify the decisive trait of Husserl’s understanding of “being there.” It can be shown that it is this character that – in a manner that is as kept from being minded as it is critical – determines the sense of *da*-hood and thus the pure element of evidence, and therefore, finally, the entire scope of transcendental phenomenology. In formal terms, we will conclude that the traits of the *da*-character necessarily only supplement the *vorhanden*-character and the kind of givenness this character implies. Although it adds a “light” to mere *Vorhandensein*, the supplementing is constrained within this very manner of being, which remains, in some sense, unbroken. In other words, the *da*-character fundamentally retains the trait of *Vorhandensein*. Let us look at this matter more closely.

Once again: What is concerning Husserl’s thinking when he says: All beings as such bear the character “*da*,” “*vorhanden*”? I shall tentatively, and specifically with regard to the guiding character “*vorhanden*,” call this concern “(natural or pure) contingency.” In the present context – and it is of crucial importance that this be understood and kept in mind – the sense of “contingency” is different from the traditional philosophical as well as from the ordinary meaning of this word. Thus, contingency here does not refer to that which happens by chance or depends, that is, “is contingent,” upon something else, and therefore is never essential. In other words, “contingent” is not to be understood, as it is usually the case, in opposition to “necessary,” “substantial,” or “absolute.” Instead, we now hear the word “contingent” (*cum + tangere*) as “being (already) contiguous, being (already) in contact.” Contingency is now the name for a manner of being (and precisely for a manner of concreteness or *Wirklichkeit*) that consists in a peculiar contiguity. In turn, this contiguity consists in an impact that implies the staying away of what we shall call nearness. The nearness that, in the sphere of contingency, stays away (i.e., withholds itself), is the open, impregnable nearness (that sways) between who man may be and what beings themselves may show as. It is the nearness of this sheer “may,” that is, as we can now say, the nearness of sheer likelihood. The staying away means: the nearness refuses to afford itself (not “in general,” but) *in its own onsetting* (*anfänglich*) “light,” that is, in a flagrancy claiming to be grounded as such and in its

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17 Anticipating the findings of Section IV of this essay, we can say that the character “*vorhanden*” implies that the givenness of the given is cast into contingency (i.e., that it is, in a manner of speaking, “contingentated”) in such a way that the original giving (the *Es gibt*) is not heard, as such, in and through the *da*. 
Where nearness stays away, the encounter of (contingent) man and (contingent) beings is a clash. This clash, which is the same as the refusal of nearness, is hidden, and this means: it shows the trait of an itself forgotten abscondedness (Verborgenheit). More precisely, the clash does not show itself as what it is, namely, that which abscondedly holds sway and attunes thinking where contingency is broken, but not broken in a sufficient manner. The rigorous determination of this insufficiency is: the breaking (the schism) itself does not flash (i.e., become flagrant) as such, and thus is not grounded in its own truth, that is, as the onset. With reference to the now elucidated phenomenon, we shall speak of the hidden clash (or impact) of contingency. This hidden clash determines, in different manners, all metaphysical thinking.

In the domain of insufficiently broken contingency, man touches beings as such and beings concern man as such, so that the two are intertwined in each other’s being. However, precisely the inter, the in-between of this intertwining, is initially and ultimately consigned to the relation of the self-contained givenness of beings and the self-contained givenness of man (e.g., man’s being as the contingent subjectivity of consciousness). As a consequence, the in-between – namely, the nearness itself – now only flashes as a character of self-contained beings, that is, as a supplement to their self-contained being. This flashing is what our tradition knows as the light (lumen) in which beings appear as such, that is to say, in their being or, as we must more rigorously say, in their beingness. However, the nearness that flashes from the contingent intertwining of man and beings not only refuses its own sway, it even keeps to itself this refusal as such.

When we speak of the hidden impact, or clash, of contingency, we are not referring to an ontical contact between given things and given thinking beings. Rather, the indicated phenomenon pertains to the “natural” undecidedness of sense into which mankind as such is cast. In the first onset of thinking, whence stems the metaphysical decision on the givenness and therefore on the da-character of beings, the clash of contingency is decided (and thus broken) in a unique manner, which, in an essential sense, remains forever enigmatic. In fact, contingency now holds sway, in the described hidden manner, within the schismatic decision in which the first onset of

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18 As long as we understand the “refusing to afford itself” merely “in general,” we are understanding the nearness itself as an object. The rigor of thinking in the dimension of the being-wyrd (Seinsgeschichte) consists in showing how metaphysical thinking attains the nearness via contingency, namely, as the beingness of beings. See my “Owning to the Belongingness to Be-ing,” p. 116, footnotes 3 and 4.

19 “Contingency is broken, but the breaking (the schism) is not grounded as such:” This formula describes the Greek onset of thinking as the onset of the tradition of philosophy. What the Denkweg is there to indicate is that the grounding of the schism’s own truth becomes both likely and a stressing need only in the thinking of Da-sein prompted by the Seinsfrage, whose flashing has already forethought, and thus opened, the depth of Da-sein that thinking, by itself, can never attain.

20 See Ivo De Gennaro and Gino Zaccaria, Dasein : Da-sein. Tradurre la parola del pensiero (Milano: Christian Marinotti Edizioni, 2007), p. 11. Many of the analyses of this essay are supported, precisely in what might be their genuine contribution to the English Denkweg, by the attempt accomplished in this book.

21 “Self-contained” implies: abiding merely by impact and as an impact, without an openly sustained schismatic decision.
thinking consists. This constellation can be indicated by the following traits, which are critical for our attempt at clarifying the scope of transcendental phenomenology: (1) in the prevailing of the hidden impact of contingency, the decision (i.e., the schism) as such refuses its flagrancy or open awareness,\textsuperscript{22} and therefore does not call for an acknowledging human stance in this flagrancy; (2) as a result of its keeping itself (its remaining contracted) in unawareness, the decision gives rise to a sphere of concreteness constituted as an opposition, a standing against each other, of man (and his thinking) and the gathered entirety of beings in their beingness. This shows how the hidden impact of contingency, if we understand it as “acting” within the decision, decides the givenness and the sense of Dasein as a relational – or, in its pure form, intentional – phenomenon. As a result of the prevailing of this impact, the \textit{da}-character of beings is precisely, as Husserl says, a character of beings, and it does not cease to be a character of beings even in its pure form. Why not? Because the interruption of the general thesis and the irruption of evidence never reach back into that which refuses and keeps itself in the initial decision. On the contrary, they are what they are precisely within the “sphere of decision” granted \textit{as} and \textit{by} this refusal.

However, what exactly does it mean that \textit{da} is a character of beings? It means that this character emanates from or, as we said, is a supplement\textsuperscript{23} of beings that are themselves undecided, unschismed, that is, beings not broken unto the tentative clearance that consists in the open want of a schismatic decision (a decision that does not immediately concern beings), in which the schism itself is to be raised as the only ground. These beings are self-contained in that they only deal with one another, but never \textit{as} themselves. They are beings for whom the explicit grasp of their \textit{da}-hood is but a posterior grounding of an itself unschismatic subsisting. It should be clear that, when we say “undecided,” “unschismatic,” etc., this does not imply an utter lack of decision. It rather means that the decision remains \textit{contracted} in the hidden impact and in the own light and brightness of this impact (the light that eventually becomes the \textit{lumen naturale}), and that therefore the truth and awareness of the schism remain ungrounded.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22}This is not the subjective awareness of an already constituted, given thinking, but, on the contrary, an awareness that onsettingly determines what thinking and who man may be. Awareness, here, is not a character of consciousness, but a synonym for \textit{Da} (\textit{Lichtung}).

\textsuperscript{23}In \textit{Ideas}, Husserl speaks of pure consciousness as a “phenomenological [i.e. non-real] residual.” (\textit{IRP}, p. 59; cf. also p. 108).

\textsuperscript{24}“Unschismatic” means: the schism itself (the only element of thinking) is not the first sake for thinking, but weirds itself unto a wyrd of growing oblivion constituted by the “onto-schismatic” forms of philosophical thinking that we encounter (but are still far from knowing in their schismatic implications) as the litherto determinations of the beingness of beings. See my “Owning to the Belongingness to Being,” p. 135. – We know the word “weird” only as an adjective meaning “strange, unusual.” The I.E. root that speaks in this word is “uer- “to turn, plait,” which also gives rise to the Latin vertere and to the German \textit{werden}. The adjective “weird” is originally a noun (O.E. “wyrd”) meaning “the principle, power, or agency by which events are predetermined; fate, destiny,” then also: that which is destined or fated to happen (one’s lot or destiny), finally any event or occurrence (as in the common saying “after word comes weird”). The adjectival use stems from the “weird sisters” in Shakespeare’s \textit{Macbeth}. 
Let us resume: the schismatic decision that gives rise to philosophy in the sense of metaphysics consists in a breaking that is in fact an abrupt refusal of the original nearness of the “may.” This implies that this decision is left in the grip of the hidden impact of contingency. The abrupt refusal is, however, a flashing of the schism itself. This flashing grants a sphere of brightness in which beings show as being given, that is, as having their provenance in a certain being, or again, as having the ground of their self-showing in a flashing evidence (namely, the ἱδέα [idea]). This provenance and this flashing, though, are already seized in a contiguity in which beings are extant as a stock, in other words, these things are left in the grip of the hidden impact of contingency and therefore forsaken by the schismatic decision. Thus, the character “da,” once it is obtained as the evidencing evidence thanks to the detachment from natural contingency, cannot but itself retain the essential trait of this contingency, that is, it is, in turn, forsaken by the onsetting schismatic “may.” As a consequence, the da-character of pure consciousness and eidetic intentionality is itself absolutely contingent (in the literal sense of its constituting an absolute contingency), while the pure constitution of givenness remains a subjective contingent grounding of contingency. In asking for the “things themselves,” thinking finds the absolute contingency of evidence (the eíde qua pure possibilities), and necessarily leaves the schismatic decision itself unthought. Why necessarily? Because the schismlessness is, as such, constitutive of the da-character (the givenness) from which the inquiry sets out and which eventually it obtains in its pure form. Hence, the schism itself cannot break as the sake of thinking.

Our provisional conclusion is that phenomenological epoché consists in a detachment from the immediacy of the impact – the naïve general thesis of that which appears as facts (the transcendent Zustände or “states of things”) –, but does not and cannot know a sufficient detachment from the clash of contingency, that is, a stance in the flagrant schism itself. Therefore, contingency remains the fundamental trait of all pure structures that are laid open in evidence. For a phenomenological critique of phenomenology, this implies that Husserl’s decision draws its likelihood from the forgottenness of the only original decision, namely, the schism itself. Hence, the ἱδέα (arché) that is eventually found in the transcendental ego is a contingent principle and thus not capable of grounding the element of self-giving or self-showing of things, namely, the element (or dimension) Da. That which in Husserl constitutes the da-character, that is, the ultimate da-hood of the transcendental self-giving ego (or monadic transcendental genesis), has the grounding-character of a self-constituting, self-evidencing substance confined to the (“enlightened”) sphere of contingency. When Husserl says that the self-constitution of the transcendental I is a reflection having “the essential character of an evidently irremovable thesis of the Dasein,” this thesis is in fact the self-position of an

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25 da (small “d”): a character of contingent beings; das Da (capital “d”): the contingency-free element.
26 IRP, p. 105.
27 IRP, p. 87.
absolutely indubitable contingency. The pure Dasein of transcendental phenomenology is ultimately the self-experience of self-constituting selfhood of the ur-positing transcendental I. In turn, the I in its evident self-experience is the absolutely contingent element, the stable uphold for the apodictic self-givenness, or the “Selbst da” of all intentional objects, that is, of beings in the whole. Husserl’s phenomenology is therefore an absolute transcendental self-reflection for the sake of setting the absolute subjectivity of consciousness as the absolutely stable ground of contingency of the absolutely evident Dasein.

Before turning to Heidegger’s thinking of Da-sein and the elucidation of its crisis-character, we can further prepare this understanding by briefly considering the following question: In what sense, if at all, does the character “da” show the trait of finitude? Husserl’s transcendental idealism shows a trait of all post-Cartesian metaphysics and, in fact, of metaphysics as a whole, to wit: the attempted step back from the immediacy of contingency – the immediacy of τα ϕυσικά (ta physiká) – results in the absolute contingency of an absolute φυσικόν (physikón), i.e., here, transcendental subjectivity as “das einzige absolute Seiende,” “the only absolute being.” 28 This step of thinking finally overcomes what the transcendental-phenomenological description of the natural stance does recognize as a “finite” character of givenness, namely, the fact that the objects of the natural world are given in Abschattungen or, as a suggested English translation sounds, “off-shadings.” However, the scope of this finiteness (“If I look at this object from this side, I cannot at the same time see the other sides,” etc.) is from the outset contained within the concept of “horizon” (here, the horizon of potential perception), which helps to form the idea of a conscious totality of perception constituted of partly dark and partly lightened regions, or, which is the same, of partly actual and partly potential perceptions. This implies that here finiteness is merely a default of actuality, in other words, it is not a trait of being as such, but a privative phenomenon within a sphere of being uniformly determined as contingency.

As a consequence, the “finiteness” encountered in the natural da-hood can be overcome by virtue of a lift-off that, exceeding natural contingency, yields the pure region of consciousness. In fact, the lift-off shifts the off-shaded “givenness to intuition” to the status of Mit-da-sein, thus obtaining pure da-hood. This implies that the being of pure consciousness does not depend on any reality. 29 In other words, the immanence of the transcendental I knows no off-shadings, that is, it is an absolute actuality. Husserl’s idea of the absolute foundation of the subjectivity of consciousness is thus an idea of total apodictic evidence and clarity implying a total seizure and assurance – thanks to a peculiar form of knowledge – of the


29“[K]ein reales Sein … ist für das Sein des Bewußtseins selbst … notwendig.” (IRP, p. 92).
contingent world, that is, of all reality or nature. The possibly inadequate degree of clarity and the necessary factual limitation of this evidence due to the essentially infinite horizon of the transcendental sphere of sense constitution does not alter the infinite character of this idea. What is at the heart of Kant’s critical transcendentalism (namely, the reliance of thinking on what is given in intuition, so that thinking itself is at the service of intuition), grounding the finite stance of man toward the given and, in this sense, finite being of things, has finally no echo in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. On the other hand, the reference to Kant and to the question of finitude may bear a clue to what arrested Heidegger’s attention, from the perspective of his own asking, in Husserl’s concept of “categorial intuition,” that is, the intuition of being.

3 Heidegger

Let us now turn to Heidegger’s thinking of Dasein. How can we make the transition? Where should we start looking for differences and analogies? Despite the introductory remarks on comparison and its presuppositions, we risk once again to fall prey to the reflex of historical computation. However, the first thing to be said is that there is in fact no likely transition from “Husserl’s” Dasein to “Heidegger’s.” The reason for this is that from within the horizon of the Dasein of transcendental subjectivity, there is no way out from the absolute contingency of evidence. On the other hand, the sense of Da-sein as thought in the Denkweg is precisely this: the onsetting, abrupt relief from contingency in favor of the now flagrant already broken onset that threatens and, in a manner of speaking, vexes itself in that and as that contingency (for any manner of contingency obtains its temper from being itself as the onset). This implies not only contingency’s (having already) collapse(d), but its being left to itself and thus held off from occupying the impregnable onset of thinking. This is why there is no way of finding an access to Da-sein by moving from the stance of transcendental phenomenology. Any step one might take from here – for instance, by indicating a new “aspect” or an unthought-of presupposition of the Dasein of evidence – cannot but lead to yet another form of contingency.

The peculiar da-hood, for the sake of which transcendental phenomenology thinks, cannot know what has been called the “element Da.” In fact, it consists in this element’s keeping itself from an awareness. The consequent unlikelihood of indicating the concern of Heidegger’s thinking from the “viewpoint” and on the

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30 As to the positivity of its being, the contingent world, that is, nature as a correlate of absolute consciousness, is in itself nothing. This being has the merely relative sense of a being for consciousness (form/soul/spirit/history as transcendental genesis), that is, of an intentional being. All transcendence is contained in and constituted by absolute Dasein (cf. IRP, § 85).

31 In all this, contingency remains ineliminable.
basis of Husserl’s subjectivity should be borne in mind when reading Heidegger’s own elucidation\textsuperscript{32} of the relation between transcendental evidence and the clearing (\textit{Lichtung}) indicated as the coming sake of thinking. In explicit reference to Husserl, Heidegger says that only the clearing or openness – the \textit{Da} – in the first place grants any evidence the fair clearance (\textit{das Freie}) in which it may sway. However, this hitherto unthought openness is not to be understood as a presupposition of evidence, to wit, as a structure of the constitution of sense that, once it is unearthed, should be \textit{added} to the self-constitution of subjective transcendental genesis “as we know it.” It cannot be understood thus, because any presupposition of (that is, \textit{claimed by}) contingency is necessarily itself a form of contingency and can never be the contingency-free element that Heidegger calls \textit{Lichtung} or \textit{Da}.

If there is no likelihood of turning toward \textit{Da-sein} from within a thinking of transcendental \textit{Dasein}, the opposite is, on the other hand, not only likely, but has indeed already taken place. In fact, the preceding interpretation of the \textit{Dasein} of evidence was entirely tuned by the hitherto unthought \textit{Da-sein}. The attempt at grounding transcendental \textit{Dasein} in its own onset, guided by the clear foreboding of the “decision” of the \textit{unknown other onset}, has nothing in common with a historicizing comparison of two philosophical positions, but belongs to the thinking of \textit{Ereignis}. More specifically, it belongs to that which Heidegger, in \textit{Beiträge zur Philosophie}, calls \textit{Zuspiel}, that is, the mutual “Playing-Forth” by which the stressing need of the other onset is to be cleared “from out of the original setting of the first.”\textsuperscript{33}

As little as the preceding interpretation might have accomplished in terms of this setting, it should help us to finally indicate explicitly what the hitherto unthought \textit{Da-sein} consists in. For this purpose, we can refer to a brief remark concerning the hyphenation of this word that Heidegger makes during Eugen Fink’s 1972 seminar on Heraclitus: “In \textit{Being and Time}, the word \textit{Dasein} is written as follows: \textit{Da-sein}.”\textsuperscript{34} What does the hyphenation of the word \textit{Dasein} mean? There is at least one reading we can rule out right away, namely, the one stating that the hyphenation “stresses the \textit{da}-component of the word \textit{Dasein}.” We can exclude this reading insofar as it presupposes a given concept of \textit{Dasein} as some form of “existence,” that is, of contingency; however, stressing the \textit{da}-component of “\textit{Dasein} as contingency” can only result in yet another form of contingency, and precisely a form in which the \textit{da}-character, the character of contingent “there-ness” is stressed, whatever this stress might imply in terms of “existential” readings of the \textit{condition humaine} and its supposed “horizontal openness.”

What does the hyphen indicate, if it is not the emphasis on the \textit{da}-aspect of a given sense of \textit{Dasein} as contingency (i.e., as contingent \textit{life})? How can the hyphenated form on the contrary indicate, as has been anticipated, the onsetting relief from

\textsuperscript{32}In his essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” (1964), in \textit{ZSD}.

\textsuperscript{33}Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy}, p. 119 (see also p. 7); \textit{BPh}, p. 169 (p. 9).

\textsuperscript{34}Martin Heidegger – Eugen Fink, \textit{Heraklit} (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970), p. 202 [\textit{H}].
contingency? We can answer this question by referring back to what has been said on the *da*-character as it appears in Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology. The *Da*, we said, “indicates the flagrant clearance in which something may show itself.” Furthermore, it has been said that precisely the contraction of this flagrancy (and thus the forgottenness of the “may-element”) yields the contingent light for Husserl’s asking for evidence as the pure “character ‘da’.” Finally, this contraction has been shown to consist in the refusal of the schismatic decision as such, that is, in its refusing to afford itself unto its own, open and wanting flagrancy and awareness. However, only in the sustained awareness of the schismatic decision the openness grants the selfhood for the self-showing of things. The awareness, the flashing of the schism, is the contingency-free clearing toward the self-showing of that which, thanks to such showing, we call “a thing.” Hence, the hyphenation does not stress the *da*-component of a given sense of existence: on the contrary, it names – in the first place and for the first time – the *element Da* as the contingency-free (or discontingent) flashing of the schismatic decision that grants the broken ground (i.e., the off-ground [Abgrund] of time-space) for the sheltered self-showing of things in their sphere of wholeness. More precisely still: the hyphen indicates (*ex abrupto* and as an onset, not by “extracting” it from *Dasein*) the *element Da* as the flashing or flagrancy of the withdrawing schism, that is, the flagrancy of the very withdrawing in which the schism itself consists.

However, we might ask, what justifies the claim that a self-giving and self-showing of things may take place (i.e., is likely) only within this discontingent flashing? And in the first place: What sustains the claim that this flashing is discontingent, that is, the claim that it consists in a relief from being as contingency, in an original unburdening and disencumbering that lets things ease themselves unto showing themselves as themselves, *from out of* themselves and by themselves?

What grants the collapse of contingency, the deliverance from the order of “only beings in the light of the *da*-character of a supplementing beingness”? The likelihood that contingency might collapse rests entirely on the trait that, from the outset, we have called “schismatic decision.” We have called it thus and repeatedly indicated its traits. Yet, we have never asked: Does the word “decision” in fact fit, and therefore say, what it is supposed to say? Or does it merely stand for that which needs to be said? Is “(schismatic) decision” an English word of the other onset, and this means: *is* it the showing-itself of that which is never a being, not even the highest or (as Husserl says of transcendental subjectivity) “the only absolute being,” but *being itself*, that is, sheer discontingency? As far as I can see, the answer to this question is: no, it is not. From all we can say after having, as it were, let the ear of the *Seinsfrage* try the speaking of the English mother-language, “decision” does not say again that which, in and from out of *Da-sein*, resounds in the *Denkweg*-word that it is supposed to translate, namely, *Entscheidung*. And if “decision” is not a commensurate word (namely, not commensurate to the ownmost word of the English mother-language tried by the soundless saying of the *Seinsfrage*), the mere addition of the adjective “schismatic” cannot make it become one.

The wanted word ought to be such that not only it does not rely on anything given. It must be a word that indeed frees the language’s discontingent, schismatic
saying that already speaks in it. Differently put, it must be a *schismatic* word, that is, a *diction* (as an alternative word for “word” sounds) in which the *word* of a mother-language (i.e., its schismatic saying) has already said and grounded itself, thus preparing and keeping in store the ground for the schismatic speaking of the language as a whole. The wanted word is, in this sense, a “word of words.” If “decision” is not such a word, on the other hand, all our languages must necessarily have such schismatic dictions. Why? Because language as such is, in its own biding (*Wesen*), the silent voice of sheer contingent being.

In order to indicate the flashing of the contingency-free schismatic openness toward the un-cleared and the yet-to-be cleared, we elect the diction “clear-cut.” This choice is not based on some linguistic deduction, but on the forehearing into the same sake of thinking that, from the outset, prompted us to speak not merely of a decision, but rather of a *schismatic* decision. To be sufficiently clear: we are now saying that “clear-cut” is, in the English mother-language, a word of the same rank as “beʒng” (*Seyn*). In “clear-cut,” we ought to hear the cut itself, as whose self-absconcing is generated (i.e., weirded), the clearance of enowning. In this understanding, “clear-cut” may be said in answer to the Denkweg-word *Ent-scheidung*. *Ent-scheidung*, we read in *Contributions to Philosophy*, is the going-asunder that scinds and thus originates the clearance for that which absconces itself and is yet *unentschieden*, that is, un-(clear-)cut, namely, “man’s belongingness to beʒng, insofar as he is the grounder of its truth, and the weirdedness (of the wit) of beʒng (*die Zugewiesenheit des Seyns*) unto the time of the last God” (*BPh*, p. 88; English translation p. 61; tr. modified).35

How “weird” is this translation of *Ent-scheidung*? And what justifies that a word of the tradition and weight of “decision” be, in the present attempt, abandoned in favor of a diction that seems to lack any immediate appeal? A justification can only come from being itself as “the say” (*die Sage*), insofar as it may show that “clear-cut” is what *Ent-scheidung* says in German, whereas “decision” merely stands for it. As to the weirdness, a reference to the saying of beginning metaphysics and of onsetting thinking might help to get over the first perplexity caused by this choice. We might think, for instance, of the Greek words ὅρος (*hóros*) as it speaks in Aristotle, and κεχορισμένον (*kechôrisménon*) as we hear it in Heraclitus’ fragment 108 DK. In this fragment, it is said that the σοφόν (*sophón*) is πάντων

35 In “clear-cut,” “clear” does not indicate a quality of cutting or being cut (as it does in the common meaning of the adjective “clear-cut,” which means “sharply defined”), but the clearing of the cut itself, and therefore the clearing yielded by this cut. This clearing is then also the ground for all *Entscheidungen*, for all “decisions,” which will, in turn, each time have the character of being a clear-cut, that is, a cut that clears in the sense of the either-or (cf. *BPh*, partitions 44 and 47). Here, “cut” speaks as a synonym of “schism,” both of these words being translations of the Denkweg-diction *Unterschied*. – Concerning the translation of *Seyn* with beʒng, note the following: Middle English knows the letter þ (“yogh”) for the sound “y” (as in “yes”). Moreover, this sign is used to transcribe “gyfu” (Proto-Germanic *gebô*), which is the name of the Anglo-Saxon g-rune, a rune meaning “gift, generosity” (as that which sustains [soothes] the being of man when all beings fail), and whose shape is that of an “x.” For a more detailed justification of this translation of *Seyn*, see my “Owning to the Belonginginess to Be-ing,” p. 125.
κεχωρισμένον (pánton kechôrisménon), that is, that which is separated or cut off from the entirety of beings, but not as another, “absolute” being; in fact, τὸ σοφὸν (to sophón) is that which, of beings as such in the whole, is the gathering separation or setting apart, the clear-cutting awareness that sways from out of its own openly withdrawing χώρα (chôra) as the openness toward all clear-cut beings. Both ὤρος and κεχωρισμένον are not words of being itself but “physical” words, that is, they are dictions of the being of beings. However, in these dictions resounds the unsustained schism that irrupts as the clearance for the clear-cut showing of things, that is, toward the showing of things in the self-withholding and thus be-holding awareness of Er-eignis.

The flashing or flagrancy of the clear-cut (i.e., the clearing of being itself) is what the Denkweg names das Da. The word Da is now written with a capital, for it does not anymore speak as an adverb, but rather indicates the withdrawn dimension from which the different uses of the adverb da obtain their meaning, while all verbs obtain from it the nearness for their dis-absconcing (entbergend) saying. Hence, in the hyphenated word Da-sein, the hyphen is not a punctuation mark used to divide two syllables or word elements. Rather, the hyphen is the cut (or schism) itself, and therefore the first trait to be heard in this, and indeed in all hyphenated words that we find in Heidegger’s writings. All dictions of this thinking – first and foremost its grounding-words (Sein, Dasein, Ereignis, Geschichte, etc.) – are schismatic words or “cut-words,” that is, dictions in which the discontinuity of being says itself in German. The clear-cut is the disencumbering, open clearing toward the self-giving of beings only because it is the flashing of the sheer cut. The cut itself, however, is neither a being nor the being of beings in whatever form, including that of absolute subjective evidence. The cut is only itself: the inwardly retreating swaying of the original “may” that onsettingly affords itself unto – and indeed as – the openness of the clear-cut.

If now we briefly turn back to the da-character in Husserl, we can state the following: The natural da-hood as the immediate form of subjective consciousness that engages phenomenological reflection; further, its interruption as the irruption or breaking of pure evidence in phenomenological epoché; finally, the infinite reductive unveiling of pure da-hood as the self-constituting and thus evidencing transcendental I: all these constitutive moments of the science of phenomenology take place in the unawareness of the flagrant clear-cut unto which, from the outset, all contingency has already collapsed. Epoché and reduction are, in some sense, themselves a cut, or, as we said, a detachment from the clashing immediacy of the natural stance. However, all depends on the sense and scope of this “in some sense.” In fact, the detachment unto absoluteness – the “cut” between nature and pure consciousness accomplished thanks to transcendental epoché – remains within the scope of contingency, in that it constitutes itself as the contingency of absolute subjective consciousness. This implies that the character of being that concerns thinking – the character “da” – owes itself to the unawareness of the original cut. Thus, the explicit grounding of this character in terms of the structures of pure consciousness enhances the power of contingency. In this manner, it serves its will to apodictic absoluteness in the increasing forgottenness of being itself.
The fact that Husserl thinks the evidence of subjective contingency as the only absolute being owes itself to the fact that the openness of the cut has retreated unto the flashing that yields the evidence of subjective consciousness. On the other hand, the fact that for Heidegger this cut – or, as he would call it for a short time, the “ontological difference” – is the only thought, comes from the onset that tunes his thinking, to wit: the shocking flagrancy of the absolute power of contingency as the beinglessness of beings and man’s oblivion of being. In other words: if for Husserl’s thinking the cut (i.e., being itself) refuses its own flagrancy and remains withheld in the hidden impact that determines the natural and the pure da-character of beings, for Heidegger the awareness of this very refusal is precisely that which initiates his thinking. In fact, the flashing of this refusal, its offering an awareness that claims to be borne as such (namely, in an instance of Da-sein), is already the first flashing of the schism itself in its retreating sway, is already the clear-cut. The refusal that remains unthought in Husserl’s Dasein flashes as the Da-sein of the Seinsfrage.36 Dasein is, in Husserl, the relative or absolute position of the gathered entirety of beings, respectively in the natural light or in the pure evidence of subjective consciousness. What, then, does Dasein mean in Heidegger, if it is to be understood as Da-sein? In order to answer this question, we need to be attentive to two constitutive traits of the hyphenated Da:

1. The spaciousness (Bereich) of the Da- as the flashing of the cut – or, which is the same, as the clearing of being (Lichtung des Seyns) – is “durch und durch nicht menschlich,” that is, “out-and-out [or: through and through] not human,” that is, “it can neither be determined nor borne by the animal rationale and just as little by the subject. This spaciousness is, in the first place, not a being (…)”. 37 This passage brings us back to what has been said concerning the de-animalizing trait of phenomenological epoché. The interruption of the general thesis, thanks to which the transcendental I obtains itself in its pure form, implies that man, that is, the psycho-physical nature, is left behind, in the sense that the being that carries out the naïve thetical acts shifts to the modality mit-da and thus becomes an intentional object, which, in itself, is nothing (i.e., it is only for the intentional consciousness). 38 However, if we view the animality of man as his contingency, it appears that in the idea of absolute subjectivity, not only something like a de-animalization does not take place, but, on the contrary, the animalization of man (and thus the contingency of all beings) is carried to a culminating point. 39 In fact, absolute subjectivity is pure of all reality, but only because, as the being of man, it constitutes the absolute contingency of evidencing life-experience. We

36 The Da is itself the in-between: not the in-between of man (thinking) and beings, but the in-between of being itself and who man may be, and thus, eventually, the in-between toward the selving of beings.
37 BPh, p. 490.
38 This point is crucial for the distinction between the self-experience of transcendental subjectivity and the psychological investigation of psychical acts.
39 This culminating point is the computed-computing animality of man as historisches Tier.
can call the reduction of man’s being – and, consequently, the reduction of all beingness – to the absolute contingency of the rational animal, “hominization” (Vermenschung). In its modern subjective form, such hominization implies that the hidden clash of contingency claims man himself, that is, pure consciousness, as the subjective assurance of absolute contingency, and thus as the warden of inhibited selfhood. Husserl’s pure phenomenology is therefore a humanism in the sense that it lays a transcendental subjective foundation for the absolute hominization of man and, as a consequence, of all beings. On the other hand, as we shall see, Heidegger’s thinking is not anymore a humanism: in fact, the element in relation to which man may, in the first place, become who he is, that is, the Da, is “out-and-out not human,” that is, not only other than any contingent man but also other than the being of man, no matter how pure this being is thought. That Da-sein implies the collapse of all contingency is the same as saying that, where the Da is grounded as the truth of being, all abiding is de-hominized (entmenscht).

2. The grounding-trait of the Da as the flashing of the schism is its wantingness. The verb “to want” is a prime instance of what we have called “cut-words” or “schismatic words,” that is, those eminently translating dictions that readily, and earlier than others, translate a language unto its own word. In fact, not only does “to want” originally mean: to be lacking, and therefore to wish for; but this lacking, in turn, rests on a more original trait indicated in the I.E. [Indo-European] base *eue (the same that speaks in the words “wane” and “vanish”), which means “to leave, to abandon,” that is, “to retreat, withdraw”. In other words, “to want” means: to desire out of a lack, which, however, is not a contingent deficiency (the lacking of something) that can eventually be made up for (namely, by supplying that something). Rather, desiring is here the inward attractiveness of sheer withdrawing in which the “lack” itself consists. Thus, “wantingness” is sheer withdrawing insofar as it withdraws and, in such withdrawing, needs to be sustained as such. Therefore, when we say that the Da “wants” or “is wanting,” we are not implying the existence of some mysterious entity endowed with a will and the capacity for expressing it. Nor, on the other hand, does it mean that the Da is missing from somewhere and needs to be restored or recovered from somewhere else. The Da is in-itself wanting, in that it is the flashing of the cut, which, in turn, claims to be sustained as sheer withdrawing.

The cut, that is, being, wants to be sustained and grounded in the flashing of its truth, so that a thing-borne world may come unto the open time-space of the clear-cut. In other words, the openness of the cut requires to be suffered, borne and held out, and thus set up in a firmness. This suffering firmness is a form of being, and precisely the being indicated in the sein-component of the word Da-sein. This form

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40Vermenschung (which, just as its opposite, i.e., Entmenschung, is a key word in Heidegger’s writings of the late thirties) is not to be confused with Vermenschlichung (humanization).

41This want and claim hints at that which provisionally may be called “the eros of the other onset.”
of being, however, sways entirely in the openness of the clear-cut, whose wanted firmness it is. The latter point is crucial if we are to understand in what sense that which the word *Da-sein* indicates “is not to be found in the hitherto wyrd of philosophy.” The form of being we now ought to think is a suffering (bearing) firmness that from the very first is formed in the openness or awareness of the cut. It originates from and bides (west) in its (i.e., the cut’s) wanting. It is native of its withdrawing sway, and therefore itself withdrawing. In one word, it is the open cut’s own bearing, before extant man or other beings come into play. This allows us to see how *Da-sein* is a firmness or form of being, or simply: a being, and that yet it is neither (a given) man nor the being of (a given) man. This is what the saying “durch und durch nicht menschlich” implies.

Man, on the other hand, comes into play insofar as the wanting cut beholds (so to speak, catches sight of and minds) a being as the one that is claimed for grounding its (i.e., the cut’s) openness by taking over the bearing of this openness, that is, *Da-sein*. This abruptly beheld being, insofar as it does take on itself to bear, in its own being, the flashing of the cut, and thus grounds the ownhood of his being unto the belongingness to the cut itself, we may call “man” or *homo humanus*. This implies that man’s own being, that is, his kind, is originally (natively) offered, and onsettingly belongs to, the firmness of being that we call *Da-sein*, whereas contingent man is, so to speak, cut off from the ground of his own being, so that it is never decided nor decidable by man himself whether or not (and in what manner) he finds an access to his own kind and thus to his ownhood and selfhood. On the other hand, being wants man to take a stance in his kind, and thus beholds the “may be,” that is, man’s likelihood, from out of its (i.e., being’s) own wanting openness.

An explicating translation of *Da-sein* now reads as follows: bearing (suffering, ek-sisting) the flashing (or the openness) of the cut or schism (i.e., being) in its own truth. However, a rigorous understanding of this word starts with the hyphen as *Da-sein*’s most onsetting trait. This results in the following translation: *Da-sein*, that is, the onsetting cut engendering the openness of being’s truth, and therein a bearing firmness, to which is ab initio offered man-kind’s openness- and truth-sustaining ownhood. This reading finally allows us to seize the unique sense of the word “existence” as it speaks in *Being and Time*. “Existing” – the manner of being of man insofar as he is onsettingly translated into *Da-sein* – means: bearing out (“standing”) and thus setting up the weird openness (the estranging “ek”) of being itself. “Existing” means “ek-sisting” in this rigorous sense. If, on the contrary, we understand “existing” as the peculiar manner of being of contingent, given man, “everything that in *Being and Time* has been gained as a new position is irrecoverably lost.”

*Da-sein* thus shows as the ground for a transformation of man’s being from its being constrained to implementing absolute subjective contingency to its taking on

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Husserl and Heidegger on Da-sein: With a Suggestion for Its Interlingual Translation

the attendance on being in man’s *Da*-bearing kind. Moreover, *Da-sein*, insofar as it is taken on in man’s belonging existence, is the grounded spaciousness toward the coming and self-giving of the concrete wholeness of things. This leads us to conclusively contrast, as an exercise in the mutual playing-forth of the first and the other onset of thinking, the meanings of *Dasein* in Husserl and in Heidegger:

In Husserl, *Dasein* means “being-there.” In its pure form, this indicates an absolute transcendental contingency (*-sein*) characterized by the trait of there-ness (*da-*), that is, a cut-less domain constituted as a potentially infinite radius of evidence enlightened by the rays of consciousness irradiating from the evidencing pole of the absolutely contingent monadic I (Ego).

In Heidegger, *Dasein* – heard and written as *Da-sein* – means “there-being.” This indicates the wanting openness of the cut or schism (*Da-*) as the initial concern of thinking, which (this cut), insofar as it is grounded in its own bearingness (*-sein*) by a man-kind that understands itself as onsettingly belonging to it, may become the open ground toward the fair self-showing and selving of things in a thing-borne world.

There is no external viewpoint whence these two phenomena may become visible. In fact, *Dasein* as absolute subjective contingency becomes visible only for a thinking that has taken a stance in *Da-sein* as the finite ground of being shed in-between all things toward their likely showing. Insofar as it grounds the openness of the schism and thus has already broken the absoluteness of contingency, *Da-sein* is “die Krisis zwischen dem ersten und dem anderen Anfang,” “the crisis between the first and the other onset.” However, “crisis” now means: the flashing of the schism itself, that is, the clear-cut in which the prevailing of *Dasein* as contingency, and with it the metaphysical stance, have already collapsed unto unlikelihood.

### 4 Minting *Da-sein* in English

How are we to indicate, in English, the sake that the *Denkweg* calls *Da-sein*? It seems strange we should ask this question after having just declared that the English translation of *Da-sein* reads “there-being.” However, this word is as yet little more than a compound formed rather mechanically on the basis of the elucidation of the German word it is supposed to render. The simple mechanics consists in equating *da* and “there,” and *sein* and “being,” and assuming that the combination of the English components must, with some level of approximation, yield an equivalent

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43 The thus obtained man-kind is itself neutral in the precise sense that, being grounded in *Da-sein*, it wants gender, that is, it always already wants man as an en-gendered being. Here is the origin, in the sense of the *Seinsgeschichte*, of what we know as “human gender” (“male,” “female”). One of the places in which Heidegger treats the gender-wanting neutrality of *Da-sein* is his 1928 lecture course *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, GA 27 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996).

44 This pole is the yoke that subjugates the cut and its flashing.
expression to that which results from the combination of the German parts. What, however, is the likelihood of “there-being” as a word of the English mother-language and, more precisely, as an English “word of words”? Not only have we not asked this question. In fact, we have just about prepared the ground on which this question becomes compelling. This ground is Da-sein itself as an echo of the stress of Seinsvergessenheit and Seinsverlassenheit, that is, of the being-obliviousness of man and the beinglessness of beings. Both the want for an English diction that says Da-sein and the capacity for testing, in thinking, a likely English translation, can only come from the experience and the bearing of this stress.

Supposing we wanted to follow a “literal” approach in order to find this English diction, we could, much as we apparently did in first suggesting a translation, proceed by analogy to German and start from the verb dasein. This verb yields the noun Dasein, which finally allows the minting of Da-sein. The analogous English sequence would read: being there – (the) being-there – ???. The three question marks indicate that it is in fact not clear how the German sequence could be “relicated” so as to produce a hyphenated word mirroring Da-sein. On the other hand, if we invert the order of the parts, we obtain a differentiation that seems to respond to the manner in which Da-sein speaks in German. But again, is this a translation? As a matter of fact, the question comes too late. Why? Because what is rather thoughtlessly called a “literal translation” simply cannot yield a sufficient English saying. It cannot do so because “literal” translating operates on the basis of the “letter” intended as a marker of contingency (in this case, the contingency of an informational content). However, just as Da-sein, as a schismatic diction of the Denkweg, is not obtained on the basis of the Dasein of contingency (i.e., by modifying the sense of contingency that this word indicates), a “literal” transposition of Dasein into English (i.e., “being-there”) cannot provide the basis for an English saying of Da-sein as “the crisis between the first an the other onset.”

An English translation of Da-sein can only come from the own saying of the English language. In order to attempt this translation, in what follows, I shall take a path that initially might appear as being itself merely “linguistic.” It will however soon become clear that it is not. The attempt asks: What does (silently) resound when the English language says “there”? Whence are we to obtain a clear-cut directive for hearing the saying of this diction? Can “the there” finally translate das Da, and in what sense?

Da and “there” are the same word, yet they have different meanings. For instance, as an adverb, da means both “here” (“in this place”) and “there” (“in that place”). However, we know that the Da of the Denkweg is not obtained by transforming the adverb da into a noun. Rather, the Da indicates a dimension which is the withdrawn source for all recorded meanings of da, but also for its peculiar tone and its unique capacity for opening the spaciousness of saying. As a consequence, a translation – and this implies: a schismatic diction – cannot be obtained by combining as many as possible of the recorded meanings and traits of the German word. In fact, if it is true that da means both “here” and “there,” on the other hand das Da does not mean both “the
here” and “the there,” nor the “horizontal space” of all “heres” and “theres” (or even, in addition, of all “nows” and “thens”). Instead, das Da says the wanting openness and clearing of the schism as the irruption of the original time-play-space (i.e., the truth) of being toward all likely thing-borne “world-heres” and “world-theres,” “world-nows” and “world-thens,” “world-thats” and “world-hows” in the whole.

In fact, the earlier indication of the guiding sense of da (see above, p. 231) was by no means the result of privileging or “generalizing” one of the meanings that the dictionary records for the word da. Rather, it resulted from electing the original trait of its saying. Therefore, the question is whether or not an equally original saying speaks in the English word “there,” independently of the degree to which this word “covers the semantic field” of da.

Even at a superficial glance at the different uses of “there,” one is stricken by the singular role this word plays in English. Much as da does in German, but even more so, “there” seems to speak everywhere in the English language and, in a sense, to uphold its saying as a whole. How can this be demonstrated? Answer: it cannot, nor need it be. In fact, here is the point where it must show that the path we are following is not a “linguistic” one. This is why, rather than listing and illustrating the uses of “there” in view of reconstructing the singularity of its role and scope as a sum of semantic and grammatical elements, I shall instead indicate the original trait of this word, which is, so to speak, responsible for its unique status. Again, it should be borne in mind that this trait is not obtained by some inductive or generalizing procedure, but strictly by forehearing into the sake that the Denkweg names das Da. In other words, that which authorizes the indication of this trait is not a “linguistic argument,” but the thinking of the Seinsfrage.

The grounding-trait that speaks in the English word “there” is the trait of soothing-clearance.

What does this mean?

The foresight on the sake named das Da implies that what has been indicated as “clearance” does not concern the appearing, nor even the appearing of the appearing, of beings. Rather, the clearance refers to being and to being only (i.e., to the only being), without any reference to beings. “Sooth,” in turn, means as much as “truth,” but again the truth of being, and more precisely still, this truth insofar as it calls for a grounding, in order for it to sway as the soothing (wholeness-granting) openness toward world and things. Hence, “there” as a name of the in-itself-wanting soothing-clearance says the original openness and clearing (i.e., freeing, unburdening, disencumbering) unto which comes the sooth of being, so as to find, in this openness, the ground for its own bidance (Wesung).

This is not to authoritatively invoke some mysterious “voice of being” issuing directives to the ear of those who, being in quest for being, are “elected” to receive them. In fact, what the preceding sentences articulate reflects the most elementary notion of what language and speaking are. To this notion belongs the fact that a language does not say what it says by virtue of some natural or artificial, “magical” or “pragmatic” imprinting, but thanks to an inner (and just as well outer) source that is not this language itself. Thinking, and, in a different manner, poetry, speak their language at the limit, namely, at the limit whence this language draws its capacity for saying from the speechless tune of being. In fact, what poetry and thinking have to say is precisely this tune, which silently tunes a language as such.
What has just been said prepares the decisive indication for measuring the astounding uniqueness of the English word “there.” In fact, this word, more distinctly than the German da, already says the truth of being in its relation to man, insofar as this soothing truth bears in itself the need for an assenting, acknowledging being that soothfastly grounds it. In what sense? In the sense that – as we can, once again, only mind and indicate, but never demonstrate – in the diction “there” silently speaks, as its grounding-trait, the “there is.” The fact that the dictionary records the expression “there is” as one of the locutions involving the adverb “there,” so that it would seem that, in the first place, there is the word “there” with its meanings and only then, as a phrase that can be formed with this word, the expression “there is,” does by itself not contradict the insight that the sake named “there is” is in fact the grounding-trait of the word “there.” In fact, the saying “there is” explicitly names the silent original trait of “the there.” The consequence of this insight is that, when we mint “there” as a translation of das Da, we explicitly form it as the “there” in which speaks, as its grounding-trait, the “there is,” in short, we form it as the “there” of (i.e., deriving from) the “there is.”

Meanwhile we have introduced the phrase “there is” as if its sense were obvious. Yet, what the ear of the Seinsfrage has shown concerning the word “there” already bears an echo of the own saying of the “there is.” Here, we must limit ourselves to a succinct indication. “There is” in some sense corresponds to the German es gibt and es ist, as well as to the French il y a. The phrase es gibt has a prominent role in Heidegger’s 1962 lecture Zeit und Sein. This text indicates the sense and provenance of “being” and “time,” soothed in their most onsetting trait, from out of the Es gibt (Es gibt Sein; Es gibt Zeit). In turn, the Es (written with a capital) says the sake the Denkweg has come to name Ereignis. Es gibt says the same as das Ereignis ereignet. Therefore, if we were to analyze es gibt and “there is” by means of a formal analogy, we would have to conclude that, if “is” corresponds to gibt (or ist), “there,” in turn, corresponds to es, so that “there” would actually say the same as Ereignis.

Indeed, the “there” we are minting as a translation of the Da does say the same as Ereignis – as does the “there is,” which translates Es gibt. However, this result is not satisfying, in that it seems to conflate Da and Ereignis in a single English word. On the other hand, if it may well be striking to find the English “there” to speak in this manner, we can certainly not be utterly surprised. In fact, the same as can be said of “there” – namely, that it says Ereignis – also holds true for Da and, in another sense, for Da-sein. We must however avoid to confuse this sameness with a formal identity or with the fact that these words are interchangeable. In fact, another manner of indicating this sameness is: the “there” (as well as the Da) abscconedly bears in itself the say of Ereignis, namely, the “there is,” where “is” is the verb of being (so that, in fact, we should write not “is” but “is”). This means that the thinking of Ereignis makes explicit, and grounds as such, the abscconed sense of “there” viz. da. What remains most striking is the singular manner in which Ereignis speaks in the “there.” This singularity, which clearly scinds “the there” from its German cognate das Da, is indicated by the “there is” as its silently tuning tune.
The following traits characterize “the there” as a translation of das Da that bears in a unique (which always implies, untranslatable) manner the say of the sake that the Denkweg has brought to the thinking of our mother-languages:

1. As we have already seen, “the there” originally speaks from the “there is” (which silently tunes it). In turn, the “is” in “there is” does not indicate mere contingency (clashing extancy, “existence”), but, in the most un-emphatic manner, being itself in its sheer schismatic givingness, that is, in its affording the openness for the crossing of the strife of world and earth and the countering of gods and mortals. This giving and affording has the trait of keeping itself from showing (i.e., from disabsconcing itself), in short, it has the trait of withdrawing. Such self-withholding giving, such in-itself withdrawing affording of a fair spaciousness is what Heidegger calls schicken, we say: to weird. Such weirding (i.e., the trait of Geschichte as Geschick) characterizes both the “there is” and the “there” it attunes. Hence, “the there” may now be determined as the breaking of the time-play-space of being, or again, as the weird openness of being toward the selving of world-gathering things. This towardness defines, on the level of being as a “thorough-fare” for world and things, that which logical-linguistic analysis recognizes as the “preparatory” (or “anticipating”) character of “there (is)” (its “coming before”). The weirdness of “the there” is the first sense in which, when we say “there,” we are already implying a relation of the thus named dimension to the being of man.

2. The “there (is)” is the “clearing by absconcement” that constitutes the withheld schismatic nearness toward all cleared (clear-cut) abiding and dis-abiding (i.e., Anwesen and Abwesen). As such it bears, and grounds in its truth, that which originally likes all biding, in short, the likelihood. Logical analysis records this trait in phrases such as “there is no saying…,” where the negated “there is” implies “impossibility.” While the truth of being as likelihood is in itself light-and soundless, being weirds itself unto the openness of light-and-sound, whose unity is a temper, that is, a grounded truth of likelihood itself, and thus (this weird temper is) the likely sphere toward the showing of things in the schismatic uniqueness of their sense.

There’s a certain Slant of light,
Winter Afternoons—
That oppresses, like the Heft
Of Cathedral Tunes—
Heavenly Hurt, it gives us—
We can find no scar,
But internal difference,
Where the Meanings, are—

47 By virtue of this un-emphatic indication, we can say that, in turn, being is the sheer emphasis of the “there is,” where “emphasis” means “the implicit, absconcedly tuning say.”

48 On the crossing, see, for example, partition 8 of Heidegger’s treatise Besinnung.
None may teach it—Any—
’Tis the Seal Despair—
An imperial affliction
Sent us of the Air—

When it comes, the Landscape listens—
Shadows—hold their breath—
When it goes, ‘tis like the Distance
On the look of Death—

The likelihood of “the there” as the openness for all sense and thus as the ground for the gift of ensconced abiding, is the second sense in which, when we say “there,” we are already implying a relation of this dimension to the being of man.

3. The “there” as the biding, weird openness and clearance is soothing. This means: it is the truth of being grounded unto the open, so that in the “there” resounds the silently soothing word of being itself. The trait of soothingness implies the “encouragement” that being itself is in its truth. In what sense? In the sense that being itself as sheer over-comingness restores or regenerates the world in its dis-absconcing mirror-play and things in their ensconced selving, but (it so restores) never before over-turning, and thus freeing, the own being of man unto the absconced provenance of such over-coming. By virtue of this overcoming-ness “by” and “through” the own being of man all abiding is in turn regenerated unto its own measure and allay. The semantic analysis of the word “there” records this sense of soothing in certain interjectional uses of this adverb as well as in the verb “to there-there,” meaning “to soothe or comfort by saying these words (i.e., ‘there-there’).”

However, this trait of soothingness implies a further trait, the need for another kind of soothing that must now be made explicit. It is the soothing in the sense of the assenting that offers a firmness and steadiness, that is, a sustained ground to the soothing in which being itself consists. In other words, implicit in the soothingness, whose openness is the “there,” is a being in the rigorous sense of the out-bearing soothfastness that is own to the bidence of the truth of being grounded unto its openness. This soothfastness is a manner of being (eine Weise zu sein), and in this sense a being (ein Seiendes). As a consequence, the “there” (in which speaks the “there is” of Ereignis) always already bears this wanted soothfastness as a being that may be owned by man in a regenerating over-turning of his being. This (to-be-owned) being, wherein, by virtue of Ereignis, the truth of being finds its ground, may therefore be named “the there-being.” In accordance with the two senses of “being,” “there-being” is to be read both in the manner of “house-keeping” (or “sooth-saying”) and in that of “(an) earth-being”.

The insight that sustains the minting of this diction is that, when we say “there” (in the sense of the “there is”) we are already saying “<the> there <, that is, the truth

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49Emily Dickinson (Johnson, # 258).
50The “always already” is, in the other onset of thinking, what the a priori is in transcendental philosophy. This implies that the “always already” and the a priori are incomparable.
of being insofar as it wants the assenting soothfastness of a> being.” The hyphen in the word “there-being” indicates the schism or cut itself, insofar as in the schism turns the generous mutuality of want (i.e., the claim of being, or likelihood, for its truth) and offered soothfastness (i.e., the believing belongingness to the truth of being). Hence, the hyphen is the schismatic trait that, swaying as the original off-ground of the mutuality of claim and belongingness, grants the there-being as the unitary ground for the truth of being, that is, of wyrd’s sheer coming, and thus as the ground for being’s over-comingness toward world and things. Again, the “there”, and the “there-being” it attunes as the ground of being’s sooth, are be-fore in the sense of this towardness. The soothiness of “the there” in the sense of the over-comingness that onsettingly soothes all abiding, including the assenting abiding of man, unto its own allay, is the third sense in which, when we say “there,” we are already implying a relation of this dimension to the being of man.

As the apparent redundancy of the preceding determinations indicates, all traits show into the same, namely, the unsaid Er-eignis holding sway in “the there.” By letting the “there” speak from the “there is” as its silent tuning, and thus from Ereignis, we have finally minted the English translation of Da-sein. This translation is “there-being.” This newly minted word now speaks not only as a genuine diction, but indeed as a mother-diction, a “word of words” of the English mother-language, and has thus lost all traits of a merely formal equivalent that to some extent replicates in English the semantic structure of Da-sein. Hence, “there-being” is not a more or less valid surrogate of the German word Dasein, but a true translation of the Denkweg-word Da-sein, and this means: a schismatically unique, therefore itself untranslatable synonym of Da-sein in the many-voiced say of the other onset of thinking.

References


Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Eccentric Translation

Julia A. Ireland

“Translating” [“Übersetzen”] is not so much a “trans-lating” [“Über-setzen”] and passing over into a foreign language with the help of one’s own. Rather, translating is more an awakening, clarification, and unfolding of one’s own language with the help of an encounter with the foreign language.

—Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,” GA 53.

Accordingly then, the following interpretation of the [Hölderlin’s Pindar]’s translations. Trans-lating as setting-over [Über-setzen] – onto another shore – onto the shore of another!!


In his earlier article from 1993, “Thinking More Deeply into the Question of Translation,” Parvis Emad distinguishes between what he calls “interlingual translation” (translation of a foreign language into one’s own language) and “innerlingual translation” (translation within one’s own language), each of which is differently bound up with what he generically calls “foreignness.”1 Thus, after detailing the significant ways, Heidegger comes into contact with the question of translation.

(this includes the fact that Heidegger himself consistently translates, that his translations substantially depart from the available standard translations, and that Heidegger makes explicit remarks about the process of translation, which include his understanding of it as an interpretation). Emad goes on to claim that what these encounters share in common is that “they explicate translation in terms of the root unfolding of language (das Wesen der Sprache).” “Root unfolding” is, of course, a quite foreign translation of the German word “Wesen,” alternatively rendered as “essential sway” and “ownmost” in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), and comes to locate what, following a remark made by Heidegger in the 1942/1943 Parmenides lecture course, Emad takes up as “essential” or “original translation” (ursprüngliche Übersetzung).

This distinction has important implications for understanding the specific status of the foreignness of the foreign language under translation and the way Emad conceives of the relationship between interlingual and innerlingual translation – what it is that governs the direction of movement between the two – with respect to that foreignness. He accordingly goes on to identify what he calls the “two poles” of translation, which become the organizing insight of his piece and what is, to my mind, most philosophically (if also problematically) at stake in it. To quote Emad:

Heidegger is not concerned with the problems that dominate the discussion of translation in the “sciences” of language. Rather, he takes translation as a unique opportunity for the root unfolding of language. And this opportunity presents itself in the way in which translation responds to the very foreignness or strangeness which calls for a deeper translation in the root unfolding of language.

In Heidegger the question of translation has two poles. At one pole there are translation’s undeniable attachments to the foreignness which rules between languages. At the other pole is the root unfolding of language as a response to that foreignness. Our co-enactment with Heidegger’s thinking on translation requires that we consider what gathers at each of these poles.

As Emad goes on to elaborate, the encounter with foreignness that takes place through interlingual translation “elicits” or “occasions” the encounter with the foreignness at issue in the root unfolding of language. Thus, where interlingual translation operates in terms of the specific differences between languages, Emad claims that innerlingual translation “turns us away from [those] differences” through the invitation it issues to respond to this still deeper level of foreignness. In other words, the specifically initiatory dimension of the foreignness of the foreign language

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2 Emad, “Thinking More Deeply into the Question of Translation,” p. 324.
3 Ibid.
4 Emad, “Thinking More Deeply into the Question of Translation,” p. 337.
moves us from the pole of interlingual translation to the pole of innerlingual
translation, “translating” us, so to speak, into the very movement of translation as
this is realized in the root unfolding of language. After citing the quotation from
Heidegger’s “The Ister” lecture course included as my first epigraph, Emad writes:

…[T]here is more to translation than just a transfer of words from one language to another.
To initiate the move in such a transfer is to face the difference between languages as the
foreignness that rules between them. By forcing us to see the foreignness and unfamiliarity
of the languages under translation, the activity of translation clarifies our relationship to our
own language. Thus, rather than serving as a means for transporting “meanings” across the
so-called language barrier, translation invites us to return to our own language. When we,
in translation, turn back from the foreignness of another language, we discover another
translation, one that occurs within our own language.5

While Emad acknowledges the “undeniable attachments to the foreignness,
which rules between languages” and what, in the concluding paragraph of his arti-
cle, he describes as “the unresolvable foreignness that always remains in interlingual
translation,” the encounter with the foreignness of the foreign language is under-
stood to undo difference on the way to a deeper, but also curiously generic encounter
with the foreignness taking place at the root or core of language’s unfolding.6 The
specific differences between languages at issue in interlingual translation would
thereby seem to be subsumed under the foreignness of innerlingual translation,
which as the foreignness that governs the movement between the two poles of trans-
lation is the foreignness that matters for Emad.

Emad’s unusual formulation in the above quotation provides an important clue
here. For Emad nowhere touches on what I want to explore as “the fact of differ-
ence” at stake for Heidegger in interlingual translation, but instead consistently
refers to the foreignness that “rules between languages.” But is not this “foreignness
that rules between languages” already the foreignness of innerlingual translation –
the foreignness that the movement of interlingual translation is supposed to get us
to, but that the specifically initiatory dimension of interlingual translation also cannot be reducible to, unless what we have here are not “poles” but a single step within
a thinly disguised dialectic? In other words, is not Emad trying to have his cake and
eat it too when it comes to the specific status of the foreignness of the foreign
language? Acknowledging Emad’s superb treatment of the relationship between
original translation and the making of a way of thinking and language, what would it mean to bring forward the “undeniable attachments” and “unresolvable foreign-
ness” of interlingual translation in order to find ourselves, as Heidegger writes, not
just set onto another shore, but onto the shore of an other?

To bring out the foreignness at issue in interlingual translation, I want to make
the case that Heidegger’s comments on translation in “The Ister” and Parmenides
lecture courses need to be located in terms of his interpretation of Hölderlin’s Dec. 4th,
1801 letter to Böhlendorff, which is the single most important document for

5Emad, “Thinking More Deeply into the Question of Translation,” p. 326.
6Emad, “Thinking More Deeply into the Question of Translation,” p. 337.
clarifying what Heidegger means by “foreign” (das Fremde) and “one’s own” (das Eigene) as well as the relationship between the two. My interpretation thus marks a significant departure from Emad in both its orientation and governing conception of foreignness by asserting two working theses.

First, I want to make the claim that the question of translation for Heidegger specifically concerns the inverted, but seemingly symmetrical or reciprocal apportioning of “endowments” (Mitgift) and “tasks” (Aufgabe) between the Greeks and the Germans as this is articulated in the Letter to Böhlendorff. It is first with his 1934–1935 lecture course, Hölderlins Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhein,” that Heidegger develops a framework within which to understand what is at stake in his own translations of the Greeks – namely, a self-conscious violence and excess that serves to correct a deficiency within the German’s endowment of the “clarity of presentation” as this is accomplishable only through the encounter with the Greek foreign. Emad, by contrast, goes back to Heidegger’s 1931 translation of Plato’s Theatetus, schematically tracking out the differences between Heidegger’s and Schleiermacher’s respective translations as evidence of the movement between thinking and original translation. In setting aside crucial aspects of Heidegger’s philosophical development, Emad misses both how Heidegger’s comments on translation are directly informed by his interpretation of the Letter to Böhlendorff and how his translations of Sophocles, the pre-Socratics, and, most particularly, Hölderlin enact that interpretation.

Second, I want to problematize Emad’s language of “two poles” as being overly schematic in presupposing an essentialist (or at least unproblematically “given”) conception of the difference between a foreign language and one’s own language. Essentialism cannot emerge as a problem for Emad because foreignness is not finally about the specific differences between languages at the same time those specific differences are understood to implicate the movement between interlingual

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7 At different junctures throughout his three Hölderlin lecture courses, Heidegger cites from Hölderlin’s two letters to his friend Casimir Böhlendorff. The first letter, which is dated Dec. 4th, 1801, was written shortly before Hölderlin’s departure for Bordeaux. It is this first letter to Böhlendorff that is the basis for this article, and is referred to throughout as the “Letter to Böhlendorff” or simply as the “Letter.” The second letter to Böhlendorff, which famously refers to Hölderlin’s having been “struck by Apollo,” is undated, but is generally thought to have been written sometime during the spring of 1802. The first Letter to Böhlendorff plays a crucially important role in framing all three of Heidegger’s Hölderlin lecture courses. For Heidegger’s treatment of the Letter in the 1934/35 Hölderlins Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhein,” GA39 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980), see pages 290–294 of that volume; for his discussion of it in the 1941/42 Hölderlins Hymne “Andenken”, GA52 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), see the “Drittes Hauptstück: Die Suche nach dem freien Gebrauch des Eigenen,” pages 123–150; and in his 1942/42 Hölderlins Hymne “Der Ister”, GA 53 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984), pp. 168–170. Holderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,” trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 135–37. The seminal discussion of the Letter within the context of Hölderlin’s own biography and writings is given by Peter Szondi, “Überwindung des Klassizimus: Der Brief an Böhlendorff vom 4. Dezember 1801” in Schriften: I. (Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 1978), pp. 345–366. Szondi’s chapter discusses various Hölderlin scholars’ interpretation of the Letter, including Norbert von Hellingrath’s with whose work Heidegger was clearly familiar.
and innerlingual translation. What Heidegger’s interpretation of the Letter to Böhlendorff importantly shows is that the translation of a foreign language into one’s own language is not one-directional (and this includes understanding innerlingual translation as a “return”). Rather, the movement of translation as a setting-over is instead the “intersecting” or “crossing over” (Überkreuzung; emphasis mine) of the reciprocal, but also asymmetrical surpassing of foreign and own, Greek and German, as a being given into difference.

This in turn changes how the direction of movement between interlingual and innerlingual translation might be conceived in ways that Heidegger’s interpretation of the Letter to Böhlendorff richly suggests, but also cannot quite account for given the fact that innerlingual translation for Heidegger traverses the dialogue between thinking and poetizing as this is taken up in Heidegger’s encounter with Hölderlin’s own dialogue with the Greeks. Instead, it is Hölderlin’s effort to “correct” (verbessern) the Greek by way of the German through his “Orientalization” of key Sophoclean odes that reveals that interlingual translation is already an innerlingual translation, one that in operating by way of a structure of transposition and excess – that is, by way of a certain kind of eccentricity – succeeds in bringing forward the “undeniable attachments” and “unresolvable foreignness” in its accomplishment of a Greek that never was. Yet this is what it means to translate German into German. Couldn’t such eccentricity also be the model for understanding the root of the foreignness and even violence of Emad’s translations of Heidegger with respect to what we understand both English and translation to allow?

1 Hölderlin’s Dec. 4, 1801 Letter to Böhlendorff

Hölderlin’s Dec. 4, 1801 Letter to Böhlendorff was written on the eve of his departure for Bordeaux and towards the end of what, in retrospect, would prove to have been one of his richest creative years. While the letter is clearly intended to praise and congratulate his friend Casimir Böhlendorff on the successful execution of his tragedy, Fernando, by in part supplying the terms for that success (“you have achieved so much in precision and suppleness, and not lost anything in warmth”), Hölderlin scholars have read the Letter as addressed more to Hölderlin himself than to Böhlendorff. In falling more than 2 years after his Sophocles translations (and likely shortly before his great Pindar translations), the Letter serves as the articulation of the poetic theory Hölderlin came to work out in the context of those translations.

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And, as his 1803 “Remarks” to the *Oedipus* and the *Antigone* further reveal, it continues to guide Hölderlin’s increasingly radicalized attitude towards translation whose logical, if also eccentrically extreme, extension is to “correct” the Greek original as this is possible only through its translation into German.

Heidegger first cites the Letter to Böhldendorff at the conclusion of his 1934–1935 *Hölderlins Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhein,”* echoing its words in the concluding lines of the course by calling on the Germans to “learn the free use of the national.” While Heidegger is generally unconcerned with the larger context that situates the Letter (and this includes the debt it owes to Herder’s conception of a people and the answer it issues to Schiller on cultural formation), it is central to how Heidegger comes to understand his own encounter with the pre-Socratics and Sophocles, beginning with the 1935 *Introduction into Metaphysics.* Thus, although Heidegger does not make general statements that connect translation to the specific language of the Letter as, for example, he does in “The Ister” lecture course, his interpretative “translation” of Sophocles’ *Antigone* with its emphasis on “violence” (*Gewalt*) carries through on the conceptual framework first developed in the Letter. Heidegger first starts translating in what might be called a “Heideggerian manner” beginning with his infamous translation of the Greek word *deinon* with “*unheimlich*” (uncanny, unhomely). I cite Heidegger’s own citation of the Letter to Böhldendorff from the “*Germanien*” and “*Der Rhein*” lecture course – which although it includes only its first half – is his most complete reproduction of the Letter:

>We learn nothing with greater difficulty than the free use of the national. And, as I believe, that it is precisely the clarity of presentation [*Klarheit der Darstellung*] which is so originally natural to us, as the fire from the heaven is to the Greeks. It is for that reason that they will need to be *surpassed* [*übertreffen*] in beautiful passion, which you too have retained, rather than in that Homerish presence of spirit and gift for presentation.

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>Wir lernen nichts schwerer als das Nationelle frei gebrauchen. Und wie ich glaube, ist gerade die Klarheit der Darstellung uns ursprünglich so natürlich, wie den Griechen das Feuer vom Himmel. Eben deswegen werden diese eher in schöner Leidenschaft, die Du Dir auch erhalten hast, als in jener homerischen Geistesgegenwart und Darstellungsgabe zu übertreffen sein.

It sounds paradoxical. But I will put it forward yet again, and submit it to your test and free employment, that in the progress of culture, the properly national always assumes less precedence. For that reason the Greeks are less masters of holy pathos because it was inborn in them whereas, from Homer onward, they excel in the gift for presentation because this extraordinary man was sufficiently soulful to capture the Western Junonian sobriety for his Apollonian realm, and thereby to truly appropriate the foreign. With us it is the reverse. That is why it is also so dangerous to abstract the rules of art solely and in isolation from the model of Greek excellence. I have long labored on this and now know that, with the exception of what must be the highest for the Greeks and for us, namely, to have a living relation and destiny [Geschick], we must not bear any resemblance to them. But what is one’s own [das Eigene] must be learned just as well as what is foreign [das Fremde]. That is why the Greeks are unavoidable for us. Only we will not keep up with them precisely in what is our own, the national, because, as I said, the free use of one’s own is the most difficult.

Though I will return to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Letter in the “Germanien” und “Der Rhein” course, I want to clarify its basic structure by way of a schematic outline included in Heidegger’s fragmentary notes, “Zu Hölderlins Übersetzung der Pindarfragmente,” provisionally dated 1944. This schematic not only has the advantage of making the basic moves of the Letter visually clear, its dating places it within the same period as Heidegger’s most detailed remarks on translation in “The Ister” and Parmenides lecture courses. Indeed, the often-cited reference from the Parmenides course to translation as being “set onto a new shore” receives its more interesting formulation in this set of notes (cited in my second epigraph as the “setting-over onto the shore of an other”):

“living relation” (“destiny”), “the highest”
“free use”
“the national,” “one’s own,” what has been endowed (E), what is
↓ “originally natural.” From whence, in the first instance, this difference? (Animal rationale? No! The crossing over: what is ownmost and foreign.)
“What is foreign.” A task (T) laid claim to.

“the most difficult” to be achieved, and thus what is most readily “to be surpassed.
what is easier — what? The “foreign” (taken in itself). — “What is most difficult”: the acquisition of what one possesses in the service of its dispensation.

For the Greeks:  E “the fire from the heaven.” “Apollonian realm.” “Holy pathos” (“consumed in flames,” untamed)
“Apollonian realm”
T “Junion sobriety,” “presence of spirit,” “gift for presentation” (Homer)

For the Germans E “clarity of presentation,” calculation, spiritual self-presence, “the reverse.” self-consciousness, ratio. (“boxed up in a coffin.”)

T “the fire from the heavens.” (Realm of the living.)

E and T; own and foreign; both must be learned.
That for us from out of T “fire” does not come into the freedom of its destined ordering!¹¹

While this schematic helps make vivid the inverted and seemingly symmetrical apportioning of foreign and own, Greek and German (Hölderlin’s “with us it is the reverse”), the conceptual originality of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Letter lies in his posing of the question, “From whence, to begin with, this difference? [Woher, zunächst, diese Unterscheidung?],” and his answer, “The crossing over: what is ownmost and foreign [die Überkreuzung: Eigenstes und Fremdes],” which is indicated graphically, and no doubt insufficiently, by the doubly directed arrow.

As Heidegger’s adoption of the terms “Mitgift [endowment]” and “Aufgabe [task]” for Hölderlin’s “Eigene” and “Fremde” suggest (Hölderlin twice uses the word “Darstellungsgabe”), what is one’s ownmost cannot be understood as simply “given” and thus as a function of what is native or “originally natural.” The still further implication of this insight is that the difference between Greek and German also cannot be assumed as “given” in, for example, the way that a Goethe or Winkelman straightforwardly assumes the final accomplishment of Greek culture as the basis for imitation by the Germans. Instead, if we follow what Heidegger is after here, the endowment, so to speak, “invests” a task through which the givenness of the endowment as an endowment is realized or comes into its own only by way of the task. Indeed, it is this “as” that reveals translation to be a movement not of encounter and return, but a transposition that is the “setting over” into differential relation. With regard to this apportioning of endowments and tasks between the Greeks and the Germans respectively, the Greek “fire from heaven” and the German “clarity of presentation” “intersect” or “cross over” one another as each “surpasses” the other not in what is their own, but in what is in each case foreign to them. What emerges from out of the peculiar “givenness” of this structure is not a logic of identity nor an easily mapped binary, but instead the reciprocal exceeding by the foreign in what is in each case other to them. As we will see in Hölderlin’s various translation experiments, this excess serves to bring forward the fact of difference between foreign and own, Greek and German, without thereby presupposing that difference as either essentially given or even fully accomplished as a difference.

Hölderlin is acutely aware of the counter-intuitive nature of what it means for the Germans to surpass the Greeks in what is their own, characterizing it as “paradoxical.” While this paradox in part derives from, as Heidegger writes, the foreign “taken in itself” being “easier,” Hölderlin is positively interested in the structure of this excess as creatively, which is to say, differentially generative. As the subsequent content of the Letter makes clear – and this is variously captured in Heidegger’s parentheticals – absent the encounter with the foreign, what is one’s own is subject to a version of deficient excess that turns its original tendency back onto itself. For the Greeks, the native “fire from heaven” is threatened by the impulse to be “consumed in flames” through which the desire for immediacy is recuperated in the undoing of the experience of difference that itself constitutes self-consciousness. This is understood as the nostalgic desire for “unboundedness” or unification with the One, and it is exactly this repressed impulse that Hölderlin seeks to bring forward in his “eccentrically enthusiastic” and corrective translation of Sophocles. For the Germans, by contrast, the native “clarity of presentation” is impelled by the tendency towards excessive conceptualization and self-consciousness – Heidegger’s
otherwise surprising reference to “ratio” – whose literally final manifestation is, as Hölderlin later writes in the Letter, being “boxed up in a coffin.” Hölderlin’s calling on the Germans to surpass the Greeks in “holy pathos” is thus to serve as a kind corrective excess for the deficient excess to which what is one’s own is otherwise subject.

Heidegger’s interpretation of the Letter in the “Germanien” und “Der Rhein” course is governed by this insight into deficient excess together with his specific concern for the German “national.” Though Heidegger does not cite Hölderlin’s “Remarks to Antigone,” he interprets the Letter in terms of a passage that directly resonates with its basic structural framework in contrasting the “primary tendency” – here described by Hölderlin as a “weakness” (Schwäche) – that distinguishes the Greek and German styles of representation: “…our poetic art must be patriotic such that its materials are selected in accordance with our view of the world, and its representations patriotic, differing from Greek representations insofar as their primary tendency is to be able to grasp themselves [sich fassen] because their weakness lies therein; whereas, in contrast, the primary tendency in the modes of representation in our time is the ability to hit on [treffen] something, to have destiny, since the lack of fate, dusmoron, is our weakness.”

Notably, however, and in a way that directly anticipates his own 1935 interpretation of Sophocles, Heidegger not only approaches the Letter through the terminology of this passage, he approaches this passage through Hölderlin’s early translation of the opening lines from the second choral ode of the Antigone in which Hölderlin translates the Greek word deinon with “gewältig” (violent). That is, Heidegger translates back into the Letter what Hölderlin’s translation and commentary on the Antigone enact as the German confrontation with the Greek foreign, which is, of course, informed by the Letter. In this terminological crossing over, the Greek endowment of the “fire from heaven” becomes for Heidegger “the having become struck by the violence of be-ing [das Betroffenwerden durch die Gewalt des Seyns]” and “the passion for the overpowering [die Leidenschaft zum Überwältigenden],” while the Greek’s task is the “taming of the untameable in the struggle over the work, grasping, bringing-to-stand [die Bändigung des Unbändigen im Erkämpfen des Werkes, das Fassen, Zum-Stand-bringen].”

12In German this sentence reads:

…und unsere Dichtkunst vaterländisch sein muß, so daß ihre Stoffe nach unserer Weltansicht gewählt sind, und ihre Vorstellungen vaterländisch, verändern sich die griechischen Vorstellungen insofern, als ihre Haupttendenz ist, sich fassen zu können, weil darin ihre Schwäche lag, da hingegen die Haupttendenz in den Vorstellungsarten unserer Zeit ist, etwas treffen zu können, Geschick zu haben, da das Schicksallose, das dusmoron, unsere Schwäche ist.


The “Western Junonian sobriety” first captured by Homer is thus here being conceived in terms that Heidegger subsequently takes up in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* as τέχνη (technē).

While I will return to the problem Homer presents for Hölderlin in the next section, the latent connection between the “clarity of presentation” and τέχνη is important to keep in mind as Heidegger goes on to parse out what is endowed and tasked to the Germans. For in contrast to some interpretations of Heidegger, the Greeks and translation, Heidegger is not about “out Greeking” the Greeks, as though the surpassing of the foreign were something that could be “taken in itself.” (This would be simply to substitute how the foreign is “easier” for the “weakness” of what is one’s own as a further avenue to evade the difficulty of appropriating one’s own.) Rather, the problem for Heidegger is precisely the deficient excess inherent in what is the German’s own as this is tied to his nascent insights into τέχνη. As Heidegger writes: “To the Germans it is endowed: the ability to grasp, the getting straight and planning of domains and spaces, ordering to the extreme of organizing. Tasked to them is the becoming struck by beyng.” As this passage reveals, the weakness inherent in the “grasping” of the “clarity of presentation” shows up precisely in the drive towards compartmentalization, which substitutes the buoyant aliveness of the outline of the work for a frame and framework. In his later interpretation of the Letter to Böhlerdorff in “The Ister” lecture course, Heidegger thus comments on the danger of mistaking the excess that shows up in the setting up of limits for the sake of the setting up of limits for “the fire itself.”

At this juncture, it is necessary to return to how Heidegger understands the endowment to be realized as an endowment only by way of the task. Thus, where what is one’s own is natively original, this originality curiously comes into its own only by way of the task, which as Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes in the “Germanien” und “Der Rhein” course is something “won through struggle” (erkämpfen). Acknowledging that Heidegger’s martial language has a rhetorical urgency in relation to the “national,” the task – though appointed – is something that the Germans and the Greeks each freely give themselves precisely in its being taken up as a task. While this, of course, includes the appropriation of the “fire from the heavens” and the “clarity of presentation” respectively, the struggle to make the task one’s own serves to transform the very structure of what it means for the endowment to have been given as an endowment. This is simply to reiterate that for both Hölderlin and Heidegger, it is the excess implicit in the appropriation of the task that uniquely opens up the space for “learning.”

Where this certainly presupposes a kind of distance, the movement here is not the encounter with the foreign followed by the return to what is one’s own (this would be to reduce the generative creativity of Hölderlin’s paradox to a dialectic), but the

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transposition or, again, “crossing over” of foreign and own as this is accomplished only through the task. In an important but underdeveloped passage Heidegger writes, “Historical determination is always about transforming what has been given, the ‘national,’ into a task” – an insight echoed and given a still more compelling formulation at the conclusion of the “Origin of the Work of Art”: “History is the ecstatic transport of a people into its task as its return into what has been endowed [Geschichte ist die Entrückung eines Volkes in sein Aufgegebenes als Einrückung in sein Mitgegebenes].”¹⁶ This highlights a crucial point: The Germans’ encounter with the Greek foreign is never just the encounter with the Greek foreign. Instead, it is always simultaneously the encounter with the Greeks’ own excessive appropriation of the “clarity of presentation” through which the Germans are transposed into differential relation with what is their own, and transposed into differential relation with what is their own only by exceeding the Greeks’ in what is the Greeks’ own. (Here it is worth noting that the German word for “surpass” in the Letter to Böhlendorff is “übertreffen,” suggesting that the Germans learn how to “hit the mark” (treffen) only by overshooting it.) It is first through the excess of the task that the German’s enter into the possibility of learning what is their own not just as foreign, but from the position of the foreign. This is what it means to be set over not just onto another shore, but onto the shore of an other.

This suggests an importantly different reading of Heidegger’s 1935 interpretation of the second choral ode from the Antigone in the Introduction to Metaphysics. While a number of scholars have called attention to the distinct pathos of that interpretation, Heidegger’s confrontation with Sophocles needs to be understood in terms of the surpassing of the Greek foreign through which the Germans are transposed into the task of their own as this becomes uniquely available in the “yes” to the tragic downgoing of the capacity to grasp. Here, particular emphasis must be given to Heidegger’s concluding provocation from the “Germanien” und “Der Rhein” course that “the violence of be-ing must once again become a real question for the capacity to grasp.”¹⁷ In other words, Heidegger is not engaged in what for some is simply a heightened version of a typically idiosyncratic approach to the Greeks (and in this case one complicated by his comments on the Greek polis [πόλις]). Instead, the excessive aspect of Heidegger’s self-confessed interpretive violence enacts the appropriation of the Greek foreign according to the terms laid out in the Letter to Böhlendorff. The act of translation, then, is not limited to Heidegger’s “actual” translation of the ode or even to his three-staged interpretive commentary on that translation, but is to be found in the quality of the tonal excess of that interpretive translation, which exactly culminates with the inability of ἠχύνη to overpower the overpowering.

Hölderlin’s Eccentric Translation

Where the translation of German into German is enacted for Heidegger through his dialogue with Hölderlin’s poetry, which uniquely becomes the language of Heidegger’s own thinking, it is Hölderlin’s “corrected” translation of Sophocles’ Greek together with his extraordinarily literalized experiments with Pindar that provide the best model for what it means to carry through on the “undeniable attachments” and “unresolvable foreignness” of interlingual translation. Such attachments are evidenced in, for example, not only Hölderlin’s singular parataxis, they are intrinsically related to the realization of what Hölderlin calls the “Hesperian.” That is, they are intrinsically related to how German first comes to speak German through the achievement of specific poetic effects learned only in the eccentric or literalized translation of the Greek, and whose traces Hölderlin’s new “German” German bears. In attempting to show what is at stake in these corrections as an extension of the Letter to Böhlendorff, I’ll be drawing from Françoise Dastur’s article, “Hölderlin and the Orientalisation of Greece,” and from Wolfgang Binder’s, “Hölderlin und Sophokles.” In addressing Hölderlin’s Pindar experiments, I refer the reader to David Constantine’s outstanding, “Hölderlin’s Pindar: The Language of Translation,” whose feel for Hölderlin’s “translated” German exceeds what I myself am capable of hearing in German. This, of course, not only begs its own interesting set of questions with respect to translation, it directly pertains to Hölderlin’s effort to bring forward a still other foreign in his “corrected” version of the Greek “original” by way of the German.

As I have attempted to show in my analysis of the Letter to Böhlendorff, the Greeks and the Germans surpassing appropriation of what is in each case the other’s own is to serve as a kind of corrective excess for the deficient excess of what is native or “originally natural” to each. While Hölderlin, as we have seen, characterizes this reciprocal surpassing as “paradoxical,” his 1803–1804 correspondence with the publisher Friedrich Wilmsen on his Sophocles translations reveals that he came to see that the reversed or inverted symmetry between the Greeks and the Germans was haunted by a still deeper and unaccounted for asymmetry. And the locus of this asymmetry is Homer’s literally being “full of soul [seele]

though the German word “erbeuten” (“to capture”) has connotations of “ensnaring” rather than of “grasping” as conceptualizing (“fassen”), Homer’s radical innovation

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lies, as it were, in his capturing of “capturing.” Yet what the Letter to Böhlendorff importantly glosses over is how the Greeks are to enter into relation with what is their own, which requires not the Germans as the foreign “taken in itself,” but the Germans’ surpassing appropriation of what is the Greeks’ own. If, as Hölderlin writes, the Greeks are “unavoidable” for the Germans, the Germans might be described as “inevitable” for the Greeks, for Homer’s initiating by way of anticipating of the German foreign curiously presupposes the Greek as “given” without actually being able to accomplish it. As Hölderlin writes in fragment to a late hymn cited by both Binder and Heidegger:

Namely, they [the Greeks] wanted to found
A kingdom of art. But in this
The patriotic was neglected
by them and wretchedly went
Greece, the most beautiful, to its downfall.

The asymmetry that attaches to Homer’s radical innovativeness generates an unexpected symmetry between the Greeks and the Germans. Where the Germans are subject to deficient excess in the “clarity of presentation” as what is their own, the Greeks are subject to a still different excess in their surpassing appropriation of an as yet also unaccomplished foreign – a foreign who, in surpassing the Greeks in what is their own, first creates the differential excess that would allow the Greeks to enter into relation with what is originally native to them. This is to say that the Greeks succumb to precisely that excess of the clarity of presentation that also threatens the Germans.

Hölderlin’s increasing awareness of this asymmetry leads him to transform both where and how he locates a necessary and corrective excess at the same time he retains the basic structure of the letter to Böhlendorff, with regard to what is apportioned to the Greeks and the Germans respectively. In contrast, then, to the reciprocal surpassing of Greek and German in what is in each case the other’s own, Hölderlin attempts to reach back behind Homer’s original innovation in order to bring forward through the translation of Greek into German a still other foreign already residing within the Greek foreign. As Hölderlin writes in his September 20th, 1803 Letter to Wilmans: “I hope that Greek art, which is foreign for us due to the national conformism and deficiency which it has been able to abide, will thus be presented in more a lively manner to the public than is customary by my bringing out the Oriental it had always distanced itself from, and by correcting its aesthetic deficiency.”

As Wolfgang Binder has shown in his article “Sophokles und Hölderlin,” Hölderlin’s retranslations of key Sophoclean odes attempt to correct these aesthetic faults by restoring the “aorgic principle” of the oriental – the wild passion and drive to undo individuation that Nietzsche will later designate the “Dionysian” – through what Hölderlin calls “eccentric enthusiasm.” It is important to be clear that what Hölderlin is doing here is not simply translating the Greek into German, but instead bringing the Greek into its own through the encounter with the German foreign,
which peculiarly entails the recuperation of a still other foreign.\footnote{As Dastur writes in referring to Binder in “Hölderlin and the Orientalisation of Greece”: “We are dealing with a triple project: That of the transcription of one language into another, of Greek into German; but also of the transposition of the original into a state of accomplishment it has missed by drawing the oriental under the Greek; finally an accomplishment of the Hesperian itself, since the oriental constitutes its cultural tendency. For Hölderlin this means neither transposing the Greek into German, which would no longer be Greek, nor carbon copying the German from the Greek, which would still be Greek, but unreadable to us. Rather, it means correcting the excess of art which led Greece to its downfall by making its oriental nature appear, which is to say, in the end translating the Greek into Greek by letting it pass into another language and accomplishing what it could not bring itself to good end,” p. 173.}\footnote{Constantine, “Hölderlin’s Pindar: The Language of Translation,” p. 831.} Significantly, however, to “correct” the Greeks’ excessive appropriation of the German foreign by way of the Oriental is simultaneously to “correct” the excess inherent in the “clarity of presentation” as what is the Germans own. This, then, is to simultaneously accomplish a Greek that never was, and in so doing to bring German into its own through the translation of a still other foreign within the foreign.

This invention of German through translation is made still more vivid in Hölderlin’s translation experiments with Pindar, which come to transform Hölderlin’s own poetic language. As Constantine elaborates in his article, “Hölderlin’s Pindar: The Language of Translation,” Hölderlin in an extended translation experiment attempted to follow as exactly as possible Gottlob Heyne’s 1798 edition of Pindar, which divides Pindar’s poetry into short and purely metrical lines. (Interestingly, this often included Heyne’s dividing of individual words.) While Hölderlin’s effort to render Pindar in the most literal possible manner sometimes led to versions of poems at the limit of intelligibility, Constantine emphasizes Hölderlin’s attempt to find a mechanism that would allow him to “minimally deviate” from the Greek in order to best approximate the poetic effect of the Greek in German. This included, for example, when and how Hölderlin choose to depart from the Greek word order in the effort to achieve, as Constantine writes, “the best possible effect for the smallest departure [from the Greek original].”\footnote{Constantine, “Hölderlin’s Pindar: The Language of Translation,” p. 834.}

While Hölderlin’s debt to Pindar has long been acknowledged, at the conclusion of his article Constantine – who is himself both a poet and translator – calls attention to how Hölderlin’s translations come to inflect his poetry by introducing a kind of strangeness. Commenting on how Hölderlin’s mature poetic language “bears the Greek in mind” in the most Hölderlinian of words, he writes:

> But my point is not that in reading Hölderlin one frequently comes up with Graecisms. Rather, that his most characteristic and powerful usages have a strangeness about them, they shock the mind, almost as though they had been translated — and from where? His use of the word ‘Gespräch’ for example…It is as though the word has connotations in another language — tones and overtones which the poet had appropriated, and was inducing into his native German.\footnote{Constantine, “Hölderlin’s Pindar: The Language of Translation,” p. 834.}

While Constantine does not connect Hölderlin’s Pindar experiments with the Letter to Böhldendorff in this particular article (he includes a discussion of the
Letter in his book, *Hölderlin*, it is clear that this strangeness reflects the translation of German into German as this is learned only through the translation of Greek into German. In contrast to Emad’s privileging of a generic conception of “the foreignness that rules between languages,” this strangeness, together with the unplaceable, but familiar “connotation” would seem to point back to the “undeniable attachments” and “unresolvable foreignness” at issue in interlingual translation. This, finally, cannot be separated from innerlingual translation. In answer to Constantine’s question, “from where?,” the alternative to the silence of the root-unfolding of language would be this very strangeness, which marks the presence of the foreign not just within what is one’s own, but that has elicited or occasioned the movement of coming into one’s own and whose irreducibility points beyond itself in bearing witness to the specificity of its attachments as difference.

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**References**

Individuation, Responsiveness, Translation: Heidegger’s Ethics

Eric Sean Nelson

[T]he transcendence of Dasein’s being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation (GA 2, p. 51).\(^1\)

aletheuein (άλθευς) means to be disclosing, to remove the world from concealedness and coveredness. And that is a mode of being of human Dasein. It appears first of all in speaking, in speaking with one another, in legein (λέγειν).\(^2\)

1 Introduction

Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time* has been repeatedly criticized for ignoring the social and ethical dimensions of human existence. After discussing the possibility of an “ethics of individuation” based on passages from *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, I argue that Heidegger is not concerned with developing a social or moral philosophy as such but with the question of how individuation (Vereinzelung), within the horizon of the question of being (Sein), is possible given the predominance

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of the social and the fallenness of the public sphere. The priority of the question concerning the individuation of Dasein – and its explication through the *alterity* of uncanniness, facticity, and death in relation to the *identity* of tradition and the “they” (*das Man*) – provides a basis for rethinking the significance of the ethical in *Being and Time*, especially in light of Heidegger’s earlier venture of a hermeneutics of facticity and related works of the late 1920s. Insofar as Heidegger unfolds the finitude and *facticity of the ethical*, as a question to which ethical thinking needs to respond, Heidegger intimates an *ethics of facticity*. In the conclusion, I consider the implications of such an ethics and responsibility for issues of language and translation in Heidegger’s thinking.

Heidegger’s reversal of ethics in *Being and Time* is not done in the name of another ethical position or view, such as egoism, nor for the sake of the unethical. It is instead a performance and staging of the very question of ethics in its facticity. Heidegger interrogates ethics as embodied in tradition and everyday life in order to disclose possibilities that remain hidden in discourses appealing to axioms, principles, values, and virtues. These unnoticed and suppressed possibilities are intimated in Heidegger’s discussions of the existential structures of Dasein such as conscience, guilt, solicitude, or concern for others, and care. The coming to freedom and responsibility involved in the individuation of human being-there – with its threefold equiprimordial structure of being-itself, being-with others (*Mitsein*), and being-amidst things – occurs or is enacted as a response to the facticity of one’s own existence, especially as disclosed in the inescapability of one’s death.

2 Ethics and Individuation

In investigating the significance of individuation in Heidegger, we are confronted with the initial problem that it is habitually not seen as an issue at all. Individuation is already self-evident, since we are all already individuals. If it is questioned at all, it is interpreted as the particularization of a universal, the instantiation of a type, differentiation according to a category, and affiliation with or alienation from some

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3 I retain “fallenness” as a translation of *Verfallenheit*, because (1) the word does not mean “falling prey” and (2) Heidegger intentionally transforms reified theological concepts, such as conscience, fallenness, and guilt by phenomenologically relating them to concrete phenomena.

4 My reading departs from interpretations of Heidegger that define ethics in an exclusively limited and negative sense. Gail Stenstad, for instance, suggests that Heidegger’s thinking has no ethical dimension and that imputing any ethics would violate “what Heidegger’s thinking is trying to accomplish.” However, even as she rejects ethics as derivative and useless theorizing, as the opposite of dwelling, she discusses claims that have a broader ethical dimension, such as holding oneself open to what is, listening and responding to things, etc., or that have a tacit ethical dimension insofar as being open, listening to, and dwelling with things suggests an *ethos* (*ēthos*), accustomed place, or way of life rather than a secondary ontic fact of human existence. See *Transformations: Thinking After Heidegger* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), especially 183–185, 197–198.
given authority or identity. It is accordingly either reduced to numerical, physical and spatial differentiation or a belonging to a pregiven genus or fixed essence for which “becoming oneself” is a redundant question.

For Heidegger, the question of individuation is an issue concerning not “what” but “who” one is. It is bound up with the enigma of how the self can know itself in its facticity, that is, that which resists the self and its appropriations, including its own self, compelling factual-life to interpret and translate itself. Heidegger described such questions, in which the self questions itself concerning itself and as a whole (GA 29/30, p. 20), as existential or metaphysical. They disclose myself as a question to myself.

Heidegger’s employment of the German word Vereinzelung (individuation) suggests a break or separation involved in “becoming one” or in being reduced onto oneself. Although they need not coincide in ordinary German, Heidegger identifies Vereinzelung with loneliness and solitude (Einsamkeit) in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: This individuation is rather the solitariness in which each human being first of all enters into a nearness to what is essential in all things, a nearness to world. What is this solitude, where each human being will be as though unique? (GA 29/30, p. 8).

Why does this individuation, the singularity that is not just a particular instance of the universal in being as though unique, require solitude? In this need, is it nothing but a flight and escapism, such as that attributed to the Daoist hermit, into the illusory tranquility of the rural solitude of some mountain stream or forest path? Perhaps. Yet more significantly, for Heidegger, solitude is a condition not of escaping the world but of encountering it. Solitariness is a prerequisite of individuation because the latter breaks with the constant noise of normal indifference in order to near and hear the world. Individuation is a kind of transcendence (GA 2, p. 51), a stepping out of oneself toward the world. The break of immanence (transcendence) is necessary for the happening of a “step back from” that is equally a “stepping out into” and allowing to be seen. Solitude, as separation from participation in the continuous hum of everydayness, is the breakdown of connection through encountering finitude. The uniqueness of self and things does not arise from the imposition of a view, prescription or imperative (i.e., “ethics” in the traditional sense) but emerges in the “indicative,” self-disclosing moment of “coming into one’s own” – which even in his early lecture-courses is not merely an ontic occurrence – of letting world be encountered and said (i.e., “ethics” in a phenomenological sense).

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As a response to finitude, including the facticity that one is, individuation is a becoming finite. Since finitude is the way in which humans exist or dwell, it is not a mere “fact” about human nature. Nor is encountering one’s own finitude equivalent to idealistically reducing the world to the ego and its concerns, as such egoism is part of the average everydayness that is in question. On the contrary, according to Heidegger:

Finitude is not some property that is merely attached to us, but is our fundamental way of being. If we wish to become what we are, we cannot abandon this finitude or deceive ourselves about it, but must safeguard it. Such preservation is the innermost process of our being finite, i.e., it is our innermost becoming finite. Finitude only is in truly becoming finite. In becoming finite, however, there ultimately occurs an individuation of man with respect to his Dasein. Individuation – this does not mean that man clings to his frail little ego that puffs itself up against something or other which it takes to be the world (GA 29/30, p. 8).

This taking-up, safeguarding, and preserving of finitude can be seen as an “ethics of finitude.” It is not ethics in the standard sense of prescribing universal rules and systems of axioms, values, or virtues to follow, since Heidegger rejected “ethics” as legislation and calculation. Such an ethics is not about the formation of a set of values, world-view, or ideology at all, much less some supposed “spiritual” and “cultural” warfare, but opening up their questionability in exposing the self to its world. The possibility of this ethics should be separated from (while confronting) Heidegger’s own “fallen” ideological engagement, which was perhaps due to blindness to the pervasiveness and power of ideology and value thinking.

The early Heidegger’s emphasis on the transformative moment – or singularization – of coming into one’s own (i.e., in his early usage of words such as Ereignis and Geschehen) and renewal in performative enactment (Vollzug), in contrast with the dominion of custom and opinion that passes things along, allows responding to the world out of its openness and givenness anew. Destructuring is introduced in order to attempt to trace that which throws views, values, and constructs into question in order to let the world, self, and other be encountered. This is not ethics in the conventional sense of legislating laws, moralizing about virtues, or prescribing values. However, it is deeply ethical in that such confrontation engages and potentially releases its own tradition, historicity, hermeneutical situation, and generation. The prospect of such a phenomenological ethics depends on whether individuation, as a break that opens and discloses other possibilities for dwelling, is even thinkable.7

3 Indifference and Individuation

The orienting issue of Being and Time is the meaning and truth of being. Yet rather than providing a classical philosophical analysis of being, or ontology, Heidegger interrogates the meaning of being via the issue of that being who examines its own

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7 On the possibility of a different ethos and poetics of responsive dwelling, and its environmental significance, see E. S. Nelson, “Responding to Heaven and Earth: Daoism, Heidegger and Ecology,” Environmental Philosophy, 1/2 (Fall 2004): 65–74.
way or mode of being. *Being and Time* asks the question of being but does so by addressing that being which questions itself. He calls this being, which we in each case are, Dasein. Far from being the philosophical anthropology that Husserl feared, much less an encyclopedic or systematic account of human nature, Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein focused on a sparse number of aspects of human existence and in an eccentric way from the perspective of modern social philosophy. Heidegger did not begin with the individual as an essence or atomic fact from which to construct society through power, markets, contracts, and convents. His analysis takes as its point of departure Dasein in its “neutrality,” in what he calls the “indifference” of everydayness, and proceeds to examine situations that broach the significance of being and the self by placing this indifference in question.

Average everyday life is not indifferent in the Kantian sense of being disinterested or Stoic impartiality. It is not the absolute indifference experienced in profound boredom, unconcerned with all affairs, which Heidegger described in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. Instead, through its self-interested concern with everyday things and affairs, it is indifferent to that which would throw light on character and of the plight of its own existence. It is in these situations, where the everyday and the ordinary become questionable, that the grip of everyday indifference is broken. The difference indicated in this breaking, in which the “one” of the “they” (*das Man*) is doubled into two in order to become the “one” of oneself (*vereinzelt*), is the possibility of individuation. Individuation as the break with indifference can take place because Dasein’s neutrality is already broken by the facticity of its existence: “The being that we in each case are, the human is in its essence neutral. We call this being Dasein. Yet it belongs to what is ownmost to neutral Dasein that it has a necessarily broken neutrality, insofar as it in each case factically exists” (GA 27, p. 146) [trans. modified].

The transition from being lost in the facticity of the indifference, conformity, and compulsion of the “they” (*das Man*) to the self-individuation involved in what Heidegger calls authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) requires that the self can be a question to and for itself precisely in and through its facticity. Heidegger accordingly contends in §9 that the analytic of Dasein cannot begin with Dasein in its difference, qua actually existing concrete individual, but rather with its common indifference or averageness. For Heidegger, Dasein’s being “must be developed from the existentially of its existence. This cannot mean, however, that ‘Dasein’ is to be construed from out of a concrete possible idea of existence. At the outset of our analysis, it is particularly important that Dasein should not be interpreted in the difference of a definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered in its indifferent character which it is proximally and for the most part. This indifference is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this being” (GA 2, p. 58, emphasis added). Although the goal of the analytic of Dasein will be Dasein in its difference (individuation), its factical possibilities (existence) are not straightforwardly available in average everydayness.

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Difference remains invisible to the indifference of the “they.” Average ordinary life dwells in the familiarity of its self-understanding without seeing its possibilities or hearing “who” (not “that”) it is. The familiarity and compulsion of common life presents itself as certain, obvious, and unquestionable. In this context of conventional hearing, and reading, “we hear only what we already understand.” This habitual and customary reproduction of power in our very senses was analyzed by Adorno, in the context of music and – needless to say – from a different perspective, as a retrogression in hearing as listeners are transformed into consumers. Such everyday hearing is all the more coercive, however, because it is not merely superimposed by an external system upon the “innocent” lifeworld, and hence easily correctable through a new consensus, but already comprises the fabric of the everyday lifeworld itself. Although Heidegger was not interested in ideology-critique or prescribing “ownedness” as a normative end or standard, since he rejected ethics and critique in this sense, his thought still has consequences for such thinking given this account of inherent non-innocence of everydayness. Dominion achieved through the public sphere and civil society, through everyday beliefs and practices, is consequently much more unquestioned and pervasive than any hegemony based on institutions alone.

It is repeatedly forgotten that fallenness, according to the logic of temporalization at work in *Being and Time*, is not so much spatial – fallen from heaven – as it is temporal. Everyday existence is not simply a “social reality” but is itself a mode of being in time, it is fallenness into the present. For fallen everydayness, according to its temporality of existing in the present without encountering the moment, everything is an extension of its own present. Although it understands and lives the past and future as mere extensions of the present, and as guaranteed by history, memorial, and progress, the absolutized perspective of the present is itself historically formed and finite. The Augenblick, the instant or moment, is an encounter with one’s own temporal finitude and, as such, potentially a break in which decision and individuation can occur. Yet human existence is not only challenged by its present. Being related to a past that cannot fully be mastered and a future that is not simply a reproduction of its own present, the identity of lifeworld and common sense are

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9 Interestingly, the question of naming difference remains deeply problematic for Heidegger. See, for example, Peter Trawny’s investigation of the “inappearance” or “invisibility” (Unscheinbarkeit) of difference in Heidegger’s thought. Trawny’s essay explores the complexity of difference, the multiple ways in which difference is enacted, in Heidegger’s thought. Difference is itself no longer difference when it is understood, according to the logic of identity, as a first principle or ground. This presents Heidegger with the impossibility of identifying and naming difference, since difference as difference withdraws and withholds itself. Peter Trawny, “Die unscheinbare Differenz.” *Phénoménologie Française et Phénoménologie Allemande*, ed. E. Escoubas and B. Waldenfels (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000), pp. 65–102.


always implicitly questionable. Everyday existence avoids such questionability in its “flight” from this unknown past and unknowable future, because exposure to this temporality, to the ecstatic character of time, throws its self-certainty and self-understanding into question.

Dasein is first of all to be understood out of the social indifference in which it is usually affected and moved. Yet, via the very affectivity and motility indicated in the self’s average everydayness, Heidegger articulated Dasein’s possibilities for understanding being and enacting its existence in its difference and singularity. This is done through the interruption of everyday indifference, which allows the releasement of the everyday. These interruptions occur through experiences of limits, which Karl Jaspers had described as “boundary situations.” These disruptions are not merely negative and inconvenient, but disclose the very character of existence in its facticity and possibility. The differentiation of existence occurs through the possibilities disclosed in the breaks and disruptions of everydayness itself. It is difference itself that reveals possibilities for the individuation of Dasein. Although alterity is hinted at in Jaspers’s notion of “boundary-situation,” it remains inadequate for Heidegger’s analysis of individuation insofar as it fails to enact the questionability of existence. As merely other, alterity and difference can always be reintegrated back into the indifference of everydayness, just as there is a kind of “newness” and apparent variety that is actually more of the same in contrast with the phenomenologically new (GA 20, pp. 32–33).

Indifferent everydayness involves a repetition without difference and without renewal. The broken hammer can be replaced, anxiety can be forgotten, and the strangeness of the stranger can be integrated or excluded according to the norms of everydayness. Interruption alone cannot individuate the self, but rather how Dasein responds to interruption is the key to its individuation: Whether the break itself is recognized as such and its questionability intensified or whether it is excluded as nonsense – as the “nothing” is habitually disclosed in average existence – or – like death – integrated into the identity of everydayness. The questionability of such experiences and situations needs to be embraced and deepened if radical individuation is to occur. This is why Heidegger emphasized the moment of being pushed and shaken (Stoß) in his description of the call of conscience: “In the disclosive tendency of the call, lies the moment (Moment) of a push (Stoß), of an abrupt arousal (Aufrütteln). The call is from afar unto afar” (GA 2, p. 360). This being called is a being pushed and shaken in the call, since ordinary hearing does not listen to it. Dasein, as being-with others, can listen to others and does so in the manner of everydayness. The average self loses itself in the undifferentiated talk of everydayness such that it hears yet fails to listen. Thus, according to Heidegger, Dasein “fails to hear its own self in listening to the they-self.” Lost in this average indifferent

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12 Heidegger developed the issue of death in proximity to Jaspers’ notion of “Grenzsituation” but increasingly differentiates them. See, for example, Der Begriff der Zeit, GA 64 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004), p. 48. I discuss the importance and inadequacy of Jaspers’ “boundary-situation” for Heidegger in “Questioning Practice: Heidegger, Historicity and the Hermeneutics of Facticity.” Philosophy Today, 44 (2001): 150–159.
hearing, Dasein “fails to hear in that it listens away to the ‘they’” (GA 2, p. 360). The call of conscience interrupts ordinary hearing and discloses another possibility for hearing: “This hearing-to [or ‘listening away’ (Hinhören) to the ‘they’] must be broken, i.e., the possibility of another kind of hearing that interrupts it must be given by Dasein itself. The possibility of such a break consists of being called-onto (Angerufen) without mediation” (GA 2, p. 360).

The individuation of Dasein, which is in each case a being with others in the world, is not enacted in the everyday relationship between self and other. This relationship is itself usually characterized by the indifference of everydayness. Instead, this enactment occurs only when the questionability of existence in its being-with is enacted. It is precisely such experiences of interruption and uncanniness that individuate Dasein, when it hears the claim addressed to it in such experiences, and thus lets difference appear (GA 2, pp. 366–368, 372, 406–407).13

The call of conscience is a call by oneself onto being oneself. As such, it interrupts the identity of everydayness to let singularity, responsiveness to it, and responsibility for it, appear. Angst, however, does not proceed from and back to oneself insofar as it, as possibility, interrupts the very being of the self. Angst individuates in relation to the non-relational that can at any time strike (GA 2, pp. 250–251, 253–254). That is, it singularizes Dasein in regard to the ownmost (eigensten), non-relational (unbezüglichen), and unbeatable (unüberholbaren) possibility of its own death (GA 2, pp. 332–333). The unavoidable possibility of death confronts each thrown existence as its own death, as a death that addresses “me” by ending and thus radically placing into the question the very mineness of my existence. This possibility is non-relational in that it cannot be ordered in the relationality of the world but places relationality itself into question. Death is not another relation; it appears as the relationless as such. Death appears as something that cannot be “outstripped” or “beaten.”

Dasein runs in after or away from death, yet it does not overcome the death it is expecting or avoid the death it is fleeing. Rather than being something Dasein can master, death masters Dasein each time. Death remains in its difference something that cannot be sublimated (unaufhebbar), mediated (unvermittelbar), and thought relationally (unbezüglich; GA 2, pp. 332–333).14 It indicates the fundamental thrownness into facticity of Dasein, and the limits of “transcendental-horizontal thinking,” which is an issue that Heidegger continues to return to and rethink in the Contributions to Philosophy.15 Dasein is incapable of conceptualizing or mastering

13The intersection of familiarity and unfamiliarity (proximity and distance) is already a topic in 1919. The disruption of the familiar presupposes the stability of the familiar that is thrown into question. Compare, for example, Heidegger, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 58 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992b), p. 251.


death, since death withdraws from being understood (GA 2, pp. 332–333). It is in this sense that the death of the other cannot be represented (GA 2, pp. 319–321). For Heidegger, it is only in the shadow of one’s own death in which this non-relationality occurs and the nexus of worldly significance is broken.

At first, it seemed that average everydayness had the first and last word, and that interruptions could always be reappropriated and integrated back into the same. Yet, with the disclosure of fundamental non-relationality in anxiety, the direction of Heidegger’s analysis is reversed. It is not uncanniness and questionability that are derivatives of everydayness; it is everydayness that presupposes the uncanniness and questionability that it suppresses: “That kind of being-in-the-world which is tranquilized and familiar is a mode of Dasein’s uncanniness, not the reverse. From an existential-ontological point of view, the ‘not-at-home’ must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon” (GA 2, p. 252). Heidegger would insist on the fundamental homelessness of “man” almost 10 years later in his Contributions to Philosophy: “Be-ing is the hearth-fire in the midst of the abode of the gods – an abode which is simultaneously the estranging of man (the ‘between’ [das Zwischen] in which he remains a (the) stranger, precisely when he is at home with beings)” [GA 65, pp. 486–487/343].16 Existence is primordially strange and foreign, we do not even know what “man” – or “the human” – is (GA 29/30, p. 10), and we remain strangers to ourselves (GA 29/30, p. 6). It is not the identity and indifference of everydayness that is primary. Singularity and difference are constitutive of Dasein through its openness as well as its uncanniness and questionability. The self is each time a question to itself.

4 Dasein and Its Other

Levinas criticized the primacy of one’s own death in Heidegger and proposed an alternative approach in which the death of the other always takes precedence.17 Is there not after all a testimony of/to the other in her death, one that suggests the ethical relation to the other rather than absorption in the egoism of self-concern? One could even formulate Levinas’s point in a way such as to alleviate some “Heideggerian” concerns: Could there not be a testimony to the other that is outside

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17 Heidegger’s presence haunts Levinas’s thought such that it is frequently present even when Heidegger is not explicitly discussed. Levinas’s most extensive discussion and critique of Heidegger on issues such as death can be found in his later work God, Death, and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). Also, compare the discussions of Levinas and Heidegger by Berasconi, Raffoul, and Wood in Addressing Levinas. Edited by Eric Sean Nelson, Antje Kapust, Kent Still (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005).
of the conceptuality and relationality of representational thinking; could there be a witnessing that does not undermine the non-relationality and non-identity of the other’s death as in each case its own? This last question raises the point of Heidegger’s reference to Tolstoy: “In his story ‘The Death of Ivan Ilyich’ Leo Tolstoy has presented the phenomenon of the disruption and breakdown of having someone die” (GA 2, p. 338n). A simple statement, yet one that indicates that testimony and witnessing are not necessarily the average everyday response to the death of the other, although they can occur through the disruption and breakdown.

The “ownmost” of death is not possessiveness and its “mineness” is not egoism, since possessiveness and mineness indicate that they are questions for oneself (myself) that place oneself (me) into question and not some other person somewhere else. Perhaps, following the structure of care, one needs to see one’s own death in order to care for the other’s death, since this breaks the uncaring indifference of everydayness that does not care for the self or the other. In that sense, it is more than the recognition of not being able to live the other’s death. Death places me into question, addresses me as a question, precisely by being my death. If death escapes representation and relationality, the other’s death can be a question for me although I do not experience or live-through what it was like for her from her perspective. This is because death is a limit to experience rather than some content that could be reproduced from one mind to another. Death is mine in that it occurs to every “I” each time alone. It is not mine in the sense of a possession that I control since it controls me. Dasein does not possess itself in death but is, on the contrary, “shattered” (GA 2, p. 509). Heidegger would transform this claim in his Introduction to Metaphysics, where he described how the human being, who responds to the violence of being through violence, shatters on death (GA 40, p. 167/168), and continues with the claim that the violence-doing of human Dasein “must shatter against the excessive violence of being” (GA 40, p. 171/173). 18 Heidegger also commented in his Contributions to Philosophy on the role of understanding and its being shattered in Being and Time: “But understanding of being is throughout just the opposite, nay even essentially other than making this understanding dependent upon human intention. How is being still to be made subjective at that place when what counts is the shattering of the subject?” (GA 65, pp. 455–456/321).

The self cannot have itself then as a possession or consolidate itself as “the Self,” according to Heidegger, since it is already thrown into a world in which it is not the center and in which it is being decentered. Dasein is not only ek-static, it is essentially decentered or “ek-centric” (GA 27, p. 11). Even if Levinas’s objection is unconvincing, the problem runs deeper. Dasein is not an identical subject that can only be interrupted by another. Dasein is already distant and foreign to itself, such that the alterity and difference of uncanniness constitute its very mode of being. Dasein is thrown into facticity not as a general self or subject (GA 27, p. 5) but as

“each time” (je-weilig) and “in each case its own” (je-meinig). It is therefore one’s own death, not the death of the other, which indicates the most radical alterity and singularity. Being-there is in each case “my own” each singular time without sublimation, mediation, or rationality (i.e., Unaufhebbarkeit, Unvermittelbarkeit and Unbezüglichkeit). Death as the most extreme possibility determines the facticity of existence. As facticity, it cannot be overcome or withstood.

Dasein is constituted as being outside of itself and outside in a world, existing as thrown beyond itself as ek-static and outside itself as ek-centric (GA 27, p.11), which literally means being out of orbit. The self of Dasein is then both near and distant to itself. This familiar and unfamiliar self occurs in and through everydayness and the individuation of uncanniness. Individuation as Vereinzelung is a singularization through the interruption of the identity of the “they,” the opening of the difference that Dasein already is as each time its own. Yet, this singularization of Dasein as thrownness in a specific situation does not necessarily imply isolation if it brings Dasein into the entirety of its relations in the midst of beings (GA 27, p. 334). The separation and solitude of individuation might be isolating but this does not by itself make it egoism or solipsism.

One can describe Being and Time in terms of an inappropriable connectedness, that is, a contextuality that centers, decenters, and recenters human existence. In this relationality, including its “relation” to the non-relational, Dasein is both dependent and free in its relations to things, others, and the world. The relation to the other exemplifies this inapproprable relationality in that Dasein cannot take the place of the other. The other’s existence withdraws from appropriation insofar as it is each time and in each case its own. Thus, “I am never the Dasein of the other, although I can be with him.” For Heidegger, “time is the principle of individuation” and Dasein is its own way of being its time. Dasein is inherently singularizing from the start, since it is its time. It is temporal. It is not only in the moment but is each time its moment.

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20 Heidegger already connected facticity and death in 1924. See, for instance, GA 64, p. 51.

21 I cannot be the other but only be with her, this entails that Dasein cannot overcome the asymmetry of self and other. This not due to the “irrationality of lived experience” or “the limitedness and uncertainty of knowledge” but is constitutive of the way of being that Dasein is (GA 64, p. 47). The alterity seen by Levinas in the death of the other does not have the same power for Heidegger. Rather than placing the self into question, the other’s death is indifferently reintegrated according to the maxim that “one dies” (GA 64: 49). However, as in his examination of The Death of Ivan Ilyich, Heidegger’s description of such indifference does not entail that he is advocating it.

22 GA 64, pp. 57, 82–83.

23 Compare Frank Schalow’s analysis of temporality as diversity and plurality in Heidegger in his article “Decision, Dilemma, Disposition: The Incarnatedness of Ethical Action,” Existentia 12/3–4 (2002), especially pp. 249–250. I would argue in addition that this follows Heidegger’s early strategy of the formal indication of facticity: Ontological difference opens up the plurality of ontic difference, time the singularity of the moment.
In the relation of Dasein to its other, it can attempt to take this away from the other by leaping in, taking over, “understanding better,” or it can promote the other’s individuation. Thus, Heidegger indicated a different kind of relation in which the other is to remain free. In solicitude or caring-for (Fürsorge) the other, as ownmost care, Dasein does not leap in for the other in order to take the other’s care away, but rather is affected by it in order to give it back to the other. Caring for the other in its “care” does not imply taking the other’s care away (abzunehmen), but instead means to overtake it (übernehmen) in order to return it (zurückzugeben). Insofar as Dasein leaps ahead for the other instead of leaping in, it does so for the sake of the other rather than for itself. It takes up the other not to appropriate her but precisely in order to bring her to her own being as care. Solicitude or caring for the other’s care is not the reduction of my responsibility to promoting the responsibility of the other instead of, for example, helping someone in genuine need. It is more than the moral minimalism of abstract individualism insofar as it indicates the possibility of a reciprocal individuation in which each has its own being, as freedom and care, promoted.

Individuation involves differentiating oneself from common life – in its average-ness and fallenness – while taking up the responsibility of sharing with the other from out of this difference. This difference is a between that separates and binds, suggesting that individuation cannot be fulfilled. It happens only out of its impossibility. As Heidegger already argued in 1924, fallenness is constitutive of facticity (GA 64, p. 51). As such, it remains inappropriable. If Dasein never overcomes, much less outlasts, its confrontation with its own death, then authenticity can at most only be a modification of facticity: “The ownmost being of Dasein is what it is only insofar as it is unownedly own, that is, ‘preserved’ in itself. [Ownedness] is not anything that should or could exist for itself next to the unowned” (GA 64, p. 81). Instead of transcendence being an otherworldly condition or the formation of an isolated sovereign individual, ownedness indicates an altered way of relating to one’s unowned everydayness. It is not to “shake off” tradition and everydayness, which is constitutive of the finitude of Dasein and thus inescapable, but to appropriate it more primordially (GA 2, p. 291). Yet, as this appropriation is always related to the inappropriable, transcendence can only be a response to – and taking up of responsibility for – facticity. That is, freedom is taking up one’s responsibility in its facticity (GA 64, p. 54). If responsibility is inevitably each time one’s own yet enacted in relations with others, and freedom is a response to facticity (the awakening of possibilities in the facticity that one is), then ethics is always already the ethics of facticity.

The “giving back” of care also clarifies the idea of an inappropriable relatedness by revealing a relation in which the other is not mediated by one’s own but is promoted precisely as being other than myself: “This solicitude which essentially pertains to authentic care; that is, the existence of the other, and not to a what which it takes care of, helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and free for it” (GA 2, p. 163). Heidegger clarified this “being-for-the-other” further in his 1928/1929 lecture course Introduction to Philosophy. There, he described how the essence of being-with-one-another consists of being-open-for-one-another
(Für-einander-offenbar-sein), an openness for the other that allows reciprocity and its lack to be possible (GA 27, p. 88). As Heidegger later maintained, understanding (verstehen) is not an indifferent mutuality but a reciprocal placing into question. Understanding is not an encounter between two fixed positions that somehow remain unchanged in their communication, or concludes in conversion, but is differentiation through addressing and questioning both oneself and the other out of care (GA 13, pp. 17, 20). Understanding is enacted through a confrontation and conflict in which the other places one’s own in question, and vice versa, transforming those who engage in it (GA 13, p. 20). Understanding thus requires both (1) the long lasting will of listening to the other and (2) the courage to one’s own determination (GA 13, p. 21).

5 The Being-with of Dasein

Levinas and others have criticized Heidegger for subjectivism and individualism and argued that Heidegger’s thought is inherently unable to think the social and ethical. In response, I have argued that Heidegger’s work hints at an “ethics of facticity” or finitude in proceeding from an indifferent commonality to the possibility of individuation through the difference in/of experience itself. This individuation requires the unfolding of what Heidegger describes as conscience, freedom, and responsibility. Although Heidegger rejected the terms “ethics” for various historical reasons, it is clear that his project has an ethical dimension and significance. In addition, rather than excluding sociality, his account of individuation shows how it is uniquely possible as free from domination (i.e., taking the other over) and as promoting the other’s Dasein as care, freedom, and responsibility.

One should not forget that Dasein is “always already” being-with and that being-with is a fundamental equiprimordial determination of the being of Dasein. The “with” occurs not because of identity or because Dasein is made alike but rather because of the “there” (GA 27, p. 137). Dasein encounters others and things in how they give themselves because it is the opening of the there (GA 27, p. 136). Because being-there is being-with, being-with cannot be derived from the idea of the subject.


26 The owned (eigentliche) is related back to one’s own (eigene). Ownedness had an explicitly social as well as temporal dimension in the early1920s, since the relation to “one’s own” means opening up the possibilities available to one to individuate oneself “in one’s own time and generation” (PIA, p. 248): Heidegger, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation),” H.U. Lessing (ed.), *Dilthey-Jahrbuch*, 6 (1989): 237–69.
(GA 27, p. 133), nor the self from the other (GA 27, p. 135), nor in the “I/you” relation that simply doubles the solipsistic subject (GA 27, pp. 141, 146). Sociality and community, and every form of “I/you” relation, are only possible because Dasein is each time in its own way already with others and is, as such, a being-with-others (GA 27, p. 141). Insofar as being-there is being-with-others, Dasein is always already spoken to and addressed by the other (GA 29/30, p. 301). The self, insofar as it listens to and hearkens to the other, is always already placed into question by the other and pulled out toward responsibility for the other in care: Care as care for the self inherently is bound to the care for the other. As owned, Dasein cannot step in, take over, and occupy its place but can only promote the other’s self-care. The answer, the binding responsibility that brings Dasein to choice and decision (WDF, p. 169), is care.27 Care discloses the difference of the average being-with of Dasein and the ownmost possibility of being-with, in which Dasein first stands in relations directed toward others.28

The question of community and individuation is not then a question of inferring a collective subject from an individual one or of deducing the individual from the collective. It is neither about an ahistorical and worldless self nor a social organism that allows no difference.29 Heidegger had already suggested this in his Winter semester 1921–1922 lecture course, when he made the case that the self-world is neither identical to the ego nor can it be isolated from being-with and the environing world (GA 61, p. 96).30 The question of being-with cannot be one of the phenomenological constitution or construction of being-with from out of one’s own self considered as an isolated ego or subject (GA 29/30, p. 302). Insofar as being-with is to be understood as a structure of everydayness, it too must be transformed in the modification of everydayness that occurs through individuation. Dasein is in each case my own such that I am never the Dasein of the other but only with the other. Consequently, Dasein never becomes the other but is rather individuated in such a way that in becoming itself, it becomes otherwise than itself and in becoming otherwise than itself singularly becomes itself. Individuation is not a closed isolated process such that the nearness to the “they” would be lost. Dasein cannot comport itself as being-with without listening to the “they” and without cultivating its ability

29Heidegger not only rejected the idea of a “worldless ‘I’” but also would later criticize the more dangerous shapes in which this worldless subject is absorbed into “something greater,” such as life or the Volk (GA 65, p. 321/225; also compare IM: 54/74).
30Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, GA 61 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994).
to hear beyond what is usually and for the most part said in order to achieve a responsive hearing that takes into consideration a being-with the other that is also a being-for the other (GA 2, pp. 163, 217). Responsiveness thus implies responsibility, and, yet, it cannot occur without the confrontation and conflict with the other for the other (GA 27, pp. 22–23, 327).

6 Being-with others and the Responsiveness of Hearing

Following the interpretation staked out in the previous sections of this paper, Heidegger did not turn to the question of the self or self-sameness to the exclusion of the other as well as the alterity of the world and one’s own self. The individuation of Dasein in its being-with unfolds through hearing. This does not occur as a process of identification or empathy, but rather it only occurs through differentiation and becoming other. All understanding is therefore in this sense differentiating confrontation (Auseinandersetzung). Dasein transforms itself in its being-with precisely through the responsibility for the other in encountering and individuating the other. Individuation signifies more than recognition of difference and alterity. Individuation and differentiation occur not as a progressive teleological development but through one’s own questionability and uncanniness. Heidegger’s thinking is thus a questioning-answering responsiveness in relation to the facticity of the thrownness of Dasein. The historicity of thrownness into one’s own generation and world signifies the impossibility of a pure responsiveness that would occur without interruption and conflict, without the historicity and destiny in which Dasein finds itself. This implies that Dasein cannot recognize another, and by implication translate, without differentiating itself and its other. Difference occurs not as indifferent lack of contact and isolation but rather, as a turning of language through the word, as and in the crossing of the between.

Dasein is frequently referred to by Heidegger as an originary unified phenomenon, but this unity belongs to difference itself. For example, in the late 1920s, Heidegger described it as the transcendence of Dasein in its nothingness and lack of bearing (GA 27, p. 354). Dasein is thus in each case already betrayed and endangered in its transcendence-in-the-world (GA 27, p. 358). It belongs to “the each time of the facticity of transcendence” (GA 27, p. 367). As such, humans do not first of all observe and inquire. Human Dasein understands others and “intuits the world” through encounter and confrontation (GA 27, pp. 367–368, 382–390). Ontological difference is not the monistic closure but opens up the radical diversity of ontic differences in being its formal indication, which is not only a phenomenology of phenomena but a hermeneutics of reading, interpreting, and translating texts.31

The hermeneutic circle in its openness and deferral is already explicated as a movement of translation in Dilthey, for whom transposition between self and other operates as translation and retranslation.32

More radically, ownedness is not a psychological category in Heidegger. The authenticity of existence, as a communicative enowning, is only possible as addressing and being addressed, hearing and responding; that is, as a responsive hearing of the other. Heidegger therefore claims in Being and Time that “Listening to . . . is the existential being-open of Dasein as being-with for the other. Hearing even constitutes the primary and resolute openness of Dasein for its ownmost possibility of being, as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears because it understands. As being-in-the-world that understands, with others, it ‘listens to’ (hörig) itself and Mitdasein, and in this listening (Hörigkeit) belongs (zugehörig)” to these (GA 2, p. 217). Listening to others is a belonging to them. Yet, there could be no belonging as listening without difference, since otherwise nothing would need to be said or communicated. The necessity of language is based in the non-identity of its participants. Since Dasein listens to Mitdasein (the being there of the other in all of its facticity and possibility) in addition to itself, it cannot simply be a listening to oneself. Despite the fragmentary character of Being and Time and the undeveloped character of Mitsein, being-with as constitutive of Dasein’s existence is repeatedly implied.

Human existence always already belongs to others; it is already with others in the world as a common significant with-world, out of which it understands and acts. Hearing and listening inform and attune a comportment that is directed toward the other, insofar as Dasein is open for the world in standing out in the world, that is, is ecstatic (GA 2, p. 218). This means that the question is not whether but how we go along with and do not go along with others, and how the alterity of the other can be recognized. Heidegger answers this question by pointing toward the possibility of genuine hearing. This hearing and hearkening indicate the passivity of a letting occur. Both are necessary conditions for a responsive relation with the other. This problematic will be transformed through what Heidegger calls the “turning in enowning” (die Kehre im Ereignis) [GA 65, p. 407/286]. The listening confrontation occurs out of the “between” (Zwischen) and the place (Ort) of de-cision (Ent-scheidung), as the answer and question concerning the violence and uncanniness of the human. Heidegger explored in his Introduction to Metaphysics this nexus of address and conflict, of logos (λόγος) and polemos (πόλεμος). More acutely, later in the decade, Heidegger thinks enowning (Ereignis) beyond agon (άγων) and

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32W. Dilthey, Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, second edition. Ed. B. Groethuysen (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1956), p. 120. Interpretation is never exclusively of an author, or his or her intentions, and therefore cannot be translation in the sense of a psychological or reproductive copying in that it already involves language, and history, as well as psychology for Dilthey.
polemos (πόλεμος), as the primordial difference (Austrag) and strife enacted between gods and humans, world and earth.\textsuperscript{33}

Heidegger addressed in “Wege zur Aussprache” the possibility of interpretive confrontation (verstehende Auseinandersetzung). Heidegger is concerned here with a recognition of the other, which does not forget the question of difference between self and other. This is understood as a conflict (Streit), not for the sake of strife – much less for the so-called “struggle for existence” – but for understanding the other (GA 13, pp. 15–21).\textsuperscript{34} This is because difference (Unterschied) is announced in hearing.\textsuperscript{35} For Heidegger, “we can truly hear only when we are hearkening” (GA 40, p. 138). We can only hearken when we are responsive to what is said. Responding, however, is something barely heard in the word “correspondence” (GA 40, p. 132). Correspondence, and accordingly translation as a co-responding, calls for being thought from out of the context of being claimed and responding to that claim. In this sense, Heidegger is articulating another fundamentally different kind of hearing that would be responsive to word and thing. But, to tweak a statement of Heidegger, we are not simply inexperienced in such hearing; our ears are overcome by what prevents responsive hearing and interpretive confrontation (GA 40, p. 138).

7 Listening and Difference

Wenn keiner mehr wirklich reden kann, dann kann gewiß keiner mehr zuhören.— T. W. Adorno\textsuperscript{36}

Verständigung im eigentlichem Sinne ist der überlegene Mut zur Anerkennung des je Eigenen des anderen aus einer übergreifenden Notwendigkeit.—Martin Heidegger (GA 13, p. 16).

Heidegger explicated the possibilities of the self’s being responsive to others, the world, and itself. This complicates the question of the relationship between

\textsuperscript{33}For instance, Metaphysik und Nihilismus, GA 67 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999), p. 77. Also see GA 65, p. 510; tr. 359. I develop this account of logos (λόγος) and polemos (πόλεμος) in the context of questions of suffering and violence in “Traumatic Life: Violence, Pain, and Responsiveness in Heidegger,” in Kristen Brown and Bettina Bergo, The Trauma Controversy: Philosophical and Interdisciplinary Dialogues, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009).

\textsuperscript{34}Despite Heidegger’s rejection of the pseudo-Darwinistic notion of the “struggle for existence” (Kampf ums Dasein), Levinas reduced his agonistic thinking to it as discussed by Robert Bernasconi, “Levinas and the Struggle for Existence” in E. S. Nelson, A. Kapust, K. Still, eds., Addressing Levinas (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005).


\textsuperscript{36}T. W. Adorno, GS 14, 15.
Heidegger’s philosophy and his involvement in National Socialism, because the quick explanations of this seem inadequate to his thought and his action. In this sense, the critiques of Habermas and Levinas have failed to meet the challenge and complexity of the question. Heidegger had already in his early and later work placed the philosophy of identity and totality radically into question. Ontology, which is always the destructuring of ontology for Heidegger, is to be understood from out of its difference, that is, the ontological difference between beings and being, and as the openness. But despite Heidegger’s use of this language, perhaps he did not go far enough since he did not develop the ethical import of this difference and openness. If we consider Levinas’ alternative to Heidegger’s thought, rather than his criticism, the question emerges of why Heidegger did not take the step from responsiveness to the primacy of ethical responsiveness to the other. Is it then this ethical unthought that remains the questionability of his political activity in the 1930s?

Heidegger’s thinking, beginning in the mid-1930s, if only as an unsaid to be said, already bears the mark and trace of a confrontation with National Socialism, and thus with his own philosophy. The critique of modernity and the history of the West that began to emerge in the mid-1930s is not without its ethical and political implications. In his later thought, the themes we have considered in his work of the 1920s will only become more pronounced: Heidegger himself will undertake the critiques of identity and presence that were later used to destructure his own thought. Yet, the question of difference is in Heidegger’s thinking also a question of the interdependence of the intercrossing and the between, a thinking from out of and to the middle that resists dialectic – which in resisting it cannot escape – and a mere opposition of identity and difference. Heidegger argued in “The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics” that the thinking of difference as difference and the “step back,” as opposed to recollection, characterizes his thought in contrast with Hegel’s. However, one can never completely escape the dialectic, and difference as difference always withdraws from being sayable and thinkable. As such, the thinking of difference as difference cannot escape the metaphysics of identity that it confronts. There is then no simple overcoming of metaphysics in which philosophy ends and thinking begins.

Heidegger’s ontology, as the simultaneous critique and demystification of traditional ontology, signifies then the fundamental openness of being. Being is the opening of the between, the intersecting fourfold, and the openness of being is a claiming and being claimed of human life, that is, be-ing is that which essentially addresses and attunes our being in its fundamental capacity to hear. The forgottenness (Vergessenheit) of this inapparent and withdrawing difference, that is, of difference as difference, belongs to difference itself (GA 11, p. 55). Difference can then

not be used as a first principle or explanatory ground, since difference itself undermines these *as* difference. This questioning of being from out of the openness of be-ing occurs through the intercrossing of the between as responsive setting-apart and interpretive conflict, which cannot be mediated or sublimated. This conflict is neither negative nor subjective; it is not for Heidegger an agon (άγων) of individuals nor the self-assertion of the will. According to the early Heidegger, the world is encountered in the communicative enowning of *logos* (λόγος), in addressing and being addressed; “The world is always encountered in a specific way of being addressed, in being claimed (λόγος)” (PIA, p. 241). Addressed and responding to this being claimed, *Auseinandersetzung* and *Widerstreit* occur through the world and the questioning that are constitutive for the understanding and attuned comportment that is Dasein.

8 Concluding Words: Ethics and Translation

For the early Heidegger, *logos* (λόγος) means legein (λέγειν), to speak, and speaking “is what most basically constitutes human Dasein”; speech, listening to Aristotle, “is a mode of the being of life” (GA 19, pp. 17–18). In his early lecture courses, Heidegger thinks existence as coming into one’s own in and through λόγος, in which λόγος is responsive enactment and letting be of phenomena instead of a universal category or identity that subsumes all particulars.39 This enowning of language, of intersection and transversal allows difference and thus the performative need for translation to appear. Difference shows the fundamental questionability of communicative existence, which is both itself and not itself, and thus calls for interpretation and translation.40 Since difference indicates the ownmost interruption and placing into question of one’s own, translation is a response to both the other’s and one’s own foreignness.41 Translation is not then a derivative or secondary use of language added on to a supposed first use of the native tongue. Unfolding within language itself, the task of translation arises from, and resides within “the ‘way making’ that comes to pass with each ‘saying.’”42

As Parvis Emad notes in “Thinking More Deeply into the Question of Translation,” “translation implies a crossing over and transposition.”43 Translation is a being under

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39 On the more extensive senses of λόγος in Heidegger, which is no mere “logocentrism” in prioritizing identity or universality, see K. Maly, *Heidegger’s Possibility*, pp. 42–45.
41 On the foreign and the native, and translating one’s mother tongue, see Emad, “Thinking More Deeply,” pp. 324, 331; and *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, pp. 23, 26.
way and a way making, as Emad indicates.\textsuperscript{44} Or perhaps, to reemploy the language of Heidegger’s earliest writings, it is individuation as explored in this paper. Existence is lived as language and \textit{logos} (\textit{λόγος}), the en-owning and en-acting of one’s own ex-istence through understanding, interpretation, and translation. Entangled amidst things with others in the world, factual existence enacts and articulates its life in dialogue (\textit{Zwiesprache}). Self-interpretation and self-reflection, individuation and translation, belong to the very facticity of human existence rather than being something alien to or imposed on it. Yet, this translation does not consist in agency, much less in a set of techniques, rules, and prescriptions for going about translating. There is no “ethics of translation” in the sense of assigning norms or standards of correctness to, and then praising or blaming an isolated “Self.” Translation does not involve an ethics – in the conventional sense, but instead is a way of safeguarding and preserving the disclosive power of the word into which the speaker is thrown and which individuates itself in one way or another. Responsiveness to and responsibility for the word, which individuates it anew in order to address and encounter its matter, is the challenge of the translator, as Emad indicates so well in addressing the translator’s “hermeneutic responsibility.”\textsuperscript{45}

Adopting Emad’s description of Heidegger’s transformative thinking in \textit{Contributions to Philosophy}, it can fittingly be said that originary translation “is at the same time a turning of and in language.”\textsuperscript{46} Translation occurs not only within language, leaving the prevailing structure of language intact, but instead extends to the uttermost limits of what can be said. Responsible translation is, as Emad insists, a “happening of ‘de-cision’” within language itself.\textsuperscript{47} Such responsible translation, prevailing “in every conversation,” is “a response that lets language unfold its core.”\textsuperscript{48} Herein consists the “originality” of translation. Accordingly, in Emad’s words,

This means that it is language – and not the interpreter – that initiates, carries through, and completes originary translation.\textsuperscript{49}

\section*{References}


\textsuperscript{44}Emad, “Thinking More Deeply,” p. 329.


\textsuperscript{47}Emad, “\textit{On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy},” p. 3.


\textsuperscript{49}Emad, “Thinking More Deeply,” p. 332.


Attunement and Translation

Frank Schalow

Was heißt “reich”, so daß wir in der Armut und durch sie erst reich werden?

— Martin Heidegger, “Die Armut.”

If in the midst of beings, humans would remember the relationship to be-ing that is hidden in the forgottenness of be-ing, then this relationship would permit humans to become aware of the incalculable richness peculiar to be-ing’s turning relation. Needless to say, this richness has nothing in common with the wealth, plenitude, and riches that belong to beings.

— Parvis Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 64.

The factor that might easily be overlooked when we consider the key elements of translation is one that may in the end prove to be the most rewarding, at least within the perspective on this topic, which is unique to Heidegger and the hermeneutic method he employs. For in coming to terms with Heidegger’s own views on translation, the decision as to how translate the key terms of his philosophy hinges to a great extent on heeding the subtlety of their nuances, the tonality of their inflections, and the richness of their idioms. Within the context of his hermeneutics, Heidegger allows for this possibility in earmarking the role that “attunement” (Stimmung) plays in any act of disclosedness. And insofar as the power of unconcealment is expressly gathered within λόγος, language and attunement are intimately conjoined. If what is unique to the task of translation parallels language in Heidegger’s sense,

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then our way of residing within it, and hearing (erhören; yielding to) its subtlest tonality, will also shape the guidelines for translating the key terms of his philosophy. For attunement calls forth the hermeneutic priority of listening insofar as it is only by first “listening” to language that we acquire the capacity for safeguarding the word, and only by safeguarding the word that thinking can respond to the claim of being.

If we were to consider translation in its most elemental possibility, it would, for Heidegger, originate at the crossing where language and thought intersect. As we will discover, it is for this simple reason that Heidegger’s approach to translation is radically unique, and, by the same token, requires an element that is missing in other views on translation, namely the element of “attunement.” It is this element and its role that border both thought and language and thereby allocates a space for translation. In making this observation, I suggest that the attempt to translate Heidegger’s writings already depends upon experiencing his thinking, and hence that the tonality of the attunement implied in the former also guides the latter as the mission to evoke the subtlest nuances and intonations of the word. Yet, only by implementing Parvis Emad’s pioneering insight, can we make the transition from assuming the link between translation and thought, to establishing its necessity. Specifically, because of its interest in recovering the roots of its most basic idioms, thinking is already engaged in an “intralingual” form of translation; and, conversely, due to this provisional synergy, the prior guidance of Heidegger’s thought is already implied in any attempt to translate his writings “interlingually” from German into the English language. Through his pioneering insight, Emad establishes that due to its hermeneutic synergy with thought, the task of translation occurs in closest proximity to the claim of being. And the nearness of this proximity defines the hermeneutic situatedness of translation in a twofold respect, first, as a task preoriented by the question of all questions, that is, “die Seinsfrage,” and, secondly, as preoriented toward the same receptivity to being as thinking is, that is, as a yielding response via an “attunement” to the creative power of the word. As “interlingual,” translation is an endeavor that is intrinsically responsive, an act of “reciprocation,” an “attuned” comportment. In this way, interlingual translation occurs in tandem with thought by heeding the same attunement, which acclimates the latter to the claim of being and its appearance in accord with the tonality of the word.

Through his pioneering insight, Parvis Emad takes seriously the hermeneutic elements of Heidegger’s approach to translation, which sets it apart from all other approaches including those that comprise specific theories, as in Paul Ricoeur’s case. For however we “conceive” the task of translation, attunement is a crucial

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dynamic that we cannot discount, if we are to consider the reciprocity between the task of translating the key words of Heidegger’s writings and his thought as a response to the “claim” (Anspruch) or “voice” (Stimme) of being. 1 Indeed, the difficulty with the so-called “theories” of translation is that they are not aware of and deny this reciprocity, and hence the centrality of attunement (Stimmung), preferring instead to view the “meaning” of words upon the model of a text. This model, however, falsely construes the text as a “semiotic” construct or a system of signs, which, in Ricouer’s theory, at least, becomes meaningful only within the narrow purview of a cultural horizon, but not, as in Heidegger’s case, through a “clearing,” which projects open the “meaning” of the most perennial word of all, that is, “being.”

This essay will be divided into three parts. First, I will outline the hermeneutic situation of translation, as arising from thinking’s dual response to the “claim” of being and the tonality of the word. Secondly, I will characterize translation as a form of “attuned comportment” (Verhalten), by outlining “reservedness” (Verhaltenheit), that is, the responsiveness to heed what is unsaid by the “intoning” of an attunement,4 the latter understood not as a subjective state of mind, but as “echoing” the claim of being. Thirdly, I will show how the “intonement” of any translation of Heidegger’s works should originate from the sheltering of silence, which, in contrast to the presumption of “textuality,” distinguishes the point of departure for any attempt to translate Heidegger’s writings. In this way, I will establish how Emad’s pioneering insight into the interdependence of intralingual and interlingual translation contrasts sharply with various theories of translation, including Paul Ricoeur’s.

1 The Responsiveness of Intralingual Translation

Let me begin by making a point whose importance might easily remain overlooked if it were not for Parvis Emad’s pioneering insight, specifically, the fundamental link between interlingual translation and Heidegger’s strategy for formulating the question of being. When we return to the beginning of Being and Time, to the inaugural remarks with which Heidegger opens this grounding work, we discover a simple, yet provocative query. Following his citation of a statement from Plato’s Sophist that echoes the perennial perplexity about the question of being, Heidegger asks: “Do we today have an answer to the question of what we actually mean by the word ‘being’?”5 While certainly not a linguistic philosopher, Heidegger nevertheless casts the question of being in terms of an enigma about a single word, and how

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2 For Emad’s use of the word “intoning,” see Parvis Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), p. 64.
we can be struck again by the importance of exploring its “meaning.” From the outset, Heidegger emphasizes that this perennial question hinges on our understanding of the word “being.” Thus, he suggests that the strategy for developing this question, or hermeneutics, already harbors a nascent concern for language, albeit the parallel inquiry into its hermeneutic roots quietly withdraws into the background of his thinking. But if, ultimately, philosophy hinges on the “meaning” of a single word, then it is because the enigma of “being” emerges at the crossroads where the meaning of the most basic philosophical terms hangs in the balance and the need to reexamine their ancestral roots becomes necessary. Yet, the provisional formulation of the question of being in this way simply entails, as Emad clearly shows, that the possibility of “intralingual” translation of this word, of its “meaning,” pregoverns any attempt to outline the structure of the human capacity to understand being (Seinsverständnis).

If we characterize such a philosophical enterprise as “fundamental ontology,” to employ Heidegger’s term, then the intralingual translation not only lies at the forefront of the attempt to re-ask the question of being but also for outlining the hermeneutic strategy of this task, which from the outset forms the various stages of its radicalization. The fact that intralingual translation redirects us to the origin of the most basic philosophical terms, however, tells us something crucial about a distinctive preorientation to language that directs the inquiry into being and allows this inquiry to hinge on formulating a lexicon for expressing its “meaning.” For the central corundum hidden in the perplexity about being is this: the “meaning” of the word cannot be reduced to any specific ideational content, but, on the contrary, there is a distinctive “tonality” endemic to its expression that simultaneously intimates both the roots of its ancestry in the past and the subsequent arrival of its meaning from the future. Because there is, at bottom, a temporal trajectory to our understanding of being, no linear path can be carved in order to discern that word’s elusive meaning. Instead, the ellipsis of temporality, demands that our understanding of “being” proceed through the unique detour of an “attunement,” thereby carving a circuitous path that accents the “pitch,” “inflection” and “tonality” of any utterance as the key to “meaning.” In suggesting that such an “utterance” is integral to the meaning of being, Heidegger not only establishes a crucial nexus between understanding and attunement, which will shape the subsequent development of his hermeneutics. He also shows how tonality and attunement point to language, not as harbinger of determinate content, but as a self-disclosive act whose “meaningfulness” may reside as much in the “holding in reserve” of what remains “unsaid,” as well as in what is explicitly stated. As Emad emphasizes, when understood most fundamentally in this way, “language is attuned by the grounding-attunement of reservedness, which reserves and preserves be-ing’s turning relation.”

The allusion to the “unsaid,” however, does not necessarily entail anything mystical and occult, although a “mystery” or Geheimnis in Heidegger’s sense is involved. Rather, the unsaid frequently stems from what is most obvious, which, by virtue of

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6 Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 56.
that fact, also withdraws into concealment, for example, what is withdrawn or hidden within Dasein’s pre-understanding of being. A foremost example of this pre-understanding pertains to how our own language harbors clues for addressing our capacity to understand being, and ultimately, for expressing its meaning in philosophical terms. Put simply, through its declension in tenses, the grammar of the verb “to be” shows an underlying affinity with time, such that temporality provides the clue to the possibility of understanding being. Conversely, what is intimated “pre-philosophically” as a link between being and time finds an historical precedent in the key expressions by which the philosophical tradition, perhaps uncritically and naively, has sought to conceptualize the meaning of the simple word “is,” for example, as “presence,” as “permanence,” and even as “coming to be” and “passing away.” This “cross-over” between the grammar of the verb “to be” and the development of the most basic philosophical idioms, however, is not accidental. Rather, due to its obviousness, the interdependence of the relation between “being” and “time,” remains withdrawn and thereby “unsaid” in the expression of the most basic philosophical idioms and concepts. As the result, the attempt to make the reciprocity between “being” and “time” question-worthy again – turning the momentum away from the forgottenness of being to the possibility of its recollection – presupposes an “intralingual” translation. Specifically, the intralingual translation proceeds by prioritizing the grammar of the verb “to be,” and the connotations that ensue from the “declension” of its tenses, of future, past, and present, in order to (1) make explicit the priority of ecstatic temporality and (2) show that in its primordial form, time provides the preliminary “in view of which” (woraufhin) for the possibility of an understanding of being. By translating the word “being” intralingually through its verbal form (i.e., “to be”), we make explicit the hermeneutic condition for its pre-understanding: namely, that only through its reciprocity with time can we understand being, and conversely, that temporal idioms yield the vocabulary to express the meaning of being.

Let us consider two works in which Heidegger undertakes the intralingual translation of the word “being.” First, in the 1925 lecture-course text Plato’s Sophist, he claims that time determines the “grammar” of a distinctive linguistic practice, the declension of the verb “to be” as a “time-word” (Zeitwort). Secondly, in his 1929/1930 lecture-course text, Heidegger succinctly summarizes the correlation between the enactment of our speech and our understanding of being: “The two essential elements characterizing the verb are that it also refers to time, and in its meaning is always related to something that the discourse is about, namely to beings. This indicates that all positing of being is necessarily related to time. In keeping with this, in German, we therefore call the verb a time-word (Zeitwort).”

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the verbal form, the intralingual translation of the word “being” shifts the fulcrum of concern to the “and” designating the grammar of its connection with time. The focus of philosophy is no longer on being or time considered separately, but, through the guidance of intralingual translation, the grammar of the “conjunction” assumes prominence according to the heading “time and being.”

In this way, intralingual translation radically transposes the fulcrum of philosophical inquiry, making the preliminary explication of temporality the new key for understanding being as well as for articulating its “meaning.” The attempt at intralingual translation, however, does not occur in a vacuum, but rather arises from a pre-orientation to the philosophical tradition and the historical situation within which Heidegger first re-asks the question of being. By the same token, through his own intralingual translation, Heidegger does not seek a uniform meaning for the word “being,” or construe it as a univocal concept. Instead, he enacts a decision that contrasts the possibility of recollecting being with the historical precedent of its forgottenness, thereby undertaking a “leap” into the historical crucible of conflict in which the birth of philosophy resides. The intralingual translation of “being” is indeed about a “word,” but only because its distinctive “meaning” simultaneously calls forth what is at issue in the unfolding of the Western tradition and its unique “destiny.”

Intralingual translation, then, transmits an important hermeneutical message: namely that the question of being is inherently historical, because its meaning remains concealed and thereby “unsaid,” within the mystery surrounding its relation to time. Due to the predominance of what remains unsaid, being is not a concept that can be univocally defined, but rather requires a circuitous path for unfolding its “meaning,” which parallels the elliptical movement of human temporality and attempt to develop a philosophical methodology in accord with its dynamic. By enacting this movement, hermeneutics arises as this uniquely circuitous path for unfolding the reciprocal interplay between being and time. The hermeneutical “circle” of understanding unfolds within the wider orbit of the reciprocity between being and time, implicating each through the primordial locutions “there is being” only insofar as “there is time.” As the key to projecting-open what can be understood through this circularity, intralingual translation provides the point of departure for “leaping” into the circle, and thereby to enter the historical clearing of being’s enowning throw (der ereignende Zuwurf). As Heidegger states in Contributions to Philosophy: “The leap gives rise

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10 For Heidegger’s reference to the “leap” into the hermeneutic circle, see GA 2, p. 418.
11 For clarification of this phrase, see Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Wege ins Ereignis: Zu Heideggers “Beiträge zur Philosophie” (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), pp. 18, 24, 30, 33, 36, 40, 56, 59, 62, 70, 77, and 92. Also see Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 75, 103, 115, 120, 123, 125–30, and 159.
to preparedness for belongingness to enowning.”

Seen in light of intralingual translation and of being’s enowning throw, as well as preparedness through the leap, being can no longer be viewed as merely one philosophical concept among others to be defined. Instead, the singularity of the locution “there is being” invites us to heed its claim by preparing a place (Ort) through intralingual translation for its unconcealment in language. Intralingual translation, then, makes explicit what otherwise remains implicit in Heidegger’s employment of hermeneutics: namely, the transformation to which language will be subjected when it says the “unsaid,” and thus inaugurates the development of a distinctive λόγος corresponding to the temporal dynamics of being’s disclosure.

By emphasizing the role of intralingual translation, Emad reveals the unity of Heidegger’s thought. That is, Emad shows how a pre-orientation to language as the locus of intralingual translation is already interwoven into the hermeneutic guidelines of Heidegger’s philosophy, and, conversely, how safeguarding the word becomes the foremost mission of hermeneutics. If one wants to commit to the dogma that the concern for language only emerges in Heidegger’s so-called “later philosophy,” then one might want to reconsider such a hasty claim by engaging in what Emad describes as a dialogue within the thinking of and by being, rather than resorting to mindless conjectures of monological reductionism:

The ‘dialogue’ within the thinking of (and by being) is shaped by the thrust of hermeneutic phenomenology, that is, by the self-transforming onefold of ‘what shows itself in itself, the manifest,’ and ‘interpretation.’

The “dialogue within the thinking of and by being” is a significant indication that Heidegger’s hermeneutics is always guided by a preliminary orientation to the word and the possibility of Dasein’s dwelling within the λόγος. When, for example, in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger suggests that phenomenology is a “temporal science,” and that all propositions of ontology are ultimately “temporal propositions,” he gives voice to this basic hermeneutic provision of intralingual translation. Far from forsaking a hermeneutics of facticity in favor of an “aberrant” form of Kantianism, as critics have claimed, Heidegger instead makes explicit the interface between temporality and language that hermeneutics presupposes in its attempt to “transcribe” the “meaning” of being in conceptual terms. In this regard, intralingual translation projects open the “in-between” (Zwischen) of this interface, in order that we can address the transformation of language, which both pre-directs hermeneutics and allows for its subsequent radicalization.

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12 Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 234; tr. 166.

13 Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 3.


In this regard, hermeneutics ceases to be simply a method we employ, and contributes to this transformed language as a “signpost” to (heeding) what remains “unsaid” throughout the philosophical tradition. Conversely, the unsaid originates from the abground (Abgrund) of language, from which the grounding-attunement (Grundstimmung) of reservedness and refusal exacts the development of new idioms of expression. Through the guidance of intralingual translation, the inquiry into being thus becomes primarily a concern about how to express a single word, and hence turns on the possibility of how we, as inquirers, can reside within language, that is, undergo a transformation that allows for such “dwelling” to occur. But such dwelling implies taking up a new relation to language by which, as speakers, we become acclimated and responsive to it by virtue of a grounding-attunement. Let us then explore the role of this attunement in preparing for the transition from “intralingual” to “interlingual” translation.

2 Situating the Task of Translation

As Parvis Emad demonstrates, the very occurrence of intralingual translation is a testimony to the relationship between language and hermeneutics, and a directive to the place reserved for the unsaid as the key to re-asking the question of being and its “meaning.” This insight becomes crucial not only for outlining the radicalization of hermeneutics, as we have seen, but for showing, conversely, how it also provides the guidelines for translating Heidegger’s writings from German into English, that is, the possibility of “interlingual translation.” Just as intralingual translation requires an attunement that orients thinking towards the word and seeks guidance from its disclosive power, so interlingual translation entails a grounding-attunement of its own. That grounding-attunement points to the fragility of the word as a limiting condition, which in advance imposes a unique challenge upon the task of translating Heidegger’s writings. But, simultaneously, the acknowledgment of this condition, as a testimony to our “thrownness” into language, also suggests that there are hermeneutic guidelines that direct the task of translating the “grounding words” of Heidegger’s philosophy. Given these preliminary observations, we must first ask: what does Heidegger mean by an “attunement?”

In asking this question, we must recognize that what Heidegger calls “dispositions” in Being and Time have a specifically hermeneutic-phenomenological import. Prior to any explicit understanding thereof, dispositions provide us with a hermeneutic-phenomenological footing for the question of being and thereby for allowing the example of our own facticity to imply the constitutive elements, which govern any attempt to understand being. By way of formal indication, dispositions like anxiety (Angst) and boredom (Langeweile) grant us experiential access to the phenomenon, to the singularity of its self-showing that otherwise remains withdrawn.

\[\text{For a discussion of boredom as a grounding-attunement, see Parvis Emad, “Boredom as Limit and Disposition,” Heidegger Studies, 1 (1985): 63–78.}\]
Attunement and Translation

from language, in order to prepare for a transformation in the direction of the inquiry itself. According to the formal mandate of phenomenology, the transformation consists simply of this: rather than superimposing arbitrary constructions and conventions upon the understanding of being, we allow the phenomenon itself to determine the nuances of our manner of expression, such that the ἡμῖν or way of speaking always coincides with the uniqueness of what shows itself by itself, or the phenomenon as such. Thus, phenomenological truth is the unique jointure or convergence between our experience and way of articulating the phenomenon as an intrinsically self-disclosive occurrence. By virtue of disposition or Befindlichkeit, then, the inquirer always questions from out of the concrete situation into which he/she is already thrown, in such a way that the development of inquiry assumes the very design of the inquirer’s finitude. As a result, there is a unique coincidence between the concrete, “factual” situation of the inquirer and the unfolding of the compass of the inquiry itself or what Heidegger calls the “hermeneutic situation.”

In simplest terms, the hermeneutic situation comprises the set of presuppositions that pre-direct the inquiry, and hence implicates the pre-understanding of being that Dasein already displays in its factual existence. Whenever there is an impetus to understand being, and thereby interpret its meaning, a hermeneutic situation already occurs. The same dependence upon a hermeneutic situation would also apply to translation when viewed “interlingually” – as rendering the language of a given text into that of another – provided, of course, that such an attempt at translating also involves understanding and interpretation. While there might be different ways of establishing these connections, Emad’s path is the most direct and most basic. Specifically, insofar as interlingual translation presupposes its intralingual counterpart, which enacts Heidegger’s thinking by eliciting the “meaning” of its key words, the interpretation of what his writings “mean” is already implied in the attempt to translate them from German into English. Because of its “coalescing” with interpretation and intralingual translation, the task of interlingual translation is already grounded on the presuppositions of a hermeneutic situation. Yet, in order for this hermeneutic situation to become explicit, it must spring from a deeper origin that joins interlingual translation, intralingual translation, and interpretation through their coalescence within language itself.

The task of interlingual translation as transmitting meanings from German into English should be conceived on a par with hermeneutics, that is, as fulfilling the role of an “intermediary.” Serving in this way as a “medium,” interlingual translation follows the same hermeneutic conditions that govern Heidegger’s attempt to re-ask the question of being. Foremost among these conditions, of course, is the relation to language, on which the task of translation, as intralingual as well as interlingual, depends. In this regard, hermeneutics, whose mission lies in making explicit and articulating a meaning that might otherwise remain indeterminate, is rooted in this disclosive power. Correlatively, interlingual translation acknowledges its allegiance to hermeneutics by first and foremost submitting to the disclosive power of language. However, how does this submission take place, if not arbitrarily, but in a manner that adheres to the hermeneutic precondition whereby language provides a place for unconcealment, and allows the “meaning,” and thereby the “truth” of being to be
spoken? Specifically, to submit to language is to acknowledge its ownmost provision, namely that thinking receives the claim of being by first yielding to the disclosive power of the word. Only in this way do the grounding words arise, which can speak from the midpoint of the “essential sway of be-ing,” that is, from the “inbetweenness (Inzwischenschaft) of god and Dasein, world and earth....”17 The need for a similar grounding-attunement applies equally, however, in the case of interlingual translation; for in order to render the key words of Heidegger’s philosophy, the translator must heed their nuances and thereby fulfill his/her mission as an emissary of being-historical thinking.

In yielding in this way, the translation adheres to the basic locutions by which the word being comes to expression, that is, “there is being.” In order for interlingual translation to occur, then, the translator must be transposed into the position of a “listener.” Only in this way can language re-emerge as the place of self-gathering, as the creative wellspring for engendering new idioms to express in English the “key words” of Heidegger’s philosophy. Already predisposed toward language on the ground of his/her “thrownness” into it, the translator proceeds from hermeneutic preconditions that orient him/her and offer a “foothold” on the specific text of Heidegger’s to be translated. The outline of the hermeneutic situation of translation thereby becomes explicit, showing that this situation is not an artificial structure to be imposed externally, but the offering or “gifting” within language itself of a hermeneutic foothold. Given this foothold, the translator can then respond to the ownmost provision of language, and by yielding to its disclosive power, fulfill the primary mandate of translation, or its “hermeneutic responsibility,” that is, safeguarding the word. The hermeneutic situation, then, does not spring from a vacuum, but emerges from a “clearing whole” within which the translator assumes his/her place within language and thereby acquires a “foothold” on the text to be translated.

The development of this hermeneutic foothold, the emergence of this stance within the “clearing whole,” always occurs through a corresponding attunement. In “What Is Metaphysics?”, Heidegger points to the role that dispositions play in shaping the situatedness of the inquirer, and the evoking of questions that resonate from the fundamental condition of Da-sein as thrown into, and emerging from within, “beings in the whole,” giving rise to questions such as “why is there something and not rather nothing?” As Heidegger suggests from the beginning, the attunement is a disclosive response to the whole, the factual testimony of our belonging to it, and hence is in no way “an interior, subjective feeling encapsulated within” the individual’s state of mind. Heidegger’s use of the German words for “belonging” (gehören) and “hearing” (hören) points to their related meanings, further suggesting that the grounding-attunement originates from the clearing of the “there,” rather than from the interiority of consciousness. Indeed, the hermeneutic situation of

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transformation, and its reliance upon attunement, doubly underscores the fact that the latter originates from the “clearing whole” and elicits our prior orientation to language. By showing how Dasein belongs to this clearing whole, the “grounding-attunement” reveals the offering that language makes and thereby its invitation in seeking a distinctive response (from us). The soliciting of such a response, as the reciprocity of our belonging to being, occurs through the unique “tonality,” “resonance” of language, and “inflection” of the word. Conversely, the attunement is determined and “intoned” (Gestimmthein be-stimmt) through the “clearing whole,” rather than by the influence of human subjectivity.18 Because of its primordiality, as Emad emphasizes, the grounding-attunement can direct thinking “away from the subjectivity of preference,” and thereby beyond the domain of assertions and opinions.19

Once again, the harmony, rhythm, and cadence of this attunement, insofar as it reverberates from the depths of language, are nothing subjective. On the contrary, because of its “pre-discursive,” pre-cognitive character (in short pre-theoretical), the grounding-attunement preorients any attempt to understand being within the clearing whole and determines the expanse of its unconcealment. As such, the attunement precedes any subject–object dichotomy, and thereby marks the sheltering-silence in which the wellspring of language simultaneously withdraws and recedes in inviting us to reside within its disclosive power. Heidegger calls this distinctive sheltering-silence, to which attunement serves notice, the stillness of the word, the preceding silence from which language first speaks. As he states toward the end of Contributions to Philosophy: “Language is grounded in silence. Silence is the most sheltered measure-holding.”20 By acclimating to this silence, the grounding-attunement not only distinguishes the threshold where the word first speaks, but also distinguishes the ownmost provision that belongs to language: the priority of “listening” over speaking. But because this priority also governs the task of translation in its stewardship of the word, the translating of the key words of Heidegger’s philosophy begins by heeding the withdrawal of the word into the sheltering-silence thus revealing the rise of new idioms of expression.

Precisely because of its indefiniteness, the grounding-attunement unravels language as the clearing that yields new possibilities for expression. Insofar as

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19Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 77. For Emad’s account of the limitations of assertions, see pp. 57–58.

20GA 65, p. 510; tr. 359.
language harbors this power of creativity, the grounding-attunement directs the translator to the breakthrough of these new possibilities, to their emergence from the sheltering-silence. As Emad states:

As the German language bends and twist to adjust itself to Heidegger’s new thinking of and by being, which gives rise to Contributions to Philosophy, so does English in translating this work. English too digs into the treasury of its forgotten words to adjust itself to Heidegger’s language.21

But in order for this breakthrough to occur, there must be corresponding preparation, which acclimates the rendering of the grounding words to a tonality uniquely their own. This tonality, however, does not necessarily resonate with our sense of the familiar, in a similar way that the experience of anxiety clashes with the passive acceptance of the “status quo.” On the contrary, only when guided by a prior grounding-attunement, which reverberates from the depths of the deepest distress, can a translation restore the power of the grounding words of being-historical thinking.

Thus, the greatest distress must be experienced in the course of translating the key words of Heidegger’s philosophy, because the power of these words speaks when thinking heeds the claim of being and thereby is enowned by de-ciding to reciprocate for this gift. As Heidegger states:

But necessities light up only in distress. And the preparing of preparation for decision indeed rests in the distress of finally only accelerating the growing lack of history and the distress of hardening its conditions, whereas this preparation wants something else.

Whoever does not know of this distress has no inkling at all of the decisions that are ahead of us.22

Because the task of translation depends upon the ownmost provision of language, the creative venture of rendering Heidegger’s words thereby hinges on a decision to project open their meaning from the roots of their deepest novelty, indeed, “unfamiliarity.” By abiding within, and becoming at home in the uncanniness of this unfamiliarity, a translation receives its guidance from the transformation of language itself, which occurs through the turning in enowning. Indeed, only by becoming “acclimated” in this way, and undergoing a reciprocal transformation by virtue of this “turning,” can the task of translation fulfill its hermeneutic responsibility. Due to the tonality of the word, and its corresponding grounding-attunement, the venture of translating cannot rest content with reinvoking the most “familiar” terms and usages. On the contrary, the creative breakthrough, of reenacting the eruption of the word from the uncanniness of the sheltering-silence, moves away, in this “turning,” from the familiar to the unfamiliar, and, in some cases, even welcomes the birth of neologisms. For by reenacting this breakthrough, the neologisms are the intra-lingual counterpart of interlingual translation. Emad has this reenactment in mind.

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21 Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 87.
22 GA 65, p. 97; tr. 67.
when he states: “The happening of the turning, which is be-ing itself, is at the same
time a turning within language, that is, a turning from the ‘familiar’ language to the
‘unfamiliar’ language of being-historical thinking.”

If it is not acquiescence, but distress that guides interlingual translation, it is
because the initial act of intralingual translation, as it shapes a specific text, is
“returnership,” that is, the “origination” of a text presupposes a return to what
is most question-worthy. In terms of interlingual translation, this means that the
translator, in order to enact this returnership, must often forsake the precedent of
conventional usage and the preference for the familiar “ring” these words have in
English. This conventional usage may have its own superficial manner of hearing,
which seeks words that are most common place and have a familiar ring to the
English ear. As Emad emphasizes, the usage of familiar words comes from the
unquestioned priority we ascribe to the “mother tongue,” the priority of which ulti-
mately blocks the path to the “returnership.” In place of this returnership arises a
“monological reductionism,” which sacrifices the power and creativity of language
to the constraints of custom, including what merely pleases the ear (in English), to
the power and creativity of language itself. Yet under the dominance of monologi-
cal reductionism, what at first seems “pleasing to the ear,” for example, “appropria-
tion” versus “enowning,” may ultimately be “def” to the new array of meanings
that the key terms of Heidegger’s philosophy evoke, that is, as “being-historical”
words. For the familiarity of conventional usage must give way to another “logic”
in the decision to render the key terms of Heidegger’s thinking, which is exemplified
in Contributions to Philosophy as “Sigetik” or the return to the uncanniness of
reticence in silence: “Reticence in silence is the ‘logic’ of philosophy, insofar as
philosophy asks the grounding-question from within the other beginning.” The
inabiding within the uncanny depths of this silence, within the self-gathering of the
\(\lambda\gamma\alpha\zeta\) as “the hinting-resonating hiddenness (mystery) of enowning,” yields lan-
guage’s ownmost creativity, from which the basic words acquire their power. As a
result, the uncanniness of unfamiliarity may be a truer measure of the tonality of the
words, insofar as their break with conventional usage creates an atmosphere orcli-
mate in which the basic words, which enact being historical thinking, can speak
from the deeper roots of their ancestry. The unfamiliar use in English establishes a
new precedent, not arbitrarily, but as a result of the enactment of intralingual trans-
lation, and in accord with its grounding-attunement, which heeds the disrupting
distress of what is most question-worthy. At the subtlest, although most basic level
of the attunement and tonality of translation, we discover what Emad describes
as the “coalescing” of interpretation, intralingual and interlingual translation.

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23 Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 131.
24 Ibid., p. 161.
25 GA 65, p. 78; tr. 54–55.
26 GA 65, p. 78; tr. 55.
This coalescence occurs within the sheltering-silence, the “gathered ringing of stillness,” which leads the way to the “transformed language called ‘saying.’”27

To illustrate this point, allow me to cite an example from Emad’s book, which is not merely one among others, but actually implicates the clearing whole by recalling what is question-worthy in the translation of the key words evoking it: “das Seiende im Ganzen.” The decision to translate this phrase as “beings in a whole,” rather than as “beings as a whole” – the prevailing practice of various translators – points to an essential element in the tonality and attunement of interlingual translation.28 As various colloquialisms and even the normalcy of grammatical errors in English attest, what by the standard of conventional usage “sounds good” in the mother tongue cannot be utilized in interlingual translation, which is guided by the grounding-attunement. In the former instance of the interlingual translation, “beings as a whole,” the tonality follows the passive acceptance of the “clamor” of “public” interests, or the expediency of Gerede. In the case of the correct translation, “beings in a whole,” the tonality receives its “pitch” from, and resonates out of, the sheltering-silence. If this silence shelters and holds in reserve what remains unsaid, then, as Heidegger suggests, “[r]eservedness is the grounding-attunement of the relation to be-ing” (“Verhaltenheit ist die Grundstimmung des Bezuges zum Seyn”).29

The reservedness as the grounding-attunement shows what is distinctive of it in its tonality. For the dynamic of holding in reserve disrupts the monotonous reign of the familiar, in order that the ring of the unfamiliar can resound. In this way, an acclimation to the birth of new meanings becomes possible, rather than the passive acceptance of what is already given in its familiar usages. What, qualifies as meaningful is no longer dominated by a horizon of presence, but instead new meanings spring from the absence of what is unsaid, from the silent reverberations of the abground. In this regard, the tonality is not the exercise of auditory sense directed at what is audible in the present. Rather, the “intonement” is the reverberating-gathering out of the future, of what has been held in reserve in the ancestry of the words in the past, in order that their meanings may be heard anew in the present. The tonality

28 Emad, Ibid., p. 16. Emad states: “Why does the monological reductive approach choose this mistranslation [‘beings as a whole?’] rather than the correct rendering, ‘beings in a whole’? It does so because the mother tongue demands smooth readability of the translated terms and resists opening itself to the unfamiliar words and phrases of the language of the thinking of and by being. Thus, it makes for a smoother reading to take the crucial phrase das Seiende im Ganzen as meaning ‘beings as a whole’ instead of coming to terms with its terminological meaning, ‘beings in a whole.’ The monological reductive approach prefers to distort the terminological meaning of this phrase because it is committed to the supremacy of the mother tongue.”
of this grounding-attunement, far from something merely sensual, reverberates with a completely new auditory pitch that Heidegger characterizes as an “echo.” Emad summarizes the intimate connection between echo, reservedness, and attunement:

> With the word *Verhaltenheit*, Heidegger stresses not only the element of reservedness but also *Verhalten*, that is, comportment. The latter stands both for the comportment, or *Verhalten*, inherent in be-ing’s turning relation as well as for *Dasein’s* comportment to this relation. Reservedness is thus an attunement that holds back and keeps in reserve the echo of be-ing’s refusal and be-ing’s dis-enowning as well as *Dasein’s* disclosing comportment. This shows that dis-enowning, the echo that intones forgottenness and abandonment by be-ing, has its own attunement.30

Because of its correlation with an attunement, and hence through its receptivity to what is unsaid, interlingual translation has its own mode of relatedness to, and reciprocity with being, which properly qualifies this translation as a “comportment” in the sense that Emad describes in the preceding passage. Because of its character as “attuned comportment,” interlingual translation heeds the tonality of the word, not as an auditory event, but instead as a “projecting-opening” that is thrown into, abides within, and belongs to the disclosive power of language.

In suggesting that interlingual translation is an “attuned comportment,” which thereby becomes “acclimated” to the word, we give richer expression to Heidegger’s phrase of “dwelling” within language. By developing further the central points that Emad makes concerning attunement, we discover that translation displays the full activity of a craft, insofar as its manner of co-responding to the word exacts from the translation a distinctive comportment of dwelling within and safeguarding language. In this way, Emad reveals a dimension that is so fundamental to the task of translation, that perhaps no one else has explicitly recognized previously: namely, that it is guided by an attuned comportment that the translator enacts a distinctive form of care, that is, undertakes a mission whose fulfillment constitutes an act of “hermeneutic responsibility.”

When we construe “action” more fundamentally as an “attuned comportment,” we can thereby see how interlingual translation is an activity in which an individual engages; this activity is reminiscent, in an analogous way, of the characterization that Heidegger reserved for thinking when he undercut the division between theory and praxis in his “Letter on ‘Humanism.’”31 If translation can be construed as an “activity” in this original sense, then we can appreciate more fully how as an attuned comportment, it can provide a “gateway” to the task of thinking. Let me then conclude this essay by drawing out implications between Emad’s insight into translation as an attuned comportment and the task of thinking the “unsaid.”

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30 Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, p. 64.
3 The Return to Sheltering-Silence in Interlingual Translation

The characterization of translation as an attuned comportment underscores the necessity of its emergence within a hermeneutic situation. In simplest terms, any comportment is already situated. In the case of translation, this is doubly the case, because the language into which the translator is thrown is not a pristine indeterminacy, but rather is housed in a sheltering-silence, which roots the most basic philosophical words in their deepest ancestry. As the “word of be-ing,” language “safeguards in silence the clearing of the t/here (Da).” Because of the intimacy between the grounding-attunement of reservedness and language, no single “theory” of translation, whether conceived through semiotics, Ricoeurian hermeneutics, or deconstruction would be applicable to the interlingual translation of the key words of Heidegger’s philosophy. For all such theories brazenly overlook the role that intralingual translation plays in preparing for be-ing’s arrival in language, as well as the guidance that a prior attunement provides for translating Heidegger’s texts. By the same token, such theories presuppose but are not aware of the crucial breakthrough, which Parvis Emad forged through his pioneering insight into the interdependence between intralingual and interlingual translation. Consequently, such theories divorce the latter translation from the former. In the process, such theories seek to abstract specific principles of translation, as if they could be developed independently (1) of the “transformed language called ‘saying’” in which they reside and (2) of the matter of thinking, which the intralingual translation already enacts, and whose historical development in terms of the question of being pre- orients the task of interlingual translation. Because the task of translation is already infused with thinking, which, through its historical response to the claim of being, calls forth the decisions of how to translate its own key words, such theories necessarily underestimate the depth and uniqueness of the translator’s craft. Because these key words echo the voice of being, the task of translating depends upon yielding to language as “attuned to this reserved, turning relation” of being.

Perhaps, the most noteworthy example is Paul Ricoeur’s theory of the text, which construes meaning as a system of signs or “semiotics,” which is constructed on various levels and harbors multiple possibilities of “interpretation.” While in some ways, Ricoeur’s approach to translation seems closer to Heidegger’s than other theorists (e.g., Derrida), these two thinkers are nevertheless separated by an unbridgeable chasm. For in contrast to Ricoeur, who begins from the premise of an already constructed text, Heidegger upholds as his point of departure the attuned response to the sheltering-silence that houses language and orients the translation from its proximity to the claim of being. As a result, Heidegger construes meaning (Sinn),

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33 Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy,* p. 56.
not just as arising from a connection of signs, as in Ricoeur’s case, but as an emissary of be-ing and its possibility of disclosure through language. Because Heidegger (1) bases the determination of what is “meaningful” on the possibility of unconcealment (and not the other way around, as Ricoeur does), while (2) showing that translation uncovers the meaning of a text only through its attuned comportment toward, and proximity with, the claim of being, that is, as intralingual as well as interlingual translation, he (3) establishes that the task of translation engages in the strife of truth as $\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\iota\alpha$, as the sheltering of concealing-unconcealing. Indeed, it is in the crucible of this strife that the translation forges the novelty of its idioms, and thereby yields to the “originary essential sway of the truth of be-ing.” As Heidegger emphasizes, interlingual translation proceeds from “the transporting of our whole being unto the realm of a transformed truth,” within which we acquire the capacity to “care for the word.” As a result, we can appreciate (4) the radicality of the premise of Heidegger’s approach to translating which, by resting on the ab- ground of the unsaid, initiates the task of translation from the sheltering-silence, in contrast to the Ricoeur’s derivative premise, which is based on the theoretical model of a text. As a result, Heidegger can (5) open the way for grasping translation as a “hermeneutic responsibility,” because of its proximity to the claim of being and its mission of safeguarding the word. If translating involves the exercise of responsibility, then, as a form of “attuned comportment” it, like thinking, is also a way of acting, and ultimately, of “being-in-the-world.” We can thereby summarize the five preceding points by emphasizing another: (6) because Heidegger undercuts the dichotomy between theory and practice, and, insofar as the activity of translating is already interwoven with the decisions of thinking, no theoretical model can ever explain the innovativeness and creativity, which pervades the task of translation.

Even the “antitheoretical,” “postmodern” perspective of deconstruction, which advances the claim of the “untranslatability” of certain terms due to the indefiniteness of their “signification,” is still the mask for another “theory” – albeit in an ironical way. For the deconstructionist perspective still imposes a preconceived notion, its own “a priori” disclaimer, upon the task of translating and the corresponding power of the word. As a result, even this viewpoint overlooks that translation is an attuned

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36 GA 54, p. 18; tr. 12.

37 For a discussion of thinking as an activity, see Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, p. 65.

comportment, a responsive engagement with the disclosive power of language, which thereby transposes the translator into an expanse of possibility, and an historical clearing, which calls forth a decision as to how to render the key words of Heidegger’s philosophy. Put another way, the decisions themselves originate from a “call” – hence their relatedness to an attunement – that “echoes” the specific claim that being makes upon thought. Because of the echo of this call, translation rises to the level of a “craft,” which stands in the service of thinking. The synergies of these relationships do not become clear, however, by consolidating them into a “theory.” Instead, we can clarify them only through the “way-making” venture involved in translating the texts, which reverberates with the “echoes” of being-historical thinking and first gives them voice, as is the case in *Contributions to Philosophy* and *Mindfulness*. Put simply, it is only as “enowned” by, and already prepared for venturing the risk of de-ciding the meanings of the crucial philosophical idioms, that a “pioneering insight” emerges, which guides this endeavor in and through the translation of these two major texts of Heidegger’s.

No theory, no matter how ingenious, can replace the pioneering insight that Emad forged within the historical crucible of venturing the ground-breaking translations, *Contributions to Philosophy* and *Mindfulness*, because only the venture of this risk explicitly stands forth within the “claim of being.” Only by standing forth in this way, can Emad, through his pioneering insight, address the *dynamics* of translation, and, in the process, acknowledge the debt to which the translator is “owning,” namely his dependence upon the language of the thinking of and by being. In light of Emad’s pioneering insight, we can fully appreciate how intralingual translation, as “commissioned” by be-ing, clears the way for interlingual translation in two respects: first, by meeting its hermeneutic responsibility through safeguarding the word and, second, by furthering the mission of “Hermes” to mark the crossing where the key idioms, which are held in reserve in the past, acquire deeper meaning through their arrival from the future. By answering a call as to how to translate the key words of Heidegger’s thinking, interlingual translation holds open the creativity of the future, whose vistas can never be encapsulated within the scope of any specific theory.

Because the task of translation receives its guidance from the future, we cannot evaluate its fruits by whether they satisfy the sensibilities of the status quo. On the contrary, the opposite might be a more appropriate litmus test. For overshadowing the words themselves are the decisions about the future transformation of philosophy, and hence the emergence of new possibilities for expressing the most elemental word of all, namely “be-ing.” Just as Heidegger suggests that a dissociative exposition (*Auseinandersetzung*) with previous thinkers exacts a measure of “violence” (*Gewalt*), so the task of translation is always governed by the explosive power of those nuances that accentuate, indeed, through a distinctive tonality, “amplify” the meaning of the grounding words. As Heidegger originally suggested through his *Auseinandersetzung* with Kant, such violence is necessary in order to evoke the power of what is “unsaid,” and thereby to deepen the meaning of what has been said:

Certainly, in order to wring from what the words say, what it is they want to say, every interpretation (*Interpretation*) must necessarily use violence (*Gewalt*). Such violence, however cannot be roving arbitrariness. The power of an idea which shines forth (*vorausleuchten der Idee*)
must drive and guide the laying-out (Auslegung). Only in the power of this idea can an interpretation risk what is always audacious, namely, entrusting itself to the concealed inner passion of a work in order to be able, through this, to place itself within the unsaid and force it into speech.39

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Because the unsaid determines what is most question-worthy, any philosophical insight is always predicated upon “returnership,” that is, upon the possibility of restoring the power of the most basic words of philosophy. Philosophy is therefore a unique enterprise because its direction does not lie in a linear progress, but in the circular path of returnership, which honors its origins by recovering them from the future. In the “poverty (Armut) of thinking,”40 or the sheltering of its truth in silence, lies also its wealth, where its most powerful idioms speak from the depths of simplicity. By the same token, the hallmark of this legacy does not lie only in what Heidegger says on this topic, but in the echoing of the further attempt to think along with him, in the manner in which Emad does through his pioneering insight into the task of translation. If our discussion of “Attunement and Translation” has born any fruit, then we should be able to experience the intertwining of Emad’s words cited at the outset of the paper, namely “the incalculable richness peculiar to be-ing’s turning relation” with a remark Heidegger made several decades earlier in his “Appendix to the Kantbook,” to the effect that “What has been said is poor while, the unsaid is filled with riches (das ungesagte erfüllt mit Reichtum).”41

In this regard, Emad’s pioneering insight into the interdependence of intralingual and interlingual translation forsakes the false riches promised by various theories of translation, in favor of a more humbler reward of “giving thanks,” which becomes enriched by its own poverty by dwelling within the simplicity of the word. In renouncing the ordinary riches of beings, he allows the depth and uncanniness of Heidegger’s question from “Die Armut” to resonate, the remote but nevertheless unique possibility that poverty could yield riches. As Emad illustrates, the task of translation provides one of the most important measures of this poverty, insofar as the translator “experiences the gathered ringing of stillness (the ownmost of language)” only by “abdicat[ing] the throne he occupies when he conceives of himself as the master and the lord of language.”42 For it is by traveling the path of “returnership,” and thereby conceding its humblest origins, that thinking reaps the fruit of its most elemental words.43 In the stillness of this humility echoes the “voice (Stimme)

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40 For one of Heidegger’s key references to the “poverty of thinking,” see GA 9, p. 364. Also, see in *this volume*, “Poverty,” trans. Thomas Kalary and Frank Schalow.

41 GA 3, 249; tr. 175 [translation slightly modified]. Italics mine in both Emad’s and Heidegger’s statements.


43 For Heidegger’s discussion of the importance of restoring the power of these elemental words, see GA 2, p. 291.
of being,”⁴⁴ which calls thinking and translation alike into a common mission of enduring the profoundest poverty, in order that philosophy may someday become the beneficiary of an “incalculable richness.”

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⁴⁴ GA 9, p. 310.
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