Abstract
Robert Heine-Geldern’s “Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia” is the most influential study of religion, the state and political authority in the region ever written. In just fifteen pages he established a paradigm that has guided the work of generations of scholars for more than 60 years. He was concerned primarily with the ways in which classical Hindu and Buddhist states were constituted as cosmic models, or what Eliade would refer to later as the “replication of archetypes.” It is as relevant for the analysis of state-religion relationships in traditional Southeast Asian Muslim states as it is for that of Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms.
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Notes
- 1.
Separatist movements have often described Indonesia as a colonial power not unlike the Dutch. Members of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, the Aceh Independence Movement or GAM as it is commonly, known I interviewed by e-mail in 1997 and in person in 2009 frequently referred to the Indonesian government as the “Javanese imperialists.” While GAM is widely perceived as an Islamist movement it is, in fact, more nationalist than religious. GAM leaders and supporters often mentioned the fact that Aceh was never part of the Netherlands Indies or “The Javanese State” (Indonesia) and refer to an eighteenth century treaty with the British East India Company as “proof” of this position. GAM understands itself not as a separatist but as a nationalist movement. The people of Aceh have suffered horribly for imagining themselves as a nation apart from the Netherlands Indies and Indonesia. Indonesia’s often brutal response has made a lie of the national motto “Unity in Diversity.” For a sustained analysis of Acehnese nationalism see E. Aspinal, Islam and Nation. Separatist Rebellion in Aceh Indonesia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- 2.
N. Madjid, Indonesia Kita. Jakarta: Gramedia, 2004, p. 114.
- 3.
B. Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World. London: Verso, 1998, p. 130
- 4.
E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalisms. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006, pp. 55–57.
- 5.
B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London : Verso, 1983
- 6.
S. Tambiah, Leveling Crowds. Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. In other cases, including China, Vietnam and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, variant understandings of Marxism-Lennism displaced traditional cultural and religious concepts in the imaginations of post-colonialities.
- 7.
P. Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought in the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? London: Zed, 1983, p. 6.
- 8.
J. Pemberton, On the Subject of Java. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
- 9.
Hidayah, op. cit., passim.
- 10.
I make this observation on the basis of having lived and conducted fieldwork in Burma for 18 months in the early 1980s and a for a shorter period in 2007 and among Burmese refugees in Singapore in 2007 and 2008. See M. Woodward, “On Monks and Mayhem: Dark Days in Buddhist Burma,” Arizona State University, Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict, http://www.asu.edu/csrc/documents/Burma_Paper_Woodward.pdf 2007 and “Burma’s Generals and Cyclone Nargis: Incompetence, Callous Indifference or Both?,” COMPOS Journal: Analysis, Commentary and News from the World of Strategic Communications, May 2008, pp. 1–18, (May 2008), http://comops.org/journal/2008/05/27/burma%e2%80%99s-generals-and-cyclone-nargis-incompetence-callous-indifference-or-both/
- 11.
I make this observation on the basis of having served on the US Government Political Instability (formerly State Failure) Taskforce for more than a decade. See, R. Bates, D. Epstein, J. Goldstone, T. Gurr, M. Woodward, B. Harf, M. Levy, M. Lustik, M. Marshall, T. Parris, K. Knight and J. Ulfelder, Political Instability Taskforce PhaseIV Report. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 2006 and J. Goldstone, R. Bates, D. Epstein, T. Robert Gurr, M. Woodward M. Lustik, M. Marshall and J. Ulfelder, “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 54, no 1, 2010, pp. 190–208.
- 12.
See G. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952, p. 97. Anderson, op. cit., Java in a Time of Revolution, shows that it was this generation of young, western educated colonial subjects who, in terms that he would use later, “imagined” Indonesia and played the central roles in the cultural, political and military struggles that made that dream a social reality.
- 13.
R. Elson, The Idea of Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- 14.
During the period of “Guided Democracy” Soekarno attempted to build an Indonesia based on his ideological vision which combined elements of Nationalism, Socialism and Religion. This experiment in social and ideological engineering failed miserably in almost every way imaginable. At least two hundred thousand people died in the military reign of terror that brought the New Order to power in 1966 and millions more endured a terror of silence that lasted for 32 years. The New Order imagined Indonesia as paternalist authoritarianism beneath the façade of “Pancasila Democracy.” See, D. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957–1959. Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Program, 1965 and D. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno’s Indonesian Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Program, 1966. On the ideological and political foundations of the “New Order: see E. Darmaputera, Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society. A Cultural and Ethical Analysis. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1998 and D. Rammage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy Islam and the Idea of Tolerance. London: Routledge, 1995. On the re-imagination of Indonesia in the post-Suharto Reformasi Era see, D. Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia. London: Routledge, 2002, B. Harymurti, “Challenges of Change in Indonesia,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 10, no. 4, 1999, pp. 69–83, P. Tan, “Indonesia 7 Years after Soeharto: Party System Institutionalization in a New Democracy” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 28, no. 1, 2006, pp. 88–114. D. King, Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia. New York: Praeger, 2003. M. Woodward, “Imagining Indonesia: Democracy and Identity Politics in the Reformation Order,” Suvannabhumi, vol. 10, no. 5, 1999, pp. 5–10.
- 15.
On contemporary Islamist imaginations of Indonesia see Z. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucuble of Terror. London: Lynne Rienner, 2002. M. van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” Southeast Asian Research, vol. 10, no. 2, 2002, and N. Hasan, Laskar Jihad. Islam, Militansi, dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca-Orde Baru. Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008 and M. Woodward, “PKS Against the Rest. The Justice and Prosperity Party and the 2007 Jakarta Election.” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Commentary no. 55, (April 2008) http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/commentaries.asp?selYear=2008 and “Indonesia’s Religious Political Parties: Democratic Consolidation and Security in Post-New Order Indonesia,” Asian Security, vol. 4, no. 1, 2008, pp. 41–60.
- 16.
See, H. Schulte Nordholt, “Renegotiating Boundaries: Access, Agency and Identity in Post-Soeharto Indonesia,” Bijdragen tot de taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, vol. 158, no. 4, 2003.
- 17.
The large number of books published about Soekarno in the last decade is one indication of the revival of popular interest in him since the democratic transition of 1998.
- 18.
Because this meeting was, to use an American expression, “off the record and not for attribution,” I can not identify the names of individuals present. The “anti-pornography” law also prohibits what is referred to as “porno-aksii” (Pornographic action). “Porno-aksi” is vaguely defined but would appear to include practices considered “normal” in many Indonesian cultures including young couples holding hands in public in Yogyakarta, to the “custom” of “wearing very little clothing” common among some non-Muslim and non-Christian communities in Eastern Indonesia. Even classical Javanese and Balinese dance could easily be deemed “pornographic.” What many find even more alarming is that the act allows nongovernmental organizations to enforce its provisions. This would legalize the brutality of FPI thugs.
- 19.
On FPI see, A. Rossadi, Hitam Puitih FPI. Mengunggggkap Rahasia-rahasia Mencengangkan Ormas Keagamaan Paling Kontroversial. Jakarta: NUN Publisher, 2008. FPI is an organized band of Islamist thugs who use fear and intimidation in attempts to enforce their own moral standards on the Indonesian public. It bears a striking and disturbing resemblance to the Nazi Brown Shirts of the 1930s. It poses a clear threat to Indonesia’s democracy and to religious, social and cultural pluralism more generally. On PKS see Woodward, op. cit., “PKS Against the Rest ….” and “Indonesia’s Religious Political Parties ….” Many Indonesians believed that the “anti-pornography” bill passed because politicians were afraid of being labeled “pro-porno” by PKS’s formidable propaganda mill. They are probably correct. Yogyakarta, Bali and some provinces in Eastern Indonesia immediately declared the legislation to be unconstitutional and made it clear that they would not enforce it.
- 20.
Javanese and especially those from Yogyakarta and Surakarta are well known for indirect speech and “talking in symbols.” Other Javanese and non-Javanese Indonesians sometimes find this frustrating. There is no correspondence between this cultural/linguistic style and religious orientation.
- 21.
PKS has attempted to appropriate many of the most important symbols of Indonesian nationalism, including Soekarno, Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX and the founders of the countries two largest Muslim organizations, both of which are unalterably opposed to the party’s program and methods in a series of Television advertisements that featured their portraits. In September of 2008, PKS went so far as to attempt to make a symbolic claim that it somehow owned the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan in Yogyakarta. See, Chapter 6 and M. Woodward, “Contesting Wahhabi Colonialism in Yogyakarta,” COMPOS Journal: Analysis, Commentary and News from the World of Strategic Communications, pp. 1–8 (November, 2008). They described support for the “anti-pornography” bill as a “feminist initiative.” Almost all Indonesian women’s organizations, most Muslim and almost all non-Muslim groups, strongly oppose it.
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Woodward, M. (2011). Conclusions: Nationalisms and Post-coloniality. In: Java, Indonesia and Islam. Muslims in Global Societies Series, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0056-7_8
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